ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF VIRTUE: AN EXPOSITION Fortunatus Nnadi (fortinadi@gmail.com) INTRODUCTION In the midst of the chatter and laughter of the contemporary society, one never fails to notice some clauses which recurrently come up as ‘conventional’ responses to issues of rightness and wrongness. Such saying as ‘Be moderate, avoid extremes, just do the right thing, etc’ abound. Similarly, when faced with dire moral challenges, a normal average thinker would more often than not admonish that “Virtue lies in the middle”, a good number of moral activists, including Aristotle, would agree with this. The theory of virtue in morality seems to have originated in ancient Greek Philosophy. Plato, who taught Aristotle, discusses the Four Cardinal Virtues Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and temperance in The Republic. Even in Aristotle's moral theory, the virtues also figure prominently. What then is Virtue? And how is one to understand the middle according to Aristotle? In this write up, we intend to attempt an intellectual exposition of Aristotle’s concept of Virtue. We will commence this task by first, focusing our interest on the approach to morality dubbed virtue ethics, and implicitly, we will show the difference between virtue ethics and some other ethical theories. To achieve our overall goal in this essay, ample space will be employed to highlight other notions of virtue. With that done, a conceptual cum expository tour shall be taken wherein is found, Aristotle’s concept of virtue. VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL THEORY Among other major ethical theories, one approach to morality, virtue ethics, emphasizes the character of the moral agent rather than rules or consequences of moral action. This sharply contrasts with two other ethical theories; consequentialism and deontology. While the interest of virtue ethics is on the character of the moral agent, the focus of consequentialism is on the outcome of an act, and deontologism stresses following moral norms in determining the moral quality of an act. In view of this, these three approaches to morality can be dubbed: act-centered morality (deontology), consequence-based morality (consequentialism), and agent centered morality (virtue ethics). Again, notwithstanding that virtue ethics theory could be recognized in several philosophical traditions, the theory could be said to have its origin from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and even till this present period the key concepts in virtue ethics remain the ones formulated by Plato and Aristotle. These concepts include arete (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom), and eudaimonia (flourishing). Meanwhile, virtue ethics was born with Plato and Aristotle, but their forms of virtue ethics are by no means the only ones. What virtue ethics refers to, rather, is a collection of normative ethical theories that place emphasis on being rather than doing. This is to say that in virtue ethics, morality stems from the character of the individual, rather than being a reflection of the actions alone or consequences of action. Today, there are extensive debates among various adherents of virtue ethics about what specific virtues are morally praiseworthy. However, one thing they all agree upon is that the primary determinant of morality is the agent’s character. One can easily notice the difference between Plato and Aristotle's discussion on virtue. For Plato, virtue is effectively an end to be sought, for which a friend might be a useful means. For Aristotle, the virtues function more as means to safeguard human relations, particularly authentic friendship, without which one's quest for happiness is frustrated. http://www.ethicstheory.com/index.php/concepts/(6 September 2010) DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF VIRTUE From an etymologically standpoint, the word virtue is originally robed in the Latin word ‘virtus’, signifying manliness or courage. Then in Greek, it comes out fully adorned with beauty as ‘Arete’, which is translated as any kind of excellence. In a general sense it can be defined as an enduring quality of character or intellect, through which an individual is enable to act in praiseworthy ways or to live a morally good life. Richard P. McBrien, Harpercollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: HarperCollins Publisher Inc., 1995), P. 1316. In other words, it means a perfection of a thing, which contrasts to a vice which is a defect or absence of perfection in a moral agent. Plato in his own notion holds that “knowledge is virtue.” Samuel Stumpf, History and problem of philosophy (New York: 1971), p. 42. He equates knowledge with virtue and maintains that to have the knowledge of a virtue is to have virtue. According to him, virtue and good actions follow from knowledge, while wrong doing is the result of ignorance. Despite the fact that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato, he differs from his master’s opinion, and directly, in his discussion of voluntariness, argues against Plato’s view that knowledge is virtue. Though, Aristotle admits the fact that there exist some knowledge in all virtue and some ignorance in all vice, but, he argues that knowledge alone will not suffice to make people good; because according to him, intellect alone cannot move us to do anything. Nevertheless, he affirms that the seat of virtue is the appetitive faculty. Aristotle, the basic works of Aristotle edited by Richard Mckeon, Nicomachean Ethics translated by W.D. Ross in (New York: Random House Inc., 1941), 1109b-15. All these definitions gear to show the fact that virtue is habits which we acquire that make us to live a good life as a rational being. More so, Aquinas posits that “Virtue is a certain kind of habit, namely, a good habit” Edward J Gratsch, Aquinas’ summa an Interpretation and Introduction (India:Bangalore, 1990), p 105.. The philosopher and Bishop of Hippo, St. Augustine, defines it as “animi habitus naturae modo et rationi consetaneus”. T.C O’Brien “virtue” the New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967edition, p.704. That is, virtue is a fixed disposition of soul making connatural the response to what is right. In Webster’s New 20th century Dictionary of the English language, virtue is defined as a general moral goodness, right action and thinking; uprightness, rectitude, morality. In the New Catholic Encyclopedia, O’Brien defines it as a “habitual, well established, readiness or disposition of man’s power, directing them to some specific goodness of act” Ibid., p.704.. Moreover, in the Encyclopedia of America, Sheedy defines virtue as “conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality.” Unknown writer, “virtue” the Encyclopedia Britannica inc. edition, Benton William, 1967 ed., p.188. Equally, in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, Oesterle defines virtues as “the primary means of directing man to the good of human happiness.” Oesterle J. A, “Human act” the New catholic Encyclopedia,1967 ed. P. 207. ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF VIRTUE Aristotle states that, “Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by M. Ostwald 2nd ed., (U.S.A: Bobb-merrill company, 1962), Bk II, Chap. 6, 1106a 20-23.. In the latter’s view, virtues of character are disposition to act in certain ways in response to similar situations. Thus, good conduct arises from habits that in turn can only be acquired by repeated action and correction. He argues that not every good action is virtuous because according to him virtuous action is an act performed as a spontaneous expression of permanent inner disposition, inclined towards such good actions; a good action performed as a result of a habit. www.philosophypages.com/hy/2s.htm - Virtue as the Golden mean In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined a virtue as a balance point between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. The point of greatest virtue lies not in the exact middle, but at a golden mean sometimes closer to one extreme than the other. Again, this mean is relative to us. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit is always an intermediate state between the opposed vices of excess and deficiency: too much and too little are always wrong; the right kind of action always lies in the mean and this is neither one, nor the same for all. Aristotle, the basic works of Aristotle edited by Richard Mckeon, Nicomachean Ethics translated by W.D. Ross in (New York: Random House Inc., 1941), 1106b-30. Thus, for example: with respect to acting in the face of danger, courage is a mean between the excess of rashness and the deficiency of cowardice. With respect to the enjoyment of pleasures, temperance is a mean between the excess of self-indulgence and the deficiency of insensibility and so on. However, Aristotle does not intend the idea of the mean to be applied mechanically in every instance and so the application of this theory of virtue requires a great deal of critical reflection in particular circumstances. This shows the reason for his view that the mean is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which man of practical wisdom would determine it. Ibid., Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a-5. Although the analysis may be complicated or appear awkward in some instances, the general plan of Aristotle's theory of virtue ethics is clear: avoid extremes of all sorts and seek moderation in all things. This calls for the moral agent to subject the often conflicting desires of the sensitive faculty to the dictate of right reason. A choice that is made in accordance with the dictate of the right reason forms the basis for virtue. KINDS OF VIRTUE Aristotle basically grouped virtue into two, namely; moral and intellectual virtues. Moral Virtues Moral virtue is defined by Aristotle as that which is acquired by repetition of the corresponding acts. These acts cannot be prescribed exactly, but must avoid excess and defect. This shows that none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature, “for nothing which exists by nature can be changed by habit.” Ibid., Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a-15. Neither by nature nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us, instead we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them while habit brings this ability to fulfillment. More so, moral virtue is prompted by regular practice which induces habit; for the things we have to learn before we can do them we learn by doing them. Man becomes a swimmer by practicing swimming, so also we become just by doing just acts. Further, the creation and the destruction of any virtue are affected by identical causes and identical means. It is in the course of our dealing with our fellow men that we become just or unjust. Also, it is our habitual reactions to danger that makes us brave or cowardly, likewise our desire and passion. So, it is a matter of real importance whether our early education confirms us in one set of habits or another. Aristotle argues further that moral virtue implies choice; because it is voluntary, it is chosen. Choice implies, also, a rational principle and thought. He strongly believes that moral virtues concern the habitual choice of action in accordance with a rational principle. Among moral virtues are courage, justice, temperance and prudence. Courage: courage is “a mean concerning matters that inspire confidence and fear, it chooses and endures what it does because it is noble to do so or base to refuse”. Ibid., Nicomachean Ethics, 1116a-10. We normally fear things that are evil like poverty, death and diseases. For Aristotle, he is courageous who endures right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in a similar way. Justice: Justice is “that disposition which makes people performer of just actions, which makes them act justly and wish what is just”. Ibid., Nicomachean Ethics, 1129a-5. There are two kinds of justice, namely complete and partial justice. While the sphere of the former is everything that concerns a morally good man, the later deals with such things like honour, material goods, security, and its motive is the pleasure that comes from profit. Temperance: Temperance is a mean between the extreme of self-indulgence and insensibility with respect to the desire for pleasures of the body (eating, drinking, and sex). The licentious person feels not only excessive pleasure with regard to physical sensations, but also excessive pain when deprived of these pleasures. The temperate person will feel appropriate amounts of pleasure, and only toward those things that are conducive to health and fitness. Prudence: prudence enters into the field of the moral virtues by pointing out the mean and suggesting ways of attaining it. Prudence could be considered as the queen of the moral virtues. Without it, fortitude becomes harshness. It helps us to discern the true ends of human conduct; to fashion means proper to arrive at these true ends. Aristotle defines it as “a truthful rational characteristic of acting in matters involving what is good for man.” Ibid., Nicomachean Ethics,1140b-20. Intellectual Virtue As we have mentioned in the introduction, virtue is the result of the choice of a mean between extremes according to the right principle. But then, what is this right principle? To answer this question, we go to the, we have to examine the intellectual virtues. As a matter of fact, Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtues, which we learn through habit and practice, and intellectual virtues, which we learn through instruction in the Nicomachean ethics. Ibid., Nicomachean ethics, 1103a-15. The soul is divided into a rational part and an irrational part. The rational part can be further divided into a contemplative part, which studies the invariable truths of science and mathematics, and a practical part, which deals with the practical matters of human life. With the practical intellect, right reasoning corresponds to proper deliberation that leads to making the right choice. There are five intellectual virtues by which the soul arrives at a truth, namely; Scientific knowledge: This arrives at eternal truths by deduction or induction. Art or technical skill: This involves production according to proper reasoning. Art, or technical skill, guides us in the correct manner of producing things. Prudence or practical wisdom: This helps us to pursue the good life generally. Prudence, or practical wisdom, guides us in the correct manner of action. Intuition: This helps us to grasp first principles from which we derive scientific truths. Wisdom: A combination of scientific knowledge and intuition, which helps us to arrive at the highest truths of all. The intellectual virtue, which is closely tied to the rational deliberation and choice necessary to the moral virtues, one of the central focuses of Aristotle’s discussion of the intellectual virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Further, a person who has phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) but does not have the right moral virtues will be very effective in devising means to personal ends, but those ends might not be noble. Without phronesis, the virtuous person would not necessarily know how to act, and without moral virtue, the clever person would not always pursue the appropriate ends. While the intellectual virtues help us to know what is just and admirable, the moral virtues help us to do just and admirable deeds. Of what value then, are the intellectual virtues since knowledge is useless without action? First, the intellectual virtues lead to happiness by helping us to make a right choice. Second, the intellectual virtues help us determine the best means to the ends at which the moral virtues teach us to aim. Without prudence and cleverness, a well-disposed person can never be truly virtuous, because these intellectual virtues help us grasp the right principles of action. CONCLUSION One feature of the classical version of virtue ethics is to regard doing the right thing with no contrary inclination as a mark of the virtuous person, as opposed to the merely self-controlled. Mere performance of the right action still leaves open the issue of the agent’s overall attitude. Virtue requires doing the right thing for the right reason without serious internal opposition, as a matter of character. This is, after all, just one implication of the thought that in an ethics of virtue it matters what kind of person you are. Of course, what it takes to develop your character in such a way that you are wholehearted about being generous, act fairly without regrets and so on, is a large matter. There is no single unified theory of our affective nature which all virtue theories share, and so there is a variety of views as to how we are to become virtuous, rather than merely doing the right thing for the right reason.  BIBLIOGRAPHY Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and temperance http://www.ethicstheory.com/index.php/concepts/(6 September 2010) Richard P. McBrien, Harpercollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: HarperCollins Publisher Inc., 1995), P. 1316. Samuel Stumpf, History and problem of philosophy (New York: 1971), p. 42. Aristotle, the basic works of Aristotle edited by Richard Mckeon, Nicomachean Ethics translated by W.D. Ross in (New York: Random House Inc., 1941), 1109b-15. Edward J Gratsch, Aquinas’ summa an Interpretation and Introduction (India:Bangalore, 1990), p 105. 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