Lights, Camera, Election: Celebrity, Performance and the 2010 UK General Election Leadership Debates

bs_bs_banner doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00504.x BJPIR: 2012 VOL 14, 375–391 Lights, Camera, Election: Celebrity, Performance and the 2010 UK General Election Leadership Debates Philip Drake and Michael Higgins The 2010 general election was the first in the UK in which a series of televised leaders’ debates were broadcast. This article takes forward research on mediated political performance and the relationship between celebrity and politics through an analysis of these debates. By discussing how the candidates perform ‘personality’, the article highlights the use of performance in constructing informality and a personalised audience address, contrasting these with where candidates engage in conventional political speech-making. The article also examines the strategic use of language, particularly where it is designed to align speakers with the public in opposition to the political establishment. The article argues that celebrity should not be viewed as an innate quality but instead as an interpretative set of frames, the terms of which are established through performance. The article concludes by reflecting upon the implications that can be drawn about the relationship between performance, framing and political celebrity. Keywords: celebrity; leadership; framing; television Great men, even during their lifetimes, are usually known to the public only through a fictitious personality (Walter Lippmann (1922, 5)). Introduction ‘Nothing gets you closer’, the billboards for Sky TV promised to those able to watch the televised 2010 UK general election leadership debates on their new highdefinition news channel. The first such debates to be broadcast in the UK promised a glimpse of the verve and thrust of political debate between the individuals vying to lead their party into government: a chance to scrutinise party leaders outside the comfort zones of their press conferences, and an opportunity for them to present and defend their arguments directly. The novelty of the televised debates occasioned substantial media discussion and speculation. Some commentators emphasised the possible vitalisation of the mediated public sphere, reflecting upon the opportunity for public access to political debate as it unfolds. Others echoed concerns addressed by John Street’s 2004 article, ‘Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation’, which examines the coming to prominence of celebrity in politics and the ensuing debates on the effect this might have on a representative democracy. In this article we intend to examine critically how these lines of thought might operate together rather than in opposition. We will argue that the leadership debates were clearly about the discussion of, and argument over, political © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association 376 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS ideas, but also that certain performative techniques were used and judgements exercised which are important in understanding how politicians fared in the debates and the sorts of impressions they gave of themselves. We are interested in what the debates can tell us about political performance on television, and the implications this might have for some of the arguments advanced on the relationship between celebrity and politics. In doing so we shall suggest that work in the field of political communication has not paid sufficient attention to the different kinds of performances required to perform political personality and celebrity, and that understanding how authenticity in particular is constructed through performance is crucial in assessing the success of political leaders. Framing Celebrity and Political Performance In recent years related sets of debates have focused on the emergence of personality-driven politics. One of these concerns the relationship between politics and celebrity culture. Street (2004) attempts to set the political components of this relationship apart from broader discussions of celebrity, distinguishing between the intervention of celebrity figures within the political realm and the association of already established politicians with the practices of celebrity and fame. To this end, Street identifies two variants of the ‘celebrity politician’: the elected politician who uses the frame of celebrity for political benefit (CP1), and the celebrity who speaks out on political issues (CP2). In making these distinctions, Street usefully challenges the idea that the relationship between celebrity and politics is merely a debasement of democratic participation, instead showing that celebrity has long been a part of political culture, to be ignored or dismissed at our peril, while also alerting us to celebrity-driven political performances that take place outside the traditionally formal political arena, such as through television appearances. John Corner (2000) has pursued a related theme by arguing that modern political communication has seen a series of shifts in how the ‘personalisation of politics’ feeds into formal political conduct. While emphasising the historical precedents for fashioning political personality, Corner suggests that contemporary politicians are obliged to maintain at least two ‘spheres of political action’ (Corner 2000, 391). The first of these involves the administrative activities of political professionalism: negotiating a path successfully through the party hierarchy, discharging everyday constituency and state duties, and working with colleagues in formulating and initiating policy. The second sphere involves the successful projection of a ‘public figure’, and carries a different set of responsibilities involving the maintenance of personal credibility and popularity, or what can be described as impression management. It is the latter that concerns us here and almost invariably this is done through what Corner describes as ‘mediated political performance’ (Corner 2000, 393). The prominence of leadership in media coverage has implications for the way that politics as a whole is mediated. In their US study, Stephen Farnsworth and S. Robert Lichter (2006, 33–34) suggest that even when there is an overall decrease in media coverage of politics, content tends to be directed away from the legislative bodies of the House of Representatives or the Senate and towards the figure of the president. © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 377 And, even while questioning the genuine electoral significance of the leader, John Bartle and Ivor Crewe (2002, 71) claim that, in the UK, ‘communications advisors take it as axiomatic’ that the appeal of the party figurehead is essential to political success. Indeed, James Stanyer (2007, 72) argues that the focus on the political leader has become such that the terms of their ‘media visibility’ extend from their public performance to the images of their families and their private lives (Smith 2008; Higgins and Smith (forthcoming)). These circumstances, in which political fortunes are influenced by media performance, encourage a strategic focus on the leader as an individual. Comparing the coverage of the US president with the legislator, for example, Farnsworth and Lichter (2006, 31) note that ‘television, with its emotionally laden images, can be particularly effective for rejuvenating public sympathy for the president over the mostly faceless crowd of lawmakers on Capitol Hill’. Unsurprisingly, then, Karen Sanders (2009, 75) emphasises how those in political office need to have an effective media strategy, clustered around the successful projection of the leader and their personality. In the UK’s 2010 general election, much of the media coverage in the final month of campaigning focused on the perceived success (or otherwise) of the political leaders in the television debates, which were subject to immediate polling and extensive media commentary. As discussion of celebrity and politics has expanded, so have the ways of defining it. David Marsh et al. (2010, 327) expand upon Street’s heuristic typology to formulate five categories: (i) celebrity advocate; (ii) celebrity activist/endorser; (iii) celebrity politician; (iv) politician celebrity; and (v) the politician who uses others’ celebrity. However, while this attempt, and others, to map out the celebrity–politics interface has some potential to drive forward the functional categorisation of celebrity–political roles, it does not in itself extend much beyond further taxonomic description. For example, even this expanded typology draws a binary division between those individuals originally located in the political field and those originally rooted in the celebrity field—reinstating an original political/ celebrity distinction. One of the aims of this article, developing but also revising arguments made earlier (Drake and Higgins 2006), is to question the distinction between these domains, and to argue that politicians may inhabit and draw upon the resources of several of these roles within even a single performance. In doing so, we adopt a broader definition of celebrity as a ‘mediated public persona’ (Drake and Miah 2010). Rather than accepting celebrity as a quality that individuals possess or inhabit, we prefer to reconceptualise celebrity as a process, or a ‘frame’ (with both performative and interpretative rules) through which particular media publics are configured and addressed. For political forms of celebrity this frame is often conventional—the discursive and performative rules of the formal political interview, for example—which establish the credentials of the subject. However it is sometimes purposefully incongruous: for instance the 2011 appearances of Prime Minister David Cameron and former Prime Minister Gordon Brown on the charitable BBC comedy telethon Comic Relief. In such frames the charitable status of the event allowed unconventional performances to take place free of the consequences that would arise in a more formal political space. © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 378 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS With these definitions in mind, we wish in our analysis that follows to consider how political celebrity and leadership can be studied using approaches derived from discourse and frame analysis, as well as performance studies. We should stress that we are using ‘frames’ to illustrate strategic modes of performance that delineate a particular relationship between utterer and audience. This is an approach to framing that sees it as an element of discourse, rather than a means of distinguishing and categorising types of content (Entman 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993). In doing so we return to approaches based around Erving Goffman’s (1969 and 1974) theorisation of framing (see also Gamson 1992). Framing is particularly concerned with the textual and contextual relationships set up between a text and audience that mark out certain acts as ‘performed’. Attention to frames offers an insight into how such factors as intention may be attributed or imputed to certain acts, for instance how politicians’ ‘sincerity’ is judged by others, or how it may be fabricated. Goffman’s early and widely cited book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1969) has been influential in political studies (Corner 2000; Corner and Pels 2003; Smith 2008), but it is his later work, Frame Analysis (1974) that provides us with a more developed account of how performance is framed, keyed, laminated and fabricated. In this work the ‘frame’ is an organising principle through which a situation, and how our involvement in it, as the audience member, is defined. Framing is therefore central to the relationship implied between performer and audience/public. It thus offers limited insight to talk about performance and meaning unless as part of an iterative process; as Goffman argues (1974, 125): ‘No audience, no performance’. Similarly we suggest that any discussion of celebrity also requires an understanding of audience and address. Political Leadership and ‘Likeability’ in the UK Election Campaigns James Stanyer and Dominic Wring (2004, 2) argue that the personalities of the politicians involved have become a key component of the modern UK election campaign. This has extended to the activities of politicians throughout the parliamentary calendar. Street’s (2001) account of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s appearance on a television chat show a year after taking office emphasises that his political party was not mentioned, with political issues only discussed as illustrations of Blair’s personal endeavours, such as with the Northern Ireland peace process. Instead most of the exchange concentrated on Blair’s leadership style and his family life, laced with a few anecdotes on the prime minister’s apparent mischievous disregard for political convention. Street (2001, 221) argues that this amounts to a carefully conceived political strategy: Blair ‘intended to enhance or promote his political image, to “brand” him. And it was about him, Tony Blair, rather than his party’. Andrew Tolson (2006, 81) shares these conclusions in his analysis of one of Blair’s election broadcasts: ‘Blair’s personal experience thus becomes his philosophy, which is now available for “you” [the audience] to share’. In keeping with the Blair strategy, the years prior to the 2010 debates saw concerted exercises in what Bob Franklin (2004) describes as ‘packaging’ the individual party leaders. In this respect all still had much of the work of branding to do. David © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 379 Cameron and Nick Clegg were comparatively new to their political roles, having become leaders of their parties in 2005 and 2007 respectively. So even though Gordon Brown had been in government office as chancellor of the Exchequer since 1997, prior to becoming prime minister in 2007, this was the first election that each of the three men entered as party leaders. Yet, what public profiles there already were of the three differed in some important respects. In spite of never having held major political office before becoming leader of the Conservative party, by the time of the debates David Cameron was a well-known political figure in the UK. In terms of how Cameron’s image had been marketed to that point, Robert Busby (2009, 185–186) argues that it was, at least in part, based on a perceived contrast between Cameron’s youth and vitality and the older and wearier Gordon Brown. Paul Kerr (2007, 47–48) also acknowledges Cameron’s success in performing ‘sincerity’ and in producing a ‘keeping it real’ kind of ordinariness and likeability. Even though Kieron O’Hara (2007, 46) suggests that Cameron’s ‘youth and agreeable personality will only get him so far’, this amounted to a media-friendly persona that was at least initially something of an asset, certainly in reaching beyond traditional Conservative voters. Indeed, a survey of Cameron’s press coverage reveals a predominance of articles dwelling on his personal qualities and his seeming ‘likeability’ (Langer 2010, 69). Overall—even in negative accounts—Cameron is routinely described as young, dynamic and charismatic. In marketing its own leader, the Labour party sought to turn comparisons between Cameron and Brown to Gordon Brown’s advantage, offering the latter as an experienced politician and man of stature (most clearly expressed in a retort of his to Cameron: ‘This is no time for a novice’), and emphasising his supposed ‘reputation for his financial management and prudence, rather than flamboyant or overt personal marketing’ (Busby 2009, 187). Yet, as Angela Smith (2008) points out, Brown soon joined Cameron in using Blair’s strategy for success by, albeit reluctantly at times, referring to his family, personal life and individual qualities. Furthermore, by the time of the debates, Brown’s preferred image as a politician of old-fashioned conviction and substance rather than spin and celebrity, had been undermined, first by an abortive general election call in 2007, and then by economic and local election setbacks over the course of 2008–09 (Busby 2009, 195). We turn now to Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg. From the relative obscurity that has recently attended leadership of a third party in the UK, Clegg attained what Katy Parry and Kay Richardson (2011) describe as ‘sudden visibility’ during the 2010 campaign and, in particular, in the immediate wake of the first of the three leader debates. Given the relative absence of an orchestrated marketing campaign by Clegg’s Liberal Democrat party, Parry and Richardson highlight how much his attractive demeanour and alleged sexual prowess drove a substantial proportion of Clegg’s media coverage, drawing far more on the resources of celebrity than on traditionally political discourse. To a greater extent than Brown or Cameron, the debates offered a stage for Clegg to establish his public image as a political performer, as well as an opportunity to present a new image of leadership to the viewing public. © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 380 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS The 2010 Television Leaders’ Debates: Articulation, Address and Performance It is against this background, combining the prominence of personality and celebrity in politics with the relationships between various types of performance of self, that we now turn to the leaders’ debates for the May 2010 general election, broadcast on Sky, ITV and BBC television during April 2010 (Hook and Hitchens 2010). Such debates had been discussed for many previous UK elections (Coleman 1998) and against predictions that the 2010 election campaign would be the first to be contested online and across social media, it was actually the television debates that provided the broadest form of public engagement with the political leaders during the period immediately before the general election. Instead of Web 2.0 social networks, it was the ‘old media’ of television and newspaper commentary (much, of course, also online) that took centre stage. Each debate ran for between 85 and 90 minutes and was broadcast in front of a selected studio audience. ITV hosted the first debate (moderated by newscaster, Alastair Stewart), Sky News hosted the second (moderated by political editor, Adam Boulton) and the BBC held the third (moderated by presenter and chair of BBC’s Question Time, David Dimbleby). Detailed rules and guidelines were produced for the debates, including a 76-point programme format agreement that specified the structure of the programme, the recruitment of the studio audience, the ‘staging’ of the debate and even the use of particular shots (Hook and Hitchens 2010). Each debate featured eight questions presented by members of the studio audience, but filtered by panels set up by the broadcaster for suitability. The leaders made an opening and a closing statement in each debate and would be allowed to respond not only to the specific questions but also to opponents’ replies, encouraging some spontaneous debate. By way of limitation all leaders were required to stand at a podium, reducing the informal studio audience interaction that has characterised debates elsewhere (for instance, the 1992 US presidential debate between Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr where Clinton moved towards the audience in answering questions). While the three debates were dedicated to different themes—domestic issues, global issues and the economy, in turn—each of them presented a similarly complex network of address in performance, involving the three participating candidates, the host, the studio audience and the audience at home. Within this elaborate arrangement, the candidates were obliged to switch between and negotiate their interlocutors, while at the same time appearing as likeable, trustworthy and persuasive. In spite of the studio interaction, the main recipients of these various forms of television address constitute what Higgins (2008, 144) describes as the wider ‘political public’, positioned outside the studio and out of sight of the debate participants. This is an audience linked in complex ways to the ‘surrogate’ studio audience through forms of address, camera angles and editing. The guidelines specified that audience cutaways—a key convention in establishing the studio audience as a proxy for the wider viewing public—should be used sparingly, stating: ‘there will not be undue concentration of the reactions of individual audience members’ (Hook and Hitchens 2010, 18). These also included a provision for a close-up shot of the questioner as he or she asked a question, but not one for © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 381 close-up cutaway shots of an individual audience member while the leaders were speaking (other than when the audience member was being directly addressed). Much commentary on performances in the debates was fixated on the interaction with the live studio audience. The leaders’ engagement with the studio audience presents what Paddy Scannell (1991, 1) describes as a ‘doubly articulated’ form of address, that is, ‘a communicative interaction between those participating in discussion ... designed to be heard by absent audiences’. While answers may be directed towards studio audience members – indeed judgements later fixed on how explicit the connection with the questioning audience member was – the exchange remains part of the overall performance for the political public at large and is therefore akin to the form of address we might associate with celebrity. Nick Clegg, in particular, was praised for his adept recital of the names of multiple audience members while providing answers: a practice that Cameron and Brown then tried to follow. Clearly, using the names of each member of the audience is not an exercise in positioning the response as a private one, thereby obliging the rest of the audience temporarily to disengage while the named recipient gets their answer. Rather, this is a performance of ‘sincerity’, showing willingness to empathise with individuals, and demonstrating an appreciation that issues of public interest are also matters of personal importance. In terms outlined by Goffman (1974), naming interlocutors ‘re-keys’ political performance towards a personal form of address, thereby investing it with a greater sense of intimacy. In large part, this draws upon the liveness of the event, as the sense of ‘immediacy’ (Marriott 2007) generated by the naming of previously unknown audience members helps to guarantee the performance as spontaneous and unrehearsed. Of course, even as liveness contributes to the construction of a sincere address, soundbites and answers to anticipated questions are carefully drilled and rehearsed beforehand behind closed doors. However, while the studio audience occupy a place of discursive importance in contributing to the exchanges of the debate, facilitating the performance of sincerity on the part of the candidates and representing the ‘public’s’ interests and concerns (Higgins 2008), the wider audience at home are invested with a central position, as the majority of the electorate that the candidates are explicitly engaged in persuading. The position of this audience is placed immediately to the fore in the opening addresses the candidates are invited to deliver before the start of questions. In reading these addresses, it is worth noting that sincerity and authenticity are not simply ways of engaging the questioner or studio audience, but of performing both humanity and humility. What is offered in such a performance is, as often with celebrities, a paradoxical double address: performing ordinariness (‘I am like you and understand your concerns’) alongside extraordinariness (‘I am an exceptional and gifted leader’). Below are the first sections of each of the opening speeches from the second leaders’ debate of the series, broadcast on Sky television on 22 April 2010 (GB: Gordon Brown; DC: David Cameron; NC: Nick Clegg). In this and the following transcripts an ellipsis in brackets denotes a pause in speech, with multiple ellipses denoting an extended pause: © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 382 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS 1 2 3 4 5 6 GB This may have the feel of a popularity contest (.) but in truth (.) this is an election (.) about Britain’s future (.) a fight for your future (.) and for your jobs (.) if it’s all about style and PR (.) count me out (.) if it’s about the big decisions (.) if it’s about judgement (.) if it’s about delivering a better future for our country (.) I’m your man [..] DC It’s clear from last week’s debate (.) that the country wants change (.) but the question is what sort of change and who’s best placed to lead that change (.) if you vote Conservative (.) you will get a new team (.) running the country (.) from May the seventh (.) and you won’t be stuck with what you’ve got now [..] 7 8 9 10 11 NC I am so proud of the values that have made our country so great (.) democracy (.) human rights (.) the rule of law (.) but the sad truth is that in recent years our governments under (.) the old parties have let those values down (.) we shouldn’t have sent soldiers into battle (.) without the right equipment (.) we shouldn’t be facing allegations of complicity in torture (.) we shouldn’t have (.) invaded (.) Iraq 12 13 14 15 16 17 This part of the debate—as well as the concluding address of each leader—is where conventional questioning is set aside and the address is the most unequivocally for the benefit of the viewing audience. Of the three, Cameron is the most explicit in drawing upon the presumed competence and electoral status of the broader political public: beginning his contribution with an interpretation of the outcome of the previous week’s debate (on line 7), as well as presupposing the viewers’ relationship with the UK government (on line 10) and their entitlement to vote (on line 9). His engagement in direct address to camera is unwavering and focused on the audience at home. Clegg, on the other hand, begins with what appears at first to be a personal statement (‘I am so proud ...’, on line 12), before immediately changing his footing to occupy the same position as the electorate at large (‘our country’, on line 12), and then moving into a development of this position in which the electorate and government share an ethical burden, expressed through the anaphoric repetition of ‘we shouldn’t’ (‘we shouldn’t have sent soldiers into battle’, on line 15; ‘we shouldn’t be facing allegations of complicity’, on line 16; ‘we shouldn’t have invaded Iraq’, on line 17). In ending this first section with a three-part list, Clegg’s introduction also draws upon a rhetorical form commonly used in political speech-making (Atkinson 1984, 57; Drake and Higgins 2006, 97; Higgins 2009). Significantly, this is a characteristic Clegg shares with Brown’s address. After setting out with an aside on the appropriate tenor of the occasion, likening it disapprovingly to a ‘popularity contest’ (line 1), Brown follows his declarative ‘count me out’ (on line 3) with a series of three positive items prefixed ‘if it’s about’ (‘if it’s about the big decisions’, on line 3; ‘if it’s about judgement’, on line 4; ‘if it’s about a better future for our country’, on lines 4–5), associating himself with each in the climatic assertion ‘I’m your man’ (on line 5). While the ‘list of three’ is a characteristic of political speech-making, its function has tended to be the production of and timing of audience applause, what Max Atkinson (1984) refers to as the ‘claptrap’. In both of these instances, the audience applause appropriate to the rhetoric of speech-making is denied in © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 383 advance by the agreed rules of the debate—where the audience is asked to applaud only at the beginning and end of each session (Hook and Hitchens 2010). There is also an embodied element to these leadership performances. As in the previous debate, both Cameron and Clegg deliver these opening addresses directly to the camera. The set-up uses a close-up shot of each leader (often combined with a slow zoom-in) as they address the camera (and, it is implied through the staging, the studio audience). This has the effect of linking the studio audience with the audience at home, both directly addressed by the politician. However, the enactment of Brown’s address still has more in common with a conventional political speech, in that he predominantly directs it to the studio audience rather than the viewing audience. In the second of the three televised debates, from which the extract above is taken, Brown occasionally follows the lead of the other two candidates and punctuates his addresses by a look towards the camera, but in this regard Brown treats the camera and watching audience as one viewer among the many present. Unlike the other candidates, Brown therefore punctuates his speech and includes pauses for emphasis by scanning his eyes around the room. Applying what W. S. Condon and W. D. Ogston (1966) describe as ‘self synchrony’ to the management of body and gesture in political speeches, Peter Bull (2003, 26) describes such a mode of performance as an enactment of sincerity designed to engage those in the room, whereas Cameron and Clegg instead direct their performance towards the viewing television audience. Of the three, Cameron is therefore the one that pays least regard to the practices associated with the conventional political speech. Both Cameron and Clegg distinguish themselves from Brown by directing their address exclusively towards the overhearing audience by speaking directly into the camera. Yet, Clegg joins with Brown in drawing upon the rhetorical devices of political speech-making, designed for a context that requires inviting and regulating audience applause (Atkinson 1984). For his part, Cameron uses this section of the debate to meet what Scannell (1996, 23) calls the imperative for ‘sociability’ in television, using a mixture of second person pronouns (‘you’) and what Deborah Cameron (2001, 133) describes as ‘conversational’ phrasings such as ‘team’ in place of ‘government’, and ‘stuck with what you’ve got’. Granted, Cameron still draws upon such qualities of speechmaking as the development of theme, where his next section expounds on a Conservative trope of ‘belief’ and ‘values’ associated with the speeches of Margaret Thatcher (Gaffney 1991, 164). Nevertheless, following the advice of the great performer Winston Churchill who counselled that traditional political oratory was ‘ill-suited to the informality of home viewing’ (Cockerell 1988, xiii), Cameron engages the viewing audience in a manner that contravenes the conventions of the political speech. This can be seen elsewhere in Cameron’s performances in less customary political arenas such as his controversial 2006 appearance on the UK’s highest rating chat show (Friday Night with Jonathan Ross, BBC, 23 June 2006) or his ‘back-stage’ video podcasts, Webcameron. Cameron and ‘Us’ We want to develop the suggestion, then, that Cameron’s genial informality and composed performance extend into a formal lexicon of inclusiveness, in keeping © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 384 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS with a celebrity frame, and we propose to do this by using an exchange between the two to contrast Cameron’s performance style with that of Gordon Brown. In addition to the strategies of address and articulation, personal pronouns play an important role in aligning the relationships between the politicians and various formations of audience and public. As we are about to see, the use of pronouns also establish a relationship with the policy apparatus and institutions of government. The following exchange between David Cameron and Gordon Brown is extracted from the last of the three leadership debates, hosted by the BBC: DC On Nick’s point (.) I mean of course we’ve benefited from immigration across decades in our country (.) people have come here (.) to work hard to make a contribution (.) to bring their special skills and we see that (.) in our health service (.) and in our schools all the time (..) but I do think (.) that as I say it’s got out of control and it does need to be brought (.) back under control 1 2 3 4 5 Host [Gordon Brown 6 7 GB Well I don’t like these words because we are bringing it under control (.) net (.) inward (.) migration is falling and will continue to fall as a result of the measures we’ve taken (.) we’ve brought together the police and the immigration officials and the custom officers in one agency (..) we’re doing that already (..) il illegal immigrants are (.) deterred (.) because (.) we’ve got ID cards for foreign nationals now (.) so an employer cannot say to someone you can come and have this job (..) they’ve gotta ask for the identity card first (.) and there are big fines if employers break the law (..) now (.) we’ve gotta do more (.) and that means we’ve gotta tighten the number of skills we need in this eh country and that’s why we’re moving Host GB Host DC [Mr Cameron [from care assistants to chefs (.) right across other occupations where we train up B British people to do the skills [let’s take Mr Cameron first [but I think I think a lot of people I think would ask though (.) y’know we’ve had thirteen years of a government (.) that’s now only started to talk about addressing this issue (.) and if you look at the (.) numbers (.) you know (.) immigration levels net migration levels before 1997 were never greater than seventy-seven thousand a year (.) under your government they’ve never been less than a hundred and forty thousand a year (..) that’s a very (.) big number (.) it’s only now you’re starting to take this (.) and you’re only starting (.) just before an election to take the steps that need to be taken 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 What Cameron and Brown have in common here is their use of emphasis (those words that are underlined in the transcript are given stress) to produce a particular form of ‘modality’ to lend assertiveness to their contributions (Cameron’s ‘of course’, on line 1; I do think, on line 4; ‘never greater’, on line 26; Brown’s ‘cannot say’, on line 13; ‘there are big fines’, on line 15). Yet their contributions differ sharply in other respects. In his first turn of the extract, David Cameron uses personal pronouns (‘we’ve’, on line 1; ‘our’, on lines 2 and 4) and a deictic adverb © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 385 (‘people have come here’, on line 2) to position his discourse as at one with the overhearing electorate and to situate himself within the home nation. This strategy of inclusiveness contrasts with Gordon Brown, who begins his response by deploying a series of personal pronouns to occupy an institutional position as spokesman for and defender of his party apparatus (‘we are bringing it under control’, on line 8; ‘we’ve brought together the police’, on line 10; ‘we’re doing that already’, on lines 11–12). While this is followed by a more inclusive example, limited to the home nation by the presumed shared understanding of ‘foreign’ (‘we’ve got ID cards for foreign nationals now’, on lines 12–13), this is then followed by a number of instances in which the ‘we’ first offers a potentially inclusive address, based upon shared interest (‘we’ve gotta tighten the number of skills we need’, on line 16), before immediately restricting the terms of inclusion to those with the governmental capacity to determine future policy direction (’that’s why we’re moving from care assistants to chefs ... where we train up British people’, on lines 17–20). Cameron’s second turn, in which he responds to Brown, has two qualities that are worthy of note. The beginning of Cameron’s turn reasserts his illocutionary position in communion with a casually unspecified number of the overhearing public by giving voice to their thoughts: ‘a lot of people I think would ask though (.) y’know we’ve had thirteen years of a government ...’ (lines 23–24). He then switches his pronominal usage to the second personal singular of ‘you’ in order to address this overhearing public directly (‘if you look at the (.) numbers (.) you know (.) immigration numbers were never greater ...’, on lines 25–26). However, what Cameron then appears to do is to direct his fire towards Brown’s chosen institutional footing, repositioning the second personal singular in an attack on Brown’s record (‘under your government they’ve never been less than a hundred and forty thousand a year’, on lines 27–28; ‘it’s only now you’re starting to take this and you’re only starting (.) just before an election’, on lines 29–30). In a parallel of his use of the second person plural in attacking Brown, Cameron’s turns are marked by his use of the first person singular pronoun in reference to himself; a quality that Norman Fairclough (2000, 103) has detected in the presentational style of Tony Blair. Whereas Brown’s only use of ‘I’ is to express the internal state of ‘dislike’ for the terms of Cameron’s argument (line 8), otherwise containing references to himself within the governmental ‘we’ (which he does on most occasions) or the home nation (which he does on two occasions), the first-person agency of Cameron is apparent throughout his turns. Furthermore, in keeping with the patterns that Martin Montgomery (1999) picks out as markers of ‘speaking sincerely’ in public, Cameron aligns first-person pronouns with mental states, thereby presenting his speech as driven by compulsion (‘I mean’, on line 1; ‘I do think’, on line 4; ‘I think’, on line 23). To some extent, the pre-election position of Cameron as leader of a party in opposition gives him greater latitude to take up a position on behalf of the overhearing public, in opposition to the governing authorities. Through this, Cameron is better able to position himself outside an institutional or partisan frame by placing a rhetorical emphasis on his own subjective agency. Yet, perhaps a significant mark of the difference in Brown’s style from Cameron’s is that Brown shows less inclination to adopt a populist mode of address that positions him in common cause © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 386 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS with the people. So while Busby (2009, 191), for one, emphasises the presentational influence that the rise in Cameron’s popularity had over Brown, this does not extend to Cameron’s strategic use of populist inclusivity in his political performances. Cameron’s performances are notable in that they evoke similarities to modes of address that are commonly adopted by media personalities and performers, who adopt a para-social method of presenting a one-way address as if it is part of a two-way conversation with the viewer. The Performance of Politics and the Political Performance So far we have discussed how the leadership candidates have been engaged in various kinds of activities to align themselves with the studio audience, the viewing audience (the wider political public) or with political institutions, while performing to different degrees such qualities as sincerity and informality. We have examined these activities in the context of our opening argument that such performances can be seen as part of the construction of a political personality, or brand, and situated within debates around celebrity in politics. While we have hinted at these factors in our discussion of ‘self synchrony’ (Condon and Ogston 1966), we now want to emphasise that there is a further performative dimension to this: political performances are not just words, but also embodied performances—kinetic and gestural; visual as well as oral and aural. There is a significant body of academic writing in performance studies, rarely addressed by political communication scholars, that has sought to understand the politics of performance, and such work has analysed performance as a particular cultural activity through which textual, social and ideological meanings are produced and circulated (Diamond 1996; Drake 2006). According to Elin Diamond (1996, 4), analysis of performance addresses: questions of subjectivity (who is speaking/acting?), location (in what sites/spaces?), audience (who is watching?), commodification (who is in control?), conventionality (how are meanings produced?), politics (what ideological or social positions are being reinforced or contested?). Clearly these questions are highly pertinent to a greater understanding of political performance and the performance of politics. Engaging with questions of performance has the potential to offer a more dynamic model of the interface between celebrity, political communication and politics. Such a focus avoids a static categorical (or constative) model of the celebrity–politics relationship and suggests instead that meanings arise out of the application and recognition of a particular performative frame (politician as celebrity performer on a television chat show, or politician as parliamentary speech-maker, for instance). As we have seen, these meanings are further contingent on how a particular public is constituted (for instance as a mediated television audience) and the appropriate mode of address and engagement. Analysing these processes of framing and mediation is critical to a better understanding of the various formulations of political celebrity. Earlier we offered a broad definition of celebrity as a ‘mediated public persona’. We might then expand this to suggest that celebrity can be conceptualised as a mediating frame (or set of frames) © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 387 through which different kinds of public performances are enacted and recognised as such by constituted publics (Drake and Higgins 2006; Higgins 2008; Drake and Miah 2010). Celebrity, then, can be understood as a performative relationship activated through these processes rather than as a condition that precedes them. In such a conceptualisation, political celebrity is not an innate quality possessed by certain individuals, but a set of frames through which particular modes of political performance may be enacted. As we have stressed, political performances can take place in varying frames, many of which are not conventionally viewed as political spaces. An example of this is David Cameron’s aforementioned appearance on Friday Night with Jonathan Ross, which caused some controversy due to Ross’ unconventional and informal line of questioning. This was a particular kind of political celebrity performance by Cameron that differed in framing from an interview with the BBC’s Jeremy Paxman, or from a heated exchange in Prime Minister’s Questions. It draws more explicitly upon the resources associated with celebrity (renown, public visibility, recognition, informality) in a way that analysis of framing and performance can help us to decipher. Different frames lend appropriacy to various forms of political performance, and situate them within different, often contrasting realms of judgement and approval. As we have tried to show through our examples above, at times political performance is itself able to re-key the current primary frame so as to suggest a greater sincerity. During the leaders’ debates Nick Clegg continually attempted to reframe the debate so as to appear to be above the (implied petty) party political squabbling of the other two leaders. For instance he responds to a questioner during the first debate by saying: ‘I’m not sure if you’re like me, but the more they attack each other, the more they sound exactly the same’. That is, by questioning a particular performance frame (the two-party ‘Punch and Judy’ contest of political debate), Clegg attempts to confer his current frame (foregrounding the truth of his own utterances) with the greater authority. Goffman astutely comments on such a strategy by pointing out: When a character comments on a whole episode of activity in frame terms, he acquires a peculiar reality through the same words by which he undermines the one that was just performed (Goffman 1974, 400, emphasis in original). There is potential for this kind of reframing in many political performances, and both Cameron and Clegg are adept at this. An aside in a speech, rather like a preface to a book, or a talk, can act as a device through which the politician can stand outside and comment upon that which will be undertaken or has been already done. It works to bracket off and layer one kind of performance from another, to reframe what comes before or after, to change the meaning, to appear sincere and more authentic than others. As well as Clegg, we have discussed an instance in which Brown also does this by stating that the leaders’ debates might be mistaken for a popularity contest, thereby positioning himself as selfless and dutiful, not interested in popularity for its own sake. However in spite of Brown’s attempts to question the worth of the competitive frame of a televised debate, Clegg’s strategy—even more than Cameron’s—was able © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 388 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS to offer a form of continual commentary on the conventional terms of a frame of politics as usual and through doing so gain greater potential claims to political sincerity. By drawing upon his distance from the two-party-dominated political system he was able to position himself as an outsider in a way similar to celebrities when they comment on politics (see the analysis of Bono in Drake and Higgins 2006). Both Cameron and Brown were, because of this strategy, forced into attempts to diffuse this authority through repeated ‘I agree with Nick’ responses (which became a short-lived national catchphrase). Moreover, in tandem with an examination of framing, we need to analyse performance with regard to sets of rhetorical conventions: the ‘mode of address’ and the ‘degree of ostensiveness’ (Naremore 1990; Drake 2006). We have already discussed the mode of address. As we noted, the opening and closing statements of the leaders’ debates used direct address—offering a stronger address to viewers and listeners at home—and this then reverted to a question and answer session with more indirect address, mediated through the studio audience. As we argued, Brown made significantly less use of direct address to camera, and relied instead on the conventions of the traditional political speech. The term ‘ostensiveness’ refers to the scale of the gestures of the performance—the ‘showing’ of the performance. In performance there is a clear relationship between ostentation and framing conditions—the frame of the political speech, for instance, already ostends the performance. Similarly the physical staging of the debates presented the leaders as ostended signs. Indeed, celebrity politicians are alreadyencoded ostensive signs. This is in part due to the way that they become associated with a repertoire of performance signs that circulate beyond the formal political domain: their ‘idiolect’, the tropes strongly associated with a particular performer (Naremore 1990; Drake and Higgins 2006). Tony Blair’s grin, David Cameron’s amiable seriousness and open-palmed earnest gestures, Gordon Brown’s earnest scowl all contribute to a recognisable bodily performance, just as their speech idiolect contributes to their vocal performance, and feeds into strategies of selfpresentation. Further analysis of political performance in these terms has some potential to offer insights into the effectiveness of political performance that cannot be addressed through more conventionally deployed techniques, such as content or discourse analysis, on their own. Concluding Remarks In this article we have attempted to outline a series of strategic practices in political performance, and through our analysis of the television leaders’ debates we have shown how these practices are manifest in attempts by politicians to align themselves with the studio audience and the viewing (political) public. This emerges in different ways from each of the leaders and might be seen as a response to the widely reported public disenchantment with formal politics, using the debates as the ideal platform. Certainly Ruth Wodak (2009, 19) points out the opportunity, and perhaps obligation, for many successful contemporary political performers to find a means of engaging with widespread political disaffection, not just with politicians but also with politics in general. Adopting a celebrity/personality frame, © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) LIGHTS, CAMERA, ELECTION 389 we have suggested, is one way in which this might be done, as it moves debates away from judgements about issues to those about the personal qualities and likeability of the utterer. In the leaders’ debates the performances should therefore be seen as strategic, and more aligned with the manner in which each leader is positioned in the debates relative to the sitting government (enabling Clegg’s performance of sincerity, for instance) than with any dominant political styles, and more or less attuned to the demands of television and the requisite televisual performance for a mediated public. For Cameron and Clegg, there was some scope to extend briefly the performance of ‘outraged bystander’ after electoral success by taking a position relative to the previous government’s legacy. However, once in political office, such a position for both has been far more difficult to sustain, calling for revised performance strategies and, in Clegg’s case, a different relationship to the political establishment. In large part, the question of what makes some political performances/performers successful and others less so remains elusive. It is tempting to return to Weber’s account of the political quality of ‘charisma’, in which the qualities of leadership draw upon a ‘personal gift of grace’ (Weber 1971 [1919], 29). Yet, applying Weber’s version of charisma to contemporary British politics is not necessarily a straightforward matter. For one thing, the term itself emerges from a religious discourse— the charisma of the prophet—which implies a form of unconditional devotion that does not fit neatly to electoral politics in the UK in spite of the encroachment of the celebrity frame. Yet, referring to the British case in particular, Paul Ricoeur argues that: In a democratic system like the British form of government, people vote for three things at the same time: a programme, a party, and a leader. Therefore we can never bracket completely the element of leadership, because politics is the place where decisions are made for the whole. The necessity of decision making preserves, at least as a residual element, the charismatic (Ricoeur 1986, 212). In our analysis of political performance the charismatic appears to play a part. Yet while seductive, the concept of charisma is ultimately unsatisfactory. Much like celebrity, political ‘likeability’ is a process that is performed (and constantly has to be re-performed), not innate. ‘Charisma’ implies that these characteristics are as much a personal quality as one’s DNA, whereas we have argued here that they are both performative and frame contingent. Successful political performance— such as that of Clegg in the leaders’ debates—may be short-lived. Clegg’s success did not ultimately translate into electoral success for the Liberal Democrats, and while it did enable his own rise to deputy prime minister in the following coalition government, it did not protect him from unpopularity with a significant percentage of the political public when he became associated with coalition public sector cuts and increased higher education tuition fees. Further elaboration is needed on these themes, taking full account of Ricoeur’s (1986, 212) call that ‘charismatic authority’ be met with an examination of ‘credentials’ and how Street’s (2004) reflections on celebrity politicians clarifies the terms within which we can make these judgements. In our analysis of the three © 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association BJPIR, 2012, 14(3) 390 PHILIP DRAKE, MICHAEL HIGGINS party leaders as political performers, we have highlighted strategies of engagement in public dialogue and ways of claiming the credentials of the political public. Successful performance style draws upon the resources of celebrity and personality but also operates in tandem with established political persona, is mediated through framing, and hinges on the ability to address political realities in ways that are judged by viewers and by voters to be sincere and believable. About the Authors Philip Drake, Department of Film, Media & Journalism, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK, email: p.j.drake@stir.ac.uk Michael Higgins, School of Humanities, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G1 1XH, Scotland, UK, email: michael.higgins@strath.ac.uk Note The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments, Angela Smith, John Street, Andy Ruddock and the editors of this journal for organising a 2010 PSA round table on celebrity politics that aided the development of the ideas presented in this article. Bibliography Atkinson, M. (1984) Our Masters’ Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics (London: Routledge). Bartle, J. and Crewe, I. (2002) ‘The impact of party leaders in Britain: Strong assumptions, weak evidence’, in A. King (ed.), Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 70–95. Bull, P. 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