European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist
governance arrangements: lobbying and policymaking patterns in a comparative perspective
Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson*
Jean Monnet Visiting Professor, Schuman Centre for Advanced Study, European
University Institute, I-50016 Florence, Italy; Uppsala Theory Circle, Department
of Sociology, Uppsala University, Box 821, 75108 Uppsala, Sweden
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Abstract
Legislative and policy-making processes within democratic structures are multi-agent, collective decision processes. Interest representation, including lobbying, may have a substantial effect not
only on policy outcomes, but also on the structure of democratic
institutions themselves. In view of current trends and challenges
facing democratic institutions, better understanding of the
processes and mechanisms by which policy-making and lobbying
operate is particularly important. This paper applies the new
institutionalism to the comparative analysis of governance and
policy-making in different political systems, particularly those in
Europe and the US. Pluralist and neo-corporatist arrangements of
influence articulation are distinguished and contrasted. It is argued
further that these do not correspond to or fit EU (European Union)
arrangements for policy-making and lobbying. A model of EU arrangements is outlined. The article considers the degree of openness, flexibility, extent of predictability, and patterns of policy
production and development in the different systems. The EU system, which is a type of ‘organic’ or informal democracy, operates
with highly flexible but well-organized procedures to engage interest groups from industry and civil society as sources of information
and expertise and to act as brokers in EU policy-making; deliberation and negotiation typically result in consensus. We conclude
that many of the advantages of the EU system with its flexibility
and adaptability to sectoral specific issues and conditions are a
source of its problems of non-transparency and ‘democratic deficit.’
* Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden and Department of Sociology, South Stockholm University College, 14189 Huddinge, Sweden
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Introduction
Group-interest articulation and pressure-group politics in
general are processes by which sub-groups of a societal population attempt to influence policy-making and regulation in pursuit of their particular interests and goals.1 These processes are
part and parcel of what we often mean by democracy. However,
such activity places significant strains upon democratic institutions that they were neither designed nor expected to deal with.
This consideration is especially significant in the light of other
developments that have tested the limits of democratic institutions: globalization, the increasingly technical nature of many
public issues, increasing specialization and the accelerating pace
of change, among others (Kaase and Newton 1995; Burns
1999). Held (1996) points out correctly that ‘the history of ...
political institutions reveals the fragility and vulnerability of
democratic arrangements.’ The fact that interest-group pressures and lobbying have the capacity to amplify many of the
other forces straining democratic systems makes it especially
important and urgent that we more thoroughly understand
these mechanisms and processes.
This paper, adopting a new institutional approach (Bulmer
1994; Burns and Carson 2002; Burns and Flam 1987; March
and Olsen 1989; Meyer, Scot, Rowan, et al. 1983; Pierson 1996;
Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Thomas, Meyer,
Ramirez et al. 1987, Warleigh 2002, among others), compares
and analyses distinct governance and policy-making systems focusing on group-interest representation, pressure-group politics
and lobbying, and participation in policy-making. The underlying premise is that institutions matter in the definition of problems, in establishing agendas, and in formulating solutions.2 The
1
In this pursuit of interests, success often comes at the expense of other groups in a
society. Such a view of pressure groups is elaborated by, among others, Becker (1983,
1985) who analyses the competition between pressure groups as a game. This game is
zero-sum with regard to influence, and negative sum with regard to taxes and subsidies.
What one interest wins in the form of subsidies, the other loses due to increased taxes.
Since all of this is distributed and administrated by a central authority, there are also
costs, or ‘dead weight losses’, where no one gains.
2
An institution is a complex of relationships, roles, and norms, which constitute and
regulate recurring interaction processes among participants in socially defined settings
or domains. Any institution organizing people in such relationships may be conceptualized as an authoritative complex of r ules or a shared rule regime, which commands loyalty,
authority, and commitment among members of a given community (Burns,
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first section provides an initial characterization and comparison
of two historically prominent types of policy-making and lobbying systems: pluralist and neo-corporatist type systems. In the
second section, we introduce the EU system and compare and
contrast it with neo-corporatist and pluralist systems. The distinction between closed, well-structured policy systems, on the
one hand, and open, fluid policy systems, on the other hand, is
particularly stressed. The third section is a short, concluding
section with tables comparing the three systems.
Interest representation and lobbying in contrasting
governance and policy-making systems3
Both neo-corporatist and pluralist systems entail ‘elitist democracy’—the domination of rule-making and policy-making
footnote 2 continued
Baumgartner, and Deville 1985; Burns and Flam 1987; Burns and Carson 2002 ).
Institutions are exemplified by, for instance, family, a business organization or government agency, markets, democratic associations, and religious communities. Each structures and regulates social interactions in particular ways; there is a certain interaction
logic to a given institution. More precisely: (1) An institution defines and constitutes a
particular social order, namely positions and relationships, defining the actors (individuals and collectives) that are the legitimate or appropriate participants (who must,
may, or might participate) in the institutional domain, their rights and obligations visà-vis one another, and their access to and control over resources. In short, it consists of
a system of authority and power. (2) It organizes, coordinates, and regulates social interaction in a particular domain or domains, defining contexts – specific settings and
times – for constituting the institutional domain or sphere. (3) It provides a normative
basis for appropriate behaviour including the roles of the participants in that setting –
their interactions and institutionalized games – taking place in the institutional domain.
(4) The rule complex provides a cognitive basis for knowledgeable participants to interpret, understand, and make sense of what goes on in the institutional domain. (5) It also
provides core values, norms, and beliefs that are referred to in normative discourses, the
giving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes in
the institutional domain. Finally, (6) an institution defines a complex of potential normative equilibria which function as ‘focal points’ or ‘coordinators’ (Schelling 1963;
Burns and Roszkowska 2003).
3
‘Lobbying’ has become a common term in speaking about the activities of associations
and NGOs and other pressure groups in EU policy-making and regulation (Andersen
and Eliassen (1991, 1995, 1997), Bern (1994), Marks and McAdam (1996), Mazey
and Richardson (1993), Pedler and van Schendelen (1993), Potters (1992), Streeck
and Schmitter (1991), van Schendelen (1993), Wallace and Wallace (2000), Wallace and
Young (1997)). However, the forms and mechanisms differ substantially from other
political systems such as European national systems and the US. This is one of the main
points of this paper. Nevertheless, interest group articulation and political pressure are
part and parcel of a common understanding and experience of modern democracy.
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processes by elites within the framework of democratic nationstates (Table 1).4 The Scandinavian countries, Netherlands,
Austria, and, to a certain extent, Germany have represented
cases of until recently what were relatively tightly organized neocorporatist systems, although with considerable variation among
them.5 (Adams 2002a; Berger 1981; Katzenstein 1984;
Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter,
et al. 1996; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). These societies
regulated social tensions and conflict with explicit integrative
strategies and well-defined societal and public agents as well as
particular organizational arrangements and procedures. The
neo-corporatist type of social organization exhibited in, for instance, tripartite or multipartite institutions, includes organs for
representatives of capital, labour, and government to participate
in consultation, bargaining, and collective decision-making
processes. The complex of organs has not simply been an ‘additional sphere’. Rather, it has provided an institutional framework on another level. Within the neo-corporatist institutional
frame, rule formation and regulatory processes take place at the
macro level in relation to, for instance, ‘market’ and ‘state’, and
to issues such as wages, pensions, working conditions, taxes,
economic policies, and social policies. In particular, they have
dealt with the interfaces – and contradictions – between ‘state’,
‘market’, and the agents representing them. 6
The US, in contrast, exemplifies pluralist principles. Here
only limited attempts are made at integration and regulation of
4
There have been several attempts to formulate systems of classifications of policy networks (Jordan and Schubert 1992; Schneider 1992; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; van
Waarden 1992). Consideration of these would take us beyond the scope of this paper.
We prefer initially to work with two general types of networks for the sake of simplicity.
In practice, the networks in which we are interested are empirically described and analysed. On a more theoretical-methodological level, our approach takes as a point of
departure the different ways societies organize power, construct agency, and established governance in different types of organizations, organizational domains, and
policy-making processes (Burns and Flam 1987; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). A major
implication of this perspective is that different types of state structures/political systems
imply differences in policy-making arrangements and processes and, therefore, differences in pressure group and lobbying patterns (Flam 1994).
5
Such arrangements were never effectively established in France, Italy, Spain, United
Kingdom, among other European countries, although there were attempts.
6
Adams (2002b) argues that neo-corporatism at the state level is being eroded by EU
(and global) challenges, but this is a matter beyond the scope of this paper comparing
different systems of governance.
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Table 1 Pluralist and neo-corporatist systems of social organization and policymaking
Neo-corporatist
Pluralist
Integrative, multi-lateral consultation and
decision-making. Particular actors or
classes of actors are empowered and held
collectively responsible. Engagement,
commitment, and interlinkages are
relatively formal and stable. Principles of
inclusive involvement in rule-making, ruleinterpretation and implementation are
explicit and provide normative force.
Unilateral and bilateral decision-making,
hence fragmented. In principle, a high
degree of access. However, engagement,
commitment, and interlinkages may be
relatively unstable (or uncertain) in any
given rule-making, rule interpretation, and
implementation process.
Institutionalization and regulation of interorganizational relationships, conflict, and
conflict resolution according to norms of
fairness (not only procedural, but substantive). In general, high degree of attempts at
societal integration and regulation.
Minimum formal institutionalization and
regulation of inter-organizational relationships, conflicts, and conflict resolution. The
state simply guarantees associational
freedom and contractual rights. In general,
relatively low degree of state intervention,
regulation, and integration.
Norms of inclusion and ‘compromise’,
‘collective benefit,’ ‘redistributive norms’.
Norm of access but not necessarily of
inclusion, nor of ‘collective benefit’ and
‘fairness.’ Such norms may be advocated but
are vulnerable to challenge or de-legitimation.
Organizational or societal power is an
important factor in influencing policymaking but mediated by rules, including
distributional norms. Social power also
exercised on the basis of appeal to key or
core norms.
Resource power is important in influencing
policy-making or actors involved. Compromise may be pursued as a strategy, but
shifts in bargaining power are followed
rather quickly and often dramatically by
shifts in strategies. Compromise and the
pursuit of mutual advantage are based on
self-interest (‘enlightened’?) and are not
normatively grounded in or derived from
normative force.
Relatively high predictability and certainty
of policy processes and outcomes under
normal conditions, but less flexibility than a
pluralist system.
Relatively high uncertainty and low social
predictability in many policy areas.
Particularly high uncertainty and low
predictability in peripheral policy areas
compared to core or strategic areas
(relating, for instance, to economic
interests and capitalist institutions).
Relatively high flexibility.
Source Burns and Flam (1987, p. 380)
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social tensions and conflict through highly organized, macrolevel multilateral negotiations. In the multilateral consultations
and decision-making of neo-corporatism, even actors representing interests that are more peripheral may become involved, although the extent and quality of involvement varies considerably
(see later). Indeed, this is a distinctive feature of the system: the
conscious incorporation (even co-optation) of peripheral actors,
after they have mobilized, into the policy-making process. In this
way, peripheral institutions and key groups in these domains
have opportunities to express their opinions about – and to try
to prevent or reduce – negative, unintended impacts on their
own spheres. They become involved in the rule formation
process as ultimate veto groups, providing also powerful incentives for them to abide by the outcome (conditions of cooptation). The involvement itself provides incentives for those
from a particular periphery sphere to coordinate their strategies
within the more encompassing frame. For example, mobilized
groups may enhance their influence on central, organized decision-making by functioning as a ‘segment’. This also has the secondary effect of providing an organizational basis for more
coherent structuring and regulation of the segment in which
they are engaged. This institutionalization of multilateral consultation and decision-making, along with segmentation of peripheral domains, tends to reduce the problem of incoherent
structuring and regulation in modern societies—a problem
characterizing a pluralist system.
In sum, a neo-corporatist model emphasizes the articulation
of interests through highly organized, stable relationships between government and interest organizations; the state is substantially interventionist with respect to economy and society,
shaping, managing, coercing domestic interest group relations,
and behaviour. The pluralist, interest-group model focuses on
more competitive and less formal or structured mechanisms and
pathways of influence. And, in general, the state is less interventionist than in the neo-corporatist arrangement (Andersen and
Eliassen 1991, 1995, 1996b).
Andersen and Eliassen (1996b) have argued that these two
well-established models are inadequate for investigating and understanding the process of interest representation within the EU.
We concur and believe that the difference in these two perspectives may well have more to do with the way in which policymaking and lobbying have evolved in the American and
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European national political contexts than in the particular functions of lobbying and policy-making in the political process—or
the ways in which lobbyists proceed in plying their trade. Among
other things, they suggest identifying the differing institutional
and situational conditions within historically given, macro-structural contexts. The strategic choices available to actors in the
process of lobbying tend, therefore, to look significantly different in diverse systems, as we show later.
The lobbying, consultation, and negotiation in both of these
distinct institutional arrangements within democratic systems
allow some affected groups and interests to make their voices
heard and to influence to varying degrees policy processes and
their outcomes. Economic power as well as political weight –
including mobilization to lobby – are the foundations for influence over rule and policy-making in a pluralist system. Weaker
groups can gain entry in a given situation, for instance, through
finding resource-rich and influential allies. But they generally
have few opportunities to remain in and influence the system
unless they make up a substantial organization or movement, or
are otherwise able to independently institutionalize their own
organizational structure and resource base. Wealthy and powerful groups are often in a position to countervail the demands of
substantial interests including voter majorities. Such established
power is occasionally thwarted by mobilized organizations, political parties, mass demonstrations, and media attention, resulting in elite concessions. However, these concessions may be
reversed once mobilization subsides and/or established powers
counter-attack, and offset. In addition, pluralist systems are
relatively ineffective at the integration of multiple domains or
sectors and addressing the problems of incoherence, negative
interaction effects, and unintended consequences (Burns and
Flam 1987).
Neo-corporatist systems have their vulnerabilities and failings
as well. One of the problems concerns the matter of representation—the fact that peripheral groups feel, in many instances,
that they have not been sufficiently taken into account, or have
been co-opted. Nonetheless, they have ‘participated,’ ‘been
heard,’ and are ‘recorded in the protocols’—it may be claimed
that these groups’ overarching ideology and proposals have, in
fact, been properly taken into account. Periodically, there may
be revolts and re-negotiation about the terms of participation,
including the rules and organizing principles for consultation,
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deliberation, and negotiation (Andersen and Burns 1992). In
general, neo-corporatist regimes have much less flexibility than
pluralist regimes—both in terms of who participates, what are
relevant issues, and how are they to be handled, and by whom
(Adams 2002b). A highly turbulent and changing environment
is particularly problematic for a neo-corporatist system and sets
the stage for crisis and instability. The issues may concern what
precisely is the directorial role or the most effective policies for
the interventionist state under substantially changed economic
and social conditions. This might concern the emergence of a
service or information economy or an aging population; or the
question of which emerging units or segments should be included or excluded from incorporation. Andersen (1986) points
out several conditions under which well-developed corporatist
systems break down or experience substantial failures:
n
a substantially new economic or social challenge emerges; or
an entirely new sphere or domain of activity arises. Established organizing principles and norms are difficult to apply
at the same time that practical experience with and know
ledge of the new conditions are, of course, minimal;
n
powerful external agents (e.g. multi-national corporations),
which do not share the neo-corporatist ideology and institutional frame, break out or refuse to enter in and thereby
contribute to challenging and destabilizing the entire
neo-corporatist system.
In sum, a neo-corporatist system is designed to operate as an
integrated whole, through mechanisms of centralization and coordination of multiple segments, as well as of institutionalized
procedures of negotiation and conflict resolution. A high degree
of policy coherence and continuity may be achieved; this may be
at the expense of flexibility and adaptability. In a pluralist system, on the other hand, there is considerable autonomy of segments and their agents. Initiatives can come from many different
agents and directions, with the economically powerful agents
having, of course, substantial advantages in these processes.
Coordination, to the extent it occurs, takes place through alliance formation, multiple bilateral and ad hoc or temporary multilateral negotiations. Typically, flexibility and adaptability are
accomplished at the expense of coherence and continuity in
policy-making. The rules of exclusion (and openness) of the two
systems also differ. There is more apparent openness in a pluralist
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system, but the openness is difficult to exploit, in many instances, without substantial economic resources or some form of
political currency, such as the kind of credibility and legitimacy
that some public interest organizations enjoy. In a pluralist system there may be de facto closure because of resource limitations,
whereas in a neo-corporatist system, exclusion is more formal or
institutionalized.
In general, the capacity to mobilize resources – power – is important in both systems. But as suggested above, economic
power is a particularly strategic resource in a pluralist system.
Moreover, it is ‘right and proper’ to use such power, as long as
one plays according to the rules of the game. In a neocorporatist system, while power, in particular economic power,
is important, normative argument and fitting in or adhering to
the logic of integration and coherence plays a key role (as also in
the EU, see below). Thus, participants should (or are expected
to) exhibit a concern for collective benefit, just or fair distribution, and readiness to compromise self-interest—all of which
countervail to some extent pure power factors. Thus, the sustained participation of weak or peripheral groups – through explicit inclusion principles – is achieved to a much greater extent
as a result of their institutionalized roles in the policy-making
process. Participation gives some substantial opportunities of
influence even to relatively weak agents, because there are norms
of recognition, collective deliberation, and self-sacrifice in neocorporatist systems.
The EU system in comparative perspective
EU policy-making arrangements7
Several of the most distinctive features of the EU type of gover
nance characterizing the EU can be summarized as follows
(Schmitter 1996).
1 There is no single locus of clearly defined supreme authority.
2 There is no established and relatively centralized hierarchy of
public offices but rather multiple hierarchies and networks.
3 There is no predefined and distinctive ‘public’ sphere of competence within which the EU can make decisions binding on all.
7
This section draws on earlier work characterizing the EU and several of the key
mechanisms of its operation [see Burns, Carson, and Nylander (2001); Andersen and
Burns (1996); Burns and Nylander (2001)].
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4 There is no fixed and (more or less) contiguous territory over
which it exercises authority (for instance, Denmark, Sweden,
and England are outside on some matters, in particular the
new monetary union with the Euro).
5 There is no unique capacity for the direct implementation of
its decisions (laws, policies) upon intended individuals and
groups.
6 There is not a pervasive ability to control the movement of
goods, services, capital, and persons within its borders.
7 There is no unique recognition by other polities, membership
in international organizations, and exclusive capacity to conclude international treaties (since member states retain much
of this).
8 Many agents, and a variety of types of agents, are engaged in
EU governance, and they expand and adapt it in a variety of
ways.
While there is considerable agreement on such descriptions of
the EU, there is little consensus on what precisely is the EU’s
form of governance. Indeed, it continues to be described in various ways. For example, some see it from an inter-governmental
perspective (Moravcsik 1998), focusing on the intentions and
preferences of member states. Member states meet and negotiate in inter-governmental conferences, and revise the Treaty
(that is, the series of EU treaties commencing with the Treaty of
Rome (1958)). However, treaty articles can be quite vaguely formulated, giving considerable room for interpretation and, as Hix
(1999) points out, ‘…treaty reform is a blunt instrument. When
signing treaties, governments cannot predict the precise implications of treaty provisions and new decision-making rules, or exactly how the Commission will behave when granted new
powers’. Nugent (1995) stresses, more over, ‘Treaty provision is
no guarantee of policy development nor is lack of provision a
guarantee of lack of development’. Thus, EU policy outcomes
are generally not understandable as simply the output of negotiations among member states (although this aspect must be
taken into account); in addition, the relative importance of such
negotiations appears to have dwindled. The EU is also seen as a
type of federative, or possibly confederative, system. Again, this
characterization does not fit very well either. Arguably one of the
most influential perspectives views the EU as a unique form of
multi-level governance with loosely coupled segments and
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networks (Kohler-Koch 1997; Peterson 1995, among others).8
Networks of policy-making agents and lobbyists crisscross and
overlap, extending across functional areas. Some configurations
of actors in a policy area or domain are very issue-specific. Others make up more or less institutionalized policy communities –
with established norms and principles for organizing policymaking – which addresses a variety of issues.
The EU consists of a complex of institutions—an inter-institutional arrangement. But this is true of any modern state. What is
unique about the EU is that the boundaries between the functions and roles of its different institutions are unclear and shifting. For instance, the three basic branches of government –
legislative, executive, and judiciary – are discernible in the EU,
but demarcation lines are fuzzier than in most national systems
(Hix 1999; Warleigh 2002). Warleigh (2002) stresses that ‘both
the initial design of the EU structure, and the way it has since
8
The EU ‘state’ (in contrast to Weber’s (1968) general characterization of a state) is sui
generis, but is likely to become a more common form in the context of heterogeneous
populations, societal differentiation, and globalization (Burns 1999; Burns, Jaegur, and
Kamali et al. 2000b). It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by
‘legislative action’, but lacks tax and welfare systems. The administrative staff is oriented to, and partially regulated by, an administrative and legal order. It is important to
add that in the EU, this regulation is very loose and flexible, allowing extraordinary
initiative and freedom of action of the main administrative body, namely the Commission. It also allows the participation of a large number of other agents without constitutional or formal roles, such as interest groups and lobbyists.
The key agents and representatives of the EU institutional arrangements claim binding authority in certain areas (single market as well as areas of competence defined by
the Treaties), not only over member states and their citizens, but over all relevant
actions taking place in the area(s) of its jurisdiction. This authority is regulated by legislation, as well as judicial and other relevant normative orders—that is, it is legitimate.
In this sense, the EU ‘state’ is an authoritative association of governance grounded
almost entirely on legitimacy and material interests in diverse jurisdictional areas. The
exercise of EU authority is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is ‘delegated’ by the
member states or prescribed by them, e.g. in EU mandates (in treaties, etc.). Hence, it
is an ultimate authority derived from general agreements (treaties) or principles. There
is a framed or bounded exercise of authority, which is essential to any jurisdiction and
certainty of authority.
Note that Weber defined the modern state as a compulsory association with a territorial basis. The EU clearly fails in meeting this criterion. Even the criterion of territory
is problematic since the EU has flexible boundaries: when it comes to the Euro, the
‘territory of jurisdiction’ is truncated. When it comes to market regulation, it is expanded to include to a large extent Norway and Switzerland.
Note also that monopoly over the use of force is not essential to the EU jurisdiction
and continuity of authority, at least thus far. Legitimate use of force by the EU is only
permitted for the time being by its member states or as prescribed by them.
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developed, relied upon complex interdependencies between the
institutions rather than a strict and clear separation of powers as
in the constitution of the US. In addition, the Union is (presumably) still evolving (Marks and McAdam 1996). The founders of
the EU were unable to create a new federal state since the necessary support was lacking at both elite and popular levels. Instead, they set in train a process which binds the member states
and the EU institutions ever more closely together, while leaving
the difficult constitutional problems such as the separation of
powers and relationship between the different tiers of government to be decided gradually or simply emerge organically.’ In
short, there is unclear separation of powers in the EU Treaty
(which has served thus far as a type of constitution). These conditions provide very substantial opportunities for entrepreneurial and informal politics (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns
1999), much more so than in typical modern states (see later).9
The EU arrangement entails, roughly speaking, democratic representation and legislative function (European Parliament), administrative or executive order (the Commission), judiciary (the
European Court), legislative body with quasi national representation (the Council of Ministers), an inter-governmental negotiation framework (the European Council with heads of member
state governments), among others. As any large complex of institutions (Machado and Burns 1998), the EU entails many cross-currents and tensions as a result of conflicting values and interests and
substantially contradictory institutional arrangements (Burns,
Carson, and Nylander 2001). The particular ways in which these
cross-currents conflict, coexist, and reinforce one another shapes
9
To be more precise, the Treaty does not define precisely the material limits of EU jurisdiction (Weiler 1999). Weiler (1999) points out that in most federal (that is, explicitly
multi-level) systems, the relationship between the general polity and its constituent
units is conceptualized by the principle of enumerated powers, but in the case of the EU
no core of sovereign state powers was left beyond the reach of the EU (based on several
doctrines supported by the European Court of Justice, that which makes EU law the
law of the land; the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law, that is, EU law trumps conflicting national law; the doctrine of implied powers, e.g., the competence of the EU to
negotiate and include international treaties; the doctrine of human rights. As we have
argued recently (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001), the single market principle – and
community issues – can be used for many different initiatives. Where will it stop? We
tend to agree with Weiler (1999) that under the present, highly flexible and in many
ways effective arrangements, there is no stopping the train. Some of the support for a
new constitution is apparently motivated by a genuine interest in putting limits to the
growth of community competencies (Weiler 2000).
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the environment in which policy-making and policy development
takes place.
The EU is then not only a segmented, multi-level system, but
a highly open and dynamic system with poorly defined boundaries between its functions, jurisdictions, and authorities; this
also characterizes the relationship between the EU and its member states. Among other things, the lack of precise boundaries
and well-defined functions and responsibilities makes for lack of
clarity about authority relationships as well as about responsibi
lity for policy initiatives and failures. These conditions of pervasive vagueness and ambiguity also contribute to the notorious
non-transparency of the EU. Boundary unclarity and openness
offers great freedom and opportunities for entrepreneurs, both
those within the system and many outside of it (who have resources and/or are organized and want to influence policy or restructure the system in practice).10 This is a major factor in
making for a highly dynamic and expanding system. Such EU
entrepreneurship operates, of course, under some constraints.
These include general constitutional and institutional constraints, as well as the opposition of other agents. An important
factor in the EU, for example is nationally-oriented agents who
seek to block the increasing expansion of EU powers and structures, that is, to maintain a status quo with substantial sovereignty (Burns and Nylander 2001).
In the type of governance that the EU embodies, the direct
influence of people through formal representative democracy
has only a marginal place (Andersen and Burns 1996; Schmitter
1996; Weiler 1999). Individual citizens voting in free, equal, fair
and competitive Euro-elections exercise little or no influence
over the composition of Euro-authorities, much less bring about
a rotation of those in office. For instance, a majority vote generated
10
The freedoms have parallels, in a certain sense, to those of a market. They allow po
werful private and public actors, but above all the Commission itself, extraordinary (in
the perspective of a normal democratic state) initiative and freedom in what they do,
who they engage or collude with, and thus a degree of agency that is uncommon within
most ‘democratic states’ (for the latter do not permit such degrees of freedom for go
vernment agencies. Even in tyrannical regimes, where government agents may enjoy
considerable freedom, individuals and groups of society must worry about arbitrary
and, therefore, unpredictable action from the tyrant). Given this relative freedom from constraints, EU-wide initiatives are grounded or justified in terms of the ‘single market,’ ‘European standards,’ ‘European quality,’ European-wide problems. The substantial
opportunities for initiatives allow for possible gains in power, resources, and legitimacy.
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by the European electorate at large cannot be translated into an
effective and predictable change in government or policy. The
EU is not, in general, a political system in which ru
lers are held accountable by citizens for their public policies and
actions, and where competing elites offer alternative programmes and vie for popular support at the European level. In
this sense, it is not a typical political democracy (Andersen and
Burns 1996; Schmitter 1996), although it satisfies general cultural notions of democracy (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns
1999).11 These conditions have led to critique and discussions
about a ‘democratic deficit’. There has been, however, some
partial developments increasing democratic accountability. For
instance, food safety problems beginning with BSE (bovine
spongiform encephalitis or ‘mad-cow disease’) have not only
triggered crises of confidence in the safety of food; they have also
threatened to further undermine the legitimacy and authority of
the EU, and particularly the Commission (Burns, Carson, and
Nylander 2001). Intense pressure from NGOs and citizen
groups was clearly felt, and continues to be, although new channels of accountability remain quite different than those in a
more typical parliamentary democracy.
Clearly, the EU is not a state in the traditional European or
even contemporary international sense. It is a new form of supra-national authority (see footnote 8). It is still in principle
based on strong national systems which have surrendered – or
are surrendering – degrees and types of national sovereignty in a
wide spectrum of policy areas. European Community law has
priority over any conflicting law of a member state. However, the
rate of implementation and degree of compliance varies consi
derably, between, for instance, Italy and Denmark, to take two
extremes.
Entrepreneurship and lobbying
The Commission plays the key role in initiating legislation.12
When final decisions are made, the Council is the major actor.
11
Although parliamentary institutions are considered the core of western political systems, they are currently undergoing systematic erosion (Andersen and Burns 1996;
Burns 1994; 1999; Burns et al. 2000b.
12
Generally speaking, the Commission is the single most key actor in EU policy-making (Nylander 2000; Pollack 1998). This is, in part, because of its organizational, technical, and discursive capabilities, its key role in agenda setting, preparing investigations,
and preparing legislation. It has the role of initiating (or responding to inquiries about)
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Parliament has been politically weak, with limited initiative or
positive influence. However, the role and strength of Parliament
has been progressively increased, first in the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992) and more recently, in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). At the same time, the Commission has further
strengthened its position through linkages and coalition building with European lobbyists and interest associations. Indeed, it
has been an explicit policy of the European Commission to encourage direct contact with specialized affected interests and
organizations, and those who mobilize expertise. This takes
place above all in diverse, specialized policy networks and subgovernments. In a system that lacks conventional democratic legitimacy and accountability, this can be seen as an alternative
approach to developing some form of constituency and the legitimacy it entails. ‘Public’ authority is dispersed in these arrangements, which integrate public and private agents. There is
not only the lack of a clear centre of authority, but also very weak
formal procedures regulating access to sub-governments and
policy networks.13
More than a thousand advisory and consultative bodies have
been established, so called Euroquangos, involving representatives
footnote 12 continued
policy-making as well as mediating interests within the EU governance structure. But it
is important to note that it does not operate as a traditional public administration. It is,
on the one side, more responsive to pressures on it, more like a political assembly, and
on the other, enjoys much greater flexibility and freedom of action in how it proceeds in
dealing with any particular issue or policy area. It is both responsive to interest pressures but also takes its own initiatives in shaping and balancing interests. For instance,
in pursuit of the liberalization of electricity markets, it formulated the agenda, helped
shape a lobby of industrial electricity users, and encouraged them to appeal to the European Court if the national public utilities refused to accept liberalization (Nylander
and Engstrand 1999). In general, it may make use of its formal resources and procedures as well as mobilize external resources, experts, and procedures, including key
agents and networks outside its domain. The Commission is particularly influential
when it has legal competence, a mandate, or established praxis in an area, when it is in
possession of, or can mobilize, greater expertise and information than most competing
or opposing agents, when it can refer to established principles, norms, rules, and procedures of policy-making, when it can define its policies in universalistic or at least
neutral terms, or can resolve conflicts among interests, including between or among
member states (Nylander 2000).
13
When specific national interests are strong (e.g. agricultural and food issues), the
process may take the form of (or revert to) international bargaining among the member
state representatives.
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of both interest organizations and Community institutions.
Roughly two-thirds of them were formed by the Commission
(van Schendelen 1998). Seventy of the Commission committees
are consultative committees, which are formally institutiona
lized arrangements. Of the council committees, there are 150
advisory committees, 60 management committees, and 80 regulatory committees (van Schendelen 1998). More generally, there
are in the EU elaborate networks of contact between a multitude
of societal interests and lobbyists, on the one hand, and EU institutions, on the other. Indeed, governance networks with the
involvement of public and private actors are the real core of the
political system. Of course, there continues to be a ‘representative authority’ in the system. Formal decisions are taken by the
Council of Ministers (representing the member states) and,
increasingly, the European Parliament representing the ‘European peoples.’
Generally speaking, the EU has a high degree of openness to
various types of representation, not only national and popular
forms, but forms for engaging many different types of special
interests and political agents. Among the most prominent forms
of representation is through ‘lobbying.’ The EU is characterized
by vast networks of lobbyists (Andersen and Eliassen 1991,
1995, 1997; Andersen and Burns 1996). Since 1987, EU lobbying has virtually exploded.14 Estimates of the number of lobbyists operating in Brussels go up to 10 000 or more depending on
how lobbyists are defined. The highest count includes all who
act to gain and maintain access to key actors at the EU level of
decision-making. This includes those who come to Brussels to
pursue particular issues as well as those more permanently positioned in the European capital (Andersen and Eliassen 1991,
1995, 1997; Greenwood 1997; Wallace and Young 1997). Earlier
Brussels lobbyists were, to a large extent, the same types of actors exercising influence at national levels. First and foremost,
these were national and European interest associations. For
14
The key institutional development that set off the exponential growth in lobbying and
the emergence of entirely new types of lobbying groups was the passage of the Single
European Act (1987). This made EU policy-making an important political arena. The
stage was set for vital and profound decision-making processes in Brussels. Before
1987, lobbying of the main EU institutions was mostly done by representatives of national organizations, who often also presented the views of special interests within the
country involved. The major channel of influence was through national representation
of the Council (Andersen and Eliassen 1991).
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instance, in 1980, European federations for agriculture, labour,
industry, business, commerce, and finance had by far the strongest representation in Brussels. The interest groups on the EU
scene today include associations and NGOs ‘representing’ such
sectors of society as education, culture, social services, environment, consumers, public health, and women (Wallace 2000).
EU institutions have increasingly engaged – and interact with
– an extraordinary range of ‘lobbyists.’ The Commission has developed a comprehensive network of contacts that cut across,
and in many instances are independent of, member states and
national representatives. Increasingly, it is necessary for lobbying to be based on broad alliances representing a more ‘European’ perspective.’ The EU system is more lobbying-oriented
than any European national system (Andersen and Burns 1996).
Private and public interest groups from within and outside the
EU can be influential in shaping decisions either through formal
consultation or by acting as sources of information, expertise,
strategic advice, and mediation between other actors (Greenwood 1997; Warleigh 2002)
‘Lobbying’ in the EU operates according to the normative
democratic principle that directly affected parties may claim the
right to participate in and influence policy- and law-making.
This is the basis for specialized self-representation in particular
policy networks or sub-governments. At the same time, expertise
plays a central role in the deliberation, negotiations, and decision-making. The technical aspect, including technical expertise, disciplines the political bargaining in the specialized
networks or sub-governments. It also provides a language and
means of framing problems and their solutions, that is, to
structure the discourses and negotiations of policy. 15 In sum,
15
The concept of framing captures the deliberate definition of a particular issue and the
particular context in which it should be understood (Diani 1996; Gottweis 1998; Snow,
Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1992). Framing has proved a very useful concept in research on EU policy, above all because of the stress on deliberation,
persuasion, negotiation, ‘soft measures,’ etc. (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001).
Specific EU research developing and applying the concept of framing are found in
Dudley and Richardson (1999); Harcourt (1998); Nylander (2000); Radaelli (1995,
2002), among others. The concept of framing stems from Goffman’s (1974) dramaturgical approach and is developed in the literature on social movements. Building on
Goffman, some of the main representatives of this research, Snow and Benford (1986)
define frames as ‘schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive,
identify, and label occurrence within their life space and the world at large’. Snow,
Worden, and Benford (1992) argue that framing is a process-derived phenomenon,
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representation, participation, and political influence are not primarily based on, or linked to, EU citizenship. They are based on
specialized, organized interests, and the mobilization of relevant
expertise.
Diversity and characteristic features of policymakers and lobbyists in EU governance
Initiatives for policy and legislation may come from the Commission, from members of Parliament, or from member states,
or from powerful and diverse lobbyists. In general, great numbers and variety of entrepreneurial agents are formally and informally involved in EU governance.
The Commission as entrepreneur
Thus far, in the history of the EU, the major public entrepreneur
has been the Commission and its various Directorates General
(DGs), for instance DGI, External relations, DGII (Economic
and financial affairs), DGIII (Industry), DGIV (Competition),
DGV (Employment, industrial relations, and social affairs),
DGVI (Agriculture), DGXII (Science, research and development), DGXXIV (Consumer policy and health protection). The
Commission is not only active in the consultation process, engaging lobbyists and experts, but also is a key agent in its own
right (although there is considerable variation among DGs in
this regard). Some DGs are in a strong position, others much
more weak and unsure of their mandate. Even with a mandate
(or ‘competence’), it takes time to build up networks of experts,
develop legitimizing discourses with arguments, and gain authority and influence in relation to other DGs as well as other
agents in the EU complex. In each policy sector, a DG strives for
a ‘constituency of support’ (Richardson 1996).
footnote 15 continued
which involves agency at the level of reality construction. However, framing does not
imply complete constructions of phenomena, but rather that some elements are emphasized over others, and that particular interpretations of reality are made. Thus,
Goffman’s frames are designed to avoid complete relativism but to show multiple realities (Collins 1988). Framing means roughly putting a frame around a picture, but it is
essential to recognize that there are several layers of frames. Around the first frame, a
larger frame could be put, and a smaller frame can be put within the first frame. In
other words, some frames are more fundamental than others. Fundamental policy
frames are often referred to as policy paradigms (see conclusion).
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Literature on the EU often describes the Commission as a
strategic actor, or involved in ‘policy entrepreneurship’ (Cram
1997, Majone 1996, Matlàry 1997; for a conceptualization of
public entrepreneurship, see Woodward, Ellig, and Burns
(1994). The Commission has the task of balancing and mediating national interests as well as interest-group opinions in order
to come forward with proposals that will be also accepted by the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, and the engaged associations and NGOs across Europe. However, it is also
an agent with goals of its own. One raison d’être of the Commission is to promote European integration, and it uses alternative
venues and means for achieving its goals. The Commission often
co-operates with the ECJ (European Court of Justice) to promote European integration, since the ECJ shares with the Commission a preference for deeper integration (Pollack 1998).
Those adhering to the inter-governmental view of the EU consider the Commission only as an agent expressing the will of the
member states. Our research and that of others shows that the
Commission is a powerful actor in its own right and a major
entrepreneur in EU policy-making and institutional reform.
Diffusion of policy initiative (or delegated
entrepreneurship)
One characteristic of the Commission is that it relies on a constituency of external consultants and lobbyists for part of its
political/policy support. It organizes this support in part, by
opening up spaces for ‘outside actors’, associations, NGOs, and
other representatives of interests, etc. to play entrepreneurial
roles. In this way, initiatives may come from any number of
sources, including not only interests and lobbyists, but also technicians.
Typically, a private entrepreneur has greater discretion and
freedom of action than public entrepreneurs, because of the expectations that public entrepreneurs will be monitored, their initiatives will be transparent, and their actions subject to public
law and norms, and accountability (Woodward, Ellig, and Burns
1994). This holds in general, but there are important exceptions,
particularly in the case of the EU, where democratic norms of
transparency and accountability are still weak. But legitimacy
for initiating and carrying through a policy remains important,
and policy entrepreneurs must establish it one way or another in
the EU public space. For instance, a lobbyist who wishes to push
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through a new policy will require that the matter be taken up by
a legitimate policy actor, e.g. an appropriate DG. On the other
hand, the Parliament has found it difficult to be an initiator of
policy, although they are able to block in some cases, and they
are expanding their public power, which, ultimately, can be
translated into initiatives. The Parliament needs a qualified majority in order to come forth with its ‘own initiative’. This has
proven difficult. Not only is the ‘legitimacy of the actor’ a major
factor, but the ‘legitimacy of the problem area’ is also a point of
contention. Some problem areas of initiative are considered (or
have been) ‘national’. This does not preclude EU policy initiatives, but it requires developing an argument why the area
should become a matter of concern for the EU. One has to
demonstrate – provide evidence and arguments – about why the
problem is a ‘legitimate problem for EU action’ (Burns, Carson,
and Nylander 2001; Burns and Nylander 2001). Such issues or
problems are, among others, (1) EU integrated market problems
or problems of common standards of market products, which
have high legitimacy for EU initiatives; (2) new problems not
dealt with at the national level; (3) global problems that call for
collective solution; and (4) regulatory gaps.
Multiple-access policy system
The EU is a multi-access policy system in that entrepreneurs
may gain access and exercise influence at various points and
levels. Of course, some points are more readily open, or give
more likely influence over the policy process and outcome, than
others. For instance, if a matter is already on the agenda of the
Commission and the agent agrees with its thrust and likely outcome, then it may simply try to add weight through the Commission or through contacts to the Commission. If, however, the
interest is at odds with the Commission’s orientation and likely
proposal, then it may have to consider such channels as the national authority or political leadership or the European Parliament. Or, in case an opposition is established and operates in the
policy process organized by the Commission, the agent will find
it advantageous to throw its weight in with the opposition. Although the Commission is the key agent with the legitimacy and
power to formally initiate policy, various entrepreneurial actors
may put an issue on the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs provide problem-solving perspectives as well as new arguments and
discourses. The more radical the proposal, or the perspective,
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the greater the resistance. A radical proposal requires considerable power, possibly normative or legal power, as in the case of
pushing through the liberalization of electricity markets; or it
calls for the mobilization of support, the formation of alliances,
and the formulation of an argument that is difficult to counter,
given the ethos and governing principles of the EU. In the case
of electricity liberalization, the single market principle as well as
the principle of opposition to monopoly were the basis for the
argument and mobilization supporting a paradigm shift and
reframing electricity distribution problems (Nylander 2000;
Nylander and Engstrand 1999). Normative arguments were
highly effective in developing environmental policies as well as
‘mainstreaming gender’ in EU policies.
In sum, several of the EU’s key institutional arrangements,
cultural elements, and dynamics can be characterized as follows.
1 As in any complex institutional arrangement, there are contradictions in values and rule complexes, manifested as zones
of stress and tension, for example at the boundary regions
between particular institutional arrangements such as the
European Parliament and the Commission; between the EU
Commission and Parliament, on one side, and the Council of
Ministers, on the other; or between groups representing diverse values and institutional arrangements such as those
supporting more centralized European policy-making and
those supporting national sovereignty and decentralization.
2 The tensions and conflicts result not only out of different institutionalized values and organizing principles, but also out
of actors’ struggles for power as well as attempts to realize
particular values. One major cleavage is that between those
representing and struggling for centralized EU power and
those representing and struggling for member state sovereignty and formal democracy (see later). The former may act
in the name of the EU and take initiatives, in part trying to
expand its powers and domains of responsibility and authority for policy-making and regulation. 16
16
What is particularly characteristic of the supranational/national cleavage is that it
cuts across most legislative and policy areas. Along such lines, Hooghe and Marks
(1997) stress this distinctively European dimension of contestation: ‘nationalism versus
supranationalism,’ which depicts the conflict about the role of national state as the supreme arbiter of political, economic, and cultural life. At one extreme are those who
wish to preserve or strengthen the national state; at the other extreme are those who
wish to press for ever closer EU and believe that national identities can co-exist with an
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3 While the roles and functions of the different EU institutions
are specified in the Treaty of Rome (1957) (with revisions in
the Single European Act (1986), Maastricht (1992), and Amsterdam (1997) treaties making up a type of constitution),
these are not precisely specified and the roles are negotiable
and shifting. Boundaries are also negotiable and flexible, not
only within the institutional arrangements of the EU but between the EU and external agents, particularly the many
non-government agents and private interests. In general, the
successive treaties have created a framework on which to
build, rather than boxes within which to operate. There is a
culture of democratic governance (entailing not only forms of
participation, deliberation, argumentation, and negotiation
but also general values such as democracy, rule of law, due
process, the necessity of expertise (rationality)). The culture
informs and provides a point of departure for deliberation
and collective decision-making as well as multiple innovations in concrete policy arenas and developments. (This is
much more open-ended than that operating within institutional arrangements that are relatively fixed since it provides
footnote 16 continued
overarching supranational (European) identity.’ The reactions to the Maastricht Treaty,
especially in Denmark but also in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, suggest
continuing controversy around the question of national sovereignty, EU sovereignty,
and forms of democratic governance.
The cleavage between the Commission and the Parliament in opposition to the
Council, and between the EU and national governments relate to centre-periphery
power struggles within the EU (for instance, as found in earlier state and empire formation. One major pattern entails a ‘central movement’ competing with and winning over
(as well as losing in some instances to) peripheral agents (and movements). The point
is that the EU as an expansive, transformative order does not proceed linearly or
monotonically. While there are multiple interests and interest configuration with incentives – and resources – to develop the ‘centre’ – and this process attracts additional
agents, resources, and makes for careers, alliances etc., there are plenty of opponents.
Among the key entrepreneurs carrying the EU project further, elaborating it and deepening it are the Commission, global business, and public interest lobbyists; as well as
experts of diverse kinds who find opportunities and niches in the dynamic EU order).
This explains why the EU expansion and transformation does not take over completely,
why it is piecemeal, and subject to a variety of constraints and countervailing forces
(Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Also, the centre-periphery dialectic is complicated by the fact that member states, through the Council of Ministers and the European Council, also influence community processes. So, the EU can be seen as an instrument of
member states rather than a purely usurping power (Weiler 1999).
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substantial opportunities for introducing and developing organic forms of governance).17
4 The EU shapes and regulates a variety of areas: markets,
technologies and technical developments, environment,
some aspects of welfare (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001)
including public health, issues of citizen rights, and some aspects of foreign policy, particularly commercial and trade
policy. In addition to making rules (including its own rules
and procedures) and regulating, the EU also resolves conflicts, redistributes resources, and defines collective problems
and possible solutions, specifically at the ‘EU level’. There is
a stream of problems, issues, and predicaments that can be
defined or established as EU concerns and put on the growing policy and legislative agenda.
5 A great variety of entrepreneurs (inside and outside of EU
institutions) raise issues (and search for issues and constituencies) and try to solve problems in EU terms, drawing on
EU authority, discourses, allies, and resources (Burns and
Nylander 2001). They contribute in this way to also reproducing or expanding EU values, principles, and institutional
arrangements. These are part of a general ‘EU movement’
without necessarily ‘coordinating’ or colluding with one another.
6 There are multiple modes of policy-making, with modes differing by arena and sector as well as by the agents involved in
an issue, initiative, negotiation (Carson, Nylander, and Burns
[2001]; Wallace [2000], Warleigh [2000]). For example, ‘international negotiation’ at the level of the Council entails negotiating treaties and new global initiatives. The European
Parliament, the Commission itself, and the Council may initiate a comprehensive policy process as, for instance in 1986,
they adopted a joint declaration against racism and xenophobia, followed by a number of other related resolutions and
declarations of intent during the early 1990s (Burns, Carson,
and Nylander 2001). Negotiation and implementation of the
structural funds brought the Commission into direct relation
17
This is a major factor underlying the organic character of EU governance (see below),
which is often ‘democratic’ in some respects (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1999).
The future constitution, now under preparation by the Convention, may make the EU
into a more fixed, less fuzzy arrangement. However, the trend in contemporary governance is toward more organic forms and practices (Burns et al. 2000b).
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with regions and sub-national authorities (Wallace 2000). In
the area of electricity (moves to liberalization and formation
of a single European market), the Commission interacted
with national public utilities (often powerful agents in the
home context) and eventually helped mobilize large industrial consumers to pressure utility monopolies to accept market liberalization. In a number of prominent areas of
policy-making such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a vast
network of industrial associations, powerful enterprises, and
NGOs and other public interest organizations are involved in
EU policy-making together with the Commission (and a
number of its DGs) and the European Parliament.
7 A number of factors drive innovation and development in the
EU, with diverse public and private entrepreneurs exploiting
the freedom and opportunities in the system: (i) expansion in
the size of the EU requiring institutional innovation;
(ii) centre-periphery struggle; (iii) technological and globalization transformations, which, among other things, generate
problems that are often of a community character, for instance, telecommunications, biotechnological developments,
industrial agriculture; (iv) in the context of transformations,
structures are generated offering opportunities for economic,
political or other types of gain, possibilities of power, status,
and prestige, etc.; (v) democratic deficits; (vi) institutional
failings and regulatory gaps (as in the case of EU food crises);
and (vii) cultural transformations in connection with the
construction of European identity (Delanty 1995, 1998), in
part through addressing concrete collective problems such as
the conflict and violence in South-East Europe and in interacting (competing and negotiating) with the US on trade
policy, environment, new technologies such as GMOs (genetically modified organisms), etc.
8 The increasing Europeanization proceeds hand-in-hand with
the gradual erosion of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number of
policy domains – such an evolution will continue (Burns and
Nylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The development is not converging to a single centre, but is instead leading to a
polyarchic complex. In other words, there is a movement
from the level of European member states to a higher,
polycentric level. But the expansion and deepening of EU
regulation is constrained and selectively developed as a result
of opposition from those with vested interests in, and
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representing and struggling for, member state sovereignty
and more conventional ideas of democracy. This struggle is
manifested in the debates and struggles at the convention on
an EU constitution.
On a more general level, there is in the EU a well-established
culture of democratic governance (with understandings, beliefs,
values, and norms as opposed to merely formal constitution of
government (Burns 1994)). This provides the basis for the forms
and evolution of EU governance.18 The EU can be characterized
as a type of ‘organic democracy’ (Andersen and Burns 1996).
This refers to a number of contemporary forms and practices of
governance that diverge from the principles of formal, representative democracy based on territory; distinctions between
‘public’ and ‘private’ are vague or fuzzy; procedures for deliberation, negotiation, and decision-making are diverse and readily
adapted to sectoral needs or requisites of specific policies;
governance may range from a mostly public agency set-up (‘government’) through mixed forms, to largely ‘private forms’
(Andersen and Burns 1992, 1996; Burns 1994, 1999).19 These
forms are democratic in the sense that ‘voice’ and ‘participation’
are to a greater or lesser extent available in matters that affect
particular interests (not because they refine or extend citizen democracy or parliamentarism). This conception does not refer
only to ‘organic government,’ where state agents reach out into
and steer many realms of society. Of course, this also goes on,
but in an organic democracy, we find agents of civil society,
18
Governance has become a useful concept with which to refer to EU developments
(but also emerging national forms), because of mixtures of private and public, informal
and formal, irregular and regular, non-standard ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’, etc.
19
The EU countries experience a deep cleavage between the emerging diffuse culture of
organic democracy and traditional concepts of national parliamentary democracy. This
has resulted in conflicts and recurring mobilizations in opposition to the EU state, just
as we find tensions and conflicts between formal parliamentary democracy and organic
types of democracy within most modern nation-states (Burns 1994,1999). The tensions
and struggles within the EU over questions of sovereignty and centralized control have
contributed to a reassessment of the role of national parliamentary forms. For many,
these are especially symbolic of national sovereignty, and of popular democracy. At the
same time, ironically enough, a great deal of major ‘public policy-making and rulemaking’ in modern states takes place outside of the domain of authority and responsibility of Parliament and the central government, although these institutions remain
largely responsible, or at least accountable, for such decisions (Burns 1999; Burns et al.
2000b).
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NGOs, business associations, companies and unofficial private
actors, who engage in governance activities, often on their own
initiative, claiming their ‘democratic rights’ and recognition of
their expertise and experience. In general, there is the interpenetration of state agencies and agents of civil society. Although
government representatives (of agencies) are partners or mediators in many of the organic processes, they are not in a position
to unilaterally decide or implement rules, whether they concern
the economy, research, education, or technological development
(Kohler-Koch 1995). In short, ‘hierarchy’ gives way to ‘reciprocity’ and ‘multi-lateral systems,’ and the boundaries between
‘public’ (and government) and ‘private’ (contractual) becomes
fuzzy. Finally, there are particular organizing principles and
rules of the game governing discourse, negotiation, and decision-making in any given policy network or community. Particularly important value orientations or values are the pursuit of the
common good and finding positive sum agreements (KohlerKoch 1995).
EU policy-making compared to neo-corporatist and
pluralist policy-making systems
The three systems can be compared on the basis of, on the one
hand, the organizing principles for arranging or conducting
policy-making activities and, on the other hand, the number and
variety of actors.20 In the view of some researchers, the EU
policy-making apparatus represents a new composition of structural elements, differing substantially from either neocorporatist or pluralist orders (Burns, Carson, and Nylander
2000; Burns and Nylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The EU as a system of policy-making and legislation is usually more organized
and formalized than typical pluralist systems such as those in the
US. On the other hand, it is more open to multiple interests and
has much more differentiated and specialized governance and
policy-making structures than do most neo-corporatist systems.
Among the major institutional and structural differences, we
have stressed the centralized and institutionalized character of
the neo-corporatist system, as opposed to the polycentric and
shifting structure of the liberal/pluralist system of policymaking. The EU represents a complex hybrid in which there is
20
In work we have come across recently, Weiler (1999) compares the EU system to neocorporatist and con-associational systems.
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increasing ‘centralization’ in the form of the gradual crowding
out of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number of policy domains. This
is true, for instance, in energy, pharmaceuticals, and economic
policy (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001). But this centralization is not converging to a single authoritative centre, but is instead evolving into a central polyarchic complex. In effect, there
is a marked, but selective movement from the level of European
member states to this supranational, polycentric level. The expansion and deepening of EU regulation is constrained and developed selectively as a result of opposition from those with
vested interests in, and representing and struggling for, member
state sovereignty and national parliamentary democracy (Burns
and Nylander 2001).
In a neo-corporatist system – as well as in some sectors of the
EU (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001) – policy processes are
carried out in accordance with well-defined institutional arrangements. Certain procedures and norms make for orderliness, conflict resolution, and more or less predictable outcomes.
But established procedures and norms are not per se necessarily
integrating and stabilizing. Some contribute in a particular
socio-political context to instability and unpredictability. This is
the case of the neo-corporatist system – as well as some EU
policy sectors — that ignore deep cleavages and substantial minorities. This may occur when these are not defined as an integral part of the system – and therefore not included in
deliberative and conflict-resolution processes. Pluralist systems
are more open and flexible to emerging groups and interests, if
the latter can mobilize resources or find powerful allies. However, such systems leave the policy process exposed to powerful,
resource-rich interests (at the expense of resource-poor interests) as well as self-proclaimed interests who can readily mobilize resources or allies. Pluralist systems are also vulnerable to
the chaotic introduction of problems or issues as well as ‘solutions’ or strategies. In other words, the policy process is vulnerable to ‘garbage-can’ type policy-making (March and Olsen
1976; Andersen and Burns 1992).
Any modern society is characterized by multiple cross-clea
vages. But these cleavages articulate differently, and are mediated differently in different policy-making systems. There is formal as well as informal bridging and regulation of cleavages in
neo-corporatist systems. The cleavages are relatively welldefined and institutionalized in particular ways in a pluralist
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system. There is more fluidity, more self-definition and self-representation, and cleavages may be articulated in a variety of possibly shifting ways. However, they may fail to be ‘bridged’ or
regulated in any systematic or orderly way. The EU recognizes
and institutionalizes cleavages, e.g. between the supra-national
and national levels, between capital and labour interests, between industry and consumer and environmental interests. This
recognition translates into recruitment (and encouragement) of
interest groups to participate in policy-making even to the point
of providing resources to such groups to be able to operate and
participate in lobbying and policy-making.
In the neo-corporatist system, the participating actors are
relatively few, but well-defined collective interests such as central employers’ associations, central labour unions, and the central government. The participants are expected to adhere to
agreed-upon principles of overall, collective benefit, distributive
justice, and compromise. In a liberal/pluralist system, on the
other hand, special or individual interests tend to take precedence over general or collective interests. In the EU, the stress
is on EU collective interests, at the same time allowing for considerable initiative and negotiation by special interests and lobbyists. In established policy areas, there are well-organized and
clear-cut procedures. Hence, these sectors in the EU demonstrate many of the organized characteristics of neo-corporatist
systems.
In a neo-corporatist arrangement, established pressure groups
have highly institutionalized engagements and relationships. Allies and opponents are well defined, as are discourses, resources,
and data. Outside lobbyists target these institutionalized lobbyists. In a pluralist system, there are, of course, norms guiding the
process of policy-making (and even lobbying), but any given
policy process is less formally institutionalized than in neocorporatist or many EU policy-making processes. In pluralist
systems, just as there are shifts in the actors participating, there
are ambiguous, shifting discourses, resources utilized, and data
called upon (although typically not reaching the degree of openness and ‘chaos’ envisioned in the ‘garbage-can model’ of policymaking [March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992]). In
other words, pluralist policy processes are neither as orderly, nor
are the outcomes as predictable, as in integrated, multi-actor
regimes with well-defined relationships and forms of policymaking and more or less predictable policy outcomes. The EU is
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157
characterized by a spectrum of arrangements and processes between these two poles; that is, there are highly institutionalized,
well-defined and well-organized areas of policy-making that approach a neo-corporatist type of order, on the one hand, and
more open, issue-driven processes and fragmented (or as-of-yet
non-integrated), unpredictable policy-making (as in the alcohol
or public health areas), on the other.
Governance and policy-making systems can be distinguished
in terms of their degree of openness (Flam 1994). For our purposes here, we dichotomize open and closed policy systems
corresponding to pluralist and neo-corporatist systems, respectively. Alternative concepts for relatively open as opposed to
relatively closed policy systems are issue networks and
policy communities, respectively (Rhodes 1991).21 A policy
community – such as in a neo-corporatist set-up or in well-established EU sectors such as energy or pharmacy – is characterized by highly restricted membership and stable relationships
and procedures, as stressed earlier. These relatively closed structures are likely to have a well-defined bargaining centre or power
locus, or to be highly homogeneous.22 The concept of issue networks, on the other hand, is close to that of open networks. Such
networks have no single focal point or dominant centre where
actors negotiate and bargain. The structures are polycentric;
there are several centres, typically heterogeneous, rather than
simple homogeneous relations or a clear-cut bargaining and
power centre in the network. Such structural concepts (Knoke
1990) should be regarded as ideal types.
Neo-corporatist arrangements (and also some well-established EU sectors such as agriculture) tend to be relatively
closed and solitary (that in a certain sense accomplish homogeneity), with a defined core of participants and procedures, and
21
The distinction between closed, stable, and predictable structures and open,
dynamic, and unpredictable ones relates to older distinctions in the institutional and
organizational literature such as ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ or ‘institutionalized’ and
‘non-institutionalized’. The most extreme form of ‘open process’ is the ‘garbage can’
process (March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992). This proposition probably
relates to Greenwood’s hypothesis (Greenwood 1997) that ‘well-defined and relatively
concentrated sectors’ have an advantage in organizing at the European level, because
they can develop common cognitive frames, normative orders, strategies, etc.
22
These hypothetical models of networks, polycentric, clearly polarized, etc. (Knoke
1990) are, however, not mutually exclusive in the real world, and should be regarded as
ideal types.
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rather predictable outcomes and developments. They have relatively standard and effective procedures for producing policies,
negotiating, resolving conflicts, etc. The maintenance of closure
usually indicates a commitment to – or acceptance of and even
trust in – a common rule regime (including rules for excluding
irrelevant agents, potential deviants, and irrelevant or improper
issues and strategies). That is, other things being equal, the more
closed the structure, the more orderly and predictable the policy
process.
Agent strategies in open and closed policy
structures
If we assume that agents, in trying to influence policy processes
to their advantage, try to create and maintain social linkages that
are effective, then we would expect different strategies in different types of structural contexts. Actors participating (or trying
to participate) in policy-making will develop strategies for forming ties as a function of whether a policy structure is open or
closed. In order to achieve this, they try to create and maintain,
for instance, network ties that are effective. These would include,
for example, networks that provide lobbyists the necessary opportunities or efficiency in the mobilization of resources and influence in striving for their goals.
In an open network, one establishes redundant linkages for
mobilizing sufficient levels of each potentially essential resource,
as well as other resources that might be important in an uncertain and unpredictable future. Thus, the actors strive to maximize their contacts and to foster redundant contacts, since the
context is much more uncertain and risky than in closed networks. Actors cannot know beforehand what might be ‘redundant’ or ‘unnecessary.’ In other words, given that the actors in
open networks are more likely to be faced with an uncertain and
risky environment – but also one with potentially new (and yet
to be discovered) opportunities – they strive to maximize contacts and even to make ‘redundant’, or apparently ‘unnecessary’
contacts. This very strategy tends to increase the size of the network but does so in ways that elaborate its open, unstable nature.
Thus, one would expect to find linkages to several actors in
each type of position or role, whether they be bureaucrats, interest groups, or experts—corresponding to known, essential valuables. Thus, what might appear to be non-essential or redundant
linkages (but which relate to potential future needs or valuables)
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tend to be established. In contrast, within closed policy structures such as a neo-corporatist arrangement or the EU energy
and pharmaceutical sectors (Carson, Nylander, and Burns
2001), the policy processes are more stable and predictable. Participating actors’ level of uncertainty and sense of risk are lower.
In such contexts, actors tend to minimize redundant or unnecessary contacts (at least those that entail costs or burdens) so as to
reduce costs and to free up resources for investment in core relationships. Participants know the major resources – and how to
mobilize them – in the network of neo-corporatist relationships.
That is, they know which actors to turn to for information, resource mobilization, and alliances. Interaction processes are
relatively stable and predictable. The level of perceived risk
tends to be low and to a certain extent can be calculated.
Consequently, one can strategically minimize redundant or
‘unnecessary’ contacts. In general, in a closed structure, an actor
may determine the strategic values (resources, programmes,
contacts), which he/she requires in exercising influence in the
network. He/she establishes linkages with those agents who can
provide each of these. There would be one link for each valuable,
provided that the link is secure and enables the level of the valuable necessary.
If a key resource is accessible through a given linkage or channel is not sufficient, then the actor would be motivated to establish additional ties (sufficient to providing the necessary
resources, votes, etc.). Such a self-limiting or conservative and
deliberative approach to establishing social ties for policy purposes contrasts sharply with the expansive character of
open networks. This argument corresponds to Burt’s (1992)
hypothesis that closed networks (as defined here) are characterized by non-redundant contacts. The aim of participants is not
to build large networks, but to build a network out of nonredundant contacts sufficient to deal with the problems, resource mobilization, voting requirements, etc. that confront
them (Burt 1992). There is, then, a built-in tendency to limit the
extension or size of such closed policy structures. The distinction between open and closed structures – and more specifically,
open and closed social networks – suggests strategic and behavioural patterns as illustrated in Figure 1.23
23
Network structures are, however, never fully closed. Even if new actors are not readily
admitted, there are external developments which impact on the network, generating
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Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson
Social structural conditions
Pluralist and EU
structural conditions (open, flexible)
commitment to
multiple, redundant
relations to deal with an
uncertain, unpredictable,
risky context; loyalty and
trust limited; flexibility high
Neo-corporatist structures
(closed, stable)
commitment to a few key
relationships (deep,
non-redundant commitments);
high loyalty and high mutual
trust, low flexibility
Figure 1 Strategic and behavioural patterns in open and closed social networks
Conclusions
Each governance arrangement, which we have examined in this
paper, is a particular authoritative rule complex or regime providing a systematic, meaningful basis for actors to orient to one
another and to organize and regulate their interactions, to frame,
interpret, and to analyse their performances, and to produce
particular commentaries and discourses, criticisms, and justifications. Each system specifies to a greater or lesser extent who
may or should participate, who is excluded, who may or should
do what, when, where, and how, and in relation to whom. It organizes specified actor categories or roles vis-à-vis one another
and defines their rights and obligations – including rules of command and obedience – and their access to and control over human and material resources. Each system has not only a certain
footnote 23 continued
new problems or suggesting new strategies and initiatives. Thus, the principle formulated earlier that closed structures provide for more stability of the policy process and
predictability of policy outcomes calls for qualification. Under some conditions, opening up a structure may serve to stabilize a policy process and policy outcomes (that is,
just the opposite of the principle that closure would stabilize the policy process and
make policy outcomes more predictable). In the EU, a key actor such as the Commission manages policy networks, opening them up in some ways, even creating new networks, or making a network more exclusive in order to reinforce support for, and the
realization of, a policy initiative. These moves are intended to stabilize and make more
predictable policy processes and outcome.
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161
interaction logic and coherence – and pattern of development –
but also established expectations, meanings, and symbols as well
as normative discourses (the giving and asking of accounts, the
criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes within the
particular institutional arrangement).
Our previous research utilizing the perspective of the new
institutionalism – and in particular our EU research – emphasizes the role of culture in explaining the ways in which conceptions of governance and policy areas guide action and policy
outcomes. That is, attention is focused on the ways in which
public issues and ‘problems’ as well as ‘solutions’ are framed and
defined within a particular culturally defined conceptual framework established (and reproducing) system of governance expressing or embodying a public policy or governance paradigm.
Thus, each of the governance arrangements is not only a different institutional arrangement but is an expression or embodiment of a distinct model or paradigm for governance, public
policy-making, and regulation (Burns and Carson 2002; Burns,
Carson, and Nylander 2001; Carson 2002; Hall and Taylor
1996). More specifically, a public policy paradigm typically indicates or articulates: (1) which problems or issues are ‘public’
and call for public policy-making (also, which issues should be
defined as ‘private’ and excluded from public consideration);
(2) the location and distribution of appropriate problem-solving
responsibility and authority to frame problems and solutions,
make judgments, adopt strategies, and initiative action; (3) the
location and distribution of ‘experts’ that are knowledgeable on
the problem and its solution; and (4) solution complexes for
dealing with the problem or issue, that is appropriate institutional practices, technologies, and strategies. Variation in public
policy paradigms entails differences in one or more of these
components, for instance the contrast between a ‘liberal or free
market’ paradigm and a ‘public interventionist’ paradigm, or the
contrast between a national policy paradigm and a
‘Euopeanisation’ paradigm.
In sum, these social systems of governance not only operate in
very different ways and generate different policy-making patterns and developments, but entail substantially different ways
of thinking about and judging matters of governance and politics, policy-making, potential problems, and solutions. Our
characterization of the three governance and policy-making
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systems is summarized in the following tables (this structure is
based on a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective, 24
stressing not only macro-structural factors (Table 1), but interaction and strategic conditions (Table 2), and outputs (including feedback effects) (Table 3).
Table 2 specifies the opportunity structures and strategic conditions characterizing the three systems.
Table 3 shows some of the outcome and development patterns, in particular, degree of stability and predictability in the
different systems.
Clearly, the EU policy-making apparatus differs in several
ways from either neo-corporatist or pluralist orders. On the one
hand, the EU, as a system of policy-making and legislation, is
more organized than typical pluralist systems. On the other
hand, it is more open, flexible, and diversified than neocorporatist systems. The neo-corporatist arrangement is more
stable and predictable than the EU system, and the latter is more
so than pluralist systems. The latter are likely to function more
effectively in a turbulent context than either the neo-corporatist
or the EU systems, addressing new problems and issues, in part
because they are more open and adaptable, less formally institutionalized. Arguably, the EU combines the best of both systems.
The EU modes of policy-making, like those of the neocorporatist system, stress the management of conflict and the
use of technical knowledge and cooptation in conflict resolution.
This is not to overlook the serious problems and challenges to
the EU system such as the following.
1 EU policy processes are highly fragmented as in pluralist systems. Neo-corporatist systems tend to generate greater overall coherence in policy-making. The proliferation of EU
24
Underlying our analysis is a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective (Burns,
Baumgartner, and DeVille 1985; Burns, Baumgartner, Dietz, et al. 2003; Burns and
Carson 2002; Burns and Dietz, 1992; Burns and Flam, 1987). This theory focuses on
configurations of actors (individuals and collectives) exercising agency, their interaction processes, the institutional arrangements within which and on which they operate,
selective environments, and key evolutionary processes (processes of generating innovation and variety, selection and reproduction and transformation). This perspective
stresses the importance of human agents – in cooperation and in conflict—in the
generation, selection, and development of institutions – a factor largely missing in conventional evolutionary and functional approaches (or, if human agency and social conflict is considered at all, it is done in an ad hoc and incoherent fashion).
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Table 2 Opportunity structures and situational conditions generated in diverse
policy-making systems
Policy-making system
Opportunity
structures and
interaction processes
Neo-corporatist
(e.g., Sweden, Holland,
Austria)
Target agents
n Inside or outside
the formal policymaking process
n
Strategic pathways
n Formal and
informal pathways
n
n
n
Appropriate or
normatively
grounded
strategies of
lobbyists
n
n
Liberal/pluralist
(USA)
Neo-corporatist
structure or its
representatives,
central actors
(labour unions,
business interests,
government
agencies) in the neocorporatist structure
(or those with
linkages to them, for
instance their subunits.
n
Formal, clear-cut
strategic pathways
through wellestablished interest
organizations.
Relatively few
informal pathways,
except for constant
movement of
personnel between
key organizations
and government.
n
Establish ties to
formal representatives or those with
linkages to them;
establish oneself as
a representative
through recognized
interests.
Appeal to common
good and/or right of
particular interests
to have a say;
mobilize legitimacy.
n
n
n
European Union
Key individual
members and staff in
executive, legislative
and judicial
branches,
Key lobbyists,
interest organizations or other agents
with contacts to any
of the above.
n
Multiple, divergent
pathways; formal
and informal
linkages corresponding to multiple
segments.
n
Establish ties to
formal representatives or those with
close linkages to
them including
agents involved in
developing or
preparing legislation;
establish oneself as
a representative of
recognized interests,
by demonstrating
connection to
relevant constituency, or by
demonstrated
relevant expertise.
Mobilize power.
Appeal to abstract
rights, or rights to
have a ‘voice.’
n
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n
n
n
n
n
Directorates General
(DGs), key expert groups
or networks, involved
interests.
European Parliament.
Member States, relevant
agencies.
Organizations, persons
or agents with contacts
to any of the above.
Multiple, divergent
pathways, corresponding
to multiple segments.
Certainty of genuine
influence varies widely.
Multiple informal
pathways.
Establish ties to formal
representatives or those
with linkages to them,
including agents involved
in developing or
preparing legislation;
establish oneself as a
representative through
recognized interests, by
demonstrating
connection to relevant
constituency, or by
demonstrated relevant
expertise.
Show problem a relevant
‘European issue.’ Appeal
to hegemonic EU
principle plus expertise
and systematic data.
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Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson
Table 3 Outcome and development patterns in diverse policy-making systems
Policy-making system
Outcomes and
developments
Institutional
continuity
Prominent
institutional
developments
Neo-corporatist
(e.g. Sweden, Holland,
Austria)
n
n
Pluralist (USA)
Relatively stable
arrangement,
characterized by
established rules
and processes
including those for
participation.
Stable groupings of
actors with
relatively orderly
movement of actors
into and within the
policy-making
system.
n
The norms of a
corporatist order
require inclusion of
all parties
considered
‘relevant’. The
normative order
offsets in part the
power differences.
n
n
n
n
European Union
Actor movement in
and out of policymaking system may
be rapid and highly
unpredictable.
Extremely complex
and changing
system characterized by shifting and
relatively unpredictable configurations
of actors, power
relationships, and
policy developments.
n
Proposals are
introduced when
powerful interests
(and their allies)
participate and
dominate. On the
other hand,
proposals are
blocked when they
fall too far outside
the interests of any
dominant interest
or coalition (that
can be formed).
Policies that
emerge may not
resolve, and may
exacerbate conflict
and undermine
legitimacy of policymaking system.
Openness and
flexibility. Most
likely to function
optimally in
addressing new
patterns and issues
when there is
diversity among
actors.
n
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n
n
n
The established sectors
display orderly, wellorganized patterns of
policy-initiating and
-making.
Increases in number
and variety of interests
and lobbyists involved,
both in established and
emerging policy
sectors.
Developing or emerging
arenas display relative
disequilibrium, with
rapid changes in actors
and procedures.
Spectrum running from
multi-agent-highly
organized systems to
pluralist systems,
depending upon the
sector.
Established sectors
(especially areas
central to EU’s goals of
integrated market,
harmonization, etc.),
tend to be characterized by consistent, wellorganized procedures
and well-defined
participants (as in the
case of EU competition
policy-making or of the
EU energy or pharmaceutical sectors
(Carson, Nylander, and
Burns 2001). Emerging
sectors are often
characterized by less
clear mandates, new
and emerging or
shifting participants,
and changing
relationships (for
instance, health,
alcohol, and other
social issues) (Burns,
Carson, and Nylander
2001)
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European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements
165
modes of governance – with highly diverse (and flexible)
arrangements – results in incoherence and contradictions or
interference between sector-specific policies. There are attempts to overcome this at the Commission level by increasingly involving multiple DGs in any given policy area.
2 EU organic forms of governance typically lack transparency
and parliamentary oversight. Standardization and simplification would contribute to transparency. However, the proliferation of modes of governance and the very adaptability to
specific situational conditions effectively operate in opposition to standardization and reduce insight and control.
3 One of the most characteristic features of EU organic governance is the involvement of diverse interests in committees and
quasi committees25 for preparing policy and carrying through
policy processes. Committee participants come from member states, often with technical expertise, together with independent experts, and representatives of industry, NGOs, and
other stakeholders. They participate because they expect that
policies and regulations will impact on their interests and that
they should and can try to influence them (Weiler 1999). But
there are major problems with these arrangements as indicated earlier—issues of transparency and representation,
equal access, and political accountability.
The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU is multi-dimensional and a
threat to long-term stability and viability (Andersen and Burns
1996, 1998). As Weiler (2000) argues, ‘…the intolerability of
governance without government will, indeed become intolerable. The violation by Europe of the most basic and fundamental
norms of democratic accountability – the ability of the electorate
‘to throw the scoundrels out’ – and its violation of the most
basic and fundamental norm of democratic representation – the
25
This form is referred to as Comitology (Føllesdal 2000; Weiler 1999). It is unlike
corporatist mechanisms or normal lobbying in pluralist systems. It is less open and
more organized than the latter. It is less fixed – more open to new participants and issues – than neo-corporatist systems. Above all, Comitology in the EU context – unlike
neo-corporatist mechanisms or lobbying in pluralist systems – in that such activities are
regulated, at least formally, by national parliaments that remain sovereign to overrule
such processes. These EU arrangements remain beyond the control – and hence beyond
the responsibility and accountability – of any single directly or indirectly elected body;
the European Parliament has challenged Comitology as undemocratic and lacking in
transparency, a major area where the de facto and de jure powers at EU level are not
sufficiently under democratic control (Weiler 1999).
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Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson
ability of the electorate to influence, through elections, the
policy orientation of European institutions – will begin to undermine the success of the past and impede would-be successes
of the future. Hence the need to touch the hitherto untouchable:
the basic Community architecture.’
Acknowledgements
The research presented in this article was conducted in collaboration with Johan Nylander. We are grateful to Helena Flam and
Claudio Radaello and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions relating to an earlier draft of this paper.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European
Sociological Association’s 4th European Conference of Sociology, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 18–21 August 1999. The research underlying this paper has been funded by the Swedish
Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, the
Swedish Council for Social Research, and the Swedish Institute
of Public Health.
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