OUTLOOK ON EUROPE
‘BEST PRACTICES’ AND THE DILEMMA OF
REGIONAL CLUSTER POLICY IN EUROPE
GERT-JAN HOSPERS
University of Twente, School of Business, Public Administration and Technology, PO Box 217, 7500 AE
Enschede, the Netherlands. E-mail: g.j.hospers@utwente.nl.
‘The variety of the small European continent is
great’, observed the geographer Gottmann in
1954. Now, half a century later, it seems that the
great diversity within Europe is challenged
more and more. The fact is that the European
Commission propagates the use of ‘best practices’ in the field of regional policy (e.g. EC
2001, 2003; Martin 2005). Borrowing successful
policies from elsewhere is seen as a means to
speed up European regional development and
achieve it at lower cost. This EU-driven trend of
benchmarking leads to the set-up of regional
policies with similar objectives, instruments and
policy concepts. Everywhere in Europe policymakers claim to aim for ‘regional competitiveness’ by creating ‘framework conditions’ for the
formation of ‘high-tech clusters’. Thus, authorities hope to be able to copy the success of wellknown ‘best practices’ of regional clustering as
found in for example California (US), Bavaria
(Germany), Sophia-Antipolis (France) and
Oulu (Finland). Porter (2000, p. 254), one of
the leading advocates of cluster policy, defines
a cluster as ‘a geographically proximate group
of interconnected companies and associated
institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities’. Fuelled by
the work of Porter and other experts (e.g.
OECD 2001; Cooke 2002) especially regional
‘high-tech clusters’ in the field of information-,
bio- and nanotechnology rank high now at
policy agendas.
In theory, it must be said, ‘best practices’ of
regional clustering have much to offer for
policy-makers in search for a suitable regional
strategy. Framework policy supporting clusters
for regional competitiveness seems to be more
generic and market-friendly than top-down policies of the past, such as the highly selective
growth pole policies (Cooke 2002). Regional
cluster policy, however, still implies a form of targeting. First, there is some selectivity ingrained
in the concept of ‘regional competitiveness’
(Reinert 1995). After all, to raise a region’s competitive advantage vis-à-vis other areas government still has to decide which regional activities
get support and which are left to market forces.
Second, even if the objectives of cluster policy
are generic, the tools used to achieve these goals
often implicitly favour certain activities. Public
investment in a region’s science base or R&Dsubsidies simply cannot benefit all clusters, but
will always have a bias towards particular parts
of the economy (Cowling et al. 1999). For
example, a biotechnology cluster is more likely
to make use of innovation-oriented policy schemes
than a traditional cluster (e.g. textiles) where
opportunities for renewal are less obvious.
Accordingly, also in a cluster-based world, public
authorities cannot escape from some kind of
targeting.
In this paper we dwell on the need to target
today’s regional cluster policy and the role of
‘best practices’ in this respect. In policy terms,
there are many possible clusters at choice: after
all, groups of interconnected companies and
institutions can be found in many economic
fields varying from high-tech, low-tech to no-tech.
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie – 2005, Vol. 96, No. 4, pp. 452–457.
© 2005 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden MA 02148, USA
‘BEST PRACTICES’ AND REGIONAL CLUSTER POLICY IN EUROPE
Given the fact that government cannot facilitate
all clusters in a similar manner, our focus is on
the question as to how authorities can cope with
the dilemma of which clusters to target and
which not to. To deal with this issue we first
assess the effectiveness of regional high-tech
cluster policy that has become so trendy due to
the EU-driven propagation of ‘best practices’.
Then, we explore the viability of regional cluster
policy at the other extreme of the economic
spectrum, i.e. a policy towards traditional low-tech
clusters. Thereafter, we take stock and present
an alternative, neo-Schumpeterian type of policy
that might be a way-out of the regional cluster
policy dilemma. At the end of the paper, this
so-called ‘new combinations’-policy, which is
aimed at the bottom-up development of clusters
where global trends and local traditions come
together, is briefly illustrated with regional
examples from all over Europe.
TRENDY HIGH-TECH CLUSTERS
Dazzled by well-known ‘best practices’ such as
Silicon Valley and the Oulu-phenomenon governments tend to focus on high-tech clusters in
their attempts to raise regional competitiveness.
In general, high-tech activities such as information and communication technology (ICT),
biotechnology and nanotechnology provide the
excitement and is something with which politicians hope to score in the public opinion (Drucker
1985). Policy towards high-tech clusters, however, involves at least three dangers.
First, there are no fundamental reasons to
believe why policy-makers are better informed
than entrepreneurs in assessing the future economic potential of particular regional clusters.
As public choice theory makes clear, ‘government failure’ is as common as ‘market failure’
owing to massive information assymmetries and
strategic behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats (Wolf 1990). Due to the inherent uncertain character of new technologies especially in
technology policy, such government failure is
likely to occur. There are many examples here
(Schilder 2001). A telling example of the lack
of public foresight comes from Sweden in the
1960s. Gunnar Lange, minister of trade at that
time, compared Volvo’s attempt to sell cars to
Americans with trying to sell fridges to the Eskimos. Later on, exporting cars to the US turned
453
out to be Volvo’s most profitable business. Also
French high-tech policy in the 1980s shows the
risks of a strategy of picking winners. After five
years of subsidising the micro-electronics sector
the French had to admit that they had backed
the wrong horse. One of the reasons why French
high-tech policy failed was the lack of commercial insight among the public elites whose only
aim was to make France world-leading in microelectronics. For a more recent case of public
ignorance on technological development, think
of the world-wide hype around information
technology: to be sure, the impact of this technology is important, but it certainly has not led
to the ‘new economy’ the authorities hoped for
(Clarke 2001).
Further, the possibility for areas to reap profits from high-tech clusters may be limited – and
not only because high-tech normally offers far
less employment than low-tech or no-tech sectors (Drucker 1985). More important than this
job argument is the fact that in the Europeanwide innovation race most regions target similar
activities. Usually, public authorities want to run
each other close, the consequence being that
nearly all of them support the development of
regional information-, bio- and nanotechnology clusters. All over Europe it is tried to create
‘Silicon Somewheres’ now (Hospers 2004).
Regions even proudly brand themselves as the
next Silicon Valley, ranging from Silicon Glen
(Scotland) and Silicon Seaside (Southern
Norway) to Silicon Polder (Holland) and Silicon
Saxony (Sachsen). However, real regional
competitive advantage comes from making a
difference, not from doing the same things other
regions do. Apart from that, from a Europeanwide point of view the current bandwagon effect
in high-tech cluster policy fosters excessive
investment (duplication) in the same technologies. This herd behaviour may lead to overcapacity, bubbles and ultimately a crash in which
only the fittest actors survive (Lux 1995). Likewise, by investing in similar technologies and
copying ‘best practices’, regions undermine
their potential competitive advantage and
should not be surprised that in the end a painful regional shake-out will occur.
Finally, in supporting high-tech clusters authorities often ignore the question whether the preconditions for such clusters are present in the
region in question. There are large interregional
© 2005 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
454
differences in starting-position, economic
structure and institutional particularities. Thus,
what works in one region is not necessarily suitable or feasible for another region. An area,
for example, is unlikely to be successful in hightech without having enough ‘absorptive capacity’ for new technologies (Cooke 2002). If a
region lacks such a ‘receiving system’, cluster
policy may be risky. Castells & Hall (1994) provide compelling evidence that the costs of starting clusters from scratch are very high and that
it may take at best a long time before clusters
are embedded in the regional economy. One of
the examples of extreme policy failure in hightechnology clustering is Akademgorodok in
Russia. After the model of Silicon Valley this
Siberian ‘city of science’ was built ex nihilo
in the 1950s. Since then, the place has been
languishing for decades. Other cases pointing
to the importance of embeddedness in clustering come from Southern Italy and the Ruhr
Area (Hospers 2004). Here, ambitious policy
initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s were simply
rejected by the socio-economic environment.
Both the industrial complexes in Sardinia and
the high-tech sectors in the Ruhr Area turned
out to be disembedded and ended as ‘cathedrals in the desert’.
TRADITIONAL LOW-TECH CLUSTERS
In practice, it is not only high-tech activities that
policy-makers support in their regional cluster
policies. Many regions in Europe are stuck with
the heritage of the ‘old economy’, being of a
low-tech or sometimes even no-tech character
(Hayter 1997). Due to fierce international
competition and declining demand notably old
industrial regions specialised in textiles, coal
and steel making, ship building, food processing
and car production have come into severe difficulties. Although these ‘regional champions’
often have undergone a restructuring process
over the last decades, most of them still obtain
aid under the heading of regional cluster policy
(Tödtling & Trippl 2004). Is such a traditional
low-tech cluster policy a viable alternative to the
current trend among policy-makers to copy
‘best practices’ of high-tech clustering?
Essentially, public authorities do not have to
be ashamed for supporting ‘old economy’clusters. In contrast to many high-tech activities
© 2005 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
GERT-JAN HOSPERS
these clusters are at least embedded in their
environment and usually employ a large number
of people (Fingleton 1999). Traditional clusters
often laid the foundation for a region’s competitive advantage and had the chance to prove
their viability for the economy. Examples are
coal and steel in Wallonia (Belgium), forestry
in Scandinavia, automotive and construction in
Southern Germany, watchmaking in the Jura
d’Arc (Switzerland), textiles in Northern Italy
and the metal industry in the Austrian region
of Styria. However, the way in which policymakers mostly support such traditional clusters
is subject to criticism. By doing so, the authorities run the risk of simply ‘helping losers’.
For one thing, public policies aimed at lowtech regional clusters regularly pursue a mixture
of goals which may hamper an optimal policy
response. Political desires to keep regional
champions alive are often mixed with aims of
restructuring, employment issues and national
industrial policy considerations (Hayter 1997).
Such multiple objectives of cluster policy are
dangerous, as they may conflict and thus rule
out the possibility for a clear-cut strategy. A dramatic case is Dutch policy towards regional shipbuilding from the 1970s until today (Van Klink
& De Langen 2001). Time after time sound
reasons to shrink Dutch shipyards have been
overridden by short-term employment thinking,
prestige goals to continue the tradition of the
Netherlands as a maritime nation and employment aims, e.g. in the northern part of the
Netherlands. Since the 1970s, similar mistakes
have been made in English regions specialised
in automotive manufacturing (Howitt 1996).
Also here, the simultaneous pursuing of social,
restructuring, nationalistic and economic goals
did not work and may explain the decline of the
car industry in the United Kingdom – with the
automotive cluster around producer British
Leyland as a ‘worst practice’.
Also low-tech cluster policy often does not
cure the underlying problems of the activities
targeted. In theory, old industrial clusters may
be supported temporarily to be able to revitalise
(Tödtling & Trippl 2004). The problem, however, is that starting such subsidies is easier than
stopping them. Moreover, subsidy-based policy
measures in traditional sectors often do not
help firms to restructure, but instead contribute
to the maintenance of inefficiencies that these
‘BEST PRACTICES’ AND REGIONAL CLUSTER POLICY IN EUROPE
firms may have accumulated in the past. In this
way, they have the chance to become fully
dependent on public support (Howitt 1996).
Old industrial activities tend to suffer from
‘inertia’ or ‘path dependency’, i.e. the tendency
to stick to existing patterns rather than to pace
up with changing economic circumstances
(Hassink 1997). A typical case of this ‘subsidy
addiction’ can be found in Wallonia (Belgium)
since the 1970s. Politicians maintained the
employment in coal, steel and textiles artificially
and thus delayed the reorientation of the
region into new activities. In short, traditional
cluster policy may frustrate the restructuring
process needed for regaining competitiveness.
Consequently, traditional clusters may become
locked-in and fail to make the connection with
new market developments.
TREND THROUGH TRADITION
In these days, regional cluster policy is widely
regarded as an area-based strategy that is less
pretentious than traditional, more selective
regional policies (see e.g. Porter 2000; OECD
2001; Cooke 2002). Inspired by regional ‘best
practices’ policy-makers all over Europe praise
regional cluster policy as a horizontal and
market-friendly approach aimed at regional
competitive advantage. In our view, however,
regional cluster policy is as selective as earlier
regional policies. The fact is that, in practice,
policy-makers still have to focus on particular
clusters instead of all clusters in the economy.
Due to the propagation of regional benchmarking (‘best practices’) by the European Commission, authorities often pick winners in hightechnology clustering. At the same time, the
alternative of supporting regional low-tech clusters is in fact a policy of helping losers. Thus,
both high-tech and traditional regional cluster
policy involves pitfalls. Roughly speaking, the
new economy may be too advanced for a region,
while old economy sectors do not seem to offer
viable opportunities either. Is there a way out
from this dilemma of regional cluster policy?
In our view, policy-makers can escape from
the traps of regional cluster policy by focusing
instead on original interfaces of local traditions
and global trends. It is important to note that
the starting point for this alternative cluster
strategy should be a region’s present economic
455
structure – after all, where regions are going to,
always depends upon where they are coming
from ( Jacobs 1969; Hassink 1997). Even if it
may be a trivial statement, the economic perspectives of an area cannot be but somehow
connected to its past. Within the structural and
cultural specificities of a region governments
may try to identify clusters specialising in – to
paraphrase Schumpeter’s (1912) term for innovations – ‘new combinations’ of local traditions
and global trends. Such global-local interfaces
with opportunities for growth may be produced
by joining existing economic activities in a
region, upgrading traditional industries for the
new economy or making use of old industrial
knowledges for novel purposes as dictated by
economy-wide, structural developments (Hospers
2004). This integration of new, global trends
into old, local traditions is quite a job and
requires much creativity. At first glance, it is
hard, for example, to conceive how heroes of
the old economy (e.g. shipyards) could revitalise. In the process of exploring and exploiting
such creative global-local interfaces, we think,
policy-makers can fulfil a supporting and developing role. Our advice for such a cluster policy
of trend and tradition is not just of an academic
nature: throughout Europe examples can be
found that show how government may help in
bridging the gap between high-tech and lowtech clusters. We want to stress that these examples are not ‘best practices’ but rather ‘unique
practices’, demonstrating only that it is always
an area’s uniqueness that counts for regional
competitiveness.
REGIONAL RENEWAL FROM WITHIN
In Europe several regions demonstrate that a
neo-Schumpeterian regional cluster policy aimed
at ‘new combinations’ can contribute to regional
competitiveness. Table 1 lists a few examples
(see e.g. Hospers 2004; Benneworth 2002 for
more illustrations). Regions can rejuvenate
their traditional industrial crafts by fostering
the introduction of high technology in design,
production and marketing. With such a strategy
‘new combinations’ have been realised in Danish furniture, the Swiss watchmaking network
and Italian textiles. Other examples illustrate
how the expertise of a declining sector may be
exploited for emerging trends. The pop music
© 2005 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
456
GERT-JAN HOSPERS
Table 1. European examples of combining local traditions with global trends in regional cluster policy.
European region (country)
Local tradition
Global trend
New combination
Jutland (Denmark)
Jura d’Arc (Switzerland)
Emilia-Romagna (Italy)
Manchester (UK)
Baden-Württemberg (Germany)
Ruhr Area (Germany)
North Pas-de-Calais (France)
Dunakanyar (Hungary)
Krakow Region (Poland)
Furnituremaking
Watchmaking
Textiles industry
Heavy industries
Machine tools
Heavy industries
Clothing sector
Bathing culture
Building/painting
Quality and lifestyle
Marketing and lifestyle
High-tech production
Pop music and pop art
Growing digitalisation
Experience economy
Need for convenience
Ageing and health
Need for maintenance
Design furniture
Swatch watches
Trendy fashion
Cultural industries
Multimedia devices
Industrial culture
Mail order services
Health/leisure resorts
Restoration services
and art cluster in Manchester (UK) and the
multimedia cluster in Baden-Württemberg (Germany) can be traced back to the prior existence
of industries whose know-how on advanced
materials proved to be useful for the new businesses. In cluster policy, authorities can also
take advantage of the trend that demand for consumer services is rising. In North Pas-de-Calais
(France) several textile factories have been
transformed into mail order firms specialised in
clothing, while in the Ruhr Area (Germany)
former mines and steel factories are used for
tourist purposes (‘industrial culture’). Relevant
examples of ‘trend through tradition’ in
Central and Eastern Europe are high-tech restoration services in the Polish building cluster
and modern health resorts around Hungarian
spas.
The experiences described above also suggest ways how to organise the cluster policy we
have in mind. As a rule, the area-specific ‘new
combinations’ in these examples have been
realised with subnational, bottom-up policies
that incited participation from relevant stakeholders in the region (e.g. local firms, residents,
business associations, universities and local
(semi)public bodies). ‘Localisation’ of this kind
typically empowers all of a region’s assets and takes
optimal advantage of the creative potential on
the spot (Pröhl 1997; Cooke 2002). ‘Regional
renewal from within’ can take various forms. In
Jutland, the Jura d’Arc, Emilia-Romagna and
Baden-Württemberg the regional government
has facilitated the creation of business support
and technology transfer centres providing
‘real services’ (e.g. technological advice and
networking events) to the local business com© 2005 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
munity. In Manchester, Dunakanyar and the
Krakow Region regional authorities have supported and combined creative ideas of single
entrepreneurs and have taken care of the marketing (branding) of the resulting clusters
within the region’s tourist and business promotion. Finally policy-makers in the Ruhr Area
and Northern France have offered regional
places of dialogue where the ‘collective intelligence’ (e.g. local business men, city/business
representatives and scientists) can meet to
develop new ideas building on unique regional
strengths. Together, these examples show the
importance of policy action at the subnational
level and the need to emphasise regional forces
and potentials. They also suggest some key success factors for a cluster policy of ‘trend through
tradition’: regional government can help in
adapting the local business community to new
requirements of the knowledge and services
economy, provide network opportunities, take
care of the region-wide marketing and establish
regional cluster platforms for creative dialogue.
In Europe, we think, there are many opportunities to find clusters that integrate new tricks
with old crafts. In our neo-Schumpeterian view,
cluster policy gets a new meaning: regional
government may support, develop and brand
clusters in which global trends and local traditions come together. For EU policy-making
this means that ‘best practices’ like high-tech
clustering in Silicon Valley are of limited use.
At best, they can provide some inspiration, but
they entirely fail to be recipes for successful
regional development. Therefore, we advise the
EU to take care with the further propagation of
‘best practices’ in regional cluster policy. Rather,
‘BEST PRACTICES’ AND REGIONAL CLUSTER POLICY IN EUROPE
we plead for an article in the European Treaty
stating that the Commission shall enable
enough ‘economic diversity’ among European
regions. In this way, local authorities will be
stimulated to attune their clusters to area-specific
assets as much as possible. Thus, the search of
European regions for the next ‘Silicon Somewhere’ may be prevented. For Europe’s diverse
geo-economy encouraging such place-based
cluster policies of ‘trend through tradition’ certainly makes more sense than today’s reliance
on ‘best practices’. Therefore, Gottmann’s
observation that ‘the variety of the small European continent is great’ has a double meaning.
Indeed: the large diversity of Europe is terrific
– and should be exploited.
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