zy zyx z zy zyxw Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism Pam Stavropoulos Australian critics are uninterested in the topic of Australian conservatism, and in “right-wing” thought and politics more generally. While this statement is as general as it is provocative, it is surprisingly easy to substantiate. It is remarkable that there has been little scholarly enquiry into the topic of Australian conservatism, and that this is something upon which a range of commentators can agree. As recently as 1976, Overland contributor Glen Lewis referred to this lack as a great lacuna within Australian scholarship,1 and in 1984 former Meanjin editor Judith Brett could still highlight a “general lack of interest in conservatism” on the part of Australian intellectuals.2 It is also the case that a marked lack of scholarly interest in Australian conservatism is paralleled by the insufficiency of the analysis that has been advanced. Thus while noting that “No extended discussion of Australian conservatism has yet been written”, Lewis directs the interested reader to a short list of eclectic titles which (while including some impressive mate~ial)~ even in its entirety does not adequately illuminate this topic. It is of course the case that the nature and influence of political philosophies in Australia is a topic which is itself insufficiently discussed. Allan Patience has noted that it is only relatively recently that scholars have seriously addressed the political philosophies which in some way shape Australian politic^.^ With reference to the work of Peter Loveday? Patience notes that political thought in Australia has never been shaped into “coherent and well-established bodies of doctrine”.6 In the light of this, one might be forgiven for thinking that Australian conservatism has been a casualty of a wider lack of interest in political philosophies more generally. Yet while there is an obvious sense in which this is true, such a reading can be misplaced. Quite apart from the more specific lack of interest in Australian conservatism, there exists the manifest situation that left-wing ideologies have attracted scholarly attention in a way that “right-wing” ones have not. As Brett has highlighted, “It has been the Labour movement and the various manifestations of radicalism which have attracted interest; “the advocates of social reform” have seemed problematic while conservatives have been taken for granted”.7 It is possible to argue that such a situation is unjustified, and that far from being unproblematic, Australian conservatism poses a range of challenges with which existing approaches have been ill-equipped to deal. Perhaps the most important of these challenges concerns the way in which conservatism is so frequently viewed. Even Brett’s implicit call for greater attention to conservatism on the part of Australian intellectualsfalls victim to a polarisation of approach which needs to be questioned. For in her contention that “the advocates of social reform” have seemed problematic in a way that conservatives have not, any conservativeclaim to social reform is effectively denied. The aims of this paper are two-fold - to discuss reasons for the neglect and ensuing distortion to which the topic of Australian conservatism has been subject, and to suggest zyxwv zyxwv 172 zyx z zyxwv zyxwv zy Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism ways in which such neglect can be rectified. While these aims can be viewed as distinct, they are also complementary in that there are fundamental ways in which the two overlap. As will be shown, the conservative ethos is problematic on its own terms, and for a variety of reasons. This, in turn, leads to its equation with other philosophies and ideologies from which it should be distinguished. Once the nature of conservativethought is appreciated, it becomes possible to distinguish conservatism from other varieties of thought with which it is confused. The fvst part of the paper will focus on the concept of conservatism, and some of the dilemmas of definition to which it gives rise. This will serve as a prelude to the second section of the paper, in which the difficulties of relating conservatism to the specific Australian context will be addressed. These difficulties have been compounded in the contemporary period by the emergence of two related yet distinct phenomena - the new conservatism and the New Right The third and final section discusses the nature of the “new” conservatism, and its differences from the so-called “New Right” with which it is frequently confused. With reference to earlier discussion, it will be argued that this confusion must be seen in the context of a longer-standing critical inadequacy which must be confronted if the nature of Australian conservatism is to be illuminated. In attempting to establish clarity of definition, an important preliminary point must be made. This has to do with the corresponding danger that in seeking to delineate concepts which are often equated (however misleadingly) significant parallels and points of continuity will be lost. For example, it will be shown how conservatism is often confused with liberalism; a problem of definition which is particularly apparent in the Australian case. But while this equation will be shown to be illegitimate, this does not mean that there is no common ground between the two persuasions. Similarly, it will be demonstrated that the contemporary phenomenon of the “new” conservatism has been wrongly depicted as virtually synonymous with that of the so-called “New Right”. But arguing that the “new” conservatism and the “New Right” represent (and should be discussed as) two distinct entities is not to deny that there are areas of compatibility between them. In attempting to establish the often subtle differences between political ideologies, one must be careful not to over-compensateby being insensitive to the ways in which they intersect. zyxwv zyxwvutsr A Misunderstood Concept Why, then, have conservatives been “taken for granted” by Australian critics, and what accounts for frequent misunderstanding of the very concept of conservatism? Part of the reason clearly stems from the way in which the conservative label has come to signify an unthinking allegiance to the status quo, rather than (as one theorist has put it) a commitment which “is just as capable of being defended in the light of a philosophical view of the nature of man, of society, and of the world as is a liberal or socialist one”.8 Whilst it is true that most labels can be misleading, the conservative” one can be especially so. This is because the commonsensical conception that it signifies nothing other than a retention of the status quo means that conservatives must fight for a legitimacy that is more readily accorded other persuasions. Properly understood, conservatism is neither necessarily nor irrevocably opposed to “social reform”. Nor has the erroneous equation between “conservative” and “reactionary” (which those hostile to conservatism have been happy to foster) done anything to decrease such misunderstanding. zyxwvutsr z zyxwv Pam Stavropoulos 173 Yet quite apart from superficial conceptions of its perceived nature, formidable obstacles confront the student of conservatism. Once it is accepted that conservatism is as worthy of serious study as any other belief or commitment, we are faced with the problem of how to characterise a diffuse entity which, by its very nature, seems to defy attempts to categorise it. While it is possible to cite a range of theorists who have influenced the conservative ethos, it is well-known that conservatism resists a theoretical empha~is.~ There also exists considerable diversity within the tendency itself. Far from signifying a static body of doctrine and principles, conservatism shows a high degree of internal fluidity, even while certain themes and traits are consistent.lo It is also the case that to a much greater degree than other philosophies, conservatism cannot be discussed with reference to the immediately political. Thus while Patience welcomes the appearance in the last few years of work which is concerned to analyse “the philosophies behind Liberal Party policy making”, this is itself 110 guarantee that our understanding of Australian conservatism will be necessarily enhanced. Ironically, there is even a sense in which it may be deflected or retarded, since notwithstanding frequent assertions to the contrary, conservatism cannot be discussed meaningfully with reference to the Australian Liberal Party (as Patience emphasises).12It is one of the hallmarks of conservatism that it resists a political analysis, and that it is more concerned with wider-ranging cultural issues than with the workings of political parties.13 It is neither possible nor necessary to embark upon a detailed consideration of conservatism per se. But nor is it possible to proceed in the absence of a recognition of conservative themes. According to one recent definition,l4 conservatism is a philosophy of imperfection which stresses the distinction between the state and civil society, and which defends a limited style of politics. It respects the past and inherited institutions, property, authority and the role of religion. It opposes radical change (while accepting the inevitability and desirability of change),l5 emphasises liberty over equality, and practical experience over abstract deductive reason. It stresses human diversity, and opposes all theories and approaches which, seeking to explain this complexity, in fact serve to simplify it.16 In the light of these characteristics, there exists a great distance between conservative thought and that of the radical right with which it is sometimes (often maliciously) equated. As British writer Noel OSullivan has remarked, ideologies of the radical right “allow far more potency to the human will than is compatible with the conservative belief in imperfe~tion”.’~ Conservatism is a philosophy of moderation which should serve to check radical expressions of both the right and the left.18 Another variety of thought with which conservatism is frequently confused is that of liberalism. At one level, the underlying premises of liberal thought cannot be reconciled with those of conservatism. Liberalism is described as individualist, egalitarian, universalist and meli0rist,~9and conservatives could not accept any of these without considerable qualification. Yet some characteristics of conservative thought seem to coalesce with liberal ones. In emphasising conservatism’s commitment to a limited style of politics, O’Sullivan notes that this raises the question of how to distinguish conservatism from liberalism, “which is also generally considered to be an ideology dedicated to the defence of such a political style”.20 Conservative respect for property is also shared by liberals, if differentlyjustified.21 It is also the case that there existed affinities between classical liberalism and conservatism from the very beginning. One critic has highlighted the “strong elements of liberalism in Burke’sthought”?2and Robert Nisbet (among others) has noted the common ground that existed between Burke and Adam Smith concerning the desirability of laissez-faire economic appr0aches.2~In addition to his support of the free market, Burke zyx zyxw 174 zyx z zyx zyx zyx Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism was also concerned with individual rights.24Yet at the same time, the varying priorities of conservative thought meant that important differences between the two ideologies remained. And if laissez-faire economic approaches could find support amongst conservatives, by the nineteenth century conservative critiques of capitalism were marked.25 There exists a key to dispelling the confusion between conservatism and liberalism which an emphasis on the free market and limited government can generate. It relates to the change liberalism underwent in the nineteenth century. For as OSullivan and others have discussed, the evolution of liberal ideology is actually “the story of a retreat from the idea of a limited style of politics”.*6 What is being referred to here is the development of the “New” or “revisionist” liberalism, with which conservatives - in their emphasis on the distinction between state and civil society - could not possibly agree. As has been widely discussed, modem liberal thought “originated in this reversal of the older fear of state interventi~n”.~~ “New” liberals like T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet disputed the primarily negative conception of freedom as non-interference which had been advanced by classical liberals. Instead they put forward the positive idea of freedom as ability, which led “to a defence of enhanced governmental activity and authority”.28 What this meant in practice was that government began to take on an increasingly interventionist role to advance “New” liberal values. In the process, there was a decided move away from the limited political style favoured not only by classical liberals, but by conservatives. As will be discussed in the latter part of this paper, this also explains why conservatives can support the contemporary revival of classical liberal ideals, whilst vehemently opposing the “New” liberalism with which the rise of the welfare state is associated (and to which the current revival of classical liberalism is in part a reaction). As the above discussion makes clear, no ideology - conservatism included - can be viewed as static. Attentiveness to changing circumstances is crucial if the relationship between ideologies (which is itself subject to change) is to be apprehended adequately. As the above also suggests, degrees of common ground at different times and in different contexts are insufficient to dissolve the important differences which remain between conservatism and liberalism.29 zyxwv The Australian Context The attempt to relate discussion of conservatism to the specific Australian context faces a number of difficulties. The first concerns the apparent absence of conservative tradition in this country; something on which a variety of critics have commented.30Together with the lack of scholarly attention the topic of Australian conservatism has received this poses obvious obstacles to the student of Australian Conservatism, who is faced with the dual problem of lack of historical context and the absence of a body of theoretical material on which to draw. Yet it is also the case that the genuine difficulties associated with the topic can become compounded unnecessarily, and that the apparent absence of conservative tradition in this country can serve as an excuse for not taking the subject of Australian conservatism seriously. As long as a lack of conservative tradition can be highlighted, the conservatism that seems to exist can be either dismissed as lacking foundation, or seen as somehow alien to Australia’s historical development.Not only does the character of Australian conservatism remain undiscussed, but the very concept of conservatism can easily become trivialised and debased.31 The long influence of “radical” interpretations of Australian history has also had unfortunate implications for the study of Australian conservatism. It is only relatively Pam Stavropoulos 175 z recently that radical historiography in Australia has been decisively challenged. Emphasis on the labour movement, and on the range of diverse factors which make up the radical interpretation of Australian history32 was not significantIy challenged until the post-war period.33 The conservative aspects of Australia’s development have been much less discussed. The post-war challenge to Australian radical historiography resurrected many of the themes and influences from which the “radical labor” view had detracted.34It also fostered receptivity to the range of factors which did not conform to radical interpretations. Rosecrance had noted that the radical fragment35had “a coercive impact on those who presumed to set themselves outside it”,36 and it was with excluded groups and elements that the post-war historical challenge was concerned. What is interesting for our present purposes is the ambivalent effect of this challenge on study of Australian conservatism. On the one hand, a decisive questioning of Australian radical historiography (and the new emphasis on such factors as the role of religion and the middle class)37 lent plausibility to the need for Australian conservatism to be taken more seriously. Yet in effect, scholarly interest in the topic of Australian conservatism remained potential, for it was to consideration of Australian liberalism that theorists turned their attention. In the light of the apparent absence of conservative tradition in this country, it may not seem surprising that critics have been more interested in the topic of Australian liberalism than Australian conservatism. And to the extent that the “liberal” paradigm can accommodate conservative expressions, there may not appear to be cause for concern. But what is remarkable is the way in which study of Australian liberalism has been at the expense of Australian conservatism, and how consideration of the latter has been almost wholly subsumed by discussion of a variegated “liberalism”. Genuine confusion about the differences between conservatism and liberalism has obscured the nature of conservatism in the Australian context. As was discussed previously, such confusion is hardly peculiar to Australia Yet in Australia, the differences between the two ideologies can be especially unclear. As Brandis and his co-authors have highlighted,38the two concepts have come to be conflated in Australian political debate, despite the fact that their ethical premises are essentially incompatible (&and notwithstanding the common ground that can exist between them). As these writers elaborate, this conflation can best be understood with reference to Samuel P. Huntington’s distinction between two different usages of the term “conservatism”- the absolute sense (which denotes a legitimate political philosophy) and the relative or “situational“ sense (which identifies no ideology but “merely serves to indicate an attitude towards the status qu0”).~9“Conservatism” in the Australian context has normally been used in this relative sense to describe the position of the Liberal Party in relation to that of other political parties. While the Liberal Party may not be (and is not) conservative in the “absolute” sense, it is considered to be “relatively” conservative when compared with, for example, the Labor Party?O This is notwithstanding recent trends which have seen a dissipation of many of the differences between the two parties.41 Usage of the conservative label in its relative or situational sense only has led to considerable conceptual confusion. Due to the apparent absence of “absolute” conservative tradition in this country, it is a confusion to which even quite sophisticated political theorists have not remained immune.42The result can be that conservatism is either wholly subsumed in discussion of Australian liberalism, or somewhat artificially counterposed against it.43 Broad conceptions of liberalism can also be made to accommodate a diverse range of political figures, further reinforcing the view that divergent expressions of liberalism are “interpretations” of it, rather than possible challenges to it.44 zyxwv zyxwv zyx 176 zyxwvutsrz zyxw zyxwvu Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism It is interesting to note the extent to which Australian theorists remain wedded to a conception of the dominance of the liberal paradigm, notwithstanding the obvious reductionism to which this view gives rise. In his introduction to the recently published Intellectual Movements and Australian Brian Head rightly noted the extent to which the device of including all non-revolutionary thinkers under the rubric “liberal“ has the effect of both “blurring the distance” between Australian literary and political journals, “and ... begging the question of the ideological diversity and contestation”.46 Yet contributors to the volume often failed to address this criticism, preferring to adhere to the “liberal hegemony” view while attempting to avoid its more blatant implication^.^^ What might appear to be a laudable appreciation of conceptual complexity can easily mask a disinclination to examine its implications. As long as a wide-ranging “liberalism” is seen as dominant, it can absolve us from the need to consider the nature, and even the possibility, of conservativedissent from i t Study of Australian conservatism has also suffered because of critical enslavement to polarities which have outlived their utility. Over two decades Henry Mayer highlighted the extent to which such polarities operated in the political sphere, and strongly argued against “the dichotomy as such”.49 He said that since the time of Federation, writers on Australian politics had subscribed to the proposition that the party system of this country constituted “a two-fold division between a party of initiative, or a positive party, and parties of resistance or negative parties”.50 From this, he said, it was assumed “as a matter of fact” that the Australian Labor Party (and “Labor” more broadly) represented the archetype of the party of initiative, and that the non-Labor parties were those “of negative ~ s i s t a n c e ” He . ~ ~went on to note that this polarised and artificial delineation was unable to do justice to political reality, that most of the arguments adduced to support it were worthless, and that it was consequently in clear need of revision.52 He also pointed to the way in which it had contributed to “the amazing lack of knowledge of non-Labor politics in Australia” (in that the negative connotations of the “non-Labor” label ensured that the parties so described as “negative, as resisting, did not seem worth close study”).53 It is testament to the pervasiveness of the dichotomy Mayer describes that reiteration of his criticisms of it should be necessary. Twenty years later, few writers openly avow allegiance to such a paradigm, and its attendant limitations. Yet what is striking is the way in which it continues to exert a powerful influence, and the extent to which Australian conservatism remains associated with negativity, and thus insufficiently discussed. As a consequence, “the amazing lack of knowledge” about non-Labor politics, and Australian conservatism in general, remains unrectified.54 Because of a lingering association with negativity, Australian conservatives have tended to suffer more from simplistic characterisations than have those on the left. And not surprisingly, left-wing commentators have been quick to exploit the assumed link. Neither conservativenor left-wing critique can be seen as homogeneous. It is also the case that conservative intellectuals have themselves been deficient in clearly articulating their perspectives, which has made it easier for them to be described simplistically. But it can be shown that left-wing depictions of the intellectual “right” have long been inadequate. As early as the decade of the 195Os, conservative writers were attempting to distinguish themselves from more extreme right-wing elements,55but left-wing critique has shown little recognition of this.56 To the extent that prominent left-wing critics fail to make clear distinctions between such labels as “conservative” and “radical right”, they perpetuate the widespread confusion about Australian conservatism which is so strikingly apparent. zyxw z zyxwv zyxwvutsr z zyxwvu Pam Stavropoulos 177 zyxwvu zyxwv The New Conservatism The emergence in the 1980s of the “new” conservatism and the so-called “New Right” underlined this widespread failure to make critical distinctions between different branches of “right-wing” thought. For obvious reasons (what, after all, does it mean to describe conservatism as “new”?) the concept of a “new” or “neo” conservatism is problematic. But consistent with the general confusion and long-standing lack of interest in conservatism which has been noted, Australian critics have largely ignored the rise of the new conservatism, and have conspicuously failed to appreciate the issues it raises. In the rare cases where it has been referred to -note that it has not been discussed in any detail - it has been discussed as either a footnote to the “New Right” phenomenon, or seen as synonymous with it.57 Yet consideration reveals that while overlapping in some respects, the “new conservatism” and the “New Right” must be viewed as distinct entities. Analysis also shows that while the former possesses clearly conservative characteristics, the latter owes much more to classical liberalism. Whilst sharing an opposition to collectivist trends and interventionist welfare states, the concerns of the new conservatism reveal an engagement with broader cultural questions which are of less immediate concern to the neo-liberal New Right. British and American theorists have been careful to preserve this di~tinction,~~ but for reasons which relate to the long-standing ambivalence about conservatism in this country, Australian critics have tended to ignore it. How, then, can these differing tendencies be defined and located within the Australian context? As regards the new or “neo” conservatism, the emergence in 1982 of a book called The New Conservatism in Australia59 provides an obvious starting-point. In his introduction M this work (a collection of essays edited by current Quudrunt editor Robert Manne) Manne said that its title had presented him with difficu1ty.m But he noted that reference to a “new” conservatism seemed to be appropriate in that it immediately distanced what was being presented from “the old and rather untroubled conservatism of the Menzies era’’.61 It thus served to indicate that new concerns and issues were being addressed. Manne spoke of the new preoccupations with which conservatives had had to deal in recent years, and declared that insofar as the book he edited represented a “new” Australian conservatism, it did so “not because of any conscious desire for novelty among its contributors, but because of the cultural journey Australia (alongside other liberal capitalist societies) has undertaken since the middle 1960s”.” Brief consideration of the contributors to this work reveals that many of those described as new conservatives were hardly new to conservatism. A changed intellectual climate has also lent an appearance of novelty to ideas which are not necessarily novel. Consideration reveals that most contributors to The New Conservatism in Austruliu either are or have been contributors to the monthly journal Quadrant, which suggests that the latter may constitute both a forum for the exposition of the new conservatism, and of its earlier evolution and antecedents. Established in the summer of 1956-7 as a conscious alternative to journals of the intellectual left,63 Quadrant has expressed conservative principles since its inception. Moreover, perusal of the very first issue of the journal reveals that the nascent concerns of the new conservatism were being implicitly While founded in the conservative Cold War climate of the 1950s, the subsequent two decades were much less conducive to the exposition of conservative ideas. But as Quadrant contributors themselves admit, the altered climate of the 1980s imparted an air of novelty to ideas which, though adapted to changed circumstances, were not and did not purport to be “new”.65 zyx z zyxwvutsr I 78 Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism zyxwvut The term “New Right” is widely and internationally applied to describe the current and broadly-based revival of classical liberal theory. While those employing the term disagree as to its precise meaning, it has a widely-accepted economic connotation, and many implicitly accept the contention of British economist Nick Bosanquet that “the New Right is mainly based in economics and on ideas about individualism and markets”.66 While it is obviously impossible to draw too rigid a delineation between economic and cultural issues - indeed, some members of the New Right stress the neo-conservative theme of - the neo-liberal New Right tends not to focus on the crucial nexus between the social and cultural issues in the way that new conservatives do.68 In Australia, the term “New Right” gained popular currency when applied to the economic challenge levelled at the industrial relations system by Charles Copeman and other members of the H. R. Nicholls Society.69 Whist widely applied, the “New Right” label is thus frequently associated with those who are seen to be active in challenging established work practices. Most of the high-profile figures to espouse the New Right cause are those whose primary interest has been economic.70 And most conspicuously among other forums, the journal published by the Institute of Public Affairs (the Institute of Public Aflairs Review) has served as a prominent vehicle for the expression of their ideas. Like Quadrant (which in more recent years it has in some ways come to resemble) this journal and forum is not itself new. Yet perusal of this forum reveals a long preoccupation with economic, rather than broader social and cultural, issues. It has only been relatively recently, under the editorship of Rod Kemp and currently Ken Baker, that the IPA Review has broadened its agenda to embrace consideration of cultural and social issues.71 Nevertheless, while still discernible, the gap between these two publications has been narrowing noticeably. Nor is it only the IPA Review which has reconsidered its tone and emphasis. Noting that Quadrant has become ‘?nore populist in tone and style”, one critic has gone so far as to say that in its anti-government stance, it is “now almost indi~tinguishable”~~ from New Right forums. Certainly Quadrunt and the IPA Review are now regarded by many - and with considerable justification - as complementary. This being the case, to what extent can distinction between the new conservatism and the New Right be meaningfully maintained in the Australian context? Why is it not legitimate to conflate the two phenomena, as it would be so easy to do, and as so many critics have little hesitation about doing? While supporting the free-enterprise economy on which Western values and institutions are held to depend, any neo-conservative alliance with “New Right” economic rationalists is a somewhat uneasy one. This point was strongly illustrated in an article by La Trobe University sociologist John Carroll73 (a regular Quadrant contributor) which sought to reaffm the differences between free market perspectives and those of conservatism - differences which were declared to be fundamental. In perhaps the strongest statement on these differences to date, Carroll asserted that “the free market does not work”, and that “the simplest example” verifies this.74Ephasising that there are institutions and traditions which need to be conserved, Carroll said that the state is generally the most appropriate organ to ensure this.75 This points to one of the key features of the new conservatism which brings it into conflict with New Right approaches - whereas for the latter the role of government should be minimal, the former holds that the state should be both strong and a source of authority. But as Carroll has noted on a previous occasion, strong govement does not necessarily mean big Neoconservatives deplore the vast inroads into society of the modem welfare state. In this respect, substantial common ground exists between neo-conservatives and New Right economic rationalists, at the same time as the potential for conflict remains. z zyxwvz z zyxw zyxwvuts Pam Stavropoulos 179 Thus to contend, as so many critics do, that the new conservatism and the New Right am virtually identical, is to focus on surface similarities only. On attitudes to the state, as on other issues, Quudrant is “wholly different in emphasis from the free-market think-tank~’’?~For example, the volume The New Conservatism in Austrafia eschewed discussion of economics altogether, and editor Robert Manne confessed that he had “little sympathy for some of the social consequences apparently acceptable to the more doctrinaire enthusiasts of monetarism and the unshackled Free Market”.78This concern with social consequences is both characteristically conservative, and at odds with the more assertive individualism which is a hallmark of New Right economic approaches. Despite such differences, however, critics have continued to link the new conservatism and the New Right to the point where they are often portrayed as synonym~us.~~ Because of the common ground neo-conservatism shares with New Right perspectives -principally an opposition to collectivist trends and to interventionist welfare states - it has been relatively easy for critics to depict the two as synonymous. But for analytical purposes, this has been a costly mistake. Not only has it allowed central neo-conservative concerns to go unexplored, but it has fostered such neglect by implicitly discrediting the neo-conservative label in advance. For as previous discussion has revealed, an emphasis on individualism, libertarianism and the restoration of incentive and productivity sits rather oddly within a conservative framework. While such an emphasis is not necessarily incompatible with conservative approaches, reference to these elements alone is to imply that the new conservatism has little claii to the conservative label. It is also to imply that a separate focus on the new conservatism is largely unnecessary, since the latter will merely echo and replicate the themes of the New Right. But as careful comparison of the forums Quadrant and the Institute of Public Affairs Review reveals, the differences between the two are no less striking than the similarities.80 Conclusion In Australia, there have been few attempts to explore areas of tension between different strands of the so-called “right resurgence”, despite calls for this to be undertaken.81Yet as consideration has revealed, the reasons for this critical neglect have roots in a much earlier period, and relate to the ambivalence and confusion that has long been apparent in discussions of Australian conservatism. If the contentions of this paper are accepted, the reasons for an inadequate response to the “new” conservatism stem from the same malaise which surrounds discussion of older varieties. The lack of a readily discernible conservative tradition, a persistent association with negativity, confusion about the relationship between conservatism and liberalism, the legacy of radical historiography and entrenched dichotomies, and the lack of critical distinction between different branches of “right-wing” thought have contributed to a theoretical impasse which has been sporadically, rather than consistently, challenged. Until the disabling legacy of this combination is confronted fully, Australian conservatism (and not only Australian conservatism) will remain a major casualty in Australian critical debate. zyxw z zyxwvutsr zyxw zyxwvutsr 180 Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Glen Lewis, “‘Go to the Mirror, Boys’, Humphrey McQueen on the Left, Ronald Conway on the Right”, Overland 64 (1976):48. Judith Brett, “Menzies’ Forgotten People”, Meanjin, 43,2 (1984):253. Lewis, “‘Go to the Mirror, Boys”’, p. 53. The material cited is by Michael Roe, Quest for Authority in Eastern Australia (Melbourne, 1965);R. M.Crawford, An Australian Perspective (Melbourne, 1960);J. B. Hirst, Adelaide and the Country (Melbourne, 1973); G. Searle, The Rush to be Rich (Melbourne, 1971); G. C. Bolton, ‘The Idea of a Colonial Gentry”, Historical Studies, (October 1968); Barrie Dyster, “The Fate of Colonial Conservatism on the Eve of the Gold Rush”, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 54,4(1968):329-55. Allan Patience, ‘The Liberal Party and the Failure of Australian Conservatism”, in Marian Sawer, ed..Australia and the New Right (Sydney, 1982), p. 73. Peter Loveday, “Liberals and the Idea of Development”, Australian Jounurl of Politics and History, 23.2, (1977):219-26. Patience, “The Liberal Party and the Failure of Australian Conservatism”, p. 73. Brett, “Menzies’ Forgotten People”, p. 253. Noel OSullivan, Conservatism (London, 1983),p. 31. For discussion of this point and its implications, see Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Impefection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott (London, 1978),pp. 12-13. For consideration of the tensions to which this gives rise, see William R. Harbour, The Foundations of Comervative Thought: An Anglo-American Tradition in Perspective (London, 1982),pp. 162-3. Patience, “The Liberal Party and the Failure of Australian Conservatism”, p. 73. Ibid., p. 81. See Harbour, The Foundations of Conservative Thought, p. 178. OSullivan, Conservatism, p. 12. Burke himself referred to “the great law of change” as “the most powerful law of nature, and the means perhaps of its conservation”. Quoted in Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke: The Practical I m a g i t d o n (Cambridge, 1967),p. 168. See Michael D. Clark, Coherent Variety: The Idea of Diversity in British and American Conservative Thought (Connecticut, 1983). OSullivan, Conservatism, pp. 14,15;also Quinton, The Politics of Impefection, p. 22. See OSullivan, Conservatism, p. 14. John Gray, Liberalism (England, 1986),pp. x-xi. OSullivan, Conservatism, p. 13. Liberals stress the relationship between private property and individual liberty in a way that conservatives do not. Gray has said that having property is “one element in being a free man or an autonomous agent”. Gray, Liberalism, p. 63). While conservative respect for private property is related to ideas about freedom, conservatives reject unqualified references to the “free man [sic]” or “autonomous agent”, stressing instead the social context from which the human agent derives. Bill Brugger, “Classical British and European Liberalism and Democracy”, in Norman Wintrop, ed., Liberal Democratic Theory and its Critics (Sydney, 1983),p. 25. Robert Nisbet, Conservatism: Dream and Reality (England, 1986),p. 37. See Brugger, “Classical British and European Liberalism and Democracy”, p. 25. See Nisbet, Conservatism, p. 65. OSullivan, Conservatism, p. 13. Don De Bats, “Liberal-Democratic Theory in America”, in Wintrop, Liberal Democratic Theory and its Critics, p. 68. Gray, Liberalism, p. 32. For a helpful introduction to the often ambiguous relationship between the two, see Chandran Kukathas, “Conservatism, Liberalism and Ideology”, Critical Review 1,3 (1987). pp. 30-44. zyxwvut zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsr zyxwvu z zyxwvu zyxwv Pam Stavropoulos 181 30 See Patience, ‘“The Liberal Party and the Failure of Australian Conservatism”, p. 79; Ronald Conway, The Great Australian Stupor: An Interpretation of the Australian Way of Life (Melbourne, 1985), p. 13, and Norman Wintrop and David Lovell, “Varieties of Conservative Theory”, in Wintrop, ed., Liberal Democraic Theory and Its Critics, fn. 101, p. 189. 31 Conway maintains that it is Australia‘s lack of conservative tradition that explains popular antipathy to the very idea of conservatism. Conway, The Great Australian Stupor, p. 3. For a debased definition of conservatism (which presents only negative and distorted characteristics) see Cameron Hazlehurst, ed., Australian Conservatism: Essays in Twentieth Century Political History (Canberra, 1979), p. xii. 32 The radical interpretation of Australian history has long been associated with historians of the “Old Left”, of whom Russel Ward, Robin Gollan and Brian Fitzpatrick are the most well-known. For a recent (if nakedly partisan) account of this tradition, which includes a detailed bibliography, see Andrew Wells, ‘The Old Left Intelligentsia 1930-1960”, chapter 10 in Brian Head and James Walter, eds, Intellectual Movements and Australian Sociely (Melbourne, 1988), pp. 214-34. 33 Wells refers to the counter-revolution in Australian historiography (which he sees to have been eagerly endorsed and promoted by Peter Coleman in 1962) as “one source of the crisis that finally beset the Old Left historians”. (Wells, “The Old Left Intelligentsia 1930-1960”, p. 228). For a conservative summary and welcoming of this counter-revolution, see Coleman, “Introduction: The New Australia”, in Coleman, ed., Australian Civiliip&iotr A Symposium (Melbourne, 1962), pp. 1-11. 34 Such as the influence of religion and the role of the middle class. See Coleman, “Introduction: The New Australia”, Australian Civilization: A Symposium 35 The “fragment” thesis of American historian Louis Hark provided powerful impetus to radical historiography in Australia. See “A Theory of the Development of the New Societies”, Part 1 in Louis Hartz, The Founding of the New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New York, 1964), especially p. 14. As Marian Simms has noted, “the fragment thesis has easily lent itself to a ready restatement of the radical-leftist legend”. Marian Simms, “A Liberal Nation”, Arena 51 (1978): 148. 36 Richard N. Rosecrance, ‘‘The Radical Culture of Australia”, chapter 8 in Hartz, The Founding of the New Societies, p. 298 . 37 See Coleman, “Introduction: The New Australia”. 38 George Brandis, Tom Harley and Don Markwell, et al., Liberals Face the Future: Essays in Australian Liberalism (Melbourne, 1984). 39 Brandis et al., Liberals Face the Future, p. 22, with reference to Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology”, American Political Science Review 51, 2 (1957): 454-73. 40 Brandis et al., Liberals Face the Future, p. 22. 41 For discussion of this point, see the opening chapter in Alan Patience and Brian Head, eds, From Whitlam to Fraser: Reform and Reaction in Australian Politics (Melbourne, 1979). 42 A charge which is implicit in one critic’s reading of P. G. Tiver. See John R. Williams, Review of P. G. Tiver, The Liberal Party: Principles and Pe$ormance (Brisbane, 1978), Australian Journal of Politics and History 2 6 , 2 (1980): 295. 43 For an illustration of the former tendency, see Tim Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character (Melbourne, 1978). Significantly, critics have expressed dissatisfaction with Rowse’s excessively broad reading of liberalism. See the reviews of this work by David Walker, Historical Studies 18, 73 (1979): 639, W. Bostock, Australian Journal of Politics and History 25.2 (1979): 255, and Humphrey McQueen, Arena 51 (1978): 153. 44 See the discussion of former Prime Minister Robert Menzies in Yvonne Thompson, George Brandis and Tom Harley, eds, Australian Liberalism: The Continuing Vision (Victoria, 1986), p. ii. 45 Brian Head, ‘Tntroduction: Intellectuals in Australian Society”, in Head and Walter, Intellectual Movements and Australian Society, pp. 1-44. 46 lbid., p. 27. 47 See the contributions by Patrick Buckridge, “Intellectual Authority and Critical Traditions in Australian Literature 1945 to 1975”, chapter 9 in Head and Walter, Intellectual Movements and zyxw . zy zyxwvutsrq I82 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 zyxwz Reappraising the Right: The Challenge of Australian Conservatism Australian Society, pp. 188-213, and Andrew Wells, “The Old Left Intelligentsia 1930-1960”. pp. 226-7. While Buckridge does refer to the existence of a “conservative” literary tradition which differs from the “hegemonic” liberal one (Buckridge, “Intellectual Authority and Critical Traditions”, pp. 190-203) his delineation of the two is imprecise and unclear. Much more common among Australian critics is the subversion of conservative responses within the broader “liberal” tradition (viz Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character). Thus Wells is able to refer blithely to ‘the conservatives‘ control” of Australian hlstoriography, whilst simultaneously adhering to the “liberal hegemony” view. Wells, ”The Old Left Intelligentsia 1930-1960”. p. 225. Henry Mayer, “Parties: Initiative and Resistance“, in Henry Mayer, ed., Australian Politics: A Reader (Melbourne, 1966), pp. 223-30. In fact Mayer had made a similar criticism as early as 1954 (a revised version of which appeared as the article “Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System 1910-1950”, Historical Studies 7,27 (1956): 253-70. Mayer, “Parties: Initiative and Resistance”, p. 223. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 234. Ibid., p. 230. Lewis, “‘Go the Mirror, Boys”’, and Brett, “Menzies‘ Forgotten People”. See, for example, Isi Leibler, “Australia‘s Radical Right”, Quadrant (March-April 1966): 1519. For more recent articles on this theme, see Gregory Clark, “An Open Letter to the Right’’, Quadrant (March 1976): 28-32, and Ted Murphy, “Australian Fascism”, Quadrant (November zyx zyxwvutsrq zyxwvuts zyxwvu 1981): 3-10. 56 See Geoff Sharp, “Editorial -Why Arena?”, and “Sociologists and the New Strata”, Arena 1 (1963): 5 , 12-19; Warren Osmond, The Dilemmas of an Australian Sociology: An Analysis of Equality and Authority, Arena Monograph Series, No. 2 (Melbourne, 1972), pp. 6-7, and John 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 Docker, In a Critical Condition: Struggles for Control of Australian Literature - Then and Now (Victoria, 1984), p. 146. See, for example, Marian Sawer, ed., Australia and the New Right, and Ken Coghill, ed., The New Right‘s Australian Fantasy (Victoria, 1987). The former considers the differing ‘‘neoconservative’’ phenomenon in a footnote to the introduction; the latter makes no distinction between neoconservatism and the economic “New Right”. See David Green, The New Right: The Counter Revolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought (England, 1987), pp. 3-7; OSullivan, Conservatism, p. 145, and David Graham and Peter Clarke, The New Enlightenment: The Rebirth of Liberalism (London, 1986), pp. 86-7. Robert Manne, ed., The New Conservatism in Australia (Melbourne, 1982). Ibid., p. vii. Ibid., p. viii. fbid. Peter Coleman, The Heart of James McAuley: Life and Work of the Australian Poet (Sydney, 1980), p. 68. James McAuley, “Comment” By Way of Prologue, Quadrant 1, (1956-7): 3-5. While allowing for obvious differences in the intellectual and political climate of the 1950s and the 1980s, such themes include a concern for culture and authority, a concerted attack on left-liberalism, and a call for less government intervention in the economy. See “According to D. M. Armstrong”, Quadrant 30,9 (1986): 9. Nick Bosanquet, Afer the New Right (London, 1983), p. 1. See, for example, Ken Baker, ‘Why the Cultural Debate Matters”, Institute of Public Aflairs Review 40.2 (1986): 26. Compare, for example, the exposition of New Right concerns in Sawer, Australia and the New Right, with the neo-conservative themes presented in Manne, ed., The New Conservatism in A ustrdia. For an account of this group, which formed in March 1986, see John Stone, “National Issues”, Institute of Public Aflairs Review 40,2 (1986): 26. zyxwvutsrq zyxwvuts zyxwvut z zyx zyxwvuts Pam Stavropoulos I 83 zyxwvut 70 They are represented, €or example, by such entrepreneurial figures as John Elliot, Hugh Morgan and Sir Arvi Parbo. 71 The shift dates to Rod Kemp’s editorship in 1982. Here it is also interesting to note that Ken 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 Baker - current editor of the IPA Review - is a former student of prominent Quudranf contributor John Carroll. Sawer, Australia and the New Right, p. 15 . John Carroll, “Free Marketeers Are All For Themselves”, Age, 26 September 1986, p. 13. Ibid. Ibid. John Carroll, Letter to Quadrant 27.8 (1983): 3. Philosopher Anthony Quinton makes a similar point in The Politics ofImper$ection, pp. 20-1. Greg Sheridan, ‘Time for the Right to Unite”, Australian, 12-13 July 1986. Note that Sheridan is atypical of Australian commentators in making this distinction. Manne, The New Conservatism in Australia, p. ix. It is interesting to note that it is not only those hostile to the so-called “right resurgence” who make this equation. Patrick OBrien has declared that notwithstanding some differences, “the interacting and overlapping neoconservative and economic rationalist streams are perfectly blended”. Patrick OBrien, The Liberals: Factions, Feuds and Fancies (Victoria, 1985), p. 8. And see again the different agendas enunciated in Sawer, Australia and the New Right, and Manne, ed., The New Conservatism in Australia. For an exception to this lack of differentiation, and a sensitive account of the degree of common ground that can exist despite areas of tension, see Michael James, “The Free Market”, Quadrant 27,6 (1983): 29-33. zyxwv