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2010, Etica & Politica
Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. A critical mass of these deliberative theorists also claims that John Dewey's writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy.
2010 •
From its inception at the origins of American philosophy up until contemporary reappraisals of traditional pragmatist themes and approaches, the pragmatist tradition has defied every attempt at defining its specific identity. The diversity and richness of pragmatism as a philosophical tradition can be appreciated by looking at the great variety of conflicting positions and perspectives on central issues of democratic theory and practice which have been argued to fall within its scope. It is possible to find pragmatist views scattered along the spectrum of debates such as those between the epistemic or ethical nature of democratic decision-making, ‘thin’-procedural vs. ‘thick’substantial views of the normative scope of democracy, and liberal vs. communitarian conceptions of democratic life and society. Moreover, while some pragmatists have primarily engaged in the theoretical and foundational project of defining and justifying democratic principles and institutions, others see pragma...
2012 •
Talking it out with others vs. deliberation within and the law of group polarization: Some implications of the argumentative theory of reasoning for deliberative democracy. This paper argues that a new psychological theory—the argumentative theory of reasoning—provides theoretical support for the discursive, dialogical ideal of democratic deliberation. It converges, in particular, with deliberative democrats’ predictions about the positive epistemic properties of talking things out with others. The paper further considers two influential objections to democratic deliberation: first, that “deliberation within” rather than deliberation with others carries most of the burden in terms of changing people’s minds; and second, that the so-called “law of group polarization” casts serious doubts on the value of democratic deliberation and, more generally, the ideal of deliberative democracy.
Education & Culture
Dewey's Political Technology from an Anthropological Perspective2019 •
This article explores the possibility that John Dewey’s silence on the matter of which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective. Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr., and Dewey in which Dewey concedes “that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.” Dewey’s concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for realizing his vision of democracy as a way of life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not problematic, though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. For then experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice. When pressured to operationalize political technology, he chose the appropriately open-ended and, at times, frustratingly vague means of education and growth. In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished.
Ph.D. Philosophy Dissertation (University of Ottawa)
Democracy after Deliberation: Bridging the Constitutional Economics/Deliberative Democracy Divide2007 •
This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical economists model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization. In charting a transactional middle way between the two programmes, deliberative institutional designers should be empowered to achieve two objectives: (i) to integrate deliberative practices into new and existing democratic institutions and (ii) to heed the critical insights and caveats of constitutional economists, who have identified genuine limitations to realizing the deliberative ideal in modern constitutional democracies.
In recent years philosophers, political theorists, as well as legal and communication scholars have proclaimed John Dewey as a predeces- sor, an influence, or a founding father of “Deliberative Democracy” (DD), and, more recently, of “Democratic Experimentalism” (DE). I argue, however, that there is room for questioning whether these recent trends in political theory capture the “thickness” and radical character of Dewey’s view. I explore some important differences between Dewey’s philosophy of democracy and some of the main tenets of DD and DE. The recent selective reconsiderations of Dewey’s philosophy in political theory fail to bring into the present dialogue the more radical Dewey. It is a failure to use Dewey in the most productive way.
Review of Policy Research
Intelligently Designing Deliberative Health Care Forums: Dewey's Metaphysics, Cognitive Science and a Brazilian Example2008 •
Imagine you are the CEO of a hospital [. . .]. Decisions are constantly being made in your organization about how to spend the organization's money. The amount of money available to spend is never adequate to pay for everything you wish you could spend it on, therefore you must set spending priorities. There are two questions you need to be able to answer . . . How should we set priorities in this organization? How do we know when we are doing it well? When people seek to achieve good public policy, the result will tend to be good public policy. In a collective choice process, public‐spirited individual participants produce good public policy by deliberating—talking with each other, listening to each other's arguments, and being willing to learn and change their minds based on such dialogue. –Steven Kelman (1992: 181) Public policy scholars agree that those persons (or agencies) vested with the authority to establish health care priorities should elicit public input before making rationing decisions. The two most common approaches are (i) consultation and (ii) deliberation. Though deliberation has obvious advantages over consultation, it falters in the face of the objection that ordinary citizens lack the cognitive resources for the extended, rigorous inquiry required of them in undertaking the priority‐setting task. To overcome this objection, I propose that deliberative forums for health care rationing should be designed so that they imitate the natural pattern of human experience. The experience of deliberation should encompass both prolonged periods of less‐demanding cognitive activity, in which citizens passively receive information, and briefer periods of more‐demanding cognitive activity, in which they engage in active problem‐solving. In arguing for this thesis, I rely on two theoretical sources and one practical case study, in the following order: (i) John Dewey's metaphysics of experience, (ii) cognitive science research on schemas and frames, and (iii) the Health Care Council in São Paulo, Brazil.
Human Studies
Can Pragmatists be Institutionalists? John Dewey Joins the Non-ideal/Ideal Theory Debate2010 •
Abstract During the 1960s and 1970s, institutionalists and behavioralists in the discipline of political science argued over the legitimacy of the institutional approach to political inquiry. In the discipline of philosophy, a similar debate concerning institutions has never taken place.
2005 •
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life: A Reply to Talisse's Pluralist Objection2008 •
Public Affairs Quarterly
Truth, Inquiry and Democratic Authority in the Climate Debate2014 •
2005 •
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Towards a Peircean Politics of Inquiry2004 •
American Political Science Review
Between Means and Ends: Reconstructing Coercion in Dewey's Democratic Theory2017 •
Contemporary Pragmatism
Pluralism and democratic participation: What kind of citizen are citizens invited to be?2017 •
Journal of Curriculum Studies
Deliberative communication : a pragmatist proposai2006 •
Journal of Curriculum Studies
Deliberative communication: a pragmatist proposal2006 •
Japanese Political Science Review
Rethinking Grassroots Participation in Nested Deliberative Systems2014 •
2009 •
2017 •
Philosophy & social criticism
Deliberativist responses to activist challenges2005 •
Communication Theory
A Conceptual Definition and Theoretical Model of Public Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face Groups2002 •
Journal of Business Ethics
Deliberation Without Democracy in Multi-stakeholder Initiatives: A Pragmatic Way Forward2021 •
Contemporary Pragmatism 10.2
The Internet and the Democratic Imagination: Deweyan Communication in the 21st Century2014 •
International Political Science Review
Deliberative Democracy in the Age of Serial Crisis2020 •
2018 •
2002 •
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
Three Models of Democratic Deliberation2004 •
2010 •
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
Liberty, Community, and Democracy: Sidney Hook's Pragmatic Deliberativism2001 •