John Min

Stanley and Min discuss how propaganda works in liberal democratic societies. Stanley observes that the inability to address the crisis of liberal democracies can be partially explained by contemporary political philosophy’s penchant for idealized theorizing about norms of justice over transitions from injustice to justice. Whereas ancient and modern political philosophers took seriously propaganda and demagoguery of the elites and populists, contemporary political philosophers have tended to theorize about the idealized structures of justice. This leads to a lack of theoretical constructs and explanatory tools by which we can theorize about real-life political problems, such as mass incarceration. Starting with this premise, Stanley provides an explanation of how propaganda works and the mechanisms that enable propaganda. Stanley further theorizes the pernicious effects that elitism, populism, authoritarianism, and “post-truth” have on democratic politics.

ABSTRACT In “The Politics of Getting It Right,” Russell Muirhead has contended in this journal that democracy is valuable because of its procedural legitimacy rather than because of the epistemic values of “getting things right.” However, pure procedural theories of legitimacy fail. Thus, if democracy is legitimate, it will have to be due partly to its (potential) epistemic advantages. There are two ways of thinking about these advantages. One approach, associated most prominently with David Estlund and Hélène Landemore, equates the epistemic advantages of democracy with its ability to approximate a procedure-independent standard of correctness. The other, associated with Fabienne Peter, explicitly rejects that standard. Peter’s view, however, is incapable of answering challenges against pure procedural theories of legitimacy.

This final substantive chapter extends the discussion of deliberative democracy and power by focusing on three topics that have shaped contemporary thinking about the pathologies of democracy—post-truth, populism, and illiberalism. The chapter concludes with questions often raised but as yet unanswered in deliberative theory: What is its account of change? How does it take power? The chapter makes a case for a humble version of deliberative theory, one that does not hoist a flag declaring mission accomplished, but one that constantly evolves because it learns from its mistakes.

Contrary to the popular belief, I argue that a more inclusive polity does not necessarily conflict with the goal of improving the epistemic capacities of deliberation. My argument examines one property of democracy that is usually thought of in non-epistemic terms, inclusion. Inclusion is not only valuable for moral reasons, but it also has epistemic virtues. I consider two epistemic benefits of inclusive deliberation: (a) inclusive deliberation helps to create a more complete picture of the world that everyone dwells together; and (b) inclusive deliberation can be helpful in reducing biases and errors endemic to a society. Having advanced two epistemic arguments for inclusive deliberation, I argue that the Deweyan model best captures the knowledge-pooling function of deliberation.

Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not h...

Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not h...

In “The Politics of Getting It Right,” Russell Muirhead has con-
tended in this journal that democracy is valuable because of its procedural legitimacy
rather than because of the epistemic values of “getting things right.” However, pure
procedural theories of legitimacy fail. Thus, if democracy is legitimate, it will have to
be due partly to its (potential) epistemic advantages. There are two ways of thinking
about these advantages. One approach, associated most prominently with David
Estlund and Hélène Landemore, equates the epistemic advantages of democracy
with its ability to approximate a procedure-independent standard of correctness.
The other, associated with Fabienne Peter, explicitly rejects that standard.
Peter’s view, however, is incapable of answering challenges against pure procedural
theories of legitimacy.

This article offers a comprehensive review of the major theoretical
issues and findings of the epistemic approaches to deliberative
democracy. Section 2 surveys the norms and ideals of deliberative
democracy in relation to deliberation's ability to “track the truth.”
Section 3 examines the conditions under which deliberative mini‐
publics can “track the truth.” Section 4 discusses how “truth‐tracking”
deliberative democracy is possible through the division of epistemic
labor in a deliberative system.

Contrary to the popular belief, I argue that a more inclusive polity does not necessarily conflict with the goal of improving the epistemic capacities of deliberation. My argument examines one property of democracy that is usually thought of in non-epistemic terms, inclusion. Inclusion is not only valuable for moral reasons, but it also has epistemic virtues. I consider two epistemic benefits of inclusive deliberation: (a) inclusive deliberation helps to create a more complete picture of the world that everyone dwells together; and (b) inclusive deliberation can be helpful in reducing biases and errors endemic to a society. Having advanced two epistemic arguments for inclusive deliberation, I argue that the Deweyan model best captures the knowledge-pooling function of deliberation.