Jón Ólafsson

""This is a study of John Dewey’s philosophy based on three interrelated themes. I maintain, first, that the best understanding of Dewey’s work is achieved by a Peircean reading. On that reading Dewey’s philosophy is partly interpreted through the conceptual framework provided by C.S. Peirce. Second, I argue that a detailed grasp of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is essential for a convincing assessment of his philosophical views. In the third place I show that Dewey’s theory of inquiry creates a common context for natural science and other kinds of inquiry. Dewey’s treatment of natural science as a model for inquiry is not an attempt to impose its methods on inquiry in general. What it does imply is that successful methods and actions in one field of inquiry should facilitate problem-solving in other fields. In the first part of the dissertation I discuss recent debates on Dewey’s philosophy centred around Richard Rorty’s interpretation of his work. I argue that because of a failure to emphasise Dewey’s methodological approach, some Dewey-scholars who claim to be true to Dewey’s word and spirit present implausible objections to the work of philosophers who, like Rorty, interpret Dewey liberally and so as to serve their own purposes for the most part. Although I do not think that Rorty presents a very useful interpretation of Dewey, I do think that the attempt to incorporate Dewey’s work into a forceful and spirited philosophical argument is more useful and interesting than a learned discussion about what Dewey’s views were exactly at any given point in time. The second chapter of my study is devoted to an exploration of some central parts of Charles Peirce’s philosophy, especially the role and place of the belief/doubt model in Peirce’s thought. I argue that together with Peirce’s methodological realism, the so-called pragmatic principle and the kind of reasoning often referred to as abduction, the belief/doubt model outlines a framework for inquiry that defines the basic tenets of pragmatism. This framework fits just as well to Dewey’s philosophy as to Peirce’s even though Peirce employs different vocabulary than Dewey. The chapters that follow deal with the third theme in the dissertation, which is also its main theme, Dewey’s theory of inquiry. I discuss some central parts of this theory and of Dewey’s conception of inquiry with reference to Peirce. I argue that Dewey’s presentation of reasoning at the early defining stages of inquiry makes it plausible to understand it as abductive reasoning. Such reasoning is concerned with selecting possible hypotheses and is, one could say, the crucial stage in inquiry from the viewpoint of Dewey’s theory. Thus for Dewey the legitimacy of any particular inquiry is determined by a principle of selection of hypotheses rather than by restrictions on legitimate results, such as that conclusions are valid only if the conditions of their revision can be specified in advance. Dewey’s idea of natural science as a model for inquiry is derived from the view that scientific success in modern times secures natural science a special status. This, according to Dewey, is something the philosophical community has failed to appreciate. He thinks that the methods and practices natural science express a conception of knowledge which philosophy has yet to catch up with. Dewey’s examination of some concepts and procedures of natural science leads him to criticise many common philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that science must be based on a strict distinction between objective facts and subjective factors. Knowledge for Dewey should be characterised in terms of a certain relationship between an agent and his environment rather than in terms of true statements of objective facts. The most important aspect of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is in my view its treatment of inquiry as a way of acting and of the inquiring agent as a creature able to enter into intellectual relationships with his environment. This model can be extremely helpful in creating a basis for problem solving and conflict resolution, in practical matters such as political decision making and in moral and public reasoning. This major achievement of Dewey’s philosophical enterprise should in my view be appreciated and taken seriously while one should forgive Dewey for not adding much useful to the history and philosophy of science.""

In the aftermath of the Icelandic economic crisis of 2008 Iceland's former Prime Minister Geir Haarde was convicted for negligence of his constitutional duty to consult with his ministers on measures to prepare for the coming crisis. The court ruled that there was sufficient information available to the government to conclude that there was real danger of a major banking crisis in the months preceding the crisis. Mr. Haarde was the only head of government to be convicted in the aftermath of the Financial crisis. His indictment and conviction was hotly debated in Iceland where many people considered the process unfair, primarily because Mr. Haarde was the only minister indicted by Parliament for negligence of duties although a Special Investigative Commission appointed by Parliament had recommended indicting other ministers and officials as well. The paper reviews the case against Haarde and the public reaction to it. It is argued that the majority of judges on the special court ...

""This is a study of John Dewey’s philosophy based on three interrelated themes. I maintain, first, that the best understanding of Dewey’s work is achieved by a Peircean reading. On that reading Dewey’s philosophy is partly interpreted through the conceptual framework provided by C.S. Peirce. Second, I argue that a detailed grasp of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is essential for a convincing assessment of his philosophical views. In the third place I show that Dewey’s theory of inquiry creates a common context for natural science and other kinds of inquiry. Dewey’s treatment of natural science as a model for inquiry is not an attempt to impose its methods on inquiry in general. What it does imply is that successful methods and actions in one field of inquiry should facilitate problem-solving in other fields. In the first part of the dissertation I discuss recent debates on Dewey’s philosophy centred around Richard Rorty’s interpretation of his work. I argue that because of a failure to emphasise Dewey’s methodological approach, some Dewey-scholars who claim to be true to Dewey’s word and spirit present implausible objections to the work of philosophers who, like Rorty, interpret Dewey liberally and so as to serve their own purposes for the most part. Although I do not think that Rorty presents a very useful interpretation of Dewey, I do think that the attempt to incorporate Dewey’s work into a forceful and spirited philosophical argument is more useful and interesting than a learned discussion about what Dewey’s views were exactly at any given point in time. The second chapter of my study is devoted to an exploration of some central parts of Charles Peirce’s philosophy, especially the role and place of the belief/doubt model in Peirce’s thought. I argue that together with Peirce’s methodological realism, the so-called pragmatic principle and the kind of reasoning often referred to as abduction, the belief/doubt model outlines a framework for inquiry that defines the basic tenets of pragmatism. This framework fits just as well to Dewey’s philosophy as to Peirce’s even though Peirce employs different vocabulary than Dewey. The chapters that follow deal with the third theme in the dissertation, which is also its main theme, Dewey’s theory of inquiry. I discuss some central parts of this theory and of Dewey’s conception of inquiry with reference to Peirce. I argue that Dewey’s presentation of reasoning at the early defining stages of inquiry makes it plausible to understand it as abductive reasoning. Such reasoning is concerned with selecting possible hypotheses and is, one could say, the crucial stage in inquiry from the viewpoint of Dewey’s theory. Thus for Dewey the legitimacy of any particular inquiry is determined by a principle of selection of hypotheses rather than by restrictions on legitimate results, such as that conclusions are valid only if the conditions of their revision can be specified in advance. Dewey’s idea of natural science as a model for inquiry is derived from the view that scientific success in modern times secures natural science a special status. This, according to Dewey, is something the philosophical community has failed to appreciate. He thinks that the methods and practices natural science express a conception of knowledge which philosophy has yet to catch up with. Dewey’s examination of some concepts and procedures of natural science leads him to criticise many common philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that science must be based on a strict distinction between objective facts and subjective factors. Knowledge for Dewey should be characterised in terms of a certain relationship between an agent and his environment rather than in terms of true statements of objective facts. The most important aspect of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is in my view its treatment of inquiry as a way of acting and of the inquiring agent as a creature able to enter into intellectual relationships with his environment. This model can be extremely helpful in creating a basis for problem solving and conflict resolution, in practical matters such as political decision making and in moral and public reasoning. This major achievement of Dewey’s philosophical enterprise should in my view be appreciated and taken seriously while one should forgive Dewey for not adding much useful to the history and philosophy of science.""

This chapter discusses recent constitution-making efforts in the North Atlantic countries Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, arguing that a colonial relationship to Denmark is an important part of constitutional discussion in all three countries. Greenland and the Faroe Islands – both autonomous parts of the Danish state – have constitution-making as a part of their independence drives. Iceland has been an independent republic since 1944, and the colonial aspects of its constitutional efforts tend to be overlooked. The chapter concludes that since one of the main complaints about Iceland’s constitution is its pedigree – it was developed from the constitution given to Icelanders by the Danish King in the nineteenth century – Iceland’s colonial relationship to Denmark plays a role that must be made explicit. It is a widely shared view in Iceland that a new constitution is a final step to sovereignty – not yet taken. Therefore, the constitution must also be entirely rewritten, not just amended.

Í þeirri lýðræðisvakningu sem varð á Íslandi eftir hrun mátti sjá hvernig ólíkir hópar byggðu lýðræðiskröfur og ákall um meira eða dýpra lýðræði á ólíkum hugmyndum um lýðræði. Kjarni þessara krafna var þó hinn sami: meira lýðræði þýddi aukin áhrif almennings á ákvarðanir og stefnumótun. Þannig undirstrikaði hin almenna umræða um lýðræði þann skilning að virkt samráð við almenning sé nauðsynlegur hluti lýðræðislegra stjórnarhátta. Í þessari grein er gerð tilraun til að varpa ljósi á ólíkt inntak lýðræðiskröfunnar eftir málefnum hverju sinni og athyglinni einkkum beint að þekkingarmiðuðu lýðræði. Því er haldið fram að þótt enn sé ekki hægt að segja að þekkingarmiðað lýðræði byggi á veigamiklum empíriskum rökum, þá bjóði það upp á áhugaverðustu leið samtímans til að hugsa um lýðræðisnýjungar.During the democratic awakening in Iceland during and after the financial crisis of 2008 it was evident that different groups based their demands for more or deeper democracy on different conceptio...

The financial crisis of 2008, which pushed Iceland to the brink of national bankruptcy, had a profound effect on democratic politics in Iceland. The most significant was the decision of the Icelandic parliament in 2009 to convene a Constituent Assembly which was given the task to revise the Icelandic constitution. The Assembly, which due to later developments became a Constitutional Council, produced a constitutional bill which remains unratified by parliament. The crisis also gave rise to new political activism, oriented against the dominance of established political parties.

The financial crisis of 2008, which pushed Iceland to the brink of national bankruptcy, had a profound effect on democratic politics in Iceland. The most significant was the decision of the Icelandic parliament in 2009 to convene a Constituent Assembly which was given the task to revise the Icelandic constitution. The Assembly, which due to later developments became a Constitutional Council, produced a constitutional bill which remains unratified by parliament. The crisis also gave rise to new political activism, oriented against the dominance of established political parties.

Abstract:Many thinkers lament the lack of public knowledge and understanding of science, expressing doubts about the wisdom of allowing public opinion to direct policy- or decision-making. Philip Kitcher argues that "free discussion" is just as likely to produce less, rather than more, informed public views. The paper takes Kitcher to task for his analysis of public knowledge and his claims that "irremediable" ignorance poses a great difficulty for properly addressing pressing social and environmental challenges. Kitcher's assessment is compared to Dewey's discussion of democratic public engagement and it is shown that their views differ considerably. It is argued that public knowledge must be understood in connection with epistemic trust toward policy-making and social institutions. It is argued that Dewey's criticism of "intellectualistic" criteria of knowledge can be usefully applied to Kitcher's discussion of public knowledge, and that a Deweyan account of public knowledge brings a more optimistic and realistic perspective on public participation in determining policies.

During the democratic awakening in Iceland during and after the financial crisis of 2008 it was evident that different groups based their demands for more or deeper democracy on different conceptions of democracy. Yet their demands had a common core: more democracy meant greater public influence on policy- and decision-making. Thus public discussion insisted on a conception of democracy according to which public consultation is a necessary part of democratic governance. This paper discusses different kinds of consultation depending on the particular demands in each case with particular emphasis on epistemic democracy. I argue that even though it can hardly be said that epistemic democracy is based on much empirical evidence yet, its approach is the most promising way to think about future democratic.

This paper discusses reconciliation as a strategy to heal social wounds caused by dictatorial regimes or deep economic crises. The paper treats two such examples: The failed attempts of the Icelandic government to reach a deal with the UK and the Netherlands about the repayment of debts incurred by the bankrupt Landsbanki Islands and the prosecution of Mr. Geir Haarde, formerly Prime Minister of Iceland. It is argued that although reconciliation strategies have in some cases been partially successful, it can be counterproductive to prefer moral aspirations or goals, such as rebuilding trust after serious political, social or economic disintegration, to strictly legal ways of dealing with individual cases. As the case with Mr. Haarde shows, the endeavor to achieve moral goals using legal means can backfire in unexpected ways.

John Dewey famously argued that we should think of democracy as a “way of life”. What this consists in he described as participating according to capacity in public decisions and participating according to need or desire in forming values. He also characterized democracy as “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1966 p. 87; 1954 p. 147; 1957 p. 209). Such and other passages in Dewey’s works show that his conception of democracy is complex. He did not think of it simply as a way of decision-making, nor is democratic procedure of particular importance to him. Concepts such as “associated living” or “communicated experience” point to the social dimensions Dewey was particularly interested in. Dewey also repeatedly claims that democracy demands “social return” from every individual and that democracy enables everyone to develop “distinct capacities” (Dewey 1966, p. 122). A related claim emphasizes how, in a democracy, “all share in useful service and e...

In the aftermath of the Icelandic economic crisis of 2008 Iceland's former Prime Minister Geir Haarde was convicted for negligence of his constitutional duty to consult with his ministers on measures to prepare for the coming crisis. The court ruled that there was sufficient information available to the government to conclude that there was real danger of a major banking crisis in the months preceding the crisis. Mr. Haarde was the only head of government to be convicted in the aftermath of the Financial crisis. His indictment and conviction was hotly debated in Iceland where many people considered the process unfair, primarily because Mr. Haarde was the only minister indicted by Parliament for negligence of duties although a Special Investigative Commission appointed by Parliament had recommended indicting other ministers and officials as well. The paper reviews the case against Haarde and the public reaction to it. It is argued that the majority of judges on the special court which convicted Mr. Haarde used the constitutional clause on the duty to conduct ministerial meetings to present a more wideranging condemnation of Haarde's failure to deal with and acknowledge the threats Iceland was facing. Public opinion changed over time: When the Parliament began its consideration of whether to indict former ministers surveys showed an overwhelming majority favoring indictments, but limited confidence that anyone would actually be indicted. When proceedings against Mr. Haarde started public support was much less. After the conviction opinion polls have shown growing doubts about the special court itself. The whole case is an interesting example of the elusiveness of accountability: The paper argues that a thoroughgoing moral reading of Mr. Haarde's conviction reveals a more damning analysis og his actions (and lack of actions) than has generally been acknowledged by political leaders and in public debates.

The paper reviews five cases where inappropriate conduct of politicians has evoked public discussion and/or led to sanctions. It is argued that inappropriateness is not a sufficient reason to demand resignation or impose sanctions. Rather such measures should center on trust and whether such conduct constitutes a betrayal or abuse of public trust.

This paper was published in an Icelandic translation in the volume Lýðræðistilraunir: Ísland í hruni og endurreisn (Democratic Experiments: Iceland in Crisis and Recovery) but this English original was never published. It is partly an overview, partly an introduction to the volume which I edited and contains original papers by James Fishkin, Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, Hélène Landemore, Paolo Spada, Giovanni Allegretti and Kristinn Már Ársælsson dealing with the Icelandic financial collapse and political crisis 2008-2013.

Many thinkers lament the lack of public knowledge and understanding of science, expressing doubts about the wisdom of allowing public opinion to direct policy- or decision-making. Philip Kitcher argues that “free discussion” is just as likely to produce less, rather than more, informed public views.  e paper takes Kitcher to task for his analysis of public knowledge and his claims that “irremediable” ignorance poses a great di culty for properly addressing pressing social and environmental chal- lenges. Kitcher’s assessment is compared to Dewey’s discussion of democratic pub- lic engagement and it is shown that their views di er considerably. It is argued that public knowledge must be understood in connection with epistemic trust toward policy-making and social institutions. It is argued that Dewey’s criticism of “intel- lectualistic” criteria of knowledge can be usefully applied to Kitcher’s discussion of public knowledge, and that a Deweyan account of public knowledge brings a more optimistic and realistic perspective on pub- lic participation in determining policies.

During the democratic awakening in Iceland during and after the financial crisis of 2008 it was evident that different groups based their demands for more or deeper democracy on different conceptions of democracy. Yet their demands had a common core: more democracy meant greater public influence on policy- and decision-making. Thus public discussion insisted on a conception of democracy according to which public consultation is a necessary part of democratic governance. This paper discusses different kinds of consultation depending on the particular demands in each case with particular emphasis on epistemic democracy. I argue that even though it can hardly be said that epistemic democracy is based on much empirical evidence yet, its approach is the most promising way to think about future democratic.

Í þeirri lýðræðisvakningu sem varð á Íslandi eftir hrun mátti sjá hvernig ólíkir hópar byggðu lýðræðiskröfur og ákall um meira eða dýpra lýðræði á ólíkum hugmyndum um lýðræði. Kjarni þessara krafna var þó hinn sami: meira lýðræði þýddi aukin áhrif almennings á ákvarðanir og stefnumótun. Þannig undirstrikaði hin almenna umræða um lýðræði þann skilning að virkt samráð við almenning sé nauðsynlegur hluti lýðræðislegra stjórnarhátta. Í þessari grein er gerð tilraun til að varpa ljósi á ólíkt inntak lýðræðiskröfunnar eftir málefnum hverju sinni og athyglinni einkkum beint að þekkingarmiðuðu lýðræði. Því er haldið fram að þótt enn sé ekki hægt að segja að þekkingarmiðað lýðræði byggi á veigamiklum empíriskum rökum, þá bjóði það upp á áhugaverðustu leið samtímans til að hugsa um lýðræðisnýjungar.

Final point:
"Although the constitutional bill did not survive opposition from political and academic elites, theoretically it can still be used as the basis for a new Icelandic constitution by any future government that chooses to do so. If this happens, its novelty should not be underestimated. Even if changes are made in individual chapters and articles, the fact remains that the draft submitted to the Icelandic Parliament by the CC was the result of audacious and original thinking, which should inspire and influence the way we think about constitutions and how they should be written."

Abstract: Pluralism, as a philosophical doctrine, still raises some unresolved problems. The most difficult one (which I will refer to in this paper as the problem of pluralism) is also the most obvious: How to justify restrictions on values while still being committed to pluralism, where the choice of value is an individual affair. On the Rawlsian model this problem is solved by creating a filter according to which a doctrine must be “reasonable” to be fit for the public sphere, i.e. to be a legitimate source of argument within public reason. Dewey approaches the problem in a different way. Since for him community is the source of social values, the filtering demanded by the Rawlsian approach is not acceptable. But this seems to create a difficulty in properly distinguishing between the moral and the political. As a consequence some commentators have dismissed Dewey’s conception of democracy as a moral doctrine. This paper defends Dewey’s conception of democracy as a “way of life”. I argue that the more inclusive Deweyan approach is properly pluralist, while the less inclusive Rawlsian approach only allows for restricted pluralism. As I will show this means that the Deweyan approach is helpful in a multicultural environment where the Rawlsian is not.

Freedom of expression is meaningless in a liberal society if it is seen as restricted to simply making one's views public. A more interesting perspective reconstructs  it as involving action. The paper offers a reading of John Dewey according to which freedom of expression is a form of social action – if it is to be meaningful.
Appeared in Pragmatist Perspectives, eds. Sami Pihlström and Henrik Rydenfeld. Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 86. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica, 2009, p. 211-222.

This paper argues that while Dewey's democratic theory mixes elements of faith and moral choice with the justification of a political conception, the epistemic qualities of Deweyan democracy is what really makes it attractive – and worth discussing.

The Constitutional Council of Iceland worked for three months on writing a new Consititution for the republic of Iceland in the summer of 2011. A new constitution has been called for many times since the founding of the republic, but the council realized a goal that politicians left of center had fought for to have a specially elected body do it, rather than a group of politicians or specialists. In the paper I will discuss the general framework created for the constitutional assembly and question the theoretical basis of the project. I argue that the main weakness is a lack of a methodological approach and a tendency to either push deliberation aside or claim that non-deliberative ways of preference ranking should determine central aspects of deliberation. I will also discuss the decision process, the choice of central issues, how the council structured its deliberations and adoption of proposals, and how it interacted with the government and main political players in the course of its deliberations. I also compare the exercise with deliberative polls and citizen assemblies and use such comparisons to analyse the success/failure of the project.

Activism and protest occupy an uncertain space within democratic politics. While the right to voice a dissenting opinion is unquestioned in liberal theory, protesters often demand more than the right to express their opinions. Protest groups employ direct and indirect threats to decision-makers, and thus some kind of coercion often replaces argument in resistance to authorities. The paper discusses what kind of success protest groups seek and in some cases expect. It attempts to show that protest action should be seen as expanding the political dialogue rather than as a sign of failure of democratic procedure. Protesters communicate with decision-makers without thereby seeking to enter the decision-making process itself, trying to influence it without becoming a part of it. Protest is a form of political participation involving a defiance of authority, which cannot easily be accommodated within democratic methods, and yet turns out to be indispensable for democratic politics.

Halldór Laxness’s political involvement in the thirties brought him twice to the Soviet Union. In 1932 Laxness travelled in the Ukraïne and in Southern-Russia witnessing the consequences of Stalin’s collectivization and the great social turmoil brough about by governmental policies. In 1937-38 Laxness again spent several months in the Soviet Union writing and travelling, ending his stay as as an invited guest to the third of the infamous show trials, the trial of Nikolai Bukharin and others.
Laxness’s journeys to the Soviet Union resulted in two books about his experiences On Eastern Roads (Í austurvegi) and the Russian Fairy Tale (Gerska ævintýrið). These works fit squarely into an emerging genre at the time – the Soviet travel book – and show Laxness in a complicated dialogue with other authors of books about the Soviet Union, with perceived opponents of Soviet Communism as well as its defenders.
The theme of the Soviet Union kept appearing and reappearing in Laxness’s essays as well as through political involvement for decades. He was president of the Soviet-Icelandic friendship society from 1950 to 1968 and went to the Soviet Union on numerous occasion during that period. In 1963, however, he published a book of biographical essays entitled Time of Poets (Skáldatími) where he criticized the Soviet government openly and re-evaluated his earlier encounters in the Soviet Union.
The paper deals with Laxness’s journey’s to the Soviet Union and his views and reasoning about Soviet reality. I argue that Laxness was keenly aware of having a role as a propagandist and exploited his literary skill quite masterfully in an effort to explain what he thought was the essence of the Soviet experiment. I examine his two books carefully as well as subsequent work dealing with the Soviet Union. I supply this research with archival material from former Soviet archives, which shed considerable light on what Laxness intended to do in his books about the Soviet Union.
The Soviet side of Halldór Laxness is a fascinating part of his authorship, which, unfortunately the tendency has been to downplay or even trivialize by scholars as well by Laxness himself in his later years. Instead of portraying Laxness as a politically naïve or creduluous idealist who for many years was fooled by the Eastern empire, I show that he was an active and willing participant in the political game, far from unaware of the intricacies of Communist power and propaganda. His writings about the Soviet Union are among the most interesting examples of Soviet travel writing and deserve to be discussed in that context.

ABSTRACT At the end of her book, Pragmatism and Social Hope, Judith Green asks why one should want to spend time on expanding opportunities for participation in democratic governance (248). The reason, according to her, is a desire that a "deeper rationality of human spirit" would direct decision-making in the world. We are currently captives of economic/military/political rationality, according to her. Only through participatory democracy, or "second-strand democracy" can the spell be broken (195). Although this does not become apparent until one has read a good deal of the book, the author is primarily interested in democratic participation as a way to "deepen" democracy. Yet the (perhaps rhetorically intended) question about why participation is important does not get an unequivocal answer. The feeling that political and economic decision-making is hopelessly tied up with narrow calculative approaches is not new. And the general view that participation and deliberation will enrich approaches to decision-making is often heard. But what kind of participation are we talking about and in what way should ordinary unelected citizens become involved in decision-making? The answers to those questions tend to be vague and Judith Green's book, does not give any clear or convincing answers to them either. This is not to say that Green does not sketch any interesting answers to these main questions. The book is certainly a fresh look at some major topics of democratic theory today and an attempt to integrate democratic theory and pragmatism. And what the book certainly does convey, is a sense of optimism which is wonderfully inspiring to anyone interested in the issues discussed and explored. The first half of Pragmatism and Social Hope is an exploration of selected answers by American thinkers to questions about nationhood, identity, self-respect and hope, where pragmatist thought is nicely mixed in with interesting commentary on Whitman, Baldwin, Dewey and, of course, Richard Rorty. Rorty's work seems to be a great part of the impetus behind the work (as the title already suggests). Rorty's views are (not surprisingly) seen as simultaneously misleading and showing the right way (e.g. 57). In a search for the right pragmatic approach to democracy, his book, Achieving our Country, is thoroughly scrutinized. The notion of "achieving one's country" is further supplemented and expanded: National pride must have a global basis and that means healing reconciliation (39). There is no such thing as achieving a country, one must achieve the world. Pragmatism is in Green's mind the right way to frame inquiry adequately and remove obstacles. Democracy can be articulated as embracing both diversity and common values. It allows that individuality be emphasized and common values celebrated at the same time (14). The "public philosopher" is then a liaison agent who helps address memory and forgiveness, democracy's meaning in crisis and the need for changing habits of feeling, thinking and acting (35). To tackle such issues is crucial, but the problem with Rorty is his "historical amnesia" that equates forgiving with forgetting. The opposite is needed. In order that self-respect can be cultivated on the individual level and national pride on the community level, it is necessary to realize first that one is not better than others and second it is absolutely necessary to find ways of reconciliation with those who have been wronged (47, 84). Forgetting is never an answer. One is tempted to interepret Green's criticism of Rorty as basically coming down to accusing him of being too shallow. Her idea of political reform goes deep: It must go to the bottom of the soul and concern the whole understanding of democracy metaphysically as well as epistemologically, "transforming a whole culture's internal social relations and transactional practices" (73). Thus Rorty simply reiterates stagnated positions of officials who fail to see these metaphysical depths of our choices (79, see also 133). Deep democracy, then, refers to understanding choices in all their dimensions. All that said, however, one cannot but ask whether democracy could become too deep and this Green does not consider. One of the main characteristics of totalitarianism is precisely the metaphysical aspect of choice, with the claim that a superficial...

This powerful and strange story has now been pieced together in a thorough research of life in the Gulag during and after the Great Purge. It brings together long years of archival research, visits to former prison camp sites and the personal recollections (both published and unpublished) of fellow prisoners...

""Jon Olafsson: Oranges from Abkhazia. Vera Hertzsch, Halldor Laxness, and the Great Purge.

The name Vera Hertzsch is known to many Icelanders and intricately associated with Halldor Laxness and his reckoning with Soviet Communism. In the thirties Laxness was an ardent supporter of Joseph Stalin and wrote two books based on his experiences of traveling in the Soviet Union.

At the height of Stalin's purge in 1937-1938, Laxness spent most of the winter in the Moscow, where he attended the last of the Moscow trials. Vera Hertzsch, who had immigrated to the Soviet Union from Germany a decade earlier, was among his acquaintances there. One night in March Vera Hertzsch was arrested by Stalin's security police, the NKVD, along with her one-year-old, half-Icelandic daughter, Erla Solveig. Laxness, who had been invited to dinner that night, witnessed the arrest.

A quarter of a century passed before he would tell the story in a memoir he published in 1963 and the fate of the mother and child remained an unsolved mystery. Vera and her little daughter shared their fate with millions of Soviet citizens: a horrendous life in prison camps, sickness and disease, slavery and hunger. They never made it back and their relatives and friends received no information about them for decades.

This powerful and strange story has now been pieced together from beginning to end. Jon Olafsson has researched Vera Hertzsch's life in the camps by chasing down facts and sources in central and local archives, visiting former camp sites and studying published and unpublished recollections of women who were held in the same camps at the same time as Vera, but unlike her, lived to tell their tale.
The book is therefore not only the story of Vera Hertzsch. It is also an exploration of life in the Gulag during and after the Great Purge, especially of the little researched special camps for women which existed between 1937 and 1939.

Jon Olafsson worked for the Icelandic Broadcasting Company, RUV, in Moscow when access was granted to Soviet archives after the collapse of the USSR. He has been a regular guest there ever since. He is author of Dear Comrades. Icelandic Socialists and the Soviet Union (1999) and has also written numerous articles on Icelandic relations with Comintern and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Olafsson received a doctorate in philosophy from Columbia University in 2000, and has since then worked for the University of Iceland, the Reykjavik Academy, and Bifröst University, where he is currently professor of philosophy and provost. He lives in Reykjavik.""

"This is a study of John Dewey’s philosophy based on three interrelated themes. I maintain, first, that the best understanding of Dewey’s work is achieved by a Peircean reading. On that reading Dewey’s philosophy is partly interpreted through the conceptual framework provided by C.S. Peirce. Second, I argue that a detailed grasp of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is essential for a convincing assessment of his philosophical views. In the third place I show that Dewey’s theory of inquiry creates a common context for natural science and other kinds of inquiry. Dewey’s treatment of natural science as a model for inquiry is not an attempt to impose its methods on inquiry in general. What it does imply is that successful methods and actions in one field of inquiry should facilitate problem-solving in other fields.
In the first part of the dissertation I discuss recent debates on Dewey’s philosophy centred around Richard Rorty’s interpretation of his work. I argue that because of a failure to emphasise Dewey’s methodological approach, some Dewey-scholars who claim to be true to Dewey’s word and spirit present implausible objections to the work of philosophers who, like Rorty, interpret Dewey liberally and so as to serve their own purposes for the most part. Although I do not think that Rorty presents a very useful interpretation of Dewey, I do think that the attempt to incorporate Dewey’s work into a forceful and spirited philosophical argument is more useful and interesting than a learned discussion about what Dewey’s views were exactly at any given point in time.
The second chapter of my study is devoted to an exploration of some central parts of Charles Peirce’s philosophy, especially the role and place of the belief/doubt model in Peirce’s thought. I argue that together with Peirce’s methodological realism, the so-called pragmatic principle and the kind of reasoning often referred to as abduction, the belief/doubt model outlines a framework for inquiry that defines the basic tenets of pragmatism. This framework fits just as well to Dewey’s philosophy as to Peirce’s even though Peirce employs different vocabulary than Dewey.
The chapters that follow deal with the third theme in the dissertation, which is also its main theme, Dewey’s theory of inquiry. I discuss some central parts of this theory and of Dewey’s conception of inquiry with reference to Peirce. I argue that Dewey’s presentation of reasoning at the early defining stages of inquiry makes it plausible to understand it as abductive reasoning. Such reasoning is concerned with selecting possible hypotheses and is, one could say, the crucial stage in inquiry from the viewpoint of Dewey’s theory.
Thus for Dewey the legitimacy of any particular inquiry is determined by a principle of selection of hypotheses rather than by restrictions on legitimate results, such as that conclusions are valid only if the conditions of their revision can be specified in advance.
Dewey’s idea of natural science as a model for inquiry is derived from the view that scientific success in modern times secures natural science a special status. This, according to Dewey, is something the philosophical community has failed to appreciate. He thinks that the methods and practices natural science express a conception of knowledge which philosophy has yet to catch up with.
Dewey’s examination of some concepts and procedures of natural science leads him to criticise many common philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that science must be based on a strict distinction between objective facts and subjective factors. Knowledge for Dewey should be characterised in terms of a certain relationship between an agent and his environment rather than in terms of true statements of objective facts.
The most important aspect of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is in my view its treatment of inquiry as a way of acting and of the inquiring agent as a creature able to enter into intellectual relationships with his environment. This model can be extremely helpful in creating a basis for problem solving and conflict resolution, in practical matters such as political decision making and in moral and public reasoning. This major achievement of Dewey’s philosophical enterprise should in my view be appreciated and taken seriously while one should forgive Dewey for not adding much useful to the history and philosophy of science."

The Comintern schools-in particular KUNMZ and the MLSh attracted a great number of non-Russian Communists and Socialists in the 20's and 30's. The original ambition behind the schools-to train and educate the progressive cadre of the world communist movement-receded rather quickly in the thirties due to growing suspicion of foreigners, but also because of the contradictory goals of the schools themselves: While the aim was to train sharp and independent minds, party discipline required absolute submission to epistemic authority. The paper discusses this intellectual and epistemic paradox, how it affected Comintern schooling and how it contributed to an intellectual culture of stagnation and inadaptability which perhaps was the biggest factor in the Communist movement's demise.

"Are referenda a good way of involving the public in politics?
In recent years we have seen many new and radical approaches to making democratic processes more deliberative and more participatory. The idea of democratic decision-making as mere aggregation of fixed opinions is outdated – deliberation is an invitation to change and review one's opinions, rather than simply measuring relative strength.
One way to increase democratic participation is through national and local referenda on political issues. Referenda are, however, neither the only way, nor necessarily the best way, to involve the public in policy- and decision-making.
In my talk I discuss some pros and cons of national referenda and some alternative ways of public consultation."

Constituent Politics: An impasse?
The Icelandic Constituent Council (CC) submitted a proposal for a new constitution of the Republic of Iceland to the Icelandic Parliament (Althing) in 2011. Since then the Parliament has been struggling to determine what to do with the proposed bill. According to the current constitution, any amendments must be approved by two different parliaments, making it necessary to pass the constitutional bill before and after a general election. A popular demand for a referendum on the proposal, however, has made it unlikely that the parliament will vote on the proposal without first submitting it to a national referendum. Opinions about what to do are widely divergent ranging from a full dismissal on one side of the political spectrum to full support. Some politicians and CC members have expressed the opinion that no changes to the proposal should be considered or that any changes made must have the approval of CC members. The talk will explore whether the politics of constitution making have brought the whole project to a standstill and whether anything can be learned from the process.

Espionage
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained a strong presence in Iceland, due to Iceland’s military importance and the American base in Keflavík. Despite a couple of incidents that revealed Soviet espionage in Iceland, no real Icelandic spies were ever caught. This final essay is a reflec­tion on Cold War spy mania, and raises the question of whether there were any Icelandic spies.

Unjustifiable risk. Kantian maneuvering and mendacity
Kant’s moral philosophy offers a way to deal with moral issues that makes decision-making depend on very general, but universally applicable rules. Kant himself tended to interpret his own philosophy quite narrowly. For example, he made truth-telling an absolute duty, always to be preferred to lying, no matter what the circumstances. Kant’s narrow interpretation opens up a curious insight into the Kantian mind, especially when one looks at his less philosophical works. Kant made a clear distinction between lying and bluffing, and while he was strict about lying, bluffing could often be justified. Unlike direct lies, bluffing requires an act of thinking by the indi­vidual being deceived and that act of thinking suffices to make that person responsible for having adopted a false belief. Thus Kant turns out to be at the same time too strict about ethical behavior and too lenient, which raises interesting questions about Kantian ethics as a whole.

Fake science: Theft, fraud and fantasy in the scientific community
Fraud in science started to fuel emotional debates in Iceland in 2003 when the first volume of a projected three-volume biography of Halldór Laxness was published by a Reykjavík publishing house. The author, a university professor and well-known political commentator, was accused of plagia­rizing parts of the book from Laxness’s own writings. He defended himself fiercely and got some support from the general public. Eventually, however, he was ordered by the Icelandic Supreme Court to pay damages to Laxness’s widow, though he did not lose his academic position. In this chapter I put this particular case in the context of scientific and scholarly fraud and dis­cuss the various ways in which fake science appears.

Education, experience and knowledge: Philosophical pragmatism
Philosophical pragmatism has gone through various episodes of enthusias­tic reception, rejection and everything in between. For the last couple of decades pragmatism has become progressively more important in both analytic and continental philosophy. The works of John Dewey have, as a result, been rejuvenated. In this essay I discuss recent Icelandic translations of two of Dewey’s most important works, How we think (1933) and Experience and education (1938), and I use the opportunity to give a more general assessment of Dewey’s philosophy and its core concepts and reflect on its relevance for contemporary moral, political and educational philosophy.

The propagandist revisits himself: Laxness on Laxness in the Soviet Union
Halldór Laxness, the Icelandic novelist who won the Nobel prize in 1955, was an ardent Socialist in the thirties and forties and traveled to the Soviet Union many times. During the thirties he wrote two books about the Soviet Union. In them he defended the Stalinist regime and argued that Soviet Communism embodied the future of human society. In the early sixties Laxness recanted in a book of memoirs entitled Skáldatími (Poets’ time, 1963). The memoir shows Laxness attempting to go back to his earlier writings. He reassesses them, and to some extent rewrites them, through complimentary experiences and perceptions that sometimes also contradict his earlier reflections. The essay focuses on Laxness’s self-reflection and the way in which he revisits his earlier self. It argues that Skáldatími has many characteristics of a confession, although this is a thoroughly concealed purpose of the work.

"Freud on civilization and society: A pragmatic reading
In the late twenties Sigmund Freud discussed civilization, culture and politics in two short works where he explained social issues and trends in the context of his psychoanalytic theory. The result is a remarkable reflection on Western civilization in the years between the wars. I argue that while Freud should not be taken too seriously as a social theorist, his thinking in Future of an illusion (1927) and Civilization and its discontents (1930) displays a certain pragmatism, which sheds an unexpected light on his psychological theories. I argue that one should see Freud’s under­standing of science as a pragmatic approach and in many ways parallel to John Dewey’s philosophy of science."

The death of utopia in politics and its resurrection in science
Utopian discussion has for decades been excluded from real politics and in liberal theory utopia and dystopia are logically equivalent: What some find utopian is dystopian to others, and thus utopia ultimately becomes dystopia. There is a second reason for not taking utopia seriously as a political concept. Utopia always seems to require a jump from actual circumstances into the projected utopian world but with at least a part of the causal chain missing. The utopian is committed to simply believing that certain condi­tions, defined by the utopian, will produce utopia. The interesting thing about utopia, however, is its resurrection in science, where the missing link between cause and effect seems not to be seen as a problem. Many propo­nents of modern science firmly believe that scientific progress will lead, for example, to advances in medicine that will radically alter the ways patients are treated, effectively making it possible to anticipate most serious illnesses and thus prevent rather than cure them. I argue that there are no grounds for believing in utopia through science any more than through politics.

Conflict as a way of life: Can irony contribute to conflict resolution?
A way of life reflects attitudes, views, habits, desires and needs which on the whole create the framework of the normal for every individual person. I argue in this chapter that circumstances of long-standing conflict will generate ways of life that prevent the conflict from being resolved, rather than facilitating conflict resolution. An important part of solving such a conflict must therefore consist of loosening up ways of life that have become fixed, through facilitating self-critical reflection. I argue that the concept of irony, in a sense similar to Richard Rorty’s, is useful in thinking about conflict and possibly even in solving conflict.

Argument or conflict: The clash of values in public debate
Political discussion is regulated by a number of constraints, some of which are implicit and some explicit. Radicalism in politics is characterized by an attempt to test these constraints and push beyond them. Thus radical groups may demand that issues not accepted as part of the political realm be admitted into political debates, and in this way issues become “politicized.” Differences between liberals or radicals on the one hand and conservatives on the other often revolve around legitimate political projects. I argue that a radical approach to politics must emphasize the need for allowing moral and religious values in, rather than excluding them from the political realm.

East, West and the multicultural “threat”
The Western world is a Christian world in a deep and important sense. Even if the countries belonging to the West (politically if not geographically) are more or less secular, and religions other than Christianity predominant in some (such as Japan), the pervasive influence of the Christian world view in the development of Western civilization makes it impossible to ignore the Christian layer present in Western culture. What is more, the Christian world has been in conflict with the Muslim world for more than a millen­nium, and at the same time, the Muslim world has in many ways played an important role in the development of the West. I argue in this chapter that multiculturalism, which by some is seen as a threat to Western lifestyles, is the best way to accommodate the fact that the West is both more and less culturally diverse than opponents of multiculturalism claim. I offer this argument to support cautious conservatism towards the Church and Chris­tianity in general, including the role of the clergy within the school system.

Radical pragmatism: Dissidence as a necessary part of liberal democracy
Philosophers associated with pragmatism have sometimes been described as not particularly radical. Classical pragmatism was even charged with being “acquiescent” in the sense of tending to conform with the dominant way of thinking at a given time. However, a closer scrutiny of the works of some of the leading pragmatists, such as John Dewey, shows that pragmatists are fundamentally opposed to ideologies and “fixed” ways of thinking and therefore tend towards a radical rather than an acquiescent stance. In this chapter I try to show that pragmatism is radical in the sense that it accepts and calls for radical approaches in all politics.

Dissidence, protest and “conventional” politics, or the problem of radicalism
The rationality of democratic institutions is one fundamental belief of the liberal mind. Democracy can only generate rational engagement within a rational institutional system. In order for democratic politics to guarantee rational decision-making, however, one could argue that there must be limits on political discussion, whereby certain beliefs and values are made exempt from political discussion and deliberation and thus pushed into the private realm. In this essay I argue that this presents a problem for radicalism, since it tends to introduce a wider range of issues into political discussion than “conventional” politics does.

Ethics of resistance and the great plan: On moral criticism of politicians’ conduct and decisions
Opposition to public plans and decisions often seems to require justifi­cation, and in some cases such justification is stated in moral terms. In this chapter I refer to this kind of opposition as “resistance on moral grounds,” and I discuss to what extent resistance can be justified and whether it always needs justification. In exploring the public discussion on environmental issues that was fueled by fierce resistance to the construction of a hydro­power station in eastern Iceland, I show how resistance and protest have led to a fundamental divide in Icelandic politics through moral polarization. Fundamental distrust towards public projects turns political participation into moral resistance.