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HUMAN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION
CRIMEAN TATARS, AND ETC
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
1
Issue 1 (3), 2016
BOARD OF ADVISERS
Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Research fellow,
London School of Economics and Social Science)
Human Security
Editors
Dr. Hanna Shelest
Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko
Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the
Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center)
Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa
National University by I.I. Mechnikov)
Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director
at the Caucasus Institute)
Publisher:
Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural
Cooperation” (Ukraine),
Centre of International Studies (Ukraine),
with the financial support of the
Representation of the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation in Ukraine.
UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian
academic/analytical journal in English
on International Relations, Politics and
Economics. The journal is aimed for experts,
diplomats, academics, students interested
in the international relations and Ukraine in
particular.
Contacts:
website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/
e-mail: Ukraine_analytica@ukr.net
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/
ukraineanalytica
Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica
The views and opinions expressed in
articles are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine
Analytica or its editors and Board of Advisors
Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the
Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
in Ukraine and Belarus)
James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the
Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham
House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs)
Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, Director of
Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs)
H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to
France)
Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands,
Director Defence Transformation at The Hague
Center for Strategic Studies)
Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, VicePrime Minister on European and Euroatlantic
Integration of Ukraine)
Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director
of the Center for International and European
Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))
Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the
Norwegian Nobel Institute)
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
WE SHOULD SPEAK ABOUT THE LIBERATION OF THE CRIMEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Interview with Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mustafa Dzhemilev for UA: Ukraine
Analytica
MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION: ART OF IMPOSSIBLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Hanna Shelest and Dmytro Shulga
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN UKRAINE AS A FACTOR DESTABILIZING DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Iuliia Tsyrfa
GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Mykola Kapitonenko
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN EASTERN UKRAINE
AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Svitlana Andrushchenko
CRIMEA TODAY: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Natalya Belitser
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN CRIMEA: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Kira Spyrydonova
ELECTORAL SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF PEACE-BUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Iuliia Serbina
DO VISA LIBERALISATION REFORMS HELP MODERNIZING UKRAINE? . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Maryana Kuzio and Iryna Sushko
2
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION:
ART OF IMPOSSIBLE
Hanna Shelest, PhD
Editor-in-chief, UA: Ukraine Analytica
Dmytro Shulga
Director of the European Programmes, International Renaissance Foundation
The analysis of the Minsk agreements implementation (a common name for a
package of documents adopted in September 2014 and February 2015 aiming to
resolve a current crisis in the Eastern region of Ukraine) demonstrates that despite
a few steps forward, the systematic violation of certain clauses as well as serious
manipulation of the others by the so-called ‘Donetsk People Republic’/ ‘Luhansk
People Republic’ (‘DPR’/‘LPR’) combatants and the Russian Federation has been
observed and confirmed by the international community. Lifting international
sanctions seems the only incentive for Russia to comply with the Minsk agreements.
Its current tactic involves partial implementation, which would help to apply for
easing sanctions and thus to decrease the cost of its waging war against Ukraine.
At the same time, Russia preserves the possibility to re-escalate the currently lowintensity-conflict at any convenient moment.
Introduction
Following the military occupation and
illegal annexation of the Crimea in
February–March 2014, Russia continued
to destabilise Ukraine. The armed conflict
in Donbas, a region in the Eastern Ukraine
in immediate vicinity to the Russian border,
was triggered by the Russian security
service officers in spring 20141. Since then
the conflict was continued with steady
inflows of fighters and weapons from the
territory of the Russian Federation and
eventually with a direct aggression by the
Russian regular armed forces on Ukrainian
soil, which was the only way to save
Russia’s proxies. At present, as a result of
this, 1/3 of Donbas region (part of Luhansk
and Donetsk regions) or less than 3% of
1
the Ukrainian territory is controlled by
the so called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’
(‘DPR’) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’
(‘LPR’) combatants, not by the Ukrainian
government.
The first Western sanctions after the
annexation of the Crimea in March 2014
appeared to be weak and sent a misleading
message to the Kremlin. Then, however, the
evidences of the Russian interference in
the Ukrainian internal affairs, the violation
of its territorial integrity and support of
the separatist movements were too vivid
to ignore and not to take respectful actions
to confirm the EU’s own adherence to the
democratic values and principles of the
international law.
Interview with I.Girkin (Strelkov), commander of the group which started the hostilities in and around the town of
Slov’yansk: http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
7
On 27 June 2014, the European Council
presented a set of requirements that could
postpone the introduction of the economic
sanctions against Russia. Among these
requirements there were an agreement
on a verification mechanism for the ceasefire and for the effective control of the
border, monitored by the OSCE; a returned
control of three state-border checkpoints
(Izvarino, Dolzhanskiy, Krasnopartizansk)
under the Ukrainian authorities; a release
of hostages including all of the OSCE
observers (captured by combatants at that
time); a launch of substantial negotiations
on the implementation of the President
Poroshenko’s peace plan2.
Given that Russia failed to respond to these
demands of the European Council (except
of the OSCE monitors’ release), on 31 July
2014 the Council of the EU introduced a
package of economic sanctions (restrictive
measures targeting sectoral cooperation
and exchanges with the Russian
«
duration of the economic/
sectoral measures against
Russia shall be linked to
the complete implementation
of the Minsk agreements.
Federation) with a view to increasing the
costs of Russia’s actions to undermine
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence and to promoting a
peaceful settlement of the crisis3.
In February 2015, the leaders of Ukraine,
8
Russia, France and Germany negotiated
a package of measures to alleviate the
ongoing war in the Donbas region of
Ukraine (implementation of the Minsk
protocol dealt in September 2014). In
March 2015, the European Council agreed
that the duration of the economic/sectoral
measures against Russia shall be linked
to the complete implementation of the
Minsk agreements4, which still remain
the principle reference documents for the
peaceful settlement of the conflict in the
Eastern Ukraine. They were supported by
the US, the EU and the UN Security Council.
Thus, the connection of the EU sanctions
with Minsk agreements implementation
looks quite logical.
‘Minsk agreements’ is a common name
for a package of documents adopted in
September 2014 and February 2015.
‘Minsk-1’ refers to September 2014
agreements – Protocol on the results of
consultations of the Trilateral Contact
Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE with
participation of the separatist leaders)
dated 5 September 2014 and a subsequent
Memorandum dated 19 September 2014.
These documents contained provisions on
establishing a cease-fire, the withdrawal
of the heavy weapons, the withdrawal
of the illegal combatants, a prohibition
for drones except those owned by the
OSCE etc. The ceasefire of September
2014 was heavily violated by separatists’
forces, leading to a significant increase of
the area not controlled by the Ukrainian
government by February 2015.
‘Minsk-2’ commonly refers to the ‘Package
of measures for the implementation of
2
European Council 26/27 June 2014 Conclusions. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143478.pdf
3
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833&from=EN
4
European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/
european-council/2015/03/european-council-conclusions-march-2015-en_pdf
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
Minsk Agreements’ signed on 12 February
2015 by the Trilateral Contact Group
representatives (Ukraine, Russia and
OSCE) and the leaders of the separatists5.
The content of Minsk-2 was negotiated
at 16 hours long ‘Normandy format’
summit in Minsk between the Presidents
of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Chancellor
of Germany, who issued a declaration in
support of the package6.
Assessment of Minsk agreements
implementation
Below is the analysis of implementation
of each particular clause of the Minsk
agreements:7
1. An immediate and comprehensive
ceasefire in certain areas of Ukraine’s
Donetsk and Luhansk regions and its strict
implementation starting at 00:00 (Kiev
time) on 15 February 2015.
The signing of the Minsk II agreement
was happening at the time of the intense
fighting near Debaltseve, started due to
the ‘DPR’ and Russian forces attack. This
attack was significantly changing the
separation line agreed in September 2014
by the conflict sides. During the Minsk
negotiations (11–12 February 2015),
Russia tried to postpone a date for ceasefire initiating, to get the final results of
the battle. However, even with the date
of the ceasefire agreed as 15 February,
actual intensive fighting continued till 20
February 2015. Since then, the situation
5
6
7
8
remained tense with regular escalations.
Among the most intensive one was ‘DPR’’s
failed attack on the Ukrainian village of
Maryinka in June 2015. As a result of such
escalations, for example, 430 Ukrainian
servicemen were killed during March –
October 2015.8
In general, during the period of 15
February – 4 December 2015 there were
only 47 days (15%) without wounded
and killed from the Ukrainian side.
Multi-days cease-fire without losses
from the Ukrainian side (except of the
mine detonations casualties) happened
only 20–23 September, 10–19 October,
1–8 November 2015, so only these
periods can be considered as a formal
cease-fire.
The intensity of fighting decreased in
September 2015 after the Trilateral
Contact Group once again confirmed the
ceasefire starting on 26 August 2015.
A crucial factor was that in September
2015 Russia started preparations for
its military operation in Syria and
temporarily refocused its attention from
Ukraine. If Ukraine had been the initiator
of the fighting, it would have been logical
to expect an increase of military offences
in September–October 2015, using
the moment of other Russia’s military
priorities. With Russia’s attention shifted
to Syria, almost full ceasefire lasted
in Donbas from September until midNovember 2015, with Ukrainian losses
caused mostly by mines.
Комплекс мер по выполнению Минских соглашений / ОБСЕ. 12.02.2015 http://www.osce.org/ru/
cio/140221?download=true
Декларация Президента Российской Федерации, Президента Украины, Президента Французской
Республики и Канцлера Федеративной Республики Германия в поддержку Комплекса мер по выполнению
Минских соглашений, принятого 12 февраля 2015 года / Official website of the President of Ukraine. http://
www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/deklaraciya-prezidenta-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-prezidenta-ukra-34695
The text of the Minsk-2 clauses is given according to the unofficial translation: http://www.ibtimes.com/minskceasefire-deal-full-text-agreement-between-russia-ukraine-germany-france-1814468
According to the unofficial ‘Memory Book’ data: http://memorybook.org.ua/indexfile/statistic.htm
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
9
Already in November 2015, shelling of the
Ukrainian positions intensified.9 Usually,
the new wave of shelling coincides with
important dates, such as Independence Day,
the anniversary of Euromaidan beginning
or a new round of the negotiations of the
Trilateral Contact Group. The new escalation
started in January-February 2016, noted
both by the OSCE SMM10 and National
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.11
Since recently, the OSCE SMM started to
publish the daily reports on the cease-fire
violations noticed by their teams.12
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by
both sides at equal distances in order to
create a security zone to be at least 50-kmwide from each other for 100mm or bigger
calibre artillery systems, a 70-km-wide
security zone for MLRS, and a 140-kmwide security zone for Tornado-S, Uragan
and Smerch MLRS and Tochka-U tactical
missile systems…. The withdrawal of the
abovementioned heavy weapons shall begin
no later than on the second day after the
ceasefire and shall end within 14 days...
A specific document on the withdrawal
of the weapons ‘Control plan for
coordination and implementation of a
package of measures to implement the
Minsk agreements’, was signed on 2022 February 2015 by representatives
of the military commanders of Ukraine,
Russia, ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’. The document
was agreed at the Joint centre for control
and coordination of issues regarding
ceasefire and gradual stabilization of
the contact line (this centre was created
along with the start of the Minsk process
Although the sides have declared the
completion of the withdrawal of heavy
weapons at the appointed time, the OSCE
SMM has regularly reported violations
– heavy weapons were recorded in the
prohibited area, changing of weapons
occurred in places of permanent deployment,
and until recently, “DPR” and “LPR” did not
provide identification numbers of their
weapons to be controlled. The reason was
a constant movement of weapons of “DPR”
and “LPR” to the territory of the Russian
Federation (for repair and recycling) and
back (new and refurbished samples).
One of the confirmations of movement of
the arms from the Russian territory can
be mentioning in the text of the Minsk
agreement of the multiple launch rocket
systems (MLRS) “Tornado-S”, which was
added to the Russian armoury only in
2012. There are more and more evidences
of the new weapons modifications
present only in Russia (not delivered for
export). For example, a heavy multiple
launch thermobaric rocket system (TOS-1
Buratino, 220mm), which is produced only
in Russia, never supplied to Ukraine, was
spotted by the OSCE SMM observers at the
training area in LPR.13
After the shift of the Russian attention to
Syria, it was possible to sign an additional
document – “Agreement on the withdrawal
of weapons calibre up to 100 mm and
tanks from the line of contact” (beyond the
9
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 18
November 2015 / OSCE/ http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/201701
10
Status Report as of 10 February 2016 / OSCE/ http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/221641
11
According to the daily briefings of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, presented at http://uacrisis.org/
12
13
10
in September 2014 and has been a point
of communication between the military of
Russia and Ukraine in Donbas).
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: Table of ceasefire violations as of 19:30hrs, 3 February 2016 http://
www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220571
SMM OSCE report on 27 September – http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/186276
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
requirements of the Minsk agreements),
which was issued as a supplement to the
Minsk agreements on 29-30 September
in Minsk by members of the Trilateral
Contact Group and the next day by the
leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”. It envisaged the
withdrawal of tanks and artillery up to 100
mm for 15 km. The withdrawal process was
formally completed on 12 November 2015.
It should be considered that ‘DPR’/‘LPR’
militants often prohibit OSCE SMM
observers to visit some areas under their
occupation, what is regularly reported by
«
‘DPR’/‘LPR’ militants often prohibit
OSCE SMM observers to visit some
areas under their occupation.
the Special Monitoring Mission in their
daily report.14 According to the Ukrainian
security sources as well as volunteer group
“Information resistance”15, ‘DPR’/‘LPR’
avoid withdrawing of essential quantities
of heavy weapons. Militants use industrial
areas, especially closed plants and coalmines
to hide MLRS, heavy artillery and tanks in
close proximity to a contact line, especially
in Donetsk, Horlivka and Luhansk
3. Ensure effective monitoring and
verification of the ceasefire regime and the
withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE
from the first day of the withdrawal, with
the use of all necessary technical means,
including satellites, unmanned aerial
vehicles, radar systems and so on.
At the time of signing the Minsk agreements,
a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of
the OSCE had been already operating in
Ukraine, launched in March 2014. The
Mission started monitoring the situation
in the conflict area immediately after the
signing of Minsk agreements. From the
very beginning, Ukraine’s position on the
SMM has been to strengthen its mandate
and increase in personnel numbers. This
corresponds to the position of Ukraine
to deploy a wide international mission
in the conflict area, perhaps under the
auspices of the UN or the EU, to facilitate a
comprehensive conflict resolution.
On 2 October 2015, the “Normandy
format” summit in Paris agreed on the
expansion of the mission and widening
its responsibilities to demining. As of 10
February 2016, mission members’ number
has reached 1053 people, including 684
monitors, 540 of which are located in the
east of Ukraine in the conflict area. On
the 22th OSCE ministerial conference in
Belgrade on 3–4 December 2015, it was
decided to extend the mission’s mandate
for another year, to advance its technical
equipment and increase the personnel
number.
A major question, however, continues to be
the restriction of access for SMM monitors.
Both ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ representatives and the
Russian officials prevent the OSCE mission
to have full access for monitoring purposes.
If some areas are not monitored due to the
security reasons (mine field, shelling), so
others are impossible to monitor due to
the deliberate restrictions. For example,
“LPR” members continue to prevent the
SMM from monitoring many areas close
to the border with the Russian Federation
in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by
the Government” – as stated in one of the
14
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3
February 2016 http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220581
15
Information Resistance http://sprotyv.info/en
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
11
daily reports issued by the Mission.16 Such
restrictions are applied not only by the
separatist combatants, but the Russian side
itself. Since the very beginning, Russian
side prevents observers of OSCE SMM to
monitor Russian – Ukrainian border in
“the certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions”.17
Also, numerous cases of violent attitude
towards the observers were reported. For
example, in August 2015, the SMM reported
about an apparent arson attack on its cars
in militant-controlled Donetsk.18 Direct
violence committed against OSCE monitors
was also being noticed, and named by
the Deputy Chief of the Mission Hug as
“deliberate, hostile interference with the
work of the OSCE SMM that amounts to
censorship”.19
4. On the first day following the withdrawal,
to start the dialogue on the modalities of
holding local elections in accordance with
Ukrainian legislation and Ukraine’s law
“On the special procedure of local selfgovernance in certain districts of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions” as well as on a future
regime of these districts on the basis of this
law. Immediately, no later than in 30 days
since the date of the signing of the given
«
Proper conditions for
organisation of local elections
are another point of fundamental
difference between the parties.
And in addition to it,
12. Issues related to local elections shall be
discussed and agreed with representatives
of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions within the framework of the Trilateral
Contact Group on the basis of the Ukrainian
law “On the special procedure of local selfgovernment in certain districts of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions”. Elections shall be
held in compliance with the relevant OSCE
standards and monitored by the OSCE ODIHR.
The dialogue on modalities for local
elections began in the framework of the
Trilateral Contact Group after the formal
announcement of the withdrawal of heavy
weapons. The positions of Russia and
Ukraine are fundamentally different. The
Russian leadership believes, and this view
is broadcast through the leaders of “DPR”
and “LPR”, that such negotiations should
take place at the political level between
Kyiv, Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia’s goal
is to have the leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”,
appointed in Moscow, legalized within
Ukrainian political and legal field, to
influence through them the political life of
Ukraine. This interpretation of the Minsk
agreement is excessively arbitrary and
contrary to its text. Clause 4 of the Minsk-2
Agreement does not specify how exactly the
dialogue on the modalities of the elections
should be conducted. From a Ukrainian
16
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3
February 2016 http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220581
17
SMM OSCE report on 1 December, see “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the
fulfillment of its mandate”– http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/205451
18
19
12
document, to adopt a Verkhovna Rada
resolution to specify the territory to which
the special regime applies in accordance
with the law of Ukraine.
Read more on UNIAN: http://www.unian.info/war/1109501-four-osce-smm-cars-destroyed-in-arson-attack-indonetsk-overnight.html
Direct violence committed against OSCE monitors, one monitor hospitalized / Ukraine Crisis Media Center.
30.07.2015 http://uacrisis.org/30171-obsye-12
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
point of view, the format of the Trilateral
Contact Group is quite adequate and clearly
defined by Clause 12 of the Minsk-2.
Proper conditions for organisation of local
elections are another point of fundamental
difference between the parties. Discussions
intensified on the eve of the Ukrainian
local elections in October 2015 when the
leaders of the separatists unilaterally
announced organisation of their own
local elections on 18 October 2015 in
‘DPR’ and 1 November 2015 in ‘LPR’
respectfully without any correspondence
to the Ukrainian legislation. Only after
‘Normandy format’ summit in Paris on
2 October 2015, the sides managed to
persuade unrecognized ‘republics’ to
postpone their elections till 2016 and
move to a substantive discussion of the
conditions for elections organisation.
The Ukrainian position is based on the text
of the Agreements where it is mentioned
that these elections should be held ‘in
accordance with Ukrainian legislation’
and ‘in compliance with the relevant OSCE
standards’. Thus, it means free access of
media and international observers; free
participation of the Ukrainian political
parties; and the top authority of the
national Central Election Committee.
The organization of the elections is
also challenged by the current security
situation, as it is impossible to organize
free elections under the guns, without
ceasefire and disarmament clauses of
the Minsk agreements fulfilled. Also, one
should consider more than 1, 5 million
IDPs in Ukraine from the Eastern regions,
who will not have a possibility to vote
under the current conditions. So, logically,
these issues should be addressed first as
the proper conditions for having free and
fair elections. The position presented by
20
‘DPR’/ ‘LPR’ leaders, is that the admission
of Ukrainian political parties, Ukrainian
media and internally displaced persons to
the elections is unacceptable.
In addition, the latest demand of
the separatist combatants is to have
a momental total amnesty for all
‘participants of the events in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions’ as a precondition
for holding elections. This would allow
participation in elections to all participants
to the conflict from the ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ sides,
regardless of the type and scale of crimes
committed during the conflict.
On 16 September 2014, Parliament of
Ukraine adopted the Law “On the special
procedure of local self-governance in
some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions”.20 According to this legislation,
a special status has been established for
3 years, when the Ukrainian legislation
can be limited only by this law provisions.
Among others, this law guaranteed use
of the Russian language, exemption from
the prosecution for participation in the
events in Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
special procedures for appointment
of prosecutors and judges (with the
participation of local authorities), a special
regime for investment and economic
activities, development of the transborder
cooperation with the Russian Federation
regions, creation of the special militia
units to keep public order, controlled
only by the local authorities. However,
it was stressed that this law should be
implemented only after the elections
take place according to the Ukrainian
legislation, with international observers
and media involved. On 17 March 2015,
the Parliament of Ukraine adopted
corresponding amendments to the Law
“On the special procedure of local self-
Закон України Про особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та
Луганської областей / Верховна Рада України. 16.09.2014 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
13
governance in some districts of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions”21 as well as adopted
a resolution on the determination of
individual regions, cities, towns and
villages of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
where the special procedure for the local
self-government is introduced.22
Despite fulfilment of its obligations under
the Minsk agreements, leader of “DPR”
Zakharchenko immediately expressed his
unsatisfaction, insisting that they would
like to have control over all localities where
unrecognized illegal referendum took place
in 2014.23
5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by putting
into force a law that would ban persecution
and punishment of individuals in connection
with the events that took place in some
areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
Ukraine.
The Law ‘On the special procedure of
local self-governance in certain districts
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’, which
provides a general condition on amnesty
in Art.3 “The state guarantees according
to this law, to compound of offence,
criminal and administrative prosecution,
21
22
23
In general, Ukrainian position is that the
amnesty cannot be full, as some of the
cases should be considered as acts against
humanity due to their extreme violence and
intention.
The position of Ukraine is in line with
international practice and the provisions
of Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, And
Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts of 1977.26
The requirement for amnesty means that
certain crimes were committed but persons
who committed them should be subjects
to the maximum possible exemption from
punishment.
Закон України Про внесення зміни до статті 10 Закону України “Про особливий порядок місцевого
самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей” / Верховна Рада України. 17.03.2015
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/256-19/paran2#n2
Постанова Верховної Ради України Про визначення окремих районів, міст, селищ і сіл Донецької та
Луганської областей, в яких запроваджується особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування / Верховна
Рада України. 17.03.2015 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/252-19
Захарченко незадоволений законопроектом про особливий статус Донбасу: хоче більше територій / iPress.
ua. http://ipress.ua/news/zaharchenko_nezadovolenyy_zakonoproektom_pro_osoblyvyy_status_donbasu_hoche_
bilshe_terytoriy_115222.html 17.03.2015
24
‘The State guarantees, in accordance with the law, prevention of criminal prosecution, criminal and administrative
liability and punishment of persons – participants of the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The authorities and their officials, enterprises, institutions, organisations of all forms of ownership are prohibited from discriminating, prosecuting and punishment of persons in relation to events that took place in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions.’ – http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18
25
Проект Закону України Про недопущення переслідування та покарання осіб – учасників подій на території
Донецької та Луганської областей / Верховна Рада України. 16.09.2014 w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=52183&pf35401=313104
26
14
and punishment of people – participants
of the events on the territory of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions,24 and the Law ‘On
prevention of prosecution and punishment
of persons – participants of the events in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions’. The
only restrictions for amnesty envisaged
were terroristic acts and murder, rape
and plunder.25 This latter law is not yet in
force, however, due to the chronic failure of
‘DPR’/‘LPR’ to comply with the conditions
of the Minsk agreements.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. https://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDocument
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
Moreover, if the conflict is considered as
an internal one, as Russia claims, then the
amnesty cannot be extended to foreign
citizens, i.e. citizens of Russia who took part
in the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. In the international law, there is
a clear division between the rules of war
and norms adopted concerning civilians
and combatants in the non-international
conflicts. In case it is a recognized
international conflict Geneva Convention
on Prisoners of War 1949 will be applied,
as well as the Protocol mentioned above.
Therefore, the status of the prisoners of war
can be applied only to the arrested soldiers
and officers of the Russian Federation. In
this case, Ukraine can use these norms
against, for example, Russian officers
Yerofeev and Aleksandrov captured on the
territory of Ukraine in May 2015. Thus,
considering that the Russian Federation,
despite the words of the officers, were
trying to insist on their retirement and
voluntarily actions in Luhansk region, the
Ukrainian state had a right to prosecute
them either for spying or terrorism.
So, in case of the Ukrainian citizens, fighting
under the “DPR”/”LPR” flags, they cannot be
considered as prisoners of war, and should
be treated according to the international
humanitarian law, which limits their rights
as prisoners of war, but widens their rights
as citizens of the state. So only this category
has a right to amnesty. As Russian citizens
only have a right for release and repatriation
(Art. 118 Geneva Convention 1949).
At the same time, a DPR representative
announced in October 2015, that their side
has started the preparation of their own
27
28
29
variant of legislation to be presented at the
Trilateral Contact Group meeting, as they
definitely would like to exclude terroristic
acts from the list of exceptions.27
6. Ensure the release and exchange of all the
hostages and illegally held individuals on
the basis of the “all for all” principle. This
process should be completed no later than
on the fifth day after the withdrawal.
The implementation of this clause of Minsk-2
is bound in time to the implementation
of the clause 2 on withdrawal of heavy
weapons. If withdrawal had been assessed
as completed on 8 March 2015, as it was
envisaged and declared by the sides, so by
the end of April, the hostages should be
released. However, the withdrawal has not
been yet announced as completed, so the
release of hostages is taking place on the
basis of bilateral arrangements.
In fact, negotiations on the exchange of
hostages and illegally detained persons have
been constant since the conflict began in
the spring of 2014. According to the official
Ukrainian estimations, at the time of signing
Minsk-2 on 12 February 2015, the Russian
authorities, ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ held more than
2000 Ukrainian citizens. In the opinion of the
Ukrainian representative in the humanitarian
working group of the Trilateral Contact
Group Iryna Gerashchenko, the ‘DPR’/‘LPR’
representatives are understating the list of
hostages taken.28 As a result, there are two
lists: one is officially agreed (around 140
remaining in captivity by February 201629)
and those who named as ‘missing’ (around
800 people). Among those there are not only
military, but also volunteers and journalists.
Боевики «ДНР» хотят обсудить в Минске закон об амнистии и восстановление мостов / Glavcom. 20.10.2015
http://glavcom.ua/news/333940.html
Геращенко: Боевики занижают количество находящихся у них в плену украинских заложников / Mignews.
22.10.2015 http://m.mignews.com.ua/ukraine/7432385.html
Some 140 people still held prisoner by militants – Ukrainian president / Interfax. 1/02/1026 http://en.interfax.
com.ua/news/general/321485.html
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
15
In addition, while discussing the hostages
list, those who are under political
prosecution in the Russian courts (such
as Sentsov and Savchenko) are not taken
into account by the Russian Federation.
Currently there are 10 Ukrainian political
hostages in the Russian Federation, trials
of whom are held with violations of the law
and are also falsified. The statements of
the high-level representatives of different
states, as well as international organizations
are happening regularly urging to release
political prisoners,30 however, without any
response from the Russian side.
Ukraine has repeatedly shown readiness
for the exchange as quickly as possible on
the “all for all” principle. However, Russia,
‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ inhibit this process by
insisting on additional preconditions –
first of all, the adoption by Ukraine of the
law on a momental and total amnesty for
all participants to the conflict.31 This is
contrary to the text of Minsk-2, as it does
not set any preconditions for “all for all”
exchange except for the heavy weapons
withdrawal. Moreover, in January-February
the amount of illegally “arrested” people
increased including volunteers.32 33
7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage
and distribution of humanitarian aid
among those who need it on the basis of an
international mechanism.
The situation with the humanitarian aid to
the occupied territories is not stable. The
first problem is that not all humanitarian
30
31
32
33
34
16
organisations can receive accreditation
from the separatist ‘republics’ for
delivering humanitarian aid to the area.
Usually access is given to either Russian
organisations or those from private
foundations who had past connections
in the region (e.g. Rinat Akhmetov’s
foundation). The scandal happened, when
Red Cross reported of their blocking while
delivering aid, and that many of their
representatives lost their accreditation.
In addition, they expressed their opinion
that ‘DPR’ authorities started a mass
campaign to discredit representatives of
the humanitarian organisations.34
The situation is deteriorating. If before
the negative attitude was mostly
witnessed against the international/
foreign humanitarian organizations, so
since recently the local organizations have
been also appearing under attack. The
recent biggest case is illegal unexplained
arrest of Marina Cherenkova, a wellknown volunteer, head of the organization
“Responsible Citizens”, who has worked in
Donbas since the first days. Marina is a local,
former Deputy Governor of Donetsk region
at the times of President Yanukovych.
“Responsible citizens” was a completely
neutral group, never associated with the
Ukrainian government of pro-Maidan
forces, so they managed to work until the
last days at the hottest and most dangerous
places of Donetsk region, providing food
and medical assistance. In few days not only
Cherenkova was arrested, but also other
members of the group interrogated by the
Ukrainian Pilot Defiant In Moscow Court As Detention Extended / Radio Free Europe. 10.02.2015 http://www.
rferl.org/content/savchenko/26839247.html
“ДНР” занялась подготовкой собственного проекта амнистии, поскольку украинский считают
неподходящим / Mignews. 20.11.2015 http://m.mignews.com.ua/politics/8210461.html
В «ДНР» схватили известного историка. Жена рассказала подробности / TV Rain. 31.01.2016 https://tvrain.
ru/articles/zhena-402745
Угруповання «ДНР» має звільнити затриманих Козловського та Черенкову – ОБСЄ / Radio Free. 04.02.2016
http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/news/27532534.html
Хто і чому не хоче міжнародну гуманітарну допомогу в “ЛНР” / Deutsche Welle. 26.09.2015 http://
dw.com/p/1Gdv2
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
“DPR” security forces and yet three activists
expelled from the territory of “DPR”.
8. Definition of the modalities of a complete
restoration
of
socio-economic
ties,
including social transfers, such as pension
payments or other payments (receipts and
income, paying the utility bills on time and
renewing taxation within the framework
of Ukraine’s legal field). To meet these
objectives, Ukraine will restore control
over the segment of its banking system in
the areas affected by the conflict, and an
international mechanism to facilitate these
transfers may be set up.
Not all socio-economic ties can be quickly
restored due to the security situation.
Numerous cases of attacks to the banks’
cars made them to stop money delivery
to the uncontrolled territories. At present,
‘DPR’/‘LPR’ allow the flow of all possible
currencies – Russian rubles, Ukrainian
hryvnias and US dollars, with prices in
supermarkets mostly presented in rubles.
The uncontrolled territories are not paying
their utility bills and taxes.
According to the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949, there is a responsibility of the
occupying side to provide services to
the civil population in the conflict zone.
One may debate whether separatists can
«
Ukraine does take obligations
towards all Ukrainian citizens,
including those living under
occupation, among others paying
pensions and other social benefits
to the people registered at the
uncontrolled territories but doing
this on the territory controlled
by the Ukrainian government
be considered as occupying side while
Russia, despite its military involvement,
is not taking responsibility as a side to the
conflict. Anyway, Ukraine as a side, which
does not control this territory, cannot be
responsible for meeting the needs and
demands of the local population. Ukraine
can bear responsibility only for those
territories returned under its control
where it can guarantee the security of the
social-economic infrastructure.
Nevertheless, Ukraine does take obligations
towards all Ukrainian citizens, including
those living under occupation, among
others paying pensions and other social
benefits to the people registered at the
uncontrolled territories but doing this on
the territory controlled by the Ukrainian
government, so people need to travel
there. For simplification, special logistical
centres were created near the contact
line with ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ to provide banking
services and goods trade for citizens. There
are numerous cases when separatists
themselves or their close relatives have
regularly received Ukrainian pensions.
9. Restoration of full control over the state
border in the whole zone of the conflict
on the part of the Ukrainian government,
which should begin on the first day after
local elections and finish after an allinclusive political settlement (local elections
in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions on the basis of Ukraine’s law, and
constitutional reform) by the end of 2015,
providing the implementation of clause 11
– in consultations and with the agreement
of representatives of certain districts of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the
framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.
This clause is one of the most important
for the realization of the Minsk agreement
and political designation of roles for the
parties involved in the crisis. The border
is always a bilateral thing, so as soon as
Ukrainian government is not controlling
the border due to the uncontrolled
territories, another side responsible is the
Russian Federation. As the inflow of the
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
17
illegal weapons and military personnel is
regularly reported by the OSCE, journalists
and others, in addition to the Russian
soldiers caught at the Ukrainian territory,
one can say that the Russian Federation is
either directly supporting the separatists
in Donbas or is not able to control its
own border. However, Russian Federation
provided assurance that it was controlling
its borders,35 meaning it was just ignoring
the fact of the weapons and fighters flow
and supporting such activity.
«
Allowing a free flow of fighters
and weapons should be regarded
as taking a side to the conflict and
supplying separatists with fighters,
ammunition, finance, and even
regular troops, and thus be regarded
as a role of an aggressor state
Allowing a free flow of fighters and weapons
should be regarded as taking a side to the
conflict and supplying separatists with
fighters, ammunition, finance, and even
regular troops, and thus be regarded as a
role of an aggressor state, according to the
UN General Assembly Resolution 3314.
The Russian Federation has already
expressed one of its conditions that it could
close the Russian-Ukrainian border along
Donetsk and Luhansk regions only after
all other clauses of the Minsk agreements
were implemented. Such statements
are quite illogical since if other clauses
are implemented it means the conflict is
more or less solved. Implementation of
35
36
37
18
provisions of the Minsk agreements on local
elections, delivery of humanitarian aid, the
restoration of the economic infrastructure,
the withdrawal of foreign armed groups
etc. logically demand the restoration of
Ukraine’s control over the border, possibly
with the mediation and presence of
missions of international organisations like
OSCE.
In January 2016, Russian delegation
blocked an OSCE decision to expand the
mandate of the OSCE Observer Mission
at the Russian checkpoints “Gukovo” and
“Donetsk” to all sections of the border
that is temporarily not under control of
the Ukrainian authorities,36 thus not even
allowing the international mission to
observe the border situation.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed
formations,
military
hardware
and
mercenaries from Ukrainian territory under
the OSCE’s supervision. Disarmament of all
illegal groups.
There is no sign of essential decrease of
the Russian military contingent in Eastern
Ukraine. Ukrainian and foreign military
experts say that there are a still at least 8
thousand regular Russian troops in “the
certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions”. Despite the regular denial of
this fact by the Russian authorities, the
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reported
on numerous occasions the facts of the
Russian soldiers’ presence37, capturing of
some of them by the Ukrainian forces and
open courts happening now are the direct
proof.
Россия отказалась закрывать границу с Донбассом и выводить войска/ Зеркало недели. 11.12.2014 http://
zn.ua/POLITICS/rossiya-otkazalas-zakryvat-granicu-s-donbassom-i-vyvodit-voyska-161550_.html
Statement of the Ukrainian Delegation at 1086th Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in Connection with the
Decision on Extension of Deployment of OSCE Observers to Two Russian Checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian
Border. OSCE Permanent Council Nr 1086. Vienna, 21 January 2016. http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/comments/4915-komentar-mzs-ukrajini-u-zvjazku-z-rishennyam-postijnoji-radi-obse-shhodo-prodovzhennya-mandatu-misiji-sposterigachiv-obse-na-dvoh-rosijsykih-punktah-propusku-gukovo-i-donecyk
OSCE reports Russian soldiers near Donetsk / World Bulletin. 4.06.2015 http://www.worldbulletin.net/
haber/160205/osce-reports-russian-soldiers-near-donetsk
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
The EU in its personal sanctions
acknowledged the Russian military senior
staff involvement, e.g. Deputy Minister of
Defence Anatoliy Antonov appeared in
the EU sanction list with the wording: “in
that capacity, involved in supporting the
deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine”.38
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg also
confirmed this information in December
2015: “We have stated again and again that
Russia is present with military personnel
in Eastern Ukraine and that is based on our
own intelligence sources”.39
It is necessary to mention that the so-called
“people militia” of DPR and LPR form a 36
thousand strong military structure, which
possesses hundreds battle tanks, MLRS and
field artillery.40 There are evidences that
the main forces of the self-proclaimed DPR
and LPR, are not only armed and supplied
by Russia, but integrated in the Russia
army structure.41 They are under the direct
command of the Centre of the Territorial
Forces, established on the basis of the
12th Reserve Command, Southern Military
District of the Russia Federation. Before
autumn 2014, the mosaic of the forces
involved had been complicated and manifold,
as comprised of different groups, including
uncontrolled and criminal, who used the
conflict as a possibility. During autumn 2014
– summer 2015, the Russian special services
dismantled uncontrolled separatist armed
groups using arrests and assassinations of
their leaders.42 Ordinary militants from such
groups were forced to join “official units” or
give up weapons. Some insight presented in
the interview of the Russian Major Vladimir
Starkov for Euronews in August 2015.43
His trucks with ammunition for separatists
“accidently” came to the Ukraine military
position, where he was arrested.
At the same time, Russia considers Ukrainian
former volunteer battalions as illegal,
insisting on their disbandment. However,
Ukrainian volunteer battalions, which
appeared in spring of 2014, starting from
autumn 2014 have been fully incorporated
in the Military Forces of Ukraine, National
Police and the National Guard. So insisting
on disbanding the so-called volunteer
battalions, the Russian Federation is trying
to prohibit an integral part of the Ukrainian
armed forces, which are fully bound by
Ukrainian state legislation.
11. Realization of constitutional reform in
Ukraine, with the new constitution to enter
into force by the end of 2015, and assuming
as a key element the decentralization (taking
into account the peculiarities of certain
districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
as agreed with representatives of these
districts), and the enactment of permanent
legislation on the special status of certain
districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in
accordance with the measures specified in
the footnotes, until the end of 2015.
38
List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Council of the
European Union. 15.09.2015 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/pdf/150915sanctions-table---Persons--and-entities_pdf/
39
Putin denies Russian troops are in Ukraine / Yahoo news. 17.12.2015 http://news.yahoo.com/putin-denies-regular-russian-troops-ukraine-170221107.html
40
Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Public Affairs Service. http://gur.mil.
gov.ua/en/content/russia-armed-aggression-against-ukraine.html
41
About reorganization of the 12th Reserve Command, Southern Military District into the Center of the Territorial
Forces. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Public Affairs Service http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/shchodo-reorhanizatsii-12-komanduvannia-rezervu-pivdennoho-viiskovoho-okruhu-u-tsentr-terytorialnykh-viisk.html
42
Meet the Cossack ‘Wolves’ Doing Russia’s Dirty Work in Ukraine / Time. 12.05.2014 http://time.com/95898/
wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/
43
Caught red-handed: the Russian Major fighting in Ukraine / Euronews. 13.08.2015 http://www.euronews.
com/2015/08/12/caught-red-handed-the-russian-major-fighting-in-ukraine/
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
19
It is clear that Russia does not want to
annex Donbas in the same way as the
Crimea. Instead, Moscow wants Donbas to
remain a part of Ukraine to be used as a
leverage on Kyiv. The Kremlin would like
to see ‘federalisation’/‘Bosnianisation’ of
Ukraine as a result of the constitutional
process, i.e. turning it into a dysfunctional
divided state. In such a scenario, Moscow
would remain in full de facto control
over legitimised autonomous separatist
‘republics’ with their own ‘people’s militia’,
i.e. de facto military, and local executive
and judicial authorities. Moreover, Ukraine
(and probably the West) would pay for the
reconstruction of the destroyed Donbas
economy and infrastructure. What is more
important, these separatist enclaves could
gain the veto power over major national
political decisions in Ukraine. Russian
pressure for a special constitutional
status for Donbas heavily complicated
the constitutional process of the general
decentralisation reform in Ukraine.
Still, on 31 August 2015 the Parliament of
Ukraine adopted in the first reading the
draft of constitutional amendments on
decentralisation for Ukraine together with a
provisional article on the special procedure
«
The Kremlin would like to see
‘federalisation’/‘Bosnianisati
on’ of Ukraine as a result of the
constitutional process, i.e. turning it
into a dysfunctional divided state
of local self-governance in certain districts
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Actually,
the decentralisation of Ukraine is generally
supported by the public and has been a
priority of the Ukraine-EU Association
44
20
Agenda. However, the ‘special status’ for
the occupied areas has provoked a serious
political divide. Still, these changes were
approved under the risk of losing Western
support (US Assistant Secretary of State
Victoria Nuland’s presence in the Rada
during the vote was seen by Ukrainians as
open pressure).
In the eyes of many Ukrainians, Western
pressure on Kyiv to implement clause 11 on
constitutional changes ahead of implementing
ceasefire and other urgent clauses of Minsk-2
looks like “appeasing” Russia for aggression
and assisting it to achieve its goals of
‘Bosnianisation’ of Ukraine. It is widely seen
that Kyiv can have a meaningful dialogue
on the future constitutional devolution of
powers only with legitimately democratically
elected representatives of the Donbas
region, i.e. it can be possible after the proper
implementation of the clauses 4 and 12 of
Minsk-2 (see above).
At the same time, “DPR” representatives
stated
their
propositions
on
the
constitutional reform of Ukraine, which
go far beyond the Minsk Agreements and
standards of the international law and
practice on decentralization. For example,
in addition to the request to have quota for
their members in the Parliament of Ukraine,
to use Russian language and have close
economic ties with Russia, they insist on
granting the right to coordinate all adopted
laws as well as the right to veto decisions in
foreign policy and granting the right to form
their own police, security services, judiciary,
prosecution, border guard service, and other
agencies without an approval by the Kyiv
authorities.44
13. Intensification of the activities of the
Trilateral Contact Group, including by means
of establishing working groups to fulfil the
“DPR” offers special view of amendments to Ukrainian Constitution / Cencor. 27.01.2016 http://en.censor.net.ua/
n371293
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
respective aspects of the Minsk agreements.
They will reflect the composition of the
Trilateral Contact Group.
The Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine
was set up following the first Normandy
format meeting in June 2014 to facilitate
the dialogue between the governments of
Ukraine and the Russian Federation to find
diplomatic resolution to the war in Donbas.
The Group originally was composed of high
representatives from Ukraine, the Russian
Federation, and the OSCE. Representatives
of separatists (‘Donetsk People’s Republic’
and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’) take part
in the discussions of the Group. Currently,
the Group is supported by four thematic
working groups: on security issues; on
political issues; on humanitarian issues; on
socio-economic issues.
The work of the Trilateral Contact Group
should not be underestimated, and it is the
stable platform for a constant communication
between the parties to conflict, which
is important to find solutions for daily
issues and more general management of
the conflict. Taking into consideration the
high level of the representatives involved,
including heads of the working groups, it is
possible to conclude the level of attention
and amount of influence these people have
to make decisions but not just to have talks
about talks.
Recently, a special representative of the
Russian President B. Gryzlov stated, that
in his opinion, Russia is not a part to the
Minsk Agreements45. Moreover, he insists
that any decisions, including Constitutional
changes should be negotiated with the
representatives of “DPR” and “LPR”.
However, it is worth mentioning, that
the Minsk talks in February 2015 took
place almost without the absence of the
separatists’ regions representatives, agreed
by four leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine
and Russia, and only later presented to the
leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”, that was quite a
vivid confirmation of the decisive role of the
Russian Federation in the decision-making
process and negotiations.
Conclusions
The analysis of the Minsk agreements
implementation
demonstrates
that
despite few steps forward, the trend of a
systematic violation of the certain clauses
as well as serious manipulation of the
others by the so-called ‘Donetsk People
Republic’/‘Luhansk People Republic’
(‘DPR’/‘LPR’) combatants and Russia can
be observed.
For the time being, the main violations and
non-conformity lay in the security domain,
which should be considered as a basic
prerequisite for the political settlement.
Without full implementation of the ceasefire, and withdrawal of the agreed weapons,
as well as permission of the full-access to all
«
For the time being, the main
violations and non-conformity
lay in the security domain,
which should be considered
as a basic prerequisite for
the political settlement
territories for the OSCE, it is difficult to start
negotiations or practical implementation of
the clauses regarding reconstruction of the
destroyed territories or local elections – in
case these elections are expected to meet
the international standards.
45 «Мы можем серьезно продвинуться в реализации Минских соглашений» / Kommersant.ru. 17.01.2016
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2895197
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
21
Minsk agreements implementation has
been taking place with different speed
for different clauses. From the very
beginning, it was a problem due to the
lack of defined deadlines for all the clauses
implementation as well as a sequence for
implementation of the individual clauses
in the list, resulting in serious disputes
between the parties. While Ukraine
insists on the simultaneous start of
implementation of all clauses, the Russian
Federation manipulates with few clauses,
for example insisting that full control of
the Ukrainian border by the Ukrainian
authorities can be restored only after local
elections and Constitutional changes.
At the same time, there must be certain
logic in implementation of the agreed
actions. Free and democratic elections as
well as reconstruction of the destroyed
towns are not possible while security
situation remains fragile. However,
provision of a secure environment
demands not only a steady ceasefire but
also effective control over the UkraineRussia state border and stop of the illegal
inflow of weapons and military to the
uncontrolled territory. If other clauses
can be presented as a responsibility of the
self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk’ and ‘Luhansk’
‘People’s Republics’, the effective border
22
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016
control is a clear single responsibility
of the Russian Federation. Continuing
prevention of the OSCE’s monitors to
observe the situation at the uncontrolled
territory reveals both the attitude towards
the international obligations and desire to
hide non-conformity to them.
Dr. Hanna Shelest, Editor-in-chief of UA: Ukraine
Analytica, member of the Board at the Foreign Policy
Council “Ukrainian Prism” and curator of the Ukrainian
Peacebuilding School. Previously H.Shelest served as
a Senior Researcher at Odessa branch of the National
Institute for Strategic Studies and a Visiting Research
Fellow at the NATO Defence College (Italy). She has a
PhD in International Relations, specializing in conflict
resolution and security issues. She has more than 50
academic and more than 100 media articles on conflicts
and security. H.Shelest is a Rotary Peace Fellow (2010),
John Smith Fellow (2012) and Marshall Memorial Fellow
(2016)
Dmytro Shulga, Director of the European Programs at
the International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine).
Studied International Relations in Ukraine and European
Integration Law in Germany, since 2005 has worked
for IRF. Mr. Shulga’s primary interests include UkraineEU-Russia relations, Black Sea region, and European
Neighbourhood Policy.