Engaging Naga Nationalism: Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies

Engaging Naga Nationalism: Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies? Author(s): Dolly Kikon Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 26 (Jun. 25 - Jul. 1, 2005), pp. 2833-2837 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416822 Accessed: 17-03-2016 00:04 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political Weekly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Engaging Naga Nationalism Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies? 'Nationalism' among the Nagas and the struggle for 'Nagalim' has, in the half-century since the 1951 Naga referendum witnessed several shifts and changing phases. While definitions of 'freedom' and 'self-determination' may differ, and there is at present a plethora of Naga representative bodies, there is nevertheless broad agreement among Nagas, like with other movements in the north-east, of the hegemonic power of the Indian state. Governments at the centre have, by turns, adopted a policy of nzilitarisation and of extending grants to a small section of the local elite that it has co-opted in the task of governance. Any resolution of conflicts in the north-east, including the Naga one, could begin when both sides negotiate from a position of equals, and by an end to the process of militarisation that has tended to largely view dissent as a sign of subversion and anti-nationalism. DOLLY KIKON I summed up the numbers game as a subjective matter [Jacob 1990:172]. It is easy to get lost in the catacombs of colonial and Introduction Naga nationalist construction that have informed the debate on T he north-eastern region of India is not only an important cartographic reality in Indian politics but also a space where physical power plays a dominant role in construct- ing a political discourse of citizenship and peoplehood. This Naga identity. However, such factors have paved the way for Nagas to develop a strong sense of nationalist consciousness. Thus, identity formations along with Naga nationalism are ongoing projects in the Naga political discourse. region does not find itself within the narrative and memory of the nation, yet continues to occupy a central position regarding II the territorial integrity of India. In this context, the Naga struggle Modern Political Decision-Making Tools for right to self-determination has been considered a threat to the and Naga Experience territorial integrity of India. Despite several attempts at resolution of the Indo-Naga conflict in the past few decades, the demand for self-determination has continued to fuel relations between the The Naga plebiscite of 1951 constitutes a landmark in Naga national history. Did Nagas trek down from the Patkai range in government of India and the Naga people. Of late, the demand for present-day Myanmar responding to a clarion call for the Naga a sovereign Naga nation 'seems' to have accommodated the idea nation? Does it even matter if they did not? The call for Naga of an autonomous, unified homeland within the republic of India. plebiscite was carried out in the Naga Hills, an administrative The population of Naga people according to the 2001 India census stood at 1.9 million. However, there are disagreements. If myths and legends gave rise to imagined communities, modern dynamics continue to construct nationalistic solidarities through unit within the state of Assam. The administrative, territorial and political character of the Naga inhabited areas have drastically changed since then, but the 1951 Naga plebiscite has become a modern legend in the struggle. The plebiscite was held around number games. Naga political and civic organisations put the two basic issues. First, whether they (Nagas) wanted to remain total Naga population at around 3-4 million,2 which includes in India or establish a separate independent state. Second, to Nagas both in India and Myanmar.3 British colonial surveys of repudiate the Indian government's view that the call for sover- the 19th century, and British administrators like Mackenzie, eignty was the work of a few misguided Nagas under Phizo and while charting out the unadministered frontiers of north-east the Naga National Council. Modern Naga historians claim with India in 1835 referred to the Burmese Nagas as 'Patkoi Nagas'4 certainty that 99 per cent of the people voted for freedom [Yonuo and cited their population as 'under 5,000 souls' without speci- fying the number of tribes [Mackenzie 1995:88-89]. However, during the creation of the state of Nagaland in 1963, the Naga population stood at 12.5 lakh with the total number of Naga tribes quoted at eight. Today, an official document published by the state of Nagaland asserts that 16 Naga tribes inhabit Nagaland.5 The Naga insurgents, with a far greater stake in consolidating the people, quote 43 Naga tribes as constituents of the Naga nation.6 However, Naga civic organisations like the Hoho and Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) state there 1974:202]. The following year (1952) the Naga people boycotted the first Indian parliamentary election and decided to continue the Naga 'freedom struggle' which aimed at achieving a sove- reign Naga homeland.8 These two events are the building blocks of a modem Naga national project and are reiterated to emphasise the legal continuities of the struggle of oppressed peoples and the process of decolonisation. The Nagas claim that their demand for the right to self- determination is based on a different historical background from India. Emphasising this point, Wati Aier, says: are 3.5-4 million Nagas and consists of 42 different tribes.7 ...There was a cohesive understanding among the Nagas that we Leading us all thus into an obscure conclusion, Julian Jacob are different historically and politically, and this made our earlier Economic and Political Weekly June 25, 2005 2833 This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions leaders take a stand...(while) our struggle is a legitimate one, the But these institutions were either banned under the prevailing question of what is self-determination is a big question.9 state laws or integrated into the state machinery.12 Nonetheless, Nagas continue to mobilise themselves and politically participate Protracted struggles for right to self-determination show that in organisations and institutions which are often seen as antinotions of sovereignty, self-determination and nation not only state entities by the administration. Often, indigenous instiget interpreted and re-interpreted during the transition of power tutions like the Hoho,13 student bodies and human rights from one generation to another, but also engineer negotiation organisations are tagged as fronts/mouthpieces of armed oppoprocesses with centralised governments and redefine priorities sition groups.14 of the people. In this context, Smith points out, "...It is true that Thus, it is within such a militarised context, that even while we are dealing here with long-term constructs, but these are not the Indian security forces launched development initiatives in essences or fixed quantities or traits.. .national identities change, the early 1990s, the union home ministry of India blacklisted but this is a process that occurs in every generation, as external 82 Naga non-governmental organisations operating in Nagaland events and internal realignments of groups and power encourage for suspected links with militant outfits in 2003. According to new understandings of collective traditions" [Smith 2001:20]. the official report, the blacklisted organisations were cited as proArticulating a similar position, an official in the Naga armed militant groups masquerading as service providers in the ecoopposition shared his personal view: nomic, healthcare and education sectors 'Blacklisted NGOs', ...(In) the 1950s, we felt that it was practicable to demand for [Easterni Mirror, May 25, 2003]. The Indian state manifested sovereignty according to the international situation with the changes its presence in the north-eastern region mainly through military going around the world. We felt that the Nagas had a case at hand. expeditions and operations. Continued militarisation has reinHowever, according to me, the demand for Naga sovereignty in forced people's views that the government is not committed to today's context has become a problematic issue. The reason being protect the rights of citizens especially during civil conflicts. that it is not possible for us to manage without the support and Baruah states that such state policies are not new for the govern- backing of a powerful nation.. .for the moment we have kept aside ment of India. One of New Delhi's containment policies has been the demand for sovereignty. In this present political process, we are looking at how we can have a peaceful and a working relation- the paternalistic carrot-and-stick approach routine with the use ship with India.10 of military force interrupted by lavish doles of development money - whose source and targets are often couched in secretive This view establishes some thoughts on nationalism (and) what deals - in the backward region [Baruah 2002:1]. practical attitude to adopt towards it. Historical studies acknow- The attempt of Naga independentists has been to negotiate at ledge that the national identities change with time, that the the level of the most basic, yet the most fundamental point, i e, demands and needs that first gave rise to national consciousness where people can have the choice to decide what system of may give way to others without a radical rupture in identity itself governance they prefer. Ironically, the growing campaign for [Miller 1995:4]. Another Naga interviewee describes the 'shift' transparent and democratic governance, has failed to take into in the Naga struggle as follows: consideration the extremely undemocratic and militarised con- ...Right now the shift that is taking place is about the sovereignty ditions under which electoral systems are introduced. The ini- of the Nagas as a people. So, the sovereignty has shifted from tiation of democracy process through the processes of electoral the state to the people. It is the people who will decide how the politics has not contributed towards any solution in the Indosystem of governance, and how the Naga people will organise Naga armed conflict. Electoral mechanism have not only been themselves. So, even if it means forming a Naga state (as part unresponsive but have systematically destroyed existing indi- of the present Indo-Naga political settlement) it may not be a 'state' going by the existing definitions of what a state is. It may be a genous institutions and created a group of parasitic elite form of state that may emerge out of indigenous values and 'managers' for New Delhi. A Naga social worker highlighted his principles and not so much in terms of its rigidity. For example, concern by saying: doing away with rigid structures and boundaries and more in terms When people do not know the system and are not comfortable of sovereignty that deals with inter-dependence (sic). And the with it they are bound to get confused (within such systems of question of inter-dependence again emerges out of the idea of the governance). However, as far as the participation of the Naga people being sovereign, so that the people themselves decide the people in electoral politics is concerned, they do that because they areas in which they want to have a relation of inter-dependence have no other option'.15 with a particular nation or to what extent. So it is the people (Nagas) who will decide and not the Indian state.ll Political participation of the electorate is necessary (though not sufficient) indicator of democratic practice in a democratic III society because it is only through participation that the public can choose and decide their options and interests. However, what Imaging Democratic Indian Mechanisms are the underlying bases of electoral choice for people in militarised For the Nagas, the image of democratic India is through the Indian electoral process. Samaddar argues that the electoral system and the process of voting is a rite of political theatre and a protocol in national life [Samaddar 2001:160]. However, the process of imposing legitimacy through the electoral system as a strategy has failed to address issues of governance. Between 1946 and the early 1950s, Naga villages and tribes came together under indigenous village institutions like the councils, women's societies and various youth forums to mobilise and resist army operations and also to keep alive politics of dissent in the region. society? Can democratic mechanisms function under conditions where state agencies either coerce or bribe the electorate to cast their vote? To begin with, there is an inherent difference in the manner in which the nation state and the people choose to define political participation. In Naga politics, the introduction of electoral system significantly defined the language of 'political partici- pation'. Electoral system became one of the significant acts of 'political participation' and also a duty to become a 'good' citizen. In this manner, politics became state patronage politics. For instance, Hokishe Sema, chief minister of Nagaland during 2834 Economic and Political Weekly June 25, 2005 This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions the early 1970s warned Nagas of protecting and supporting In this context, an interviewee defined what freedom meant 'anti-social' elements. He issued stern warning to the Naga public for him: that if the guerrillas were given protection and it came to the It would mean being able to exercise the truth that I believe in notice of the government, police and the army, the consequence without being intimidated, without being obstructed, without being would be severe [Yonuo 1974:100-61]. Such democratic policing coerced or threatened...I mean being able to manifest my human- ness in different spheres of life like political, social, economic and also defined the 'anti-national'. In militarised zones like the cultural fields...2north-eastern region of India, construction of these definitions The interviewee's vision and understanding of freedom can severely restricted civil and political rights as the discourse of participation and 'rights' was entrusted to security institutions be categorised as a general human rights need, but not a definition armed with regulations like the National Security Act, the Armed for 'freedom' in a political sense. However, this ambivalence Forces Special Powers Act 1958, the Nagaland Security Act 1962, reflects the fact that the right to self determination has continu- and the Disturbed Areas Act 1955. ously been redefined in the last 300 years. Scholars and jurists continue to argue whether there exists a right to self-determi- Ironically, lawmakers who constituted, framed and reviewed regulations that conferred enormous powers at the hands of nation in customary law and the definition of who constitutes military forces16 acknowledged that mere possibility of abuse a definite 'peoples' remains disputed between nation states and could not be counted as a ground for denying the vesting of peoples' movements. At the same time, Hannum points out that while the meaning and scope of the right to self-determination powers or for declaring a statute unconstitutional.17 On Novem- ber 27, 1997, the Supreme Court of India, while upholding the continues to remain vague and imprecise, the principle of self- Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA) stated that, determination will continue to be a major political force both internationally and domestically (1990:27-49). 'The powers under the act are not arbitrary or unreasonable and An ambiguous language of rights has also shaped and defined are subject to sufficient safeguards, such as binding instructions on the Armed Forces, to prevent misuse and abuse. Therefore, the rhetoric of what actually constituted 'rights'.21 In the the powers do not violate any constitutional rights'.18 The interviewee's response, freedom and self-determination are synonymous. Thus, for him, it comprises fundamental rights like consequences of state policies where the language of rights and the right to create and participate in one's own internal political, justice are abused, unresolved political conflicts are handed over to the army, and people are collectively clubbed under anti- social, cultural and economic systems. Ironically, it is only democratic laws and regulation does not yield in the end, sus- through such basic demands that the Indian democracy's failure tainable meaningful political settlements. It is under such existing to recognise and address people's movements becomes evident. structures, that people's choices are severely restricted. But Electoral politics in India often glosses over critical political shrinking political spaces does not mean a decline in resistance. issues raised by its marginalised electorate. One may then argue that no democracy is perfect. What then It may well indicate that one needs to readjust and look at the situation to adequately probe further into the efforts of the is the difference experienced by Naga people, especially when invisible population in the north-east region who continue to compared to other marginalised groups within India? To begin with, there is the ubiquitous conflict and processes of militarisation mobilise against state violence and address a centre that has encouraged in a sycophancy culture based on client - state of the region. Besides, as Deng (1987:69) argues, if the concept relations and policies. In this context, development projects of political participation has to be equated to electoral politics, initiated by security agencies to bring an end to violence results liberal democracy has to presuppose a framework characterised in lack of popular participation19 and further limit the role of by a broad consensus on the fundamental principles of nation- official civic bodies. hood, the structure of government, and the shaping and sharing of power, wealth and other national resources. Where consensus IV on these fundamentals is lacking, parliamentary democracy becomes the rule of a numerical majority imposed on an alienated Shrinking Democratic Spaces in India minority, whether numerically determined or otherwise It is within such rigid processes that the government of India often contradicts the constitution which spells out a cultural marginalised. This means that we must address the pending fundamental issues of nationhood before we can legitimately diversity and a pluralistic political system. As a result, such invoke majority votes as justification for imposing any decisions processes expose cleavages and strains within state-centre rela- on the minority. tions in India. Therefore, the present political discourse as outlined To understand whether electoral politics ensures a reasonably above points to the circumstances in which Naga nationalism meaningful participation, one has to understand the schizo- generally evolved, these have not been those in which the state phrenic character of politics in the north-east region. Baruah itself was lacking, or when its reality was in serious doubt. The observes that the political parties in the region re-align themselves state was only too conspicuously present. It was, as Gellner states 'its boundaries and the distinction of power, and possibly of other advantages, within it which were resented' [Gellner 1983:4]. This with the existing national ruling party. He says that this under- scores a dependency syndrome related to the north-eastern states' structurally weak position in India's constitutional architecture. reality underlines the shrinking democratic spaces, within which Such political equations with mainland Indian political parties notions of rights and justice are re-constituted. are critical for establishing the conduit of nebulous funds from Existing political circumstances have conditioned Naga New Delhi [Baruah 2004:1 ]. After the 2004 elections in Nagaland political strategists to redefine their actions and functions, the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN)22 seemed hard which in turn continuously reinforce political mobilisation. pressed to re-align itself with the Congress Party. The present In this manner, ideas evolved from everyday lives become chief minister of Nagaland, Neiphiu Rio, stated that his party vital in reconstituting the social and political voice of the people. might support the Congress-led alliance in the centre, and Economic and Political Weekly June 25, 2005 2835 This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions common ground, one that appeals to both the negotiating parties declared, 'everything is possible in politics'.23 There was also can be a settlement whereby Naga people can decide to choose speculation whether the Congress-led government in New Delhi a system of governance. Instead of following the existing Indian would show any enthusiasm for the ongoing Indo-Naga peace electoral system of politics, Nagas can work out an association process, and whether financial packages released by the previous NDA government would be sanctioned by the new government with their indigenous forms of governance thereby bringing all in New Delhi. Thus, even solemn affairs such as electoral al- the Naga inhabited areas into one administration. But such liances and political ideologies are undermined or determined representation should ensure equality and gender balance because by an omnipresent need to continue with the economic packages Naga customary law and indigenous institutions continues to extended from the centre to the states. remain a strong patriarchal domain. In accordance with the Indo-Naga ceasefire agreement, the Nagaland was granted statehood in 1963, solely on political grounds without any consideration for financial viability. While talks have remained outside the ambit of the constitution. Ironi- it was a strategic consideration to appease certain sections of cally, Article 371 (A) of the Constitution which grants rights and the Naga armed opposition, it served only to intensify the armed concessions to the Nagas has remained silent over issues of struggle and 'garrisoned' a section of the Naga people within political rights. In this context, the constitution of Jammu and a territorial unit that was created without the consent of all the Kashmir points out that a discourse about a Naga constitution Nagas. Notwithstanding democratic mechanisms like regular is in itself, not a scandalous suggestion. The reason being that elections following the granting of statehood, Naga political if the Indo-Naga negotiation finds a solution, it is most likely practices seem to reiterate the position of the Indian state as a that the settlement will be ultimately 'within' the Constitution. hegemonic power structure located in New Delhi. Therefore, The settlement would require a parliamentary ratification and addressing the issue of losing out in the Indian electoral numbers constitutional amendments for it have to be effectively imple- mented. Such a settlement would require the participation of game for the Naga people is academic and irrelevant. Irrespective jurists, policy-makers and an effective third party to monitor the of which coalition is in power in New Delhi, the significance of India's territorial and political sovereignty over Nagaland, agreement. Any shortsighted negotiation between the govern- continues to define the relationship between the government of ment of India and the Naga representatives will not only exacer- India and the Naga polity. While justifying coercive state bate the Indo-Naga conflict but also set a poor precedent to ethnic mechanisms and policies, patronage politics catering to a small and nationalist conflicts willing to negotiate for peace in the section of the Naga elites has become a ready substitute for north-east. Thus, for a long-term solution, India needs to reflect institutionalising civic tensions over almost all political issues. on its principles of federalism. Such a step would not only enable Hence, even though there are few instances of regional Naga India to come out with a framework that will translate peace parties who form the state government, their failure to effect processes and political negotiations in the subcontinent but also changes in the structure adds to their powerlessness and invests give up its knee-jerk reaction to ethnic and nationalist movements greater importance to centralising actors within Naga politics. in the north-east. However, such a solution cannot turn into a Thus, the vicious cycle of dependency on the central government reality without engineering the existing Constitution, which at ends up reducing even well meaning Naga regional political present grants enormous power to the central government. Demilitarisation is the most important issue that needs to be parties into 'managers' for an agenda emanating from New Delhi addressed. Indian policy-makers have never hesitated to impose - an agenda with little resonance in the 'lived politics' in Naga un-democratic and coercive force to settle political differences areas and which is almost totally divorced from local concerns. with its citizens. Notions of equality and respect are not imme- V diately the first principles that come to mind in the relations between the Naga people and the Indian state. The Indo-Naga Conclusion ceasefire negotiation is an apt example. In the seven-odd years Why does a multicultural democracy like India lack a frame- work to tackle demands of ethnic groups and nationalist move- ments, other than a coercive one? Despite obvious tensions between minority rights and multiculturalism on one hand and of its existence, the formal demilitarisation of Naga areas has not been discussed. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 continues to be enforced throughout the Naga inhabited areas of Nagaland, Assam and Manipur. This raises uncomfort- citizenship and civic virtue on the other, India's republican able questions about the psychological advantage enjoyed by history has accommodated both trends. Naga political discourse Indian security personnel in a region where a citizen's political on self-determination and nationhood could be read by consti- rights can be revoked according to the whims of non-commis- tutionalists as a manifestation of a minority rights debate that sioned officers. A political dialogue where justice and peace are recognises thatjustice is no longer defined in terms of difference- desired goals would seem impossible under such circumstances. blind rules and institutions. Developing concepts of human Policy-makers in India have defended such draconian regulations rights, minority rights and indigenous rights may contribute in the interest of security. Yet, in the last five decades, leave directly to strengthening the principle of self-determination, even aside evolving an adequate response to the Naga national ques- as state-developed law seeks to minimise its post-colonial impact. tion, this militarised environment has only seen the creation of It is important to recognise that a successful Indo-Naga nego- more armed conflicts, hence more insecurity for the citizens of tiation will open up positive pathways to address questions such the north-east. as autonomy and right to self-determination claims voiced by different groups in north-east India. It is necessary to find a ground to restore mutual trust and initiate a process of democratisation that provides a system to address social, political and economic justice for the people. Finding a Democratic mechanisms such as electoral politics do not spell out democracy, nor does it guarantee to preserve and address democratic participation. Unless nation states are willing to negotiate with people's movements on terms of equality, centred on people's rights, measures such as equality and rights remain 2836 Economic and Political Weekly June 25, 2005 This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions participation. For text see Hannum, Hurst, 'Autonomy, Sovereignty, and mere tools which do not ensure people's empowerment and Self-Determinlation', (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) p 114. participation to address questions of rights in different spheres 20 The interviewee is a Naga student and a human rights activist. The of their lives. These measures are not an end in itself. The burden interview was held in Dimapur, Nagaland, on January 8, 2004. of proof now lies with the defenders of Indian national (and 21 States justify gross human rights violations by shifting the focus from territorial) interest, who must show how retaining the status quo addressing rights to that of defending the state's sovereignty and its is the best way to engage with Naga nationalism. 1[3 territorial integrity. But many non-violent movements are subjected to state repression. States often refuse to 'compromise' and give into demands not realising that many existing framework of states fails to Email: dollykikon@yahoo.com chalk out rights of its people, especially so in cases of ethnic minorities and indigenous people. Thus, inflexible nature of the state and its coercive Notes nature of addressing such voices not only leads to violent retaliations from people's movements but has also exacerbate these conflicts into [An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2nd International Conference on Regional Autonomy and Ethnic Minorities, held on June 10- 13, 2004, Uppsala University (Sweden).] long drawn bloody armed conflicts. Ironically, by the time states are willing to 'give in' and 'compromise' the situations tend to become much more complex. 22 The Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) is the current coalition 1 But this accounts only the Nagas of Nagaland. There is no break up for Nagas in other states because the census is conducted on the basis on scheduled caste/tribe of particular states. government that consists of the Naga People's Front (NPF), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and other groups. 23 The reason for this re-alignment, according to the chief minister was 2 See <http://www.nscn.com>, (accessed December 12, 2004). suggested so that the peace process between the government of India 3 This is a rough estimate since there has never been a attempt to bring and the Naga armed opposition does not get derailed. <http:// out a joint census of the Nagas residing in India and Myanmar. Yet, www.telegraphindia.com/1040518/asp/northeast/story_325969 >, the Naga civic and political bodies frequently use this figure. In such (accessed on October 12, 2004). instances Naga nationalist myths not only circulate around one blood/ References one people theory, but also graft onto modern nation state practices of censuses and number games to mobilise and demand for a homeland. 4 'Patkoi' refers to the Patkai hills situated between India and Myanmar. 5 Government of India Census Report 2001. 6 <http://www.nscn.com > (accessed December 12, 2004). 7 For a detailed text see <http://www.npmhr.org> (accessed December 12, 2004). 8 The present term used for a sovereign Naga homeland is Nagalim (Lim means land), a term used by the Naga armed opposition in their manifestos. I use Nagaland because the documents referring to the Indo-Naga conflict use this term. 9 Personal interview held in Dimapur, Nagaland on January 7, 2004. 10 The interviewee, (name omitted) is an official in the Naga-armed opposition. The interview was held in Dimapur. Nagaland on January 4, 2004. 11 The interviewee (name omitted) is a research student. This interview was held in Dimapur, Nagaland on January 8, 2004 12 For instance, the traditional village guards were employed by the state and transformed into a tool for governance. They were often used by the Indian military forces as spies orguides to track down Naga nationalists and their sympathisers. Agrawal, S P and Datta Ray (1994): Reorganisation of North-East India since 1947, Concept Publishing House, New Delhi. Baruah Sanjib (2002): 'Governors as Generals', <http://mail.sarai.net/ pipermail/reader-list/2002-june/001600.html> (accessed on July 5). - (2004): 'Unscheduled Matters', The Telegraph, Kolkata, May 26. <http:/ /www.telegraphindia.com/1040526/asp/opinions>, (accessed on May 26). Deng, Francis Mading (1987): 'Myths and Reality in Sudanese Identity' in Francis Mading Deng and Prosser Gifford (eds), The Search for Peace and Unity in Sudan, Wilson Centre Press, Washington, DC. Gellner, Ernest (1983): Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Hunnam, Hurst (1990): Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Jacob, Julian (1990): The Nagas: Hill Peoples of Northeast India, Thames and Hudson Publication, London. Mackenzie, Alexander (1995): The North-East Frontier of India, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, fifth edition. 13 The Naga Hoho is the apex tribal council of the Naga people. Miller, David (1995): On Nationality, Clarendon Press, Oxford and New York. 14 The SATP portal indicates such allegations frequently in their publications. Samaddar, Ranabir (2001): A Biography of The Indian Nation 1949-1997, For reference see http://www.satp.com 15 The interviewee is a human rights activist, social worker and a student advisor. This interview was held in Guwahati. Assam on December 20, 2003. 16 Amnesty International report on the Indian military operation in Oinam, Sage Publication, Delhi. Smith, Anthony (2001): Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Polity Publication, London. Yonuo, Asoso (1974): The Rising Nagas: A Historical and Political Study, Vivek Publishing House, Delhi. a Naga village, recorded mass torture, rape and murder of the villagers. Major General P L Kukrety, the officer in command at the time of the Oinam operation stated: '...we shall bash on regardless and not rest until Back Volumes we recover every single arm.. .we have not spared those whom we suspect of being involved with the underground movement'. He acknowledged that, 'villagers and suspected informers were interrogated and some of Back Volumes of Economic and Political Weekly them beaten to extract the truth'. India: "Operation Bluebird" A Case from 1976 to 2004 are available in unbound form. Study of Torture and Extrajudicial Executions in Manipur: Amnesty International, October 1990: AI Index ASA 20/17/90 Distr: sc/co/gr) 17 On December 16, 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the Prevention of Write to: Terrorism Act which has been highly misused across the subcontinent. Victims of this Act are as young as 12 years old and old as 81 years Circulation Department, old. (http://www.sentinalonline.com/ (dated January 13, 2004). Economic and Political Weekly 18 Naga People's Movement for Human Rights vs Union of India (1997) Hitkari House, ICHRL 117 http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases /ICHRL/1997/117.html 19 Hannum points out that a broad definition of popular participation might 284 Shahid Bhagat Singh Road, simply require the involvement of citizens in public affairs with the fullest Mumbai 400 001. respect for human rights, without any discrimination and giving special attention to groups which have so far been kept apart from genuine Economic and Political Weekly June 25, 2005 2837 This content downloaded from 128.250.144.144 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 00:04:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions