"Hugging Trees" Preserving green environment in Hanoi. A case study on urban grassroots-movements in Southeast-Asia. (Bachelor Thesis)

BACHELORARBEIT „Hugging Trees“ Preserving green environment in Hanoi. A case study on urban grassroots-movements in Southeast-Asia. Verfasser Ulf Michael Steindl angestrebter akademischer Grad Bachelor of Arts (BA) Wien, 2015 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 033 629 Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Bachelorstudium Politikwissenschaft Beurteilerin / Beurteiler: MMag. DDr. Ursula Juliane Naue Acknowledgements First of all I want to express my gratitude to my friends in Vietnam who helped me to conduct the survey that this thesis is based on, especially Ms. Ngoc Phan who provided the Vietnamese translations for it. I also want to thank my parents Jörn and Silvia Steindl who supported me all the way; my professor Mag. Dr. Karl Husa for backing me in bringing my interest for East Asia into my academic work and helping me organize a semester abroad in Hanoi; and my supervisor for this thesis, MMag. DDr. Ursula Naue, who gave me valuable feedback to improve the thesis as a whole and the underlying theory in particular. Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... 1 TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 “Hugging Trees” ................................................................................................................. 4 1.2 Scientific Relevance ............................................................................................................ 6 1.3 Research Approach ............................................................................................................. 7 2. Theory ......................................................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Definitions ........................................................................................................................... 8 2.1.1 Controversial policies.................................................................................................. 8 2.1.2 Protest ........................................................................................................................... 8 2.1.3 Social movements ........................................................................................................ 9 2.1.4 Grassroots .................................................................................................................. 10 2.2 Concepts of protest and social movements .................................................................. 11 2.2.1 What is framing? ........................................................................................................ 11 2.2.2 Social movements and frame alignment................................................................. 12 2.2.3 Policy framing ............................................................................................................ 14 2.2.4 Frames of the macro level - Political opportunity structures (POS) .................. 14 2.2.5 Social media and social capital ................................................................................. 17 2.2.6 The multilayered frame concept (synthesis) .......................................................... 21 3. Methods .................................................................................................................................... 23 3.1 Studying the other side of the world… .......................................................................... 23 3.1.1 Constraint 1 – Data ................................................................................................... 23 3.1.2 Constraint 2 – Distance & Time ............................................................................. 23 3.1.3 The Web 2.0 ............................................................................................................... 24 3.1.4 Finding a research design ......................................................................................... 24 3.2 The survey .......................................................................................................................... 25 3.2.1 Sampling ..................................................................................................................... 25 3.2.2 Questionnaire ............................................................................................................. 26 3.3 Analyzing the data ............................................................................................................. 27 3.3.1 Exploration ................................................................................................................ 27 3.3.2 Subgroups ................................................................................................................... 27 3.3.3 Contextualization....................................................................................................... 27 4. Perceptions of the sample ...................................................................................................... 28 1 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction 4.1 Getting the picture ............................................................................................................ 28 4.2 Movement participation ................................................................................................... 30 4.3 Communication channels ................................................................................................ 31 4.4 Collective goals .................................................................................................................. 34 4.5 What does the future hold? ............................................................................................. 35 5. Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia ..................................................................... 37 5.1 Typification ........................................................................................................................ 37 5.2 Drivers ................................................................................................................................ 37 5.2.1 The fight for livability ............................................................................................... 37 5.2.2 Media coverage .......................................................................................................... 38 5.2.3 Controversial politics ................................................................................................ 38 5.2.4 The rising dragon or authoritarianism in the 21st century ................................... 39 5.3 Hugging trees online ......................................................................................................... 41 6. Conclusion and Outlook ........................................................................................................ 43 APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................................... 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 47 OTHER SOURCES ..................................................................................................................... 53 FACEBOOK GROUPS ............................................................................................................... 53 THE QUESTIONNAIRE............................................................................................................. 54 2 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1 – "Tree Hugs Hanoi" Poster (Source: National Times 2015) .................................. 5 Figure 2 – Framing Strategies (Source: DIANI 1996: 1056) ................................................... 15 Figure 3 – Political Opportunity Structures and Protest visualized (created by author, based on OPP 2009: 163) ....................................................................................................................... 16 Figure 4 – Age distribution in the sample ................................................................................ 28 Figure 5 – Place of residence...................................................................................................... 28 Figure 6 – Place of birth ............................................................................................................. 29 Figure 7 – Education of the sample .......................................................................................... 29 Figure 8 – Current occupation ................................................................................................... 29 Figure 9 – Familiarity with the terms ........................................................................................ 30 Figure 10 – Participation in the movement .............................................................................. 30 Figure 11 – Initiation of the movement ................................................................................... 31 Figure 12 – First information about the movement ............................................................... 32 Figure 13 – Process of information about the movement ..................................................... 32 Figure 14 – Participation in discussions ................................................................................... 33 Figure 15 – Participation in online discussions ....................................................................... 33 Figure 16 – Used social media platforms ................................................................................. 33 Figure 17 – Perceived goal of the movement .......................................................................... 34 Figure 18 – Share of young people ............................................................................................ 34 Figure 19 – Young people as organizing force ........................................................................ 35 Figure 20 – Impact on city politics ............................................................................................ 35 Figure 21 – Expectation for movements in the future ........................................................... 35 Figure 22 – Plans for future plans ............................................................................................. 36 3 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction 1. Introduction East Asia currently experiences an unseen economic development and going along with it rapid urbanization. Alone in the decade after the turn of the millennia 28.000 additional square kilometers were classified as urban areas and nearly 200 million people, approximately the population of Brazil, moved into the cities of the region (cf. WORLD BANK 2015: IX, XX). While 600 of the currently 864 East Asian urban conglomerates are located in China, nearly all countries in the area experience a similar process (cf. p.28). Between 2000 and 2010 China experienced an average annual growth rate of its urban population of +3.3%. During the same period of time the country in the focus of this paper, Vietnam, even saw an average growth rate of +4.5% (p.147). This ranks Viet Nam third country in the region, just after Laos and Cambodia (cf. p.15). Going along with this fast urbanization is an increase of population density (cf. p.28). While urban density is wanted to some extent, as it eases the allocation of all kinds of infrastructure, high density also produces problems. Often green space falls victim to the process, reducing livability and raising tensions (cf. pp.51-56). Currently Viet Nam has 30 agglomerations that are classified as urban areas. 28 of them experience an aggregation of urban living space. Altogether in the decade after 2000, the density in Vietnamese urban areas increased by 894 people per km² (p.28). The share of urban population in the total population grew from 19% to 26% and from 15 to 22.6 million people (p.14, p.16). Two cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (henceforth HCMC), belong to the 25 biggest metropolitan centers of East Asia (cf. p.21). Hanoi, ranked 24th and behind HCMC (13th), is a prime example for the trend (cf. p.150). As of 2010 the Hanoi urban area (note: not the administrative one) had 5.6 million inhabitants. In the decade before that it grew at an annual average of +3.8% in size and +4.8% in population (p.151). For a few months in early 2014 I myself was one of the people living in the metropolis. By that time the population had grown to nearly 7 million (GENERAL STATISTICS OFFICE OF VIET NAM 2013A). The district I lived within, Dong Da, outmatches with 35,341 people/km2 not only the rest of Hanoi, but belongs to the most populated districts in the world (cf. HANOI GOVERNMENT 2010). Already 2013 I got valuable insights on the problems arising from the rapid growth of the city and the countermeasures applied by the local government, when I participated in an excursion under the lead of a local city planner. Then in 2014 I was not only confronted with the high population density in Dong Da, but also got to enjoy the numerous lakes and tree lines in the heart of the city. When the city council announced plans to cut down 6.700 of these trees, protest was imminent. 1.1 “Hugging Trees” In the week of the 16th March 2015 the head of the city’s People’s Committee announced a landscape plan for Hanoi, with a focal point of felling 6.700 trees along 190 streets all over the central districts of Hanoi (cf. THE ECONOMIST 2015, XINHUA 2015). According to sources in the office of the People’s Committee 60 billion VND ($2.8 million) were allocated for the project (cf. TUOI TRE NEWS 2015, NATIONAL TIMES 2015). After the first 500 trees were felled and pictures of the works were posted online on social media sites, protest erupted, first online and soon on the streets (cf. NATIONAL TIMES 2015, PEEL 2015). One of the first online groups “6700 trees for 6700 people” was already created on the 17th March (see appendix). After a few days the group widely overflew the set goal by 4 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction gaining 35000 followers (NATIONAL TIMES 2015, XINHUA 2015). At the time when I wrote this thesis the group had expanded to 62.500 followers. On Sunday the 22nd March the first demonstration-picnic followed, attracting a few hundred participants (cf. PEEL 2015). Various other Facebook groups and petitions were brought to life soon after. Slogans evolved like “I am a healthy tree don’t cut me down” or “safe our trees“ (cf. PEEL 2015, AFP 2015, XINHUA 2015). The most widely used slogan though, specifically on Facebook, became “Hugging Trees Hanoi / Tree Hugs Hanoi”. Below you can see the picture that spread over profile pictures, group pinwalls and protester’s posters. Figure 1 – "Tree Hugs Hanoi" Poster (Source: National Times 2015) Information and the related anger did not only spread in social media, but also government controlled media engaged in a reporting that was quite friendly towards the protesters (e.g. NATIONAL TIMES 2015, TUOI TRE NEWS 2015). In a country were media control and repression against dissidents is common, this an unusual exception. Even understanding voices from inside government institutions appeared and the project was halted (cf. PEEL 2015, DAILY MAIL 2015). High-level politicians like deputy prime minister and foreign minister Pham Binh Minh who himself comes from Hanoi, supported the movement’s requests (cf. PEEL 2015). A central issue that angered the protestors was the lack of official information about the project. When local authorities explained the step with the argument that about 2200 of the trees were sick and in danger of being thrown over by the wind and that another 4500 trees were specimens not suited for urban areas, it was too late for damage control (cf. TUOI TRE 2015). Various theories circulated, for example that politicians wanted to pocket the money allocated from selling the precious timber (cf. THE ECONOMIST 2015). By July 2015, more trees were felled but the government also involved experts in the project to look closer into the reasonableness of cutting down the trees (cf. INFO NET VIET NAM 2015). Those inspectors attested a number of shortcomings, most importantly the lack of scientific studies prior to adopting the landscape plan (cf. THANH NIEN NEWS 2015a). After the suspension of a number of involved officials in March, two of them were dismissed in July and others received warnings (cf. THANH NIEN NEWS 2015b), Although there are reports of a backlash, with articles taken down and involved 5 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction academics silenced, the whole process definitely exhibits a certain level of reception by the local and national government (cf. THE ECONOMIST 2015). 1.2 Scientific Relevance Viet Nam, like other authoritarian regimes, is not known for a lively protest culture, especially when it is directed against government policies. Still protests, specifically those related to environmental concerns, have surged in the last few years (cf. CLARK 2015A). This is another parallel to the dynamics in China. Not only urbanization, but also the economic Doi Moi policy is quite similar to the Chinese model, despite growing disagreement between the two countries (cf. THE ECONOMIST 2011). This was also the impression I got during lectures at Hanoi University, where the Chinese reform model was definitely preferred over the Russian one. Since the economic development and the accompanying social and environmental distortions began in China during the 1990s, the number of so called “mass incidents” has risen tremendously. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Tsinghua University these mass incidents grew from 8709 in 1993 to 87.000 in 2005 and 120.000 in 2010. Those numbers would be equivalent to a yearly growth rate of +25% (cf. STRANGE 2012: 32). Sun LIPING, the Tsinghua lecturer who published the number of 120.000, cites an unnamed source for 2010 that puts it even higher at 180.000 (cf. LIPING 2011). While the exact number does not matter here and now, those reports are relevant for asserting protest culture inside China. The Annual Report on China's Rule of Law No. 12 (2014) identified labor disputes, land acquisitions, forced demolitions, pollution, traffic accidents and ethnic tensions as primary reasons. While the report has limited validity considering that only bigger, media covered protests were included, it is unlikely that the reasons for smaller protests are very different from those stated in the report (cf. LIQIANG 2014). Beside the latter two, all causes are directly related to the rapid economic development and urbanization. And though political dissent is still strictly suppressed, environment related protest are more and more accepted by the government and the police force (cf. HOOK 2013). Considering that Viet Nam follows the same path and that according to observers it resembles China ten years ago, the question arises if the multiplication of comparable incidents for similar reasons is to be expected. In fact, some academics already see a growing number of protests (e.g. GAINSBOROUGH 2012). Examples are an extensive strike wave between 2006 and 2011, the continuing protests against the grave reshaping of the center of HCMC or last year’s movement against the construction of a cable car into the Son Doong, the world’s biggest cave (cf. SIU AND CHAN 2015, CLARK 2011). While the degree of civil society is still very low, there has been a number of dissident movements, most famous the “Block 8406” (cf. LONDON 2009: 393395). It is highly interesting to check if the identified parallels hold up in the development of civil society and what the differences between the two countries exist. Is there are similar evolvement of environmental protest that is accepted by authorities? After all, according to Radio Free Asia police backed down after a first confrontation with early protesters in Hanoi, in fact at the time when they learned about the protestor’s concerns (cf. LIPES 2015). The most convenient way to check the hypothesis regarding a rising number of protests or mass incidents – as they are called in China – would be to have the actual statistics (cf. LIPING 2011). Unfortunately not even approximate numbers are available. Another approach is investigating the reasons for contemporary protests. 6 Hugging Trees Hanoi Introduction 1.3 Research Approach Following the previously displayed thoughts I decided to approach the issue with a case study. Less than a year after I spent a semester abroad in Hanoi the extraordinary happenings that I will henceforth refer to as “Tree Hugs movement” occurred. As already mentioned before this movement was special in its extent, the use of social media and the acceptance by government and local media. But that is just the info taken from media reports. After all they reported that the anger did not merely evolve from concern about green space, but also about corruption and included the demand for the involvement of citizens in policy decisions. Therefor I chose to gather info from the residents of Hanoi and the participants of the movement to check up on the presented media picture. A special focus will be put on the perceptions of the protesters themselves, as well as on their use of social media. A closer explanation of the methods used can be found in chapter 3. To narrow the approach, I defined a central research question and sub-questions to set limits. The main question focuses on the overall character of the movement: How can the Tree Hugs movement be classified following contemporary research? How can it be characterized following existing models of protest and social movements and what are the differences? The secondary questions follow below, focusing on the role of social media and the goals of the participants. 1. What were the intentions of the people participating in the movement? Did they rather focus on livability for them and their families, or economic and political concerns? 2. How did the information about the movement and events spread? Did Social Media, especially Facebook, play a central or only a partial role? 3. Where did the movement initiate? Was it in Social Media, in friendship circles, schools and universities etc.? 7 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory 2. Theory The terms protest and social movements have common meanings that are different to each person. To be able to use them in a scientific context it is necessary to define them first, before further applying them on any events that took place in Viet Nam. So first of all, the following pages will offer clear definitions, taken from literature and adapted for this specific case. Following that, I will elaborate on theories about protest movements and existing research about their characteristics. 2.1 Definitions As stated above already, terms like protest, social movement or organization are not limited to scientific studies, but have everyday meanings. Therefor it is essential to clarify their exact meaning in the realm of science. Obviously there is a wide number of different approaches to those phenomena and a Bachelor thesis is too short for integrating all of them, so I will narrow it down to those that are relevant for this thesis. 2.1.1 Controversial policies Before approaching the terms central to this thesis it is necessary to introduce the “controversial politics”, as we will need the term later. Controversial policies comes from the “policy controversy” of SCHÖN AND REIN’s theory on policy frames (SCHÖN AND REIN 1995: 4). The concept of framing and the character of policy frames will be explained in the second part of the theory chapter (2.2). For the moment it is sufficient to define the term. Critical for distinguishing it is another term: Policy disagreements. Those are simple disputes about issues that can be solved easily, because the correct facts can be looked up and both parties will most likely accept them (cf. p.3). Policy controversies on the other hand are disputes revolving about the opinions of the involved parties and their subliminal values and ideologies. Therefor a controversial policy is a policy that is disputed because the opposing parties are immune to facts, as their opinion towards the issue of content is based on their beliefs, values and ideologies, and therefor often not deliberate, which hinders the reflection needed for resolving the dispute (cf. pp.4, 5). 2.1.2 Protest Karl-Dieter OPP suggests in his 2009 ground work on political protest theory a very wide definition of protest: “Protest is defined as joint (i.e. collective) action of individuals aimed at achieving their goals or goals by influencing the decisions of a target.” (OPP 2009: 38). As he points out himself, this broad approach would in fact also classify collective action in the family (for example children putting pressure on their father) as protest (cf. pp.37, 40). TURNER approaches the issue likewise: “An expression or declaration of objection, disapproval, or dissent, often in opposition to something a person is powerless to prevent or avoid.” (TURNER 1969: 816). It exhibits the same problem as the previous one by embracing too many phenomena. A definition embracing such a variety of different issues is not expedient for a case study on street protests. Considering this, I decided to further investigate on definitions that OPP himself set aside because of their specifics. Two alternatives provide the needed detail. “[…] protest activity is defined as a mode of political action oriented toward objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic systems while working within the system.” (LIPSKY 1968 cited in OPP 2009: 8 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory 35). LIPSKY’s definition of protest offers a helpful notion about the reasons for political protest. The stated goal (rewards of the system while working within it) on the other hand is worth questioning, as “rewards” is, in my opinion, the wrong definition for protester’s ambitions. The second alternative provided by OPP is based on Ralph H. TURNER. “An act of protest includes following elements: the action expresses a grievance, a conviction of wrong or injustice; the protestors are unable to correct the condition by their own efforts; the action is intended to draw attention to the grievances; the action is further meant to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group; and the protestors depend upon some combination of sympathy and fear to move the target group in their behalf.” (TURNER 1969 cited in OPP 2009: 35). This definition is very specific, as it integrates the most important features of (political) protest. It has one weak spot though: the use of the term “grievances”. TURNER’s definition does not provide any clarity about the nature of those grievances (cf. OPP 2009: 38). Considering the strength and weaknesses of the presented definitions, I decided to provide my own definition for the purpose of this thesis. Here “controversial policies”, which I defined for that purpose on the previous page, comes into play. (Political) protest is defined as collective (political) action by individuals that are not able to correct an issue of criticism directly by their own efforts, which is aimed at pressuring actors involved in the decision making process and oriented towards the objection or adaption of controversial policies. 2.1.3 Social movements The classification of social movements varies widely. The approaches range from “social movement are […] collective challenges, based on common purposes […]” (TARROW 1998: 2 cited in OPP 2009: 35) to “A social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs […]” (MCCARTHY and ZALD 1977 cited in OPP 2009: 35). Both of those definitions do not suit the theory of framing, which will be introduced in chapter 2.2, as it requires a definition that is more focused on the elements of a social movement – the individuals. Below are three quite simplistic and very similar definitions that match this requirement, but differ in essential parts. They also have some shortcomings that have to be addressed before I can adapt them for the study. “A social movements is a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures” (ZALD AND ASH 1966 cited in OPP 2009: 35). “Social movements are “effort(s) by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem that they feel they have in common” (TOCH 1965: 5 cited in OPP 2009: 35). “Social movements are traditionally been defined as organized efforts to bring about social change.” (JENKINS AND FORM 2005 cited in OPP 2009: 35). The first definition only specifies “to change […] individuals, societal institutions and structures.” While certain political laws eventually can be characterized as institutions, specific political decisions and policies such as the felling of trees are certainly not. Therefor the definition cannot be used in this form for the case of Hanoi. TOCH’S definition on the other hand lacks the clarity regarding “problems” we have seen before when we were already confronted with TURNER’S “grievances”. The third of the presented approaches on narrows down social movement to “organized efforts”. While OPP himself leans towards attributing social movements with “some degree of formal organization” (OPP 2009: 41), I see no necessity for the identical usage of the terms social movement and social organization, especially as the first one is often not used in common language with that meaning, creating 9 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory unnecessary confusion. OPP offers with the term “protest group” an alternative for unorganized social movements, although one could argue that “protest group” is better used for the sum of individuals protesting against an issue in one single instance. A social movement on the other hand might only focus on a single issue, but on more than one instance. OPP himself brings up the idea of “longevity”, which I will use to clarify the difference between protest groups and social movements (cf. Opp 2009: 41). Considering the named issues, I decided to adapt ZALD and ASH’S definition as it comes closest. A social movement is a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals, policies, societal institutions and structures, which holds some degree of longevity.” (ZALD AND ASH 1966 cited in OPP 2009: 35; bold not included in original). A social organization is a social movement that has evolved to a certain degree of formal organization. A protest group is a group of individuals belonging to a social movement or organization that uses the means of protest on a particular instance to oppose a contentious issue or institution. 2.1.4 Grassroots For the purpose of distinguishing certain type of movements during their initiation phase, I decided to include the term “grassroots” into my concept. The term grassroots (movements) is widely used in the literature, but in fact a scientific definition is hardly available. Robert K. C. FORMAN, who focuses on religious grassroots movements, offers some interesting points: “We call it “grassroots” to indicate that it has developed in a spontaneous and disorganized way among many everyday, ordinary people. Nobody has planned this growth. […] No one is running this show.” (FORMAN 2004: 26). He describes them as “anti-hierarchical” and that their members display inconsistent beliefs and attitudes, leading to a “messy” picture (cf. FORMAN 2004: 26, 27). He still lacks a specific definition, as do many other authors. According to NAPLES, grassroots is “being outside the control of any state, church, union or political party” (NAPLES 1998: 223). Therefor grassroots is used to define bottom-up processes, for example citizens protesting against a policy and, as FORMAN and NAPLES point out, that no existing organizations or institutions are involved in the founding process. Another feature are relatively low hierarchical structures that are applied in the founding stage. This means that the organizing of protests is led by small groups and person to person relations, and not by one core group that mobilizes the rest. Of course this accounts for the initiation phase, with longer existence a more complex organization can be expected. Synthesizing these two definitions is sufficient for our purpose. Grassroots movements are social movements that have developed spontaneously, are disorganized, and are not controlled by any existing institutions such as the state, the church, unions or political parties. 10 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory 2.2 Concepts of protest and social movements Before closing further in on the case sample Hanoi, a concept for protest is needed. While the previous pages already offer an exact definition of the term, a basic model of why protest and the formation of social movements happen is still missing. There is a wide variety of different approaches available, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Considering the volume of this thesis I will restrict this part as well to only those concept(s) that I will actually apply. An important issue to consider is the mix of macro and micro theories. Following OPP’s suggestions and his structural-cognitive model (SCM) I will therefor combine two different approaches (cf. OPP 2009: 327-334). Especially two existing theories are central for my concept of protest. First, I will elaborate on “Framing” which offers a good explanation for the micro and meso levels of protest dynamics. Following that I will integrate the theory of “political opportunity structures” in the model, as well as include the relevant factors of social media and the authoritarian system. 2.2.1 What is framing? The concept of framing is a model that attempts to explain decision making on the individual as well as higher levels. It is based on socio-psychological assumptions and social constructivism (cf. SCHEUFELE 1999: 105). The name giving “frame” is defined as “organization of experiences” or “belief systems” (GOFFMAN 1974: 11, 27 cited in OPP 2009: 235). OPP himself describes it as a “mental model which consists of cognitive elements” (OPP 2009: 235). Those mental models consist of concepts and cognitive and non-cognitive beliefs. A concept is the mental idea about a real phenomenon – for example a tree. It can be used to identify similar elements in the real world. Cognitive beliefs refer to ideas, theories etc. that require thinking and interpretation. Non-cognitive beliefs on the other hand are norms, values and attitudes (cf. pp.235, 236). Those can be adapted as well, but do not depend on logical evaluation like the cognitive ones. The original idea of the delineation of frames has changed since. Simplified, the basic idea states that certain issues – in our case trees – or events (e.g. a unilateral decision by a city government) are connected with values and beliefs. It does not matter what is communicated, but rather in which variations (cf. SCHEUFELE AND IYENGAR 2012: 1, 3). That places communication in the center of frame building and means that different persons might attribute a single issue with different characteristics (which per se does not prevent them from engaging in the same social movement). According to ENTMAN a frame consist of “problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (ENTMAN 1993: 52). Similarly to that Donald SCHÖN and Martin REIN describe four facets of frames. First, frames can be understood as rigid frames, providing stability for the whole structure. Second, they are the boundary which determines what is relevant and what not. Third, frames provide schemata of interpretation to understand the surrounding world and render events meaningful. And fourth, frames are the thread which guides the individual how to identify problems and what to do about them (cf. HAJER AND LAWS 2008: 257). While each of this facets can be understood as a frame itself, together they produce more complex frames such as those towards policy decisions. Contemporary research acknowledges different kind of frames, depending on their clarity (cf. DE VREESE 2012: 367). According to FAAS AND SCHOEN, this differentiation in various frame types is based on new research about media induced frames. The results have shown that the clarity of frames depends on previous cognitive engagement with the issue. If 11 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory individuals were not concerned with a topic previously, their frame lacks clarity. These fluctuating frames are more prone to external influence, while frames about everyday issues are rather consolidated (cf. FAAS AND SCHOEN 2010: 124, 125). As mentioned before, frames are created on different levels as well – about elements in the real world as well as about policies or ideologies. Extensive frames such as basic ideas about political or economic systems, or towards religion, are dubbed “master frames”. They are active in the background and have influence on “lower” frames as well (cf. NOONAN 1995 cited in OPP 2009: 246). Master frames can also be understood as the first facet of SCHÖN and REIN’s approach, the rigid structure lying beneath the more adaptive frames. An example relevant for social movement research are frames about equality. SNOW and his colleagues, focusing on the influence of these ideas towards protest behavior, call them “injustice frames” (SNOW ET AL 1986: 1 cited in OPP 2009: 236). While master frames affect the attitudes towards smaller issues, this dynamic also works vice versa. The framing of a new policy is built upon existing frames that the new policy touches. Based on the evaluation of subjects in an individual frame, these frames are the source of the importance each person credits an issue with (cf. FAAS AND SCHOEN 2010: 125, 126). As SCHEUFELE AND IYENGAR criticize correctly, many researchers limit their frame theories only on either the micro, meso or macro level. Thereby their theories lack the needed depth for correctly picturing the overall dynamics. In fact frames are created on all levels at the same time and are in continuous exchange (cf. SCHEUFELE AND IYENGAR 2012: 6). While we already covered the micro level – individual frames – I will further explore how frames are created on the meso and macro levels and their mutual dependency on the micro level and each other. This will be limited only to variables that are relevant to the thesis, as in fact frames could be defined regarding every issue. 2.2.2 Social movements and frame alignment Frames are created on the meso level – e.g. social movements – as well, but “Social movements do not frame issues; their activists or other participants do the framing” (BENFORD 1997: 418 cited in OPP 2009: 242). BENFORD AND SNOW call them “collective action frames” and describe them as frames that “[…] are action–oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization […]” (BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 614). Frames on the movement level are similar, but different from those on the individual one. They are created and adapted through communication, especially negotiations (cf. SNOW ET. AL 2014: 38 and BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 614). Basically they derive from the overlaps of individual frames, which are synthesized into a movement frame. These collective action frames can have more or less sharp boundaries, eventually influenced by the organization level of the movement. The shared ideas, based on all the individual frames, will get externalized in the form of a collective group frame. SNOW AND BYRD describe three specific types of how frames get externalized by movements: Diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing is the act of describing a problem and making people aware of it, thereby increasing the movement profile (cf. SNOW AND BYRD 2007: 124). Prognostic framing on the other hand builds up on this first step by offering solutions and thereby sharpening the movement profile (cf. pp.126, 127). Motivational framing is the last step in this process, if still needed. At this point potential supporters have to be transformed to members. This means overcoming obstacles like risk considerations and the free-rider problem (cf. p.128). Altogether 12 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory movements can approach relevant events in two ways: Frame articulation or elaboration. Frame articulation includes the connection and alignment of a movement and its frames with an event, while elaboration is the process of highlighting specific happenings and identifying some of them as more important than others (cf. p.130). The whole process can be summarized as “frame alignment”, the approach between individual and movement frames. All the introduced parts of frame alignment can happen unconsciously, but are also likely to be conducted on purpose to recruit more members (cf. OPP 2009: 241-243). In fact researchers define three mechanisms of frame building and adaption, which can happen parallel to each other. The discursive one is dominant in the early phase, when a collective frame is just about to evolve. Here the exchange of views and negotiations defines the characteristics of the frame. Strategic mechanisms on the other hand happen when the members of an existing movement or its leading level create or adapt a frame on purpose to attract more members (as described above). Here deliberate, goal focused adaptions prevail. Another mechanism, contestation, is in fact present the whole time. Contestation is composed of all outward influences that have an effect on the frame. Examples are opponents and bystanders, but also the media and their narration (cf. BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 623-626). An important variable for the success probability is “resonance”. Resonance describes the similarity between individual and collective frames (cf. OPP 2009: 244, 245). Resonance is built upon three factors: Frame consistency, empirical credibility and credibility of leaders and advocators. Frame consistency describes how the elements of a frame – values, ideas etc. – fit together. If the outward “picture” is not logical, a collective action frame is unlikely to attract new members. Empirical credibility on the other hand describes how the movement frame fits into the surroundings that means contemporary events and transformations of the environment. Last but not least, while collective frames and movements are built on a great number of individuals, some degree of organizational structure and leadership is needed to conduct frame alignment (especially when it is strategical). Resonance also depends on the personal integrity of those figures (cf. BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 619-621). The intensity of frame alignment can be described by four different types of adjustment. Following OPP, these four types can in fact be placed along a scale (cf. OPP 2009: 247). The four modes are named frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. Frame bridging is the simplest type of frame alignment, when only small differences exist and two different frames just have to be connected. Frame transformation on the other end of the scale requires a huge adaption of at least one frame, eventually by changing old meanings or reinterpreting them. Frame amplification describes the highlighting of specific events and elements of a frame, thereby underlining commonalities. Frame extension on the other hand is the process of adding issues to the frame and increasing the commonalities and resonance (cf. SNOW ET AL. 1986: 467-476 and BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 623-626). Of course frame alignment can work both ways and be used deliberately in form of the strategic mechanism. While the level of needed adjustments and existing resonance influences the likelihood of a successful frame alignment, extensive transformations are not impossible. 13 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory 2.2.3 Policy framing SCHÖN AND REIN apply the framing approach on policies as well. Their motivation was to explain the often stubborn, hard to change opinions that oppose policies (cf. BADIE ET AL. 2011: 1925). In fact this is an approach of the micro level, as it investigates a specific kind of individual frames. Their question is why often groups are unable to find common ground in their arguments about specific policy decisions. They identify two different policy conflicts: Policy disagreement and policy controversy (cf. SCHÖN AND REIN 1995: 3, 4). Policy disagreements are conflicts that can be solved by simple research, therefor disagreements regarding simple facts that can be looked up. Policy controversies on the other hand derive from conflicting frames. As individuals are often not fully aware of their subliminal frame towards an issue, it is much harder if not impossible to resolve the conflict (cf. pp.4, 5). As we have seen before, this is due to the rigid structure of master frames that are values, ideologies and beliefs. Therefor without a deliberate attempt to understand the opposing side, which is often not successful, an understanding is nearly impossible to achieve. The process of reevaluating one’s frame is called “frame reflection” (cf. HAJER AND LAWS 2008: 259). The process does not have be successful, but it represents an attempt to understand the otherwise subliminal frame and its elements. Actors that are able to conduct a successful frame reflection are able to identify the controversies lying beneath a conflict. This allows them to either solve it or to use the information to shape the conflict for their purposes (cf. SCHÖN AND REIN 1995: 37). Even if the details of a policy frame are not available for a person, it will still try to force them upon other actors with competing frames (cf. BADIE ET AL. 2011: 1926). SCHÖN AND REIN also apply their theory of policy frames on institutions (cf. p.1926). Comparable to social movement frames, these are collective frames as well. Because (political) institutions are much more organized and long-lived than movements, and often formalized in a legal structure, their frames are different. They are much more stable and less dependent on the individuals representing the institution, in fact often even shaping their behavior. They live “lives of their own” and can hardly be steered, although sometimes individuals can gain influence (cf. SCHÖN AND REIN 1995: 54).This does not necessarily lead to frame alignment were the individual takes over the institutional frame. The reason is because institutional frames simply have a different nature. While institutions have specific policy frames towards single policies, more stable frames lie under the surface. First, institutional action frames structure how policies as a whole are managed. Therefor they are the style in which an institution conducts its work. Even below that comes the metacultural frame. It represents the worldview that lies below the whole identity of an institution (cf. BADIE ET AL. 2011: 1926). Metacultural frames are again another version of macro frames, which got institutionalized in an organization. 2.2.4 Frames of the macro level - Political opportunity structures (POS) Political opportunity structures are an approach to conceptualize the political environment of a country or lower administrative unit and its influence on social movement development and recruiting. The term POS is used widely throughout the literature, with varying definitions (cf. MCADAM ET AL. 1996: 24-26). Following I will follow primarily the work of MCADAM ET AL. and DIANI whose ideas seems to be strongly influenced by the theory of Peter K. EISINGER and his extensive POS concept. Basically, the political opportunity structures a movement or the citizens are confronted with are available as a master frame 14 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory and thereby saved as cognitive imagine (cf. BENFORD AND SNOW 2000: 628). This means again it does not matter what POS exists, but how they are perceived. Summarized from the work of leading researchers in the field, MCADAM and his colleagues identify four dimensions of POS: 1. 2. 3. 4. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity. The presence or absence of elite allies. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression. (MCADAM ET AL. 1996: 27). Together, those four dimensions are the base for the perceived success chances. This affects movements as a whole as well as individuals and touches various dynamics. E.g. as already elaborated in the previous sub-chapter, one central part of recruiting is motivational framing. The changes for success, as well as anticipated repercussions influence if interested bystanders evolve to movement members. Depending on the perceived POS, movements grow faster, slower or decline, which directly effects their capability of reaching their goals. The POS perceived by individuals even determine if movements are found in the first place. While MCADAM and his colleagues approach the issue of POS by describing single elements inside of them, DIANI splits them up in repression and the chances for participation. His ideas are displayed in the figure below. Opportunities Created by the High Crisis of Dominant Cleavages Low Opportunities for Autonomous Action within the Polity High Low Realignment Frames Antisystem Frames Inclusion Frames Revitalization Frames Figure 2 – Framing Strategies (Source: DIANI 1996: 1056) DIANI defines two different aspects: The possibility for autonomous action comprises chances that movements have to actually engage themselves inside the existing system. This is dependent on repression as well as available resources, or, when looking at the four dimensions introduced earlier, connected to the points one and four. Existing crises are the second factor, as insecurities and internal struggles destabilize a system and open up the field for discourse. It can be linked to the points two as well as four, considering that disagreements inside society and the political system increase the chances for finding potential partners there. Depending if both, one, or none of these opportunities reach a recognizable level, different frames can be applied and are more or less successful. Realignment frames are available if a movement can fully engage in the negotiation process and provide a new orientation. Inclusion frames on the other hand can be applied when there is no need by the system itself, but opportunity for engagement. Antisystem frames derive when movements are excluded from the system, but tensions and discourse exist. Revitalization frames are viable in environments where no paths for new movements are open. Here the entering and redirecting of existing movements or institutions is central (cf. DIANI 1996: 1056, 1057). MCADAM ET AL. and DIANI cover the whole span of political systems, from liberal democracies to dictatorships. As Viet Nam is a one-party system with strictly limited political participation and high repression we will take a closer look on the consequences of this type of POS on the following page (cf. FREEDOM HOUSE 2015A). 15 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory EISINGER provides a helpful approach to compare POS between different political systems. He suggests a curve-model to display the volume of (potential) protest. There are two different varieties, both visualized below. The linear model is based on the assumption that total repression and the lack of any resources creates the highest amount of protest, as there is no opportunity at all for citizens to influence the political decision making process. The “perfect” state would be a system with no repression and enough opportunities for citizen participation. Protest in this hypothetical system is not required, as citizens have official channels to influence decisions (cf. OPP 2009: 162, 163). The linear models has not been confirmed by any studies and can therefore be set aside. The curvilinear model on the other hand sees the highest level of protest in (semi-)authoritarian systems with moderate repression and limited citizen influence. OPP calls those systems, which are in part open and in part closed, “mixed systems”. Here the assumption is that lacking opportunities for participation will only lead to protest if repression is moderate (OPP 2009: 164). Total repression would raise the costs too high for any protests and will eventually led to insurgency which is not covered by that term. Protest Linear Model Curvilinear Model Political Opportunities Figure 3 – Political Opportunity Structures and Protest visualized (created by author, based on OPP 2009: 163) Obviously the curve displays an idealized model, which is rather a point for reference than actually an instrument for analysis. In fact a myriad of factors has an effect on POS, social movement building and protest. In the following I will introduce some important factors and place them into the context of POS and frames. For a start, a short critique of prevalent ideas about political systems is needed. The POS curve above invites to make a common mistake – tying repression to the overall classification of political systems in a onedimensional model. In fact even in liberal democracies various parts of society experience different levels of repression and civil liberties. Especially minorities are confronted with this phenomenon. For example AHMAD shows with his study on Palestinian citizens how even in Israel, which is classified as a liberal democracy, a minority faces high levels of repression (cf. AHMAD 2015 and FREEDOM HOUSE 2015A). In consequence, he pleads for a repression scale independent of the general one applied to classify political systems (cf. AHMAD 2015: 458). Ruling elites dispose over a number of potential instruments to alter POS and tackle social movement recruitment. Repression eventually belongs to the most important ones. As we 16 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory have seen before, expected repercussions have a strong influence on the success of the frame alignment process. By increasing repression this process can be halted. In fact repression already affects the evolvement of social movements and protests, even before a reaction to a specific policy. The smaller a group, the more dangerous participating is, as disposing social movements is easier when media coverage and the profile in the population itself is low (cf. TUFEKCI AND WILSON 2012: 376). This rises the costs for frame alignment. Still repression, especially extensive one, is often only a last resort against protests or rebellions (cf. CAREY 2006: 1, 2). Repression and protests often get stuck in feedback loops, pushing each other to more extreme levels. For a regime this means further destabilization and can eventually lead to international sanctions or even the loss of power (cf. pp.3, 8, 9). Therefor an expedient and by elites widely applied approach is manipulation. This is possible by increasing the threshold for participation in social movements arising from the perceived costs and cutting off resources that are needed (cf. CAREY 2006: 4 and MEGORAN ET AL. 2013: 88). One example is integrating parts of the opposition into the political system (compared to figure 3, opportunities for autonomous action within the polity). Studies on authoritarian systems have shown that those with legislatures are more robust than those without. Authoritarian legislatures feature parliaments and elections (although often rigged) and that way include a certain share of the opposition, which gets a small fraction of power (or eventually has the perception of that) (cf. REUTER AND ROBERTSON 2015: 236). Doing that influences the master frame of POS perceived by the remaining opposition and in the overall population. Standing outside the system gets costlier and inequality frames might get adapted. Likewise single figures of the opposition can be approached. I did not go closer into the role of leadership of social movements as internal structures are not the focus of this thesis. Still, it was mentioned before that the leadership is the main driver for strategic framing. Cutting leading figures out of the process is highly effective to prevent successful frame alignment. This can happen two ways: By buying them off, either by integration into the system as already described or by offering a share of the spoils (cf. REUTER AND ROBERTSON 2015: 237). Another way is getting them out of the country (cf. BARRY ET AL. 2014: 575). Individuals have the possibility to either protest, stay silent or leave (cf. p.576). Leading classes can allow emigration at the same time as they create push-factors for migration, which will eventually bring potential opposition leaders to leave the country (cf. pp.576, 577). Eventually this is even economically viable as it often provides remittances for family parts staying at home (cf. p.575). On the other hand dangers like brain-drain or frame alignment with master frames in the international sphere exist (cf. p.576). Also there needs to be a destination, that is countries abroad that are willing to accept immigrants (cf. p.578). Of course opposition figures can be simply arrested as well, but that might actually increase inequality frames and can lead to easier movement building and recruitment. Another tool is the control of communication, for example social media. As this is a focal point of the thesis, the following chapter will focus on the general use of social media for framing and its role in authoritarian regimes. 2.2.5 Social media and social capital Media and its influence on framing has been in the focus of research for some time already. In fact a whole sector in communication research has specialized on media frames (e.g. ENTMAN 1993, SCHEUFELE 1999, CHONG AND DRUCKMAN 2007, and SCHEUFELE AND TEWKSBURY 2007). While media frames are closely related to individual frames they are different. Their most important feature is that while individual frames are mental and often 17 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory subliminal, media frames are stated verbally. Because of that they are also often referred to as communication frames (cf. CHONG AND DRUCKMAN 2007: 101). According to CHONG AND DRUCKMAN they consist of “[…] the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker […] uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an audience” (p.100). SCHEUFELE describes media frames as the storyline that provides an explanation for a series of events and as a working routine for journalists (cf. SCHEUFELE 1999: 106). This means that media frames are another sort of frames, sitting on the meso level between individual and master frames. Anyhow, there are short- as well as long-term media frames, with the latter being in symbiosis with master frames. Short-term ones are those related to daily issues (cf. p.107). According to different, but complementary research approaches individual as well as media frames can be dependent or not (cf. p.108). Studies on nondependent (factors of) media frames cover their influence on individual frames. Research on dependency on the other hand focuses on the influence on media frames by journalists, political elites, social norms and values, etc. (cf. p.109). Similarly, dependence and independence of individual frames focuses on the factors that influence them, especially by which extend media frames do and vice versa (cf. pp.112-114). Of course journalists have individual frames as well. This conclusion leads to the concept of a feedback circle between media frames and individual ones. Simplified, media frames influence those on the individual level, which leads to a change of values, behavior and attitudes. Journalists are integrated in this process as well. Additionally, their work gets influenced by pressures from organizations, ideologies and elites. Based on all of those factors new frame building or adaption derives (cf. pp.115-117). Besides framing, two more mechanisms (or tools) are at work in the creation of media frames. They are agenda setting and priming. Agenda setting refers to what is important in the public sphere. Priming on the other hand means the influence on how people evaluate an issue, thus which standards they compare it to (cf. SCHEUFELE AND TEWKSBURY 2007: 11 and CHONG AND DRUCKMAN 2007: 112). Framing differs from them in the way that it focuses on how people think about an issue, while agenda setting and priming determines if they think about it all (cf. SCHEUFELE AND TEWKSBURY 2007: 14). The latter two are often referred to as “second-level agenda setting” (cf. p.15). Already during sub-chapter 2.2.1 we illustrated how the clarity of frames is determined by earlier confrontation with the topic. Here so called second-level agenda setting has an influence, as it regulates (to a certain extend) which issues are framed already (cf. pp.13, 14). CHONG AND DRUCKMAN further divide the degree of deliberation in the variables availability, accessibility, applicability and appropriateness. While availability reflects if there is any existing frame for a topic stored at all, accessibility depends on how distinct it is (cf. CHONG AND DRUCKMAN 2007: 108). Both are processed unconsciously, while applicability and appropriateness are conscious mental processes that depend on each situation and its context (cf. p.109). The potential impact of media or other meso level frames depends on these factors. Before I will go forward to how competitive frames play out in this context comes a short excurse to “bias” and “slant”. In general bias describes distortions of the information and its representation in media frames that happen due to belief systems, ideologies and personal views that are as inherent to journalists as to everybody else (cf. ENTMAN 1993: 163). It does not include intentional deviations due to political agendas, which are defined as slant (cf. p.165). Bias as well as slant lead to contending media frames in the public sphere, which can weaken or even cancel each other’s impact. Studies have proven that uncontested media 18 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory frames can alter individual frames to a greater extent than those with opposition (cf. CHONG AND DRUCKMAN 2007: 106). The assertiveness of contending frames depends on their loudness and strength. Loudness stands for the frequency in which the frame and its parts are repeated (cf. p.104). The continuing confrontation will eventually lead to clearer outlined individuals frames. Eventually, if the frame is weak, this process can be countereffective when the lacking soundness turns the arguments against itself (cf. p.105). The strength of a frame is based on credibility, effectiveness, soundness and resonance (cf. pp.104-106). From the perspective of the receiving individuals “motivation” accounts for another success factor for frames. Motivation depends on the clarity of frames as well as the level of engagement that derives from them. Recipients with low motivation will be prone to weak and strong frames. In a competitive environment though, they will succumb to the strong frame. Motivated individuals on the other hand are harder to influence, especially through weak frames. They are also those who will eventually see through a weak frame and get pushed in the opposite direction as the one intended (cf. p.111). The influence of the internet and social media on social movement dynamics and protest behavior has come into focus ever more since the “Arab Spring” started in 2011. So far an integration in the framing concept is missing. The role that new technologies and especially social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and others play for social movements and protest is heavily disputed. Most existing studies agree though that they have at least some level of influence, even if it is just moderate (cf. BOULIANNE 2009 cited in BREUER 2012: 1). Also there is a growing number of recent protest movements, from the Middle East, Iran, China and Myanmar to Latin American countries, where observers grant social media a central role in the dynamics of the individual protests (cf. BREUER 2012: 1). BREUER with her study on the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, as well as MARKHAM who focuses on the whole Middle Eastern region during the same time period, see social media primarily as a tool that amplifies existing structures. While Twitter was at the time the central platform for the blogging-culture of the Middle East, MARKHAM states that in the Tunisian protests Facebook evolved to the most widely used website regarding organizational purposes. In Syria on the other hand, YouTube advanced to the prime website (cf. MARKHAM 2014: 90). The usage of social media is determined by existing social capital, censorship and the unique character of each protest/conflict. In Tunisia social media was important for the formation of networks, disseminating censored info, the formation of a collective identity, intragroup collaboration as well as intergroup coalitions (cf. BREUER 2012: 3, 4). GERBAUDOA AND TRERÉBC show on a number of examples, from the Guy Fawkes mask to various hashtags, that social media facilitates the emergence of collective identity. While collective identity is in fact another concept of what is already covered by collective frames and frame alignment, their paper highlights the role of symbols and their specific uniting power (cf. GERBAUDOA AND TRERÉBC 2015: 865, 866). The base from which social media influences protests and the buildup of social movements is social capital (cf. BREUER 2012: 2). FAYONG describes social capital in his study on Shanghai grassroots movements as follows: “The term “social capital” contains three elements: social networks, norms of reciprocity, and trust. Social networks offer access to relatives, friends, acquaintances, and others as resources; norms of reciprocity generate moral pressure among people and oblige collective action for group benefits; trust reduces transaction costs and facilitates social exchange.” (FAYONG 2008: 237) 19 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory This means that the existing social capital – a central factor for the organization of social movements – determines how much difference the use of social media can actually make. Sebastián VALENZUELA identified three types of social media functions: Information, expression and activism. Information is in part traditional media and its distribution of information through news, articles and similar types of information. Because traditional news channels are still integrated into social media, (self-)censorship in this sector still plays a role (cf. VALENZUELA 2013: 921, 923, 935). Only rarely are media outlets opposed to the current regime and support the protesters, as did Al Jazeera (cf. TUFEKCI AND WILSON 2012: 366). But there is another type of news as well: every video, every status update, which contains unknown information is news for other users. Insofar social media incorporates some potential for distributing additional information. The spread of smartphones with cameras parallel to social media strengthens this potential as it creates “journalists” everywhere (cf. pp.366, 367). Also, complex issues can be summarized more easily – that means framed simpler (cf. LIM 2012: 244). Social media enables the statement of personal opinions and related discussions online. Psychological studies have shown that the confrontation with different opinions and discussions requires increased mental processing. Individuals are stimulated to think about a topic, even if they are not involved in it but just read about it in their newsfeed (cf. VALENZUELA 2013: 923, 924). We know already that individual frames tend to take clearer shapes if the issue was processed before. Therefor the continuing bombardment with contemporary issues throughout the newsfeed of a social network pushes the formation of related frames as well as their distinction. The strength social media has versus traditional newspapers is based on the already mentioned factor social capital. The friendlist in social media is in its core neutral and based on existing social networks (cf. p.925). As MARKHAM observes, apolitical posts in social media can quickly become political through the comments of another person (MARKHAM 2014: 91, 92). The third function, activism, is in fact a special type of information. Social media platforms provide a portal for joining causes and finding mobilization info. This allows social movements to reach more individuals than they could through conventional means (cf. VALENZUELA 2013: 921). The activism function of social media faces the same constraint that normal websites have. It is a selective bias, which exists because primarily people who are already interested in a topic will visit a related website. The same way social media has the strength of being built on existing social networks, those networks are a source for this same bias. Besides family and work colleagues, the majority of friends often have similar backgrounds and opinions which raises chances that social media users are confronted with sources of activism that fit to their personal environment and thereby thinking (cf. p.925). This bias gets strengthened on some platforms by the very own algorithm it uses. Facebook for example, adopts the newsfeed on the preferences of each individual user (cf. CHOWDHRY 2015). Therefor one’s interest in a topic has a self-enforcing effect, providing already interested individuals with ever more info, while those wo are not will see less of the issue. In his own study on the Chilean protests in 2010, VALENZUELA concludes that of his three types of usage, expression and activism were often applied, whereas information was spread only to a minor extent (cf. VALENZUELA 2013: 935, 936). This aligns with the study of TUFEKCI and WILSON about the Tahir Square protests in 2011. The results of their survey showed that social media raised the number of participants considerably. Those involved in early online discussions were the first to join the protests. In opposition to VALENZUELA’s results, the 20 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory information function reached a relevant level as well, with about half of the surveyed persons hearing the first time about the protests on social media (cf. TUFEKCI AND WILSON 2012: 375, 376). With the introduction of (social) media we have introduced another specific meso frame that can be addressed as media or preferably in regard to social media as communicative frame. Communicative frames are the product of the individual frames of journalists or posters, master frames and the frames of influential elites or organizations. They are integrated in a feedback process which leads to continuing renewal, altered by bias and slant. Their potential depends on strength and loudness, as well as on the clarity of already established individual frames. These processes which were studied in classical media are only one part of the dynamics of social media. Social media frames are much more adaptive than those in classical media. This derives from the influence of more separate voices that can state opinions to each post. At the same time this influence is biased as well, as social media is based on social capital, and personal networks are not neutral. Additionally classic media is still part of social media as well and some platform such as Facebook have background algorithms that create a self-enforcing dynamic. The fact that classical media is present in social media partly repeals the phenomenon that social media reaches citizens faster than other media (cf. VAN DER MEER AND VERHOEVEN 2013: 231). Anyhow, social media provides a space for intensified competition of individual frames as well as media frames and the stimulation of neutral persons. This eventually leads to stronger individual frames and less influence by those imposed by elites and other factions. It also facilitates frame alignment and eases social movement creation and their recruitment. When opposing the classical media sources, social media can help to bypass their agenda setting and priming. 2.2.6 The multilayered frame concept (synthesis) On the previous pages we have seen the grand strokes for the concept of framing, an approach to understand decision finding specifically in the context of social movements and protest. Frames can be distributed on various levels – here we have defined three: the micro, meso and macro level. Those levels can be distinguished by their longevity and the number of people they affect. The micro level just covers the individual and its mental frame. The individual frame is the most deeply rooted element in the whole system, as from it all other frames evolve. On the meso-level we can find collective frames like social movement frames and media/communicative frames that we encounter in public discourse, as well as institutional frames. These meso frames differentiate in their variability, from fast changing media frames, to social movement frames that can be adapted for recruitment, to institutional frames whose inner life is quite solid. On the macro-level at last, we find the most subtle frames like ideologies or cultural norms, but also the overall perceived political environment (see POS). It is important to differentiate between the subject of a frame which can be a person, institution, policy or ideology and the frame itself. The frame is a mere impression and cognitive fabric which is attributed with values and preferences. Policy frames are de facto individual frames that are also adopted by organizations, such as movements or institutions. Because they are based upon quite solid master frames they are the cause of political struggles, as they represent the interest of those actors. The conscious identification of the elements in one’s policy frame requires complex frame reflection. While that requires much effort, it enables to identify the resource of conflict and to solve or deliberately continue it. 21 Hugging Trees Hanoi Theory Altogether the various frames on the three levels are in a continuous exchange of frame alignment and competition. Frames about contemporary issues such as policies are fed by the master frames of the macro level. Specific groups such as elites, journalists and movement leaders are in an ongoing process of imposing their frames on an audience, while being themselves under the impact of other frames. Media frames take a special role in this process because they can be associated with specific interest groups, are less subliminal as other frames and can be controlled quite easily to support interests. They represent parts of the public discourse and are shaped by bias and slant. This obviously opens the door for autocratic regimes to manipulate individual frames. By raising the perceived cost to an unbearable level protests can be suppressed. Other ways include buying off or exiling opposition elites and thereby altering the cost-factor as well. Repression can be used for driving the perceived costs up too, permanently or against specific groups or movements. These methods can have unintended consequences, such as strengthening inequality frames and pushing citizens over the threshold for action. Nowadays in the toolset of altering citizen’s perceptions controlling media takes a central role. Through classical media slant can be used efficiently. While social media integrates classical channels as well, it opens up space for improved frame alignment for the opposition, especially social movements. As we have seen before, there are hints that social media has a faster impact on citizens than the classic counterpart, which can create distinct frames early on and diminish the impact of elite slant. Social media can be used to spread strong opposition frames as well, overcoming weak elite frames and eventually turning them against themselves. (Perceived) repression and possible participation inside the system can be operationalized in a coordinate system as political opportunity structure, which enables comparing various political systems. These POS enable comparisons between different countries, as a system type approach is not handy for gradual variables as the two stated before. Altogether framing offers a convenient approach for integrating various actors and influences in a concept of social movements and protest. While I have only specified those meso frames that are relevant for this Bachelor thesis, additional variables can be integrated at any time. While we have seen that the formation of social movements is triggered by the interplay of individual frames, so is protest. Therefor protest can happen without the precondition of social movements. This is relevant when taking a look back at the early definitions in sub-chapter 2.1. When comparing social movements to organizations, it is fair to say that the latter one might have more specified collective frames. A higher organizational structure and leadership will eventually ease strategic framing. Therefor the differentiation between the two is important. Last but not least grassroots movements can be attributed with a dominant root in individual frames, while other movements are prone to experience frame alignment with those institutional actors that are involved in their creation. 22 Hugging Trees Hanoi Methods 3. Methods The following chapter will provide an introduction to the research approach applied and a short overview about the online survey itself. 3.1 Studying the other side of the world… Conducting research in a country as far away from the author’s home university as Vietnam can be difficult, especially considered that this is just a Bachelor thesis. The constraints arising from this issue shape the research approach as well as the methods used. 3.1.1 Constraint 1 – Data This Bachelor thesis is confronted with various restraints, first of all the lacking data about the number of protests in Vietnam. Of course there are reports about those events, but they are mostly based on accounts of external observers, the access to minority areas in the central highlands is often blocked and there is no official data provided by the government (cf. CLARK 2015B). Therefor a solely statistical approach – for example a comparative study between the number of protests in China and Vietnam – is not feasible at this point. The most recent case in Hanoi enabled another approach, namely a case study. A case study is in fact a decision what to study rather than how to study a phenomenon. It allows as well qualitative as quantitative methods (cf. FLYVBJERG 2011: 301). A case study focuses on a single unit in a row of phenomena and can be used for generating hypotheses or for falsifying them (cf. pp.302-306). But most importantly it enables research in more depth, while allowing the integration of the broader context into the analysis (cf. pp.301, 302). On the other hand, it lacks the breadth that a statistical approach can provide. Many contemporary scholars now see statistical and case studies as complementary, rather than opposing approaches. While there is a number of studies about the relation between Vietnamese authoritarianism and protest movements in the country, most of them are qualitative as well, as they suffer from the same constrains regarding statistical data (e.g. THAYER 2014). Comprehensive studies about the drivers of contemporary Vietnamese protests are missing at all. Considering the limitations and the virginity of the field, I decided for conducting a case study. While this does not enable me to make statements about the extent of the phenomena, as case study can very well work as an explorative study that eventually has the potential of falsifying earlier assumptions. 3.1.2 Constraint 2 – Distance & Time The second constraint that shaped this thesis is distance and linked to it time. Unsurprisingly a Bachelor thesis is a short time project and a student at this step lacks the resources for conducting a longer stay abroad just for gathering data. Therefor a longer stay in Hanoi, e.g. for interviewing locals, was not within the realms of possibility. This is problematic, considering that the most appropriate approach for studying social movements is participatory research (cf. BETTENCOURT 1996: 215). On the other hand, group-level approaches are possible as well. Though the majority of them are comparative studies of similar entities, there is nothing wrong with conducting a case study either (cf. pp.215, 216). Under the circumstances, another widely used method for gathering data from social movements became convenient, the survey (cf. KLANDERMANS AND SMITH 2002: 3). Even before the spread of the internet, surveys were a widely used method for this kind of research. They enable the description of the different groups in and outside a movement 23 Hugging Trees Hanoi Methods (cf. pp.4, 5). Research distinguishes between two types of surveys: individual and organizational ones. While the first is aimed at a single person, e.g. a participant, the second is set up for important persons inside the movement like leaders (cf. pp.3, 4). During the Tree Hugs movement no specific leaders or speakers emerged, therefor conducting the latter one was not possible. Anyhow, the framing theory enables us through frame alignment and collective frames to use the answers of the individual to make conclusions about the movement itself. 3.1.3 The Web 2.0 Modern technology enables us to conduct surveys over the internet as so called online surveys. Online surveys have a number of considerable strengths that distinguish them from their analogue brothers. It is much easier to reach target audiences all around the world, for example in Vietnam. For analogue surveys an adviser is needed, who visits potential participants and introduces them to the survey. This is a rather time consuming task (cf. EVANS AND MATHUR 2005: 195, 196). It also reduces the flexibility for those surveyed. An online survey can be filled out at day- and nighttime, at home, at the workplace or on the way, using a smartphone. This reduces the threshold for potential participants, as it reduces the perceived time-costs (cf. p.196). Convenience and flexibility account for the researcher’s work as well. It reduces the costs of conducting the survey in the first place, as no advisor is needed and also regarding the gained data, which is already available in digitalized form and therefor analysis requires less effort as well (cf. pp.196, 197). The possibility of required (or optional) questions improves the quality of the individual questionnaires (cf. p.200). Of course every method has its weaknesses. Lacking internet penetration can lead to a bias because only certain parts of the population are online (cf. p. 196). This is an actual danger, considering that less than half of the Vietnamese population has an internet access. On the other hand, internet penetration throughout the young population and in urban areas is much higher (see chapter 5.3). Also attributes such as age and employment can be considered during the interpretation, reducing the danger of grave distortions. Other problems include low response rates due to wrong perceptions regarding the length and therefor time-costs, unclear instructions and misinterpretations. These problems could be solved by an instructor on the ground (cf. pp. 197-200). Weighting the strengths and weaknesses of online and analogue surveys, I decided for the former. It would be too problematic to be on the ground myself or maintain a representative, and in my experience the internet penetration in Hanoi is high enough to reduce the danger of a bias. Also preinvestigations about the activity of Tree Hugs participants on social media showed it as a perfect environment to distribute the survey. 3.1.4 Finding a research design As stated above, according to FLYVBJERG 2011 case studies are not a method of research, but rather a decision about what to study. Case studies allow qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. For this case-study I decided to apply a mixed methods approach, as it provides the deepest insight into the topic. Also it allows to include open as well as closed questions in the survey (cf. CRESWELL 2003: 21). To reduce the complexity of the survey and ease the translation, as well as reducing the perceived time costs, it is dominantly quantitative. While it offers open questions where provided answers might not be sufficient, the most likely possibilities are already available. Also the processing of the gathered data will be conducted in dominantly quantitative manner by the way of descriptive statistics. 24 Hugging Trees Hanoi Methods Bringing the results into context on the other hand, the most valuable feature of a case study, will require interpretation and the addition of qualitative and quantitative sources. 3.2 The survey The online survey is the central empirical method that this thesis is based upon. In this subchapter the details of the survey itself are introduced. The whole questionnaire can be found in the appendix. 3.2.1 Sampling The sample size was approached in a pragmatic way, basically in a “the more the better” manner (cf. MARSHALL 1996: 523). Anyhow, the desired minimum size was set at about n=125. As we will see in chapter 4, this was reached with n=130. Defining the total population N, out of which n is drawn, is complicated. First of all, all inhabitants of Hanoi are part of N, including expats living in the city. Second, Vietnamese citizens, at home or abroad are relevant to the study, as the movement was covered in national media and the study is set up to collect answers of individuals inside as well as outside the movement. Therefor N consists of all current inhabitants of Hanoi and all Vietnamese citizens. Obviously this is a huge group, considering 7 million inhabitants of Hanoi and 94 million in all of Vietnam, without even touching the issue of oversee citizens (see chapters 1.1 and 5.2.3). In fact N can be narrowed down to all inhabitants of Hanoi and all interested Vietnamese citizens, at home or abroad. While we cannot put a number on this group, the definition is sufficient considering the set minimal size for n. The sampling itself was conducted by non-probability sampling in three waves with different approaches (cf. pp.523, 524). The first wave of sampling was conducted through convenience sampling, based on the accessibility through my Facebook friendlist. People were chosen solely dependent on the factor that they were living in Hanoi or were Vietnamese citizens that lived in Hanoi before (cf. FINK 2012: 85, 86). The second wave immediately followed up on this one and was based on snowball sampling (cf. p.87). The earlier participants were asked to share the survey with interested people. No other limitation was set despite “interested”, as useless responses could be excluded from the data later anyway. The third wave of sampling was conducted as convenience sampling again, although it had features of judgment sampling (cf. MARSHALL 1996: 523, 524). The link to the online survey was posted in Facebook groups relevant to the topic, such as the group pages cited in the appendix, other pages related to social action and one broader group for exchange of information focused on the Hanoi area. Those groups had member numbers up to 30.000, giving the sample some chance of randomization. After all the participants of the movement are in the main focus of the survey and those who did not are in fact additional resources. Also, as will be shown later, the sample was divided into sub-groups during the analysis. Considering these facts partly resolves the bias normally deriving from convenience sampling (cf. FINK 2012: 85-87). To enlarge the group of potential participants and reduce the bias deriving from the level of education, the online-survey was available in English and Vietnamese. It was translated by a former Vietnamese colleague of mine, Ms. Ngoc Phan. She herself was a student of Political Relations in Hanoi and has enough knowledge about research designs to provide a useful translation. 25 Hugging Trees Hanoi Methods 3.2.2 Questionnaire The questionnaire itself is split into five parts and following the focal points of the research approach. While quite in the overall quite simple, it features two hierarchical questions that are dependent on the answers of earlier ones. It comprises an introduction, a main part and a statistical background inquiry (cf. BLAIR ET AL. 2013: 210, 211). The main part is divided into “perceptions”, “communication” and “outlook”. After the welcome page to the survey, which explains the topic, purpose and conductor of the study and provides an estimation about the time needed, follows the introduction page. It consists of two simple Yes/No questions, asking for familiarity with the most popular movement names and if the surveyed person took part in movement’s events. A third question is multiple choice, asking at the same time if the participant took part in discussions about the topic and with whom. Following that comes the main part with substantive questions. Perceptions – It focuses on features of the movement itself. First a multiple choice question picks up the issue of movement goals. It offer the option “other” as well, enabling the participant to bring in extra information (that option is also available in the following multiple and some single choice questions, but will not be mentioned every time). A concluding question (Y/N) asks if the participant supports those goals and if not, a hierarchical questions asks what he or she would support. The second issue of perceptions centers on the role of young people in the movement. Two Y/N questions explore if they played major roles in the movement as a whole and/or in the organization of it. Communications – The second main section is directed on another issue defined by the sub-research questions. (Perceived) channels of communication, especially the relevance of social media, are explored. The first two questions are set up to cover the initiation phase. They ask for the provider of the information (single choice) and the channels used (multiple choice). If social media is picked, a hierarchical question asks for the specific platform. Belonging to this topic, another question inquires if the participant took part in online discussions. The last question goes back to the initiation phase and concentrates on questioning in which environment the movement had started (single choice). This question was put to the end, as the earlier ones all focused on the individual and this one on the group. Outlook – The last section functions as the finale of the actual survey and consists of three Y/N questions. Number one questions if, in the opinion of the participant, the movement and protests actually were successful. The following two focus on the future of protests in Vietnam. One requests an estimation how often this kind of movements will happen in the future, in relation to the years before Tree Hugs (ordinal scale). The second one inquires if the participant would take part in those movements (Y/N/do not know). Following that comes a background check, collecting information on age, sex, education, employment, place of residence, origin and citizenship of the participant. Also one open question enables the participant to leave additional information and remarks. Throughout the survey all questions are compulsory (if they appear), only the last open question is optional. After finishing this statistical inquiry a page informs about the end of the survey, including an expression of thanks and an email-contact for further questions. 26 Hugging Trees Hanoi Methods 3.3 Analyzing the data For analyzing the data a mixed-methods approach was applied. First, the survey with a strong quantitative focus provides the base for the case study. After that the results are interpreted under the circumstances of the current Vietnamese development. 3.3.1 Exploration As can be taken from the previous sub-chapter 3.2 the survey is rather simplistic, with the major part consisting of simple nominal scaled Yes/No questions. With exception of one ordinal scaled question in the section “outlook” the multiple and single choice questions are ordinal scaled as well. While some of them include an open “other” answer, they can be analyzed statistically after data coding. The inquiry about the participant’s age is the only question producing interval scaled data. Considering the simplicity of the data and the short length of the survey, I decided to stay with a descriptive analysis as the data is not feasible for inferential statistics. In a first step, the data was transformed into a number matrix, where “other” answers are summarized as number too. This enables the display of proportions, as will be done in chapter 4. For that the data was standardized and the proportions in relation to the sample calculated. Chapter 4 comprises not only the display of these proportions, but also an interpretation of them. 3.3.2 Subgroups After exploring the data, I decided for applying a subgroup analysis. This analysis allows to separate a sample in various subgroups, e.g. depending on demographic data (cf. HOLBROOK 2008: 853, 854). The sample can be split up along various lines, such as living in Hanoi or not, the place of origin, or according to occupation. I will consider these subgroups as well and will include them in the analysis, if there are differences that are worth mentioning. I put a distinction based on age aside, as the distribution is not suitable for that. The age groups are too unequally distributed as that any scientific value could be expected. In the table below the sub-groups used are displayed. The groups A1 and A2, as well as I, II do not incorporate the whole sample. Overall A B A1 A2 I II X Y whole sample living in Hanoi not living in Hanoi living in Hanoi; origin there living in Hanoi; migrants in training working participated in the movement did not participate Table 1 - Sub-groups 3.3.3 Contextualization After analyzing the survey results with descriptive statistics, a qualitative interpretation is pending. Chapter 5 evaluates the results of chapter 4 under consideration of additional sources. Tying the early conclusions to studies of the political environment and to economic and demographic indicators will eventually improve the picture. Additionally chapter 5 is set up to connect the survey results with the theory introduced in chapter 2. Therefor it is the main part of the study. It represents the qualitative part of the mixed methods approach. Additional information from the “other” answer-options, as well as remarks from the open question at the end of the survey are brought in at this point as well. 27 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi 4. The sample’s perceptions Over the following pages I will present the results of my survey. The chapter is set up to provide an overview of the sample’s answers, the proportions of them and chosen subgroups. While I will give an overview here, only in the next chapter an interpretation and discussion under consideration of the research questions will follow. 4.1 Getting the picture The first short sub-chapter will focus on presenting the sample itself. As mentioned previously, the survey was available in a Vietnamese and an English version. With 113 individuals the larger part of the participants used the Vietnamese version, while 17 stuck to the English one. Together 130 participants filled out the survey completely. Of the 130 persons surveyed, 86 were female and 44 male. As you can see in the figure below, the participant’s age ranges from 15 to 63 years. With an average of 28.3 and a median of 25 the majority of participants are young adults though. Age distribution of the sample Number of participants 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 Age Figure 4 – Age distribution in the sample Nearly all of them are Vietnamese citizens, with only two foreigners taking part in the survey. Because they are both living in Hanoi I decided to include them in the analysis. As you can see in the figure below, 35 other participants are not living in Hanoi at the moment. Figure 5 – Place of residence Half of the sample was born in Hanoi, while half of it comes from other parts of Viet Nam (+2 foreigners). Furthermore, of the 35 who are not living in Hanoi right now, nine were born there and 26 were not. Additionally 39 other participants are migrants to the city, as they were not born in the city but live there now. 28 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi Figure 6 – Place of birth When looking at the educational background and current occupation it is obvious that the sample is biased. The sample is dominated by individuals with academic background. More than 75% have graduated in a Bachelor or Master degree. Four are still in school and 25 have graduated from High school. Only two are still in secondary level, the other 23 are students in university. The bias will be further discussed in chapter 5. Figure 7 – Education of the sample When looking at current occupations, the picture evens out a little. Nearly one third are students, more than half are (self-)employed. Other forms, such as working in the family business, being unemployed or already retired, as well as students in school, are represented in small margins. Figure 8 – Current occupation 29 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi 4.2 Movement participation Similarly to the survey the answers will be separated into four parts. The first one covers general issues such as the knowledge of common movement slogans (see chapter 1) and overall participation. As we can see in figure 9, the slogans are widely known to the participants. It is not surprising that the names are more known in sub-group X, which includes individuals that participated in protest events. That group B exhibits a higher knowledge than A could be explained insofar as media outlets used repeatedly those slogans. Because group B is not living in Hanoi it would eventually be more dependent on it. Surprisingly group A2, migrants in Hanoi, have a quite low knowledge with one out of five being not familiar to it. It could eventually be explained by lacking localized social capital, which led to less inclusion in local events. Figure 9 – Familiarity with the terms The following figure presents the participation in the movement itself. As we can see the share is quite low, with just 21% in the overall sample participating. Considering chosen sub-groups, we see the highest proportion in A2. But also group A1 has more partakers than the average. While it is hard to explain why A2 has a higher number of partakers, which contradicts the hypothesis on the top of this page, it is not surprising that the overall group A (A1+A2), that means Hanoi residents, were included in the protests to a greater extent. Those working already have a significantly higher share than those still in education as well. It is fair to assume that the result is closely connected with the higher average age and therefor the availability of more resources in this group. Figure 10 – Participation in the movement 30 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi 4.3 Communication channels The following sub-chapter is a central part of the case study, as it incorporates the tools and channels of communication that are relevant for the group. Already in the first figure, showing the perceptions of the initiation phase, we can see that social media played a central role. Two thirds identified it as the setting were early movement formation took place. Educational facilities mattered even less than friendship circles. This rebuts the bias identified earlier regarding education a little. Figure 11 – Initiation of the movement Considering the sub-groups, it gets clear that for those not living in Hanoi (B) traditional media played a much more important role. We might connect that to the fact that social media is based on social capital that is furthermore based on local networks. Of course this can only be an assumption. Comparing the answers of participants with those of observers shows little differences. Friendship circles played a bigger role for the latter one, while social media did for the former. That fact could be related to privacy, as social media networks are normally more open to third persons (friends of friends). So those who did not want or dare to take part would eventually be less eager to engage into semi-public discussions. Group B showed quite different answers than A regarding the proportion between social media and friendship circles. Considering that in B only three individuals participated in the actual protests, their answers carry less weight than those of A. While social media obviously was an important tool in the early moments of protest formation, figure 12 shows us that at the same time traditional media was the key information medium. Of course this also includes media outlets active in social media. Second important source were friends, other sources only played a minor role. The relation between the influence of media and friends is the main difference between the sub-groups. For group B again media played a more important role than for A, as well as unspecified sources in social media. Looking at those living in Hanoi, we see that migrants were more often informed by friends. This stands in some contrast to the conclusion before, which attributed the group with lacking social capital. A possible explanation is that migrants stay with migrants, therefor enclosed friendship circles establish. This is a normal phenomenon for temporary migrants, what students often are (cf. HUSA AND WOHLSCHLAEGL 2014: 154, 155). For students friendship circles matter a lot more as well, a hint for their strong interest and the role of young people in the events. Interestingly it seems that the channel of first information did not matter for participation, as they display similar answers. 31 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi Figure 12 – First information about the movement Figure 13 supports the conclusions drawn above. While classic media outlets were the main source for early information they reached their audience mostly over social media. Only 15% read about the issue directly in newspapers, 10% in other online sources. Face-to-face conversations had the smallest share. While the variations are only minimal between the sub-groups and the whole sample, those who participated display a much higher number of in-person contacts than those who did not. It is not unlikely that those contacts inperson played an important role for recruitment. Figure 13 – Process of information about the movement Only eight of the surveyed individuals did not engage into any discussion about the topic. Therefor figure 13 only shows the proportion of discussion partners. The question was multiple choice, so the answers below show the relation between the use of all those social circles. The results show again that friendship circles were the main field for the exchange of ideas. Family and colleagues together make up less than half, with the family still being of more importance. While there is little difference between the groups A and B, we can see from group II that the workplace matters for discussions as well. Those who participated were more active in all the different circles than the average. Eventually this 32 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi means that no discussion partners played a significate role, or that those individuals were so committed that they engaged in discussions with their whole environment. Figure 14 – Participation in discussions Figure 15 – Participation in online discussions Another factor is the usage of social media platforms for discussions. As figure 15 exhibits, only 41% participated in them. For those outside Hanoi the platform matters more, eventually because of the dependency on it when being abroad or in rural locations. For group X we see that two thirds participated in those discussions. Insofar for those participating in the protest it was in fact an important platform for exchange. On the right side we can see a general inquiry about the platforms used (for discussions as well as information attainment). Without doubt Facebook is the single most important platform. A closer discussion on this fact can be found in the last chapter. Figure 16 – Used social media platforms 33 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi 4.4 Collective goals Another central question looks at the goals that lie beneath the protest and the identification with them. In the figure below the results considering this issue are displayed. The outside ring encompasses the goals perceived by those who did not participate in any events, while the inside shows the drivers that brought the participants to the streets. As we can see the sole stop of the landscape plan is only one part in a more complex network of reasons. Calls for political participation are as well in the mix as concerns for corruption, tourism and living conditions. Interestingly we see a quite equal distribution of goals in the inner circle. This is a hint on a quite diverse mix of protestors. Figure 17 – Perceived goal of the movement The second point of interest in this section is the part that young people played in the protest movement. It was dealt with two questions. The first one can be found in the question below. There is no clear result if the Vietnamese youth was the main driver of the protests. Even in group X the answers are half-half. Figure 18 – Share of young people It seems that young people were in fact an important factor during the protests, but other groups played a role as well. When it comes to organizing the results are clearer. Nearly 90% of the overall survey group, as well as group X, see them as the ones organizing the events. It is fair to say that young people are more affine to new techniques, such as social 34 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi media. Insofar the results here and the ones earlier that underlined the importance of social media in the process align. Figure 19 – Young people as organizing force 4.5 What does the future hold? The last sub-chapter deals with the question how this movement influences the future of the Vietnamese civil society. Again nearly two thirds of the sample see an influence of the movement on politics. Only 16% reject that idea. This is quite significant considered that the plans were only adapted rather than stopped for good (see chapter 1). On the other hand, we have just seen that other reasons contributed to the protests as well. Eventually the steps taken afterwards, such as the discharge of involved officials is seen as a success. Interestingly, more of those who participated see an effect than those who did not. Also more of the people who do not live in Hanoi stated that (of those only three participated), which hints to a positive media frame about the movement as well. Figure 20 – Impact on city politics Figure 21 – Expectation for movements in the future Asking about the expectations regarding likewise events in the future, the answers are quite clear. 85% expect a rise of similar happenings in the future. Only 10% expect a reduction of them. This might be a sign for a growing willingness for participation in the population. 35 The sample’s perceptions Hugging Trees Hanoi As shown in chapter 1, social movements and protests are on the rise in recent years. Combined with the perception about the success of the movement and the figure below that shows the willingness in the sample, the evolvement of a protest culture might be upcoming. Nearly 90% of those who participated want to do so again, as well as 80% of those who did not. Figure 22 – Plans for future plans 36 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia 5. Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia In this last chapter I will interpret the results of the case study under the conditions of the theoretical concept introduced before, as well as under the socioeconomic dynamics at hand in East Asia. A review of the research questions will be included as well. 5.1 Typification Before examining the frames that can be identified from the survey it is important to clarify the character of the protest movement. Neither from media, Facebook groups or the survey itself any leadership could be identified. Also the movement was rather short-lived, although in displayed a small degree of longevity (a few weeks) and in its wake a number of groups were created. Still the use of the same slogans was widespread and events were unified rather than fragmented. Insofar we can definitely speak of a social movement as introduced in chapter 2.1. At the same time the lack of any leadership shows that it was not a social organization. The so called picnics and demonstrations were a form of peaceful protest. In the survey section for open comments a few participants touched the issue of movement organization. While one participant suspects that the protestors were manipulated by some interest group in the government for the use in an internal struggle, another one sees exactly the need for an ally in the government for future success. Regarding actors outside the government, a number of groups was identified. Some general statements reported about bloggers and NGOs that were involved in the protests. One group named was No-U, a group that campaigns against the Chinese claims in the South China Sea. One participant underlined the role that LGBT persons played in the movement. Summarized we can say that a number of already existing groups of civil society were involved, but there was no clear force that shaped the process. Despite a few suspicions, an involvement of political elites cannot be proven either. Therefor the movement most likely earns the attribute grassroots. Looking back at the main research question we can say that the Tree Hugs movement most likely was a grassroots social movement. 5.2 Drivers In the following section I will attempt to synthesize the information collected from the survey with the concept of framing introduced in chapter 2. 5.2.1 The fight for livability Chapter 2 already presented the idea of movement frames, deriving is the frame alignment of numerous individual frames. While those frames can be adapted deliberately, this is an aspect highly unlikely for the Tree Hugs movement considering its short span of life and lacking leadership. Sub-chapter 4.4 displayed the goals participants had as well as those perceived by observers. There are only small differences between those two frames. While concern about the trees themselves definitely played a role, we could see that the policy was framed in a much broader picture. Second most stated reason was the preservation of living conditions. Numerous comments by participants focused on this issue, calling for the protection of “lung of the capital” (cf. PEEL 2015). Therefor concerns for the environment represent the core of the movement frame. The second most named topic was the involvement of citizens in policy decisions. After that participants already focused on the danger for tourism. Hanoi’s trees are often nearly a hundred years old, dating back to the colonial time and are one of the main features of the city picture. Their red blossom is a 37 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia famous scenery for pictures, such as those used for advertisements (cf. PEEL 2015). Vietnamese tourism is still underdeveloped, but a promising market. Since 1998 tourist numbers have grown by 286% to now more than 4.5 million (cf. VIETNAM TRAVEL 2009 and GENERAL STATISTICS OFFICE OF VIET NAM 2013b). Last in the line but still on a relevant level is corruption. Those who did not participate even saw it as more important as tourism. Viet Nam ranks 119 out of 175 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 (Transparency International 2014). Despite the implementation of legislations in the last few years, corruption is still common not only in the private sector but also in government agencies (cf. MARTINI 2012: 3). Altogether the survey’s results show that the concern about environmental issues deriving from a rapidly changing and agglomerating city and the concern about livability were in the center of the protest frame, but underlining political and economic issues played a role as well (see sub-research question 1). We can also assess that the slogans “Tree Hugs Hanoi” and the picture depicted in figure 1, evolved to a vague form of collective identity. The use of it on profile pictures and as demonstration posters functions as displaying a “we”-feeling centered on the rejection of the policy. 5.2.2 Media coverage Media frames are not in the focus of this thesis and are in fact an issue of communication sciences. A little excurse is justifiable though as it was included in the theoretical concept. The most important fact is that there was a media frame at all in domestic media outlets. This cannot be taken for granted in a country like Viet Nam. Also we have seen in the survey that classic media and therefor its frames played a major role in distributing information in the early phase. This means the influence of media frames and frame alignment had an influence on individuals in the early phase. While I could not conduct broader researching in Vietnamese language media, English articles by national media, dated on the first week after the announcement of the landscape plan, show a critical approach towards the issue. Many of the concerns, such as corruption, were mentioned in the early articles. Eventually media frames were in fact critical towards the controversial plans and supportive of the later movement. 5.2.3 Controversial politics Following SCHÖN AND REIN 1995 the dissatisfaction about the tree felling is a policy controversy. In the focus of this controversy is the landscape plan itself. This thesis centers on the protesters, but it is possible to make assumptions about the institutions tasked with the project, the Department of Construction, as well as the Hanoi City Peoples Committee who adopted the policy (cf. THANH NIEN NEWS 2015B). As we have already seen, protestors, and following that the movement, associated the policy primarily with the felling of the trees themselves, the livability based on clean air, provided shadow etc., and on concerns about an impact on tourism. According to media reports, the Department of Construction and the Committee on the other hand focused on security concerns, such as the danger arising from old trees and those not suited for urban areas (cf. CLARK 2015A). It is fair to estimate that the institutional frame superposes the official statement, as a hidden institutional agenda is unlikely. One the other hand we cannot rule out that the interests of individual officials, who were eventually framing the policy as an opportunity to pocket funds from selling the timber, played a role in the policy. The reaction of the city council, halting the project and consulting experts, speaks for frame reflection. By respecting the concerns of the protestors and adapting the policy, the institutional policy frame was 38 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia changed. It would be too much to speak of frame alignment, as the city government did not actually follow the demands. Two other features of the protestor’s frame, corruption and citizen’s participation, are not aimed at the institutional policy frame. They challenge how the policy was adopted, therefor the institutional action frame. Obviously the Hanoi City Peoples Committee and its subordinate bodies are used to make decisions internally and then announce them, often without a sufficient explanation about the reasons. By demanding an integration of the city’s inhabitants into this process the demonstrators are requesting a change of the institutional action frame. If corruption belongs to the action frame is discussable. I argue that endemic corruption, deriving from lacking oversight and missing penalties, is rooted in the very base of the institution. If the legal construction of the institution allows corruption, the issue touches the level of metacultural frames. A close analysis about how corruption if facilitated in this environment and how deeply rooted it actually is would be needed for a definite classification. Anyhow, addressing corruption aims, like citizen’s participation, at the very institution itself and not only on a specific policy. This indicates the wish for a deeper change of the system as a whole, rather than just for the modification of a single policy. 5.2.4 The rising dragon or authoritarianism in the 21st century 2014 Freedom House ranked Viet Nam 6.0 on a 1-7 scale and described it as “not free”. Regarding political rights, the country falls with 7.0 in the worst class, while civil liberties reach 5.0. This sector achieved slightly better results due to the recognition of LGBT communities and same-sex unions, as well as (relatively seen) more equal opportunities for the majority of women, regarding political participation and education. For ethnic and religious minorities on the other hand the situation is much worse (cf. FREEDOM HOUSE 2015B). Especially the Degar minority, deriving from the unification of the Montagnards in the central highlands, faces harsh repression (cf. THAYER 2014: 144). Beside them, prodemocracy activists, Catholics and Zen Buddhists are the prime target of the security apparatus (cf. pp.141-145). When it comes to civil liberties, the picture is quite murky as well. The freedom of association is limited, organizations need to obtain a legal permit from the government and are monitored. This also includes labor unions. While the number of groups that promote issues such as environmental protection, land rights and similar topics grows, it is still small (cf. FREEDOM HOUSE 2015B). The ranking of the government itself is not very promising either. There is de facto no political pluralism in the one-party state, although there are reports about factionalism and infights in the party during recent years. Only party officials can participate in the elections for high level posts. The party membership itself has evolved to an entry point for nepotism and obtaining business contacts. Government functions are impaired by corruption and internal splits (cf. FREEDOM HOUSE 2015B). In 2001 a scandal involving the General Department II (GDII) became public. A10, a special wiretap unit inside the GDII, was misused by Party Secretary General Le Kha Phieu for collecting dossiers on other party officials. In the wake of the scandal the general lost his powers inside the party and high ranking officials like Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and famous war-general Vo Nguyen Giap called for restrictions for the intelligence service (cf. THAYER 2014: 138, 139). Of course the problem was the usage against party members and not the surveillance as a whole, as the adoption of new 39 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia legislation and various crackdowns throughout the coming years proved (cf. THAYER 2014 and FREEDOM HOUSE 2015B). The tools used by Viet Nam’s security apparatus reach from monitoring and surveillance to violence conducted by not uniformed mobs (cf. THAYER 2014: 145-156). Parallel to the spread of internet access throughout the population, new laws were introduced by the government. The most important tool for repression is still the vaguely worded Article 88. It is part of the penal code on “Conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam”. In fact it enables punishment for the spread of any information, including official documents, which can be depicted as defaming for Viet Nam as a whole and the party and government in particular. Even material that is “confusing” to Viet Nam’s citizens is forbidden. In the past most charges against activists and bloggers were conducted under this article (cf. p.135). The leading institution inside Viet Nam’s security apparatus is the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), whose members also form a bloc of the party’s Central Committee (cf. p.136). It comprises six departments: police, security, strategic intelligence, education and personnel, logistics, and science and technology. Beside the 1.2 million strong police force belonging to the MPS, there also exists the People’s Armed Security Force (PASF), tasked with the fight against ordinary crime, insurgency and political activity. It is said to be active in rural areas on the local level and to be directly reporting to the People’s Committee, therefor bypassing the Ministry of Interior (cf. p.137). When it comes to surveillance there are three important units. First the unit A42, part of General Department of Security of the MPS. It is tasked with monitoring telephones, emails and the internet. Recently it has acquired new systems that significantly extend its wiretap abilities, like the Verint and Silver Bullet mobile phone monitoring systems. The General Department of Strategic Intelligence, also part of the MPS, is tasked with collecting and examining information about enemies inside and outside the country (cf. p.137). The third relevant unit is the already mentioned infamous GDII, the military intelligence service, which is part of the Ministry of National Defense. It is tasked with collecting news and information as well and pays special attention to foreign countries and organizations and individuals inside and outside the country that are a threat to the party and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (cf. p.138). Censorship and propaganda on the other hand are conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI). Under its overview directives regarding the restriction of the internet are issued. A number of regulations were introduced during the last decade and made the owners of internet cafes legally responsible for their customers (2001), forbid the use of the internet resources to oppose the state (2005), required businesses to obtain licenses for setting up a website (2007), and restricted bloggers to only write about private matters (2008) (cf. pp.139, 140). The MCI also issues the firewalls that block unwanted websites, like 2000 sites that were classified as “subversive” after an audit in 2007. After protests against bauxite mining projects in 2008 it also blocked Facebook temporarily and restricted the use of Twitter and Google. Both companies are now required to use servers inside Viet Nam, which are much more vulnerable to the previously described surveillance units (cf. p.140). In 2010 it also issued legislation that requires providers of public networks to install the so called “Green Dam” software that enables the tracking and blocking of websites (cf. p.141). 40 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia Repression, surveillance and censorship are not the only elements of political opportunity structures. As seen in sub-chapter 2.2.3 the second facet are opportunities for participation and the resources available. Already on the previous page the issue of political participation was handled. Options for political participation are de facto not available, with ethnic minorities and democratic activists experiencing the worst situation. Here the question arises why Viet Nam sees a rise in protest movements despite tightening controls and the not very favorable climate for activists inside the country. While feedback loops between protest and repression cannot be ruled out (cf. CAREY 2006), it is unlikely considered that we do not see extensive cases of police violence yet. Therefor I reckon that the rising living standard and new technologies are in fact the driver for this increase. This would coincide with similar dynamics in China after 1998 (see chapter 1.2). It is difficult to assess the exact differences in living standard and connectivity in detail, but we can revert to some quantitative indicators. Viet Nam is one of the fastest developing countries inside the ASEAN group. Since 1990 (the Doi Moi economic reforms started in 1986) Viet Nam’s human development index increased by 40%, gross national income (ppp) did so 3.5 times, life expectancy rose 10 years and average years spent in school for those older than 25 years increased by 1.5 years (cf. OECD 2013: 3). While the country’s GDP growth was declining during recent years, it is was still at +5.6% in 2014. For 2015 even a rise back to +5.7% GDP growth are expected by the IMF. GDP per capita (ppp) saw an immense growth as well. After standing at $660 in 1990 it will bypass the $4.500 in 2015 (IMF 2014). While Viet Nam still lags behind after regional leaders such as Malaysia or Thailand, it displays the fastest progress in these sectors and a relatively equal access to the spoils for a wide share of the population (cf. OECD 2013). Another way is assessing the state of the domestic middle class. The Vietnamese government does not support the idea of a class society and therefor no official data is available, but some international studies focus on the issue. Estimates put the size of the Vietnamese middle and affluent classes in 2012 at around 12 million people. By 2020 this number will likely grow to 30 million, including nearly every third Vietnamese and its members will account for 50% of national consummation (cf. BHARADWAJ ET AL. 2013). With rising financial security and the servicing of consumer needs it is not unlikely that the demands for more political participation and personal autonomy will rise. Considering the whole complex network of elements in the POS it is most likely that economic independence is the crucial one when it comes to the evolvement of a Vietnamese civil society and the formation of more social movements and protests. The increased financial opportunities are linked to the spread of the internet and smartphones as well. While, as we saw, the Vietnamese security apparatus responds to this development with ever more surveillance and restrictions, it is unlikely that it can stop those dynamics. Before concluding a quick look at another central issue – new media – is still missing. 5.3 Hugging trees online This section covers the research sub-questions 2 and 3, which focus on the issues of movement initiation, information and the role of social media. The sample group gives quite clear answers to those subjects. As we have seen in 4.3, during the early phase classic media outlets using social media were the first links. This aligns with VAN DER MEER AND VERHOEVEN’s study that saw social media as reaching users quicker than traditional channels. But as we saw as for distributing information media outlets still matter as well by using a representation in social media. When it comes to movement initiation, the survey 41 Hugging Trees Hanoi Tree Hugs and greater dynamics in East Asia participants also identified social media as the dominant space. Other environments, such as universities or simple friendship circles only played a minor role. Second in line, but far behind regarding the distribution of information, were friendship circles. For discussions they were the most important environment though. Of those participating in the protests 67% also participated in online discussions and so did 34% of those who did not take action themselves. Insofar we can attest that the internet and especially social media played a central role for movement recruiting and frame alignment. Viet Nam has an overall internet penetration rate of 43.5% and a Facebook penetration rate of 11.4% (ECONOMY WATCH 2014A+B). 38.8% of Vietnamese go online weekly, but the proportion rises to 78.5% in the group of 15 to 24 year olds. The share of internet penetration also rises with the education level (GALLUP POLL 2015). Nearly all of those who have internet go online at least once a week to access News (93.6%) and 99.3% of them use Vietnamese sources, but only 12% read English content (GALLUP POLL 2013). Every third Vietnamese citizen has a smartphone, but that proportion rises to nearly 50% in the group of the 15 to 24 year olds as well (TUOI TRE NEWS 2014 and GALLUP POLL 2013). Mobile phones are the prime tool for accessing the internet, with 8 out of 10 owners doing so (GALLUP POLL 2015). Facebook is the most popular social media website in Viet Nam and significantly outperforming competitors like ZingMe and Twitter (cf. BDG ASIA 2014). For the movement Facebook was the central platform as well, as 96% of the sample agree. Those facts supplement the picture that we already got from the online survey. As we have seen in sub-chapters 4.3 and 4.4 young people played a major role in organizing the protests and Facebook was their main tool for doing that. It is not surprising as young people are often more affine towards new technologies. Insofar there is a clear connection between growing internet penetration, the use of social media, the spread of smartphones that can access the internet and a young generation that wants their voice to be heard. 42 Hugging Trees Hanoi Conclusion and Outlook 6. Conclusion and Outlook Following China and other countries of the region, Vietnam currently experiences a rapid economic development that touches issues like demography, the standard of living, the spread of technology and increasingly also the political consciousness of the population. The industrialization of the country pushes the agglomeration of its inhabitants in and around urban centers. The immense growth, reaching nearly +5% in some areas like the capital Hanoi, leads to strong pressures on environmental resources and decreases the space for living inside the growing cities. At the same time the economic growth rises wages, therefor increasing the standard of living and education. Pushed by it as well, new technologies spread, most importantly the internet and smartphones that can access it. As those new tools bypass the old censorship active in classical media, the authoritarian system felt it had to react. During the last decade one of CAREY’S “feedback loops” between protesters and the regime has developed (cf. CAREY 2006). Rising internet penetration and tools such as blogs and social media forums have provided space for the exchange of critical thoughts. As a response the Vietnamese security apparatus has adopted a series of legislation that strengthens surveillance and censorship. While women and LGBT movements experience some level of acceptance, political dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities are the main target of the new repression, which often leads to intimidation and arrests. Bloggers, which the Vietnamese population regards as more honest than classic media outlets, faced one of the harshest prosecution, with some of them being arrested (cf. GALLUP POLL 2015 and THAYER 2014, see chapter 5.2.4). Nonetheless, since Vietnam stepped on its path of reformation and industrialization, the number of protest movements is rising. Concerns for the environment and livability are one of the main drivers. Following the protests against the reconstruction of Saigon and plans for a cable-car in the Son Doong cave, the most recent movement erupted challenging a landscape plan in the Hanoi. The focal point of the plan was the felling of 6.700 trees in the inner districts of the city. Outgoing from a policy controversy, a social movement developed and gathered around the slogan “Tree Hugs Hanoi”. In form of a case study this study has investigated the characteristics of the movement. For that an online survey was conducted in English and Vietnamese, featuring the topics perception, communication and outlook. The responses were analyzed with descriptive statistics and interpreted under incorporating contextual political, economic and demographic factors (see chapters 4 and 5). The study has shown, based on the response of 130 surveyed people, the majority of them living in Hanoi, that not only environmental concerns drove the protest, but also the call for including citizens in policy decisions and the resentment of corruption throughout the administration. Considering the theory of policy and institutional frames, this means that the protestors did not only demand a change of the landscape plan, but push for a reformation of the institutions responsible for it (see chapter 5.2.3). The concern about endemic corruption fits to the reports of foreign observers that still assess Vietnamese institutions as belonging to the most corrupt in the world. Additionally, there are still hardly any opportunities for citizens to influence political decision from outside the party. According to the theory of framing, these drivers can be summarized as collective movement frame, deriving from the individual frames of the participants (see chapter 2.2.2 and 5.2.1). The responses to the survey have revealed that observers estimated the frame almost similar to the protest participants themselves, although the latter’s answers show a 43 Hugging Trees Hanoi Conclusion and Outlook quite heterogenic mix of drivers. This supports the presumption of a relatively free media coverage and successful frame alignment through social and classical media. Assessing the organizational structure showed that Tree Hugs did not develop complex organizational structures as leading figures were missing (see chapter 5.1). Existing groups and institutions took part in the movement, but did not push the development either. Taken this features together, Tree Hugs is indeed a grassroots social movement (see chapter 5.3). The data derived from the survey proved that the initiation happened on the social media platform Facebook. While classic media outlets functioned as primary information source, their reporting reached the citizens primarily through their social media representation. This is conform to studies on the Arab spring that showed that social media reaches citizen much faster than classic channels such as TV, radio or newspaper. The close alignment between the individual frames of participants and observers, as well as the media, hints to a quite free coverage by the latter. As external- and self-censorship are common in Vietnam, it raises questions regarding the intentions of political elites. The sample group did not express the feeling that this phenomenon is due to political infights, as happened before with a scandal involving the GDII military intelligence service, but a manipulation cannot be excluded completely. Another explanation is that the Vietnamese government orientates its reaction on the Chinese model, were protests are accepted as long as they are “insystem”, therefor not challenging the rule of the Communist Party (cf. FISHER 2012). The combination of a very young population and the spread of new technologies and education, concentrating in lower age groups, creates a generation of young, educated and technology affine citizens that increasingly displays political consciousness. Nearly every fourth Vietnamese is younger than 15 years and 41% of the population have not reached their 25th birthday (cf. THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2015). Parallel to that demographic development, the average years of education, as well as its quality, continue to rise (cf. OECD: 3, 4). While the Tree Hugs movement seemed to be dominated by educated people, its participants spread over all age groups. At the same time though, according to the sample, the youth was perceived as leading organizational force. Those findings support the assumption that the young generation is the most important actor in increasing protests throughout the country, based on their familiarity with new technologies. In contrast to numerous protest events around the world, most importantly those of the Arab spring, Twitter was not the central instrument for coordination, but Facebook. This coincides with the fact that Facebook is the social media platform with the highest penetration in Vietnam. Interestingly, Concluded, the sample shows a very positive stance towards the Tree Hugs movement. A significant majority thinks that the protests were successful. While the tree felling has been halted only temporarily, experts have been consulted to verify the decision and leading officials have been dismissed or warned. Respondents see the events as the start of a civil protest culture in the capital, with 85% expecting a rise of those happenings. At the same time, while only 21% of the sample participated in Tree Hugs, 82% want to participate in such movements in the future. Only 5% definitely refuse such an idea. This shows that Tree Hugs in fact had an impact on the local population by rising awareness, reducing reservations and creating social capital. Social capital describes the collection of social networks and their strength, depending on features such as trust. While investigating the sample responses the influence of social capital was evident, although additional research 44 Hugging Trees Hanoi Conclusion and Outlook is required for this issue. So far the analysis has shown that for those already working, colleagues became a relevant factor, thereby reducing the importance of friendship circles, which were more important for students. Obviously this is a fact that bears little surprise, still it is worth mentioning as it confirms an assumption. Friendship circles are the main space for the exchange of information and discussions, followed by the family. Those who participated in the movement were involved into discussions to a much greater extend. Their activity also distributed more equally about the circles friends, family and colleagues. Observers on the other hand were dominantly discussing in friendship circles. Social capital was also evident in the group of migrants, who were much more dependent on friendship circles. This applies for information distribution, were migrants were less dependent on media coverage than those born in Hanoi, while also displaying less knowledge regarding the prominent movement slogans. It also accounts for discussions, where migrants relied on friendship circles as well, while those born in Hanoi had a much greater share of their discussions inside the family. Considering that those living outside Hanoi had the highest share of online discussions, followed by migrants, and this ranking also applies for the importance of friendship circles, it is fair to say that discussions with friends happened to a significant extent online, while those in the family happened face-to-face. Surprisingly migrants had a higher level of participation in the protests. This can be explained by the fact that the migrants in the sample are dominantly young students, the group in which participation was higher anyway and that we can most likely attribute them with a higher use of social media than older age groups. This means they were more active in the environment where initiation happened. Still, the analysis of sub-groups has also shown that those who participated had gained first information to a much greater extent in person that those who stayed observers. Insofar it is conjecturable that early frame alignment raised the chances of participation, as the policy frame was already quite distinct when other influences arised. Without doubt the movement has improved the existing social capital. One place where that becomes evident is Facebook. Groups like người vì 6,700 cây xanh (6700 people for 6700 trees) that already initiated during the early phase of the protests or Vì một Hà Nội xanh (For a green Hanoi), which formed in the aftermath, are still active. Reports about participants with t-shirts from the Son Doong protest point at a greater trend of a forming civil society that understands protest as a normal tool of political discourse (cf. CLARK 2015A). Based on the results of this analysis I raise the assumption that Vietnam is just at the beginning of developing a protest culture. While the security apparatus has shown that it intends to limit the influence of new technologies through additional surveillance, censorship and legal restrictions, it will be unable to stop it. This is due to three important facts. First, as already explained, the number of potential protestors that are used to social media and have higher education will grow in the coming years. With higher education, improved knowledge of the world language English will go along. This will ease frame alignment and will enable protestors to access the field reports of movements in other countries, as well as exchange ideas with them (see chapter 2.2.6). Second, with the economic growth the extent of middle and rich classes will increase. According to prognoses this part of the Vietnamese society will reach 30 million people by 2020 and will account for 50% of the consummation in the country. With the fulfillment of material needs the demand for political participation will rise, especially when it comes to conflicts about the distribution of the economic gains. Third, the Vietnamese security apparatus will not 45 Hugging Trees Hanoi Conclusion and Outlook be able to completely control new technologies such as social media or block them. Unlike China, Viet Nam’s intelligence services have not acquired the technology to apply a comprehensive censorship system similar to the “Great Firewall of China” (cf. FALLOWS 2012). And even if it could, its domestic market is too small. Viet Nam only has 94 million inhabitants, therefor possible users, while China has 1.367 billion (THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2015). That not even considering the still low national internet penetration. The internet is not just a source for news and the space for social media, but is also important for conducting transnational business. Even in China foreign investors complain already for years about the negative effect that the restrictions have on their business (cf. FALLOWS 2012). For a country like Viet Nam, which is still at the beginning of its economic rise and in the process of wooing international companies, a blockade would not be feasible considering the damage that could be done. Of course a crackdown on internet freedom is possible and we cannot predict the results of possible party infights between reformers and conservatives. It is to hope that the decision for such a blockade or a possible violent escalation will not happen. Anyhow the Tree Hugs movement shows that political thinking and the idea to take influence on politics has reached the center of the Vietnamese society. It is also the most recent example of a row of protest movements that are a symptom of an evolving civil society. To get more insight into the extent of the phenomenon and draw conclusions in comparison with other countries, further research is required. 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OTHER SOURCES ECONOMY WATCH 2014 A: http://www.economywatch.com/economicstatistics/Vietnam/Internet_Penetration_Rate/ (22.07.2015) B: http://www.economywatch.com/economic- statistics/Vietnam/Facebook_Penetration_Rate/ (22.07.2015) GENERAL STATISTICS OFFICE OF VIET NAM 2013 A: http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=774 (15.07.2015) B: http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=780 (22.07.2015) HANOI GOVERNMENT 2010 http://english.hanoi.gov.vn/ct_trangchu//hn/c39G4R0YIzAC/2002/11807/population-and-area.html (15.07.2015) INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/weoselser.aspx?c=582&t =1 (23.07.2015) THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2015 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_eas.html (23.07.2015) TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 2014 http://www.transparency.org/country#VNM_DataResearch_SurveysIndices (22.07.2015) VIETNAM TRAVEL 2009 http://www.vietnamtravel.org/vietnam-tourism-statistics (22.07.2015) FACEBOOK GROUPS 6,700 người vì 6,700 cây xanh https://www.facebook.com/manfortree (24.07.2015) Vì một Hà Nội xanh https://www.facebook.com/groups/vimothanoixanh/ (24.07.2015) 53 Hugging Trees Hanoi Appendix THE QUESTIONNAIRE Welcome to the survey “Tree Hugs Hanoi”, which focuses on the events of March 2015, which created a de-facto movement opposing the cut down of 6700 trees in Hanoi. My name is Ulf Steindl, I am a currently a student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna in Austria. The following survey is part of my Bachelor thesis, which focuses on “grassroots-movements”, a specific form of popular movements. To complete the survey you won’t need more than 5 minutes. Your answers will be evaluated anonymously. Thank you very much for participating and please share the survey with your friends, family and colleagues. A. Introduction A1. Are you familiar with the “Tree Hugs” movement in Hanoi? [yes|no] A2. Did you discuss the topic with your friends, family members, colleagues? (multiple choice) [yes with friends | yes with family | yes with colleagues |no] A3. Did you participate in any events (picnics, meetings) related to the topic? [yes|no] B. Perception B1. In your opinion, what was the main goal of the whole Tree Hug Movement? (multiple choice) [Safe the trees | confront corruption | force the city government to involve the citizens in their decisions| improve/preserve the living conditions in the city | save the city picture for tourism |other: open field] B2. Do you support (all of) those goals? [yes|no]  B2.1. if “no”; What were your main goals? [B1. again] B3. Do you think that the event was dominated by young people? [yes|no] B4. Do you think that young people played a major part in organizing it? [yes|no] C. Communication C1. From whom did you hear the first time about the Tree Hug Events? [friends | family | colleagues | media | other: open field] C2. How did you get to know about it? [in person | over social media | newspaper paper or online |online (other than social media or newspaper) | other: open field)  C2.1. if “social media”; On which platform: [Facebook |Twitter | Google+ | other: open field] C3. Did you participate in any online discussions about the topic (for example on Facebook)? [yes|no] C4. Where do you think did the organization of the movement/events start? [on social media | at universities or schools | in friendship circles |other: open field] D. Outlook D1. Do you think the movement had an impact on city politics? [yes|no |don’t know) D2. Do you expect that in the future events like the Tree Hug meeting this will happen… [more often |less often | same as before |never again] D3. Do you plan to participate in future events/movements like this? [yes|no |don’t know] E. Statistics E1. How old are you? [number field] E2. Are you… [male|female] E3. Are you living in Hanoi [Yes|No] E5. Are you a Vietnamese citizen? [Yes|No]  E4.1. if “yes”; Were you born in Hanoi? [Yes|No] E6. What is the highest degree or level of education that you have completed? [lower than secondary level |secondary level| high school | graduate (Bachelor) | post-graduate] E7. What is your current occupation? [Student in school | student at university | employed for wages | self-employed | working in family business | unemployed | retired] E8. Do you have any further remarks you want to share? [open field] Thank you very much for participating in the survey. If you have any further questions or comments please write me at ulf.steindl@gmail.com. Don’t forget to share it with your friends! 54