Recovering Pragmatism's Practicality: Four Views

P HILO SO P H IC AL F RONT] ERS P h i losop h i ra I Fton n ers ISSN 1758-r532 1 (2009) vol. 4, ksue pp.3-18 Recovering Pragmatism's Practicality: Four Views Shane l. Ralston Pennsylvania State Univers ity- Hazl eto n ABSTRACT: In this paper, I evaluate three views of philosophical pragmatism's practical implications for academic and non-academic or public discourses, as well as offer rny own view of those implications. The first view is that of George Novack. In an underappreciated tract, Pragmatism versus Marxism, the American Trotskyite and union organizer launched a vicious attack on John Dewey's career as a professional philosopher. He alleged that Deweyt ideas were inaccessible to all but a small community of fellow academicians. While Novack conceded that Dewey's philosophical inquiries had a crosspollinating influence on other academic fields, he doubted that the beneficial products ofthose inquiries traveled far beyond the walls ofthe so-called 'ivory tower.' Larry Hickman offers a second view. He understands Dewey's claim in Experience and Nature that philosophy serves as a "liaison officer" to mean that philosophers should provide a common lexicon that translates between the languages ofdistinct disciplines. In other words, for Dewey, the role ofphilosophy, including philosophical pragmatism, is to facilitate interdisciplinarity. Since interdisciplinary sharing is usually confined to academic discourse, Novackt challenge is perfectly compatible with Hickman's interpretation of Deweyt 'liaison officer' claim. Both Novack and Hickman are mistaken, though in different degrees and for different reasons. The third, and more promising, view is advanced by Robert Talisse. He cites the life and works of Sidney Hook, one of Deweyt better-known students, as an exemplary case of a pragmatist who consistently realized his pragmatic commitments in public discourse. The most important reason for qualifying Hickmant interpretation of Dewey's 'liaison officer' claim is that the measure of pragmatisnis value is not solely the ability of pragmatists to facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, but their ability to also insert their ideas into public discourse. In my view, philosophical pragmatists, and philosophers generally, should both facilitate interdisciplinarity in academic discourse and introduce philosophical notions into public discourse-that is, serve in the dual capacity of interdisciplinary scholar and public intellectual. O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press R,ECOVERING PR,AGMATISM'S PMCTICALITY: FOUR VIEWS P H I LO S O PHIC AL F RONTIE RS Ifhis IDewey's] intellectual interests were centered on academic philosophy, they radiated widely into other fields. -G. Novack' lP]hilosophy as a critical organ becomes in effect a messenger, a liaison oficer, making reciprocally intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues, and thereby €nlarging as well as rectifying the meaning with which they are charged. -J. Dewel In this paper, I evaluate three views of philosophical pragmatism's practical implications for academic and non-academic or public discourses, as well as offer my own view of those implications. The first view is that ofGeorge Novack. In an underappreciated tract, Pragmatism versus Marxism,the American Trotslryite and union organizer launched a vicious attack on John Dewey's career as a professional philosopher. He alleged that Deweyt ideas were inaccessible to all but a sma1l community of fe1low academicians. While Novack conceded that Dewey's philosophical inquiries had a cross-pollinating influence on other academic fields, he doubted that the beneficial products ofthose inquiries traveled far beyond the walls ofthe so-called 'ivory tower: Larry Hickman offers a second view. He understands Dewey's claim in Experience and Nature that philosophy serves as a "liaison officer" to mean that philosophers should provide a common lexicon that translates between the languages of distinct disciplines. In other words, for Dewey, the role of philosophy, including philosophical pragmatism, is to facilitate interdisciplinarity. Since interdisciplinary sharing is usually confined to academic discourse, Novack's challenge rs perfectly compatible with Hickman's interpretation of Deweyt 'liaison officer' claim. Both Novack and Hickman are mistaken, though in different degrees and for different reasons. The third, and more promising, view is advanced by Robert Talisse. He cites the life and works of Sidney Hook, one of Deweyt better-known students, as an exemplary case of a pragmatist who consistently realizedhis pragmatic commitments in public discourse. The most important reason for qualifying Hickman's interpretation of Dewey's 'liaison officer' claim is that the measure of pragmatismb value is not solely the ability of pragmatists to facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, but their ability to also insert their ideas into public discourse. In my view, philosophical pragmatists, and philosophers generally, should both facilitate interdisciplinarity in academic discourse and introduce philosophical notions into public discourse-that is, serve in the dual capacity of interdisciplinary scholar and public intellectual. In terms of organization, the paper contains five sections. In the first section, I present Novack's critique of Deweyt career as an academic philosopher. The second section is devoted to reconstructing a Deweyan response to Novackt challenge as well as canvassing Hickman's exegesis of Dewey's claim that philosophy's function is to serve as a liaison officer. In the third section, I argue for a more expansive, and what I think is an improved, interpretation of what Dewey's 'liaison officer' claim means. The penultimate section examines Robert Talisset account of Sidney Hook's career as a pragmatist and public intellectual. In the conclusion, I articulate my own view ofthe proper role ofphilosophy and philosophical pragmatism in academic and non academic discourses. I Novack (1975),52. 2 Dewey (1996), LW l:306. Citations follow the conventional method, LW (Later Works) or MW (Middle Worr<s1 or EarlyWorks (EW), volume: page number. 4 @ 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press P H ILO S O P H IC AL F RONT/ERS SHANE I R AISTON NovaclCs Challenge Novack had a debt to pay to his mentor, Leon Trotsky, and it was one motivated by the concern that Dewey's pragmatism posed a substantial threat to Trohky's brand of Marxism. He was encouraged by the revolutionary Marxist to "undertake a Marxist critique of the pragmatic methodl" Dewey chaired the Commission in Mexico that exonerated Trotsky of the charges he was earlier convicted of at the Russian Show Trials. While Dewey had been friendly to Trotslg, the two engaged in a brief debate in the late 1930s that revealed some fundamental differences in their two philosophies.' Novack was faithfully allied with his fellow Marxist and mentor to the end. He served as the secretary to Trotslgr during the Commission's inquiry. He contributed to the debate with Dewey on Trotsky's side. And he carried on a correspondence with Trotslqr until his death. It is therefore unsurprising that Novack would heed the advice of Trotsky and write a book criticizing Deweyt philosophy from a Marxist perspective. However, it would not be until the mid-1970s, over fifteen years after Dewey's death and thirty,five years since Trotsky's assassination, that Novack would finally repay his debt to Trotsky with the publication of Pragmatism yersus Marxism: An Appraisal of lohn Dewey s Philosophy. In the short and long term, its reception was relatively muted.' For the purpose of this paper, what is noteworthy in Novack's work is his criticism of In the third chapter, "From Puritanism to Pragmatism," the author retraces the development of American thought from colonial to modern times, paying close attention to the way in which philosophy became increasingly professionalized. By the late nineteenth century, he notes, "teaching philosophy offered a reputable and secure, ifnot lucrative, life workl' Employing the Marxist method, Novack reveals the material conditions under which America's homegrown philosophy, pragmatism, developed. He criticizes the process by which free thinkers became professional scholars, particularly for the tendency among administrators and universrry presidents to subordinate philosophy to the exigencies of "free trade" and capitalist enterprise. With the segregation of universities into departments by subject areas, "academic philosophers sought a private province which they, as specialists, could cultivate as their ownl' Thus began the growth of a chasm between the ordinary life of Americans and the life ofthe professional philosopher. According to Novack, philosophy "became pedantic and genteel, shrinking from controversy [,] . . . obsessed with the traditional dificulties of its own past and fussed over its special techniques, slighting the great social and scientific questions of the timel'. white pragmatists went some way towards attempting to return philosophy to the concerns ofordinary life, the pull of professionalization was unforgiving. Dewey's career. Dewey was no less a product of his times. Novack writes: He Ii.e., John Dewey] was one of the first Americans to prepare himself for an academic 3 Novack (1975),3. 4 Trotsky, Dewey and Novack (1969); Dewey (1996), LW t3:349-355; Ralston (2007). 5 Fortunately, at least one review ofthe book was positiver "Novack shows convincingly that on many fundamentals Dewey's philosophy is incompatible with Marxism." Milton F isk (1977),269. 6 Novack (1975),51-2. @ 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press RTCOYERING PR,4G MATISM'S PMCTICALITY: FOT]R VIEW S PHl'OSOPHICAI FRONTIERS career as a philosopher, and from the beginning to the end ofthis career it was to an audience ofprofessional philosophers that he directed his arguments.T primarily Although Novack acknowledges that Dewey's ideas about education, psychoiogy, politics, and other subjects diffused broadly into a host of other disciplines (or as he writes, "radiated widely into other fields"), he claims that the beneficiaries were limited to a small circle of fellow academics. So, on Novack's account, Dewey's philosophy never affected the lives of ordinary people, or those outside of academia, whether teachers, clinicians, policy-makers or other dayto-day practitioners of the arts and trades. A Deweyan Response Most mainstream Dewey scholars enthusiastically defend fohn Dewey's credentials as a public intellectual. Still, they have either ignored or overlooked Novackt argument that the results of Dewey's inquiries were fi.t solely for a small circle of fellow academics. With the narrowing of philosophyt function to a peculiarly professional enterprise, Dewey was unable to bridge between his academic interests and the everyday affairs of ordinary people. So, he could not convince them of the value of the pragmatic method in its application to a wide range of non-academic concerns.3 Since no direct response to Novackt challenge can be found in the literature, one will have to be reconstructed here. Following this reconstruction, I present Hickmant interpretation of Dewey's'liaison oficer'claim and identifi a problem in its scope. The Reconstruction Overall, Novackt critique ofJohn Dewey's career will strike the orthodox Dewey scholar as faulty. It questions the authenticity of Deweyt stated concern with "the problems of men' without providing evidence ofdisinterest. Moreover, it underestimates the practical utility ofthe pragmatic method for addressing those self-same problems. Dewey wrote a multitude of articles tackhng the social and political issues of his day, applying the pragmatic method in a manner that was accessible to average citizens and, it is possible to speculate, swayed public opinion. These included his involvement in the outlawry of war Movement, chairing the Trotsky commission and authoring a series of articles criticizing the policies ofFranl<lin Delano Roosevelt and opposing his re-election.' Finally, Novack's attack on Deweyt career ignores the pragmatist's many involvements 7 lbid,52. 8 More recently, Robert Talisse has echoed this criticism: "IA]s Dewey's own career demonstrates, philosophers are not necessarily particularly deft when it comes to public policy analysis." Talisse (2007), I14. 9 On the outlawry of war involvement, see Dewey ( 1996), "If Law Were Outlawed," MW l5:110-5, "What Outlawry of War Is Not," MW 15:115 22, "War and a Code of Law," MW 1,5:122-128. On the Trotsky affair, see Dewey ( I996), "Significance ofthe Trotsky Inquiry," LW l1:330 336 and Farrell (1950). on his opposition to !.D. Roosevelt, see Dewey(1996),"DemocracyloinstheUnemployed,"LW6:239-46,"prospectforaThirdparty,"LW6:246-253a, "Alier the Election-What?" LW 6:253 2.57. For summaries and commentary of Dewey's involvements in these O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press PHI LOSO PHIC AL F RONTIERS SHANE I R,ALSTON in civic-minded groups and activist organizations addressing the issues ofhis day, from serving charter member of the New York Teachers Union and the American Civil Liberties Union to his research on the Polish question, to mention only a few.'o Notwithstanding this reconstructed response, Novack's critique to the effect that Dewey's ideas never found much reception beyond the walls of the 'ivory tower' remains unchecked by contemporary Dewey scholars. as a Though he might agree with my reconstructed response, Larry Hickman interprets Deweys claim that philosophy fullills the role of a liaison officer in a way that falters in the face of Novack's challenge. He understands Dewey's claim to mean that philosophy should serve as an intermediary, a translator, and a facilitator for interdisciplinary communication. According to Hickman, Dewey "indicated his view that one of the most important functions of philosophy was to act as a liaison officer, rendering the languages of these various disciplines intelligible to one anotherl", If this is its meaning, then the non-philosopher would likely recoil at the hubris of Dewey's claim, namely, that a professional philosopher would have the audacity to pretend that she could accomplish the herculean task ofconstructing an interdisciplinary lexicon.,' However, rrry concern is not to defend Deweyt claim against this kind ofobjection. Rather, it is to appreciate how Hickmant interpretation affords the critic an opportunity to insist, as Novack does, that while the professionalization ofphilosophyhas indeed bequeathed it an interdisciplinary mission, it has also insulated the discipline from the concerns of average persons. As we shall see, while Hickmant interpretation is perfecflT consistent with Dewey's comparisons of philosophy with a liaison oficer, it is also, unfortunately, perfectly compatible with, and thus lacks the resources to check, Novack's challenge.,3 Philosophyb Liaison Function Reconsidered So, what did Dewey mean in asserting that philosophy should serve as a "liaison officer"? One possibility is Larry Hickmant interpretation, namely, that the philosopher is especially well equipped to translate between linguistic and conceptuai conventions of diverse disciplinary discourses. Besides the slight conceit that this interpretation betrays (i.e., that philosophers alone have the training appropriate to fulfill this translation function), Hickmant interpretation has the prominent disadvantage of permitting Novackt objection to stand, if not gain traction. In other words, Hickman's exegesis of the 'liaison oficer' claim does not block, and to some extent encourages, the objection that exposure to Dewey's philosophical insights was limited to the members ofthe academy, and never percolated into the ideational brew ofthe wider society. matters, see Westbrook (1991),26-27 4, 480-482, M9,451, 458, and A. Ryan (1995),212,5,24j -8,292-4. l0 On Dewey's conttibutions to these organizations and causes, see Eldridge (2002), Zerby (1915) and Dewey (1996), "Confidential Repott of Conditions Among the Poles in the United States," IIW 11:259-331. Fot summaries and commentary, see S/estbrook (1991), .179, 278, 21,1 223, and Rvan (1995), 295-7, 169, L72 3, 198 9,20'7. 11 Hickman (2007), 62. 12 Nlike Howard suggested this insigl.rtful point. 13 In a personal convetsation with Hickman, he stated that he does agree with this more expansive interpretatioit of Dewey's liaison officet claim. Nevertheless, as HicLman interprets the claim in his essay, it is restticted ro rhe thesis thar philosophy should solely facilitate interdiscrplinarity. @ 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press XECOYERING PRA GMATISM,S PRACTICALITY: FOLIR VIEWS PHILOSOPHICAI FRONTIERS Improving on Hickman's account demands that we take a closer look at Deweyt writings. Reference to philosophyt 'liaison function occurs in two texts: Experience and Nature and The Quest for Certainf.y. In the former, one can detect a critique of the growing compartmentalization ofthe academy and a call for promoting interdisciplinary dialogue: Overspecialization and division ofinterests, occupations and goods, create the need for a generalized medium of intercommunication, ofmutual criticism through all-around translation from one separated region ofexperience into another. Thus philosophy as a critical organ becomes in efect a messenger, a liaison officer, making reciprocally intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues, and thereby enlarging as well as rectifiing the meaning with which they are charged.,, If one exclusively examines this first source , it becomes readily apparent how Hickman arrived at his interpretation of the claim. However, if we consult the second source, The euest for Certainty, a more expansive view of phi-losophy's liaison function emerges. There, Dewey writes, "It fPhilosophy] is a liaison oficer between the conclusions of science and the modes of social and personal action through which attainable possibilities are projected and striven forl'rs In other words, philosophers should also translate the outcomes ofspecialized inquiries into terms suitable for "social and personal actionl' Consequently, these inquiries may enrich the common, everyday experience and practices of lalpeople and non-academics. Hence, the expansive interpretation of Dewey's 'liaison officer' claim states that it is the function of philosophy to both translate between distinct disciplinary discourses and between academic and non-academic discourses. By appealing to this more encompassing interpretation, it becomes possible to repel Novackt challenge. Thus, what it means for a philosopher to perform as a "liaison officerj' in Deweyt double-barralled sense, is to be both (1) an interdisciplinary scholar and (ii) a public intellectual. While there is no doubt about the fust barrel, Novack directly questions whether Dewey avoided hypocrisy and lived the second barrel. As we have seen in the reconstructed response to Novack (above), Deweyt distinct calling was to be a liaison officer between those intellectuals inside the ivory tower and those ordinary people outside it-that is, to be a public intellectual. Indeed, this is a paradigmatic case where, as Friedrich Nietzsche and (more recently) Robert Sinclair remind us, biography becomes philosophy.,, Talisse on Hook's Pragmatic Politics In his recent book, A Pragmatkt Philosophy of Democracy, Robert Talisse argues that Sidney Hook, a philosophical pragmatist, philosophy professor and one of Dewey's best-known students, realized his democratic vision in his democratic practice. Hook's ideas entered into the public 14 Dewey (1996), "Existence, Value and Criticism" in Experience and Nature, LW 1:306. 15 Devey (1996), "The Copernican Revoh.rion" tn Th pten.for Certahry,LV 4:248. 16 Nietzsche wrote: "It has graduallybecome clear to me whateverygreat philosopher has hitherto been: a confessron on thepart ofits author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir..." Nietzsche (1973 11886]),37. Sinclair (2005). O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press P HI LO S O P H I CA L F RONT/ERS sHA NI /. R,4 ISTON discourse, and though they did not becorne the norm, they at least had a fairly wide circulation beyond the walls ofthe 'ivory towerl Drawing a sharp contrast between Hook and Dewey's careers, Talisse contends that "Deweyt own . . . demonstrates . . . [that] philosophers are not necessarily particularly deft when it comes to public policy analysisl',' Unlike Novac[ ThJisse does not allege that Dewey's ideas had little or no influence outside of academic discourse; rather, they influenced the public discourse, but in ways that were neither positive nor helpful.', According to Talisse, Hook attempts to move public discourse in the direction of postpartisanship. The trajectory of Hook's own career covered the whole ideologicaJ spectrum, from a Marxist in his early career to a vehement anti-communist and neoconservative in his later years.r'However,thereisanunderlyingthreadofconsistencyinHook'stheoreticalapproachto practical politics: his support for the principles ofcivil discourse, an understanding ofreasons as the drivers ofgoodjudgment and his rejection ofideological categories as barriers to consensusdirected inquiry. According to Talisse, it is 'bn Hook's view" that, nor right. In fact, the model ofdemocratic citizenship that follows from Hookt conception ofdemocracy entails that we should ryecf ideological categories such as "liberal" and 'tonservative," and "Ieft" and "right": these are blocks to inquiry, mere dogmas.,. . . . democ racy as such is neither liberal nor conservative, neither left For Hook, political discourse should be governed by a set ofrules that ensure civility, critical inquiry, personal responsibility and informed judgment. For instance, Hoolis second rule of discourse is that " [e]veryone involved in a controversy [or discourse over a controversial issue] has an intellectual responsibility to inform himself of the available facts.",, Moreoveq for Hook, cardinal sin" occurs when controversy obstructs the "looking for truth offact or wisdom ofpolicy, particularly because of a participant's "refusal to discuss, or action which blocks discussion.",, In other words, this conception ofdemocracy requires that citizens push beyond partisan labels and engage in reason-giving discourse aimed at clarifying and (hopefully) resolving their differences on policv issues. 17 Talisse (2007). 110. 18 Unfortunately, Talisse provides little evidence to support this claim. If we look at Dewey's actual involvements in political debates ofhis tine, he \,r'as at times prescient (e.g. on the ill etrects ofeconomic imperialism), sometimes wrong (e.g his opposition to F.D. Roosevelt's reelection), sometimes willing to admit tl.rat he was wrong (e.g. his supPort for Woodrow Wilson's Prosecution ofthe First World War), but on average, more often right about his polcy Prognoses. OP cit. note 9. Talisse's move to defend Hook's political practice and criticize Dewey's similar activities is motivated by his desire to show that Deweyan democracy is flawed, while Peircean democracy, which he sees Hook as an unaware advocate of, is decidedl) .uperior. l9 Talisse writes: "According to a standard view, Hook began his career as a prominent Marx scholar and a powerful voice on the left, but he eventually betrayed leftist politics and adopted an obsession with anti-communism whrcn drove him to neo-conservatism." Talisse (2007), 123, Nicholas Capaldi claims that this orthodox account is a "m)'th": "That m''th is a historical drama whose genesis was Hook's endorsement in 1932 ofthe Communist candidate for the presidency ofthe United States (in opposition to Roosevelt and Hoover) and whose climax is Hook's presence at the Hoover Institution, considered the most prestigious conservative think tank." Capaldi ( 1983), 18. 20 Talisse (2007), 123. 21 Hook (1980), p. 122; cited in Talisse (2007),119. 22 rbid. O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press RECOYERING PMG MATISM'S PMCTICALITY: FOUR VIEW S PHIIOSOPH/CAI FRONTIERS One objection to Hookt rules of democratic discourse is that they are fine in theory, but flawed in practice. The U.S. Circuit Court judge, economist and legal academic, Richard Posner, urges a more refined version ofthe objection, viz. that we should be skeptical of modeling discursive activity in actual democracies after a "faculty workshopi!. For a "faculty workshop is a productive forum for deliberation," while a group ofordinary people, whose average LQ. drops well below one-hundred, is definitely not.', However, this objection fails to hit the target because Hook's rules are not intended to model the constraints on public discourse after those placed on academic discourse. Indeed, norms such as not obstructing discussion and responsibly informing oneself about public issues are not peculiar to academic discourse. Rather than a matter of I.Q. or individual endowment, civil discourse in a democracy relies on cooperative problem-solving (or pooling cognitive resources), and cooperative problem-solving presupposes a commitment to responsible discussion. So, Hook asks and answers a question that concerned many of his fellow citizens, not merely his colleagues and fellow academics: How do we address controversial pohcy issues in ways that are collaborative, non-ideological and do not '1end to undermine fthe bonds of] democratic society"?,: According to Talisse, Hooki involvement in three controversies was a testament to how he could realize his theoretical commitments to democracy via his own contributions to public (non-academic) discourse. Rather than assessing the acceptability ofhis positions on their own (or independent ofthe reasons offered in their defense), such a demonstration requires a careful examination of Hook's rationale for taking the positions he did. Talisse insists that "a proper evaluation ofHooki own democratic practice must focus not simply on the conclusionshe reached but the reasonshe offered in support of those conclusionsl',u Next, we turn to consider Hook's contributions to the public discourse about three controversial issues ofhis time: (i) the legitimacy of protests against the Vietnam War, (ii) the acceptability of members of the Communist Party (CP) serving as public school teachers and (iii) the defensibility of the Supreme Courtt bans on spiritual activities, such as prayer and Bible readings in a public school setting. Accordrng to Talisset account, Hook inserts three ideas into these public discourses: one, that there is a difference between internal and external criticism ofthe democratic order; two, that hish-stakes democratic decisions call for civil discourse and dedicated inquiry; and three, that secuLrizatien ofpublic institutions should result from democratic choice. not judicial fiat. On the Vietnam War Student Protests During the 1960s, Hook's critique ofthe Vietnam War student protests might seem out ofcharacter for a secular humanist who disagreed with American military involvement in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook draws direct comparisons between the Deweyan pragmatism that Hook so avidly defended and the manifesto of a prominent I960s anti-war student group: "Perhaps nowhere did Dewey's ideals echo more resoundingly than in the'Port 23 24 25 26 10 Posner (2003), 107. lbid., 13s. Hook (1980), I17; cited by Talisse (2007), 119. Talisse (2007), 124. O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press P HILO SOP H IC AL F RONT/ERS SHANE I R-ArSTON Huron Statement' (1962) of the Students for a Democratic Society ISDS]JL' Nevertheless, Hook publicly criticized SDS and other anti-war student groups for their coercive tactics. Talisse explains Hook's reasoning: Hook opposed the student anti war movement in the 1960s not on the grounds that he thought American intervention in Vietnam was justified, but rather because the students employed anti-democratic methods ofexpressing their objections: they destroyed private properry obstructed the free movement oftheir fellow citizens, actively prevented their fellow students from attending classes, and, in general, attempted to gain by force and intimidation what in a democracy can be gained only by argument and persuasion. Hookt complaint was that the student protesters used undemocratic means-coercion and violence, rather than discourse and inquiry-to achieve democratic ends. Branding the protests as a "war against the democratic processj' he identified the war's agressors at Columbia University and the University of California-Berkeley.^ Thus, Hook showed the courage to engage in the rough-and-tumble politics and often bitter public discourse over the Vietnam War, expressing a nuanced position that reasoned dissent was acceptable while direct and violent action was not.?' Even though it was an unpopular position to take, especially for a university professor, Hookt opposition to the student protests was entirely in keeping with his theory of democratic discourse as well as his own Dewey-inspired pragmatism. Talisse notes that Hook distinguished between internal and external criticisms of the democratic order: "On any democratic view, a distinction must be drawn between tolerable and intolerable modes ofdissent, between opposition and revolt, or, in Hookt nomenclature, between heresy and conspiracyi',' Whereas an internal critique conforms to the rules ofdiscourse and other norms ofassociation within the democratic community, an external critique defies those rules and norms. The students protesting against the Vietnam War clearly employed an external critique of democracy, and thus, on Hook's view, their activities were deserving of repression, not toleration. Hook's position is also consistent with the thesis of an earlier work by Dewey. In the 1939 essay "Democratic Ends Need Democratic Means for Their Realization," originally given as an address to the Committee for Cultural Freedom at the outset of the Second World War, Dewey expressed concern about the argument, prevalent among elites during the 1930s, that preserving democracy will, at times, require the use ofnondemocratic means, such as violence, propaganda and torture.', Dewey observed the menace of totalitarian governments in Germany, Iapan and ltaly, and noted that the problems of"repression of cultural freedom" in these countries is not solely attributable their fascist political regimes. The ills of totalitarian rule are also symptomatic of a larger cultural environment. Warning that 'bur chief problems are those within our own culturej'Dewey decried the use of undemocratic 27 Westbrook ( 1991), 549. 28 Hook (1969, 1975). 29 Indeed, Hook was widely criticized for his position on the Vietnam War student protests. For instance, Phiiip Rahv, an editor at the Partisan Review, attacked Hookfor being amongthose "political philistines. . . who at opportune moments still choose to call themselves socialists butwho in practice support and defendthe American capitalist drrve for world hegemony." Cited by C. Phelps ( 1997), I L 30 Talisse (2007), 129. 31 Dewey (1996), "Democratic Ends Need Democratic Means for Their RealizatioI.," LW 14:367-9. O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press l1 RECOyERING PRAG MATISM'S PRACTICALITY: FOUR VIEW S PH/LOSOPHICAT FRONTIERS means for the sake ofsecuring democratic ends.r, therefore, Hook, similar to his teacher, Dewey, argued that undemocratic means (or methods associated lohn with an external critique of democracy) cannot be tolerated within a democratic communiry On CP Members as School Teachers While Dewey had his own difficulties with orthodox communists and teachers' unions,rs Sidney Hook advocated a much stronger position than his teacher on the issue ofwhether members ofthe Communist Party (CP) should be permitted to serve as teachers in public educational institutions. Hook insisted that card-carrying members ofthe CP who were public school teachers ought to receive suspensions from their duties until authorities could complete a full investigation oftheir activities. In response to this highly controversial position, some philosophers have judged that Hook's pragmatism was thoroughly unacceptable when put into practice.' For instance, lohn Capps interprets Hook's position as tantamount to the view that someone is "unfit to hold positions of public trust" if he or she is a "member of the CPI',' Talisse objects that Capps overloolis a series of premises in Hook's argument that would make membership not a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition that would lead to the conclusion that a public school teacher "should therefore be suspended": (1) lhe CP is a conspiratorial organization under the direct control ofa dictatorship that aims to undermine American democracy. (2_) Members of the CP must, as a condition of membership, pledge allegiance to the Party and its stated aims and methods. (3) Among the methods explicitlv stated by the CP of dissolvins American democrac-y is the willful lndoitrinatiori of students in the-principles approved by the CP.r^ Given these premises, Hookt argument for temporary suspensions followed by background inquiries appears less objectionable, though still somewhat suspect. Even a temporary suspension with the possibility offull reinstatement could surround the CP teacher with an aura ofperceived guilt and threaten her with the prospect of future ostracism-an outcome that, on a large scale, could rival the blackJisting of suspected Communists during the McCarthy Era. 32 Ibid., LW 14:367. 33 Eldridge (2002). For Dewey's critique of the Marxist Leon Trotsky's yiews, see Dewey ( 1996), "Means and Ends," LW 13:349-55, 34 Talisse mentions John Capps (2003) and James Good (2003). 35 Capps (2003),72j cited by Talisse (2007), 126. 36 Talisse (2007), 127. This is a formalization ofHook's argument in Hook (1953),206-207. 12 O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press PH I LOSO PH IC AL F RONT/ERS 5'HANE I R AISTON Yet, by appealing to Hooks reasons against the student Vietnam War protests-viz., that democratic ends require democratic means*his argument becomes more cogent. To appreciate this point, it is instructive to examine Dewey's debate in the 1930s with the Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky. In the essay "Their Morals and Ours," Trotsky reacts to widespread allegations that his writings and actions reflect the fesuit ma.xim'the end justifies the meansi,'He agrees that ends do lend support to means. However, Trotsky distances himself from the position that Mardst ends justify any means whatsoever; in his words, "not all means are permissiblel'.' Why? For Trotslry, consistent with the dialectical logic ofHegel and its materialist adaptation by Marx, history is a dialectical progression of contradictions, between a flawed capitalist economic system (i.e., the thesis) and alienated workers (i.e., the antithesis), which inevitably results in class warfare, the overthrow ofcapitalism and the consolidation ofworker control in a dictatorship ofthe proletariat followed by the emergence of a classless communist society (i.e., the synthesis).," Given the laws ofthis dialectical movement of history, a single means is necessary: namely, revolutionary class struggle.ao In Dewey's response to Trotslcy, entitled "Means and Ends," he identifies the core fallacy at work in Trotslry's argument. Insofar as the Marxist theory of history prejudges the selection of means, it undermines Trotskyt claimed interdependence of means and ends. Since the means of class struggle alone can be, in Deweyt words, "'deduced'from . . . an alleged law ofhistoryi' the Marxist must forego a critical examination of alternatives, thereby rendering the determination of means independent ofthe end; according to Dewey, "the end is dependent upon the means but the means are not derived from the endl'n, Moreover, to treat class struggle as the exclusive means for securing Marxist ends ignores the ever-present possibility that other means might prove to be more effective for obtaining the end. So, if Trotsky and other orthodox Marxists wish to achieye their goals, they should adopt an inductive method oftailoring means to ends, as well as ends to means, through observation, experimentation and choice--that is, through intelligent inquiry.,, While both Dewey and Hook rejected orthodox Marxists' advocacy for the employment of violent means in order to achieve revolutionary change, Hook took a significantly stronger position than Dewey on the matter of cP members serving as public school teachers. Still, Hook's 37 Trotsky (1969), l1-17. 38 Ibid.,37. 39 lvlarx and Engels (1967),12 20. 40 Trotsky writes, "there is no way of building a bridge to that lcommunist] society save by revolutionary, that is, violent means." Trotsky (1969), 27.Ind,eed,, Trotsky's two reasons for resisting a morally neutral path toward socialism, according to Steven Lukes, are, one, "that no significant line can be drawn between peacefui class struggle and revolution" and, two, "that there is no way ofbuilding a bridge to communist society save by revolutionary that is violent means." Lukes (1981), 344. 41 Dewey ( 1996), "Means and Ends," LW 13:351 2. He explains further: "The professed end-the end-in-view-the liberation of mankind, is thus subordinated to the class struggle as the means by which it is to be attained." Ibid., LW 13:352. 42 Wdting only a year after their debate, Dewey calmly reflected, " lw]e must know that the dependence of ends upon means is such that the only ultimate result is the result that is attained today, tomorrow, the next day, and day after day, in the succession ofyears and generations." Dewey (1996), "Democracy and America" in Freedom and Culture, LW I3:188. Still, in Dewey's response to Trotsky, he conceded that he too held that the end justifies the means: "I hold that the end in the sense ofconsequences provides the only basis for moral ideas and actions, and therefore provides the only justification that can be found for means employed." Id., "Means and Ends," LW 13:350. @ 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press l3 RECOYERING PRlG MATISM'S PRACTICALITY: FOUR VIEWS P H I LO S O P H I C AL F RONTIE RS means-namely, conducting background inquiries and examining the activities of those teachers who are CP members-are entirely compatible with the Deweyan maxim that democratic ends require democratic means (i.e. intelligent inquiry) for their realization. On fudicially Required Secularism in Public Schools The last ofTalisset three illustrations ofSidney Hook's pragmatic politics also demonstrates how pragmatism proves to be practically relevant to public discourse. In his public life and book Religion in a Free SociefT, Hook expressed his discontent with the Supreme Courtt 1960s rulings that efectively banned prayer and Bible reading voluntarily undertaken in public schools.n. Talisse distinguishes Hookt rationale for opposing state-imposed secularism and conservatives' similar, though differently reasoned, position: Hook's opposition is not based on a belief that prayer is wholesome or necessary for the cultivation for virtue. After all, Hook was a vehement secular humanist and atheist throughout his life. Instead, Hook obiected to the process by which the secular position was secured.no And asain: But even a cursory canvass of the conservative literature on these matters reveals the vast difference between Hook's reasons and those offered by self-described conservatives. When the latter defend prayer in public schools, they do so on grounds of moral wholesomeness ofChristianity and the allesed fact that the United States is a "Christian nation'...a5 Talisse claims that while the conservative basis for resisting state-imposed secularism is moral in character, Hooks justification is actually epistemic. Since democratic choice depends on average citizens deploying well-reasoned arguments, then the choice ofsecular practices over sectarian ones should likewise require recourse to inclusive and democratic mechanisms, not exclusive and oligarchic ones (such as the wisdom ofnine appointed Supreme court Justices). Another way of highlighting Hooks position and its differences with political (and even judicial) conservatism is to show how it aligns with a jurisprudential position known as 'judicial restraintl One well-known person who argued for judicial restraint was the American jurist Learned Hand. In the Holmes Lectures at Harvard, Hand declared that, For myself it would be irksome to be ruled by a bely of Platonic Guardians, even if I know how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge I should 43 Hook (1967), 63; cited by Talisse (2007), 124. 44 Talisse (2007), 124. 45 Ibid., 125. t4 O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press P HILO SOP H IC AL F RONTIERS SHANE /. RAISTON miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in public affairs.nu "bely Platonic Guardians" Hand refers to are those Supreme Court Justices who would impose their supposedly enlightened judgments on the will ofthe majority, so that the average The citizen would lose "the stimulus of living in a fdemocratic] societyi' Threatening such an outcome are activistjudges who believe that striking down statutes as unconstitutional (in a process known as 'judicial review') is a legitimate way of remedying substantively poor, though democratically enacted, public policies. By doing so, these judges undermine the majorityt will and subvert democratic choice, for both majority rule and democratic decision-making are tied, at least indirectly, to acts of legislation through the popular election ofthose who legislate. So, similar to Hand, Hook sought to defend the democratic principle and, in particular, average citizens' prerogative to participate in the democratic decision making process, not the authority ofnine appointed judges who would pretend to know what is best for them. Conclusion In the previous pages I have presented and compared the views ofNovack, Hickman and Talisse concerning the proper function of philosophy in academic and non-academic (or public) discourse. To conclude, I would like to defend my own view on the matter. Notwithstanding the title ofthe paper, my argument is not confined to the practical implications ofphilosophical pragmatism or the ideas ofits adherents; it extends to philosophy and the ideas ofphilosophers, generally. Given the prior analysis, there appears to be at least three possible candidates for what or who fulfills the liaison oficer function: (i) philosophical tools (or a philosophical tool-kit), (ii) professional philosophers, and (iii) the profession of Philosophy. On the first account, philosophy offers academic inquirers a method or set oftools to better understand the nature of their own inquiries, to provide a broader theoretical vantage from which to effectively criticize their presuppositions-what Dewey called the 'triticism of criticismsl',' On a charitable readirrg, Hickman understands Dewey's liaison oficer claim in this way.ns However, this candidate does not overcome the objection that the function of philosophy has little impact beyond the walls of the ivory tower-that is, the cru-.r of Novackt challenge. Philosophy's tool-ktt still contains only instruments for translating between distinct disciplinary discourses, unless ofcourse those conceptual tools are understood as equally accessible to non-academics, and for purposes other than facilitating interdisciplinarity." The second account states that professional philosophers 46 Hand (1958),73. 47 Dewey writes: "These remarks are preparatory to presenting a conception ofphilosophy; namely, that philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of cdticisms, as it were." Dewey (2006), "Existence, Value and Criticism" in Experience and Nature, LW 1:298. 48 Mark Tschaepe suggested these three candidates and the more charitable reading. 49 There is some evidence to support this more charitable reading. Hickman includes the "professions" in addition to "various disciplines" as beneficiaries ofphilosophy's liaison function: "He [Dewcy] thought ofphilosophy as a kind of'liaison officer,' a kind of go between, helping the various disciples and professions within a culture communicate @ 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press 15 R-ECOVERING PR/G MATISM'S PL\CTICALITY: FOUR VIEW S PHII OSOPHICAI FRONTITRS fulfill the role ofliaison oficers. The weakness ofthis account is two,fold: (i) It could be objected that the philosopher's self-conception as a liaison officer is an unjustified conceit and (ii) it ls unclear whether the liaison officer function merely facilitates interdisciplinarity or, interpreted more broadly, permits better communication between those inside and outside of the academy. If Novack's critique ofDeweyt career is to have any force, then it depends on rejecting this second candidate and restricting the professional philosophert function to facilitating interdisciplinary sharing. To end the paper, I turn to the final candidate for a liaison officer: viz. the professron of Philosophy. My argument that Dewey's'liaison officer'claim should be interpreted more expansively has several far-reaching implications for the profession of Philosophy. In the past century, the increasing professionalization of academic philosophy in the United States has become an undeniable fact.so Reconsidering philosophy's function and advocating for a more expansive view of that function are of inestimable value if philosophers are to reverse the trend by which therr own discipline has become increasingly marginalized within the academy. Since philosophy departments rarely attract grant funding, they tend to be the last to receive new tenure-track lines, capital and resource improvements as well as research support. The majority ofphilosophy professors fulfill the role of general education instructors, teaching undergraduates required courses in logic, ethics and critical thinking. Unsurprisingly, the acceptance of this limited role for philosophy in the academy has generated unintended and, at times, deleterious consequences. At many institutions, it frustrates ambitious philosophy faculty who feel that their scholarship is undervalued. Sometimes it also produces friction between philosophers and members of other faculties whose research receives more generous financial support. However, frustration and friction only prove counterproductive for the cause of widening philosophy's place within the academy. When widely expressed and frequently encountered, these unintended consequences have the effect of alienating philosophers from faculty in other disciplines, as well as from those standing outside the ivory tower. My hope would be that philosophical pragmatists, and philosophers more generally, would opt instead to reconstruct the function of their discipline, seeing themselves as liaison officers in Dewey's double-barrelled sense, that is, as thinkers capable oftranslating bofft between different disciplinary discourses and between academic and popular discourses. In other words, to counter their own marginalization within the academy, philosophers should remake themselves in the image of interdisciplinary scholars and public intellectuals-or in the image of lohn Dewey and Sidney Hook, among others.s, effectively." Hickman (2008), I89. 50 For a more comprehensive history ofthe professionalization ofthe discipline ofPhilosophy in the U.S., see James Campbell (2006). In a review ofthe book, Michael Eldridge draws attention to Campbell's commentary on the 1916 address bythe then-APA President, Arfiur O. Lovejoy, in which Lovejoystressed how philosophy required increasing specialization: "Campbell comments that Lovejoy'seems' thereby'to be delibemtely driving a wedge between the work ofacademic philosophers and the intellectual interests ofthe general, educated public' (179)." Eldridge (2007), 380. 5i I am not claiming that contemporary philosophers do not already, to some degree, fulfill both these roles. Indeed, to name only a few representative examples, John Murungi and Gary Backhaus, have for several years run an exciting interdisciplinary conference on environment, space and place at Towson University, combining philosophical inquiry with geographical sub.iect-matter. Also, experimental philosophers, led by joshua Knobe and Stephen Stich, have breached the barrier between philosophy and the sciences, probing and testing various intuitions and hl?otheses in the areas ofcthics, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology. Several high profile philosophers in the U.S. and Canada, such as Richard Rorty, Ronald Dworkin, and Charles Taylor, have assumed the role ofpublic intellectuais 16 O 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press P HILO SOP H IC AL F RON?IERS sHANt I X,AISTON References Campbell, I. (2006). A Thoughtful Professlon. New York Open Court. Capaldi, N. (1983). Sidney Hook A Personal Portrait. In P Kurtz (ed.) (1983). Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy and Humanism. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 17-26. Capps, |. (2003). Pragmatism and the McCarthy Era. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 39tr,6t-76 Dewey, I. Q996). The Collected Works of lohn Dewey: The Electronic Edition.L. A. Hickman (ed.) Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corp. Eldridge, M. (2002). The Teachers Union Fight and the Scope of Dewey's Logic. In F. T. Burke, D. M. Hester, and R. B. Talisse (eds.) (2002). Deweyi Logical Theory.Nashville: Vanderbilt University vfess. 26z-z /4. (2007). When Philosophy Became 'v\4-rat It Peirce So ciety, 43 1 2, 37 5 k Today. Transactions of the Charles S. -38I. Farrell, J. T. ( 1950). Deweyin Mexico. In S. Hook (ed.) ( 1950). /ohnDewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom. New York: The Dial Press,35l-377 . Fisk, M. ( 1977). Review of George Novaclis Pragmatism Versus Marxism. Erkenntnis,I1,269-73. Good, j. (2003). The'Eclipse'of Pragmatism: AReplyto lohn Capps. Transactions of the Charles Society,39ll,77 -86. S. Peirce Hand, L. (1958). The Bill of Rrgfifs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hickman, L. (2007). Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Fordham University Press. Lessons from lohn Dewey. New York: Hook, S. (L969). Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy. New York: Cowles. (1953). 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(1975). |ohn Dewey and the Polish Question: A Response to the Revisionist Historians. History of Education Quarterly , 18 @ 15 I I , 17 -30 . 2009. Progressive Frontiers Press