Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music, Embodied
C
Speculative Realism, and Aesthetics-Driven Techné
Sp
for Spontaneous Audio-Visual Expression
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Joshua Banks Mailman
Jo
Perspectives
of New Music
Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 2016), pp. 5-95
Vo
Published by: Perspectives of New Music
DOI:
Pu 10.7757/persnewmusi.54.1.0005
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7757/persnewmusi.54.1.0005
D
Page Count: 91
ABSTRACT
This article deals with the philosophical idea of worldmaking pursued through techné,
meaning the fusion of the technical means of artistic creation, theorizing, and analysis, but
specifically occurring in a feedback loop involving introspection and computation (cybernetic
phenomenology). The discussion ranges over a wide variety of topics, including (1) the history of music
theory from Ancient Greece to the present (including a rebuttal to Daniel Chua’s (2001) account of
music history); (2) emergent properties in music arising from self-organization (explored through the
Ancient Chinese abstract strategy board game go); (3) the ontology of musical qualities (properties)
and categories (including their relation to visual, tactile, and olfactory qualities and categories).
Various repertoires, artists, and philosophies are referenced. The essay analyzes aspects of
Ligeti’s Violin Concerto, Carter’s String Quartet No. 5, and Lachenmann’s Kinderspiel. Connections
to the author’s own previous analytical and theoretical work are also discussed in relation to his
interactive algorithmic audio-visual works (such as Fluxations and FluxNOISations). The techné of
these is discussed in terms of logistics as well as aesthetic influences, including Wagner, Liszt,
Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Crawford, Babbitt, Carter, Xenakis, Parker, Reich, Ligeti, Truax, Oliveros,
Kandinsky, Miro, Pollock, Hofmann, Rothko, Louis, Frankenthaler, Moholy-Nagy, Newman,
Richter, and Brakhage. The essay touches on philosophical ideas of Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze,
Harman, and Bogost, and more fully engages the philosophies of Nelson Goodman and Hannah
Arendt in connection with artistic creation as relating to the theorizing and analysis of artistic works.
Download:
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Contact author: jmailman@alumni.uchicago.edu
CYBERNETIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF
MUSIC, EMBODIED SPECULATIVE
REALISM, AND AESTHETICS-DRIVEN
TECHNÉ FOR SPONTANEOUS
AUDIO-VISUAL EXPRESSION
JOSHUA BANKS MAILMAN
INTRODUCTION
a tantalizing prospect
Tfor adventurous or philosophically mindedis artists
and musicians,
HE CONCEPT OF WORLDMAKING AS TECHNÉ
taking it to mean that the creation of work is the creation of concepts,
joining the efforts of theory and praxis in one process (techné ), such
that the results of our works are the expression of an ontological
proposition (worldmaking). It is epistemologically productive while
also being a unique expression of freedom, in the sense proposed by
philosopher Hannah Arendt (1977, 1998).
My claim to worldmaking as techné is that my work as a music
theorist-analyst has always to some extent fed into my compositional
and improvisatory musical activities. Technology often plays a role. In
my essay (Mailman 2009a) that asserts an imagined drama of
6
Perspectives of New Music
competitive opposition in Elliot Carter’s lute piece Scrivo in vento
(and comments on its symmetries, quantitative lux, and Heraclitean
dimensions), I interpretively analyzed the composition through a
narrative lens, such that elements of the music are imagined as
inhabiting a turbulent adversarial world akin to that depicted in the
Petrarch sonnet that inspired Carter’s composition. Crucial aspects of
that analysis involved computational analytic procedures prompted by
my hearing, procedures whose output in turn enhanced my experience
as a listener and sparked my imagination for interpreting its poetic and
philosophic context. Such a cybernetic circle of introspective reception
and computational analysis has embedded itself in my musical activities
—as well as those of others—to the extent it now seems second nature.
There’s no going back.
The feedback process model of artistic practice and reception swims
against the tide of the fatuous cliché that artistry is magically inspired
ex nihilo. I stress this because it is the feedback process aspect of the
countervailing view that propels worldmaking as techné. Speciically,
the lynchpin connecting recent and ongoing interpretive and creative
practices of myself and some others is cybernetic phenomenology, which
is both a receptive-perceptive and creative-constructive activity, to be
explained further below.1
Flexibilities of categorization and ontology that arise from cybernetic
phenomenology relate to Nelson Goodman’s (1978) theory of worldmaking, exempliied in his assertion that “worlds differ in the relevant
kinds they comprise” (10). New methods for deining and creating
enable new relevant kinds to be identiied or brought into existence.
Thus new worlds are distinguished, or indeed made.
Like artistic works themselves, cybernetic phenomenological activities evolve out of past musical and other creative and interpretive
practices. Yet that fact fails to forecast what has already started to
happen. The lexibility of early 21st-century technologies is enabling
technologically proicient artists to venture beyond what could be
foreseen—even by its inspirers, such as the philosopher Henri Bergson.
How could it be foreseen that such disparate phenomena as the
buoyant color and morphological dynamism of Kandinsky’s paintings,
the stimulus saturation of Scriabin’s synesthesia, harmonic palettes
ranging from Wagner and Liszt’s to Schoenberg’s, to Varèse’s, to
Partch’s, textural luidities of Xenakis or Truax, or the propulsive
processes of Ligeti or Reich, the expressively intricate rhythmic
spontaneity of free-jazz improvisation, and the visceral visuality of
modern dance could enact and activate each other, not just in some
abstract poietic theory, but rather in physically experienced live
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
7
spectacles and audio-visual documents? This is beginning to happen,
and is yet still only a basis of far greater expressive potential. Much of
this present and future artistic activity—a new phase of artistic practice
—can be understood, and also further motivated, through a synthesis
of cybernetics, process philosophy, and cognitive metaphor (embodied
mind) theory—a synthesis I will merely suggest but not undertake fully
in this essay.
In the four sections that follow, this essay considers the historical
background of techné as worldmaking in regard to music, and how
recent and current practices build on, and in some ways transcend,
these patterns. The irst section, “Music as Worldmaking as Techné,”
considers the evolution of music theory as techné and the tradition of
music as worldmaking. The twentieth century sets the stage for a new
intensiied kind of musical inquiry, which contributes to a new technoembodied form of artistic inquiry and creativity. Therefore, the second
section considers “The Technological Phase of Music Theory and
Music Making” at the turn of the 21st century, including the cybernetic
phenomenological approach of myself and others. The third section,
“Instances of Intermedia, Interactivity, and Comprovisational Worldmaking in Creative Practice,” explores my own intermedia and interactivity creative practices, as evolving from my theorizing and analyzing
of past musical repertoires (as well as visual art and dance works). This
includes a discussion of comprovisation as well as algorithmic synesthesia.
The inal section applies cognitive metaphor and embodied mind
theory to suggest how worldmaking as techné is a kind of pragmatic
speculative realism pursued by forging unconventional embodied
experience, for instance through algorithmic synesthesia.
I. MUSIC AS WORLDMAKING AS TECHNÉ
The connection between music and worldmaking as techné is perhaps
unobvious. This is because its two binding connections (music-andtechné and music-and-world) are more or less mutually exclusive historically, one more or less displacing the other. Such mutual exclusivity
is by no means logically necessary, but rather was a symptom of historical conditions that now hold sway much less. Nevertheless, these
historical preconditions to the present situation suggest how the concept of worldmaking as techné seems new, yet also resonates deeply
with pre-existing expectations of artistic practices and goals.
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Perspectives of New Music
A. MUSIC THEORY AS TECHNÉ
1. MUSIC THEORY’S SHIFT FROM LOGOS TO TECHNÉ
The connection of music to techné cannot be taken for granted, as the
strength of this connection has luctuated. At its strongest, it primarily
falls under the domain of music theory, but did not always do so. This
is complicated by the fact that the deinition of music itself has transformed signiicantly over the last two millennia. Now we tend to assume
music as being repertoires of compositions or at least as relating to
activities making sounds we hear physically with our ears. Yet this was
not always assumed. In the era of the Ancient Greek civilization, it seems
musica was less a physical manifestation of aesthetic ideals than an
aesthetic ideal itself, especially under the inluence of Plato’s neoPythagorean dictums. As such, musica was more an ideal than a physical
experience, more theory than practice. In this respect it links to what
we now call music theory—though it was by no means analogous to
the whole of the now more inclusive ield of present day music theory.
While treatises on musical practice (composition) began to appear in
the Middle Ages, the emphasis on music as an ideal to some extent
carried forth through the Italian Humanist movement of the ifteenth
and sixteenth centuries under the auspices of music theorica, which
primarily elaborated the neo-Pythagorean/neo-Platonic paradigm for
music (musica), what it is and how it ought to be learned and studied.
Daniel Chua (2001) in his study on “Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity
and the Division of Nature” and Elisabeth Pace (2007) in her study on
“The Techne of Music Theory and the Epistemic Domain of the (Neo-)
Aristotelian Arts of Logos” each consider the evolution of musica
(Western music and its theory) in ways different from each other, but
each of which is relevant here. Music theory is typically traced back to
Pythagoras in the sixth century BC. From that time moving forward it
mainly concerns numerical ratios—the approach urged by Plato—
rather than any account of how music is or might be heard, or how to
compose it. Music sat alongside geometry, astronomy, and arithmetic
in the medieval quadrivium. Compositional (praxis) treatises began to
appear during the Carolingian period, around 800 AD, as part of
Charlemagne’s campaign to unify liturgical practices within his empire;
such treatises continued alongside those that treated numerical ratios
(theorica) and during the Renaissance period became more formally
divided into musica practica (composition and performance) and
musica theorica (mathematical proportions and their history).
Pace (2007) contrasts techné with logos, and deines techné as the
study of creation of that which could be otherwise (which characterizes
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
9
the poetic arts) as opposed to that which is necessarily a certain way
(the mathematical arts).2 The way music can relate arises from
doctrines of Pythagorean Platonism as I’ll explain in the next section.
In any event Pace pinpoints music theory’s shift toward techné to the
publication of Burmeister’s Musica Poetica (1606), a treatise that
accounts for the artfulness of speciic compositions by analyzing how
the musical rhetoric of each is created. In this, and through this, music
theory’s emphasis on techné increases markedly as music is made
instrumental, in the sense of being used to effect persuasion; this puts
it into the trivium, which includes techné. (Whether it’s the seventeenth century or the 21st century, technology of any era extends the
instrumentalism of music. This is made even more vivid by Pauline
Oliveros’s recent remarks that “every instrument is a prosthesis.”)3 “In
the trivium,” writes Chua, “music becomes human and can be made
ininitely malleable by the power of rhetorical persuasion” (2001, 21).
In its new techné guise, as Pace explains, “music does not simply
reproduce what is given in nature. Rather it avails itself of the
properties of sound and the ability of the human mind to cognitively
manipulate and construe objects of thought, all for the purpose of
producing something art-ful, something that goes beyond (and
sometimes against) nature in the service of historically luid aesthetic
goals” (2007, 182). Thus, concerned primarily with the techné of
conventions of harmony and counterpoint, music theory continues in
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries; that is, through
the time periods of common practice tonality. (It was this period that
bore the theories of igured bass, roman numerals, harmonic function,
and Formenlehre.)
2. THE PERFORMATIVE TURN OF MUSIC ANALYSIS AND
THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF MUSIC THEORY
Though it remains techné in the Aristotelian sense deined by Pace
(2007), music theory as a discipline shifts its perspective on what its
purpose is in regard to such techné. In the twentieth century, music
theory becomes instrumental to analysis; it becomes an instrument in
the service of analysis more than it was previously. Explaining this,
Nicolas Cook (2002, 94–95) takes his cue from Schoenberg’s remarks
that what we can sensibly aspire to is a “system of presentation—a
system—whose clarity is simply clarity of presentation, a system that
does not pretend to clarify the ultimate nature of the things presented”
(Schoenberg 1922, 10–11). In this passage, says Cook, “Schoenberg
spells out . . . the epistemological premise of a great deal of twentieth
century music theory. Of particular interest is the suggestion that
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Perspectives of New Music
analysis should aim not to replicate, in some veridical manner, but
rather to complement the immediately perceptible and thus selfevident qualities of the music. . . . Analysis is performative, in the sense
that it is designed to modify the perception of music—which in turn
implies that its value subsists in the altered experience to which it gives
rise.” Thus he remarks that analysis takes a “performative turn” in the
early twentieth century, and, as implied by Schoenberg, theories serve
as instruments (systems of presentation) for presenting such analyses.
That is, music theories becomes more technical apparatuses that are
instrumental to analyses of musical works—analyses that are, more than
ever before, self-consciously interpretive in that they complement
(rather than verify) what is already self-evident. Thus the “performative
turn” implies that instead of there being only a single musical theory
deemed valid, theories instead are themselves viewed as tools, instruments, apparatuses for different kinds of analyses serving different aims
in regard to understanding, unpacking, critiquing, reverse-engineering
music; this now puts the music theorist-analyst (now equipped with
her own array of analytical techné apparatuses) alongside the composertheorist as a practitioner of phronesis (the art of deciding how to implement techné).4 In a sense (to be explained further in the next section),
this puts the composer-theorist or theorist-analyst into the ontologically proactive position of worldmaking, with regard to the reception
of each musical work or repertoire. But the ontological aspect of music
theorizing extends yet more pervasively than that, both before and
after the turn of the twentieth century, and in ways very signiicant to
present and future worldmaking as techné.
3. MUSIC THEORY’S QUANTITATIVE-COMPUTATIONAL PROACTIVE ONTOLOGY
Though it often focuses on pre-existing musical works or repertoires,
music theorizing is ontologically proactive in the sense of positing new
objects of thought and typically new systems of thought, and so is
worldmaking, in Nelson Goodman’s (1978, 6–7) sense:
Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds already on
hand; the making is remaking. . . . Much but by no means all
worldmaking consists of taking apart and putting together, often
conjointly: on the one hand, of dividing wholes into parts and partitioning kinds into subsequences, analyzing complexes into component features, drawing distinctions; on the other hand, of composing wholes and kinds out of parts and members and subclasses,
combining features into complexes, and making connections.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
11
Insofar as ontology is concerned, music theory, as techné, has always
engaged in ontological acts in that it names and categorizes new kinds
of events (intervals, chords, dissonances, etc.), procedures, forms, and
to some extent properties as well (syncopation and dissonance can be
viewed as qualities as well as events). As mentioned above, and
elaborated on more below, the technology of a theory can enable new
methods of deinition and creation; thus analysis, theory, and composition intimately connect techné to worldmaking. This itself explains and
justiies the role of the composer-theorist, a tradition that can be
traced back to Hucbald in the ninth century, and includes Guido of
Arezzo in the eleventh century, Rameau in the eighteenth century, and
Schoenberg, Babbitt, Xenakis, and countless others in the twentieth.
Particularly striking examples are Rameau in the eighteenth century
and Weber in the nineteenth, as explained by Jairo Moreno (2004).
Rameau posits fundamental bass tones and implied dissonances; Weber
posits roman numerals as representing a listener’s hypothetical hearing
of chords in a stream of sound, each as relating to a contextually established tonic pitch. As Moreno explains, these theories (when compared
to those of the sixteenth century—Zarlino’s, for instance) exemplify an
evolution of the concept of listener-subject (noesis ), a modern agential
listener-subject who both inluences and is inluenced by theoretical
representations of his hearing. Within this feedback-oriented tradition,
composer-theorists have been signiicantly engaged in ontological acts,
of three kinds: (1) positing new musical properties and entities based
on listening and interpretive-analysis of previously existing works or
mere acoustical examples; (2) devising new compositional or improvisational rules, systems, or technologies that manipulate the newly
posed properties or entities; and (3) creating new works which directly
exploit newly posed properties and entities, or which exploit systems or
technologies that do so.
By the standards of our technological age, these ontological acts are
somewhat conservative and modest. They share at least one noteworthy
feature in common, which makes them relevant to the present situation: they all have a numerical or indeed computational character. In
addition to the numerical scale-degree entities theorized by Rameau,
Vogler, Weber, and Sechter in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
there is the interval-based symbol system of Hermannus Contractus in
the eleventh century and David Lewin’s (1987) generalized interval
system in the late twentieth. In the second category (devising new
compositional or improvisational rules, systems, or technologies that
manipulate the newly posed properties or entities) we may count
Guido of Arrezo’s eleventh-century lookup table for generating pitches
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Perspectives of New Music
from syllables and Heinichen’s seventeenth-century unigured bass
rubrics. Prior to the twentieth century, however, such system building
was primarily retrospective, modeling pre-existing practices.
B. MUSIC MAKING AS WORLDMAKING:
FROM ARCADIA TO UTOPIA?
In a sense, music was worldmaking before it was ever techné; that is,
when the world was regarded as pre-ordained. As discussed above,
Chua (2001), like Pace (2007), sees the late sixteenth-century shift of
music from the medieval quadrivium (mathematical knowledge) to the
trivium (rhetorical arts) as a pivotal change for music and its theory.
1. PYTHAGOREAN-PLATONIC MUSIC AS WORLD AND WORLD AS MUSIC
Chua also sees the earlier state of music as an equivalence between
music and the world: music is the world; the world is music, the true
world being its harmony, a coniguration of charmed numerical ratios,
the Pythagorean-Platonic idealized conception of the world, music, as
one supernatural cosmic unity. As Chua explains:
In Plato’s account of creation, music tunes the cosmos according
to the Pythagorean ratios and scales the human soul to the same
proportions. This enabled the inaudible sounds of the heavens to
vibrate within the earthly soul, and conversely, for the audible
tones of human music to relect the celestial spheres, so that
heaven and earth could be harmonised within the unity of a welltuned scale. . . . As the invisible and inaudible harmony of the
spheres, music imposed a unity over creation, linking everything
along the entire chain of being. When music moves, the earth
moves with it. Thus music is not simply an object in a magical
world, but the rational agent of enchantment itself. (2001, 22)
As Chua continues, the sixteenth-century transfer of music from the
medieval quadrivium to the rhetorical arts of the trivium is part of a
drive towards the new (modernity). It entails the surge of instrumental
music (which Vincenzo Galilei called the original polyphony), including
its compromised tunings. All this entails, by Pythagorean-Platonic
standards, an apocalyptic detuning of the world, which is to disenchant
the world. In relation to this mythologizing of musica, “instrumental
music . . . is the original sin of modern music. The ‘modern contrapuntists’ may write for voices, but their music is already unsung,
because humanity has eaten from the tree of instrumental knowledge,
which excludes modernity from the garden of Arcadia” (27). “To
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
13
disenchant the world, modernity had to sever the umbilical link of the
[Pythagorean tuned] monochord, disconnecting itself from the celestial
realms in order to remove music as an explanation of the world” (22–
23). Thus music was the world until it was detuned and disenchanted.
2. MUSIC ONTOLOGY, MODERNISM, CREATIVITY, FREEDOM, EMERGENCE
In stark contrast to the present situation, the Pythagorean-Platonic
idealized conception of the world, music, as one supernatural cosmic
unity (music as world and vice versa), excludes the possibility of
multiple musics. There was not a plurality of musical greatness but
rather just a singularity: the harmonious perfection—an ideology that
went unquestioned through the eighteenth century, and was barely
challenged in the wake of Beethoven in the nineteenth.
Yet, once music is considered creative, instead of discovery of preexisting heavenly truth, music’s techné is drawn into its creativity,
inseparable from it. This is another reason why worldmaking as techné
runs deep with music, for, as the composer-theorist Robert Morris
(2010, 120) puts it, “method and result interpenetrate each other in
creative work” and the issue of realist ontology becomes mute.
Scientists, ever mindful of Occam’s razor, strive for a lean parsimonious
ontology; yet artists are in the business of continuously redeining their
own ontologies. As suggested by the process philosophies of Bergson
(1911) and Whitehead ([1929] 1978), bringing new entities into
existence is creativity by deinition. And such creation is precisely the
business of artists: using artiice to create.
Of course prior to the twentieth century, when stylistic convention
circumscribed creativity,5 it would be a stretch to say that each creative
musician was confecting his own entirely new musical world. The freedom of such total worldmaking comes later with modernism, exempliied in Harry Partch’s new tuning systems and invented instruments
and Schoenberg’s development of twelve-tone music—new offshoots
of which continue to emerge. System building is often recognized as a
distinctive facet of twentieth century musical modernism.
Yet rather than the systems themselves, what I ind more relevant to
worldmaking are the unconventional (exotic) emergent qualities that
such systems give rise to.6 These qualities, rather than rules themselves,
account for the experiential value of such music. Focusing on emergent
qualities, rather than rules, has the advantage of being able to relate
repertoires that are more or less systematized, or barely systematized at
all—the gamut runs wide.
It’s not necessarily self-evident how a set of rules can give rise to
qualities recognizable as anything other than the rules themselves. Yet
just this has been shown time and again; however, not with music. The
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Perspectives of New Music
relation between the rules of musical systems and the audible qualities
that emerge from them seems to be more elusive than visual examples
of self-organization presented by Mandelbrot and Wolfram, and the
various emergent patterning witnessed in the Game of Life and in
cellular automata (“gliders” and so forth). It is perhaps more proitable
to discuss emergence in a new context that is, I hope, more transparent
with regard to musical relevance. Therefore I now present a new
demonstration of audible qualities emerging form a relatively simple
musical system—that is, a system that exempliies self-organization
rendered in music.7
First consider a series of alternations between two chords generated
randomly, one pitch at a time. Example 1a shows this series, notated in
half notes. (There is also an audio rendition.8) Heard as a passage of
music (for strummed harp), some basic features—call them irst order
behaviors—immediately stand out: it projects a binary rhythm of
alternation (accentuated by the alternating direction of arpeggiation);
the density (cardinality) of the chords increases linearly; it’s canonic:
once a pitch occurs, it recurs again on the corresponding beat in each
subsequent measure, thus new instances of the canonic comes
accumulate measure by measure, each echoing the same dux that
started it all. All this, however, derives trivially from the alternation of
incrementally built-up chords. For the sake of comparison to what is to
come next, Example 1b represents (re-notates) the same passage on a
tonnetz (tone map), in this case a tonnetz that places F2 in the bottom
left corner and radiates in minor thirds across (F 2, G#2, B2, etc.) and
major thirds upward (F2, A2, C#3, etc.). Black and white circles
represent the notes of the strong-beat versus weak-beat chords.
Example 2a shows a musical passage having the same irst-order
behaviors (alternating content, increasing density, and cumulative
pitch recurrence) but whose pitches are not generated randomly.9
Instead, the pitches are generated by playing the ancient Chinese twoplayer board-game Go, a game rich in strategy but which has relatively
simple rules. Here a 7 × 7 tonnetz is interpreted as a Go board (goban)
and the incremental note-by-note build-up of alternating chords is
generated directly from the successive plays (placement of pieces) by
the two opposing players, in this case me (black) playing against
computer software (white).10 In the game, players alternate placing
pieces (stones) in order to cordon off a greater open area (as compared
to the opponent’s) while minimizing the number of pieces that are
captured (by being directly surrounded by opponent pieces). As with
any other strategic game, experienced players develop tactics and
strategies optimized for winning. Example 2b shows the successive
moves of the Go game aligned with the musical passage it generates.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
15
Returning to the musical passage itself, in Example 2a, I draw your
attention to a number of qualities strongly affecting its sound as it is
heard, but none of which are direct consequences of the rules of the
game that generated them. Call these second order behaviors:
i.
At irst the range is neither very narrow, nor very wide
ii. The range gradually widens; it also keeps illing in: it balances
widening with illing in.
iii. As it progresses, the proportion of major and minor thirds (as
compared to other intervals) within each chord increases
noticeably.
iv. From one chord to the next, there are a great many notes and
subsets that transpose by a major or minor third. Thus a
major/minor third transposition oscillation quality tends to
dominate.
v.
[012] clusters (chromatic clusters) are virtually absent from
chords.
Looking again at Example 1a, notice that none of these features (i–v)
obtains in that randomly generated musical passage. The random passage exhausts almost the full range immediately, using the rest of the
time merely to ill it in; it ills the space in an uneven clumpy fashion that
has no particular intervallic preponderance; the notes of the downbeat
and upbeat chords do not tend to relate by any close transposition;
there are three [012] cluster subsets among the two chords by the end
of the passage. The effect is somewhat jarring, having little continuity
other than the de facto alternating accumulating pattern.
By contrast, the opposite features (i–v) in Example 2 create a
distinctively smooth sound with its own particular atmosphere; not
quite “tonal” in the usual sense, but yet quasi-triadic and reminiscent
of Benjamin Britten’s music, for instance. This quality emerges from
the optimal playing strategy employed by the two opponents, which is
to build up, using as few pieces as possible, a wall as close as possible
up against the other opponent’s emerging wall. Example 3 shows
another example of music generated from a played-out game of Go.11
Notice it sounds much more like the music of Example 2 rather than
like the random music of Example 1, and in fact shares the same
features (i–v) that the Example 2 music has.
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Perspectives of New Music
EXAMPLE
1A: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS RANDOMLY GENERATED.
NOTATED ON A GRAND STAFF (SCORED FOR HARP)
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
F3 Ab3 B3
F4 Ab4 B4 D5
F5 Ab5 B5
C#4 E4 G4 Bb4 C#5 E5 G5
A3 C4 Eb4 Gb4 A4 C5 Eb5
F3 Ab3 B3 D4
F4 Ab4 B4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
A2 C3 Eb3 Gb3 A3 C4 Eb4
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F2 Ab2 B2 D3
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
EXAMPLE
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
F3 Ab3 B3
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
C#3 E3 G3 Bb3 C#4 E4 G4
1B: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS RANDOMLY GENERATED.
17
NOTATED ON A TONNETZ (DOWNBEAT TONES: BLACK; UPBEAT TONES: WHITE)
18
Perspectives of New Music
EXAMPLE
2A: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS
GENERATED WITH SELF-ORGANIZATION
(A GAME OF GO: GAME 1)
NOTATED ON A GRAND STAFF (SCORED FOR HARP)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
EXAMPLE
2B: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS
GENERATED WITH SELF-ORGANIZATION
(A GAME OF GO: GAME 1)
19
NOTATED ON A TONNETZ (DOWNBEAT TONES: BLACK; UPBEAT TONES: WHITE)
20
Perspectives of New Music
EXAMPLE
3A: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS
GENERATED WITH SELF-ORGANIZATION
(A GAME OF GO: GAME 2)
NOTATED ON A GRAND STAFF (SCORED FOR HARP)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
EXAMPLE
3B: ACCUMULATING ALTERNATING CHORDS
GENERATED WITH SELF-ORGANIZATION
(A GAME OF GO: GAME 2)
21
NOTATED ON A TONNETZ (DOWNBEAT TONES: BLACK; UPBEAT TONES: WHITE)
22
Perspectives of New Music
These features are not the rules—in fact they are more nuanced and
intriguing than rules are—but rather are a consequence of what may
happen when playing by the rules, or, putting it differently: these are
tendencies and possibilities that distinctly characterize what plays out
in the world constructed by the stipulated rules; these qualities emerge
from the negotiation between goals and constraints. Unanticipated
qualities emerge from any rule system of suficient complexity, once
activated. It is generally these qualities, rather than their rule-system
source, that draw aesthetic fascination. Therefore, these qualities, once
recognized, may then form the basis for yet another rule system, and
so forth, in a perpetual semiotic-evolutionary chain of inluence.
A few more words about emergence in this context: At a certain
point the running of a computational or evolutionary process may
suddenly produce a novel property—a sort of ontological eureka!; this
is called diachronic emergence (Humphreys 2008). Yet in the passages
of Examples 2 and 3, the qualities discussed are instead emergent in
the sense that they are holistic qualities, qualities of the whole
coniguration (or a signiicantly large subset of it). That is, rather than
being qualities of basic parts (pitch, duration, loudness of individual
notes) these qualities instead emerge at a higher level of temporal
experience, at a broader time scale.12 Such qualities are analogous to
heat, humidity, and pressure, and are deemed synchronic emergent
qualities (Humphreys 2008), since their emergence is not associated
with a point in time or chronology. For the remainder of this essay
assume synchronic emergent qualities, except where noted otherwise.
As I have explained previously (Mailman 2009b, 2010a, 2010b,
2010c, 2011a, 2012a), in temporal experiences such as music, perception of such synchronic emergent qualities usually entails some
duration of time; awareness of such qualities is not necessarily
immediate. Also they are not transparent; and furthermore being
affected by such emergent qualities often does not entail knowledge or
conscious awareness of the generative principles or rules from which,
indirectly, they emerge. For instance, in an empirical study on music
memory and cognition, Krumhansl (1991) presented listeners with
excerpts from Messiaen’s Mode de valeurs et d’intensités,
[A piece] written according to a unique compositional principle that
rigidly couples values of pitch (chroma and octave), duration, and
dynamics. Listeners heard test excerpts, which were judged in terms
of whether or not they might have come from the piece (either
from the part they had heard or from the remainder of the piece).
Even in the irst block of trials, listeners were able to recognize
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
23
segments from the part of the piece they had heard, suggesting
surprisingly accurate memory for surface characteristics. Listeners
were also able to generalize to the rest of the piece, accurately
judging segments from the part of the piece they had not heard.
(Krumhansl 1991, 401)
Another example is the work of visual artist-programmer Casey Reas,
one of the two originators of Processing, the open-source programming language and environment for creating images, animation, and
interaction. His algorithmically generated art works are made by
deining an “element” as a “form” (a visual shape) and “one or more
behaviors.”13 Though each of his generative art works has distinctive
emergent qualities, the forms and behaviors from which they are
generated are much less obvious.
In music, especially music such as classical Western art music of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, much of the
distinctive sound that typically orients listeners emerges out of
conventional practices and may therefore be deemed conventional
emergent properties. Examples are tonality and meter, each of which
arises out of conigurations of more basic properties of pitch and
duration, for instance. Emergent properties, however, need not be
conventional, and indeed need not even have pre-existing names, as I
have shown previously (Mailman 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c,
2011a, 2011b, 2012b). The unconventional nature of modernist
music, whether based on an explicit new system or not, typically brings
forth unconventional emergent qualities, such as those in the tonnetzGo generated music of Examples 2 and 3 (properties i–v). Such
unconventional (exotic) emergent properties as found outside common
practice repertoire deserve extensive study on their own accord, some
of which is discussed in the next section.
One further note about emergence, also explored in the next
section: The emergent properties such as tonality and meter, as well as
properties i–v of the tonnetz-Go music discussed above, are basically
conceived or experienced in a static way: they are present or absent.
Yet this need not be the case. As I’ve shown (Mailman 2009b, 2010a,
2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b) an emergent property may also
act dynamically. That is, during a duration of time, it may obtain to a
varying degree. It’s not so much that the presence versus absence of
the property can be fuzzy (although this could be as well), but rather
that the intensity of the property itself may luctuate.
24
Perspectives of New Music
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL PHASE OF MUSIC THEORY AND MUSIC MAKING
The performative turn that makes music theories instrumental to music
analysis evolves to a new stage by the end of the twentieth century. It
synthesizes with another intermittent facet of twentieth century music
theory and analysis: phenomenology, and started to do so in a way that
begins to address the issues of studying unconventional music, including its emergent qualities.
A. PHENOMENOLOGY, QUALITIES,
AND ONTOLOGY OF WORLDS
Phenomenology (inquiry through introspection on one’s own
conscious experience), named by Hegel in the nineteenth century, got
underway in the writings of Husserl (1913, 1964) in the early twentieth. Less well known is that in those early decades it was immediately
taken up explicitly as an orientation for music analysis by, for instance,
Ernst Kurth and Hans Mersmann (Rothfarb 2002)—though to some
extent phenomenology aptly describes the working methods of
previous music theorists, such as Rameau and Weber discussed above.
By the 1980s, phenomenology was pursued again as an explicit engine
of music analysis, by Clifton (1983) and Lewin (1986).
Lewin also further theorized music phenomenology by developing
computational tools for sharpening its presentation and extending its
technical reach. Speciically, Lewin (1981) developed a running vector,
which is used to trace the competing prevalence of different pulse
streams in Schoenberg’s piece for piano op. 19, no. 6. Lewin (1987)
later applies the running vector to track the competing prevalence of
different rhythmic motivic cells in a Brahms piano ballade. This
happens to resonate with Mersmann’s (1922–1923) running comparison
of two opposing melodic motives in a Haydn sonata; but Lewin uses
computational precision to focus the phenomenological orientation. In
the 1990s, such introspection-fueled computational cognitive modeling
re-emerged in regard to yet other musical features: accent of climax in
Roeder’s “A Calculus of Accent” (1994) and melodic contour
similarity in Quinn’s “Fuzzy Extensions to the Theory of Contour”
(1997). In all these cases the computational models were inspired by
the author’s music listening experience. The qualities (pulse, accent,
and melodic similarity), modeled through these innovative methods,
each already has its own prior status (is already named) in the music
theoretical lexicon, and are in this sense conventional, even though
Lewin, Roeder, and Quinn demonstrate them in such unconventional
repertoire as Schoenberg, Carter, Xenakis, Ligeti, and Reich.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
25
In other words these are qualities (or models of qualities) that were
already known to be relevant kinds of things in more conventional
repertoire. Yet such repertoire as Schoenberg, Carter, Xenakis, Ligeti,
and Reich need not consist only of the same relevant kinds of things as
more conventional repertoire. They may be notated with the same old
kinds of symbols and soniied in the same old kinds of acoustic signals
(as the music of Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms, for instance) but
there’s a world of difference to the sound and low of the music of
Schoenberg, Carter, Xenakis, Ligeti, and Reich, without the awareness
of which, we would experience it as incoherent or dull. As Goodman
(1978, 9–10) remarks: “Worlds differ in the relevant kinds they comprise. . . . A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably
monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds.” I should
emphasize may, because there is often enough ontological overlap
between worlds such that we can make our way in one (a less familiar
one) even while relying on the ontology of another (a more familiar
one), especially if the categories of the ontology are generalized
beyond their original context. This might be said about pulse, accent,
and melodic similarity in regard to Lewin’s, Roeder’s, and Quinn’s
work in relation to Schoenberg, Carter, Xenakis, Ligeti, and Reich.
Goodman (10) further elaborates this in a direction I wish to pursue:
While we might say that . . . some relevant kinds of one world are
missing from another, we might perhaps better say that the two
worlds contain just the same classes sorted differently into relevant
and irrelevant kinds. Some relevant kinds of the one world, rather
than being absent from the other, are present as irrelevant kinds;
some differences among worlds are not so much in entities comprised as in emphasis or accent, and these differences are no less
consequential.
Such issues of epistemology and ontology are sharpened by considering how various visual pattern recognition classiication strategies are
developed, for instance as explored through Bongard problems (Bongard
1970). As Ignazio Licata and Gianfranco Minati (2010) describe them:
Bongard presented one hundred problems. Each problem consists
of twelve igures subdivided per six classes of two. The problem
relates to inding what differentiates classes and what the igures of
the same class share in common. They are very interesting and fascinating problems, because different solutions are possible depending on which description level is assumed. Each problem has its
speciicity, but all the problems, as they are solved, can display
26
Perspectives of New Music
background correlations which could be said [to contribute to]
“The Bongard’s World Theory of Everything.” (2010, 4)
Two sets of Bongard squares are shown in Example 4. The images
can be grouped and differentiated in various ways. Yet relevance
depends on the goal, which in this case is to ind a rule that uniies the
six images on the left but excludes those on the right. For Example 4a
we might focus the direction of the internal trajectory of the curved
and angularized spirals, whereas in the world of Example 4b we might
attend to which shapes are inside which other shapes.
Of course relevance is not usually just a binary choice, but is often
usefully relativized. For instance, this can be stated in terms of color
categories. As compared to green and blue, glaucous is perhaps a less
relevant color category in our world (hence it is an obscure word
rather than a standard one), but another world could be fashioned in
which it is exactly the other way around, a world that contrasts with
our own in that the areas on the cusps between our standard categories
are emphasized at the expense of what are our standard categories. As
Goodman remarks, some of the most striking contrasts of this sort are
forged in the arts. Sure, we might favor a conservative or parsimonious
approach to ontology, for reasons of pedagogy or to aspire to
incremental “normal science,” but this may conlict with our ability to
identify or cultivate awareness of what is most intriguing in the
unconventional repertoire we are analyzing, or theorizing, repertoire
that seems to inhabit or forge new worlds of experience. I sense the
hindering effect of these ontological constraints particularly when
moving beyond the note-to-note actions of these works (which, after all,
are conditioned by the standard notation for acoustic instruments) to,
rather, the unconventional long- and medium-range lows we experience, or may experience, as we hear them, their peculiar ways of projecting “form from the ‘comprehensive continuum,’” to use Adorno’s
(1998, 197) phrase.
My own work demonstrates that, in such unconventional repertoire
as this, long-range and medium-range form can arise from lux of
intensity of one or more emergent properties, properties emerging in
the hearing of the lowing surface of the music (Mailman 2009b,
2009c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b). Form in music
is traditionally conceived in static (structural, four-square architectural)
terms as crisp sections or segments as akin to the parts of a traditional
building or other structure (2009b, 2010d); call that sectional, structural, or architectural form. Form from lux therefore is distinguished
as dynamic form,14 which is form from lux of intensity as music elapses
in time; and usually this is the lux of an emergent property.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
TWO SETS OF BONGARD SQUARES
IMAGES ON THE LEFT VS. RIGHT TO BE GROUPED (UNIFIED) AND
DIFFERENTIATED (PARTITIONED) ACCORDING TO VARIOUS RULES
EXAMPLE
4A: LOOK FOR INTERNAL TRAJECTORIES
EXAMPLE
4B: LOOK FOR SHAPES INSIDE SHAPES
27
28
Perspectives of New Music
B. EMERGENCE AND EMERGENT PROPERTIES (QUALITIES)
Now, with their form-projecting role in view, it’s appropriate to
consider (synchronic) emergent properties in more depth. By emergent
properties (synchronic emergent properties or qualities) I mean something
like what the philosopher John Locke distinguished as “secondary
qualities”: those higher-level properties (macro-properties) that emerge
from lower-level properties or conigurations of lower-level constituent
elements.15 Though merely a dictionary deinition, the notion of emergence suggests a “process of coming forth, issuing from concealment,
obscurity, or coninement.”16 There is often a sense in music that, as
written (or preconceived) notes are animated in sound and in time, a
sort of centrifugal force (or momentum) brings forth higher-level qualities not otherwise present. It is my claim that such higher-level properties (macro-qualities, secondary qualities) in music are indeed novel,
in that they are new to this animated (higher-level) context, and are
thus emergent, in some way or another, when taking into account the
diverse ways we relate to music, including various modes of listening.
Take for example even the fairly mundane property temporal density
(interonset density). How is it emergent? Consider how it presents
new features that don’t exist at the lower level of its constituents.
These properties are not merely resultants of properties of the lowerlevel consistent elements. To a listener, higher degrees of temporal density may prompt: (1) confusion of detail (a negative capability that
enables other qualities to surface); (2) perceptual fusion or blurring
(another negative capability that enables other qualities to surface); (3)
a feeling of the sublime, of being overwhelmed: an affect arising from
the previously listed qualities. Of course the sensations mentioned are
not merely present or not, but rather depend on the intensity, the
amount, or degree of temporal density (interonset density), which
typically is not static but rather luctuates. To the extent such properties do obtain at any given time, these are novel properties that do
not exist at the level of individual notes that might be scrutinized in a
musical score when time is stopped. Of course the degree (the intensity)
of temporal density can be computed in terms of (it supervenes on)
lower-level information (“basal conditions”), but the novel causal effects
of it—the confusion, fusion, blurring, and sublimity, and so forth—
which are experienced in the moment of hearing (the animated context),
are not so reducible or predictable, and in this sense “transcend” the
properties of the constituent elements. Computation of the quantitative
amount of temporal density in a particular duration of time is, in a
sense, merely resultant. Yet what warrants its distinction (from individualized attention to events) is some awareness of qualitatively different
kinds of experiences it causes.17
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
29
Thus emergence is phenomenal; it is not a feature manifested in the
unperformed score, but rather is relative to observation, as the music is
heard (or imagined) as elapsing (animated) in time. To clarify what I
mean by this I’d like to focus, for a moment, on the more material
oriented view of emergence advanced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987,
40) in their discussion of the Earth as a deterritorialized body without
organs permeated by transitory particles. The self-organizing (sorting)
processes these undergo, which Deleuze and Guattari call machinic
phylum, are what give rise to properties we experience in the world. As
Robin Parmar (2014, 10) explains it (quoting Manuel De Landa):
Consider as an example how sedimentary rock is formed, by “a
‘double articulation’ [that] transforms structures on one scale into
structures on another scale” [De Landa, 1997, 62]. We start with
a “multiplicity of pebbles of heterogeneous qualities,” eroded
from mountains and carried downhill by water lows [60]. Rivers
act as hydraulic computers, sorting out the pebbles into different
sizes and shapes. (Remember that according to Turing all computations can be reduced to sorting exercises. Thus it is not an analogy to say that a river is a computer; it is a literal truth.) These
pebbles are deposited on the sea bed and at different places along
the alluvial low. Then, “a second operation is necessary to transform these loose collections of pebbles into a larger-scale entity:
sedimentary rock. This operation consists of cementing the sorted
components together into a new entity with emergent properties
of its own, that is, properties such as overall strength and permeability which cannot be ascribed to the sum of the individual pebbles” [60].
De Landa goes on to ind similar processes in organic realms,
notably the process of evolution in which genetic material is sorted
and reconstituted into new forms [having novel properties].
My comment is that it is only because of our perspective that these
could be considered distinct properties and be considered new. We
have a perspective that treats things differently at different scales (and
indeed is only able to observe a limited range of scales in space and in
time), so when something occurs at a certain macro level we are able
to acknowledge it having properties at that level; for instance, permeability. At the microscopic atomic level there is never any such
permeability, but merely differences of coniguration that only differ in
degree (not kind) from conigurations obtaining when the macro state
is not permeable (or less permeable). It is for reasons like this that
30
Perspectives of New Music
emergence is inherently relative, in the sense of being phenomenal.
Emergent properties such as overall strength or permeability, ostensibly
properties of the matter, are phenomenal, depending, as it were, on the
situatedness, disposition, and capabilities of an observer, who is able to
distinguish “levels” of description because of witnessing phenomena
from an appropriate scale or granularity, a scale or granularity from
which there are appropriate distinctions of obscurity versus clarity and
concealment versus transparency. For instance, for a creature of suficiently small size, there might be no perspective from which a supposedly novel property could be observed; there would be no “issuing
from concealment.” The condition of being concealed or obscured is
observer dependent. For there to be a higher-level property (notably
absent from lower levels), there must be a higher-level witnessing.
In regard to music speciically, the philosopher Luis Felipe Oliveira
(2014, 25) asserts that “the very relationship between listener and work
can be understood and described as a self-organized dynamic system,”
with the signiicant possibilities of emergent properties arising from this
coupling, which suggests that self-organization cannot be accounted
for without including the observer. Or as Putnam (1979, 603–04)
more generally characterizes it “there is, for Goodman as for late
Wittgenstein, no sharp line to be drawn between the character of the
experience and the description given by the subject.” Putnam goes on:
Experiential data, as Goodman points out in his discussion of
apparent motion, are themselves doubly the result of construction
and interpretation: construction by the brain itself, and construal
through the need of the subject to use language and public concepts to report and even grasp what he “sees.” Comparison of theory with experience is not comparison with unconceptualized reality, even if some positivists once thought it was. It is comparison
of one or another version with the version we take to be “experience” in the given context. (611)
Thus we should acknowledge that any such deference whatsoever to
experiential data (to phenomenal properties, such as emergence) is
somehow a nod to constructivist epistemology à la Piaget (1967). In
regard to interpreting a text, the constructive role of the reader has been
characterized by Boretz (1977, 104) as creating semantic fusion.18
In fact the constructivist role of the observer has more recently been
taken up by Licata and Minati (2010) speciically in regard to emergence, “mesoscopic variables,” and creativity in modeling. “Creativity
is conceived as the ability to [prompt the] emerging [of] unusual
cognitive strategies to deal with the complexity of the relation
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
31
observer-observed” (2). As they explain, the most diverse, most prevalent, and perhaps most relevant kind of emergence is “intrinsic or
radical emergence, [instances of which are] non describable by a single
formal model because of the dynamical complexity of interactions
between system and environment” (2). As they continue:
The problem of . . . describing creativity inds its proper formulation within the approach to emergence. In particular, the key
question is: once a process of intrinsic emergence—unforeseeable
on the basis of any available model—has occurred, how can we
analyze it, even partially, by computational tools? (Licata and
Minati 2010, 3; citing Licata 2008)
Rather than a deterministic path to modeling that might be assumed
(involving purely deduction or induction), their characterization
emphasizes abduction: “Mesoscopic state variables are invented by the
observer in a constructivist manner . . .” (Minati and Licata 2013).19
The constructivist role of the observer is considered creative as it
relates to neither non-linear replication [diachronic emergence]
nor [mere] transposition of levels of description and models used
for artiicial systems, like reductionism. Creativity rather lies in
inventing new mesoscopic variables able to identify coherent patterns in complex systems. As it is known, mesoscopic variables represent partial macroscopic properties of a system by using some of
the microscopic degrees of freedom possessed by [its constituent]
elements. Such partial usage of microscopic as well as macroscopic
properties allows a kind of Gestaltian continuity and imitation
between levels of descriptions for mesoscopic modeling. (Licata
and Minati 2010, 1)20
Although I would not claim their depiction of modeling of physical
phenomena in general exactly matches our approaches for analyzing
emergent lux in music, there is certainly a strong analogy, especially
encapsulated in their further remark that “conigurations we detect in
the world are a homeo-cognitive ‘compromise’ between mind and
world” (4). Thus we ind that emergent properties we are most interested in are a hybrid between observation and creation.
As Putnam (1979, 603) says “the phenomenal has many equally valid
descriptions.” Consider that new music continues to be discovered and
created, often prompting new phenomenal descriptions. Yet moreover,
because emergent qualities are a hybrid between observation and
creation, it stands to reason that there are an indeinite number of such
luctuating emergent properties in (or of, or from) music.
32
Perspectives of New Music
During the time it is experienced, a synchronic emergent property is
a continuous issuing forth from concealment—even as its intensity may
luctuate. Yet we can also speak of how or when each such property
issues forth for the irst time ever, especially as they are partly created.
In one sense such properties emerge when the music is initially composed, improvised, or performed. Yet in another sense they emerge
when they are for the irst time experienced (for instance, by a listener),
but in yet another sense they emerge when they are formally (systematically) deined (such that they can be later recognized, deployed, or
taught). So wherefore the emergence? Exactly where (or when) one
senses this emergence is taking place depends on whether one is taking
the point of view of the casual concertgoer, the score-reading analyst,
the composer, a software programmer, a psychologist, a historian, and
so forth. Thus the locus or loci of emergence is relative to one’s
relationship or stance toward the music. Even the acknowledgment of
emergence is so relative: one may ind that what seems emergent to a
listener in the leeting moment can be found to be merely additive,
resultant, supervenient, or reducible when subject to analysis out of
time (the non-animated context). Each application of the term (or
concept) “emergence” involves a shift of perspective, because things
assumed to be always either objective and transparent, of subjective
and ineffable, are instead regarded as neither of these, but rather as
crossing between. This is a productive point of view, because it
suggests a way of crossing an apparent chasm. Yet the question of
exactly how or when an emergent quality emerges for the irst time (its
locus of emergence) is relative to one’s observational disposition.
C. THE EMERGENCE, REIFICATION,
AND RESIDUE OF FEEDBACK
What is deinite, however, is that if at some point in the past, the
quality did not exist (was not manifested in music) prior to human
musical activities, and then at some point later it is actually deined
formally (systematically) such that new instances can be identiied, or
gauged, then the property can be said to have emerged (diachronic
emergence begetting synchronic emergence), in the sense of coming
forth, through some or other music activity, even if where and how are
still open to question. A follow-up question might be to ask why
bother making assertions of emergence if or when such assertions
sometimes fail to pinpoint the origin or author of the property (its
locus of emergence). My answer is that asserting emergence in music
focuses attention on—so we don’t take it for granted—the fact that
not only new art works (compositions) are being created (coming into
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
33
existence), but also new properties, which persist beyond (are exportable from) the work in which (through which) they were born, and so
are world-deining (or world-expanding). Moreover not just the composers (or improvisers) are responsible for this world-expanding
creative activity, but also so are the creative observers (theorist-analysts)
who choose to think about and articulate what they are experiencing.
Among the indeinite number of luctuating emergent qualities in
music, some may be familiar, such as temporal density; for others I’ve
invented metaphorical names, such as viscosity, hesitancy, smoothness,
freshness, permeation, durational diversity, interonset volatility, and textural incline of pitch, each of which corresponds to a precise but lexible
quantitative model. All these are shown to luctuate in speciic musical
works already composed; yet typically they are not explicitly named or
identiied by their composers. The properties may emerge from enacting
rules, as in the tonnetz-Go music above, but are not necessarily asserted
by the rules, by the system, or by the composer who made them.
To consider emergence (emergent properties) in the artworks brings
us into somewhat new, unknown territory for the simple reason that
previous theorizing about emergence has focused on situations where
we are observing the results (the effects, the properties, the qualities)
of a natural complex system or of an artiicial complex system designed
to imitate a natural one. In such situations we either (1) can’t inluence
the design or initial conditions of the system (as in complex systems of
nature), or (2) are interested in adjusting the design of an artiicial
system or its initial conditions primarily to emulate emergent properties already known from nature (for instance, self-similar morphology,
locking behavior, or consciousness). Yet artworks are human-made
but creative, not just imitative. The artist may design, conigure, or
adjust a system in view of a particular imagined novel outcome; that is,
in order to achieve or reine a certain anticipated emergent result that
perhaps never happened before, and that therefore has never even been
named. Hence techné is developed or reined in an adventurous whatif scenario, where the “what-if ” can be a speciic anticipated emergent
property (or more likely an optimization of an ensemble of emergent
properties, perhaps some stable and others luctuating).
Thus, just as with listening, analysis, and theorizing of music, so also
in composition, and improvisation, there are feedback processes which
entail one of the touchstone features of both emergence and cybernetics, namely downward causation, which is higher-level events
regulating lower-level ones (Campbell 1974); for instance, physical
events being indirectly caused (or inluenced) by mental events. Other
examples are when evolutionary pressures of the environment affect
34
Perspectives of New Music
gene expression, or when an organism chooses behaviors to adapt to
its environment, thereby indirectly inluencing the micro-details of the
environment.21 The important point, however, is that these feedback
processes serve a different purpose in the artistic situation than they do
in more typical instances of emergence. In the artistic situation the
feedback processes are regulating toward (adaptive toward) an individualized novel outcome willed by the artist (in the case of composing)
or negotiated by the theorist-analyst (negotiating between the facts in
the score, his or her phenomenology of listening, as well as his or her
own creative-intellectual inclinations).
An example of such feedback processes (including downward causation) in composition is the development of korvai in Carnatic music,
whose relevance to this discussion I was recently reminded of.22 A korvai
is a cadential rhythmic procedure involving the repetition of a rhythmic
pattern at a systematically increasing pulse rate, forging an intricate
interaction of beats and subdivisions (micropulses) that create hierarchically nested repetitions as well as a longer range process of acceleration
designed to terminate on a particular prescribed beat in the future, and
does all this while also maintaining a slow and steady underlying pulse.
Also emerging from this are various syncopations, cross-pulsations, and
other polyrhythmic artifacts, which differ depending on the particular
design of the korvai (how the system is set up). When listening to a
korvai, one experiences not only the steady underlying pulse and the
predictable gradual acceleration and build-up of tension (or exhilaration), but also a uniquely variegated lively interplay that carries forth
this process. To complete a korvai, the composer may have to shuttle
back and forth between the micro-detail level and the macro-tension
lux level, with the results each time feeding back into each other, until
the overall results are satisfying. In such cases, a small-scale structural
feature may be selected in order that a speciic macro feature emerges
when the system (the korvai in this case) is enacted. 23 From the point
of view of listener phenomenology, the stable and luctuating holistic
features emerge from the micro-details, but procedurally and conceptually the micro-details emerge from the desired holistic results, which
may be highly individualized while also addressing aesthetic norms.
The causation is bidirectional in a fashion that is peculiar to creativeartistic endeavors and therefore should inluence our consideration of
emergence in art works.
Another example which was recently brought to my attention is
Lachenmann’s composition “Schattentanz” from his piano suite Ein
Kinderspiel (1980), which is described thus:24
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
35
The pianist plays percussive rhythms in 12/8 using the two highest notes of the piano together, while at various times the lowest
octave of strings are depressed silently or the pedal is engaged,
allowing the “shadows” of the high pitches to resonate. The result
is a highly constrained, ghostly exploration of the physical and
acoustic construction of the piano. The pianist is not allowed to
play any other notes in the normal manner, but by resonating the
broadband noise contained in the transient attacks, the entire range
of the instrument, the wood of its soundboard, the hardness of the
hammers, and the operation of pedal mechanism are all revealed.
From a irst-time listener’s point of view, this “exploratory resonance” is as clear a case of an emergent property as one could
hope for: the listener hears the high notes as the primary “composed” part of the piece, and slowly they come to be aware of the
entire sound of the piano through the resonant “shadows” which
emerge as a consequence. Compositionally, however, one could
make a case that this resonance is in fact the primary compositional goal, and therefore he was forced to write the piece using
the extremes of register. We can imagine the composer beginning
with a concrete timbre in mind, or even an abstract timbral concept, and through trial and error the content of the piece emerging directly from the timbral constraints.25
I would add, however, that, a irst-time listener might entirely miss
some of this, for failing to know what to listen for, and is likely to
beneit from some guidance in this regard. Yet another listener,
perhaps one who is routinely engaged in composing, improvising,
making sound art, or in modeling any or all of these, may, in some
instances, be able to take Lachenmann’s composition as a mere prompt
or stimulus for developing another composition, or an interactive
system, or formalized approach to analyzing and listening to further
instances of similar music, pre-existing or yet to be composed. In this
sense, there is apparently wiggle-room as between intention, actualization, reception, and imaginative response, which together exemplify
how awareness of emergent properties is a hybrid of observation and
creation, as discussed above. In the examples just discussed, the
composers did not discursively name or model the emergent qualities
that seem so signiicant. And I don’t think the verbal descriptions I’ve
offered do justice to their experiential speciicity. Yet we need not leave
it at that, staring—as it were—into a chasm. As I described above, the
act of precisely deining such properties is sometimes left to the music
theorist-analyst, who forges an appreciative aesthetic-receptive world
for the music by means of music-analytic techné.
36
Perspectives of New Music
D. ANALYSES OF CARTER AND LIGETI
1. FORM-BEARING EMERGENT FLUX IN CARTER’S QUARTET NO. 5, MOVT. 10
For instance, consider Elliott Carter’s Quartet no. 5. We can both gain
and guide aesthetic experience of it by attempting to model one of its
luctuating emergent properties. The quartet’s tenth movement
presents the four string instruments each proceeding at its own steady
pulse; a four-part polyrhythm results. A lux of interonset intervals
(IOI) arises from the interference pattern of the incommensurate pulse
streams of the four instruments as shown in the interonset graph of
Example 5.26 The lux itself serves as a vessel of form for the piece and
is modeled as a qualitative intensity called InterOnsetVolatility (a.k.a.:
TemporalClumpiness or RhythmicVolatility). To model this, let Et
denote the set of events that start at time t; and correspondingly tE is
the time of this occasion E. (Either Et or its time t could be referred to
as an occasion.) The interonset interval leading up to occasion E is the
difference between its time and that of the preceding occasion; thus,
InterOnsetInterval(E ) = tE − tpredecessor (E ).
(1)
Now deine InterOnsetVolatility as the standard deviation of these
interonset intervals for each occasion E in the span S.
InterOnsetVolatility (S )
= Volatility (S ) = StDev (InterOnsetIntervals (E ) : E ∈ S )
Interonset Interval
(2)
The lux of the InterOnsetVolatility itself can be tracked as it changes
over the course of the whole quartet movement. Since this is a quartet,
the interonset volatility is computed for spans S each consisting of four
consecutive occasions. The result is the dynamic form graph shown in
Example 6, which includes timings from the Arditti Quartet’s recording.
As an offshoot of this computational modeling, I have developed
sensor-controlled algorithms (implemented, for instance, in apps for
sensor-equipped mobile devices such as the iPhone) that promote
kinesthetic learning of such emergent lux (2012a, 2012d). Further
details of the computational model and the analysis are reported
previously (2009b, 2010a, 2012a). Coordinated audio-visual cues help
as well: therefore videos of synchronized animated dynamic form
graphs are presented online27 and in the latter publication (2012a)
which also discusses the mobile app’s responsive generative algorithms.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
0
1000
2000
3000
EXAMPLE
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
5: VISUALIZATION OF THE FLUX OF
INTERONSET VOLATILITY (A.K.A. TEMPORAL CLUMPINESS)
10
37
IN CARTER’S FIFTH QUARTET, MOVEMENT
38
circulating flow system
(increment = 1 onset; docket capacity = 4 onsets)
150
1:03
(pianissimo)
InteronsetVolatility
130
crescendo to
mezzo forte
110
Perspectives of New Music
1:37
Interonset Volatility
90
(a.k.a. TemporalClumpiness)
as standard deviation of 4
consecutive interonsFt intervals 70
0:23
50
1:23
0:07
30
0:35
10
1:58
loudest: forte
-10
247
EXAMPLE
250
253
256
259
262
265
268
271
274
277
6: DYNAMIC FORM GRAPH OF CARTER’S FIFTH QUARTET, BASED ON FLUX OF INTERONSET VOLATILITY
280
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
39
2. FORM-BEARING FLUX IN LIGETI’S VIOLIN CONCERTO
Ligeti’s Violin Concerto is another instance of a work whose longrange form is proitably analyzed in terms of lux of intensity of an
unconventional emergent property. The start of movt. 3 of Ligeti’s
Violin Concerto, shown in Example 7, exhibits one of his hallmark
textures: a layering of descending patterns. In this case its overall pitch
height remains stable—that is, when suficiently long spans of time are
considered (for instance, considering one measure at a time). The result
is a pseudo-descending texture. At other times the status of the texture
is unstable; the intensity of the quality is in lux, as in Example 8, which
shows mm. 34–37 of the solo violin part in movt. 1 of the concerto.
Such lux can be modeled as a comparative (oppositional) vessel,
which is a computational model based on thetic versus antithetic contextual sets. Speciically the vessel TexturalInclineOfPitch (abbreviated
TIP ) is a quality based on the number of ascents versus descents,
regardless of distance.28 Its thetic contextual sets are composed of events
each of whose pitch is higher than that of the pitch of its predecessor.
TIP Thetic
= A = {e | PPredecessor (e ) < Pe }
(3)
Correspondingly, antithetic events are each of those whose pitch is
lower than the pitch of its predecessor:
TIPAntithetic
= B = {e | PPredecessor(e ) > Pe }
(4)
TIP continuously compares the size of the two opposing contextual
sets over the course of the piece or excerpt. This can be deined as follows for a span S of duration w and ending at time t, with thetic and
antithetic sets deined as above in equations (3) and (4):
TIP ( t−w St ) = Proportion(t−w, t, A, B ) = #(t−wAt )
#(t−wBt )
(5)
Example 9 shows an excerpt that starts with a somewhat neutral
degree of TIP (almost an equal proportion of upward as opposed to
downward motions) that then starts to oscillate more drastically, then
tending toward a preponderance of descents. Example 10 shows a
similar pattern over the course of the whole movement, like a driver on
an icy road gradually losing control of his car, until ultimately it
swerves right off the road. Nowhere does Ligeti name or deine the
form-bearing emergent quality TIP, which quite clearly fuels the work’s
dynamic form.
40
Perspectives of New Music
EXAMPLE
7: PSEUDO-CONTINUOUS DESCENT IN LIGETI’S VIOLIN CONCERTO, MOVEMENT 3, MM. 1–4
(VIOLIN 1 SECTION AND VIOLA 1)
Ligeti Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, Copyright © 1992 by Schott Music, Mainz Germany, All rights reserved
Used by permission of European American Music Distribution Company, sole U.S. and Canadian agent for Schott Music, Mainz, Germany
35
36
37
leggiero
EXAMPLE
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
34
8: EXCERPT FROM LIGETI’S VIOLIN CONCERTO, MOVEMENT 1, MM. 34–37
STARTING WITH UPWARD AND DOWNWARD MOTIONS FOLLOWED BY A PROPENSITY FOR
DOWNWARD MOTIONS DESPITE AN OVERALL INCREASE IN PITCH HEIGHT THROUGH M.
36
41
Ligeti Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, Copyright © 1992 by Schott Music, Mainz Germany, All rights reserved
Used by permission of European American Music Distribution Company, sole U.S. and Canadian agent for Schott Music, Mainz, Germany
42
1.8
circulating flow system
(increment = 1 beat; docket capacity = 1 measure)
1.6
1.4
1.2
as Proportion:
VQXBSEFWFOUTEPXOXBSEFWFOUT
1
Perspectives of New Music
Textural Incline
of Pitch (TIP)
0.8
0.6
0.4
Textural Incline of Pitch (TIP)
0.2
y = -0.0037x3 + 0.3204x2 - 9.1416x + 87.624
0
26
EXAMPLE
27
28
29
30 measures 31
Poly.(Textural Incline of Pitch (TIP))
32
33
34
35
9: DYNAMIC FORM GRAPH OF THE SOLO VIOLIN PART OF LIGETI’S VIOLIN CONCERTO, MOVEMENT 1, MM. 26–35,
NEUTRAL TEXTURAL INCLINE OF PITCH (TIP), FOLLOWED BY MORE EXTREME FLUX OF TIP
Ligeti Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, Copyright © 1992 by Schott Music, Mainz Germany, All rights reserved
Used by permission of European American Music Distribution Company, sole U.S. and Canadian agent for Schott Music, Mainz, Germany
25
circulating flow system
(increment = 1 beat; docket capacity = 1 measure)
20
15
10
Textural Incline
PG1JUDI TIP)
as Difference:
#upward events ¦ #downward events
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
0
10
20
30
40
measures
50
60
70
80
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
5
Excerpt: mm. 1–3
EXAMPLE
10: DYNAMIC FORM FROM FLUX OF TEXTURAL INCLINE OF PITCH (TIP) OF SOLO VIOLIN ACROSS ALL OF
1 (LONG RANGE DYNAMIC FORM SIMILAR TO MM. 26–35 WITHIN IT)
LIGETI’S VIOLIN CONCERTO, MOVEMENT
43
Ligeti Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, Copyright © 1992 by Schott Music, Mainz Germany, All rights reserved
Used by permission of European American Music Distribution Company, sole U.S. and Canadian agent for Schott Music, Mainz, Germany
44
Perspectives of New Music
This ontologically proactive computational modeling once again
leads to productive techné. Through this modeling I was inspired to
develop another interactively controlled algorithm; this because the
basis of another sensor-controlled mobile app, called Vortex, which
enables spontaneous manipulation of the TIP property. This I used to
make the comprovisation Vortex Colossus (2011), in which I was able
to spontaneously steer trajectories of emergent lux similar to those
Ligeti composed.
E. CYBERNETIC PHENOMENOLOGY
IN MUSIC ANALYSIS
All of this computational modeling derives from my introspection on
listening to this music; that is, from my phenomenology. But the unconventionality of the qualities modeled make them inaccessible to the usual
verbal guise of phenomenology that is traditional in philosophy and in
music listening oriented analysis prior to Lewin, Roeder, and Quinn.
Consider what typically happens in traditional listener phenomenology
(concentrated introspection about past perceptual and cognitive experience).29 When the theorizing of a musical quality is pursued as
traditional listener phenomenology, it leads to descriptive prose which
another reader-listener imagines in sound in order to hear it for herself.
Often this is a matter of categorizing the relation between speciic notes,
chords, beats, or other events, as serving a speciic function among a
handful of functional categories known in advance as part of a conventional music-theoretic ontology. Yet one cannot refer verbally to that
which has no name. When phenomenological description reaches
beyond pre-categorized discrete events, to new and often elusive
emergent qualities, we ind that communication of the phenomenology
is blocked by limits of the conventional ontology.
By contrast when such a newly recognized quality is computationally
deined, it is then more plausibly viewed as an ontological act, which is
indeed not only pedagogically communicative but is also worldmaking.
Or, if it is not making new worlds from scratch, it is (by identifying or
systematically deining or modeling relevant kinds of entities, processes,
or qualities) participating in and contributing to the rule-driven or
procedure-generated worlds invented by composers. The rules and
procedures are not the worlds; the worlds are the acting out of, the
enacting, of these rules and procedures. Modeling and naming the
emergent properties that arise through such enactive activities in these
worlds—like the activities in the tonnetz-Go world—enhances the
experiential value of hearing or observing these activities. It makes
worldly facets more vivid or even reveals new worlds altogether.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
45
Being inspired by phenomenology of listening, inevitably, such
computational modeling involves ingenuity as well as trial and error in
a feedback process of reinement. This feedback process of listening,
phenomenology, and computational modeling is what I call cybernetic
phenomenology. It is thus ideally suited for treating emergence in music.
Through technological ingenuity and imaginative awareness this activity
deliberately blurs the lines between discovery, assertion, observation,
and creation. Once there are multiple ways to provide deinition (not
just verbal ways) it follows naturally that the process of deining becomes
more luid and consequently so does our ontology become more luid,
more lexible. Techné helps dissolve the metaphysical rigidity that
supposes everything possible already pre-exists. Thus techné is not collapsing into logos (is not engaged in merely discovering what’s already
there), although it often co-opts or adapts logos to serve other motivations.30 The ontological adventurousness implicit in cybernetic phenomenological music analysis is inspired by the process philosophies of
Bergson, James, and Whitehead, for I am imagining, discovering, and
devising unconventional (exotic) kinds of lux in music, and speciically
newly conceived emergent properties whose intensities luctuate.
F. THREE APPLICATIONS OF CYBERNETIC PHENOMENOLOGY
Once a perceived quality is modeled computationally, the model can
be deployed in several ways: (1) to analyze and theorize yet more music,
(2) pedagogically, to communicate and cultivate understanding and
aesthetic appreciation of unconventional music, and (3) for creating
more music or creating formal models or technology for creating music
(improvised or composed) based on the models. For instance, this
approach spurs the creation of music whose trajectories of lux suggest
the activities of hypothetical meteorological or physiological systems,
which have enticing associative, expressive, and affective potential.
Possibilities for neoplasmatically generated music are also suggested by
this approach (for instance if the intensity of a detected biological
emergent quality is mapped to one of these computationally modeled
musical emergent properties).31
In some of my own work as a music theorist-analyst (Mailman
2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b), teacher,
and creative musician (composer-improviser), I have pursued cybernetic phenomenology and applied it in all three of these ways mentioned above. Mainly, my focus has been on modeling unconventional
(exotic) emergent properties, speciically to show how compelling
musical forms and expressions arise from their lux of intensity. This
46
Perspectives of New Music
aspect of cybernetic phenomenology is diagrammed in Example 11,
detailed explanation of which was presented previously (2010b, 2012b,
2012c). Practices such as this in music theory, analysis, composition, and
interactive system technology extend, with more deliberate systematic
rigor, the thinking in experimental arts of the 1960s that spawned
“cybernetically modeled performing machines, sculptures, and bizarre
artworks that attempted to respond to their environment through
feedback mechanisms and thus [blur] the lines between art, science,
and research” (Salter 2010, 307). The technological practices of recent
music theory and analysis, as modeled in Example 11, resonate with
cybernetics theory proper and with the practices of computer music
composers, which you can see by comparing the general ideas of feedback low suggested in Example 11 with those in Alex Andrew’s (2009)
diagram of process with adaptive control (Example 12a) and Simon
Emmerson’s (1989) model of computer composition (Example 12b).
I did not yet mention a crucial aspect of such feedback process
models that is at least hinted at by most of the diagrams shown so far.
That is the importance of modeling the experience of streams of
discrete events in terms of continuous quantity. In his recent study,
Andrew (2009) attributes the shortfall of AI and earlier cybernetics
research to their failure to acknowledge the importance of continuity;
that is, continuous quantity. Andrew critiques the earlier cybernetician
Gordon Pask for insisting on crisp classiication as a necessary step in
learning. Citing the nervous system, motor control, and learning,
Andrew explains “at all levels life depends on complex regulatory
processes having continuous character” (Andrew 2009, v). Therefore
continuous variables should be seen as fundamental rather than
peripheral. “Continuous measures enter into many tasks that are
usually presented as discrete” (Ibid.). In fact their interconnection is
also noted: “The remarkable ability of people and animals to learn
from experience inds similar expression in tasks of both discrete and
continuous nature and in tasks that require intimate mixing of the
two” (Ibid.). Continuity permeates thought. Like the computational
modeling of lux in music that I and others have pursued, Andrew’s
characterization resonates with Bergson’s emphasis on continuity
(temps durée, for instance) and qualitative intensity, but yet synthesized
with Whitehead’s views on the importance and lexibility of acts of
measurement—thus emerge intriguing points of contact between
cybernetics (often associated with machines, which are presumed to
operate in discrete steps) and process philosophy (which has always
emphasized the continuously changing nature of reality as we
experience it).32
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
NOESIS
Analyst-Theorist
NOEMA
Musical
work W
as sensory
stimulus
Analytical self-conscious
(phenomenological self)
Reflect on (phenomenologize) one’s own cognition that produces
(or could produce) the experience of flux and aesthetic appreciation
Aesthetic
appreciation A
!
$ % "♮ "
% "♮ s) "& '
Experience
of flux F
* "♮ + , '
Cognition
Develop or choose physical or conceptual
Compare flux
computing machine whose computations
to refine,
Computing Machine model the cognition that gives rise to flux F
revise,
Array of
adjust the
numbers
representing
computational
flux F’
model
input device
such that
F’ ~~ F
Machine
computations
Learn how the
machine does the computations
that result in array of numbers F’
such that
F” ~~ F’ ~~ F
so that
A” ~~ A
Reader-Listener
Directive self
(procedural self)
Try to emulate or approximate the learned machine
computations and attend to the resulting experience of flux
Aesthetic
appreciation A”
( '
Musical work
W’s score
encoded or
partially
encoded
2d/
8a/
=
2f/
4c#/ …
Musical
work W
as sensory
stimulus
!
$ % "♮ "
% "♮ s) "& '
Experience
of flux F”
Cognition
EXAMPLE
47
* "♮ + , '
( '
11: DIAGRAM OF THE CYBERNETIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO MODELING AND ENHANCING MUSIC LISTENING
48
Perspectives of New Music
FEEDBACK PROCESSES ASSERTED FOR
CYBERNETICS AND FOR MUSIC COMPOSITION
Product
Process
Transducer
a b c
d
Transducer
Raw
Material
e
Controller
h
Determination
of Degree of
Goal-achievement
EXAMPLE
12A: DIAGRAM OF PROCESS WITH ADAPTIVE CONTROL
(ADAPTED FROM ANDREW 2009)
NEW ACTIONS
ACTION REPERTOIRE
REINFORCE
(action)
(accept)
ACTION
TEST
STORE
(material)
(reject)
yes
MODIFY
no
EXAMPLE
12B: EMMERSON’S (1989) MODEL OF COMPUTER COMPOSITION
(AS ADAPTED IN OJALA 2009)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
49
In these respects, we see now, just before and since the turn of the
21st century, a convergence between cybernetics and process philosophy, manifested in both analysis-directed theorizing and in creative
practices. Indeed the experiential relation between discreteness and continuity is one of the central themes I explore not only in my analysisdirected theorizing of music but also in my intermedia, interactivity,
and comprovisational worldmaking practices.
III. INSTANCES OF INTERMEDIA, INTERACTIVITY, AND
COMPROVISATIONAL WORLDMAKING IN CREATIVE PRACTICE
Technological art provides new narrative opportunities. One way it
does so is by forging new contexts for frustrating or enacting agency,
contexts explored by digital media artist Toni Dove for instance (Salter
2009, 329) and which I discuss in relation to narrative interpretations
of processive minimalist music (2013a). Another side of this relates to
the experiences of qualitative change seen, heard, or felt, as discussed
above. As I already suggested, some kinds of music analysis can draw
attention to musical properties (the strategies that produce them as
well their qualitative affect) that are sui generis, that is, properties that
are not quite and not only texture, that are not quite and not only
rhythm, that are not quite and not only melodic contour, like properties that are neither blue nor green but in between, or whose color is
time dependent.33 In the artistic realm however the point is not just to
formulate a new or unusual quality (which could be grasped synoptically), but rather to forge situations, or opportunities, that emphasize
such qualities so they are experienced in the low of time; hence, the
connection between worldmaking and narrative. Herman (2009, 73–
74) explains that the representational nature of narrative
conveys the experience of living through [a] storyworld-in-lux,
highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined consciousnesses affected by the occurrences at issue. Thus . . . narrative
is . . . concerned with qualia, a term used by philosophers of mind
to refer to the sense of “what it is like” for someone or something
to have a particular experience.
In technological art, the particular experiences might derive from
hypothetical worlds one step removed from our own. For instance, we
might try to imagine different ways that the stimuli from our environment could be distributed (partitioned) across our distinct sense organs.
Or we might try to imagine sources whose visual and sonic impression
50
Perspectives of New Music
consistently combines types of change and stasis in ways not normally
encountered in our actual world, or that segregates types of change
and stasis that are typically experienced as being paired with each
other. Going further, we might dream that such imagined reality and
the artiicial means of simulating it might, at a certain point, become
indistinguishable from each other. What might that transformation
look or sound like? Finally, we may fashion an artiicial physically immersive interactive world with real-time cause-and-effect that is highly
systematized yet still partly indeterminate—systematized and indeterminate as our usual real world is, but not in the same way as our usual
real world is; it’s a responsive world whose systems of cause-and-effect
combine “real-world” physics with aesthetics-driven techné informed
by cybernetic phenomenology of past music and visual art works.34
A. MOBILE APP COMPROVISATIONS
Food consumption is one of those experiential pleasures whose
phenomenology intermingles the discrete and continuous; for instance,
in regard to lavors, textures, quantities, and multiplicities: We are
routinely aware that every lavor can vary in intensity and is transmitted
through some or other texture which we are quite aware comprises its
own component parts which we might or might not sense directly. The
particularity of such lavors and textures, which we may enjoy, emerges
from their molecular and super-molecular content and coniguration.
And texture as experienced inside the mouth emerges quite differently
from the way it does through our hands. Also relevant is the
experience of continuity without repetition, which is an implicit aspect
of ingestion: you don’t eat the same raviolo twice. Yet we experience
continuity in eating ravioli, including their continuous decrease in
temperature from one to the next.35
To constructively explore such emergent aspects of experience, a
recent phase of my cybernetic phenomenological activities involves programming generative algorithms for interactive technologies. The technologies are designed for comprovisation, which is a technology-based
hybrid of composition and improvisation.36 Because most music does
not represent aspects of our world in the straightforward way that visual
art is often capable of doing, the opportunities for worldmaking through
music have to be articulated and forged differently. Comprovisation
stands at the cusp between the planned and spontaneous, between the
deterministic and indeterminate, and between the embodied and
disembodied; so it does cut across some usual categories. A distinctive
feature of technological art is that no matter what categories you
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
51
(pre)deine, there is always some way to forge experiences that cut
across these categories.
Like a compositional space (Morris 1995), a comprovisational system
is a hybrid between a composition and an instrument. This allows an
instance of comprovisation to be a hybrid between a composition and
an improvisation. Comprovisation is compositional in that the design
of the system (the interactive algorithmic technology) is more aestheticintentionally speciic than that of an instrument; thus the system verges
toward being an open-form work in itself (as does a compositional
space). An instance of the compositional aspect of comprovisation is
that comprovisational algorithms generate complex streams of events
that are spontaneously controllable, but the features controlled are
statistical characteristics of emergent qualities (macro-properties) such
as texture and harmony which are often manipulated to project longrange form in planned-out compositions, but which usually cannot be
so manipulated in improvisation. Related to this is that comprovisation
may involve the planned choreography of physical movements, some of
which may infuse long-range form into the generated music (through
gradual shifts of harmony or texture, for instance). Since it is not speciic
to musical sounds or the typical playing of a musical instrument, the
concept of comprovisation also applies to visual imagery (motion
graphics).37 These and other facets of comprovisation are discussed
and illustrated in my previous essay “Improvising Synesthesia” (2013b)
and other writings about Fluxations, which is also discussed below.38
Because they are technological, comprovisational systems generate
streams of complexity that could not be simultaneously created and
steered by a single person playing a musical instrument. Thus, by
doing what couldn’t be done before, they enable a new opportunity to
be exploited. By using sensors to provide input to comprovisational
algorithms, our creativity and spontaneity become intertwined with
computation whose design is aesthetically informed. This allows us to
explore the ramiications of our own aesthetic intentionality. Thus such
cyber-improvisation serves as a discovery process (for instance, as a simulation of a composition) as much as it serves as a mode of expression.
Among other things, comprovisational technology allows the userperformer to spontaneously but systematically increase or attenuate the
intensity (the extent) of various kinds of diversity, using continuous
controllers or sensors such as sliders and tilt-sensing accelerometers.
These are continuous variables controlling discrete events stochastically,
rather than being one-to-one mappings of gestures to events. In other
words, these input variables control statistical proiles of collections of
events such that their change is sensed holistically rather than directly
or immediately. Thus the qualities that shift noticeably with intention
52
Perspectives of New Music
can only be sensed as emergent, emerging from the experience of the
low of multiple events. Although they are being manipulated as if they
are primary (non-emergent) properties, they are actually still issuing
forth from concealment in the algorithms which are too fast, complex,
and indeterminate to be reckoned during the listening moment. That
is, the properties are still emergent since they arise as surface artifacts
of fast moving algorithms whose operations cannot be decomposed in
any realistic context. The properties are unmistakably present (though
to varying degrees of intensity). Though the intention (agency) of the
performer can be sensed through macro-level shifts of the qualities, the
inner workings of the qualities remain mysterious while they are being
experienced.
The technology has resulted in a series of comprovisational nonrepetitive ambient music works some of which were presented at a
listening installation at the Seventh International Conference on Music
Since 1900, in 2011 (Lancaster, UK), among them: Coriander Castle,
Cinnamon Crevice, Cardamom Canyon, and Licorice Loops 1 and 2—
each inspired by the hypothetical fusion of emergent properties of taste
sensation (lavor) and texture re-imagined as a tactile experience of
micro-landscape morphology.
How could that be? Typically the most obvious control exercised by
a musician is the timing and the pitch of each individual sound, whereas
features such as texture, composite rhythm, or harmonic palette are
indirectly or less obviously controlled and usually cannot be gradually
shifted in a controlled way. For instance, playing a conventional instrument, it would be dificult for a person to improvise a complex
irregularly arpeggiating texture that maintains (repeats) a particular
harmonic palette (quality) but while smoothly shifting (transposing) its
constituent tones, without ever repeating any of its resultant contour
patterns. And to do this while gradually attenuating (quantitatively
decreasing) the interonset density while holding a steady underlying
pulse and gradually thickening the texture (number of simultaneously
occurring pitches) and meanwhile forging oscillations (waves) of the
degree of sustain (increasing and decreasing durations) of individual
pitched sounds, without ever repeating individual rhythms—such a feat
would be impossible to do spontaneously. But all of this is feasible
with comprovisation systems, which therefore reconigure some of our
typical expectations about continuity and repetition, the qualitative
and quantitative, and determinism versus spontaneity, in regard to the
micro- and macro-level aspects of musical experience.
In regard to smell, taste, and ingestion, we might know intellectually
that these are, on a micro-level, affected by the morphology of molecules encountered inside our mouths and noses, but that is not how we
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
53
typically experience the smells, lavors, or even the textures of that which
we ingest. Conversely, morphology is typically something we experience
on a more macro-level, on the exterior of our bodies, through tactile
experience, for instance. Knowing that these seemingly separate facets
of reality are actually highly related might inspire us to try to transcend
or upend their distinction through some other experience that parallels
such a transgression, but in a different sense domain. For the reasons I
explained above, music comprovisation is perhaps one such parallel.
Through its creative actions (pragmatist acts) it perhaps helps us push
the bounds of our usual consciousness of other kinds of experience.
Unusual experience in one sense domain may help shake up our minds
about experience in another. By reconiguring the more conventional
relations between musical continuity and repetition, qualitative and
quantitative, and determinism and spontaneity, comprovisation (the
activity of doing it as well as resulting works such as Coriander Castle,
Cinnamon Crevice, and so forth) might suggest hypothetical worlds
that reconigure inside and outside the body experiences, such that
experiences like taste-olfactory sensation (lavor sensed in the mouth)
and tactile sensation (touch sensed by the hands) are intermingled in a
fashion that is a step removed from the usual.39
B. THE CHAMELEON JELLYFISH SERIES
The afinity between the lux of exotic properties in music and exotic
creatures in nature leads me to another phase of cyber-art, one inspired
by Whitehead’s ([1929] 1978) multiple “actual worlds” ontology.40
Although the algorithmically generated computer music-animations that
comprise my Chameleon Jellyish initially arose as a technical experiment,
it was Whitehead’s metaphysics that inspired me to continue to develop
the project, which ultimately consists of ive audio-visual pieces:41 Song
of the Chameleon Jellyish, Lament of the Chameleon Jellyish, Mating
Ritual of the Chameleon Jellyish, Chameleon Jellyish Cyber-telepathic
Transformation, and the addendum, Thought Experiments of the Chameleon Jellyish.
As explained above, in technological art, the particular experiences
evoking enticingly unusual qualia might derive from hypothetical worlds
one step removed from our own. In this case, I am inspired by the idea
of creatures with mysterious activities producing novel and noticeably
pleasing effects. This provides new narrative opportunities to represent
visual and aural experiences of continuous and discrete (smooth and
crisp) lux. These are narratively suggestive in unconventional ways inspired by Lanier’s (2010) perceptive appreciation of a natural wonder:
54
Perspectives of New Music
the chromatophore camoulage choreographies of cephalopods, which
he calls “postsymbolic communication.” In creative media, communication such as this perhaps supersedes Nelson Goodman’s (1978)
symbol system view of worldmaking. Lanier’s idea of postsymbolic
communication suggests a bypassing of discrete language-like symbols
in favor of continuity-based interaction, interaction that exploits the
continuity of time, of physical space, and of analog sensors (artiicial or
biological). It suggests a direct pursuit of adaptation and “self-tuning,”
which is promoted by Andrew’s (2009) continuity-based cybernetics as
well by my own computational modeling of dynamic form in
unconventional musics. As it happens, as early as 1955 Elliott Carter
declared his “dynamic and changeable approach . . . [which] tries to
give musical expression to . . . unexpected types of changes and
relationship uncovered . . . in the life cycle of insects and certain
marine animals by biologists” (Carter 1972, 309, discussed in Mailman
2009a). The exotic qualia of the ocean’s visual music, real or imagined,
seems rich in narrative potential, and apt for cybernetics-infused techné.
For the Chameleon Jellyish series (2011–12), I added color, sound,
and other features to a computer graphics algorithm called Puff, by Ira
Greenberg, in order to depict what I imagined as the activities of a
hypothetical sea creature equipped with chameleon-like color-transformative abilities and distinctive sonic projective powers, but with the
translucency, morphology, and motion of a jellyish. Nearly amorphous
shapes constantly but smoothly change their morphology while color
hue is shifting at a slower pace, and movement at a still slower pace;
the triadic pitched sounds also shift simultaneously at different paces.
Such “continuous actualization” is that which Kwinter (2001, 110–13)
focuses on to characterize Kafka’s Bergsonian inlected narrative motif:
metamorphosis as a purely intensive “passage from one state to
another. . . . In Kafka, the ship of Being has been made rudderless and
subject only to the peripeties of winds, currents, and tides.”
It would be too much to claim that attending to position-correlated
microglissandi in an audio-visual work would automatically alert us to
“continuous actualization” in the world around us. Yet precisely because
it is such a contrived and circumscribed situation, it prompts us to shift
from our usual way of attending. Watching the “continuous actualization” of the chameleon jellyish, their different rates of smooth lux,
perhaps primes us a little better for attending to analogous phenomena
in the world around us (including its music) that might normally escape
notice. This is partly because of how, in these works, stasis and lux, as
well as correlation and indeterminacy, are conigured differently in
relation to each other as compared to how they are usually related.
To quote Goodman’s (1978) statement again:
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
55
While we might say that . . . some relevant kinds of one world are
missing from another, we might perhaps better say that the two
worlds contain just the same classes sorted differently into relevant
and irrelevant kinds. Some relevant kinds of the one world, rather
than being absent from the other, are present as irrelevant kinds;
some differences among worlds are not so much in entities comprised as in emphasis or accent, and these differences are no less
consequential. (10)
As mentioned above, glaucous is perhaps a less relevant color
category in our world, but another world could be fashioned in which
it is exactly the other way around, and as Goodman says, some of the
most striking contrasts of this sort are forged in the arts.
In the visual arts, which are referential more often and more straightforwardly than music is, such forging could come down to merely
depicting an imagined world that replaces sapphires and emeralds with
sui generis sapphglaumeralds. Of course in the visual arts there are many
more imaginative ways of cutting across standard categories, such as
those exploited in the surrealist paintings of Magritte, Ernst, and Dali.
It is no coincidence that their powerful instances of worldmaking
involve deliberate representational distortions of our usual world.
Over the course of the Chameleon Jellyish series, the viewer is forced
to reconcile combinations and juxtapositions of stasis and lux,
uniformity and diversity, singularity and multiplicity, interdependence
and independence, sudden and smooth changes of color, distinct
geometries and amorphous shapes, hard lines and soft edges that are
similar to but yet a step removed from what one observes in nature.
Song of the Chameleon Jellyish presents micro-time-scale discrete changes
of pitch (major triads) which move in smooth position-correlated transpositional trajectories on the longer-range time-scale while color hue
and morphology mercurially luctuate. Lament of the Chameleon Jellyish
casts a different affective tone by presenting portamento (continuous)
micro-changes of pitch. The third video, Mating Ritual of the Chameleon Jellyish, combines symmetrical and asymmetrical lux, and does so
in a way that differs from how predetermined versus spontaneous
behavior are typically encountered in our environment. The intention
is that its peculiar combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical lux
challenges spectators to decipher the independence versus co-action of
the hypothetical creatures, who seem to simultaneously exhibit ritualistic
and agential spontaneous behavior (Example 13). The creatures’ coaction is that they are perpetually mirroring each other’s shape; their
agential behavior is that each is maintaining its own independent
stream of color shifting. These precise but smooth maneuvers are
examples of post-symbolic communication.
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Perspectives of New Music
EXAMPLE
13: STILL FRAMES FROM MATING RITUAL OF THE CHAMELEON JELLYFISH,
SHOWING BOTH RITUALISTIC (COORDINATED) AND AGENTIAL (INDIVIDUALISTIC) BEHAVIOR
(LARGER COLOR IMAGE AVAILABLE AT WWW.PERSPECTIVESOFNEWMUSIC.ORG)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
57
The algorithm that produced the fourth video, Chameleon Jellyish
Cyber-telepathic Transformation, is partly stochastic like the previous
ones, but differs from the previous ones in two crucial ways, with
ramiications for the resulting effect. In this case the creature gradually
gets bigger and also is allowed to interact with the edge of the screen
—indeed it can go off the edge of the screen—which is imagined as a
sort of “cyber” tank which it is, or was, loating within. By removing
the edge of the screen as a constraint, the state of the system can vary
much more unpredictably, like nonlinear dynamical systems (chaos).
Indeed it can evolve, or devolve. To the extent this evolution or
devolution is a qualitative change (such as existential state), it’s an
ontological eureka moment: diachronic emergence. The edge of the
screen itself is imagined as a threshold or membrane between two
opposing existential states of the creature: a simulation of an embodied
entity that is generated artiicially, versus a computational entity that is
real but disembodied (or “cyber”-embodied). The lux between these
two existential states is experienced by the viewer-listener because the
visual and sonic behavior of the creature changes upon crossing this
threshold, so that it is witnessed even when the creature goes off
screen and in a sense loses its “physical” location, its presence being
“relocated” into a cyber-realm (cyber-[dis]embodied). The change in
the sonic behavior is that the pacing of the creature’s song is drastically
stretched out so that what was a idgety texture (micropolyphony)
becomes a sort of disjointed counterpoint of melody and voice-leading
(macropolyphony). In terms of visual behavior, when touching on or
beyond the screen edge, the creature’s hue starts to take over the
entire screen, as if it has swallowed, or enveloped, its own cyber tank,
and thus wrested control of its own artiicially induced predicament.
This smooth takeover, as well as the smooth shifts of hue, are instances
of continuity-based interaction (as opposed to linguistic-symbolic communication). Also, a quirk in the algorithm causes the sonic material to
evolve in an additional way that affects both pitch and texture in an
enchanting correlation. As it moves farther and farther off, it gradually
ilters out pitch events that are not part of an E major triad. Therefore as
the creature becomes more and more cyber-(dis)embodied, the texture
of its sonic stream becomes noticeably sparser and more triadic. Since
the creature is slowly growing in size, even though it loats rather randomly (like a jellyish), its tendency to go off screen (out of the cybertank and thereby become cyber-[dis]embodied) increases over time, so
that the work has evolutionary form, experienced sonically and visually.
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Perspectives of New Music
Stated in more fanciful terms: The evolutionary form of Chameleon
Jellyish Cyber-telepathic Transformation additionally depicts telepathic
communication between jellyish and digital system, gradually resulting
in a transformation of the jellyish’s consciousness into a more expansive
cyber-cognition. The suggestion of such cyber-transformation exploits
certain narrative capabilities unique to technological music, as I discuss
elsewhere (Mailman 2013a). It is also a hypothetical exploration of the
notion of technoetics proposed by Ascott (1998).
The ifth video, Thought Experiments of the Chameleon Jellyish,
explores exclusively the creature’s off-screen (out of the cybertank)
states, and adds a new twist in that its generation was interactive.
Speciically the background color was controlled in real-time as the
other aspects of the algorithm ran on their own, which meant the
rhythm of color changes, which are imagined as affects or emotions
(also suggesting post-symbolic communication), could be made to
mimic the more erratic rhythm of human emotions. The algorithm was
also set to abandon the consistently amorphous jellyish morphology in
favor of a horizontalized (physically sedentary) disposition, which connotes the cyber-(dis)embodiment of the creature while simultaneously
highlighting the ever shifting gradations of subtle versus stark color
contrast. The exploration of subtle color changes and shifting line
borders between contrasting color ields was inspired especially by the
color-ield paintings of Barnett Newman, as well as those of Mark
Rothko, Hans Hofmann, and Morris Louis.
To forge a connection between cultivated aesthetic tastes and the
attractively strange dynamism of living creatures is one of the potentials of cybernetic phenomenology–infused techné that I had intended
to explore. In particular, in this case I wanted to explore the appealing
contrast between gradual and abrupt changes of color and patternedversus-non-patterned musical sound—phenomena that resonate with
my experience of Gerhard Richter paintings, certain quasi-aleatoric
musical works of Earle Brown and Witold Lutosławski, as well as the
hours I have spent observing cuttleish and jellyish, especially at the
Aquarium of Western Australia, in Perth.
C. THE FLUXATIONS HUMAN BODY INTERFACE FOR
COMPROVISATIONAL COMPUTER MUSIC
The physical motions of the body, and their use as input sources in a
digital performance system, demand their own techné, as discussed by
Wilson-Bokowiec (2010), for example. In the Fluxations Human Body
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
59
Interface for Comprovisational Computer Music (which I developed in
coordination with collaborator Soia Paraskeva), such body-as-digitalperformer techné is synthesized with the ontologically adventurous
cybernetic phenomenological approach to music which I discussed
above (Mailman and Paraskeva 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Our system
uses an infrared (depth sensing) video camera (Kinect) and custom
designed, built, and programmed sensor gloves to provide input to my
Fluxations music generating algorithm, which runs as a looping RTcmix
script in a Max patch. OpenNI and PrimeSense’s NITE middleware
interpret the infrared video stream to produce the OSCeleton
datastream from which raw and computed values serve as continuous
control variables for emergent quality intensities realized continuously
by the Fluxations music-generating algorithm. Rather than triggering
individual sounds, the algorithm produces a textured continuous stream
of sound (although it also has a limited ability to trigger sudden bursts
of sound through a single glove-mounted button). So far it has been
demonstrated in New Jersey, London, New York, Montreal, San Diego,
and Santa Barbara (Mailman and Paraskeva 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).
1. TECHNÉ OF INTERMEDIA: TRI-MODAL MAPPINGS AND BI-MODAL MEDIA
A second phase of the Fluxations human body interface (presented in
Montreal, New York, San Diego, and Santa Barbara) involves spontaneously controlled animated generative computer graphics I programmed. The generated graphics coordinate noticeably with the
generated music, creating an immersive world, whose correlated audiovisual trajectories are expressively steered and sculpted like luid by the
motions of the human moving through continuous space. Its prismatic
particle systems and luctuating continuities of color, texture, and
harmony are regulated by the planned or spontaneous actions of the
performer. The generative algorithms are designed to maximize both
variety and coherence of the musical and visual experience, including
cross-modal relations between them and evolving emergent patterns of
the particles (Mailman 2012e).
In one sense, the emergent qualities instantiated in this way would
be more deinitive if the bodily motions were choreographed in advance.
(This is true despite the indeterminate, stochastic, contribution of the
steered algorithms.) Yet I am more drawn to exploring the potential of
such systems in regard to spontaneity.42 In my view, to design an
interactive system for ixed composition is a bit like designing clothes
for a mannequin. Instead, as I explain in “Improvising Synesthesia”
(2013b), I’ve been intrigued by how improvisation with such a system
as Fluxations entails certain indeterminacies of interactional intention.
60
Perspectives of New Music
C
perfect 4 / 5 th
A#
D
D#
G#
C#
th
th
F#
EXAMPLE
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(ut-re-mi-fa-sol-la)
14: IN HARMONIC SPACE 5, STOCHASTIC PITCH POOLS ARE
GENERATED FROM THE CYCLE OF PERFECT FOURTHS AND PERFECT FIFTHS.
BACKWARD AND FORWARD POSITIONS OF THE BODY SELECT FOR
HOLLOWER HARMONIES (FEWER PITCH CLASSES) OR
FULLER HARMONIES (MORE PITCH CLASSES)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
61
(A)
(B)
b
b
b
EXAMPLE
15
(A) LATERAL MOVEMENT (LEFT TO RIGHT OR VICE VERSA) TRANSPOSES THE
PITCH-CLASS SETS AROUND THE PITCH-CLASS CIRCLE. THE DISTANCE
TRAVELED AFFECTS THE CONTINUITY OF HARMONY.
(B) INCREMENTAL TRANSPOSITION OF PITCH-CLASS SETS, INFLUENCING
HARMONIC CONTINUITY IN TERMS OF MORE VS. FEWER COMMON TONES
(MORE VS. LESS CONTINUITY), WHICH DEPENDS ON THE DISTANCE OF
LATERAL MOTION
62
Perspectives of New Music
As in the everyday world we experience, nearly every nuance of our
movement produces some effect through elaborate semi-predicable
systems of cause and effect. And so it goes with Fluxations, too.
Through an intricate techné of interactivity-to-algorithm parameter
mapping, Fluxations provides its own musical and visual art living
environment; not one that mimics the everyday world, but rather one
that maximizes one’s ability to explore and experience a coherent
interweaving of sights and sounds I have found aesthetically appealing
in works by great composers, painters, and visual artists. What I have
learned from theorizing, analysis, and casual observation, I have
programmed into the generating algorithms.
The techné derived from cybernetic phenomenology applied to
previously created works of others is applied to the creation of the
interactive system to create a new immersive world of luid dynamism.
This techné is also fused with the techné of simulating real-world
physical systems, such as the velocity responsive motion of particles in
luid. The affective results of artistic developments and real-world physics
become fused in the synthetically immersive environment of Fluxations.
The harmonic space (controlled by forward-backward and lateral
position) is carefully designed to be both spatially logical and
incremental while providing the ability to navigate the harmonic sound
worlds ranging from medieval drones and organum, to Steve Reich
and Terry Riley, to Wagner, Liszt, Schoenberg, Varèse, Stravinsky, and
even microtones, vaguely evoking the aural ethos of Harry Partch. One
of the harmonic spaces is based on the cycle of ifths and becomes
fuller as one moves forward, as shown in Example 14. The background
color of the generated visual imagery also becomes lighter, and
eventually white, as one moves forward. Moving laterally transposes
the pitch-class set incrementally, as in Example 15. The resulting
emergent lux is more or less continuous depending on the performer’s
front-versus-back position, as shown in Example 16, because it
depends on the proportion of tones held invariant when the pitch-class
set is transposed, a proportion that changes depending on the fullness
(cardinality) of the pitch-class set, which changes according to frontversus-back position. This is designed so that some trajectories within
the space produce subtle pitch transpositions that evoke the nuanced
harmonic shifts I have enjoyed in Steve Reich’s music; other trajectories evoke Wagnerian, Lisztian, Schoenbergian, or Varèsian harmonic
shifts. Moving laterally also smoothly shifts the hue of the background
color. Such gradual shifts of hue are designed to evoke the nuanced
dynamisms of color I have enjoyed in abstract modernist paintings.
Thus new aesthetic syntheses arise by enacting the logistics of the
interactive system.43
C ontinuity
(in terms of number of common tones)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
63
r
La
te
(le ral m
ft t
o r otion
igh
t)
e
t siz
ss sety)
a
l
c
i
Pitchcardinal
(
tion
posi
d
r
a
)
Forw r to near
a
f
(
ler
smal
er
C ontinuity
(in terms of proportion of common tones)
farth
EXAMPLE
large
er
near
er
La
te
(le ral m
ft t
o r otion
igh
t)
ller
sma
er
farth
size
s set y)
s
a
l
c
lit
hPitc cardina
(
tion
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d
r
a
ar
Forw r to ne
(fa
larg
er
near
16: COMPARING THE EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT FRONT-BACK
POSITIONS HAVE ON CONTINUITY DURING LATERAL MOVEMENT: FORWARD
MOTION INDIRECTLY DECREASES THE EFFECT OF LATERAL MOTION, BECAUSE
AS PITCH CLASS SETS INCREASE IN SIZE (CARDINALITY) THEY DIFFER LESS
FROM EACH OTHER (SHARE MORE COMMON TONES) WHEN TRANSPOSED.
IN THIS WAY, THE DEGREES OF CONTINUITY IN THE SPACE VARY
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Perspectives of New Music
Aspects of the texture, its viscosity versus luidity, are controlled by
lowering and raising the body, as shown in Example 17. The possibility
of manipulating this directly was inspired by similar textural luctuations I admire in music of Renaissance composers such as Dufay and
Isaac, as well as in modern works by Ruth Crawford Seeger and Robert
Morris. This textural lux was originally modeled through cybernetic
phenomenological analyses of works by these composers.
Pitch events
Textures with varying degrees of viscosity, yet all three
A)
textures have the same attack(density
and rhythmic volatility.
high
viscosity
Viscosity (vs. fluidity)
B)
effected by(crouching
(vs. standing upright)
(less
fluidity)
Pitch events
Time
medium
viscosity
Pitch events
Time
low
viscosity
(more
fluidity)
Time
EXAMPLE
17: TEXTURE IS CONTROLLED PARTLY THROUGH VERTICAL
DISPOSITION OF THE BODY
(A) VARYING DEGREES OF VISCOSITY INFLUENCE THE TEXTURE
SIGNIFICANTLY (NOTE THAT ALL THREE EXAMPLES HAVE THE SAME ATTACK
DENSITY AND RHYTHMIC VOLATILITY)
(B) VISCOSITY (VS. FLUIDITY) IS CONTROLLED BY
CROUCHING VS. STANDING UPRIGHT.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
65
The range of color hue of the large ellipses and the kind of pitch-class
set chosen by the algorithm are both controlled by the performer’s
forward-backward location; backward position chooses narrower ranges
of hue and smaller pitch-class sets. We see, for instance, looking ahead
to Examples 18a and b, when I am in the back position (away from the
camera), the ellipses are blue, then moving slightly forward in c and d,
the hue range expands to include purple, and then expands further in e
and f to include a broader range of hue: the whole rainbow.
The ability to manipulate the diversity of durations (how widely they
vary above and below an average as opposed to being uniformly the
same) was also inspired by analysis of Crawford Seeger’s music
(Mailman 2010c) as well as various accordion and bandoneon music by
Piazzolla. In the Fluxations system, durational diversity increases to
the extent the performer separates his or her legs from each other,
which also controls the variability of the disappearance-rate of ellipses
presented in the visual imagery.
Timbre also varies interactively, in coordination with the generated
visual imagery. Wrist lexing effects continuous degrees of attack
hardness as well as whether large crisp ellipses accompany the attack
sounds. (Their size is inversely proportional to the pulse speed
[temporal density] of the generated music.) The system is designed so
that a low-pass ilter dampens the timbre as the performer’s hands are
brought closer together, similar to the way vowel sounds in speech are
shaped by how we open and close the mouth, which acts as a ilter.
This aspect of the music’s timbral lux was inspired by the vowel based
“sound color” music of Wayne Slawson.44 In tandem, the background
color of the visual imagery darkens to black as the low-pass ilter is
closed by the hands.
Continuous degrees of syncopation and homophony are also
controlled by wrist lexing and body twists, allowing the performer to
spontaneously traverse various textural rhythms that simulate those as
diverse as Reich’s, Stravinsky’s, Babbitt’s, and Charlie Parker’s. The
system is designed to enable traversal of textural granularities ranging
from the metallic pointillisms of Xenakis, to the dense washes of Truax,
to the gradual ethereal evolutions of Oliveros. The technés of the
algorithm and the interactivity are designed to balance the competing
demands of coherent continuous spatial logic, on the one hand, with
stylistic diversity, on the other.
The Fluxations and FluxNOISations interactive systems are like
continuous spaces, and therefore, for the most part, do not have
discrete moves, like a game of Go does—or the playing of a piano
keyboard, for that matter. Although in Fluxations and FluxNOISations
individual discrete sounds are generated by the systems to create their
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Perspectives of New Music
textured streams, these are not triggered individually by the performer
(except for occasional button-triggered bursts) but rather are triggered
automatically in succession. That is, the discrete sounds are generated
in a continuous stream whose qualities (including the rate and
regularity of the succession) the performer-user manipulates as the
stream lows. These systems’ interaction is predominantly continuous,
to enable the projection, or creation, of gradual macro-level processes,
smooth trajectories of changing emergent behavior, both sonic and
visual. In both cases the shifts are subtleties within complexity.
2. ENTAILMENTS OF THE MAPPINGS
In such a situation, in order for there to be any clarity in the
interactivity, certain trade-offs had to be made, especially in regard to
timbral variety in the case of Fluxations. For instance the mapping that
is most obvious when observing the interactivity of Fluxations is the
low-pass ilter controlled by the distance between the right and left
hands (as detected by motion-tracking technology). If this sound color
(steady-state frequency spectrum) aspect of the timbre was additionally
affected by other bodily movements, then the hand-distance mapping
would be severely obscured, both for the user-improviser and for the
observer-listener. As discussed above, there are other aspects of timbre,
but some of these impinge on textural parameters. For instance, as
explained in connection with Example 17, the average duration
(viscosity versus luidity) of each individual sound in a Fluxations
stream is controlled by the height of the highest part of the body at
any moment (head or hand, whichever is higher). With the body
crouched low to the ground, long duration notes sustain and blend
into each other (it’s muddier at the bottom like a body of liquid might
be), whereas standing up with a hand raised above the head, an
extremely staccato pointillist texture is realized (like wet drops shooting
through the air). Intermediate postures (such as normal standing with
arms down) produce intermediate textures (interpolating between the
extremes just described). Also as explained above, the distance between
the right and left feet control the diversity of durations of notes. With
the feet spread widely apart, a stochastic (random) variety of durations
occurs; as the feet are brought gradually closer together, the range of
durations gradually becomes more uniform. The variety to uniformity
is always centered on the average duration, which is controlled by the
height of the hands or head, as explained above. If the amplitude
envelope aspect of the timbre were affected by some other bodily
movement, that would obscure the durational aspects of texture
controlled by the hands and feet. Thus these timbre limitations arose
from principled logistics of the system design.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
67
To enhance the timbral variety somewhat, the decision was made to
enable the mix-in of a vibraphone sound to each note (wrist-lex
controlled attack hardness explained above) but only such that this
feature could, at the will of the user-improviser, be entirely withheld,
through feasible positioning of one’s body (holding the wrist bent
inward). It is quite feasible to independently change one’s feet
distance, hand distance, or hand/head height while also maintaining
one’s wrist at one or the other extreme angle of lex. (Wrist lexing is
gauged by a lex sensor mounted each of the Paraskeva wireless
gloves.) The decision was made to map it so that when lexing the
right hand palm-inward the vibraphone sound would be absent; but
the more the right hand is lexed backward (palm out) the more
vibraphone sound is mixed in, thereby allowing the softer organaccordion-harmonica family of timbres to gain a harder edge, and also
enable the user-improviser to forge trajectories between these timbral
extremes.45 Nevertheless, despite the various efforts to enhance the
timbral variety of Fluxations, its timbral palette is in the end somewhat
limited. Partly this is a price to pay for having complexity that can be
spontaneously controlled in a systematic way, through body movement
in a continuous space. There are also technological limitations (a
restricted number of variables and sensors) which will eventually be
overcome. Actually the timbrally limited nature of Fluxations prompted
the design of the next system, FluxNOISations, to focus mainly on
timbre (with simultaneous wood, metal, and water-paper-rock streams
whose timbres are controlled by elbow and shoulder positions).46 In
Fluxations, by contrast, primarily the goal from the beginning has been
to explore the resources of pitch, texture, and rhythm (which have
been developed so intricately in acoustic compositions as analyzed) in
the context of spontaneous embodied interactivity, and in systematic
connection with real-time generated visual imagery.
3. GENERATED VISUAL IMAGERY OF FLUXATIONS
As with Fluxations’s audio component, the algorithmic and interactive
technés of the visual imagery are designed to coordinate continuous
spatial logic with visual aesthetics inspired by abstract paintings,
sculptures, and ilm. Examples 18, 19, and 20 show chronologies of
individual frames taken from screen capture footage of Fluxations Full
Body Comprovisation no. 1 and no. 2 (2012).47
For various reasons, Full Body Comprovisation no. 2 provides a better
starting point for examining the visual world of Fluxations, including its
use of color, which is inspired largely by the color theories and demonstrations of Johannes Itten (1970) and Josef Albers (1963). In Examples
18a, b, and c, a lateral move causes the hue of the background to
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Perspectives of New Music
smoothly shift from orange to yellow to green. In Examples 18c, d,
and e, movement forward causes the background color to brighten
from medium green, to light green, to white, after which, in Example
18f, it darkens to black as the hands are closed (also closing the lowpass ilter, dampening the timbre). This move allows the bright colorfulness of the larger ellipses, and their fading transparencies as well, to
contrast against and blend with the now dark background in a different
way than they relate to the white background a few frames earlier
(Example 18e).
During the whole passage, various changes to the medium and large
ellipses are effected by my movement forward in the space. At irst I
am toward the back, so the color hue is limited to only blue (and a
single pitch-class in the music)—though the system compensates for
this by presenting various shades of the blue hue. Moving forward, the
range of hue expands to include purple (Examples 18b and c) and then
the full rainbow (Examples 18d and e). After initial appearance, each
medium and large ellipse fades in transparency, a visual feature inspired
by the paintings of Kandinsky and the lumino-kinetic art of MoholyNagy. As the large ellipses fade, they are also programmed to wobble
and pulsate slightly, a feature inspired by the prismatic color lux of
some of Stan Brakhage’s ilms, such as Text of Light (1974).
The conigurations of small particles luctuate according to particle
system physics: their velocities are proportional to their proximity to
the source of disturbance, which in Fluxations comes from performer’s
left hand. Also the size of the particles is inversely correlated to the
height of the left hand. Meanwhile, the hue of the particle system
luctuates smoothly according to what angle I am facing. The hue of
the particle system shifts from green to blue to pink in Examples 18a,
b, and c, as I turn from sideways to forward-facing, but the particles
remains pink from Examples 18c to f.
Excerpts chosen from Full Body Comprovisation no. 1 better illustrate the morphological, kinetic, and textural behavior of Fluxations’s
visual world. In Examples 19a, b, and c, my body is low to the ground,
creating a viscous texture in the music and making the particle system’s
particles larger. I am in a somewhat forward position so the background is almost white and the medium ellipses varied in color—
reminding me of some of the paintings of Helen Frankenthaler. The
slight changes of position of the particle coniguration from 19a, to b,
to c, exemplify the continuity strived for in the design of the system:
the continuity of physical space is mirrored by other sorts of continuity
in the virtual space. The continuous but irregular motion of the
particle system, for me, resonates with the luid morphologies I
observe in paintings by Kandinsky, Miro, and Pollock.
b
c
d
e
f
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
a
EXAMPLE
69
18: STILL FRAMES FROM A VIDEO SCREEN CAPTURE OF FLUXATIONS: FULL BODY COMPROVISATION NO. 2
(LARGER COLOR IMAGE AVAILABLE AT WWW.PERSPECTIVESOFNEWMUSIC.ORG)
c
d
e
f
g
h
j
k
l
m
19: STILL FRAMES FROM A VIDEO SCREEN CAPTURE OF FLUXATIONS: FULL BODY COMPROVISATION NO. 1
(LARGER COLOR IMAGE AVAILABLE AT WWW.PERSPECTIVESOFNEWMUSIC.ORG)
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EXAMPLE
b
70
i
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
71
20: ADDITIONAL STILL FRAMES FROM A VIDEO SCREEN CAPTURE OF FLUXATIONS: FULL BODY COMPROVISATION NO. 1
(LARGER COLOR IMAGE AVAILABLE AT WWW.PERSPECTIVESOFNEWMUSIC.ORG)
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
EXAMPLE
a
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Perspectives of New Music
In Example 19d, the particles are much smaller as I have raised my
body upright. Their coniguration is still recognizable from Example
19c, despite the different texture the smaller particles now create. The
background color shifts to blue as I have moved backward in physical
space. The particles enlarge again in Examples 19f to m, as I lower my
body. With my hands close together (effecting the dark background) I
gently rock back and forth the system of enlarged particles, whose
loating vertical arrangement of bright particles, against the dark
background, reminds me of irregular crevices of bright pigment which
recur in the paintings of Clyfford Still.
Example 20 shows frames from later in the comprovisation, when I
use a sensor glove to trigger a slowly expanding cloud of wobbling
bubbles. Because a different harmonic space was chosen (as compared
to Comprovisation no. 2) the hue range of the bubbles centers around
yellow (correlated to chromatic, ic1-generated pitch-class sets). The
bubbles fade in transparency as they disperse. The background lightens
(from dark to light green) during this process because I moved forward
in the space, thus complementing one already triggered process (the
sudden burst and gradual dispersion of bubbles) with another continuous process effected through continuous movement (the gradual
lightening of the background color). The immersion entails discrete
and continuous inluence on the audio-visual environment, which
responds in both abrupt and continuous ways. Yet the complexity of
the interaction is systematic so as to be instrumental to expression.
Notice how the visual imagery of Fluxations is similar to, but yet a
step removed from, the visual environment we routinely experience. As
in the visual environment we routinely experience, the visual imagery of
Fluxations’s environment juxtaposes crisp well-deined large shapes with
amorphous conigurations of smaller ones, and intermingles discrete
entrances of ellipses with continuous shifts of color, density, transparency, position, velocity, size, shape, and endurance. The ability to
project distinctions of color similarity versus color contrast help shape
the temporal low and chronological form of the comprovisations. Of
course all of this imagery differs from routine reality in that its objects
and substances are not quite familiar, at least not in the particular
combinations presented here. The aesthetics of music, visual art, and
the logistics of interactivity converge to create a system of cause-andeffect response that constitutes its own expressive immersive world.
Despite its networks of aesthetics-driven external references, Fluxations is an immersive world unto itself, with its own cyber-physiological weather patterns of viscosities, durational varieties, densities,
hollowness and fullness, consonance and discord, timbral and luminous
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
73
brightness and darkness, expansions and contractions of color hue,
lowing and lickering particles, continuities of opacity and transparency, trajectories, textures, swarms and singularities, synchronies, and
syncopations, and all the multitudinous luid interactions between
these, simultaneously ambient and focal to both observers and participants. This “storm in the computer,” to use De Landa’s (2011) phrase,
is steered from the outside (stochastic algorithmic music and graphics
forged kinesthetically by spontaneous input from the human body) and
projected back out to communal space to be seen, heard, and felt (by
the human body) and is thus a peculiarly immersive cyber-embodiment.
At several points in the comprovisations, a gradual change is effected
both aurally and visually, thus creating a cross-modal gradient of
qualitative intensity. Such passages simultaneously afirm Bergson’s
emphasis on smooth change of intensive quality (which characterize
temps durée) and refute Bergson’s rejection of cinematic time as unreal
and incompatible with the experience of temps durée. I say this because
all computer graphic animation is created in discrete frames (like
cinema) yet the palpable smoothness of the experience—made even
stronger by being presented simultaneously in visual and aural
modalities—afirms Bergson’s notion that the experience of lux of
qualitative intensity is the primary mode of temporal experience. Yet,
inspired partly by Bergson, the design practices of Fluxations are
encouraged by my music theorizing and analysis as well as the recent
critique of cybernetics by Andrew (2009): These practices intermingle
the continuous with the discrete, the smooth with the crisp, trying to
optimally balance aesthetic variety of the generated music and visuals
with spatio-logical coherence for its interactivity, so that the ear, eye,
mind, and body are pulled together as a whole into the aesthetically
varied experience.
IV. PRAGMATIC SPECULATIVE REALISM PURSUED BY FORGING
UNCONVENTIONAL EMBODIED EXPERIENCE
Above, I discussed Chua’s (2001) characterization that music’s transformation into instrumental-expressive techné entails a “detuning” of
the world that represents its disenchantment.48 He describes how
modernity takes music out of its ancient cosmic position in the celestial
supernatural realm, “collaps[ing] it into ‘reality’ as an audible fact,
divorced from celestial values.” Yet doesn’t such pessimism lose power,
in light of all else I discussed since?
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A. PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE REMOTE
I discussed emergence and cybernetic phenomenology through
much of this essay obviously for a reason. Unconventional (exotic)
emergent qualities are hard to get at, hard to learn, and dificult to
communicate about; their ontological status is almost paradoxical.
Yet they’re worth it. Whether it be the qualities emerging from the
rules of Go, from the compositional procedures of Ligeti or Carter,
from the secret motivations and transformations of ictitious jellyish, or
the ones that emerge multi-modally from the cyber-immersive, aesthetic
systematics of Fluxations, such emergent lux rewards our attention.
The processive feedback approach of cybernetic phenomenology is a
strategy for addressing the situation, an approach that points in both
scientiic and artistic directions—often with the two intertwined.
Some of the best music starts as noise. Media philosopher Ian
Bogost (2012) sings such praises to the tune of noise, what the
philosopher Graham Harman calls “black noise”:
Harman uses the name “black noise” to describe the background
noise of peripheral objects: “It is not a white noise of screeching,
chaotic qualities demanding to be shaped by the human mind, but
rather a black noise of mufled objects hovering at the fringes of
our attention.” . . . As philosophers, our job is to amplify the
black noise of objects to make the resonant frequencies of the stuff
inside them hum in credibly satisfying ways. Our job is to write
the speculative ictions of their processes. (Bogost 2012, 32–34)49
Bogost calls this alien phenomenology and considers it a pragmatic
speculative realism.50
B. PRAGMATISM, EMBODIMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND WHAT’S BETWEEN US
Pragmatism prompts us to seek real engagement, not just pontiication, with the phenomenological road-less-traveled. Everyday language
inds a way to bridge from concrete familiarity to unfamiliar abstraction,
often through either narrative or conceptual metaphors, which build
up from various analogies and mappings. Such is the basis of Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of cognitive (conceptual) metaphor
and embodied mind.
Their theory proposes that certain schemas facilitate conceptual mappings between diverse experiences, called cross-domain mapping. One
of the crucial ones is the VERTICALITY image schema, which, for instance,
relates positive and negative emotions, as well as large and small
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
75
quantities, to high and low positions in space: verticality. Consider that
any mapping based on continuous quantity could, in some way, exploit
the VERTICALITY image schema. In order to be learned—that is, as an
analogy, literally and iguratively analog—the luctuating intensity of
an unfamiliar emergent quality may be reckoned in terms of intensive
lux of more routine qualities we experience.
Previously (2009a, 2010b) I explained how such thinking igures
into music analysis, enabling us to relate luctuating emergent properties in music (such as melismaty or pitch variety) to other luctuating
emergent properties (such as stock-market value, temperature, or
humidity), for the purpose of interpretive narrative or hermeneutics, as
diagrammed in Example 21. Conceptualized this way, such mappings
amplify and extend natural worldly experience by prompting the listener,
reader, interpreter to imagine new affective responses. Theories of
embodiment suggest that concepts are learned through the medium of
the body; for example, by relating quantitative lux to vertical motion
we can experience with our bodies. In fact the neuroscientist Rodolfo
Llinas (2001) declares: thinking is internalized movement. That is an
instance of embodied mind. If anything, it is through the fuel of
embodiment that technological (interactive, immersive, synesthetic) art
can serve as an engine to drive pragmatic speculative realism.
Writing on Whitehead’s processive metaphysics as relating to
aesthetics and media theory, Steven Shaviro (2009, 28) remarks that
“mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness.”51 In
response to unconventional affective stimuli, the embodied mind continuously adapts and tunes itself, with or without being conscious of
this, and Whitehead would argue that this process is driven by affect, as
all cognition is iltered through emotion, which forms the basis of
experience. “For Whitehead, affect precedes cognition” (Shaviro 2009,
14) It is often through the sense organs of the body that affect is, shall
we say, effected. So how do you learn something utterly foreign?
If, as Llinas says, thinking is internalized movement, then it seems
the ability to think (as a listener, composer, improviser, analyst, critic,
theorist) of luctuating viscosity, melismaty, harmonic hollowness,
durational diversity, or any other intensity-varying emergent quality
would be signiicantly enhanced by the experience (or even the
observation) of moving one’s body to effect such change. Indeed this
is kinesthetic learning: learning from the outside in (Mailman 2012a).
Upon approaching an utterly foreign phenomena: you live it to learn
it. Experienced through irst-person or observed bodily participation,
mappings of physical movement to utterly foreign emergent properties
amplify and extend natural worldly experience by conjuring synthetic
experiences that prompt new affective responses.52
76
S ource domain
HIGH
metaphoric
projection
LOW
UP
metaphoric
projection
DOWN
VERTICALITY
image schema
PitchVariety
pitch
intensity
stock market
temperature or
humidity
Target domains
emergent properties
emergent properties
music domains
EXAMPLE
non-music domains
21: CROSS-DOMAIN MAPPING BETWEEN MUSICAL AND NON-MUSICAL PROPERTIES,
BASED ON THE VERTICALITY IMAGE SCHEMA
Perspectives of New Music
Melismaty
inter-domain
correspondence
of
metaphoric structure
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
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Technology provides the opportunity, in ways ininitely lexible.
Citing Cunliffe (1994), an essay by Sagiv, Dean, and Bailes (2010,
306) remarks that “by sharing computational process or data, one may
be able to establish creative exchanges between different modalities,
and these may be cognitively and emotively interesting.” They call this
algorithmic synesthesia.53 As discussed above, Fluxations is perhaps an
example—one, however, that does not explore algorithms for their
own sake, but rather exploits them pragmatically to optimize a balance
between competing demands: immersive interactive expressivity on the
one hand, and musical and visual aesthetics on the other. Among other
things, the purpose of Fluxations is to provide the opportunity to
immersively and expressively explore unconventional emergent properties of music and visual art that I have admired. The exploration is
also conveyed, in the intersubjective space of public performance and
documentation. I consider myself extremely fortunate to live in a time
when all this is possible.
Each such active exploration exempliies a particularly valuable sort
of freedom, precisely because it is not, or does not seem to be,
regulated by imperatives of or from the pre-existing natural world. As
McGowen asserts, in paraphrasing Hannah Arendt’s philosophy:
Freedom must be pure, completely spontaneous, a totally unexpected intervention into the causal change. As such, the free act is
quite literally a “miracle” (169), an event with no causal antecedents, a radical beginning that brings something new into the
world (167–69). (McGowan 2011, 155–56; citing Arendt 1977)
Thus our intersubjective public space (for instance, of artistic performance and documentation)
signiies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and
distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world,
however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of
organic life. It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to the affairs which go on among
those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together
in the world means essentially that a world of things is between
those who have it in common, as a table is located between those
who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and
separates men at the same time. The public realm, as the common
world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each
other, so to speak. (Arendt 1998, 52)
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Through the kinds of endeavors I’ve been discussing (composition,
analysis, theorizing, improvisation, system design, and so forth), this
public realm is made richer through individuals forging and sharing
varied connections (mappings that are conceptual or cross-modal
perceptual) that did not pre-exist in our natural world, but which
perhaps enliven our experience of it nevertheless. These endeavors are
pragmatic for being creative embodied actions, not just pontiications.
Yet they bear no destructive force. Nor are they coercive.
C. THE PHRONESIS OF ENCHANTMENT
Thus worldmaking is not necessarily a utopian rejection of the world
as it is. On the contrary, in the spirit of pragmatic speculative realism,
I’d prefer to consider it an imaginatively productive attempt to reengage with the world on new terms, new categories, and new crosscategorizations. In other words, worldmaking is not an exclusion of
reality but rather a change of attitude toward it, a bracketing of reality,
what Husserl calls epoché. Moreover worldmaking as techné is a particularly pragmatic, proactive mode of doing this, a mode that does not
merely assert new deinitions to be grasped synoptically, but rather
presents experiences or opportunities for such experiences. For example,
technology enables us to enact newly created cognitive metaphors,
embed new mappings into embodied action. That is, it enables us not
only to infuse cybernetics into phenomenology but also, from there, to
infuse imagination into embodiment, fantasy into physiology. Forging
strange scenarios of multi-sensory lux: if anything this actually reenchants the world.
As Bogost remarks: “The science iction writer Robert A. Heinlein
advocates speculating about possible worlds that are unlike our own,
but in a way that remains coupled to the actual world” (Bogost 2012,
29–30). Obviously music is rarely depictive in the straightforward way
that visual art often is. But I will leave it to others to debate whether
and what music is actually ictional, because I know my engagement
with it is real and purposeful. Experiencing the lux of unconventional
emergent properties (for instance in music) has the effect of amplifying, rather than negating, features of the world we seem to live in,
features that were perhaps inaccessible or obscured when the world was
perceived only through the streamlined elegance of its platonicpythagorean “tuning.”54
Seen in this light, as compared to the platonic-pythagorean reverentially passive mode of existence, worldmaking as artistic theory and
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
79
practice (techné) is thus a proactively positive form of adaptation, and
one that enchants, rather than disenchants, the world. What is worldmaking as techné? It is what Bogost calls “constructing artifacts that do
philosophy” (Bogost 2012, 85). In embodied experiential form, proactive and enacted, this is appreciative commentary, positive critique,
of the diverse richness of worldly experience. What better enchantment
is there?
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NO T E S
1. It relates loosely to the artistic and discursive activities of telematics
pioneer Roy Ascott (see Shanken 2003). By comparison, however,
cybernetic phenomenology usually has a narrower focus and a more
analytical epistemological orientation, the adventurousness of
which is somewhat cautiously incremental yet still open-ended in
principle.
2. Brian Kane (2014, 113) actually distinguished two different kinds
(scopes) of techné discussed by Aristotle, the irst being a more
narrow one, which is imitating nature, and another broader one
that complements what nature does not already supply. It is the
second type that corresponds to Pace’s account of music theory.
3. This was an impromptu remark Pauline Oliveros made on June 14
at the conference Skin—Surface—Circuit: Embodying the Improvisatory, ICASP-McGill Center for the Critical Study of Improvisation
Interdisciplinary Conference, Montreal, June 14–16, 2012.
4. Morris (2010) also discusses the role of phronesis in music
composition.
5. Ashby (2009) persuasively describes tonal practice as legalistic
rather than scientiic law—that is, as law articulated through its
contravention; as I explained it (2013a), tonal practice represents a
constraint of possibilities that, for the purposes of musical narrativity, mimics the physical, social, and psychological constraints of
the real world we live in.
6. I use the term exotic to denote that which is perhaps a combination
of unusual (statistically rare) and which is enticingly strange in how
it differs signiicantly (not just trivially) from that which is most
usual. In regard to cultural products and people the term has
unfortunate political baggage in that it connotes an “othering”
stance. In using the term exotic I have in the mind the more
neutral ways the term has been used to characterize, for instance,
certain atoms and subatomic particles (positronium and exotic
baryons), or inancial products, such as “exotic derivatives” and
“exotic options,” which are contrasted with the “plain vanilla”
variety.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
81
7. A self-organizing system is a system that exhibits regularities that
arise without a plan or leader, but emerge from the interactions of
the parts of the system” (Chemero forthcoming).
8. Sound Example 1 is found at http://www.perspectivesofnew
music.org/soundexx/.
9. Sound Example 2 is found at http://www.perspectivesofnew
music.org/soundexx/.
10. The software is Goban v.3.2.1.2 from http://www.sente.ch
/software/goban/.
11. Sound Example 3 is found at http://www.perspectivesofnew
music.org/soundexx/.
12. There are various philosophical issues with this somewhat loose
deinition of emergence but they need not concern us here. (The
issues pertain to reductionism and supervenience, for instance.)
13. Reas (2004–2010), “Process Compendium (Introduction),” video
documentation with sound. http://vimeo.com/39078622.
14. This use of the term dynamic form in relation to music traces back
to a less formalized version of the concept asserted by Mersmann
(1922–1923). See also Rothfarb (2002).
15. Philosophers Alexander Rueger (2000) and Paul Humphreys
(2008) have called this synchronic emergence (as opposed to
diachronic emergence which is a property that unpredictably arises
at a point in time or in the chronology of a process).
16. This is a deinition of emergence from the Oxford English Dictionary, cited by Batterman (2002).
17. The reader could compare my description here to the touchstone
ive tenets of emergentism proposed by Jaegwon Kim (1999) as
well as Paul Humphreys’s (1997a, 1997b) discussion of a “fusion”
operation and his distinction between emergence and mere supervenience. It’s also worth mentioning that temporal density (TD)
can be realized from various completely different systems of microdetails, from which emerge qualitatively different manifestations of
TD, even if having the same quantitative intensity of TD or the
same trajectory of lux of intensity of TD. As Robert Batterman
(2002, 76) explains, “Multiple realizability gives us good reasons
for thinking that certain important intertheoretic reductions, as
typically understood by philosophers, will not be possible.”
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18. Boretz (1977) describes a feedback process whereby, through
reading a text, he develops a “mental image” (its role is not so
different from that of vessel in dynamic form theory) which serves
as a sort of ilter. He explains that he reines and re-applies this
ilter to that reading, which in turn results in a unique “determinate feel” coming from the (now iltered) text. It is this “mental
coniguration” stimulated by the original close reading that “in
turn uniquely transforms what that mental image was, emerging
bonded in what I want to call a semantic fusion. . . . My theory of
reading, therefore, is what I want to call attributive: that is, it isn’t
descriptive or explanatory of anything; what it does is ascribe
properties to and thereby determine what there is. And if my
verbal portrait of that theory were a bit more reined, it would
mention that some components of my mental landscape are slots
for entities that might be called ‘stretches-of-print-received-asthought’ slots, in a landscape of such slots which might be called a
‘thought-slots-in-an-array-conigured-by-logical-connections’ landscape. This mental landscape would continually expand to accommodate subsequent thought-slots in further logical connections,
asserted or implied” (Boretz 1977, 104).
19. Actually, the continuation of this remark resonates strongly with
methods of dynamic form analysis discussed since 2009 (Mailman
2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b,
2012c, 2014) if certain terminological substitutions are made
(shown in square brackets): “Mesoscopic state variables [vessels and
vessel components] are invented by the observer [music theoristanalyst] in a constructivist manner and represent clusters of agents
[events] taking on the same values at the same time [within a
suitable time span, a docket]. For instance, the value taken by a
mesoscopic state variable at time ti [could represent] the number
of elements [events] which have the same (within a range of values)
value of some microscopic state variables such as the same distance
from their nearest neighbors, the same speed, the same direction or
the same altitude over time [e.g., same pitch, or interval, duration,
or timbre, etc.]” (Minati and Licata 2013, 58, italics original).
20. In Minati and Licata’s (2013) subsequent reinement of these
ideas, they write that “The invention by the observer of a suitable
mesoscopic level of description is related to its constructivist role,
which in this way is theoretically embedded in this approach
intended as a research strategy. For instance, mesoscopic variables
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
83
may be identiied by considering clusters of microscopic variables
used for components and at suitable threshold values” (54).
21. The concept of downward causation was proposed by Donald
Campbell (1974) in relation to biological systems. It has recently
been extended substantially into a theory of practopoiesis (Nikolić
2015), which can be understood as a form of a second-order
cybernetics, or cybernetics-of-cybernetics (Heylighen and Joslyn
2001; Foerster 2003).
22. Numerous times I have experienced the emergent qualities of
korvai, but it was an anonymous reader of an earlier draft of this
essay who suggested they be mentioned in the present discussion
of emergent properties in music. My description of the development of korvai paraphrases that reader’s comments.
23. This is of course an instance of extreme sensitivity to initial
conditions (the “butterly effect”), a touchstone of deterministic
nonlinear systems considered in chaos theory.
24. The example of Lachenmann’s “Schattentanz” was brought to my
attention by an anonymous reader.
25. This description of Lachenmann’s “Schattentanz” is a direct quote
from an anonymous reader, which comports with my own
assessment from listening and viewing the score.
26. In a longer, more comprehensive form, this analysis of movement
10 from Carter’s Quartet no. 5, and also Ligeti’s Violin Concerto,
are recently published in conference proceedings (Mailman 2012a)
and are discussed more extensively in Mailman 2010b.
27. An audio-synchronized video illustrates this lux in the tenth
movement of Carter’s Fifth Quartet. Use password body at the
following: http://vimeo.com/luxations/carterqt5tenlux.
28. I had previously (2010b, 2012a) called this vessel vUpward
because greater magnitudes of it correspond to a prevalence of
upward moves (downward moves being considered a depletion of
this quality).
29. This is a summary of a longer argument presented at an interdisciplinary conference at Cornell University (Mailman 2012b).
30. Consider two examples of logos being exploited for practical or
even phronetic motivations: (1) The quadrivial study of harmonic
ratios (so called “canonics”) exempliies logos, but was applied in
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musica practica treatises to guide the technique of tuning a
monochord. As an anonymous reviewer of this essay has noted,
Guido’s inclusion of the Gamma pitch in his monochord division
makes this much simpler to carry out than it was in the earlier
middle ages; Guido proposes doing this division of the canon as an
ear-training exercise for students, as well as a route to understanding
the tuning of scales. (2) As I explained in the “computation”
section of “Seven Metaphors” (Mailman 2012c), the more openended listening stance called legein (listening with, listening in
readiness) can be enhanced by extending one’s repertoire of
deined listening strategies. In many instances, as I’ve tried to
show, this can be done by formally deining myriad vessels of form,
each of which corresponds to a speciic listening “angle.” To
deine such vessels formally, in a mathematical computational sense,
so they can be communicated intersubjectively, requires logos. In
this way logos is co-opted to advance legein.
31. Neoplasmatic means the manipulation of actual biological material.
32. Process philosophy designates a focus on the dynamic nature of
being, which has been articulated in various ways by Heraclitus,
Hegel, Bergson, James, Whitehead, Deleuze, and others. In process
philosophy emphasis is placed on the continuously changing
nature of reality as we experience it; for instance, through our
senses and our consciousness. Thus process philosophy contrasts
with Western metaphysics’ more usual prioritizing of static persistence and regularity that supposedly underlies experiential lux, as
theorized in the writings of Plato, for instance.
33. Goodman (1978, 11) proposes a hypothetical time-dependent
color designation, grue. “Grue cannot be a relevant kind for
induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude
some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive
inference.”
34. Some aspects of the latter are covered previously in Mailman
(2013b), “Improvising Synesthesia.”
35. Further parallels between music listening and digestion are
explored in the “Listening as Digestion” section of my essay
“Seven Metaphors” (Mailman 2012c).
36. The term comprovisation is used by Dudas (2010), Bhagwati
(2010), and myself (2013a, 2012e). It relates to the concept of
“interactive composition” offered by Chadabe (1984).
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
85
37. See Mailman (2013b), “Improvising Synesthesia: Comprovisation
of Generative Graphics and Music,” Leonardo Electronic Almanac
19/3.
38. See Mailman (2013b), “Improvising Synesthesia”; Mailman
(2012d), “The Fluxations Stochastic Interactive Algorithmic
Music Engine”; and Mailman (forthcoming 2017), “Pragmatist
Ironist Analysis and Embodied Interactivity.”
39. Certain aspects of my thinking on this are inluenced by Evelyn
Glennie’s (2008) assertion that “hearing is basically a specialized
form of touch” and Oliveros’s assertion that “every instrument is a
prosthesis” (see note 3).
40. In regard to the term exotic, see note 6.
41. Published at http://the-open-space.org/joshua-banks-mailman/.
42. In that improvisation is the responding to the unforeseen or even
unorthodox, it has been rightly elevated to a coherent ethicalphilosophical stance by Gilbert Ryle (1976), George Lewis (2007),
and Arnold Davidson (2011). As Ryle (77) remarks: “[if someone]
is not at once improvising and improvising warily, he is not
engaging his somewhat trained wits in some momentarily live
issue, but perhaps acting from sheer unthinking habit. So thinking,
I now declare quite generally, is, at the least, the engaging of
partly trained wits in a partly fresh situation. It is the pitting of an
acquired competence or skill against an unprogrammed opportunity, obstacle or hazard” (Ryle 1976, 77). I take from this that there
is an awareness value in improvisation that is comparatively attenuated in composition.
43. Beyond what is explained in this essay, further details of the
datalow and mapping strategies are explored in “Improvising
Synesthesia” (2013b) and in “Pragmatist Ironist Analysis and
Embodied Interactivity” (forthcoming 2017).
44. This mapping was stimulated by my exposure to Wayne Slawson’s
sound color theory (1985, 2005) and compositions, such as Rapt
Soft (2000), which he realized with his C-sound embedded voice
synthesizer system called SYNTAL.
45. Wrist control of the hard edge timbre in Fluxations is readily
apparent in Montreal Comprovisation no. 1 accessible on Vimeo at
http://vimeo.com/luxations/mc1.
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Perspectives of New Music
46. A performance demonstrating FluxNOISations can be viewed at
http://vimeo.com/luxations/FluxNOISnycemf2015. A trio performance from the New York Philharmonic 2016 Biennial can be
heard at http://soundcloud.com/joshua-banks-mailman/material
-soundscapes-collide-june-2016-nycemf.
47. Fluxations Full Body Comprovisation no. 1 and no. 2 exist in digital
video format in the Interactions area at http://www.joshuabanks
mailman.com/.
48. Chua does not clarify whether he is explaining his own beliefs in
terms of historical-mythological doctrine or merely explaining a
point of view that would have been held by Vincenzo Galilei or
Max Weber, as inluenced by historical-mythological doctrine.
49. I thank Jonathan De Souza for bringing Bogost’s writings to my
attention.
50. This may seem similar to Ascott’s (2008) syncretic thinking
(“seeking likeness in unlike things”) but is yet something else.
51. One lesson from the recent ield of behavioral economics (Ariely
2008) is that often such unconscious mental operations can be
shown to be unexpectedly consistent, indeed unintentionally
systematic.
52. An example of this is the awareness of our own bodies. As Krueger
writes, “Awareness of your body is a vital part of experiencing the
medium [of ambient interactive systems such as Videoplace, Glowlow, and Psychic Space]. When you ind that bending an elbow has
one effect and tilting your head has another, you discover a new way
of relating to your body” (1983, 50). Further fascinating aspects of
this and related phenomena are explored by Salter (2010, 303–48).
53. Algorithmic synesthesia in relation to interactive systems is
discussed further in “Improvising Synesthesia” (Mailman 2013b).
54. This is, in a way, a creative kind of self-regulation (self-regulation
pursued artistically) toward the end of greater happiness, in the
sense described by Irtem (1971), which cannot be pursued, let
alone attained, under the passive platonic-pythagorean program of
merely observing the default harmonic “tuning” of the world.
Cybernetic Phenomenology of Music
87
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