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On the Theoretical Foundations of Orality and Literacy
It is only fair to attribute the popularity of the terms orality and literacy in many
branches of humanistic studies to Walter Ong. His publication, in 1982, of Orality
and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, marks a significant stage in the
conceptual study of oral tradition, and especially of its relations to other traditions
of communication and signification. However, while the contrastive procedure in
Orality and Literacy etched in stark relief some of what Ong considered
fundamental differences between the oral and written, some markedly similar
submissions had been made by him in his earlier works, notably The Presence of the
Word (1967) and Interfaces of the Word (1977). To that extent--and this does not
detract from the eminence of their author or the timeliness of the ideas--the
arguments of the later work do not represent such a radically novel thesis as we
have seemed inclined to think in the last decade and half.
More than this, the binarism represented by the
contrast of the two terms transcends the question of alternative media or modes of
communication. Ong's arguments hinge on the cultural differences which arise
from, and are symbolised by, the two communicative orders. For this reason, it is
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useful to sketch the terminological history of orality and literacy as a binary
complex. This has indeed partly been done by Ong himself, who admits his
indebtedness principally to Eric Havelock, Milman Parry and Albert Lord (Ong,
The Presence 17-110; Interfaces 92-120 and 272-302; Orality and Literacy 6-30).
According to him, Milman Parry's philological inquiries revolutionised Homeric
studies and resolved, once for all, the age-long Homeric question. For Parry found
that "the distinctive feature of Homeric poetry is due to the economy enforced on it
by oral methods of composition" ( Ong Orality and Literacy 21). Metrical
exigencies and the constraints of human memory compelled the oral poet to take
recourse to formulae, standardized themes, epithetic expressions, stock or `heavy'
characters, and a copious and repetitive style. These findings of Milman Parry were
later confirmed and extended by Albert Lord's study of contemporary Balkan epic
poets in his well-known The Singer of Tales (1960). But it is to Havelock that Ong
owes his elaboration of the consequences of the acquisition of literacy by the oral
poet and an oral culture.
In a more recent essay, Eric Havelock, while
acknowledging the primacy and necessity of oral language, restated the
revolutionary impact of literacy on Greek society and Western civilization--much
the same point as he had made in Preface to Plato (1963), Origins of Western
Literacy (1976) and The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural
Consequences (1982). The Greek alphabet, he argues, was unique and infinitely
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superior to earlier Egyptian, Sumerian and Phoenician writing systems because it
"provided an exhaustive table of atomic elements of acoustic sound that by diverse
combinations could represent the molecules, so to speak, of linguistic speech" (“The
Oral-Literate Equation” 25). The importance of its introduction into Greek society
lies in its enhanced storage and retrieval capacity--a function earlier served
primitively by oral poetic rhythm. Another consequence was the replacement of the
narrative, activist, agent-oriented syntax of Homeric poetry, with a "reflective
syntax of definition, description, and analysis" which, according to Havelock, is
typified by Platonic prose (“The Oral-Literate Equation”25).
This was not a mere stylistic shift. On the contrary,
it embodied a change in the psychological preconditions of the act and process of
communication. In other words, it resulted in alterations in the organisation and
operation of the human consciousness. Therefore, it is not surprising that Havelock
attributes to this shift the advances of Western knowledge and civilization. As he
explicitly states: "Without modern literacy, which means Greek literacy, we would
not have science, philosophy, written law or literature, nor the automobile or the
airplane" (“The Oral-Literate Equation” 24).
If the claims made by Havelock jar on us as somewhat extravagant, the support lent
them by the alternative studies of Marshal McLuhan in The Gutenberg Galaxy
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among other works, or Jack Goody and Ian Watt ("The Consequences of Literacy"),
soon demonstrates their explanatory currency and appeal. That they have become
standard theoretic fare in cultural and linguistic anthropology is attested to by the
subsequent works of Walter Ong already referred to, of Goody and David Olson,
to mention only a handful of the most eminent. Perhaps a look at some of the most
salient of the differences between orality and literacy under a few serviceable
rubrics might provide easier access to the arguments. And for this we must turn
again to Walter Ong.
Ong begins his exploration of the contrast between
oral and written communication by relating the operations of the human sensorium
to the philosophical categories of time and space. Speech, he argues, is related to
hearing, the auditory faculty which is most directly connected with time. The
objects of sight, smell, taste and touch can be arrested in time, but human utterance,
the object of hearing, vanishes as soon as it comes into being.
Words come into being through time,
and exist only so long as they are
going out of existence...When I
pronounce "reflect," by the time I
get to the "flect" the "re" is gone,
and necessarily and irretrievably gone
(The Presence 40).
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Other sensory experiences, on the other hand, are primarily oriented to space, that
is why they can be arrested in time, unlike sound which has a "built-in progression"
through time. Admittedly, all sensory experience involves duration, but Ong argues
that the perception of duration in the other senses is made possible only through
scientific investigation, while that of hearing is grasped immediately. This situation
can be contrasted with what obtains in the domain of writing. The faculty with
which writing is concerned is sight which, as we have seen, is oriented to space.
What the technology of writing makes possible is the spatialization of sound, that
is, its noetic transformation from time to space. The consequence is that human
utterance ceases to be evanescent and becomes fixed, linear, reversible or
retraceable, so that our beloved "re" remains intact ages after we have crossed
"flect." This commitment of sound to space through the invention of the alphabet
makes such a tremendous impact upon the process of human verbalisation that no
less than the workings of human consciousness are altered by it.
Ong's elaboration of these consequences is such a
minefield (in more senses than one) that a certain amount of reductionism is
inevitable in the presentation here. But before going on to the actual mental and
cultural paradigms which his description entails, we need to address the validity of
his interpretive strategies and of his foundational premises. We shall do this by
examining his notion and use of the categories of time and space. Ong's arguments
are so skilfully and authoritatively presented, with such a welter of scholarly
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references, that some elementary questions that need to be raised are quickly
forgotten in the breath-taking force and boldness of the conceptualisation. For
instance, how can it be said that sound is oriented to time merely because it cannot
be arrested in time? Is not the contrary equally true, namely, that sound is not
oriented to time for the very reason that time cannot capture it, that it too quickly
progresses through it?
On the idea of objects of the senses being arrested
or not, we need to reconsider exactly what ordinary processes are involved in the
continuous experience of sensory objects. When we see an object continuously, that
is, when it is `arrested', to use Ong's phraseology, the prolonged physical and
physiological experience is possible only because the object remains within our
visual field. If either the object or we ourselves move away, the object becomes
invisible. The mode in which the experience subsists in us in such eventuality,
whether as sensation or memory or whatever, may perhaps be of professional
interest to philosophers (cf. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror or Nature), but from a
commonsensical point of view, what counts is that the object is arrested only
because it is there repeatedly. In the same way, if a sound is there repeatedly and its
auditors do not go away, surely they would continue to hear it. To that extent,
seeing is no different from hearing. It may well be that there is some mystical
connection between time and the unique physiological properties of hearing, but
that is an argument that belongs in the domain of theology, not of logic or
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epistemology.
At the source of the problems which Ong's
description raises is his conception of time and space. These two terms are
notorious for the central but not always convincing stage they have occupied in
philosophical debates since Newton and Leibnitz. Those debates are only of
marginal concern here, but it is important to remark that Ong sometimes speaks of
time in chronometric terms, and at other times, in a kind of philosophical absolutism
that is not even Newtonian, but is rather grossly physicalist. Time seems to him to
be an inert mass spreadeagled in some nondescript reality and from whose bulky
continuum the spoken word is in a hurry to get away . We can compare this to the
very sensible Kantian idea of time and space as a priori intuitions which do not
inhere in the objects of sensory experience but in the subject, intuitions that are
prior to the objects of experience, and which enable us to represent them as distinct
from ourselves and each other (Kant "Transcendental Aesthetic" 23-37).
One source of the misunderstanding is the rather
obvious difference between the auditory faculty and the other parts of the human
sensorium. The other faculties operate typically in connection with material objects
in space. We see, touch and taste objects; no secondary action of the agent is
required to identify the sources of these sensations. With smelling and hearing, this
subsidiary action is often required. Yet they are no less connected with spatial
objects, since we naturally seek to identify the objective origins of the emanations.
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For the sense of smell, these objects are conceivably commonly closer to hand than
with sound, whose sources can be quite distant and for that reason less materially
obvious. This is one reason for the presumed immateriality of sound. For the rest,
advances in acoustic science should put paid to any illusions about its physical
nature, or rather the lack of it.
More central to Ong's argument, and correspondingly more contentious, is the claim that since oral cultures have no fixed texts, they
organize and transmit knowledge and information in a very unique way. Oral
thought proceeds, he says,
in heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns,
in repetitions or antitheses, in alliterations
and assonances, in epithetic and other formulary
expressions, in standard thematic settings
(the assembly, the meal, the duel, the hero's
`helper', and so on), in proverbs...or other
mnemonic form (Orality and Literacy 34).
In other words, at the basis of oral thought and style is memory. As Havelock puts
it, the "secrets of orality, then, lie not in the behaviour of language as it is
exchanged in the give and take of conversation but in the language used for
information storage in the memory" (“The Oral-Literate Equation”24). To serve this
mnemonic purpose, this language must be rhythmic and narrativized.
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This mode of codification and structuration of
knowledge can only lead to a certain type of discourse--a traditionalist and
conservative one which demands continuity and stasis and eschews experimentation. This resistance to innovation of method is at one with the content of the
discourse which confines itself to what is concrete and familiar in the human life
world. Thus whatever is conceptualized becomes formalized in existential terms and
skill and knowledge are passed on by way of personal participation and practice. In
this manner, the categories of thought are appropriated in the immediacy of personto-person communication and interiorized as communal knowledge (Ong, Orality
and Literacy 41-57).
In contrast to this regimen, writing cultures are
innovative and inventive. Since information storage and retrieval no longer present
any problem, the spirit of novelty is given free rein. The foreign and unfamiliar no
longer constitute a threat to a stable grasp of reality, because the ever expanding
frontiers of knowledge demand newer and newer measures of the true, the good and
the beautiful. But then the conditions of knowledge acquisition are also altered.
Knowledge and information now come through books, manuals and other nonhuman sources, become objectivised and are appropriated impersonally as selfsubsisting commodities. The production of knowledge becomes a solipsistic activity
and the forms of thought generated by this state of affairs are necessarily abstract,
analytic, syllogistic and definitional.
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According to Ong and Havelock, when an oral
culture acquires writing in any deep way, that is, when it becomes a pervasive
characteristic of the society in question, what has happened is that the culture has
taken upon itself a force capable of permanently altering its state of being and
direction of development. It is not a mere question of having seized on a useful
technological item. On the contrary, the impact of this technology is felt no less than
in the very consciousness of the members of the society. The way they reason and
therefore the types of discourse which they produce; their arts and sciences; the
forms of government and social organisation; in short, all that we would
characterize as their material and spiritual culture, are determined by this one
technology. To take the example of Greece, on which, by the way, Havelock (and to
a lesser degree Ong) relies almost entirely for these claims, the secret of the success
of its civilization "lay in the superior technology of the Greek alphabet" (Havelock,
“The Oral-Literate Equation”24).
The notion of the alphabet as the key to the genius
of the ancient Greeks is undoubtedly a bold and challenging one. The only question
is whether it is true. It has become a historical commonplace that we owe the
alphabet to the Greeks. What is not clear is what we really mean by this. If this
implies that the Greeks invented the alphabet, this runs counter to all available
knowledge of the history of writing. As I. J. Gelb, following several other
authorities persuasively argues in The Study of Writing, there is no question at all
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that the Greeks borrowed their signs from contemporary Semitic syllabic systems of
writing, most notably from the Phoenicians with whom they had long established
commercial contacts (cf. Diringer 35). The very names of the signs, no less than
their form, are of Semitic origin.
How the Semitic people themselves came by their
signs was no sudden stroke of genius, as is only to be expected. From early
semasiographs ( as Gelb calls the pictographs and different forms of mnemonic
devices common to all peoples globally), it was a long way to logographic writing
as represented variously by Sumerian and Akkadian cuneiform or by Egyptian
hieroglyphic and hieratic scripts (Gelb 191f; Diringer 15). The further refinement of
these ideograms into phonetic systems such as the Phoenician syllabaries of the
ninth-century BC, was an extended historical process. The idea of an inventive
stroke of genius is consequently a complete myth. In fact, the introduction by the
Greeks of the vowel into the Semitic Aleph-Beth, commonly held to be the single
most important factor in the Greek creation of the alphabet, has been shown to be
after all not such an original event.
As Gelb argues: "the Greeks did not invent a new
vowel system but simply used for vowels those signs which in the various Semitic
systems of writing likewise can function as vowels in form of the so-called matres
lectionis...The greatness of the Greek innovation lies, therefore, not in the invention
of a new method of indicating vowels but in a methodical application of a device
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which the early Semites used only in an irregular and sporadic fashion. As we have
seen, even the Semitic and other Near Eastern writings in the course of time
developed this method of indicating vowels to such an extent that they, too, were on
the way toward creating a full system of vowel signs and consequently an alphabet"
(181f). Even the elimination from the early alphabet of a few of the original
Semitic signs, and the addition of new ones until the standardisation of the classical
system in the transitional period of Greek history, attest to the evolutionary path
through which the Greek alphabet developed.
It also needs to be asked: if the acquisition and
development of the alphabet is singly responsible for Greek scientific and
technological achievements, what can account for the relative low-technology of
either India, which obtained the Aleph-Beth at about the same time as the Greeks,
or the Semitic people themselves who later on received back from the Greeks the
newly vocalised alphabet? It has sometimes been urged against this position that in
these societies, literacy was socially restricted, belonging exclusively to a priestlyscribal class because of the religious or theocratic nature of these cultures. Greece,
on the other hand, was not only democratic, providing access to writing for all
segments of society, but even more importantly secular, free from the mental
stranglehold to which all religious tyranny subjects people. The only problem with
this attractive rejoinder is that it ends up holding secularity rather than literacy
responsible for the glory of Greece. And as for the question of social classes, we
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shall see below just how far the argument can take us.
The substantive question that needs to be addressed
here concerns the claim that by the beginning of the fourth century BC when Plato
wrote his philosophical treatises, and Athenian power was being threatened,
centuries of literacy had ensured the permanent alteration of Greek consciousness
from an oral prototype to a so-called literate one. This raises several serious
questions, as we have seen and shall see further below, but before we return to
these questions, we might note in passing that the lack of uniformity among the
Greek city states makes the total reliance on the Athenian model by itself a
problem. From a cultural point of view, Athens, especially Periclean Athens, was a
gem among the hundreds of Greek city states. It was the wealthiest and one of the
most powerful, being rivalled militarily only by Sparta to which it succumbed in the
Peloponnesian War. Thus, even if it could be argued that as far as the education of
Athenian citizens (as distinct from metics and slaves who outnumbered them), was
concerned, literacy was pervasive, could we say the same, for instance, of Sparta?
The Spartiatae, who numbered a mere tenth of the inhabitants of Sparta, enjoyed
none but a military sort of education. As for the rest of the despised and oppressed
population of that city state, perhaps the least said the better. (Mulhern 135f)
More importantly, Greek speculation in science,
philosophy and mathematics had begun as early as the seventh century, that is,
before literacy had become at all widespread in any state. On what form of
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communication-consciousness were these early intellectual efforts dependent? The
argument that these speculations lacked the intellectual rigour and objectivity of
subsequent works, which therefore proves that they possessed vestiges of the earlier
oral culture, smacks of secondary elaboration, if not outright circularity. One
problem with the mono-causal view is that, from a logical standpoint, and given the
deductive approach adopted by Ong and Havelock, all that needs to be done for the
thesis to be disproved is to show any number of alternative factors that could have
given rise to Greek intellectual and artistic achievements.
But perhaps it would be fairer for us to address the
thesis on its own grounds. First of all, the presentation of the argument leaves one
uncertain whether these effects pertain to individuals or sub-groups or the entire
culture (Street, “A Critical Look” 5). While Havelock does indeed concentrate on
Plato as the quintessential literate consciousness of his time, Ong continually
oscillates his analysis between individual, sub-group and group consciousness, as if
these logical and empirical sub-sets are co-extensive or identical. Surely this
methodological free-ranging cannot be calculated to inspire confidence in the
outcome of the inquiry. An individual such as Plato must undoubtedly be regarded
as attaining the highest degree of literate mentality in his time. But was Plato a
typical Greek? That is, did he embody these values in such a way that he
represented the broad spectrum of ordinary Greek consciousness? Certainly, a subculture such as the Academy (both Plato's and ours) might set up shrines in honour
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of rationality, objectivity and theoretical analysis, yet these constitute ideals which
are not achievable at every instance of writing. It would surely be a strange sort of
person who, at all moments of verbalisation, is without exception rational, objective
and theoretical. Such a creature belongs in the realm of fantastic literature, not the
real world. Moreover, this kind of argument is difficult to sustain by anyone such as
Walter Ong or Eric Havelock, for the simple reason, as Street points out, that no one
trapped in his own literate mentality could accordingly have access to the operations
of the oral consciousness. He would have no means of gaining entry personally into
the oral consciousness, if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion (Street, “A
Critical Look” 1-5).
Ong occasionally provides some examples of
contemporary oral cultures, especially in his Interfaces of the Word. But to
generalize on this basis raises questions of validity no less than the Greek example.
Many of the so-called oral cultures globally have undergone so many changes in
their mode of life, including media of communication, that to speak of them as if
they are fixed in a putative pristine oral condition, is a piece of anachronism. On
the other hand, not even the most rigorously literate society today is completely
devoid of features of orality. And if it needs reminding, we are not even concerned
at this stage with the technical communicative understanding of orality. The point is
that none of those features which Ong describes as the cognitive conditions of oral
cultures are completely absent in the most literate societies of our own day. This is
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what enables Ong to speak of "secondary orality".
What comes out clearly in all this is that a faulty
principle of causality is at work here. It is not logically admissible, and equally
empirically impossible, to explain the entire direction and shape of society on the
basis of a single technological item, when the connection between the two terms is
so tenuous. This point has been made quite forcefully by Ruth Finnegan in a
passage that deserves to be quoted at some length:
Much of the plausibility of the `Great
Divide' theories has rested on the often
unconscious assumption that what the
essential shaping of society comes from
is its communication technology. But once
technological determinism is rejected or
queried, then questions immediately arise
about these influential classifications
of human development into two major types:
oral/primitive as against literate/civilized...
It is worth emphasizing that the conclusions
from research, not only about the supposed
`primitive mentality' associated with orality,
but also about, for example, concepts of
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individualism and the self, conflict and
scepticism, or detached and abstract thought
in non-literate cultures now look different...
[and] once-confident assertions about the
supposed differentiating features of oral and
literate cultures are now exposed as decidedly
shaky (Literacy and Orality 13f).
To underline the point, if we look at the distinctions
drawn by Ong, there appears very little to differentiate them from the dichotomies
created by earlier cognitive anthropologists such as Levy-Bruhl (How Natives
Think, 1910), or even later ones like Levi-Strauss (The Savage Mind, 1966). For
instance, in what is undoubtedly his most seminal work, Levy-Bruhl argues in How
Natives Think that the collective representations of "undeveloped peoples" reveal a
pre-logical mentality which is based on the "law of participation." This marks them
sharply from Western consciousness conceptually or in terms of logical procedure
(37-38). This participation mystique and the mentality to which it gives rise are
responsible for the fact that the primitive mind is essentially synthetic, being little
given to analysis; that in the life of primitives, memory plays a much more
important part than it does in Western mental life; that the slightest mental effort
involving abstract reasoning, however elementary it may be, is distasteful to them;
that objective validity which can be verified is unknown and that their reasoning is
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unrelievedly concrete. (86-128). Thus he sums up:
Primitive mentality does indeed possess
a language, but its structure, as a rule,
differs from that of our languages. It
actually does comprise abstract
representations and general ideas; but
neither this abstraction nor this
generalization resembles that of our concepts.
Instead of being surrounded by an atmosphere
of logical potentiality, these representations
welter, as it were, in an atmosphere of mystic
possibilities...and for this reason logical
generalization, properly so called, and logical
transactions with its concepts are impracticable(127).
Placing these remarks side by side with what Walter Ong had to say seventy years
later would require no further comment. While some scholars have made much of
Levy-Bruhl's retraction of this position in his posthumous notes (Les carnets de
Levy-Bruhl, 1949), it remains clear, as Scott-Littleton argues, that "much of what is
now taken for granted by cognitive, structural, and symbolic anthropologists was in
fact anticipated in Levy-Bruhl's work, especially his early work" (Scott-Littleton
xlii).
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However Scott-Littleton intended his conclusion to
be taken, it is nevertheless true that Levy-Bruhl's work provided the inspiration for
Levi-Strauss's The Savage Mind, even if his system of classification relied on the
work of Durkheim and Mauss. Levi-Strauss argues that magic and science are `two
parallel modes of acquiring knowledge' and he shows that neolithic man had a
genuine scientific spirit, and further, that in the nominal and classificatory systems
of primitive societies is to be found a logical categorial ability. But it is in his
concept of oral or mythical thought as `intellectual bricolage' that he reveals the true
direction of his thought:
The characteristic feature of mythical
thought is that it expresses itself by
means of a heterogeneous repertoire
which, even if extensive, is nevertheless
limited. It has to use this repertoire,
however, whatever the task in hand
because it has nothing else at its
disposal(17).
In his thought pattern, the `bricoleur' is perceptual, while the scientist is conceptual;
the scientist opens up new possibilities of knowledge by extension or renewal,
while the `bricoleur' conserves knowledge by reorganisation only; the scientist
creates events by means of structures, thus changing the world, while the `bricoleur'
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creates structures by means of events. Admittedly, mythical thought, bricolage, is
not the necessary preserve of any culture and indeed all cultures have these
alternative thought processes. Still, what is of importance, as later (poststructuralist)
commentators have pointed out, is the framework, the (con)textual condition of this
analysis, including the metaphoric import and the constitutive terms of the discourse
which elaborates not mere mental forms but structures of social and cultural
organisation. As Jacques Derrida says explicitly in Of Grammatology, this is
ethnocentricism masquerading as anti-ethnocentricism (120-122).
To this extent, the work of Levi-Strauss, no less
than that of Levy-Bruhl, shows that Ong's orality/literacy merely reproduces the
classical oppositions of cultures: pre-logical versus logical, wild versus
domesticated, primitive versus civilized, hot versus cold, traditional versus modern,
magical versus scientific... all of the discursive baggage of Western anthropological
thought. It is instructive that Jack Goody not only admits this, but actually
advocates this superficial substitution in his Domestication of the Savage Mind.
How endemic this Western perception is can be
gauged from philosophical literature on the subject as it has proceeded under the
rubric of rationality and relativism (cf. Wilson, Rationality, and Hollis and Lukes,
Rationality and Relativism)1. Under the serviceable idiom of science and magic, the
last three decades have witnessed an ardent debate on just what degree of
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rationality, if any, can be attributed to primitive thought. The variety of viewpoints,
not to speak of the disparity of disciplinary approaches, makes a concise description
difficult, but four basic positions can be roughly isolated, namely, (a) that primitive
(oral) thought is irrational, illogical and unscientific; (b) that it is rational and
logical but not scientific; © that it is rational but unscientific and illogical, and
lastly, (d) that it is as rational and logical within its own cultural context as the
scientific in modern Western society. Presented in this manner, the rational is
clearly separated conceptually from the logical and scientific, but in reality, many of
the disputants have often used these terms interchangeably.
One approach to the issue which purports to be
favourable to primitive mentality is illustrated by the extensive exposition of the
relations between African thought and Western science by Robin Horton (197-258).
In this view, traditional thought is rational and logical, often in ways analogous to
scientific thought. For one thing, models of scientific theory are a quest for unity,
simplicity, order and regularity underlying apparent diversity, complexity, disorder
and anomaly which characterize the universe of phenomena. African thought also
seeks this order through the structure of the pantheon and the categorial relations
of its spiritual forces. And just as scientific thought seeks causal explanations, so
does African thought; for example, the causal connection between social conduct
and disease states.
For another, the two forms of thought employ
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similarly different levels of theory (low and high) to cover respectively narrow or
wide areas of experience. They operate by first breaking up and then re-integrating
objects and experiences (abstraction, analysis and integration). In the same way,
these two theoretical forms draw analogy between puzzling and familiar phenomena
in their modelling processes; and in this, only a limited aspect of the familiar is
useful, and for only a while, because sooner or later, the models obscure the analogy
with the familiar. While this similarity of theoretical procedure does not turn
traditional African thought into a specie of the scientific, it nevertheless
demonstrates its rationality.
But there are also substantive differences between
the two models, differences which Horton, borrowing an idiom popularized by
Karl Popper, characterized as `open' versus `closed' predicaments, by which he
means that traditional culture, unlike scientific culture, has no understanding and
toleration of alternative thought. He manages somehow to connect this with the
commonplace notions of the mystical attitude to language, recourse to a personal
idiom and contextual basis of all oral discourse. In the event, oral thought turns out
to be lacking in logic and philosophy in the strict sense although, Horton maintains,
"most African traditional world-views are logically elaborated to a high degree"
and are "of eminently rational character." (229).
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The suspicion lurks that there are deeper conceptual sources for Horton's
ambivalence towards African traditional thought than the thought system itself. The
question arises whether the foundation for this sort of comparative analysis is
sufficiently sound; whether the minimal condition of equality of the terms has been
satisfied. Without prejudice to other aspects of this discourse, for example, the
similarity of Horton to Ong in the characterisation of oral thought, there does appear
to be a fundamental problem with the categorial relations of its terms. Horton's
problem, and that of many other contributors to the debate, is twofold. First, he
equates all traditional thought with traditional religious thought; and secondly, as
an extension of the first, he proceeds to compare such widely divergent areas of
human experience without a theoretical clarification of the basis of the procedure.
The assumption on which he proceeds is indeed a
common one, perhaps the commonest in all anthropological-philosophical
discourses of this sort. This is the notion that the magical, with its connotation of,
and connection with, ritual and religion, is the dominant characteristic of all
primitive thought and behaviour. The volume of anthropological research, from
James Frazer upwards, served up to demonstrate this assertion is indeed
overwhelming. What is not so certain is the theoretical justification for this. In
addition, if it is indeed true that traditional thought is prototypically religious, or
magical--to resort to the commanding idiom of the rationalist anthropologists-- still
the basis for seizing on it as the measure against which the scientific is to be
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weighed, or vice versa, would still need to be more closely specified. Why, for
example, is the comparison not made within the same experiential domain, say,
between traditional religious thought and modern Western religious thought? Or
alternatively, between an instance of traditional non-religious thought and science?
In other words, what is to be done with the burning question of their
incommensurability?
Presumably, because the scientific is regarded as
the most characteristic Western model of thought, just as the religious is regarded as
the most characteristic model of traditional (non-Western) thought, a comparative
analysis is felt possible on cross-cultural grounds. If this suggestion is correct, and
there are sufficient grounds for believing that it is, a few problems do arise. First of
all, given the discrepancy between this claim and the practical reality of ordinary
life and thinking habits among Western persons, as pointed out by both Horton
(Patterns of Thought) and Peter Winch (“Understanding a Primitive Society”), as
well as many others (cf Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture; Appiah, In My
Father’s House, and Sogolo, Foundations of African Philosophy), it is difficult to
decide precisely what is meant by "most characteristic." But whether this refers to a
numerical class or a mental type or level of intellectual and cultural achievement,
what is implicated is a consideration of the criteria of science. While full
examination of this complex subject is beyond our present interest, at least a brief
look is unavoidable in order to reach some satisfactory conclusion of this part of our
25
discussion.
We have already seen, in the work of Robin
Horton, theoretical models as they operate in the sciences. However, in the classical
model of rationality, no scientific theory can be considered valid if it is not
necessary, universal and rule-governed (Brown 3-37). It is in this sense irrelevant if
these truths have been arrived at by observation and experimentation, that is,
inductively, or through deductive intuition. What counts is that the results or
conclusion must follow necessarily from the data or premises, and that this relation
must be recognised as such; that the principle be applicable in every possible
instance and domain; and that the entire proceeding should conform to the
appropriate rules.
This is without doubt as it should be. There remains
however a few questions such as: on what basis are data or premises selected or
what makes them suitable and acceptable? Secondly, who makes these `appropriate
rules' and how can we tell if they are really adequate? In their quest for answers to
these questions, philosophers have found that the only propositions that can fully
satisfy the fundamental conditions of rationality are self-evident and self-justifying
ones, since every other conceivable proposition seems to require a precedent
justification, thus creating a very inconvenient, not to say infinite, regressiveness.
They have also found, incidentally, that getting propositions that met these two
features simultaneously seemed impossible. When they found self-justifying
26
propositions, these were not self-evident at the same time. Their truth could be
grasped only intuitively.
This unhappy state of affairs has led naturally to all
sorts of speculative and critical efforts to resolve the dilemma. Some philosophers (
for example, Karl Popper) admit that the truth of science cannot be proven, but they
insist that its falsehood can be refuted and that therefore rationality consists, not in
corroboration of claims, but in our readiness for their refutation, which is what
empirical testing is about. But even here, when pressed hard as to the procedural
grounds for beginning this refutation (for example, on what rational basis can we
accept Popper's `basic statements'), they turn out to be no more secure than
convention.
If propositional foundations are lacking, we are not luckier with foundational rules.
It does not seem sufficient merely to have a logical or scientific rule for testing or
evaluating the rationality of any claim. We need appropriate rules; and therefore we
need some way of judging that any given rules are the right ones. And no meta-rule
seems available that does not involve us in regress. As Harold Brown argues, not
even the most traditionally incontestable laws of logic (for instance, the law of noncontradiction and modus ponens) are indubitable, as shown by intuitionist and other
recent systems of logic (Brown 70-78).2
27
If the very foundations of scientific and logical
rationality turn out to be no more than intuition or convention, on what grounds can
cognitive anthropologists claim some truths to be irrational and others not? The
position seems to be on pretty thin ice, as even some philosophers of social science
have come to recognise by now. The concern that this would involve us in cultural,
not to say, moral, relativism, is a genuine one, but it is not answered by evading the
argument. Charles Taylor has tried, for instance, to resolve the difficulty by taking
recourse to a form of appeal to force. For him, even if we can find no theoretical
grounds for adducing superior rationality to Western scientific and technological
culture, the factual evidence of its material achievements is irrefutable proof of its
being a higher order of life than that of primitive societies. Says he:
If one protests and asks why the theoretical
order is more perspicuous transculturally,
granted the admitted difference between the
aims of the activities compared, and granted
that the two cultures identify and distinguish
the activities differently, the answer is that
at least in some respects theoretical cultures
score successes which command the attention of
atheoretical ones, and in fact invariably have
done so when they met. A case in point is the
28
immense technological successes of one particular theoretical culture, our modern scientific one. Of course, this particular superiority commands
attention in a quite non-theoretical way as well.
We are reminded of the ditty about nineteenthcentury British colonial forces in Africa:
`Whatever happens We have got the Gatling
gun, And they have not' (104).
It is impossible to imagine that Charles Taylor is not aware of the patent fallacy of
this argument. And if this is so we can well see why the frustrations of logic should
drive a philosopher to such an ironic finish. Ironic, not just because he himself
knows that the Gatling-gun argument will not pass muster, but because on this score
readers could very easily mistake their author for a contemporary historical figure
of the same name in the West African nation of Liberia more closely associated
with clinching ethnopolitical arguments on the battlefield. It is perhaps a sad
commentary on the ethnocultural motivations of the philosophical arguments that
they would perforce end on such a note.
If, as I have striven to show, the basis of the
distinction between the magical and scientific, (with all the intertextual connections
to the other oppositions: savage vs civilized, pre-logical vs logical, oral vs written
etc.) is hardly more than ethnocentric convention or intuition, what function can this
29
distinction serve in the Western understanding of the culture of the Other? The
point is important because surely the value of the preceding arguments lies in the
various attempts made, however unsuccessful, to account for cultural differences.
But if these failures in the domain of philosophy, anthropology and the social
sciences are related in some way to the aims and methods of these disciplines, it is
inevitable for the debate to be carried over to the fields of linguistics and literature,
which may be commonly regarded as lying in the very heart of cultural
communication. Orality and literacy are, before anything else, cognate concepts in
the field of verbal communication. The enormous amount of research on orality
and literacy in the disciplines of language and literary communication is thus to be
explained not only on the basis of a certain natural disciplinary appropriation of the
concepts, but because of the perception that research had come to a dead end in the
social sciences. At the same time, it is a pointer to the intertextual variability of the
concepts, as I have been at pains to show in this discussion.
We come then to an aspect of the relations between
the oral and written that appears less controversial. This is the connection between
spoken and written language. In the main, three broad areas of research have been
undertaken in this respect. Some scholars have been interested in drawing
similarities or differences of a linguistic sort, involving phonological, semantic,
lexical, and even more commonly, syntactical elements. Drawing on the work of
Drieman (“Differences between Written and Spoken Language”), Devito
30
(“Comprehension Factors in Oral and Written Discourse of Skilled Communicators,” and “Levels of Abstraction in Spoken and Written English”), and several
others, Jack Goody (Literacy and Orality) has provided a summary of the supposed
lexical and syntactic specificities of written language, in implicit or explicit contrast
to spoken language. They include: a tendency to use longer words, increased
nominalisation (as against verbalisation in speech), greater variety of vocabulary,
more attributive adjectives and fewer personal pronouns. On the syntactical side, he
found greater complexity of nominal and verbal constructions, preference for
subordinate rather than coordinate constructions, for usage of declaratives and
subjunctives (rather than imperatives, interrogatives and exclamations), for passive
voice, for definite articles (instead of demonstrative modifiers and deictic terms),
and a higher frequency of certain grammatical features (for example, gerunds,
participles, attributive adjectives, modal and perfective auxiliaries). Goody manages
to come to this conclusion, even though he admits that many of these features may
be language specific, since the data are based exclusively on European languages,
mostly English.
In a similar vein, some scholars (cf.Chafe,
“Integration and Involvement in Speaking, Writing and Oral Literature” and
“Linguistic Differences Produced by Differences between Speaking and Writing”;
Chafe and Danielewicz “Properties of Spoken and Written Language.”), have been
concerned with elaborating the discourse features of speaking and writing from the
31
language production process itself. Chafe (“Integration and Involvement”) for
example, found that speaking is done in spurts of what he called "idea units" at the
rate of about one in two seconds, corresponding roughly to our thinking rate. This
can be compared to writing which is over ten times slower. In consequence:
In writing, it would seem, our thoughts
must constantly get ahead of our expression
of them in a way to which we are totally
unaccustomed when we speak. As we write
down one idea, our thoughts have plenty of
time to move ahead to others. The result
is that we have time to integrate a succession
of ideas into a single linguistic whole in
a way that is not available in speaking. In
speaking, we normally produce one idea
unit at a time(36).
Chafe (“Linguistic Differences”), and especially
Chafe and Danielewicz (“Properties”) examined some of the linguistic consequences of this varying speed of discourse production, taking as data, samples of
four discourse types - dinner table conversations, lectures, letters and academic
papers - which correspond respectively to informal spoken language, formal spoken
32
language, informal written language and formal written language. Their conclusions
are that from the point of view of vocabulary, speakers tend to "operate with a
narrower range of lexical choices than writers," because speaking is done "on the
fly," while the editing possibilities allowed by writing increase the variety of
lexical choices. According to them, the level of written language is also higher
because it is richer, less hedged and more explicit.
There are differences as well in clausal and
sentential construction. Spoken language moves in clause-like "intonation units,"
corresponding to Chafe's earlier "idea units" which are relatively brief compared to
those of written language. Written language elongates these intonation units through
such syntactical devices as prepositional phrases, nominalisations and adjective
attribution. Interclausal relations in sentences tend, in speaking, to be restricted to
coordinate forms, unlike written sentences which evince more elaborate and
complex clausal connections, because of ample opportunities available to the writer
to plan, edit and construct his sentences. A few other features of spoken language
include the speaker's greater involvement with his/her audience, involvement of self
in the speech, and involvement with the reality he or she speaks about. This can be
elicited from the speaker's frequent reference to self notable in spoken language,
his/her reference to the addressee and references to the concrete reality he or she is
dealing with. This contrasts with the detachment of the writer, which shows up in
"interest in ideas that are not tied to specific people, events, times, or places, but
33
which are abstract and timeless" (Chafe and Danielewicz 108).
Linguistic studies of orality and literacy such as
these have about them an air of `scientific' objectivity, of dealing only with the
available data, untrammelled by the assumptions of cognitive and theoretical
anthropology. In fact, in many of these (for example, Chafe ), there is no evidence
of awareness of the work of scholars like Havelock, Ong or McLuhan. Yet a
comparison of the positions of these latter with the work of the linguists reveals
very little difference. Other language scholars, for instance Deborah Tannen (“The
Oral/Literate Continuum in Discourse”), frankly admit that their work is based on
investigating and testing the validity of the claims of cognitive anthropology
regarding orality and literacy. While some of the findings show divergence on
certain specific features, most however validate these earlier claims. We are often
left with the impression that these scholars are working backwards to answers
assumed from the start.
A third approach from language and communication deals with the specific processing of narrative discourse. Two examples can be
examined. The first is Deborah Tannen's study of the narrative strategies of
American and Greek subjects (“Oral/Literate Continuum”). Tannen begins with a
review of the work of Goody, Havelock, Ong and Olson. She notes various
dichotomies
arising
from
these
studies,
viz:
textual
vs
contextual,
rhapsodic/formulaic vs analytic/linear/sequential; experiential vs logical as
34
processes of knowing and knowledge production. However, departing from the
dualism of the earlier scholars, Tannen is at pains to stress the interconnectedness of
orality and literacy. Perhaps for this reason, she draws a correspondence between
the discourse strategies identified with orality-literacy and what have been
described in language studies as focused and unfocused discourses or, even more
pertinently, as interpersonal involvement and message content (Tannen 3).
Tannen's basic thesis is that the oral-literate
paradigm, re-echoing as it does these other paradigms, has helped her in clarifying
and categorising contrasting discourse strategies from various situations including
conversations, narratives, aesthetic responses and so on. She discusses three
examples from her research involving respectively Greek and American subjects,
Americans and Greeks/American-Greeks, New York Jews and non-New
Yorkers/non-Jews (Tannen “Oral/Literate Continuum” 4-13). Her conclusion is that
the Greeks, Greek-Americans and New York Jews used discourse strategies that
were `inherently oral’ even though these subjects were highly literate people. These
strategies include a tendency to formulaicness of language, personal/emotive
involvement and internal evaluation. The American subjects, on the other hand,
adopted writing strategies such as external evaluation, decontextualisation and
novelty of expression. Although she admits that these strategies have become
`culturally conventionalized', she nevertheless insists with surprising agility that the
distinction is not along ethnic or cultural lines, proclaiming in one telling sentence:
35
"It will not do to label some people as oral and others as literate" (13-14).
But this conclusion is completely at variance with
the substantive finding of her studies. If these strategies are culturally conditioned,
surely it cannot be too wide of the mark to describe any of the study groups as
correspondingly predominantly either oral or literate. And therefore her caveat is
either entirely gratuitous or it serves to mask her unease with a paradigm which she
repeatedly declares is merely an analytic tool. It surely cannot be very relevant to
her, at least in the context of the specific work in question, whether some people are
labelled one way or another. But she has a professional obligation to examine
whether the constitutive terms on which she relies for the description of her
research findings are reliable ones, whether there is a sufficiently rational basis for
adopting them or if they run the risk of conveying more than she intended them to
do. In other words, for her to avoid the charge of blindly following those she
accuses of labelling, she has a responsibility to show the propriety, not to speak of
the necessity, of associating those strategies with orality and literacy or indeed to
jettison them altogether for carrying more ideological deadweight than she intends
(something which, by the way, she managed to do several years later, long before
her current gender interests, for example in Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue,
and Imagery in Conversational Discourse ,1989). What she cannot do is to take over
wholly or partially those associations only to turn round to deny that she intended
anything else by them than as value-free descriptions of her research conclusions.
36
This is especially insidious, bearing in mind her awareness of the ideological and
cognitive dimensions of the oral-literate debate, as can be judged from her literature
review in the first part of her paper.
A second example is Hildyard and Olson's "On the
Comprehension and Memory of Oral vs. Written Discourse." This work, whose
conclusions are more or less predictable, viewed from the standpoint of earlier and
subsequent works of the two authors, states as follows:3
In summary, it appears that readers and
listeners do adopt somewhat different
strategies in comprehending narrative
discourse. The listeners pay primary
attention to the theme of the story,
building a coherent representation of
what was meant. The readers, on the
other hand, are able to pay closer
attention to the meaning of the
sentences per se, recalling more
incidental but mentioned details and
being more accurate in their judgements
of what was in fact stated in the text.
Furthermore, the acquisition of literate
37
skills appears to involve a greater
awareness of the sentence meaning, an
awareness that shows up not only in
comprehending written texts but those
presented orally as well (31-32).
In other words, reading subjects showed superior skills in analytical tasks, those
involving distinctions and discriminations between elements, particularly what a
text objectively says and what the processing subject interprets it to have said.
There are obvious problems with the claims of textual neutrality and objectivity,
including the ideological foundations of these claims, but they are not of immediate
concern here (cf. Street, Literacy in Theory 38-43). Hildyard and Olson state
repeatedly that the children who read well, listen well also and they offer three
possible explanations for this: acquisition of specialized reading and listening skills;
suitability of certain procedures for both oral and written language; good readers
learn to treat even orally presented stories like written texts. But one very critical
factor of this research is that the seventy-two subjects are distributed into two sets
(depending on school grades) of good readers, average readers and poor readers.
The question is: since what is being tested here goes beyond mere language skills,
how does this reading ability correlate with other intellectual abilities? Why do the
authors feel constrained to offer only linguistic or language-related explanations for
the superiority in comprehension of good readers?
38
It is perhaps not so difficult to account for their
manner of proceeding. They wish to avoid dragging in the complex cognitive
questions which their findings entail. But this very reluctance or silence is the single
most eloquent testament of the presence of these complexities and of the ideological
attitude they adopt to them. In striving to present the picture of a scientific
experiment untainted by any cognitive assumptions or socio-cultural ideologies and
practices, when in fact all these are implicated in their procedures and conclusions,
Hildyard and Olson reveal the sort of subterfuges to which several scholars resort in
the discourse of orality and literacy. There are of course many others involved in
this discourse, especially in the area of literary criticism, who are profoundly
unaware of all the implications of its constituent terms; this cannot render their
more or less harmful repetition of stereotypes excusable, but it is nevertheless
understandable.
Besides historiography, where, since the sixties
when the study of African history by Africans themselves gained impetus, and aided
by the publication of works such as D.T. Niane's Soundjata,ou l'Epopee Mandingue
(1960) and Jan Vansina's Oral Tradition (1965), orality has been largely accepted as
a valid method of historical inquiry, the formal questions of orality and literacy
have been raised mainly in literary studies.4 But perhaps `question' is too strong a
word here, for only rarely, if at all, has orality commanded explicit attention in
literary theory.5 On the other hand, in many areas of literature in the developing
39
world, and most especially in Africa, hardly any evaluation or criticism of literary
texts occurs without some form of reference to oral tradition.
Many of such references however are quite content
to assume some pristine or intuitive familiarity with oral tradition, or at best have
repeated by rote some of the extravagant or doubtful claims of Walter Ong and Jack
Goody about orality. At any rate, the basis of the oral intertext in modern African
literature was made clear by Emmanuel Obiechina more than two decades ago.
Writers and critics are quite familiar, he says, with their own folklore, and
communicate competently in their vernaculars, in spite of being Western-educated.
More than this they "share the values, attitudes, and structures of feelings...which
are implicit within their oral cultures" ( Obiechina 27).
We can construe this to mean that there are values,
attitudes and structures of feelings peculiar to oral cultures. If these exist, in the
light of our arguments above, we do not know for sure how they are to be
distinguished from literate ones. And if they can be distinguished, we would still be
left with the problem of whether their articulation within the domain of language
stands in an autonomous relation to other ways of manifesting themselves in the
culture, or indeed of how to permutate them with these other means. But perhaps
Obiechina might argue that none of these questions is envisaged or permissible in
the context. Nevertheless, to describe certain cultures as `oral' in contradistinction
obviously from `written' cultures, already assumes a dominant relation between
40
language and non-linguistic features in a culture. This relation certainly need not be
causal, but it is unavoidably determinative to merit the descriptive emphasis.
There is also the additional question of the
character of these values, attitudes and feeling-structures. Are they essential
immutable features of a culture? If they are, presumably they would be transposed
inevitably to the new literate culture in the event of a historical, cultural
transformation from an oral to a writing situation. If they are not, the writing
situation would necessarily lead to the formation of a new set of values, attitudes
and emotive structures. But this is not what Obiechina says. The African literati, he
claims, manifest these oral psychic and noetic elements in the emergent novelistic
medium as an inimitable substantialist feature of their consciousness. But the
contradiction here should be obvious. If there is an essential oral consciousness,
then it should be matched by an equally essential literate one. In this sense, Eric
Havelock, Walter Ong, Jack Goody, and David Olson are at least consistent. The
problem arises when there is a transformational situation, where an ostensibly fixed
oral consciousness acquires the technology of writing. Does it not acquire a fixed
literate consciousness with it as well? If it does, surely this can only mean that
either the oral consciousness was not fixed in the first place, or the subject acquires
in itself two fixedly contradictory consciousnesses.
In any case, most literary critics are content merely
to describe or evaluate the specific literary features of their texts and hesitate to be
41
drawn into the wider philosophical and psychological implications of their analyses.
In the context of Africa literature, this regrettable reluctance has not, interestingly
enough, dampened the enthusiasm with which scholars produce detailed analyses
of what they imagine is "the oral style" of their subjects. What does this consist of?
Economy of expression, spare and uncluttered language, `normal' syntax, communal
imagery and symbolism, at least according to Chinweizu and others in Towards the
Decolonisation of African Literature (241-247). For these authors, true African
fiction modelled after the oral style would reflect:
communalist ethos; unexaggerated prominence
of the individual within his society; the
open and healthy treatment of sex... the
utilization of proverbs; succinctness of
descriptions.. the use of stock characters
and situations in parabolic presentations,
magic, ghosts, and the supernatural;
characterization through allusions, praise
names and metaphors (159).
The authors are not done with these contestable generic claims about fiction, but
indeed generalize their remarks for all of literature:
Orature, being auditory, places high value
42
on lucidity, normal syntax and precise and
apt imagery...Efficient structure and logistics
is valued in orature, for it takes one through
to the climax without tedious or unnecessary
diversions (247).
Although it may sound as a harsh judgement to make, random and unsystematic
thoughts such as the above constitute the substantive contribution of this over-rated
book to the pursuit of African poetics. For all we need to ask is this: is the espousal
of communalist ethos true of all African oral narratives, if indeed this is what the
authors mean by "African narrative tradition?" Are these features a function of a
cultural narrative style or of individual raconteurs working within recognisable
repertoires of oral narrative genres, forms and traditions or even degrees of artistic
skill? Can we speak of the complexity of characterisation in heroic narratives as
reliant on stock characters?
For the authors, African literature is one stable,
unitary formation, transmissible from generation to generation. But the very nature
of oral literature and the structure of its communication makes this eminently
impossible. Every oral performance is in many ways a unique performance. Literary
forms in oral tradition, as in written, have no eternal existence, but live and die, are
resurrected and transformed in various ways. Genres and performance traditions as
well as styles are as multiple, possibly more varied than in the written tradition. The
43
idea of an essential African oral tradition is more than a pious myth; it is a
laughable one. It greatly impoverishes our understanding of literature in Africa.
But above all, it is quite significant, how, using
almost identical language, Towards the Decolonisation of African Literature repeats
the arguments of Walter Ong. In so doing, it not only throws us back to the
treacherous paths we have trodden so far, but actually ends up defeating the major
plank of the authors’ argument. For the similarity shows that there is nothing
uniquely African about the oral style. All it reveals is that, as the thesis has often
been presented, societies whose medium of verbal transmission is entirely oral, have
a certain stylistic tendency. And the truth of this position remains untested.
In the field of oral literature itself, certain literary
elements have commonly been held as characteristically oral, and to this we shall
now turn. Of all the features of oral poetry, the one held to be most distinctive by
many scholars is repetition. As Ruth Finnegan mentions, some scholars "unequivocally regard repetition (including parallelism and formulaic expression) as
characteristic of oral literature [and] even the yardstick by which oral can
definitively be distinguished from written literature" (Oral Poetry 127f).
Undoubtedly, as one recent work of Isidore
Okpewho shows, in African oral literature, just like other oral literatures, repetition
plays an extremely important stylistic function (Okpewho 70-88). It is not only of
practical or utilitarian value in oral performance, but is an aesthetic touchstone of
44
oral art in general. Repetition helps the oral artist to organise his material and
master the limitations of memory; it is also necessary for the fuller and more
assured assimilation of information by the audience. More than this, many of those
stylistic features which are recognisably oral, for example, formulae and
parallelism, are merely instances of repetition, which in principle and practice range
from simple lexical or phrasal recurrences to more structurally elaborate forms,
including repeated motifs of theme, character and action, and even of the binary
forms of (psycho)logical life, as structuralists have argued.
However, anyone who goes on “to take the
occurrence, or a specific proportion, of repetition as a touchstone for differentiating
between `oral' and `written' styles is...bound to be disappointed” (Finnegan, Oral
Poetry 130). The concept of repetition is so wide and its application so various that
to delimit it in more precise definition is to lose its universality. Moreover,
Finnegan further argues, stylistically speaking, repetition is at the heart of all poetry
and is the means for distinguishing poetry from prose in all cultural traditions.
Indeed, if there is anything we have learnt from structuralist poetics, it is the
repetitive nature of all literature. While oral literature might make repetition
particularly explicit, it is a stylistic feature which belongs almost intrinsically to all
verbal art.
Finnegan has noted the underlying premise beneath
the theory of the special significance of repetition in oral art. Quoting the example
45
of the work of Gonda, Olrik and others, she argues that repetition has often been
seen by several anthropologists as part of the primaeval nature of `primitive man.'
Since `primitive man,' (Ong's primarily `oral man,') is averse to change, and is
dependent on constant re-enactment and repetition of old rituals, this issues in the
ritualistic repetition characteristic of his literature.6 Spells, charms, and magical
incantation of all sorts are an especially apt realisation of this (cf. Ong, The
Presence 161-169; Orality and Literacy 31-77). Finnegan dismisses these and
similar assumptions by the patent lack of evidence to support the claims, pointing
out that oral poetry does not typically occur in the tradition-bound contexts implied
by these scholars. She concludes:
In any case, it would be surprising if any
one generalization about style were to be
valid for all the different genres of oral
poetry. On the contrary, it is clear from a
study of the style of oral (as of written)
poetry that it is variety of stylistic
features that differentiates genres from
each other both within and between cultures (Oral Poetry 132).
This is indeed a fitting conclusion. For part of the reason for the more exuberant
assertions made about orality comes from ignoring the integrity and autonomy of
the cultural practices in which oral communication predominates. A good example
46
is oral literature. It surely makes more scholarly sense to study a particular oral
literary piece in terms of its own individual style than to make grandiose
pronouncements about the oral style. Such an individual focus does not preclude
attention to the generic orientation of the work, the cultural context of its
production, the role of the oral performer as a creative artist or the vast range of
performance factors that come into play in its actual execution. On the contrary it
calls for, indeed requires all these as a pre-condition for any meaningful and indepth analysis. Another point connected with this is that unlike the work on writing
culture in the last few decades, theoretical thinking on orality has almost always
been a comparative project. For various reasons, several scholars seem unable to
make any serious theoretical sense of orality except in contrast to literacy. This in
turn is partly the consequence of another confusion, namely, the confusion of orality
as a mere mode of communication, with orality as
culturally-conditioned
expression of psychosocial values and states. It seems clear that until clarity is
achieved at these preliminary levels, the discourse of orality and literacy will
continue to be bedevilled by the sort of cyclical reasoning we have seen so far.
What we have tried to do is to go over the gamut of
humanistic studies to see the protean shapes that the discourse of orality and literacy
assumes. It is to the credit of Walter Ong that he has unearthed, howbeit
unintentionally, how cognate the oral-literate dichotomy is with the variety of
cultural and racial prejudices which are dignified with the appellation of science (cf.
47
Vail and White 24). No field seems to be immune from this . The insidious manner
in which these sanctified prejudices are deployed in different discourses within the
human sciences, is one more proof that Western attempts to understand the Other
seem to be useful only in so far as they shed light on the peculiar mentality of those
who engage in such inquiries..
Notes
1 Wiredu has recently addressed this question extensively. See Cultural Universals
and Particulars (1996). See also Wiredu, “Toward the Decolonizing of African
Philosophy and Religion”(1998), accessible on the net at www.clas.ufl.edu. Other
significant recent works include Owomoyela The African Difference: Discourses on
Africanity and the Relativity of Cultures (1996) and Gyekye Tradition and
Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience (1997). From a
different perspective, there is also Norris Against Relativism: Philosophy of
Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory (1997).
2. Richard Rorty ( 322-333) might indeed argue, following Kuhn, that systems of
logic are culturally determined.
3. See, among a host of other materials: Olson, “From Utterance to Text: the Bias of
Language in Speech and Writing”(1977); Hildyard and Olson “Memory and
Inferences in the Comprehension of Oral and Written Discourse” (1978);Torrance
48
and Olson “Oral and Literate Competencies in Early School Years”(1985); Hildyard
and Hidi “Oral-Written Differences in the Production and Recall of Narratives”
(1985); Olson “Mind and Media: the Epistemic Function of Literacy (1988); Olson
and Torrance,Literacy and Orality (1991).
4. Translated and published in 1965 as Sundiata. But a useful introduction to the
question from the African viewpoint is Toyin Falola (Ed) African Historiography
(1993).
5. See however Abiola Irele “The African Imagination” (1990) and especially
“Orality, Literacy and African Literature” (1990).
6. The critique of the concept of `oral man' by Vail and White (1991) is notable in
this respect.
49
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