lecture 6..pptx

2017

Philosophia, 1986

notes for general

2019

This Article aims to create a complete typology of the forms of decisional law. Distinguishing “rules” from “standards” is the most commonly attempted jurisprudential line, roughly drawn between nonvague and vague. But no agreement exists on the dimension along which the rule/standard terminology lies, or on where the dividing line on the continuum lies. Thus, classifying in terms of vagueness is itself vague. Ultimately it does not aid legal actors in formulating or applying the law. The classification works best as an evocative image. A clearer distinction would be useful in formulating or applying the law. For the law-applier, it would be more useful if expressly focused on whether the law-giver was trying to pin things down and thus narrow the room for discretion. It would be even more useful if it had helped that law-giver to think about how to pin things down.This better top-level distinction lies between binary and scalar directives. If the directive comprises a checklist of ...

International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2013

Stanford Law Review, 2008

DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 1 MANDATORY RULES Scott Dodson* Whether a limitation is jurisdictional or not is an important but often obscure question. ... 750 (2008). 10. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. UL REV. ...

Law and Philosophy, 1997

Legisprudence, 2010

Oxford Bibliographies

Philosophy Compass, 2024

‘Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke’s skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution is devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II will be about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian’s and Wright’s new puzzles.