1 Yiannis Mylonas Constructions of the opposition to ‘structural adjustment reforms’ in the German mass-media (to be published by the Journal of Political Ideologies) Abstract This article analyses Germany‟s Der Spiegel weekly journal, and its discursive constructions of the oppositional voices against the so-called structural reforms imposed on Greece in the context of the Eurozone crisis. The analysis is focused on relevant articles published by Der Spiegel between late 2009 and early 2015, during important, crisis-related sociopolitical events. Drawing on discourse theory and critical discourse analysis, the article concludes that Der Spiegel (along with other mainstream media in Germany and elsewhere) publicly legitimises the elites‟ hegemonic crisis-narratives and policies, while discrediting oppositional voices. The study further foregrounds the ways Der Spiegel and other German mainstream-media reproduce a nationalistic „victimisation‟ of Germany, which advances Germany‟s own national branding-strategy of positive Self-representation in the EU and in the world. Keywords: neoliberalism, Greece, Germany, Eurozone, crisis, austerity Introduction: the Eurozone crisis as an economic and political crisis This article looks at the ways that voices and agents opposing the so-called „structural adjustment reforms‟ implemented in the EU‟s periphery in the context of the Eurozone‟s crisis, are covered by the online version of the popular German weekly journal, Der Spiegel. The focus on the German press concerns Germany‟s hegemonic politico-economic position in the organisation of the economic-political foundations of the EU and the Eurozone1 and the leading role of the rightwingconservative German government (in power since late 2005). In terms of the managing of the Eurozone crisis, following Donald Trump‟s election as US President and a broader shift of Western mainstream politics towards the far right, Germany has increasingly been branded as the main pillar of liberalism in the world.2 The analysis of a leading German media output offered here follows a theoretical understanding of the crisis in its symbolic and material terms (primarily) as a political phenomenon. In the coming section, the hegemonic discursive construction of the crisis is presented, taking into account the 2 socio-political antagonism (that emerged via the rupture that the economic crisis and subsequent austerity) brought to the „social contract‟ of the states involved.3 The Eurozone crisis is discussed in critical terms, with the use of Political Economy Theory,4 as a symptom of contradictions in the latecapitalist reproduction process. Finally, the hegemonic crisis-policies currently implemented in the EU and its periphery, are discussed as indicative of the EU‟s „post-democratic‟5 and „post-political‟ turn.6 This covers the emergence of what Streeck described as the „European consolidation state‟, marked by a shift from a „people-orientated state‟, to a „market-orientated state‟.7 In this context (times of augmented national debt), and due to the neoliberal (counter) revolution that has been advancing since the 1970s, national states are, “to provide both the legitimacy and the efficiency of capital accumulation”.8 This governance mode means that states need to respond to the demands of the lenders and provide confidence to financial markets, rather than addressing their citizens‟ rights. Not accountable to national or (working) class demands, the EU provides a technocratic, neoliberal framework of governance for its state-members, through the development of neoliberal institutions and financial tools (such as the Euro currency). Germany has emerged as, “the de facto governor of the European Monetary Union (EMU)”, “due to its import strength, the low European interest rates” and the „hard currency‟ structure of the Eurozone that benefits the EU‟s core countries.9 A critical political economy approach; a local symptom of a global crisis Political economists, like Harvey and Streeck (among others), have argued that the 2007-8 US Credit Crunch and the 2009-10 insolvency of the Eurozone‟s periphery were connected to the 1970‟s (socalled) „global oil crisis‟, which constituted a major crisis of growth in the global development of capitalism. This crisis, as the above scholars have argued, has never been fully resolved. In this framework, neoliberalism emerged as an ideological and policy-making paradigm for economic recovery.10 Harvey described neoliberalism as an upper-class restoration project that meant to dissolve the egalitarian social-democratic institutions that developed in the West after the Second 3 World War. He explained that, its intention was to intensify productivity and capital accumulation regimes through the institutionalisation of frameworks that triggered constant social mobility (to the lower social-classes) and, “creative destruction”.11 Harvey presented four interrelated frameworks of neoliberal political strategies: a) the privatisation and commodification of broader aspects of the natural and social world; b) the financialisation of economic activities; c) the management and manipulation of crises to produce institutions strengthening corporate power or reducing social and political rights and; d) the public „bail outs‟ of vibrant businesses, notably banks, that may be risking bankruptcy.12 Indeed, the globalisation of the so-called free market that developed after the „global oil crisis‟ meant the abolishing of national protectionist policies and trade tariffs, reducing the ability of nation states to sustain relative independence in domestic economic policy. Most importantly, a significant amount of public income was lost by such economic „liberalisation‟ policies, because (due to global economic competition) high capital saw significant tax reductions.13 For these reasons, states became more reliant on credit institutions (such as banks) to replace their missing revenues and to continue serving their national budgets.14 The ongoing Eurozone crisis was dealt in the EU with via policies that required the radical cutting of public expenditures, along with a heavier taxation of medium and lower incomes (instead of taxing higher incomes) in order to sustain public deficits. The development of the common Euro currency across the EU and neoliberal reforms after the crisis erupted in Europe in late 2009, meant a significant loss of productivity from the EU periphery, which was neither able to compete, nor to protect itself from the competition of the core capitalist countries.15 International banks were able to provide low interest-rate loans to national governments (due to the securities offered by the common Euro currency to the financial markets‟ rating agencies) to compensate for the productivity loss in the EU‟s „common market‟ and „common currency‟ framework. This process did not last long, however, as the Credit Crunch of 2008 produced a more competitive environment and strengthened the financial markets‟ political power. The peripheral Eurozone countries would have to become as 4 competitive as the core ones, in order not to undermine the power of the Euro-currency. The Euro itself proved to be a neoliberal tool to „reform‟ national economies according to its own logic and needs. This was related to the aforementioned financialisation of the economy, and the Euro‟s connection to the core EU economies.16 Here though, the banking system refused to accept the potential loss of its loaning activities, with Greece and other indebted countries taking the political and public blame for a systemic deficit.17 In the US 2007-8 crisis, the US Federal Reserve bailed out its own bankrupted financial institutions.18 The EU did a similar thing in 2010, but through a more complex process of bailing-out countries like Greece and transforming a debt owed to private institutions (e.g. international banks), to a debt owed to public ones (e.g. the national budgets of countries participating at the bailout program). Such political decisions created further divisions and conflicts in the EU, because the credit donor nations imposed strict conditions on the indebted countries to make sure that their debt would not be cancelled. As Streeck explained, the donor nations, “behave as imperialists, interfering in the internal affairs of others and undermining their democracies”.19 The ordo-liberal ideological framework of the EU’s crisis-restructuring To understand the European response to the economic crisis, we need to address the European branch of neoliberalism. In his later work, Michel Foucault approached his time‟s advancing neoliberalism (in the 1970s), by distinguishing two main, parallel variants of neoliberalism: the German neoliberalism (known as ordo-liberalism) and the American neoliberalism.20 As a policy framework, ordoliberalism combines state intervention with a secure free-market and competition, and the state‟s disciplinary role is to construct a neoliberal subjectivity for its citizens. Contrary to the idea that capitalism today is deregulated, it would be more appropriate to say that capitalism has been reorganised on new bases whose mainspring is the use of generalised competition, including in the order of subjectivity. What people are happy to call „deregulation‟ – an ambiguous expression which might be taken to mean that capitalism no longer has any mode of regulation – is in fact a new ordering of economic activities, social relations, conduct and subjectivities.21 5 The neoliberal state thus intervenes in all social fields, in order to produce social relations and subjectivities in line with the productive premises of neoliberal capitalism. As Dardot and Laval stressed, key ideas underlining the ordo-liberal construction of Europe are: a) flexibility of wages and prices; b) reform of pensions by prioritising individual saving; c) promotion of the spirit of the enterprise; and d) defense of „free society‟ against „nihilism‟, connected to the EU‟s anti-socialist aspirations.22 A variety of historical events and political interventions (starting in post-WWII Federal Germany) have established the current ordo-liberal doctrines in Europe. The central ordo-liberal ideas of the EU‟s established liberalism are the austere organisation of competition policy and the institutionalisation of the European Central Bank‟s (ECB) independence.23 These features are the central principles and mechanisms guiding all national policies in the EU. The austerity regimes organised by the Troika-mechanisms (which include the ECB, the European Commission (EC) and the IMF) all operate on such principles. Crisis, antagonism and regimes of public meaning-making Jessop argued that there might be crises in and of the system, besides, “external” ones (e.g. crises caused by the forces of nature).24 Crises in the system are associated with the dynamics, crisistendencies and antagonisms of a given social form (e.g. capitalism) occurring within the dimensions of the system‟s natural and social arrangements.25 Such crises include mechanisms to manage the crisis and restore the basic routines and functions of the system.26 Crises of the system are more fundamental, because they imply the system‟s breakdown and, “can cause social inertia, stagnation and social unrest, and may be met by exceptional policy measures, or emergency regimes”.27 Laclau and Mouffe noted that moments of crisis are also forms of rupture of the hegemonic symbolic order constituting a given society.28 Social antagonism emerges over the rupture, connected to different views, meanings and discourses over the denotation of the crisis/rupture and its alleviation. 6 This was related to a fixation on the social order according to specific social imaginaries. The crisis triggered unprecedented social turmoil in countries like Greece, which became the centre of hegemonic political interventions in the interests of the global and the European north.29 Simultaneously, counter-hegemonic tendencies also emerged, challenging the neoliberal economic paradigm, as part of socio-political struggles to advance alternative social imaginaries and institutions for the crisis and its resolution. The construction of a general public-consensus on the hegemonic meanings of the crisis and its resolution policies has been central to legitimising the exceptionalist policy-measures and emergency regimes mentioned above (that compromised democratic and human rights in the countries worst affected by the crisis). Thus, the study of the media is crucial in understanding the ways that the neoliberal ideology is publicly formed, legitimised and reproduced in the times of crisis.30 According to Free and Scully, “the global hegemony of neoliberalism before and following the 2008 crisis must be situated within national cultural contexts”.31 The media publicly advances the ideal subjectivities that neoliberalism in crisis demands for capitalist growth, in this way, it develops the system‟s biopolitical agenda.32 This, as the analysis will show, has at its core, an aim to „reform‟ both national institutions and the individual psyche as well. The public framing of the economic crisis of the Eurozone by the EU‟s political-economic elites, pundits and mainstream media, was done in neoliberal, but also „orientalist‟ terms, particularly as far as Greece was concerned.33 The crisis was, therefore, presented as a cultural and moral failure produced by the „abnormal‟ practices of people and institutions, in peripheral EU states.34 The crisis and its effects in the EU‟s core countries were also represented in equivalent moralistic terms.35 The crisis‟ contradictions and the failure of austerity reforms36 revealed a more complicated picture however; one that the crisis‟ hegemonic narratives concealed. 7 Empirical study: Der Spiegel representations of the opposition to austerity reforms Founded in 1947, Der Spiegel is popular weekly magazine owned and published by the SpiegelVerlag company. Der Spiegel is generally acknowledged as a quality journalism medium of „progressive‟ investigative journalism on issues and events of common concern. It features opinion columns from a variety of intellectual sources from Germany and elsewhere. Data was primarily obtained from www.spiegel.de and this was translated by the author from German English.1 The key search-terms used were, “Finanzkrise-in-Griechenland” and, “Syriza” (the main leftist, anti-austerity opposition-party in Greece during the time of study). The period of study is from the beginning of the Eurozone crisis (at the end of 2009) to the 20th of January 2015, which coincides with the Greek national elections of late-January, 2015 that brought Syriza to power. Both searchterms produced hundreds of articles published both in the print and in the online editions of Der Spiegel. For practical reasons, the study focuses on the online articles that were accessible free of charge. In total, 165 news and opinion articles were selected for study. These are articles that contain different references to oppositional voices and events against austerity, expressed during specific moments of the crisis and its political management. Such moments include the negotiations between the Greek governments and EU officials over austerity reforms and loans, the votes on austerity laws by the Greek parliament, the Greek national elections of 2012 and the pre-election period of January 2015, the voting for loans to Greece in exchange for austerity by the German parliament, and the visits of key German politicians (like Merkel and Schäuble) to Greece. The analysis developed is primarily a thematic one. The articles were read multiple times, and the oppositional agents appearing in them were identified. The main themes addressing these agents were then coded, according to the most common ways they are represented.37 These themes were determined to be the main discursive constructions that produced the anti-austerity opposition in Der Spiegel during the period studied. 1 Where an English translation of the selected article was provided by Der Spiegel International Online (www.spiegel.de/international/europe/), the pape s o t a slated te t is the o e e-produced in the excerpts of the current text. 8 The agents of opposition to austerity were usually protestors, demonstrators, trade unionists, leftistpoliticians and –parties; and civil-society groups and agents (like NGO‟s or critical intellectuals). On this subject, protest activities drew attention from Der Spiegel up to 2012, and Syriza appears to be the online paper‟s main focus after its electoral success in April 2012. Der Spiegel articles belong to a specific textual/media genre connected to the field of social action and the formation of public opinion in Germany.38 The media genre of Der Spiegel is that of „investigative journalism‟ and the texts studied here are connected to the norms and the authority deriving from this media genre. Claims of objectivity are commonly associated with the journalistic ideology of such media,39 and the ways that the public is positioned towards „preferred readings‟ of the issues is presented here. Dealing with political issues, these articles include a variety of voices from the economic crisis‟ broader field of discursivity, including the broader socio-political, economic, historical and national-cultural context from they emerge.40 The ways these voices are presented in the articles, involves preferred positions of Self (for Der Spiegel readers and the general public it addresses/constructs) and others (those in disagreement to Der Spiegel positioning on the crisis). Using specific examples, this analysis will demonstrate the ways that social agents are textually constructed in Der Spiegel. The analysis will also focus on the ways that austerity is legitimised by Der Spiegel contributors, through the ways that they respond to austerity opponents. The textual construction of the crisis‟ actors (e.g. as perpetrators, victims or benefactors41) is connected to the Der Spiegel positioning towards the crisis and its resolution, which (as will be demonstrated) is also connected to the hegemonic, neoliberal and nationalist understanding. Critical discourse analysis is a valuable resource to this end. The analytical categories of legitimacy construction developed by Van Leeuwen (2008) will be deployed to show how the Other is produced in a process of publicly legitimising austerity. “Legitimation is the process of „explaining‟ and justifying”,42 and argument is a 9 form of a syllogism that uses particular elements to legitimise or verify a statement and, most importantly, to make it plausible for a given audience.43 Topoi are the elements of justification of positive and negative positions expressed.44 The analytical use of topoi is connected to the examination of the ways negative representations of the Other are constructed in order to publicly legitimise political strategies (such as austerity reforms). In what follows, the four main themes of representation that frame the opposition identified in the texts studied are: a) the threatening opposition; b) the irrational opposition; c) the victimised opposition; and d) the active opposition. The first three are interconnected in more direct terms. The fourth, allows some space for the appearance of a „less mediated‟, anti-austerity voice in the German public sphere (which is nevertheless regulated by the constant iteration of the previous frames that correspond to the hegemonic understanding of the crisis). The threatening opposition A variety of oppositional activities and agents are labeled as threatening in Der Spiegel. Protest events (like demonstrations and strikes) and oppositional politicians and political parties, are framed as dangerous and risky, causing uncertainty. The works of the opposition thus deepen the crisis and harden its alleviation, by disturbing the policies and processes deemed to batter the crisis and preventing the reaching of a general public consensus to the crisis‟ hegemonic narrative. Strike against austerity: unions want to paralyse Greece (11/03/2010) General strike against austerity: nothing works in Greece (26/09/2012) Chaos in Greece: Samaras warns of Weimar conditions (05/10/2012) The titles above suggest that opposition to austerity is catastrophic. This is connected to what has been identified as the, “eschatological” public framing of the crisis, where the economic crisis represents an imminent, apocalyptic threat that requires exceptional political measures to be 10 resolved.45 The „threatening frame‟ unfolds in descriptions of material damages and violent acts taking place during demonstrations. Metonymies denoting disturbance, catastrophe and violence are also exemplary of the general theme: “Greece is sinking in garbage” (23/11/10), “impressions from a war-torn country” (02/11/11), “public life stands still” (2/2/13). Metaphors, such as, “Weimar conditions” (5/10/12), “mountains of garbage in Athens” (20/10/11) and, “end of Europe” (28/9/12) are also frequent. The prioritisation of threat and catastrophe in the discussion of the Greek opposition downplays the demands of socio-political discourse and activity, or the consequences of austerity to the general population and the economy itself. Metonymies (e.g. “Athens paralysed”) enable Der Spiegel authors to, “conjure away responsible, involved, or affected actors”.46 Indeed, their coverage of labour strikes in Greece often focuses on the details of the disturbances, without referring to the demands of the strikers. The understanding of the public space emerges as a commercial one; focusing on economic activities and centralised governance concerns, and devoid of civic concerns over the uses of the social space. The threatening frame is, therefore, content-specific, and is concerned with what is valued and to be protected by the hegemonic crisis-rationale. The threatening frame expresses anxiety, but also forms a rhetorical topos instrumentalised to develop and legitimise public pressure in favour of austerity. Past research has shown that the media emphasis on violent acts and the construction of public risk narratives in moments of socio-political crisis has been a useful political tool in organising a collective feeling of dismay towards oppositional activities.47 In moments of transition and uncertainty (like the broader economic crisis context), such media discourses can function strategically in favour of specific political imaginaries and policy frameworks to be established. Sensational media representations of violence/risk/crisis are discussed in Naomi Klein‟s work on the, “shock doctrine”.48 As she explains, fear and shock block critical thinking, and open possibilities of consent and the passive acceptance of emergency regimes in expense of democratic procedures. Populism is an important allegation emerging in this threatening construction of the opposition. 11 Syriza, in particular, the crisis‟ emergent, leading leftist-oppositional party in Greece, is generally addressed as a populist party by Der Spiegel (and other mainstream media).49 It is related to what is described as the contemporary post-democratic turn of politics, where public affairs are to be managed by unelected technocrats and economists, moving towards a biopolitical mode of societal reproduction regulated by the competitive demands of the „free market‟.50 The possibility of having a „wrong‟ government elected is something that is met with fear by the elites and mainstream media like Der Spiegel: “On Monday, most stock markets in Europe reacted with relief at the outcome of elections in Greece” (18/06/2012). In such excerpts, the stock markets are topoi of expert-authority,51 which are meant to publicly legitimise austerity. Here, the authority of economists generally appears to be more valid than that of politicians or popular vote. As the following excerpt from a 26/5/14 article shows, Syriza is charged with risk, simplicity, irresponsibility, opportunism and discredited as „populist‟. Its leader, Tsipras, is addressed according to what Reisigl and Wodak described as the “straw-man fallacy”,52 where a distorted picture of the antagonist‟s standpoint and personality is presented: Greek-left politicians Tsipras: The Euro-horror (Photo of Tsipras and note: Alexis Tsipras: he declared the Reforms required by the EU and the IMF as null and void). Alexis Tsipras likes simple sentences. One goes like this: if the bank is owed £ 5000, it's your problem, but if you owe the bank £ 500,000, it is a problem of the bank, said the head of the Greek radical Left (SYRIZA) to the British Guardian. This simple picture is to represent the situation in Europe – where the problem should fall on the creditor. Tsipras has one main theme: the impoverishment of the Greek society by austerity. His party alliance comes with a ten-point program promising resistance to the labor market reforms… rejecting the conditions of the EU rescue-package. His furious performances - combined with a good dose of patriotism – appeal to many Greeks during the confusing time of the crisis. In another article, dated 5/1/2015, one can read the following analysis: The biggest risk for the Euro (currency) is not the markets, but the protest parties. They grew not only in Greece, but also in Spain, Italy or France. With a battle cry against „austerity‟, and populist attacks against Germany in particular, political newcomers win support among voters. In Berlin it is generally agreed that the euro crisis in each country was self-inflicted and that the crisis can only be dealt with a mix of austerity and reform… This excerpt is indicative of the aforementioned „post-democratic‟ way of thinking about popular movements against austerity. Parties from both the left and the right are nominalised as, “protest parties”, reducing their ideological differences and defining them as equivalent opponents to the EU 12 and the Euro currency. Der Spiegel adopts an objectivist, „European‟ and „realist‟ perspective, legitimised by the institutional authority of, “Berlin”, a metonymy referring to the German government and its central position in EU policy-making. In this way, the socio-political antagonism of the crisis is addressed in post-democratic terms. On the one hand, there is the calm and unifying position expressed by the (“Berlin”) technocrats, defined by knowledge and efficiency; and, on the other, the populist side, which is irrational, catastrophic and, “dividing”. This delimitation of the political horizon is an expression of the ideology of the, “extreme centre”;53 a self-proclaimed „centrist‟ position, which cannot tolerate anything opposing its rationales and strategic planning: “European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso appealed to EU leaders not to give in to populism on Tuesday after Italian voters roundly rejected the austerity policies pursued by outgoing prime minister Mario Monti”54. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe‟s work, Stavrakakis and Katsampekis understand populism as a discourse articulated around the nodal point of, “the people” or other nodal points, such as those related to social class.55 This is a discursive strategy to produce a unity of common interests and identity traits in order to fight a common and powerful opponent. Contrary to the elites‟ understanding (where the left is often equated to the far and the extreme right under the reductionist label of „populism‟) there are many variations of populism and democratic politics should focus its inclusive forms.56 The populists are further dismissed as being connected to the, “underdog culture”.57 This points towards upper-class, bourgeois values and political priorities in its masking and discrediting of the class dimension of the opposition (through the stigmatisation of the disadvantaged and the exploited as an „underclass‟ that is responsible for its own disempowered position).58 The irrational opposition Frustration over saving-plans in Greece: a nation of protest voters (04/05/2012) Protest vote: Greece is ungovernable (07/05/2012) 13 Greece‟s privatisation bankruptcy: We do not sell anything! (26/07/2012) Irrationality appears as another general characteristic of the opposition in the articles analysed. The threatening Other is also irrational, while „we‟ are moderate, rational and realistic. In Laclau‟s terms, the Other is constitutive of „us‟, by representing the limit of what we are and what we are not. “Irrationality” is analytically understood as a master theme that comprises a variety of signifiers that reduce the opposition‟s identity as reactionary, frustrated, angry, confused or simply as lacking in knowledge. Nominalisations (e.g. “protest vote”, “angry Greeks”) produce the reduced substance of the opposition. As showed before, expert-based knowledge is a central topos in the public legitimation of technocracy in the managing of socio-political and economic affairs. The sense is that, those opposing austerity reforms lack adequate knowledge; otherwise they would understand the necessity of austerity reforms and they would support the politicians to implement them. Economics are presented as a scientific, non-ideological site that informs neutral technocrats to do policy well. Critique is, therefore, discredited as irrelevant, confused and often „cultural‟; a remnant of the past, or a sign of an unfulfilled modernity. In an article published on 17/6/2013 entitled, „ATTAC‟s criticism: Most of the billion-aid to Greece went to the banks‟. One further reads: “Who benefits from the Greek bailout? Certainly not the citizens, say the critics of globalisation, Attac. They have calculated that more than three-quarters of emergency loans went to banks and investors have flowed. But this is at best a half-truth”. The end statement concludes that Attac‟s points are mistaken, denoting the epistemic modality of the article‟s authors.59 „Modality‟ concerns the Der Spiegel stance and perspective on the crisis and austerity, and its own identification with specific ideas and values in relation to those of oppositional Others.60 Here, the topos of technocracy rises to legitimise austerity reforms,61 as the validity of Attac‟s sources and facts are challenged by a topos of scientific rationality: But is that true? So impressive figures of Attac sound - they are not really new. The organisation made use of public and easily accessible non-public sources. So much of the report is based on information from press sources. It is known and logical that the emergency 14 loans have flowed to those actors who have lent money to the Greek state. And these are just mainly banks and investors at home and abroad. In addition, if the Euro-rescuers had not helped Greece, the country would have been insolvent within a few weeks - with predictably devastating consequences for citizens. The federal government rejected the allegations of Attac. People in Greece have benefited from that of the government in Athens gives time for reform and the banks had been saved from collapse, it said, according to „SZ‟, the Ministry of Finance. From the so-called troika of the EU, the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank stated that the billions for the banks would also benefit the citizens. An economy cannot function without reasonably equipped banks. The objectivist style of the argument gives further weight to the German government‟s position. Custom authority62 appeals to the readers‟ conformity to „common sense‟ (“it is known and logical”) perspectives, emphasising the reified processes of financial capitalism. Banks and investors are thus presented as plain, “actors lending money to the Greek state”. The catastrophe-myth (the pending of a greater catastrophe if austerity is not followed63) further legitimises the exceptional regimes of austerity. Simultaneously, a positive self-presentation is made for those developing and supporting austerity reforms, they are framed with the nominal metonymy of, “Euro-rescuers”; positively framed as the crisis alleviator that, “helps Greece” (and its citizens, as mentioned above) not to go bankrupt. A broader political and conflictual process is thus abstracted under the nominalisation of power agents (the banks, the EU technocrats and the core EU countries like Germany that organise the bailout plans) and unequal politico-economic relations (between a class divided, peripheral Greece and Greece‟s creditors).64 The loans in return for austerity are presented as a „no alternative‟ solution, as the possibility of declaring the debt odious is not discussed as a serious option. Insolvency is also presented as a catastrophe that will primarily affect citizens and less as something that will weigh down the banking system. This way, the financial system is neutralised as a „normal‟ component of the economy, and as something a-political and neutral, that works for, “the benefit of all”, without considering the role of finance in the rise of global inequality since the advent of neoliberalism. In another example from Der Spiegel, Habermas‟ theorisation of the post-democratic turn of the EU is discredited, along with the 2011 emerging Occupy Wall Street movement: Under the apocalypticists‟ view: Habermas belongs to the camp of the apocalyptic-minded 15 hysterics. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas has turned to the euro debate: Europe is on its way to „post-democracy‟, with Angela Merkel being an agent of capital. Thus, the debt crisis has finally reached the stage of hysteria… there are currently two competing interpretations of what actually happened: an analysis of the economic laws that led to the crisis of confidence in Europe, and the outcry of the heart, which describes the current confrontation with the terms of an ideological contest…(07/11/2011). The author above, a certain Jan Fleischhauer, favoured the objectivist, “analysis of economic laws” to understand the crisis, instead of an „ideological‟ one (which is outdated, emotional and irrational: a mere, “outcry of the heart”). The nominal use of adjectives denoting abnormality (“hysterics” and, “apocalypticists”) reduced the enunciation of critique to a form of irrationality. The, “economic laws” appear to be an objective and non-ideological realm, guided by the premises of positivist science and liberalism. Fleischhauer develops a scientific rationalisation of austerity and simultaneously develops a mythopoietic topos formed by the reduction of critique to „emotions‟ and „ideology‟, legitimising austerity through a comparison between science and fiction.65 A variety of legitimation strategies (rationalisation, mythopoiesis and moral evaluation) are enacted by the author, to establish austerity as an objective necessity. Thus, the textual construction above presents the economy (in fact, a deeply-political entity organised by constant political-antagonisms and –interventions) as something perennial and natural. The crisis itself is also reduced to a, “crisis of confidence”. Confidence is a nominal entity that does not entail a subject. Who lost confidence in „Europe‟ (another nominal metonymy that subsumes a divided geopolitical space) is not named, but one can suppose that it is the „financial markets‟66. Post-democratic, neoliberal logics often reduce opposing positions into mere culturalist or moralist symptoms of failure to adjust or to understand the „present reality‟. Likewise, social critique is, in the following quote, reduced to, “complaint”. The trustees of social complaint like moral reasons for their actions... The beautiful word of „redistribution‟, which is back in fashion, evokes the idea that those who have more should help those who need the assistance of others. But that describes a condition that has long belonged to the past. There are not enough rich - also in Germany - to fund all the promises of the welfare state... 16 In line with the mythopoetic strategy previously discussed, a, “moral tale” is developed to explain the, “present reality” from the perspective of the, “rich”.67 The instrumental use of the nominal term, “past”, presented as a concrete, resolved and unproblematic entity, is an ideological position related to the loose logics of post-modernism; relativising and excluding anything that could be potentially disturbing to capitalist accumulation processes.68 “Redistribution” (and along with it, “the welfare state”) is another nominalisation of a process that is presented in a-political and reduced terms; as a form of charity to be given by „choice‟ to those in need. As Nancy Frazer has shown, however, that redistribution has strong theoretical, political and historical premises, and is related to struggles for justice.69 Instead, a bourgeois understand of the economy is suggested, reifying private property and naturalising exploitation and inequality. Nominalisations (“redistribution”, “complaint”, and, “past”) abstract the Other‟s arguments, while the moral values of property and work are the topoi that legitimise the author‟s disapproval of Habermasian critique. Conclusively, a moral evaluation topos of argumentative legitimacy70 is produced, by abstracting the Other‟s arguments and then linking them to the moral values of capitalism. The victimised opposition A „winner/loser‟ argumentative topos emerges in the hegemonic narratives of the crisis and austerity, producing a moral evaluation of the Other‟s activities and arguments and legitimising the rightfulness of „our‟ own. The idea of „winners‟ and „losers‟ is an enduring theme in the culture of late capitalism.71 This is connected to the cynical, individualistic ideology of the entrepreneurial culture, and connected to the fear and risk of one becoming redundant in today‟s highly-precarious politicoeconomic context.72 As Harvey has noted, neoliberal reforms produce more recession.73 Nevertheless, the failure of austerity to reach its proclaimed goals (e.g. to make the economy competitive, the sovereign debt „sustainable‟ and to bring growth) is attributed to the countries subjected to it, as another symptom of 17 their own cultural and moral deficiencies that require „reform‟. The resistances towards austerity, in particular, are seen as a major cause of the reforms‟ failure. In the case of Greece, the work of opposition has been framed by the pro-austerity camp within the country and abroad, as a symptom of the general (supposed) „Greek-backwardness‟, which needs to be „cured‟ by austerity.74 Thus, the „loser‟ is an implied general category that is used to discredit, not only the opposition, but also the whole of Greek society for not occupying a place next to the „winners‟ of neoliberal globalisation.75 Predicative nouns and adjectives (such as terms denoting psychological pathologies and reactive attitudes, signifying defeat, negation or loss: “self-pity”, “complaint”, “humiliation”) are used to construct and affirm the „loser‟ position of the „victim‟ that (supposedly) defines the state of the protestors.76 This way, representation, “passivises”77 the acts of opposition, by reducing them to „selfpitying‟ or „complaining‟ gestures that have no positive or pro-active potential. The „victim‟ frame suggests that, instead of complaining and weeping, one should „do something‟. Opposition is thus deprived of positive agency and represented as inert and reactive: Greek crisis: In the stronghold of self-pity (24/6/2011) Debt crisis: Greeks complain about the ugly Germans (09/09/2011) Greece‟s debt dilemma: The humiliated people (10/11/11) Der Spiegel confronts the negativity towards Germany with a positive victimisation of the national German Self. Thus, in the texts studied, both a negative victimisation of the Other, and a positive victimisation of the Self emerge. While the Other-as-victim is addressed as a failure, the Self-asvictim is moralised in nationalist and also in „Europeanist‟ (and even „universalist‟) terms. In a 27/02/12 article entitled, „We, the new world-villains‟, Fleischhauer, again, attempted a reading of this negativity in national terms: The German parliament is set to approve a new multibillion euro bailout package for Greece on Monday, but instead of thanks, southern Europeans are expressing their dislike of us. Germans will have to get used to their new role: We have become the Americans of Europe. Sentiment towards the Germans isn't very good in the region right now. Hardly a day goes by without Chancellor Angela Merkel being depicted in a Nazi uniform somewhere. 18 Nominalisations construct national homogeneity: „we‟, „us‟ and „the Germans‟ address the national community of the German people. Here, “Greece” and “the South of Europe” are signifiers addressing the Other, while, “the Americans” and, “the Chancellor” are signifiers forming the identity of „us‟. Moral legitimacy is again provided to „us‟ due to our graciousness and responsibility, working as Europe‟s „rescuers‟: If the calculations of the experts are right, we are long past the point of guarantees. We will never see again a good deal of the 130 billion euros of aid decided by the Bundestag today. But if what is done is interpreted according to the main opinions of the crisis-regions, for which the money is destined, then we only want to accomplish what our grandfathers 70 years ago failed to do… A theoretical rationalisation78 here legitimises the author‟s indignation towards the opposition to austerity policies, based on analogies he draws from a selective interpretation of history and geopolitics. In this way, the author explains Germany‟s current position in the EU and the source of the South European negativity towards Germany in ways favourable to the positive construction of the Self. Here, German „graciousness‟ is justified by the risky bailout loans decided on by the German government. These loans are, however, addressed as, “aid”. The nominal entity of, “aid”, along with the sum of money it concerns (130 billion euros) provides authorisation79 to express „our‟ resentment towards the Other. Such authority is impersonal, deriving from the power of lending „our‟ own money. The hard-working taxpayer (who is also a responsible European aiding others) becomes a role model authorised to interpellate the Other. Affective descriptions like, “we will never see it again”, further victimise the identity of the common „hard working German taxpayer‟,80 who is aiding ungrateful people, “beyond their abilities”.81 These potential scoundrels are positioned as living at the expense of others, despite the fact that the so-called bailout loans weaken the economic and political position of the EU periphery, sinking it further into debt and recession. Indeed, the Greek lower- and middle-classes experienced a rapid expropriation through wage cuts, loss of jobs and severely heavy taxation. 19 A moral evaluation of the Other‟s position is developed by referring to the values of, “aid”. This legitimises the position of „us‟ as benefactors and also as critics of the Other. The parallels drawn between Nazi Germany and contemporary Germany are used to victimise the German nation and to moralise Merkel‟s „prudent‟ policies. As Forchtner demonstrated, ones acknowledgement of ones wrongdoings can become a symbolic topos to claim superiority over „failed‟ others.82 Unlike „us‟ (here, “Germans”), the Other is unable to accept responsibility and repent in the ways that „we‟ did: “we admit our past wrongdoing and stress the successful process of „coming to terms‟ with it in order to present us as morally superior vis-a-vis an external other”.83 The treacherous feeling of inferiority. Before we complain about so much ingratitude, we should remember that… as long as America was the world-villain, the Germans were happy to feel part of the party … The function of the United States as the world's policeman was secretly allowed by all, just as our neighbors leave it now to the Germans to save the euro. Unfortunately, the feeling of inferiority is at least as dangerous as that of superiority. Of course you can try to make yourself smaller than you are. We will see how far this self-denial takes... at the end of the hegemon can never conceal his size permanently. A moral tale is advanced here too. Here, to develop analogies between the tasks, and the problems faced by global superpowers, the author compares Germany with the USA. Germany‟s hegemonic position in the EU is legitimised by the use of an authoritative example: that of, “America”. A series of abstract nominalisations (“world policemen”, “America”, “all”, “save the euro”) are used to produce a robust argument manifesting positivity over the role of „the West‟ in the world. The passive voice (“allowed by all”) reduces agency, while justifying the consent of „all‟ for America to act as „world policeman‟. A psychological explanation is also advanced to explain political antagonisms. The author suggests that the Germans feel, “inferior”, because of the ungrateful accusations laid against them and due to the shadow of Germany‟s atrocious Nazi past. Such varying expressions of nationalist narcissism are already identified in the German press‟ coverage of the Eurozone crisis.84 The active opposition; possibilities of voice 20 The frames described above passivise the opposition, by (effectively) excluding its political discourse as irrelevant, absurd or pathological.85 As such, the voice of the opposition, related to the maderedundant, proletarianised, gendered and racialised „Others‟ that are exceptionalised by austerity regimes and subjected to their biopolitical (and even thanatopolitical86) violence, is suppressed by representational strategies. In her famous 1988 essay, Gayatri Spivak asked, “can the subaltern speak?”.87 Here, she was referring to radical intellectuals‟ attempts to speak on behalf of the colonial subaltern, potentially distorting the subaltern‟s own voice with their own agendas and meaning constructions. One can attempt to reflexively address Spivak‟s question in the context of economic crisis, when the subaltern, oppressed by austerity, attempts to raise his/her voice and is blocked, primarily through a distortion of his/her views and actions by the media. Quoting Ahmed, “the question becomes, not who speaks, but also who hears”.88 The Other‟s „voice‟ occasionally emerges in Der Spiegel‟s Greek-crisis representations, during ruptural events. With, “voice”, Couldry refers to, among other things, the realities and agendas that the oppressed attempt to address in the public sphere, and the problems entailed in this process.89 Examples of ruptural events, where voice may publicly emerge in ways less mediated by the dominant neoliberal crisis-framing, include the political suicide of the seventy-seven year old pensioner, Dimitris Christoulas on the 4th of April 2012, in Athens‟ central square, Syntagma. In his suicide note, Christoulas explained the impact that austerity had on his life; reducing his ability to live a dignified life. He denounced the submissive Greek government‟s implementing of austerity regimes with a call for revolutionary justice, referring to Mussolini‟s execution by Italian partisans in 1945. Another similar event allowing the possibility of voice was the murder of the anti-fascist rapper, Pavlos Fyssas on 18/09/2013 by the Nazi thugs of Golden Dawn (a previously marginal Nazigang that emerged as the country‟s third biggest parliamentary party in the crisis‟ times). The torturing of anti-fascist activists by the Greek police in late 2013 was another event that allowed some space for voice. In the light of international publicity, as an intertextual reference to the British 21 Guardian newspaper in Der Spiegel reveals, this event was presented in an objective style: “Protesters tortured by the police. There are serious allegations, lawyers talk of torture scenes, as in Abu Ghraib prison: 15 Greek anti-Nazi protesters complained loudly at the Guardian to have been ill-treated in detention. Policemen had beaten them, filmed them naked and burned their skin” (09/10/2012). The connection between crisis, austerity and the rise of fascism, was not made in the article, however. The 12/02/2012 upheaval that occurred in the streets of Athens after the passing of a further austerity memorandum by the Greek parliament, also allowed space for voice in Der Spiegel. The possibility of a Syriza-led government in early 2015 prompted the production of several articles in January 2015 that problematised austerity and the German interventions in Greece‟s politics, and also discussed the inequalities of the Greek society in class terms: “Elections in Greece: Syriza wants to disempower oligarchs. This struggle is also popular in foreign countries: the Greek left party, Syriza, wants to reduce the influence of the oligarchs in Athens. This is one of the top priorities after an election victory” (07/01/2015). Finally, despite their sensationalised representation, moments of popular struggles, such as strikes and demonstrations, also opened a space for voice in Der Spiegel, as its authors were forced to partially mention the people‟s demands, their lived realities of austerity and their imaginaries for justice and dignity: Opinion: It‟s Time To End the Greek Rescue Farce! ... the latest demands by Germany show just how absurd negotiations over Greece's future have become. It is time to bring an end to this tragicomedy. (07/02/2012) Strike in Greece: In Germany no-one has a clue. Trains are stationed, hospitals deal only with emergencies - a strike paralyses Greece. In Athens, tens of thousands took the streets. With their last strength, trade unions oppose the intervention of the EU ... (07/02/2012) Greece on the brink: Liberty or Death. Athens has experienced the most violent protests for years, and the storm against the radical austerity program takes effect: after just three months, PM Papademos is a failure - and the country on the brink. Many people literally struggle to survive. (13/02/2012) 22 The politicised voices of the oppressed are nevertheless undermined by the overall prevalence of the previous themes that have reproduced the hegemonic narratives of crisis and austerity. Voice is undermined as „hopeless‟ in the face of the crude realities of the economy and (the aforementioned) cultural/place specific „deficits‟ that emerged through the use of derogatory nominalisations in such articles as: “Protest against austerity measures: Police defended Parliament against mad Greeks” (15/06/2011). Conclusion The study focused on the ways different oppositional voices and practices are framed by the German journal Der Spiegel, in its online version between late 2009 and early 2015. These dates mark a significant phase of an ongoing process, related to the unresolved, so-called „Greek crisis‟.2 The analysis demonstrates the neoliberal and nationalist character of the Der Spiegel framing of the crisis and the opposition to austerity reforms that are supposed to solve the crisis (although actually, they deepen it for the middle and lower social classes, while undermining democracy in Greece and in Europe). As Hay argued, “[a] crisis is not an objective condition or a property of a system… but subjectively perceived and brought into existence through discourse and narrative”.90 The framing of the opposition by Der Spiegel occurs through three, interrelated representational-themes, where the opposition, in its diversity, appears: a) as a threatening and dangerous entity; b) as irrational; and c) as a victim. In this discursive construction of the crisis, the opposition obtains the position of the „Other‟ who is constitutive for the identity of „us‟, because s/he represents what we are not. Simultaneously, these demeaning themes reproduce the hegemonic crisis/austerity narratives as correct and realistic.91 As the analysis showed, the dimension of victimisation entails a flip side too, as Germany is also As sa the ise of o e of auste it s ai oppositio al age t - the leftist party of Syriza - to power in Greece, future studies could usefully address the ways that the Syriza-led government of Greece was dealt by mainstream media, in particular, in the EU. 2 23 victimised by Der Spiegel. The victimisation of Germany occurs in positive forms, presented as a country and people envied for their might, and unjustly treated by those that Germany has alleviated through bailout loans. This is despite the unprecedented forms of pauperisation and political oppression that the bailout policies brought to countries like Greece. The uncritical public representation of Germany as a benefactor, further serves the positive national branding of Germany, while developing its political hegemony in the EU.92 Indeed, in the midst of a European and global economic crisis, “Germany is on track to overtake China as world champion in capital exports this year, according to calculations by the Ifo Institute. Germany‟s current-account surplus [was] forecast at 310 billion US dollars (goods, services and transfers) in 2016, versus 285 billion US dollars in 2015”.93 Finally, it is important to stress that moments of socio-political struggle open the possibility of the emergence of voice in the public sphere, and can cause ruptures to the hegemonic crisis‟ narratives, by addressing questions and demands that relate to the subjectivity of the oppressed by austerity subjects. Syriza‟s succumbing to the EU demands for the continuation of austerity in July 2015, showed a further advance in a post-democratic EU, and marked a crisis of the opposition that was assimilated by the hegemonic political power. The reinvention of the opposition will require more straightforward critique of the Euro currency, the EU and capitalism itself, from class-orientated and internationalist perspectives and in the paths opened by the global working-class movement and its victorious past struggles. 1 P. Dardot and C. Laval, The new way of the world: on the neoliberal society (London: Verso, 2014), p. 207; W. Streeck, How will capitalism end (London: Verso, 2016), p.131. 2 L. Balho , Me keli g to the ight , Ja o i , De e e , a aila le at: https:// .ja o i ag. o / / / e kelburqa-ban-refugees-cdu-germany/ (accessed 6 February 2017); M. 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