Ivar Jonsson Theories of Neo-Corporatism ~ A Thematic Discussion of Paradigms ~ Supervisor: Professor Heinz Lubasz External examiner: Professor Bob Jessop M.A.-Dissertation in History and Philosophy of Social and Political Science, University of Essex 1983 1 Content I. Introduction 3 II. The contemporary debate on neo-corporatism 5 a) Forms of appearance 6 b) The different definitions of neo-corporatism III. From epistemology to explanatory models 18 25 a) Paradigms and revolutions 25 b) The different explanatory models 37 IV. Concluding remarks - alternative approach 47 Bibliography 58 2 I. Introduction In this dissertation, we will attempt to analyse the contemporary theoretical debate on ‘neo-corporatism’. This object of study requires interdisciplinary approach as it is to be explained by economic, political, ideological and cultural factors. Our aim is threefold: 1) we will give a relatively detailed description of the different theories and definitions of neo-corporatism or ‘liberal corporatism’ as it also often called; 2) we will give our own definition of the concept of paradigm and discuss different theories of paradigms and; 3) we will sketch alternative outlines for a paradigm of analysis of neocorporatism. As we are dealing with an interdisciplinary object and different theories of it, our main theme is thematic paradigm discussion and/or reflection on the different paradigms of the contemporary debate on neo-corporatism. We will approach our problem in three main parts. The first one will deal with the immediate forms of appearance of neo-corporatism and the different theoretical definitions of it. In the second part, we will analyse the different explanatory models of neo-corporatism and discuss our model of paradigms. The third concluding part deals with our own alternative theoretical point of departure for analysis of neo-corporatism. Neo-corporatism is most often referred to as increased power of the centralised state and the main interest organisations (of capital and labour) which undermines parliamentarism and reduces the power of the parliament and political parties. It is supposed to be a threat to 'democracy'. It is often seen as increased sectorisation of society especially as the increased collaboration of the interest organisations in different branches of the economy that initiate and increasingly influence if not control the economic policy of the state/government. Some see it as the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elites of the interest-organisations vis-a-vis the rank-and-file members and these elites build a power elite with the elite of government and 3 administration. Some see neo-corporatism as increased state intervention in the economy and industrial relations. The approaches to neo-corporatism are very different both in terms of theoretical background and ideological stand. Although some political scientists (cf. S. Rokkan) and economists (cf. Shonfield) had analysed corporatist trends in modern capitalist societies, it was only after (roughly) 1974 that theorisation and discussion on these trends seriously began, at the same time and spontaneously at first in the Occident. These discussions and theorisation had its general socioeconomic background in the economic boom in the West that lasted from the early 1950s to the late 1960s when the period of economic recession started (cf. E. Mandel 1976; 1978). In this boom period, Keynesian economics dominated policy-making, especially income policy and fiscal policy that reproduced general demand in the economy and worked against business cycles. In this era, the interest-organisations were increasingly incorporated into the state apparatuses and the prosperity and economic growth seemed to have no end. Sociologists talked of “end of ideology” and ‘post industrial society’ and claimed that class struggle was only to be found in the scrap heap of history. Even Marxists believed that capitalism had got rid of economic crises; instead of class struggle and the ‘proletariat’, now revolutionary practice and critique of ideology was to concentrate on alienation, authoritarian and undemocratic power structures and technocracy (cf. the Frankfurt school). As state intervention and social planning increased in late capitalism the New-Left-movement, humanrights movements, social-minority-movements and the movements against the Viet-Nam war and the imperialism of the USA, environmental movements, students movements and the women’s liberation movement flourished on the arena of politics in the 1960s In the late 1960s the recession started and with it a wave of “wild” shop floor strikes in the Occident, partly because of technological development and increased exploitation and ‘rationalisation’ in some sectors of the economy 4 (especially conspicuous in Western automobile industry in the early 1970s (cf. J. Mendner). Because of the recession, governments now had the task of finding solution to the new situation of stagflation, i.e. increasing unemployment attended with increasing inflation. Governments had simultaneously to cut public spending (and welfare institutions) to keep demand in control and cut real wages and struggle against wage pressure from increasingly militant workers. Governments, whether social democratic or not, responded at first by coercive means and Industrial Acts to prohibit strikes and reduce directly the possibilities of strikes. Later on ‘social packages’ instead of wage increase were tried in the form of ‘social contracts’. All this established strains between the rank-and-file members of trade unions and the leadership that had to legitimise policies of at least the social democratic governments and their economic policies. At the same time capital pressed on cuts in taxation of firms as profitability of investments in general, decreased and this called for cuts in public spending. As a consequence, struggle against centralised power whether in the interest-organisations or the state apparatuses increased. Furthermore, on the ideological level, libertarian ideology flourished whether individualist or collectivist and neo-liberalism and monetarism became influential with its demands of cuts in public spending and ‘privatisation’ of social security. It is with this general socio-economic background that the theorisation of neo-corporatism starts ‘spontaneously’ around 1974 and they reflect the general ideological and economic discussion and struggle in society. II. The contemporary debate on Neo-corporatism We will discuss theories of neo-corporatism in more detail below, but for the moment, we can in brief say that there are three main perspectives from which the problem of neo-corporatist development in western societies is 5 approached. First, we should mention theories of democracy in political philosophy and increased interests in participatory democracy inspired by libertarian views (both liberalist and collectivist/socialist libertarian).1 Secondly, we have approaches that work a fortiori within the traditional paradigm of political science, dealing with power relations and decision-making processes. Lastly, we have approaches that are a fortiori based on theories of political economy and/or Marxist problematic dealing with the relations between institutions of the state and classes and economic interests. In many cases theories of neo-corporatism deal with problems of all of these main three fields of theoretical practice together and it is not unexpected as the object of analysis neo-corporatist trends - by nature must cover many fields or territories of the traditional disciplines of the social sciences. The approaches are bound to be interdisciplinary. a) Forms of appearance If we begin our discussion on the level of immediate forms of appearance or the ‘pseudo-concrete’ level of corporatist forms2 we should highlight what is pointed at as a sign of neo-corporatist trends by various students of neocorporatism. Some scholars highlight the threat to the (presumed) existing democratic political systems in the West, in which the concentration of power is in the relatively small group of leaders of the organisations of organised interests of labour and capital (cf. TUC in England, LO in Sweden etc.) It is not only thought of in terms of the relations between the rank-and-file and the leaders in the interest groups, but as well in terms of the power relations between organised interests and parliament and the state or between organised interests 1 See e.g. C.B. Macpherson, chapter V, and D. Guerin. See e.g., K. Marx in Grundrisse, Introduction, The Method of Political Economy, on this method of going from the pseudo-concrete forms of appearance to the essence. 2 6 and the state as a block confronting parliament. In brief, this problematic of the relations between democracy and corporatism can be approached either from a micro or macro point of view.3 In the micro-view the focus is on the individual, the voter's situation and his/her rights and possibilities of taking part in the decision making process in society. In the macro-view the focus in on the position of the political system as a whole and its possibilities of realising the will of the majority of the electorate (O. Ruin p. 14). In a “positive” version of the micro-view, the fusion of interestorganisations and the state is said to give the citizens more possibility of raising issues and demands, and this new path would add to the power of existing political parties. Furthermore, the interest organisations are presumed to be power-resources for the citizens that strengthen their position, which is weak because of structural reasons in modern society (e.g. the organisations of labour). A ‘negative’ version of the micro-view claims that it is unjust that the members of such interest-organisations with close collaboration with the state have much stronger power than other citizens whose only power resource is casting vote in general elections. Furthermore, it is claimed that these interest organisation often have policies that do not represent the will of their members. (C. Ruin, p.14-l5). If we now refer to a macro-view, we can highlight a 'positive' view of the fusion of the state and interest-organisations in social decision making. Some people would say that this fusion or concentration of power makes it possible to make decisions more ‘scientific’ and there will be more of specialists in different domains taking part in the decision making process. It is also thought to be easier to come to an agreement with the interest-organisations in question. Against these views a negative would emphasise that there is always a risk of a ‘break down’ of the neo-corporative system, especially in the administration, in 3 See e.g., O. Ruin in Nykorporatismen, Introduction. 7 times when there is ‘overload’ of interests and to many organisations or interest are represented or want to be represented. Furthermore, there is thought to be a risk of clear cut sectorisation leading to a minimised role/power of parliament and to a monopolisation of decision-making in some areas by administration and interest- organisations (especially concerning economic policy). It is often claimed that decisions on policy made by these extraparliamentary bodies often oppose the will of the majority of the people. It is feared, that this trend to sectorisation could even lead to a collapse of the existing structure of interest organisations (which is not sectorial) and furthermore to a rank-and-file revolt in cases when the leaders of the orgapnisations take part in unpopular decisions and this would weaken the organisations as power resources (C. Ruin, p. 15-17). But, corporatist trends are not only referred to in terms of problems of democracy and/or parliamentarism. We can, in brief, add two perspectives in the analysis of neo-corporatism: one which is based on the traditional problematique of political science dealing with power relations between ‘political’ institutions and policy making (especially of governments and the state). Besides this political-science-perspective we can mention another perspective which a fortiori is rooted in political economy that deals with the relations between the state and economy and industrial relations. Those students of neo-corporatism that work within or are influenced by the traditional problematic of political science focus on problems which throw light on corporatist trends such as4  the relations between social-functional principles and principles of politics and the state in interest representation and performance of policies (different authors such as S. Beer, G. Lehmbruch and B. Jessop); 4 For a detailed discussion, see H. Kastendiek, p. 60-1. We have reorganised his points slightly according to our categorisation. 8  the organised and ever more institutionalised collaboration between centralised interest organisations and the state, not only on the level of decision making but execution as well (cf. J.. Lermbruch);  increased power and influence of the bureaucracy of the state that defines and realizes the imperatives of the state independently of the will of the majority of the people (writers such as politician Tony Benn as an example) (H. Kastendiek p. 60-1). From the point of view of the political-economy perspective some students of neo-corporatism highlight as siens of corporatist trends:  increased state intervention in the economic process and organisation (e.g. Pahl and Winkler); and more specific;  state control of the working class by means of integration of, first and foremost, the trade unions in the state apparatuses, (cf. L. Panitch);  a special strategy or policy to regulate industrial relations or even class stretegy in which capitalism appropriates or subsumes the interestorganisations of labour (C. Crouch);  disorganisation and fragmentation of the working class and particularisation or sectorisation of its organisations so that the workers do not (anymore) confront the state and capital as an united front (cf. Valentin) (H. Kastendiek, p . 60-1). As we can see, what is pointed at as signs of neo-corporatism is very different for different students of neo-corporptism. What is highlighted depends on the different theoretical background or practice of the people in question. C.B. Macpherson (1979) has analysed the development of modern theories of democracy and by referring to his analysis we can grasp some of the theoretical background we mentioned above. The dominant democratic-theories of the postwar era were totally different from those of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. The theories of the fifties and sixties where based on analogy 9 with economic theories. As he puts it, there is not, as earlier theories had presumed5 - any: ‘…nonsense about democracy as vehicle for the improvement of mankind. Participation is not a value in itself, nor even an instrumental value for the achievement of a higher, more socially conscious set of human beings. The purpose of democracy is to register the desires of people as they are, not to contribute to what they might be or might wish to be. Democracy is simply a market mechanism: the voters are the consumers; the politicians are the entrepreneurs.’ (Macpherson, p. 79). Macpherson furthermore writes that these democratic theories of the fifties and sixties see democracy simply as: ‘…a mechanism for choosing and authorising governments, not a kind of society nor a set of moral ends, end second, that the mechanism consists of a competition between two or more selfchosen sets of politicians (elites), arrayed in political parties, for the votes which will entitle them to rule until the next election. The voters' role is not to decide political issues and then choose representatives who will carry out those decisions: it is rather to choose the men who will do the deciding.’ (p. 78). As a consequence, the driving force of democracy according to these theories is not the ordinary voter or citizen, but political elites that compete and democracy is simply reduced to description of the party system in the West (or simply, following the train of thought of the cold war era: democracy is what we have in the West as opposed to the totalitarian systems of East-Europe). Doubts began to flourish concerning the adequacy of seeing democracy in this way in the 1960s and 1970s, both in terms of the rationality of voters behaviour and unequal distribution of necessary resources and in terms of widespread participation in raising issues and in decision-making by the 5 i.e. J.S. Mill, J. Dewey etc. 10 ordinary citizens. (Macpherson, p. 87, 88, 93).6 In these years, the scope of democratic theories shifted to the interest in participatory democracy. The reason was not only increased state invention and expansion or the New Left, student movements of the 1960s and growing job-dissatisfaction among both white- and blue collar workers and widespread feeling and discussion of alienation (as Macpherson assumes). The reason was as well increased interest of capital in finding new systems or technics of management as alternative to the obsolete “scientific”, hierarchical management of ‘Taylorism’(e.g. huge investment in management experiments in western automobile industry in human relations and self-management, see J. Mendner; D. Pignon and J. Querzola). Trends towards increased self-management or ‘participatory management’ is not only a response to increased militancy of workers, it is a means to increase productivity/profitability as well (J. Mendner). But, interest in participatory democratic forms is not only to be found among students, workers and capitalists. Following the expansion of the state and administration in recent decades it becomes a growing practical necessity to minimise possible negative reactions from the citizens against its performance of policy making and execution of policies (cf. the problem of ‘overload’, O. Ruin, p. 15). Now, if we relate this theoretical background, especially theories of participatory democracy, to theories of neo-corporatism we can see that participatory democratic forms can both be interpreted as alternatives to and part of neo-corporatist development. We can only judge between these two interpretations by analysing whose interests this development serves and what causes it. The analysis of this development by students of corporatism seems predominantly to be rooted in the two different discourses of political science and political economy. The field and conceptualisation of especially AngloOn the irrationality of voters’ behaviour and lack of knowledge of formal ideological systems see e.g. Campbell. 6 11 Saxon political science seems to consist of the two problems of power and the state. R.A. Dahl (1976) defines politics and political aspects for example in his standard textbook Modern Political Analysis, as human relationships that involve to a significant extent, control, influence, power or authority. Moreover, political systems are defined as persistent patterns of these relationships. (p. 3) Dahl writes: ‘Ever since Aristotle's time, the notion has been widely shared that a political relationship in some way involves authority, ruling, or power. For example, one of the most influential modern social scientists … Max Weber … postulated that an association should be called political “if and in so far as the enforcement of its order is carried out continually within a given territorial area by the application and threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staff.” This, although Weber emphasized the territorial aspect of a political association, like Aristotle, he specified that a relationship of authority or rule was one of its essential characteristics.’ And Dahl adds: ‘…a leading contemporary political scientist Harold Lasswell, defines “political science, as an empirical discipline, (as) the study of the shaping and sharing of power” and “apolitical act (as) one performed in power perspectives.’ (p. 2-3). For Dahl, political science deals a fortiori with political systems, i.e. patterns of power relations rather than processes. Furthermore, the emphasis is on the political system as a pattern as a distinct system among many systems which constitute society (in this respect he echoes system-theory (p. 5-6). But, more importantly, this political system is analysed in an external way as features that can be compared and may vary in different societies, but political relations are not seen in an internal way as part of the social totality which is a developing 12 process.7 As a consequence, this approach is descriptive and empirical, designed for comparative studies. In the post world war era and until the late 1960s positivist view of the social sciences dominated in the West. The aim was quantitative comparative methods and specialised sciences with clearly distinct fields of study and with emphasis on statistical methods. Moreover, these specialised social sciences were also put in a pragmatic context, to be used in governmental ‘science policy’ as a part of long term aim of building interdisciplinary project that would cover all spheres of society, integrated by the general systems theory, which divided reality into systems which would be related to each other in an information flow of in-put/demand and out-put/supply (cf. Parsons) (see Dahlström, p.10) The concept of power is fundamental to the analysis of political science. But this concept is though defined differently by different scholars. But the most usual definition of power in political science is probably in line with Lasswell, power is ‘the fact of taking part in decision making’ or definitions that refer to the decision-making process (N. Pou1antzas 1975, p. 104). Implicit in this definition is a similar thought as in the democratic theories of the fifties and sixties; individuals or groups enter the abstracted and distinct political system or decision-making process and act rationally and goal oriented. The very existence of the distinction between the political system in its contemporary form is ‘normalized’; i.e. not seen as a consequence of particular, historical structures of social relations8 (private ownership of capital, laws of For an analysis of intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ relations and the concept of totality, see J. Israel, part 2; also H. Reichelt on Marx's idea of capital as autonomous subject subsuming social relations in its process of self-valorisation, also K. Marx 1976, p. 255 and K. Marx 1974, p. 459-60 and 409-10, on capital as autonomous subject of valorisation which produces and reproduces its own conditions of existence (i.e. ‘intrinsic’ relations of capital). 8 As Marx puts it, the distinction between the state or political life and civil society is to be explained by the fact that the individuals are atomised in their relations to each other in capitalism and act in an egoistic way. As a consequence the social nature of their civil life 7 13 value and market relations and generalised division of labour between intellectual and manual labour in economy and in/of the state apparatuses9. Or as N. Poulantzas puts it: ‘The fundamental defect of this conception, at least in the framework of a society characterized by class conflict, is that (i) it succumbs to a voluntarist conception of the decision- making process, through disregarding the effectiveness of the structures, and it is not able exactly to locate beneath the appearances the effective centres of decision inside which the distribution of power works; and (ii) it takes as a principle the 'integrationist' conception of society, from which the concept of 'participation' in decision making is derived.’ (1975, p. 104). In the consensus theorist approach of Parsons’ structural functionalism, power is reduced to ‘…the capacity to carry on certain functions [i.e. taking part in decision making· - I.J.] to the profit of the social system considered in its entirety.’ (ibid, p. 105). The defect of this definition, besides the circularity of functionalist reasoning, is that it reduces the concept of power to reproduction functions or the “profit of the social system” and consequently misses power as a relations of conflicting agents. (The status of the Bolsheviks in Russia in the pre-revolution period would not for an example be covered by this concept etc). On the bases of this Lasswellian concept, political scientists are stuck in the hollow debate and naïve empirical analysis of whether the decision making ‘elites’ are many and different in different fields (the pluralist view, e.g. R.A. Dahl) or few or even one - by some seen as stratified and others not stratified (the elitist view, Mosca, Pareto, C. Wright Mills etc). Expanding on the problem of power, in an instrumentalist way, political scientists analyse power relations in terms of power resources referring to skill, never appears directly but mediated by the market and the state (Marx 1975, p. 143-4 Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the state) See also H. Reichelt p. 49-94. 9 On the knowledge-power or monopolisation of specialised knowledge of the state see Pou1antzas 1978, p. 54-62. 14 time, money, organisational apparatuses, capacity to use force etc. Power may be actual or potential as actors do not necessarily have actually to use their power resources to have influence, it is enough that the opponents know of their resources which they can use (as e.g. trade unions can call for strikes). The field of political economy is rather different. It deals with national income and its determinants and distribution of this national income in society. It deals with government expenditure and policy and its effects on employment and investment and uses of resources in the economy and economic growth. In Marxist political economy the emphasis is on the role of class struggle, exploitation of surplus-value and valorisation processes as consequences of the laws of motion of capitalist societies and the interrelation between these. Having in mind the brief account above of the scope of the theories and disciplines, it is easier to see different theoretical background of the different students of neo-corporatism and the roots of the self-blocking of the debate on neo-corporatism (which we will highlight better later on). These theoretical backgrounds can be seen at work in the different definitions of neo-corporatism. P. Schmitter one of the most often quoted student of neo-corporatism is at pain in his attempt to synthesise the different approaches to the problem of neocorporatism. To summarise the development of the debate on neo-corporatism10 he writes: ‘…the discussion on neo-corporatism … moves sideways, by shifting away from its earlier preoccupation with the structure of organised interest intermediation to a collateral emphasis on the process of policymaking, and implementation; it moves forward, from the initial efforts to define the distinctive properties of corporatism and to speculate about its origins and causes to an empirical focus on the measurement of its consequences. Needless to say, this 'shift may seem confusing to some … but it is arguable that it represents progress towards a common goal. I would define that goal as understanding how the conflicts between The ‘forum’ for this debate has been the SAGE publications of Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979 and 1982. 10 15 increasingly organized interests can be resolved and to whose benefit when they are being continuously subjected to the contradictions generated by an industrial, but capitalist, economy and a democratic, but bureaucratic, polity.’ (1982, p. 259). According to Schmitter, the students of neo-corporatism have contributed to establishing a new way of analysing the role of We stern democracies; i.e. contributed to a “paradigmatic revolution” and an alternative to ‘pluralist’ approaches (p. 260). Obviously, Schmitter reduces the debate to his own point of departure which is the problematic of political science and the ‘shift’ in the discussion is not as confusing as he beliefs it to be, as it is only a logical continuation of the new emphasis on the role of organised interests in policy making, working within the discourse of political science and giving it empirical content (this is a quite usual procedure in scientific development). But it is not the shift from ‘pluralism’ to ‘neo-corporatism’ which have caused much stir. According to Schmitter it is rather the different efforts to explain the origin, practice and consequences of the rise of neo-corporatist structures and the why interests participate in policy-making that have caused much stir. Schmitter writes: ‘In their ambitiousness … the proponent theorist s of neo-corporatism have linked it to such major issues as the nature of the state, the scope and content of public policy, the extent of governability of democratic regimes, the shifts in the balance of class forces, the stage of capitalist development, the degree of international economic competitiveness, the swings in the business cycle, the impact of world wars- not to mention such normative matters as the equitable distribution of benefits across sectors and between classes, the effect of such extra-parliamentary arrangements on territorial and partisan modes of political expression, or the legitimacy of corporatist structures in liberal, democratic, individualistic societies. This is not to claim that the students of contemporary or neo-corporatism have by any means provided answers to these questions or even major insights which will lead eventually to some such ‘theoretical breakthrough’, but they have addressed them openly and aggressively.’ (p. 261) 16 We can summarise this rather Popperian train of thought by saying that according to Schmitter, the discussion has developed from bold conjectures which are at the moment in the stage of being falsified or will be held for the time being. Because of the very diverse ideological and theoretical background of the theorists of neo-corporatism, the meaning of the term has been various and confusing. According to Schmitter it is very difficult for Scandinavians to “swallow” the label corporatism as it evokes too easily the spectre of fascism and authoritarian rule which is the opposite to their dominant view that their political system is voluntarist and democratic. They therefore ‘…hang on to the label ‘pluralism’ simply because of the presence of multiple interests.’ (p.262) The term is also confusing, as it has been used in a too wider sense: ‘Some would call any close collaboration between interest associations and the state, ‘corporatist’, others would restrict it to a device forged by capitalists for the further subordination and continued exploitation of the working class. Still others tend to identify it with all tendencies towards high levels of interest organization and explicit contractualizing over issues - with or without the presence of state.’ (ibid.). Finally, it has been used in a too narrow sense as a mode of managing the economy at the level of firms. However, we would agree with Schmitter that: ‘…the most productive confusion in the dialogue on neo-corporatism has been that which has ‘opposed’ those who define it as a distinctive mode for organizing the conflicting functional interests- whether these are based on social class, economic sector or professional status - and those who identify it as a distinctive mode for making and implementing public policy - whether in the field of incomes policy (acknowledged to be its contemporary ‘heartland’) or in agriculture, health, welfare etc.’ (ibid). 17 However, this formulation is rather misleading if not meaningless as it is abstracted from the very diverse theoretical backgrounds of which these conceptualisations are products (i.e. political economy, especially Marxian and political science). Indeed, Schmitter does not manage to synthesise the different approaches in one coherent ‘paradigm’, but relapses to his political scientist problematic; corporatism is for him a mode of interest intermediation. (p. 263). b) The different definitions of neo-corporatism How do students of neo-corporatism then define their object? The different definitions are based on generalisations of the conceptualisations of the different theoretical backgrounds of the theorists. They claim to have explained the constitutive elements of neo-corporatism and some claim that there has occured a structural rupture in the societal and political-state relations of power (Kastend iek, p. 66-9). Schmitter and Lehmbruck's definitions are related to the traditional problematic of political science. Schmitter's definition is, as he says ‘…an idealtype description, a heuristic and logico-analytical construct composed of a considerable variety of theoretically or hypothetically interrelated components.’ (1979, p. 14). For Schmitter, corporatism must be defined in terms of its praxis but not in terms of ideology (p. 9) and it is supposed to have much utility for purposes of systematic comparison (p. 8) (cf. comparative studies in the tradition of political science). According to him ‘…corporatism can be defined as a system of interest into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.’ (p. 13). This system of interest representation is different from that of both pluralism and syndicalism that differ from it mainly 18 in that ‘organised constituent units’ are competitive, not exercising monopoly of representational activity, are voluntary and not licensed or controlled by the state or party in their scope of activity or leadership selection and not hierarchically organised (p. 15 and 17). Furthermore, Schmitter specifies the characteristics of corporatism as ‘…a distinctive and self-sustaining system of interest representation’ (p. 17, my emphasis/this criterion of self-sustainance does away with the Marxist problematique of the economic ‘base’(determining the ‘superstructure’). In his taxonomy, Schmitter then defines sub-types of corporatism and divides it into societal corporatism and state corporatism. The difference refers basically to the nature of the party systems and the state to which corporatism or a system of interest representation is related. State corporatism is seen as one party system in which the party monopolises recruitment of the state and controls the scope of activities of the interest organisations. Societal corporatism is related to two or multi-party systems in which elections play fundamental role on a bases of various ideologies. It is not centralised to a high degree as the political system of state corporatism instead, it is characterised by relatively autonomous, multi-layered territorial units (p. 22). This definition is but a version of the descriptive democratic theories of the 1950s and 1960s, which generated in the cold war era: societal corporatism is what we have in the West (it was called democracy in these decades), state corporatism is what they have in Eastern Europe and many Third World countries. We are of course not claiming that there is no difference but only highlighting the theoretical/ideological background of this train of thought. Lehmbruch defines his ideal type as follows: ‘By the term ‘liberal corporatism’ we mean a special type of participation by large organized social groups in public, especially economic, policymaking … the distinguishing trait of ‘liberal corporatism’ is the high 19 degree of cooperation among these groups themselves in the shaping of public policy.’ 1979, p. 53-4). The emphasis is on the tendency to collaboration of the interest groups as autonomous vis-a-vis administration and government. It is a question of sectoral bargaining and steps in the bargaining procedures in policy-making, initiative power of the groups vis-a-vis administration and government. Liberal corporatism is distinguished from the corporatism of pre-industrial Europe and the fascist type as its ‘…essential feature is the large measure of constitutional autonomy of the groups involved, hence the voluntary nature of the institutionalized integration of conflicting social groups.’ (p. 54). As for Schmitter, Lehmbruch’s aim seems to be to develop taxonomic parameters for comparative studies of various political systems. After sketching Schmitter's and Lehmbruch’s definitions, taking them as prominent representatives of the political science problematic we will now proceed to the political economy/Marxist dimension. While Dahl and Winkler have defined corporatism as a specific economic system as opposed to capitalism and/or socialism, although it is still to be characterised by private ownership of the means of production. What is fundamental according to them is the increased degree of control of these by the state and quasi-state institutions (Kastendiek, p. 66, Jessop, p. 188). In another version of this dimension, L. Panitch defines corporatism in a fourfold way as: ‘… a political structure that attends if is not actually produced by, the emergence of the advanced capitalist economy … corporatism as used herein carefully stresses the centrality of the large socioeconomic groups' relationship to the state and the cooperative interaction among them as essential to the paradigm … stressing the centrality of functional representation … as well (as) on the state’s reciprocal influence on interest groups, and their consequent employment as agencies of mobilization and social control vis-à-vis their members.’ (p. 123). 20 Bob Jessop works more explicitly within the Marxian tradition defines corporatism in functional terms as well as in terms of balance of classforces/struggle and as a state form. According to him, corporatism is a form of articulation of political representation and state intervention. (1979, p. 185), it: ‘…involves the fusion of political representation mediated through a system of public “corporations” which are constituted on the basis of their members' function within the division of labour and state intervention through these same corporations and/or administrative agencies formally accountable to them. Thus, in contrast to the characteristic institutional separation of representation and intervention in parliamentarybureaucratic systems, corporatism implies their institutional fusion since the formal organs through which political representation is mediated are also responsible for intervention. Thus, even where this is not directly undertaken by the various corporations, the administrative agencies involved are accountable to the collective corporatist will through executive organs on which the corporations are represented.’ (p. 195). In simple terms, Jessop seems to be saying that the functional corporations in collaboration with administration make policy (i.e. political representation) and in execution of these policies administration is accountable to the corporations and realise the policies through the corporations and corresponding administrative bodies. But, we must keep in mind that Jessop's definition gets its meaning in his Marxist discourse in which it is related to state forms in terms of adequacy to the preconditions of accumulation in different phases and conjunctures of capitalism. (p. 196). This aspect will become clear in the discussion below. Jessop’s definition of is an ideal type definition, i.e. corporatism as defined does not exist in pure form in the capitalist democracies, but only articulated with parliamentarism and as such it is a hybrid and Jessop calls it ‘tripartism’ (p. 195). As a mode or combination, tripartism varies according to 21 the power-relations or role of its constituent elements in policy-making. (p. 1956). Finally, we should mention Kastendiek’s definition who rejects the formal methodology of ideal types. He defines it as an attempt or strategy for a construction the state and society that is based on direct and organised articulation of political, economic and social relations. (p. 73). This definition contains both empirical and ideological moments.11 As for the empirical side Kastendiek prefers to analyse ‘corporative structures’; and rejects the ideal typical notion of a corporatist system: ‘Corporative structures … must not be understood and inquired into as parts/moments of a corporatistsystem, but on the contrary, as parts/moments of a given existing socio/political formation.’ (p. 75). As a consequence, his studies aim at: ‘…enquiring into whether there has developed in the existing organization of domination in the West-European democracies, a net of corporative structures that mutually influence, fit and support one another. The question of on the one side such a net's internal connexions and on the other its importance for and influence on the existing organization of the domination can be seen as the fundamental object of the corporatism/corporativism analysis.’ (p. 76-7). The problem with Kastendiek's alternative is that the ontological status of the ideological dimension (i.e. ‘strategies’), is ambiguous. Corporative structures are not necessarily realisation of ideology (as e.g. ‘social democratic corporatism’) but often rather a result of the immediate power-position and resources of the organisations in question (‘balance of forces’ if you like). These definitions depend on different fundamental socio-analytical presuppositions and so do the different explanatory models that follow. As 11 This definition covers e.g. Panitch’s emphasis on consensus/ corporative ideological moments in social democratic ideology, Panitch 1981, p. 31. 22 Kastendiek (p. 67-8) has highlighted, Winkler's concept of society is very narrow and so is his conception of capitalism, socialism and corporatism as economic systems (he refers to the economic systems of the Middle Ages at the same stroke as Italian fascism as corporatism). Winkler’s concept of the economy reduces it to a pattern of production, distribution and exchange that is characterised by different ownership and structures of control. As a consequence, the problematization of the sociopolitical organisation is marginal. (Kastendiek p. 67). As we have highlighted, Schmitter abstracts the system of interest intermediation from the other levels of society as his problematic similar to that of ‘system theory’: it is only one among other systems of society. His analysis of the relations between the state and the interest organisations are rather thin, the active role of the state is highlighted as characteristic of state-corporatism, but in societal corporatism, the state is analysed in passive terms, i.e. in terms of interest-pressure-groups. But, the power base and the mechanisms of influence of these groups is hardly problematized (Schmitter 1979, p. 20, also Nedelmann/Meier, p. 97). The Parsonian postulate that societies’ development in general is characterised by of a trend according to which they constantly develop towards increased structural differentiation12 creeps in his concept of society and polity as he writes: 12 T. Parsons explains social systems in a teleological way. According to him, all social systems must realise four basic functions if they are to survive: that of adaption (A) (the economic system), goal attainment (G) (policy-making, the political system), integration (I) (the family, education, socialization) and latency (L) (the value system basic to these values). Parsons explains the changes or dynamics of the systems AGIL trend towards ever more differentiation of subsystems and institutions and consequently a trend that increases AGIL‘s need of increasing integration. This is merely a description rather than explanation. Society according to Parsons is a social system with high degree of self-sufficiency. The change from one type of society to another (as in the case from feudalism to capitalism) is due to changes in the basic values of society, i.e. it as an idealist explanation. His way of analysing societies is by comparative studies on the degree of differentiation societies (cf. Parsons The System of Modern Society, see also Turner). 23 ‘…both pluralists and corporatists recognize, accept and attempt to cope with the growing structural differentiation and interest diversity of the modern polity. As a political remedy and image of the future forms of interest-representation, the latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence … corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole.’ (Schmitter 1979, p. 16. We should add that Schmitter is in this pragmatic wy discussing corporatism as a paradigm of political analysis, p. 14). Lehmbruch works also with this postulate of structural differentiation but unlike Schmitter emphasises the active role of the state and especially government as he sees the fundamental problem of liberal-corporatism to be that of consensus building in support of increased state invention and this is the ‘output’ of the political system while the ‘in-put’ is the requirements of the economic system (basically managing business cycles) and of its corresponding interest organisations13 (1979, p. 154-7) (Although Lehmbruch does not use these terms, the Parsonian thought is there). Another feature of this consensus building problematic is Lehmbruch’s formulation of the ‘incorporation’ of the corporations in the state realised through technocratic expertise whose consultant role is based on consensus constitutive theories and equilibrium rnodels of modern (Keynesian and neoclassic) economics (p. 172). Although Jessop's concept of society is neither narrow nor system-theoretical, but his approach is formalist and semi-ideal-typical (as his concept of corporatism is ideal-type, but tripartism is an empirical concept) and his field of study tends to be reduced to the traditional object of political science, i.e. policy-making of/for the state; the socioeconomic base is a taken for granted background (this last point of ours is somewhat unfair as Jessop’s essay is after all only 28 pages). The ‘Easton-system’ is probably the best elaboration of this train of thought with its feedback mechanisms between systems, gatekeepers etc. 13 24 We have emphasised the importance of the different theoretical backgrounds of the students of neo-corporatism in their formulation of the object of study and their consequent definition of neo-corporatism. We would claim that this is not only a matter of different ‘values’ of these students or choice of theoretical perspectives and we would agree with Kastendiek that it is not simply a matter of different positions in social theory and politics: these different approaches of theorists of neo-corporatism are determined by the chaotic, professional specialisation of academic discourses. This will become clearer as we proceed to highlight the different ‘epistemological self-reflections’ of these theorists and their different explanatory models. III. From epistemology to explanatory models a) Paradigms and revolutions For the sake of convenience, we can, in a schematic way, posit a scientist or theorist in the process of theoretical practice as follows:  Scientific practice develops as strain-relations between, on the one side, the traditions and paradigms of different disciplines and discourses and consequent apparatuses (laboratories, libraries, means of informationflow, data-technology etc.) and, on the other side, influences/power and forms of appropriation by political/state, ideological and economic forces.  A scientist/theorist is socialised into this process, but this is not a question of naive role theory as the scientist/theorist cannot simply be reduced to the paradigm of his/her normal science.14 The scientist/theorist does not internalise his/her role, it is a question of active interiorisation, and work 14 This is the case in theories that emphasise the total autonomy of science as e.g. L. Althusser who emphaises the a-historical nature of ‘theoretical practice’ and rejects social relativism. See L. Althusser 1977, 59 and 133. We have discussed this in more detail in our unpublished paper Reflections on Althusser’s rheories of Science. 25 on/within the process of theoretical practice as strain relation between internal and external forces (both within the conceptual framework of a paradigm and struggle with fellow scientists/theorists in the ‘scientific community’ in question, i.e. the ‘internal aspect’ and as for the ‘external aspect’, work on/within the relations of the theoretical/scientific process to the external forces).15 Briefly we can define the concept of a paradigm of a discipline as a whole that consists of: 1) world view or ontological postulates; 2) notion of territory or field of study; 3) notion of object of study within a territory/field; 4) notion of science ideal and; 5) research programs or 'puzzles' and instrumentality (concepts, language, technical instruments, methodology). Scientists/theorists are not always conscious of the history, dynamics, worldviews or ideologies, which construct the paradigm of their discipline. They are socialised into the paradigms through a fortiori educational processes, but as all socialisation, this socialisation is never total16, the difference of the scientist’s/theorist’s own ‘project’ and/or ‘private’ paradigm varies from the ‘collective’ paradigm and their critical attitude towards the dominant paradigm(s) of their discipline. We can call this consciousness of the metacritical bases of paradigms and of the strain between the ‘collective’ and ‘private’ paradigms, ‘epistemic self-reflection’. 15 Our problematique of paradigm analysis differs from e.g. T.S. Kuhn in that although he emphasises the social aspect of paradigms he does only refer to this aspect in terms of socialization. As a consequence he keeps his analysis on the level of micro-sociology. We emphasise the possibility of interiorizing macro-social interests and ideology into the process of paradigm. In that sesnse Kuhn tends to de-politicize his analysis. Although P. Feyerabend emphasises both the ambiguous meaning of the same theories and paradigms in the same scientific community and although he, as in his analysis of Galileo, emphasises the necessity of legitimizing paradigms vis-a-vis political interests, our approach differs from his in that we emphasise the role of political structures and balance of power of forces as determining in the last instance the act of interiorizing external interests in science. 16 Even Parsons would accept this in his ‘voluntary action theory’ according to which there is always choice of alternatives in acting in a role, but he turned away from that kind of thought in his later years as he worked on his system theory and/or structural functionalism. See Turner. 26 The individual enters the theoretical process and its paradigm with his/her ‘private’ paradigm but in addition he/she has competence (in handling the problem ‘puzzles’ of the collective paradigm and struggling for transformation of, or alternatives to dominant paradigms(s) in the scientific community in question) - and interests (depending on lived background, relations to external ideological, political and economic forces and his/her life-style such as e.g. isolation in campus life and university). In Gadamer’s terminology we could say it is a question of a ‘fusion of horisons’ of the collective and private paradigms.17 Now, with this model at hand, we can reflect on the degree of epistemic self-reflection of the participants of the debate on neo-corporatism. P.C. Schmitter is the one who is most outspoken on the epistemological problems. He seems to see the debate as a forum for nothing less than a paradigm revolution. In a bold way he claims that in the debate the theorists of neo-corporatism have contributed to giving ‘…elements common to the corporatist perspective on interest politics, elements that constitute a sort of paradigmatic revolution when juxtaposed to the long predominant ‘pluralist’ way of describing and analysing the role of organised interests in the political life of western democracies.’ (1982, p. 260). According to Schmitter, these contributions will lead to ‘theoretical breakthrough’ (p. 261). In the 1979 version in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation his claim is softer: ‘What the volume does offer is a strong criticism … of the heretofore dominant way of conceptualizing the activities of interest groups, the pluralist model … that of ahistorical, self-contained, configurative description. Beyond this negative contribution, the volume seeks to establish the positive foundation for an alternative problematigue.’ (p. 3) 17 See Törnebohm concerning the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘collective paradigms’. 27 His purpose is ‘…to offer to the political analyst an explicit alternative to the paradigm of interest politics which has heretofore completely dominated the discipline of the North American political science: pluralism.’ (p. 14). Unfortunately, Schmitter’s ‘paradigm revolution’ is as poor as T.S. Kuhn's ‘scientific revolutions. Schmitter’s revolution refers only to reformulation of the relations between part of the traditional elements of the model of political science of interest politics (basically, changing the term ‘competition of interest groups into monopoly or non-competition). This tastes like if he had mixed his Courvoisier 50/50 with water. His worldview18 is contemplative as he approaches the object study by way of contemplative description. Consequently, it does neither differ from that of pluralism and nor the conceptualisation of the world in terms of systems. The field of study is the same as for pluralism and the object within that field is the same (the system of interest intermediation) and the explanatory conceptual framework is basically the same (we will highlight the explanatory model later on), the explanatory factors are external factors to the system which he 'explaines'~5 Qeen as aggregate of variables rather than as totality of processes of development. Insofar as Kuhn's notion of scientific revolutions is obscure and does not only refer to major changes of thought such as e.g. the Galilean ‘revolution’ or change of general world view, it also refers to partial changes of partial theories and disciplines (S. Toulmin). Schmitter is free to call his contribution ‘revolution’, but it is more of a powerful slogan than explanation as his contribution is a change within the explanatory model of traditional system theoretic, (American) political science. We distinguish between two fundamental worldviews: ‘Contemplative’ which does not take into account the reciprocal subject/object relation between ‘Man’ (the investigator) and the world (the object of investigation). This worldview can both be a static view and a process view as e.g. in the case of determinist dialectical materialism); Worldviews can also be ‘practice worldviews’ that emphasise that ‘Man’ and the world are in a reciprocal transforming process. 18 28 Lehmbruch is more cautious and more realistic. He says that the: ‘…multiplicity of conceptualizations is largely due to different theoretical backgrounds. It is all the more remarkable that across these nuances, important convergences are emerging. In fact, the discussion on modern corporatism has become a meeting ground for different approaches and social science traditions. This could eventually result in mutual stimulation…’ (1979, p. 299, our emphasis). As a paradigm, his approach does not vary much from that of Schmitter. He does indeed see his formalist typology and institutional approach as advantage rather than shortcomings and he claims that: ‘Until now, it is the only conceptualisation that is truly comparative in character, and it should allow operational measurement in cross national as well as longitudinal perspective.’ According to Lehmbruch, it establishes bases to “measure corporatism” in comparative research and his definition of corporatism could serve as basis for a developmental model of interest intermediation. (p. 300). As for Schmitter, his science ideal is comparative study and accordingly he claims that typologies that are conceived as operational instruments are an important intermediary step to cumulative and comparative empirical research on interest intermediation. Whether they can fruitfully be employed depends on the availability of appropriate indicators and a sufficient database.’ (1982 p. 8). Lehmbruch’s approach differs somewhat in that: 1) he works with a definition of power in the line of ‘who , gets what and how’ rather than the Lasswellian definition; for him corporatism is not only articulation of interest but also ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (1979, p. 150); 2) secondly, it is the problematique of different roles plaid by different elements of the political system in building consensus necessary for economic policy-making; 3) thirdly, the problematique presumes the function of corporatist structures to have the function of regulating class conflict and industrial relations (p. 151); 4) comparative analysis of issue areas as degree of corporatism varies in different 29 issue areas: ‘The corporatist pattern is most conspicuous in economic policyformation, above all in the domain of policies affecting the business cycle, employment, monetary stability, and the balance of trade … regulation of competition or industrial codetermination, are less frequently included in corporatist policy making.’ (p. 152) and; 5) the problem of relations between phases/stages of societal (capitalist) development and emergence of corporatism: ‘…importance in the relation between state and economy in a particular stage of capitalist development and under particular constraints of economic policymaking.’ (p. 300). However, Lehmbruch does not work on the internal dynamics of these stages of development of capitalism, they would be made an object for typology which would give static variables for more “valid” comparative studies. As Schmitter's paradigm, Lehmbruch's paradigm is a static comparative study. In their contribution to the debate Nedelmann and Meier, criticise Schmitter's model for being static and descriptive. Their alternative is actiontheoretical, claiming that corporatist collaboration depends on the actor’s definition of the strategic situation at particular ‘moment’ and place (there is some similarity with game theory here). In short they call their approach ‘dynamic process-oriented approach’ (p. 106). However, they do not concentrate on processes of development of macrosocietal structures that determine articulation of social levels, institutions and actors. They criticise theories of corporatism for the way in which society is conceptualised: ‘lt is presented as consisting of certain elements or “levels” of which two are emphasized particularly - namely, the level of decision-making and the level of interest representation. One consequence of such a “level” image of society is that it encourages approaching macro political problems in a static manner. The focus of interest is directed to the question of institutional arrangements between associations and the state. If “processes” come into the picture at all, they refer only to macro historical changes (such as the transformation of capitalism) to which the 30 origin of the structural configuration called corporatism is attributed. What is less often done, however, is to deal with two other types of processes; first, those processes by which the “changed nature of capitalism” is mediated into the structure of both interest groups and the state, with the joint result of bringing about corporatism; and second, the internal processes which constitute a structural configuration such as corporatism.’ (p. 105-6) According to Nedelmann and Meier, corporatism must be seen as a continuous reproduction of certain processes and cannot be seen as a characteristic of total societies it must be treated ‘…as an interaction configuration based on or consisting of processes.’ (p. 106). The interest organisations of corporatism cannot be reduced to economic organisations alone as increased cultural organisation for example must be included in the model of corporatism (p. 99). Interesting as the processes of mediation of the changed nature of capitalism into corporatist structures and the internal processes of the structural configuration called corporatism are, they are barely analysed by Nedelmann and Meier (which we presume would require analysis of ideological and cultural processes). They criticise Schmitter's theory of societal-corporatism for not dealing with the problem of what makes the interest organisations able to determine the action of the state, i.e. the problem of analysing the powerbase and the mechanisms of influence of these organisations (p.97). Unfortunately , they don't give any analysis of these mechanisms but only in a formalist way refer to differing power positions of the state vis-a-vis the organisations and vice versa in different issue areas and the power positions are analysed in terms of actors participation in the decision making process conceptualised as question of whether these actors enter the areas/stages of initiating, consulting or resolution of policy decisions (p.104). What they are satisfied to do, is firstly to focus on changes in the actors participating in decisional processes concerning economic policy. Secondly, 31 they concentrate on the processes which constitute and change corporatist constellations. They reduce their object of study even more as they say: ‘In this regard only two types of processes which seem to be especially relevant will be considered: (1) processes relating to the “definition of the issues or conflict objects” and (2) processes involving the “definition of the situation” in which such issues are raised, or “transformed.’ (p.107). In addition, they present a ‘dynamic’ explanation of the mechanisms of corporatism in the form of ‘general hypotheses’: ‘Interaction constellations change according to (1) the dominant way in which the actors define an issue (or conflict object) on which their interaction is concentrated, and (2) the dominant way in which the actor~ define the situation in which the interaction takes place.’ (p. l08). Then they go on and look for an empirical case that corresponds to their hypotheses. Now, with reference to our model of paradigms, we can say that Nedelmann's and Meier's approach is based on a contemplative process worldview and the processes they want to analyse are determined by conscious actors who define their own situation. Their territory/field of study is the traditional analysis of policymaking processes and their object of study is corporatist participation in these processes. Their science ideal is that of empirical tests of hypotheses (and not any ‘emancipatory’ interests c.f. J. Habermas); as a consequence they see their contribution as that of giving more valid and more accurate account/description of corporatist processes. The constituent parts of the paradigms of the theorists working within the problematique of political economy/Marxism (Panitch, Jessop and Kastendiek) are quite different. Their worldview is dialectical and based on the idea of capitalist society as a totality of/and transforming process. Their field of study is problems of a Marxist theory of the (capitalist) state and/or increased 32 socialisation of valorisation and capital accumulation and its forms. Their object of study is corporatism as particular form of state functions moulded by and via class struggle. Consequently, the conceptual framework and explanatory models are quite different from the theorists mentioned above. These authors do not mention any ‘paradigm revolution’ as the aim of their contributions. Jessop’s aim is to ‘locate current discussions of corporatism in relation to Marxist political economy and to assess the political and economic significance of corporatist tendencies in the capitalist: state.’ (1979, p. 185). He criticises Schmitter’s and Pahl/Winkler's approaches on the epistemological level for being too abstract and Pahl/Winkler as they don't ‘…attempt to analyse capitalism as a mode of production at different levels of abstraction, nor to examine the complex articulation between its economic and political determinations in different phases of capital accumulation.’ (p. 190, 187-90).19 In simple terms, Jessop is saying that different phases of capital accumulation must be analysed in terms of historical mediation through political, social and ideological structures/struggles. Jessop's science ideal is Marxist explanatory models, his field is problems of Marxist theory of the state and his object of study is concretisation of that theory in analysis of tripartite structures of corporatism and parliamentarism. Moreover, his contribution is as well a critique or alternative to traditional economic reductionist Marxist theories of the state: ‘If we are to locate the analysis of corporatism in terms of Marxist theory of the state, we must first define the state. Moreover, although the search for guarantees that the state is capitalist is particularly tempting to 19 In Marxist discourse, concrete as opposed to abstract usually refers to a whole determined by many determinants (see e.g. K. Marx 1974 p. 101: ‘The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse.’) The differentiation of the levels of abstraction usually refers to on the one side logical analysis of the essence of societal wholes (e.g. capitalist mode of production) and on the other side real analysis, i.e. the analysis of the forms of appearance of the essence at particular time and place, e.g. in particular historical cultural context etc. (Lenin called this ‘concretisation of the concrete’). 33 Marxists, all forms of essentialism have to be avoided. At the same time we want to avoid treating the state as a simple instrument and/or as an autonomous subject. The appropriate solution is to adopt the following assumptions: (a) the state should be seen as a set of institutions that cannot, qua structural ensemble, exercise power; (b) political forces do not exist independently from the state but are shaped in part through its forms of representation and intervention; (c) state power is a complex social relation which reflects the changing balance of forces in a determinate conjuncture; and (d) state power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation in given circumstances and is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realized.’ (p. 190-1). Jessop emphasises the reciprocal influences of the main instances of political development of capitalist conjunctures and that all sides of the state or state activity is not in the service of capital accumulation. But, he does not problematize the question to what extent functions/institutions of the state which are not directly related to capital accumulation may still be preconditions of the reproduction of capitalist conjunctures. That these speculations can easily lead to new kind of reductionism (e.g. D. Läpple) is not enough excuse for not dealing with the problem. Jessop emphasises that the effects of state power on capital accumulation varies according to the different conjunctures in which it takes place. He writes: ‘In this context capital accumulation has a dual theoretical function in our analysis: it is both a point of reference and a principle of explanation. We should not confuse the two nor stress one to the exclusion of the other. To treat capital accumulation only as a point of reference would endow the state with absolute autonomy in relation to capital; for accumulation to be treated merely as a principle of explanation would reduce ~he state to a more or less complex effect aim seems not simply to provide a more value correct or accurate conceptualization of his object of study his aim is as well - on the basis of seeing the state as an institutional complex of forms of representation (of political interests in parlamentarism) and intervention in the economy - to examine the effects of the inadequate articulation of representation and intervention on accumulation and 34 domination and thus to provide concepts useful in the analysis of structural crises of the state apparatuses.’ (p. 193). L. Panitch's field of study is also Marxist state theories and he concentrates especially on the relations between trade union structures and the state a field that he criticises Marxist theories to have hardly and inadequately dealt with. His object, corporatism, is a concretisation of these problems. He sees his contribution as a break with conventional Marxist discourse (1981, p. 24). He claims that in the Marxist theories: ‘…the pivotal role of trade-union integration within the network of policy-making apparatuses linking the state executive and bureaucracy with private corporate management was elided or merely treated in passing as a subsidiary aspect of the general development of an interventionist state under monopoly capitalism.’ (p. 22). Marxists, he claims,20 tend to define the trade today unions to be directly inserted in the (state) administrative structures. However, the strain implicit in this situation of the trade unions, as mediating the levels of rank-and-file members and administration, is bypassed in the analysis. Furthermore, Marxist theorisation of the state has: ‘…tended to see trade unions as ‘less important’ because they are geared to short-term demands which are neither explicitly political or revolutionary. Particularly in a period when the class struggle has been increasingly industrial in form, and when industrial militancy has accompanied the incorporation of trade unions in the state apparatus, this ‘politicist’ syndrome forecloses the possibility of a full analysis of the balance of class forces in the contemporary conjuncture and of an assessment of the contradictions arising from changes taking place in the bourgeois democratic state.’ (p. 23). 20 Panitch refers here to Poulantzas and Therborn. 35 Like Jessop, Panitch rejects reductionism and the 'instrumentalism' of seeing the state as instrument of the dominating class(es): ‘Rather the scope of the state is an object of struggle itself. As I shall attempt to show remain unstable in face of repeated struggles about whether trade unions are to become more agencies of the state or preserve their role as autonomous working-class institutions. It is precisely the open and unresolved nature of this conflict over the scope of the state as pertaining to corporatist political structures that distinguishes them from their brethren in fascist regimes.’ (p. 27). Panitch concentrates on the level of mediation of state forms and capital accumulation and economic growth. J. Kastendiek's paradigm is different from that of both Panitch and Jessop. Rather than building ideal types of corporatism by generalisations of partial structures his point of departure is totalisation; seeing partial corporative structures as moments of a given, existing social organisation of political life (Kastendiek, p. 59 and 75) or as part of organisation of politics in society in general. Concrete historical analysis can consequently, according to Kastendiek, concentrate on attempts at corporative organisation on different levels and activities in state and society (p. 76). These attempts should be analysed, says Kastendiek, within different fields of politics (income policy, industrial relations policy etc) and (following A. Wassenberg) on different levels such as the micro level (individual forms), meso level (branch of industry, region) and macro level (central-state authorities, centralised decision making). Kastendiek relates these formalist schemes with his overall problematique, which is ‘…corporative structures within the capitalist power systems’ (p. 59) and the influence of these structures on ‘…the existing organization of the domination’ (p. 77). However, unfortunately there is no attempt to analyse the mediation of these structures and the political system visa-vis phases of capital accumulation or in terms of ‘balance of forces’ of class struggle. Consequently, the result of his contribution is emphasis on empirical 36 ‘real analysis’ of corporatist attempts or strategy. Furthermore, he emphases empirical studies as opposed to rationalist/Weberian methodology of ideal types. Finally, which is an advantage, Kastendiek stresses the need to expand the discussion to other fields than direct policy-making on state-level. b) The different explanatory models Hitherto, we have discussed the different paradigms in terms of worldview, field of study, object of study and science and ideal. We should compare them as well in terms of instrumentality, i.e. explanatory models and methodology, which aim is to explain the origin, mechanisms and future of neocorporatism or corporative structures and strategies. As we have seen above, there are three main explanatory perspectives in which the theorists mentioned ground their theories: that of descriptive, comparative studies of systems theory (Scmitter, Lehmbruch); that of action theory or rather interaction theory (Nedelmann/Meier) and finally that of structural approach with emphasis on function of mediation of structures (the economic and political/state structures c.f. Jessop and Panitch). In Schmitter's case, the origin of neo-corporatism is explained in a very abstract way with a rather simple conception of history. Concerning the historical origin of corporatism, we find two kind of explanation: one is circular, merely a reformulation of the definition of corporatism. The other one has a predictive character. As for the first one, Schmitter writes: ‘When viewed in motion … (societal and state corporatism) are revealed as the products of very different political, social and economic processes, as the vehicle for very different power and influence relations, and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences. Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial mints; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities even with highly “layered” or “pillared” politicaI subcultures … Societal 37 corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist state.’ (1979, p. 22). This train of thought does not tell us much about the mechanisms of the becoming of corporatism, it merely states that different forms of corporatism is to be expected in circumstances where we find these different forms of corporatism. Schmitter's second type of explanation of the origin of corporatism, the ‘predictive-explanation’, is both functional and predictive but also rather simple/abstract: ‘Summarizing … the decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois- dominant regime, due to processes of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the political process.’ (p. 24-5). State corporatism, on the other side is established: ‘…with the necessity to “enforce peace” not by co-opting and incorporating, but by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state.’ (p. 29). And, Schmitter is quick to add: Of course, to these general elements, one must add several other. 38 ‘overdetermined factors which combine with the former, making corporatism an increasingly likely outcome: (1) secular trends toward bureaucratization and oligarchy within interest associations; (2) prior rates of political mobilization and participation; (3) diffusion of foreign ideologies and institutional practices; (4) impact of international war and/or depression. Nevertheless, the core of my speculation about structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by delayed, dependent capitalist development and nonhegemonic class relations in the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monopoly or concentrated capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of societal corporatism.’ (p. 25 our emphasis). The explanatory model of the origin of corporatism is not complex and it consists of presuming some variables which are believed to generate corporatism. Rather than being a historical explanation - based on the idea of explaining phenomena qualitatively as a part of the development of the totality of particular society dominated by particular part of that totality such as the economy - it is a set of variables to predict/explain the/any chronology of the emergence of corporatism. Schmitter’s explanation of the reproduction of corporatism or its mechanisms is formulated as a ‘macro-hypothesis’ and in functionalist terms: ‘I suggest that corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism.’ (p. 24). However, Schmitter does not work on the processes of mediation of on the one side these ‘internal’ developmental stages of capitalism (capitalist accumulation) and the ‘external’ context of international relations and on the other side political forms. This is a serious shortcoming in view of the contemporary 39 slump/recession era of late capitalism. However, as he says himself, he is not familiar with this side of corporatism. (p. 25). But, Schmitter does not hesitate in developing some hypothesis concerning the future of corporatism. In Still the century of Corporatism (1979), he mentions two fundamental “tensions” faced by societal corporatism: ‘1) increased demands of direct forms of participation which might undermine the stability of corporatist systems both in terms of internal hierarchies of authority and their claims to democratic legitimacy; 2) what is more important according to Schmitter, corporatist systems are being bypassed with increasing frequency by broad social movements on the one side and specific spontaneous protest actions on the other these “tensions” are grounded in the fact that the very values and assumptions about society upon which corporatism ultimately rests, - functional specialization and hierarchical organization, security and prévision, “productivism” and efficiency, economic growth and mass consumption as ends in themselves - are being called into question by these movements and actions.’ (p. 41). But unfortunately, as there is no further analysis of the bases of this development, it is impossible to see how realistic his views are; These movements seem to have fallen from the clear sky and ‘the answer is blowing in the wind.’ In the 1982 version, he stresses that a shift to territoriality or increased decentralisation is what he thinks is ‘most likely to affect the long run viability of neo-corporatism’ (p. 273). Lehmbruch does not add much to Schmitter's explanatory model. He explains the origin of ‘liberal corporatism’ by three main ‘causes’ (or rather contexts): ‘(1) the replacement of classical liberal-competitive capitalism with “organized capitalism” (Hilferding) and a growing “politicization” of the market, by the transformation of competitive economies through the social power of oligopolistic firms and organized interest representatives; 40 (2) the traumatic experience of the economic crises of 1929 with its subsequent disastrous consequences for political stability in the liberal democracies. Due to this experience, economic policy became subject to the political imperative that full employment, monetary stability, balance of payments, and, increasingly, economic growth (which is perceived as a precondition for social pacification through the distribution of increments in national product) should be guaranteed and maintained in a balanced condition” (1979, p. 54, [or shortly management of the business cycle and of economic growth- I.J.] (3) “Liberal corporatism rests on the theoretical premise that there exists strong interdependence between the interest of conflicting social groups in a capitalist economy ... One of the most elaborate versions of the “interdependence of interests” model can be found in modern versions of macro-economic equilibrium analysis in the Keynesian tradition … The strong influence which economists of the Keynesian and post-Keynesian persuasion have gained in formation of economic policy in a number of West European countries has doubtless contributed to the advance of liberal corporatism.’ (p. 55) Central to Lehmbruch’s explanation of the reproduction of corporatism is, besides Schmitter’s functional explanation, i.e. his reference to imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources (Lehmbruch 1979, p. 151), is that he adds additional functional element and claims that ‘…corporatism appears to serve such imperatives by regulating the conflict of social classes in the distribution of national income and in the structure of industrial relations.’ (p. 151). This regulation of class conflict is partly explained by the role of economic expertice (Keynesianism) in consensus building and partly by the role of the party system in consensus building, that undermines growth of militancy in interest organizations in periods of recessions. (170-72, 163). Besides these functional elements mentioned above, he adds four ‘independent variables’ that determine the success of ‘conjuncture politics’: 1) above all, a high degree of centralisation and concentration in/of the interest organisations; 2) degree of rank-and-file autonomy and shop-level bargaining; 3) ideological bases of the labour movement, i.e. its degree of class conflict 41 orientation (rather than consensus orientation) and; 4) the position of the labor movement within the party system. Lehmbruch claims that: ‘Generally speaking, liberal corporatism is most important in those countries where the working class movement had obtained participation in political power by the channel of the party system and where, in consequence, the trade unions had gained privileged access to governmental and administrative centres of decision.’ (p. 168-9). But, although these variables are thought to affect successfulness of conjuncture politics, the concentration is on consensus building of political elites and in that sense, Lehmbruch is true to the traditional field of study and explanation of political science (p. 170). Lehmbruch does not explicitly discuss the problem of the future of corporatism but he does though claim that corporatist systems can never replace the party system in consensus building which is fundamental to the success of conjunctural policy-making (p. 181) and it goes that if there occurs a change in the elements of reproduction of corporatism then its future changes. L. Panitch's explanation of the origin of corporatism in West-Europe is economic, historical/organisational and ideological. It refers to the long-term development of capitalist accumulation in terms of concentration and centralisation of capital which leads to concentration of labour as well and works as structural basis for the strength and/of organisations of trade unions (1981, p. 29). On a more concrete level, it refers to conditions on the labour market after the Second World War. As he puts it: ‘The critical factor accounting for the development of corporatist state structures … appears to have been the level of employment, and relatedly the commitment of the state to maintain a high-employment fiscal and monetary policy.’ (p. 30). 42 These economic conditions resulted in a historical and political strength of the working class and its allies on the question of ‘full employment’, ‘…although the conditions favouring rapid economic growth set the framework for the extent of this victory.’ (p. 30). Furthermore, Panitch adds: ‘Within the context of the general trend toward the structural strengthening of the working class in the monopoly capitalist era, it was the attenuation of the reserve army of labour as a result of nearly full employment in particular societies that critically further strengthened the organized working class at the industrial level. And, as the state intertwined with corporate management to facilitate the restructuring of capital necessary for accumulation and economic growth, what largely dictated the absorption of trade unions into this policy-making network was the extent to which high employment closed off the possibility of securing the necessary rate of exploitation via labour market mechanisms alone. Where the labour movement was too weak or too divided to secure an effective commitment to full employment from the state, the expansion of the state's role in the economy occurred without the unions’ participation.’ (p. 30). High rate of employment caused increased wage pressure from the working class and its organisations. ‘If these increases were passed on in price increases, however, this had the effect, given the growth rate of productivity, of affecting a country's foreign competitiveness. If the increases were not passed on in an inflationary spiral, on the other hand, the motor force of the capitalist economy - profits - tends to be squeezed. It was this problem that provided the both at raising productivity (and hence economic growth) and inducing trade unions to cooperate in an incomes policy which would restrain money wage demands.’ (1979, p. 134). It is on this base of incomes policy-making, conditioned by this economic and political context, that corporatist state structures emerged according to Panitch. However, there is more to it, namely, what he calls ‘facilitating factors’. 43 These are pre-existing degree of union centralisation and a legal framework for collective bargaining. Furthermore, he adds, as facilitating factors, social democracy - not only social democratic governments and loyalty to them, but also social-democratic ideology with its rejection of Marxist concept of class struggle. (1981, p. 31). In the same way as he explains the origin of corporatist state structures by the balance of forces, he explains their reproduction by means of controlling the political strength of the working class. What is at stake is the possibilities of the leadership of the trade unions to restraint wage-pressure from the rank-and-file members so that it does not exceed the frame established in the corporative incomes policy. The function of the leadership is to legitimise this policy, and it is here that we find the core of instability of corporatism. As Panitch claims: ‘The very legitimation that corporatist structures are designed to give to state policy is contradicted by the ‘de-legitimation’ that these structures produce over time.’ It is the concrete form in which trade unions legitimate/mediate state economic policy via their promulgation of wage restraint ‘in the nation interest’ and their administration of it to their members that causes instability. In the long run rank and file members lose their belief in the trade unions, especially if real wages or falling. As Panitch puts it: ‘…in so far as wage restraint is practised continually or intensified to the point of producing falling real wages, there is an increasing likelihood that, through the mobilization of opposition within union organizations at the policy or union elections level, or through the expression of unofficial strikes on a large scale, trade unions will withdraw from, or at least attempt to renegotiate their place in corporatist political structures.’ (1981, p. 34-5). The fragility of corporatist political structures appeared in the outbreak of rankand-file militancy throughout Europe in the late 1960s. "This militancy, being a general phenomenon after the recession of 1966-7, cannot, of course, be 44 attributed only to the resentment against them certainly fueled militancy and became a focal point for mobilization.” (p. 35). Coercive state responses failed against this militancy in the form of ad hoc prohibition of strikes and legislation aimed to reduce strike actions (1979, p. 144; 1981, p. 35-6). Given this failure of coercive tactic and rather than running the risk of endangering bourgeois democracy altogether, the state, especially social democratic governments, set about to integrate lower levels of the working class movement - right down to the shop floor - more effectively. Panitch writes: ‘This took the form of progressive legislation and state - fostered managerial practices designed to facilitate union recognition in unorganized sectors and extend union membership in organized sectors; to foster workers participation schemes in company boards and works councils (this time under the direct aegis of the unions); to institutionalize local-level bargaining and shop-steward committees;oJand to provide a legal framework for qualitative issues (e.g., health and safety), unfair dismissals and redundancy... These reforms were progressive, but they further enmeshed the trade unions in the legal apparatus of the state and institutionalized and juridified conflict on the shop floor.’ (1981, p.37). Although Panitch refers to economic boom and recession among fundamental factors in bringing about and determining the instability of corporatist state structures, he does not analyse these aspects further. This is a shortcoming, as it would not only make a better explanation of both the development of these structures until now, but would as well explain future prospects as well. However, that requires a theory of economic crises, long waves etc. These problems seem to be outside his field of study, presumably taken for granted. We would expect that Jessop make more out or these problems in his explanatory model. Unfortunately, his contribution is on such a abstracttheoretical level that we can't read out of it any concrete explanation of the actual history of the existing forms of tripartism. This is not his aim anyway; he is dealing with the problem of defining tripartism as a state form. He emphasises 45 that the state and its historical forms must be analysed in terms of phases of capital accumulation, balance of forces, political and ideological domination and the development of social classes or the social bases of state power and the reciprocal relations of influence between these. But, capital accumulation seems to have ‘overdetermining’ role in his model and capital is seen as an ‘autonomous subject’ which creates its conditions of reproduction and valorisation. As he puts it: ‘Here it should be noted that capital accumulation depends on the continued ability of capital itself to secure through struggle the many different preconditions of the creation and appropriation of surplus-value on an expanding scale. Thus, the laws of motion of capitalism are not natural and inevitable: they depend for their realization on the balance of forces in the incessant struggle between capital and labour. It follows that a reorganization of this balance may become a prerequisite to restoring the conditions favourable to accumulation. Changes in the articulation of different state apparatuses, in the organization of access to such apparatuses, in the forms of political mobilization, in the character of state intervention, and in political strategies and alliances could prove significant in this respect. It is in this context that we can locate the growth of corporatism in the advanced capitalist states.’ (p. 197).21 But, the bases of capital as autonomous subject - securing its preconditions through struggle is found in responses against the crises tendencies of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and/or ‘…to promote the socialization of capitalist relations of production in the attempt to bring them According to H. Reichelt and many ‘capital-theorists’ of the ‘capital logic’ school, there was a break in Marx around 1858 when he re-read Hegel. After this point, he reformulated his critique of political economy and began to formulate his concept of capital, giving it the same structural formulation as Hegel's Absolute Spirit, as self-realising autonomous subject in the history of humanity. Marx did not only start to talk about capital as autonomous subject, selfrealising subject of valorisation, but began as well to build on the same kind of procedure of analysis, reading history/the past from the present. The analysis of the structure of capital and its subsumed conditions of existence is distinct from the analysis of its becoming. B. Jessop’s speculations/analysis reminds of this interpretation of Marx. 21 46 into correspondence with the increasing socialization of the forces of production.’ (p. 197). What Jessop misses, but Panitch hints at, that the high rate of employment in the post-world war era, was one of the preconditions for political strength of the working class, which resulted in expansion of corporatist state structures. This high rate of employment was determined partly by economic boom and expansion (generated by significant increase in the rate of surplus-value pressed by fascism and in the Second World War. Another source that boosted employment was substantial reduction in the price of important elements of constant capital and by the third technological revolution and accelerated technological innovations and inventions, E. Mandel, 1976, p. 557). It is only on a very abstract level that ~his boom can be explained by ‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.” IV. Concluding remarks - alternative approach Sofar, we have highlighted the basic moments of the different paradigms of the students of neo-corporatism and their fundamental definitions of the phenomenon. We have emphasised their different theoretical background, which influences their demarcation of their field and object of study and explanations of neo-corporatism. We should now add their evaluation of each other’s approaches. Schmitter accuses some students of neo-corporatism for ‘…greater or lesser merit and/or ‘orthodoxy.’ (1982, p. 260). Besides Schmitter's naive notion of ‘paradigm revolution’ we must emphasise that his own approach is less a merit than orthodoxy in so far as his own contribution is closed within the tradition of political science. His views reflect the objectivism of the era of Enlightenment aiming at knowledge without being influenced by values and ‘horizons’ (See H.G. Gadamer on the objectivism of the movements of Enlightenment). While Lehmbruch finds the debate on neo-corporatism 47 ‘stimulating’, he accuses Schmitter for to narrow an approach. Panitch criticises the ideological interests implicit in some theories: There is, according to him, a tendency to ignore the question of which class interests liberal corporatism serves and, secondly, these theories are often based on the assumption that the functional representation in economic decision-making of trade unions and business organisations takes place within the framework of an equivalence of power and influence between both. This assumption, says Panitch derives from traditional liberal theory. (1979, p. 124-5). He points out that: ‘Trade union power is based on the effectiveness of its collective organization. But, power of capital is based on control of the means of production, and this control is not transferred to the interest associations of business by individual firms. This means that these associations' incorporation via state structures is less significant for capital than is the incorporation of trade unions for labour, precisely because these associations play a less critical role for their class as agencies of struggle, of representation and of social control than do unions for their class, not least because of the role of the capitalist state itself in cementing a common interest among capital’s competing fractions.’ (1981, p. 26-7). Jessop criticises Schmitter for being too abstract in his approach but his approach is formalist and abstract as well. Kastendiek critique is also of abstractness of theories and calls for empirical bases of analyses instead of ideal types, but his approach turns out to be abstract as well and does not have much explanatory value. What strikes us is that the theorists do not discuss the superiority of their own theories or assess their epistemological grounds in any detail. Each one takes his/her approach for granted and the debate (?) is characterised by presentation of different approaches rather than a dialogue. In practice the debate reflects a liberalist (Weberian) view of value freedom and chaotic gathering of different perspectives and some (Lehmbruch) think it is ‘stimulating’. It is only Panitch, that highlights the impact of ideology and class 48 interests in the theories. However, the 'debate' is overdetermined by a chaotic academic division of fields of disciplines, which is reproduced in the ‘debate’, and it blocks its development; the value freedom and the different perspectives are only 'relatively autonomous. This problem of evaluation of superiority of theories brings our discussion back to our model of paradigms. The theorist/scientist enters the process of theoretical/scientific practice with his/her own interests. These interests can be both theoretical and ideological. In our own case, we prefer to enter a Marxist theoretical process and will concentrate on the object of corporatist structures with the interest of political realism or relevance as our aim. We can explicate this problem by referring to science as critique. It is well known how K. Marx criticised the method of political economy and formulated what he called correct, scientific method in the Introduction to Grundrisse (1974, p. 100-8). In short, we can formulate the procedure of analysis in three main steps: 1) The first step consists of going from the ‘pseudo-concrete’ level of reality or the immediate forms of phenomena to abstract concepts (Marx takes as an example going from the population, to classes and from classes to wage labour, capital and from these concepts to exchange, division of labour, prices, etc., i.e. to ever more abstract concepts); 2) The next step consists of going from these abstractions and building out of these an interrelated whole that is determined by the laws or trends of development, which are generated by the relations of its elements. This whole is concrete insofar as it is ‘concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse’ as Marx puts (p. 101). This ‘concrete whole’ is what we can call the essence of the appearance and/or appearing phenomena on the ‘pseudoconcrete’ level; 49 3) The third step of analysis consists of going from this essence to ‘realanalysis’; i.e. to particular phenomena determined by the essence. The diagram below sketches the main features of a research process. What interests us here is not what was Marx's notion of dialectics, which determined his analytical studies when he proceeded in going from the abstractions of political economy to the essence i.e. the capitalist mode of production. (i.e. Marx taking step two).22 What interests us is step three, i.e. going from essence to ‘real-analysis’. Marx’s own epistemology closed of any problematization of this step. Marx did emphasise the practice aspect of ‘Man’s’ search for knowledge as conscious goal oriented actions (See A. Schmitt 1976, p. 117-18) and he emphasised the historicity both of the becoming of abstract reality (‘real abstractions’) - or the reification of human relations which generate the abstract conception of social reality - and the historicity of the validity of such abstract conceptions (1974, p. 104-5). He believed that he was describing in a correct, scientific way the inevitable collapse of the capitalist system (1976, p. 90-1; 929) and in his epistemology this perspective or inevitable development of capitalism and the perspective of communism or the communist view of reality is one and the same thing (1975, p. 348). As a consequence the political relevance of his theories is not prob1ematised; his theory of capitalism is both at the same time a critique and In his peculiar terminology, L. Althusser calls this step ‘Generalities II’ or ‘means of production’ in theoretical practice/production or dialectical materialism (see L. Althusser 1970, p. 182-93). 22 50 description. As Marx writes in a letter to Lassalle (22.2.1858), his work in Capital ‘…is both at the same time a presentation of the system and via the presentation a critique of it.’ However, because of Marx's apparently contradictory views of the historicity of knowledge and his determinist view of the collapse of capitalism and his stress on correct method, we prefer to call his epistemology ‘dialectical objectivism’23 We would claim that step three (i.e. C in the diagram above) is more than a question of ‘correct’ method. In our terminology, it is the question of defining the object of study within particular field and instrumentality of a paradigm. It is here that external ideological interests clash with scientism and trends towards ‘normal science’ (we are not saying that such external influences/interests do not affect the other steps of analysis, but such affects are not of our concern here). We can call the anti-scientist interests ‘emancipatory interests’ (cf. J. Habermas) and roughly classify them as they appear in recent counter-movements in/to science: There are three main trends of counter-movements in the sciences: The first one, often called pseudoscience by defenders of science, attempt to be accepted by scientists and wants to change the object of particular disciplines. The second one rejects science as inhuman procedure and wants to realise mutual relationship between man and Nature. This trend is often called romantic. The third main trend is critical science, which aims at unveiling the ideological, political and structural relationship between science and society. Some want to transform society in a socialist revolution (Nowotny and Rose). Usually when people try to assess how realistic different alternatives are that attempt to incorporate political and ethical values into science and their possibilities of realising alternative development. This is done by means of 23 We have discussed his epistemology and its development in more detail in the dissertation Marx’s Metascience. [This dissertation was unpublished in 1983, but was published in 2008 by Félags- og hagvisindastofnun Islands. ISBN 978-9979-9032-1-5. –I.J.]. 51 social integration of science (socialist science), of social commitment (science for the people) or acting as the ‘good scientist’. As G. Böhme has written: ‘The effort is guided by the image of the Hippocratic Oath to commit the application and even the production of knowledge to social problems’ (Böhme, 120). Böhme argues that the idea of realising good science by means of social integration is impossible as good science, from his point of view, as it presupposes the good society. His conclusion is that the good science must be realised at the level of cognition (p.121), i.e. by changing the interests which organise the phenomena of research into object (cf. Habermas’s theory that the natural sciences are dominated by technical interests). However, Böhme’s approach must be criticised because it does not take into account well enough the structural effects of social and economic context, which determine the possibilities of changing the cognition-content of science. These structural imperatives are relevant for general critic of the social relevance of critique of science and its alternatives. Let us mention some of such important imperative factors: a) In cases when the actors of realisation of alternatives are considered to be scientists, it is important to highlight the real possibilities of critique with reference to the development of employment among educated people and scientists; b) It is important to highlight the structural development of the labour-process and ‘proletarianisation’ of scientists. This ‘proletarianisation’ results from technical change (see J. Mendner); c) The effects of long waves and economic spurts and slumps must be taken into account when the relevance of different romantic alternatives are assessed and the effects of the concrete market situation and relations in different economies; d) The concrete political situation and forms of class struggle in different countries must be taken into account when the different actors and alternatives are assessed; f) All these factors above must be assessed within a framework of the developmental tendencies and ‘laws of 52 motion’ of contemporary social and economic structures; in the Occident within the framework of late-capitalism (see E. Mandel 1976, 139). The fundamental question concerns not the role and/or world view of the scientists themselves, but their relation to, on the one side, different social ideologies (or utopias) and on the other side, social and political forces and their situation in the balance of power of these forces. The era of economic recession since the late 1960s has decreased the role of scientists as an emancipatory/revolutionary actor (both because of the threat of redundancies due to higher rate of unemployment among scientists, cuts in university departments and especially increased steering of science by the state and capital.24 However, this recession has called for increased economic struggle and has brought back the emancipatory potential of working class struggle. In short, if we want to relate our analysis of neo-corporatism to external ideological and social forces - aiming at increasing the political realism/relevance of our analysis -, and if we want to build an critical alternative to the different theoretical backgrounds of the ‘debate’ on ‘liberal-’or ‘neo-’ corporatism, we would have to base our analysis on two key concepts: division of labour and corporative structures/strategies. These terms cover the dimensions of both democratic and political theories and the analysis influenced by the tradition of political economy/Marxism. Moreover, these terms reflect the aim of emancipatory movements and working class struggle. We will now explain our claims. The struggle for increased participation in decision-making processes has not only attacked decision making in firms, universities, local authorities and governmental bodies on the ‘public’ level. As a part of general struggle against authoritarian structures in ‘private life’ in the family and in sexual relations as 24 We can also ask, whether the radicalisation of science and scientists does not reflect more scientists’ fear of falling “down” to the status of the proletariat in the ‘Taylorisation of their work rather than being a reflection of increased ‘proletarian consciousness’. 53 well. In other words, there has been wide ranging discussion in society and struggle against authoritarian power relations both ‘horizontally’ in private life and ‘vertically’ in hierarchical structures in firms and institutions, independent of whether they are private or public. We would point at social movements that have struggled against authoritarian structures such as the student movement and the New Left, women's liberation movements and the working class movement. The bases of these power structures or authority structures is division of labour in such different spheres of society ranging from the division of labour in sexual and production/economy to administration domains. Sexual division of labour, as an example, is not only found in the ‘private domain’ but also in the public domain. Instead of calling these sexual-authoritystructures patriarchy, we would call them gendered authority and gendered authoritarian structures. This terminology makes the discussion between the different antiauthoritarian movements easier and refers to the libertarian and anarchist tradition. It refers to sexual/gender domination both in and outside the domestic level. The concept of division of labour covers also the structural division between the political system and civil society and is the bases of the knowledgepower of the state (cf. N. Poulantzas 1978) and the status of intellectual vis-a-vis manual labour. However, division of labour is not constant in all societies, in all its areas and on all levels of society. The struggle for minimising division of labour is one of the fundamental corner stones of true socialist revolution25, besides the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production (this is a part of the revolutionary potential of the Polish Solidarnosc movement). This leads us to the struggle between capital and labour, as the preconditions of a real minimising of the division of labour is only possible 25 See e.g. Marx on the The Civil War in France and R. Bahro, chapter 12. 54 given that the private ownership of the means of production he abolished. As e.g. J. Mendner has shown, capital sets limits to democratisation of labour/work and the abolition of the division of labour by using ‘net-planning’ as management strategy which only partially increases participatory democracy in factories but secures overall control (even in the case of ‘self-management’). It is the working class that has the potential emancipatory role in the struggle against such organisation of labour in firms. Having explicated briefly the relationship between emancipatory movements and socialist, revolutionary aims, i.e. the interests entering our analysis, we have established the point of departure from which the object, neocorporatism should be approached. One of the fundamental consequences of this is that we realise that the problem of corporatism (i.e. class collaboration), must be approached as a phenomena that appears not only within the traditional territory of the political system but as well on the ‘micro-level’ in the firms. Among the theorists of neo-corporatism, we have discussed, it is only Kastendiek that emphasises this point. Corporatist structures on the micro and the macro level appear as:  a result of the general division of labour in society; as a result of long term economic waves (cf. above Mandel and Panitch);  changing balance of forces (cf. Panich and Jessop);  ideological forces and traditions (especially social-democratic ideology, cf. Panitch and Jessop);  organisational structures and management technics/strategies;  often as a result of attempts of the state and administration to incorporate interest groups in the decision making process so as to avoid harsh forms of class struggle which are not ‘in the interests of the nations’, i.e. corporatist structures appear as an attempt to control class-struggle and wage pressure (Lehnbruch/Panitch/Kastendiek/Strinati). Corporatist structures appear in the form of: 55  on the micro-level in a direct form in participatory “democratic” management and indirectly in piece-wages and bonus wages (J. Mender);  on the macro-level in collaboration of the interest organisations of labour and capital in tripartite structures (Jessop) with administration and government;  these structures appear especially in the issue areas of incomes policymaking as a part of the policy behind the state budged, taxation and puplic spending (Lehmbruch), these structures appear in the form increasing ‘initiative power’ of these sectorial corporative structures vis-a-vis parliament. Corporatist structures are seen here as both a state form and as a social relation of capital (a form of the ‘collective work’ cf. Marx). The dynamic bases of the trends of development of the division of labour, balance of forces, state forms and ideological struggle is the valorisation process of capitalist accumulation which in national and international economic context, which on the level of real analysis, affects and is affected in a reciprocal relation by these social structures and levels, but still overdetermines these. As Jessop puts it: ‘…the development of monopoly capitalism requires increasing state intervention to mobilize counter-tendencies to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and/or to promote the socialization of capitalist relations of production in the attempt to bring them into correspondence with the increasing socialization of the forces of production … ln turn the changing imperatives of capital accumulation in the field of intervention entail changing requirements in the field of representation. Here it should be noted that capital accumulation depends on the continued ability of capital itself to secure through struggle the many different preconditions of the creation and appropriation of surplus-value on an expanding scale. Thus, the laws of motion of capitalism are not natural and inevitable; they depend for their realization on the balance of forces in the incessant struggle between capital and labour. It follows that a reorganization of this balance may become a prerequisite to restoring the conditions favourable to accumulation. Changes in the articulation of different state apparatuses, in the organization of access to such apparatuses, in the forms of political 56 mobilization, in the character of state intervention and in political strategies and alliances could prove significant in this respect. It is in this context that we can locate the growth of corporatism [and corporatist structures-I.J] in the advanced capitalist societies.’ (p. 196-7). Our concern here is not to explicate the laws of motion of capitalist accumulation or laws of value in any detail, this dissertation is too short for that purpose. Our concern in this dissertation is only to situate the debate on neocorporatism in the context of paradigm-discussion and to find a base for analysis of neo-corporatism in a conceptual framework that synthesises the knowledge interests of political realism/relevance and socialist aims. We believe the point of departure for such analysis would be the concept of division of labour and theories of valorisation and capital accumulation. 57 Bibliography L. Althusser: For Marx, Vintage Books, New York 1970. L. Althusset/E.Balibar: Reading Capital, NLB, London 1977. R. Bahro: Alternativet, Suenson, Copenhagen 1979. G. Böhme: ‘Alternatives in science - alternatives to science’ in H. Nowotny/H. Rose: Counter-movements in the Sciences; Sociology of the Sciences, Yearbook 1979, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1979. A. 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