Mindful Judgment
and Decision Making
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Elke U. Weber and Eric J. Johnson
Center for the Decision Sciences (CDS), Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;
email: euw2@columbia.edu
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009. 60:53–85
Key Words
First published online as a Review in Advance on
September 17, 2008
choice, preference, inference, cognition, emotion, attention, memory,
learning, process models
The Annual Review of Psychology is online at
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10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633
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Abstract
A full range of psychological processes has been put into play to explain
judgment and choice phenomena. Complementing work on attention,
information integration, and learning, decision research over the past
10 years has also examined the effects of goals, mental representation,
and memory processes. In addition to deliberative processes, automatic
processes have gotten closer attention, and the emotions revolution
has put affective processes on a footing equal to cognitive ones. Psychological process models provide natural predictions about individual
differences and lifespan changes and integrate across judgment and decision making ( JDM) phenomena. “Mindful” JDM research leverages our
knowledge about psychological processes into causal explanations for
important judgment and choice regularities, emphasizing the adaptive
use of an abundance of processing alternatives. Such explanations supplement and support existing mathematical descriptions of phenomena
such as loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting. Unlike such descriptions, they also provide entry points for interventions designed to help
people overcome judgments or choices considered undesirable.
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Contents
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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ATTENTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exogenous Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Endogenous Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ENCODING AND EVALUATION . .
Evaluation is Relative . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Choice from External Search . . . . . . .
Inferences from External Search . . . .
Goal and Framing Effects . . . . . . . . . .
MEMORY PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Memory Storage and Retrieval . . . . .
Memory and Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MULTIPLE INFORMATION
PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Emotions Revolution . . . . . . . . . .
Affective Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dual-Process Explanations . . . . . . . . .
Dual-Representation Models . . . . . . .
LEARNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Predictive Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
DECISION MAKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cognitive Traits/Styles . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INCREASING POLICY
RELEVANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Implications: The Behavioral
Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INTRODUCTION
JDM: judgment and
decision making
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Since its origins in the 1950s, judgment and decision making ( JDM) research has been dominated by mathematical functional relationship
models that were its point of departure in the
form of normative models. This focus on economics and statistics may have led JDM research to underutilize the insights and methods of psychology. Aided by the recent arrival
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of neuroscience methodologies to complement
behavioral research, the field has started to realize, however, that the brain that decides how
to invest pension money and what car to buy
is the same brain that also learns to recognize
and categorize sounds and faces, resolves perceptual conflicts, acquires motor skills such as
those used in playing tennis, and remembers (or
fails to remember) episodic and semantic information. In this review, we make a strong case
for the utility of this realization.
JDM reviews are often structured by task
categories, with section headings such as “preferences,” “beliefs,” and “decisions under risk
and uncertainty” (Payne et al. 1992), and “risky
choice,” “intertemporal choice,” and “social
decisions” (Loewenstein et al. 2007). In contrast, our review employs headings that might
be found in a cognitive psychology textbook.
It capitalizes on the 50 years of research on
cognitive and motivational processes that have
followed Simon’s (1957) depiction of human
decision makers as finite-capacity information
processors and decision satisficers. Attentional
(in particular, perceptual) and learning processes have a longer history of consideration,
with phenomena such as “diminishing sensitivity of outcomes” or “reference point encoding” for perception and the “illusion of validity”
for learning. Affective, memory, and prediction processes have only more recently emerged
as explanations of judgment and choice
phenomena.
We retain some task category distinctions
to organize specific content where appropriate.
Thus, we distinguish between preference and
inference. Preferences involve value judgments
and are therefore subjective, such as deciding
how much to charge for an item on eBay. Inferences are about beliefs, such as the judged likelihood that a political candidate will win the next
election, and typically have objectively verifiable answers. Although this distinction reflects
tradition, it may not reflect psychological reality. Preferences and inferences seem to draw on
the same cognitive processes.
Our ability to organize our review by psychological processes is a sign of the growing
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maturity of the field. JDM research no longer
simply generates a growing list of phenomena
that show deviations from the predictions of
normative models. Instead, it has been developing and testing hypotheses about the psychological processes that give rise to judgments and
choices and about the mental representations
used by these processes. Although the number
of JDM articles in major social psychology journals remained constant over the past 10 years,
the number of JDM articles in major cognitive
psychology journals increased by 50% over that
period, reflecting the increased interest in integrating judgment and choice phenomena with
the frameworks of hot and cold cognition.
New tools have undoubtedly contributed to
this trend. This includes functional imaging and
other neural and physiological recordings, process tracing tools (see sidebar Process Models
and Process Tracing), and, increasingly, modeling tools such as mediation (Shrout & Bolger
2002) and multilevel analysis (Gelman & Hill
2007). A focus on psychological mechanisms
has guided the decomposition of JDM task
behavior into contributing cognitive processes
and their variation across groups (Busemeyer
& Diederich 2002, Stout et al. 2004, Wallsten
et al. 2005, Yechiam et al. 2005). An increased
focus on individual differences has been a noticeable feature of behavioral decision research
over the past decade. Increased use of Webbased experimentation (Birnbaum & Bahra
2007) allows access to respondents with much
broader and representative variation on demographic and cognitive variables, with new insights about individual, group, and life-span differences on JDM tasks, topics that are discussed
in the second section of our review. More affordable genotyping has led to examinations
of the heritability of economic traits like trust
(Cesarini et al. 2007).
JDM research attracts public and media attention because it addresses real-world phenomena, from myopic dietary decisions to excessive stock market trading. Policy makers
have increasingly utilized JDM theory and results when designing or changing institutions
(Shafir 2008), the topic of our last major sec-
PROCESS MODELS AND PROCESS TRACING
Early models in decision research attempted to explain changes
in judgments or decisions (the “output”) as a result of changes
in information considered (the “inputs”) using tools such as regression and analysis of variance. This approach is problematic
because it considers only a subset of observable behavior and because different models can predict one set of outputs from a given
set of inputs. Process models help because they consider more
variables and add multiple constraints. By virtue of hypothesizing a series of psychological processes that precede a judgment
or choice, they make predictions about intermediate states of the
decision maker, between the start and end of the decision (“What
external information is sought out? What facts are recalled from
memory?”). Process models also make predictions about the temporal order of these states (“What will a decision maker think
about first, second, etc.?”). Process data are the data used to test
hypotheses about these intervening processes and intermediate
states. They include functional imaging and other measures of
localized brain activation, response times, verbal protocols, eyemovement tracking, and other information-acquisition tools (see
www.mouselabweb.org).
tion. The recognition that preferences are typically constructed rather than stored and retrieved (Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006) may be
psychology’s most successful export to behavioral economics and the policy community and
illustrates the utility of psychological process
explanations. We now know how, and increasingly why, characteristics of choice options and
task guide attention, and how internal memory
or external information search and option comparison affect choice in path-dependent ways.
This not only explains apparent inconsistencies
in choice, but also provides insights and recipes
for decision aiding and interventions, including the design of decision environments that
nudge people to construct their preferences in
ways they will not regret after the fact (Thaler
& Sunstein 2008).
Psychological process explanations cast light
on areas obscured in the shadows of statistical
decision-process approaches. For example,
years of work with Egon Brunswik’s lens model,
which provided valuable insights into the
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Preferences: in
economics, inferred
from choices and
assumed to reflect
utilities. In psychology,
thought to be
constructed in order to
make a choice
Inferences: decision
makers’ judgments
about the world using
logic and often
imperfect and
uncertain information
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performance of human decision makers, may
have hidden the important distinction between
automatic and deliberative (controlled) processes and their properties (Schneider & Chein
2003). Process explanations also serve an integrative function by explaining multiple phenomena, providing an organizing principle for
a field criticized for being long on effects and
short on unifying explanations. Judgments and
choices typically engage multiple psychological
processes, from attention-guided encoding and
evaluation, to retrieval of task-relevant information from memory or external sources, prediction, response, and postdecision evaluation
of consequences and resulting updating. Different tasks involve these processes to different degrees. For example, attention accounts
for a larger proportion of response variance in
decisions from description, where the decision
maker is explicitly provided with all relevant
information in numeric or graphic form. In
contrast, memory and learning will be more
important in decisions from experience, where
information about outcomes and their likelihood is acquired by trial and error sampling
of choice options over time (see Hertwig et al.
2004). Similarly, affective processes are more
important in dynamic decisions under uncertainty, whereas analytic evaluations play a larger
role in static risky decisions (Figner et al. 2008).
The last comprehensive Annual Review
article on JDM was published more than
10 years ago (Mellers et al. 1998). Two reviews
since then have addressed special topics, namely
rationality (Shafir & LeBoeuf 2002) and unsolved problems in decision research (Hastie
2001). Given this time span between JDM
articles, our review had to be extremely selective. Our mandate, to review research on
cognitive processes in judgment and choice,
necessitated the omission of papers that describe JDM phenomena without emphasizing
psychological process interpretations. We also
had to limit the scope of psychological processes covered. With a few exceptions, we omitted very basic perceptual processes (e.g., categorization) and processes that go beyond the
individual (e.g., group judgments and decisions;
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interdependent, competitive, and strategic decisions; advice giving; social judgments; information aggregations; and prediction markets).
We were unable to go beyond judgment and
choice processes, not covering problem solving, reasoning, or positive psychology. The burgeoning field of neuroeconomics recently received its own review (Loewenstein et al. 2007).
When multiple papers could have been cited
for a given point, we restricted ourselves to
the most important, innovative, or comprehensive examples, and omitted citations for classic
phenomena.
ATTENTION
Decision makers face a wealth of potentially relevant information in the external environment
and memory. Given the processing limitations
of Homo sapiens, selectivity is a central component of goal-directed behavior. Selective attention operates at very basic levels of perceptual
identification (Lachter et al. 2004). It also operates at higher cognitive levels, including the initial perception of the situation and assessment
of the task at hand (framing, goal elicitation),
evidence accumulation (which can be external
or internal, and usually is a combination of the
two), and judgment or choice (determining cutoffs or decision rules).
A focus on attention as a finite resource,
requiring selectivity, goes back to the beginnings of scientific psychology. William James
in 1890 considered attention a necessary condition for subsequent memory, distinguished
between voluntary and nonvoluntary attention, and suggested the use of eye movements to track attentional focus. More recently,
Daniel Kahneman (1973) summarized what was
known about attention during the postbehaviorist period when attention was used as a “label for some of the internal mechanisms that
determine the significance of stimuli” (p. 2).
Kahneman emphasized capacity limitations and
the selective aspect of attention and distinguished between two determinants, momentary
(voluntary) task intentions and more enduring
dispositions such as the (involuntary) orienting
response to novel stimuli. Herbert Simon
(1978) identified conscious attention as a scarce
resource for decision makers in the year of his
Nobel prize; Kahneman’s Nobel lecture (2003)
reiterates that this scarce resource needs to be
allocated wisely and points to automatic (orienting) processes and fast emotional reactions
as means to that end.
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Exogenous Influences
Orienting responses. Some features of the
environment attract attention because responding to them has survival value. Changes in the
environment, and especially the appearance of
novel stimuli, introduce the possibility of opportunity and/or threat. Constant exposure to
a stimulus leads to habituation, i.e., reduced responding, as things not previously responded to
are likely to be neither dangerous nor promising. On the other hand, a change in the environment results in dishabituation and an orienting
response (Posner & Rothbart 2007).
As a result of the orienting response to
changes in the environment, things that vary
automatically attract and maintain attention. A
siren that wails will attract attention longer than
a siren that operates at a constant frequency.
This has implications for a wide range of issues, from research design to human factors
and institutional design, with salient continuous changes in the level of key decision variables as a recipe for keeping people’s attention
on the task, a manipulation perfected by video
games. Arguments by Birnbaum (1983) about
the consequences of within- versus betweensubject manipulations of base rates have recently been revived in the context of quantity (in)sensitivity in protected value tradeoffs.
Bartels & Medin (2007) reconcile conflicting
results by showing that between-subject designs
lead to quantity insensitivity (e.g., the same willingness to pay to restore the pH level of one lake
or of ten lakes) (Baron & Ritov 2004), whereas
within-subject designs, which attract attention
to variation in quantity, show sensitivity to the
variable (Connolly & Reb 2003).
Task characteristics. In the same spirit of integrating across apparently contradictory research results, a range of JDM tasks and context characteristics have been examined for their
effect of guiding attention and thus decision
weight to different outcome dimensions. Violations of procedure invariance are one of
the most vexing cases of deviation from normative models of preference. Selling prices
typically exceed buying prices by a factor of
two, even when strategic misrepresentation is
eliminated, and discounting of future benefits is much steeper when people are asked
to delay rather than accelerate consumption
(Kahneman & Tversky 2000). Below, we review information-recruitment mechanisms that
explain how the direction of an economic transactions (e.g., acquiring or giving up ownership;
switching from immediate to delayed consumption or vice versa) can affect valuation. Relating
such valuation asymmetries to attentional processes, Carmon & Ariely (2000) show that decision makers focus their attention on the foregone, i.e., the status quo and its characteristics
attract more attention and thus importance and
decision weight than do other choice options.
Judgment versus choice. It has long been known
that judgment versus choice tasks can direct attention to different characteristics of choice options, from preference reversal studies of risky
decisions in the 1970s to the theory of taskcontingent weighting of multiattribute choice
(see Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006). Editing operations cancel out common outcomes for choices
but cannot do so for judgments, with resulting differences in attentional allocation and information use that translate into differences in
preference. Consumer purchases are typically
the result of choice from among multiple alternatives, where alignable features receive greater
attention, whereas postpurchase consumer satisfaction is the result of judging the product in
isolation, where features that are easily evaluated in an absolute sense receive greater attention (Hsee & Zhang 2004). Many task-detailinduced inconsistencies in judgment and choice
can be explained by differences in attentional
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PT: prospect theory
Beta-delta model:
explains greater
discounting of future
outcomes when
immediate rewards are
available than when all
rewards are in the
future by an
exponential delta
process that always
operates and an
additional exponential
beta process that only
operates when
immediate rewards are
present
focus, although the inconsistencies are not exclusively due to attentional mechanisms. Most
stable JDM phenomena such as preference
reversals are probably stable because they are
multiply determined.
Description of choice options. The way in which
information about choice options is communicated to decision makers influences preference
construction through selective attention, even
though variants may be informationally equivalent. One of these ways is the order in which
options are presented. Candidate name order
on ballots, for example, has been shown to influence preference and voting sufficiently to determine election results (Krosnick et al. 2004).
Options encountered first capture attention, leading to reference-dependent subsequent evaluations and comparisons (Kahneman
2003). In decisions from description, some outcome dimension values (namely certainty on
the probability dimension and immediacy on
the delay dimension) are given special status,
i.e., extra attention and decision weight of a
more categorical than continuous nature, as
captured by prospect theory’s (PT) decision
weight function and Laibson’s (1997) beta-delta
model of time discounting. Weber & Chapman
(2005) show that certainty and immediacy
are connected, in that adding delay “undoes”
the special preference given to certainty, and
adding uncertainty removes the special preference given to immediacy.
Process of knowledge provision. In decisions from
description, attention is shared between outcome and probability information, which are
both explicitly provided. In decisions from experience, the series of sequentially experienced
outcomes focuses attention on this dimension,
with more recent outcomes looming larger
(Weber et al. 2004). The emergent evidence
that rare events get underweighted in decisions
from experience but overweighted in decisions
from description, as captured by PT, can be explained by differences in attentional focus during information acquisition (Erev et al. 2008),
because attention directed by both external and
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internal factors has been shown to translate into
decision weight (Weber & Kirsner 1997).
Endogenous Influences
In addition to external influences, the internal
state of the decision maker guides attention.
Decision makers generally have more control
over their internal states, thus allowing for more
voluntary allocations of attention.
Goals. JDM research over the period of our review has started to interpret behavior in terms
of goals and plans rather than (or in addition
to) utilities (Krantz & Kunreuther 2007). Survival and economic well-being dictate that material goals play an important role in people’s
plans and decisions. Material goals are responsible for the effectiveness of financial incentives
in shaping behavior. However, people harbor
many other goals, some of which relate to nonmaterial dimensions of the choices made [e.g.,
being defensible (Lerner & Tetlock 1999)],
whereas others relate to the nature of the decision process [e.g., wanting a procedurally just
process (Tyler 2005) or a process that feels right
(Higgins 2005)]. With multiple and often conflicting goals in play, selective attention to different subsets of goals has been shown to influence how a decision is made and what is
selected (Krantz & Kunreuther 2007). A range
of factors has been shown to situationally activate goals or chronically elevate their accessibility, including cultural values of the decision
maker (Weber et al. 2005a), the content domain
of the decision, e.g., risky choices about course
grades versus stock investments (Rettinger &
Hastie 2001), and task characteristics such as required accountability (Tetlock 2002). Activated
goals determine whether the decision rules used
are deontological (“What is right?”) versus consequentialist (“What has the best outcomes?”)
versus affective (“What feels right?”) (Bartels &
Medin 2007). Ariely et al. (2000) point to the
importance of goals in the context of choices
between different streams of experience over
time. Similar to the discussion above about
quantity (in)sensitivity in the context of
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protected value tradeoffs, people are more or
less duration sensitive when evaluating experiences over time as a function of how their
attention is focused by how they report their
experiences and why.
Affect as spotlight. Emotions experienced by
the decision maker, in addition to the many
cognitive factors mentioned above, focus attention on features of the environment that matter for emotion-appropriate action tendencies.
Mood-congruent perception focuses attention
on either upside opportunity or downside risk
(Chou et al. 2007). Feelings of fear or worry
focus attention on the source of the apparent
threat and ready flight responses (Loewenstein
et al. 2001). Feelings of anger focus attention
on information about motives and responsibility and make decision makers eager to act and
punish. Sadness elicits a desire to change one’s
state, resulting in reduced selling and inflated
buying prices, whereas disgust triggers a desire
to purge or acquire less, with the opposite effect
on willingness to pay (Lerner et al. 2004).
ENCODING AND EVALUATION
One clear finding from behavioral decision research is that information is acquired by decision makers in ways not addressed by normative
models. Goal-relevant and context-sensitive
encoding of information is one of the ways in
which people execute their task with minimal
effort and, perhaps, maximal satisfaction. One
important distinction to make is between information obtained from a search of external
sources (external search; e.g., when choosing
a cereal by studying product information in a
supermarket aisle) versus information retrieved
from memory (internal search; e.g., when retrieving options about which route to take on a
drive home). Most decisions involve both kinds
of search. The cereal choice probably involves
recalling how much the previously purchased
brand was enjoyed, and the choice of a route
home uses external retrieval cues and information about traffic congestion. The distinction matters, however, because the properties
of external search (reviewed in this section) are
demonstrably different from the properties of
retrieval from memory (reviewed in the next
section on Memory Storage and Retrieval).
Evaluation is Relative
Outcomes. The humorist Thurber was once
asked how he liked his new wife. His response “Compared to what?” reflects one of
prospect theory’s (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)
major insights, namely that evaluation is relative. This insight continues to gather support,
albeit in more complex ways than formalized
by PT. Since neurons encode changes in stimulation (rather than absolute levels), absolute
judgments on any dimension are much more
difficult than relative judgments. The list of reference points used in relative evaluation continues to grow and includes other observed or
counterfactual outcomes from the same or different choice alternatives, as well as expectations. For example, the range of options offered as potential certainty equivalents has been
shown to affect people’s valuation of gambles
(Stewart et al. 2003). One important area for
future research is to understand better the selection among reference points and how multiple reference points might be used.
Most discussions of relative evaluation have
focused on the evaluation of a single outcome
by comparing it to a reference point, typically
by computing their difference in value. However, differences themselves may be in need
of relative evaluation. If asked how good his
$5000 salary increase was, Thurber probably
would have also asked, “compared to what?”
Gonzalez-Vallejo’s (2002) proportional difference model is a stochastic model of choice that
answers this question. Differences in attribute
values of two choice options are normalized by
dividing them by the best (for positive) or worst
(for negative) possible outcome. These proportional differences are then integrated across attributes by a stochastic decision process, allowing the model to account for a broader
range of choice patterns than other models
(Gonzalez-Vallejo et al. 2003). Normalization
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Variability or risk:
the risk in risky choice
options is introduced
by not knowing what
outcome will occur. In
economics and finance,
the variance of possible
outcomes is used as a
measure of risk
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Expected value: the
average outcome one
gets from some risky
choice; e.g., $50 is the
expected value of a
coin toss for $100 or
$0 [$50 = 0.5($100) +
0.5($0)]
60
is regressive. In other words, decision makers
pay more equal attention to all possible outcomes than is warranted by their (typically unequal) probabilities, and decision makers linger
at extreme outcomes to assess best- and worsecase scenarios. Rank-dependent models of risky
choice have provided such a reinterpretation of
the way in which explicitly stated probabilities
are evaluated in choice. They also provide an alternative way to think about risk-averse or riskseeking behaviors. In cumulative PT (Tversky
& Kahneman 1992), the subjective weight given
to a given outcome no longer is simply a nonlinear transformation of its objective probability of
occurring, but also reflects the relative rank of
the outcome in the distribution of possible outcomes. Cumulative PT is only one way in which
the evaluation of outcome probabilities can depend on the position of the outcome in the configuration of outcomes (Lopes & Oden 1999).
More complex ways, such as those in Birnbaum’s transfer of attention model (Birnbaum
2005), have been shown to account for a broader
range of choice phenomena. These attentional
effects become even more important when
choice options contain more than two outcomes
or when the gambles are mixed (Luce 2000,
Payne 2005).
of outcome differences in ratio form also appears to hold for implicit evaluations of variability or risk. The coefficient of variation, defined
as the standard deviation of possible choice
outcomes divided by their expected value (i.e.,
risk per unit of return), predicts people’s risky
choices and risky foraging of animals far better
than does the typical nonnormalized measures
of variability or risk (standard deviation or variance) employed in finance (Weber et al. 2004).
The discriminability of differences is a central concern for relative evaluations. It lies at the
root of Ernst Weber’s 1834 basic law about the
psychophysical coding of just-noticeable differences, which captures the observation that detectable increases in visual or auditory signal
intensity are proportional to the starting value,
i.e., need to be larger for larger starting values.
Furlong & Opfer (2008) provide provocative
evidence about the effect of outcome magnitude
on the discriminability of differences. In their
studies of humans and orangutans in the prisoners’ dilemma game, changing the currency in
which the usual payoffs for defection or cooperation are issued (for humans, dollar outcomes
multiplied by 100 to produce outcomes in cents;
for orangutans, grapes issued intact or cut into
tiny pieces) increases the rate of cooperation,
presumably because the difference in payoffs for
defection over cooperation is less discriminable
with the larger numeraires.
Choice from External Search
Probabilities. Traditionally, explicitly provided probability judgments of events were
thought to reflect either a frequentist evaluation
or an expression of a degree of belief. However, more recent formulations have posited
transformations of explicitly provided outcome
probabilities in choice into decision weights
that are a function of the amount of attention paid to the different potential states of the
world, which is affected by more than the states’
likelihood of occurrence. Events may attract
greater attention for perceptual and motivational reasons (Weber & Kirsner 1997). Thus,
small-probability events may be overweighted
by PT relative to their stated likelihood of
occurrence because decision makers’ attention
Heuristics for risky choice. Brandstätter
et al.’s (2006) priority heuristic (PH) tries to
account for many phenomena in risky choice
in simpler ways than do models that involve
tradeoffs, such as PT. The model is noteworthy for making not just choice predictions, but
also predictions about response times and information acquisition. The PH has been criticized
for its use of discrete measures of error (Rieger
& Wang 2008) and for making choice predictions that are not observed (Birnbaum 2008).
Johnson et al. (2008) found that although some
implications of the PH were supported, the
critical test, namely that decision makers do
not integrate probabilities and payoffs, were
not borne out by process measures. Despite
the mixed empirical support surrounding the
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heuristic, the research exchange triggered by it
demonstrates that process predictions and their
tests can improve choice models.
Sampling and evaluation in external search.
If we believe that decision makers often attend
selectively to a subset of possible information,
it is important to understand the properties of
such samples, the processes used to produce
them, and the consequences these samples have
on decisions.
A class of what might be called middle-level
sampling models ambitiously attempts to describe a large set of empirical regularities or
stylized facts. Each model has its own set of assumptions about cognitive processes and representations and thus makes predictions not
just for observed choices, but also for process
measures such as response times (Ratcliff et al.
2006). Although these models share a concern
with the accumulation of evidence via sampling,
they emphasize different aspects of the decision
process.
Prototypical of a class of models that could
be characterized as stimulus sampling models are recent extensions of Busemeyer &
Townsend’s (1993) decision field theory (DFT)
to multiattribute choice (Roe et al. 2001) and
to models of value judgments as well as choice
( Johnson & Busemeyer 2005). The key idea in
DFT is that attributes of choice alternatives are
repeatedly randomly sampled and that evidence
accumulates over samples. This process of information retrieval, whether from the external
environment or from memory, is assumed to be
independent of the evaluation of the object, i.e.,
is not path dependent. When applied to choice,
DFT posits a race between options, with each
additional acquisition of evidence increasing or
decreasing the valuation for an option, ending
when the first option exceeds a preset threshold. In addition to having a closed-form mathematical formulation, DFT can also be expressed
as a multilayer connectionist network and has
been applied to explain context effects such as
the similarity, attraction, and compromise effects (Roe et al. 2001). By adding a set of potential responses (in a comparison layer) to its
neural network version, DFT can generate predictions for several preference reversals (Busemeyer & Diederich 2002). DFT (and its decomposition) has also provided a useful framework
to analyze group differences on the Bechara
gambling task, as described below. Computational considerations have led to a modification of DFT that incorporates loss aversion
into the accumulation of evidence (Usher &
McClelland 2004), thus extending stimulus
sampling models to explain the endowment effect and other JDM phenomena attributed to
loss aversion.
Decision by sampling (Stewart et al. 2006),
another mid-level model, is an interesting attempt to explain several stylized facts with two
simple mechanisms: (a) value is constructed by
simple ordinal comparisons between an object
at hand and consecutive repeated samples of
objects drawn from memory, and (b) the samples reflect the external ecological frequency
of objects. Using archival data, these two assumptions are able to reproduce the PT value
and probability weighting function and a timediscounting function that looks hyperbolic.
Decision field theory
(DFT): a
mathematical and
process model
suggesting that
decisions are made by
aggregating samples
randomly drawn from
the information
available about a set of
alternatives
Decision by distortion. Stimulus sampling
models typically assume samples that are unbiased reflections of the environment and are
path-independent. In contrast, two streams of
research suggest that choice involves a biased,
and path-dependent, integration of information. Building on earlier ideas about constructed dominance by Montgomery and
Svenson in the 1980s, Holyoak & Simon (1999)
and Russo and colleagues (2000) posit that
choices are speeded up and made with minimal regret by distorting the value of options
to support early-emerging favorites. The existence of an early favorite leads to subsequent
information being interpreted in a way that supports that favorite, bolstering its chances of being chosen (Simon et al. 2004), even for a single
option (Bond et al. 2007). Simply being listed as
the first option can cause this distortion of values and increase in choice (Russo et al. 2008),
showing the influence of attentional focus on
subsequent evaluation and choice.
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Inferences from External Search
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In contrast to mechanisms such as availability,
which posit that biases in inference result from
biased representations produced by recall, several researchers have argued that such biases can
result from biased sampling of external information, either as a function of how the information is presented by the environment or by biases in a search on the part of the decision maker
(Fiedler 2000). For example, the observer of a
conversation, which provides a sampling of the
beliefs of the two conversing parties, may get a
biased sample of what the participants believe
because a range of Gricean conversational rules
apply restrictions (e.g., not repeating what was
just said). As a result, Fiedler argues, the observer may well conclude that the conversation
is more hostile than it really is. By arguing that
the observer is insensitive to the bias in the observed sample of beliefs, Fiedler (2000) moves
the origins of observed bias from the decision
maker’s memory (as in availability) to the environment, aided by the decision maker’s lack
of understanding the biased origin of the sample. Juslin et al. (2007) have applied very similar
ideas to confidence judgments.
Goal and Framing Effects
McKenzie & Nelson (2008) suggest that different semantic frames that might be seen as
logically equivalent (e.g., a glass being half full
or half empty) linguistically transmit different
information because different frames elicit different semantic associates. Fischer et al. (1999)
similarly suggest that different response modes
have different goals and that evaluation differs to accommodate those goals. For example, prominent attributes receive more weight
in tasks whose goal is to differentiate among
options than in tasks whose goal is to equate
options.
MEMORY PROCESSES
Making decisions without recourse to relevant
prior memories is a difficult task and is a topic
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that has long fascinated writers and filmmakers.
Memory is necessary for our ability to learn and
to draw on past experience to predict future desires, events, or responses to outcomes. Yet the
connection between properties of memory and
judgment and choice has previously been underexplored. During the past decade, memory
considerations have played a more prominent
role in explanations of JDM phenomena, attempting to leverage what we know about memory to provide insight into the processes underlying known decision phenomena (Reyna et al.
2003, Schneider 2003), but this is still a relatively underdeveloped area of behavioral decision research.
Memory Storage and Retrieval
Memory accessibility and priming. Seeing a
stimulus results in a transient increase in accessibility of the representation of that stimulus and related concepts, a phenomenon called
priming, with effects on subsequent memory access, i.e., shorter reaction times and
greater likelihood of retrieval. Priming is widely
used in social cognition, where primed attitudes and values shape behavior. Extending this
paradigm, Mandel & Johnson (2002) demonstrated priming effects in multiattribute choice.
In a consumer choice task, their selective priming of product attributes with appropriate wallpaper on the initial page of an online shop
affected not only choice but also information
search and use.
Memory is reactive. Unlike computer memory, human memory is changed by attempts
at retrieval. Accessing memory both increases
short-term accessibility and changes the longterm content of memory.
Short-term effects. Studies of anchoring suggest
that priming memory accessibility, and consequently preference, can be changed by asking a
prior question, even if the answer to this question should be irrelevant to subsequent tasks,
such as using the last four digits of a social security number as an anchor for pricing a gamble
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(Chapman & Johnson 1999). This effect was
replicated with fine wine by Ariely et al. (2003),
who also show that such accessibility-mediated
anchoring effects are strong and robust and
persist in the presence of significant accuracy
incentives, experience, and market feedback.
The selective accessibility model provides similar mechanisms and provides evidence that anchors make some information more accessible as measured by reaction times (Mussweiler
& Strack 2001), though accessibility may not
be sufficient to explain all anchoring effects
(Epley & Gilovich 2001).
Long-term effects. Accessing information about
possible choice options not only generates
short-term changes in the accessibility of related information but also changes memory in
a more permanent fashion, a phenomenon long
recognized in social cognition. In the context
of consumer choice and a line of research that
goes back to the work on the self-correcting nature of errors of prediction, measuring the longterm effects of purchase intentions on memory
has been shown to change subsequent purchases
(Chandon et al. 2004).
Retrieval and preference construction. A
recent perspective on preference construction,
query theory (QT; Johnson et al. 2007), suggests that decision makers consult their memory (or external sources) with queries about the
choice alternatives, in particular their merits or
liabilities. QT assumes that most tasks suggest
a natural way to the order in which queries
are posed. When one class of components of
a memory structure is queried, the accessibility of other components that could be response
competitors is temporarily suppressed to minimize intrusions, but with consequences for the
success of subsequent queries for which these
components are legitimate responses. Memory
inhibition as the result of prior recall of related and competing material is one of the oldest and most developed memory phenomena
(Anderson & Neely 1996). Johnson et al. (2007)
show that QT accounts for the endowment
effect, under the assumption that sellers and
buyers have different query orders, and they
demonstrate the causal involvement of query
order and memory inhibition by making the endowment effect disappear by switching the natural order of queries. Extending this paradigm,
Weber et al. (2007) show that queries about
reasons supporting immediate versus delayed
consumption are issued in reverse order for intertemporal decisions about accelerating or delaying consumption, explaining the well-known
result that people are much more impatient
when delaying than when accelerating consumption. Explicitly prompting queries in the
order opposite to the naturally occurring one
again eliminates the effect. The task- and goalspecific distortions in balance of support that is
generated by QT-predicted and empirically observed memory retrieval interference presumably have the same function (i.e., faster decisions with less postdecision regret) in decisions
based on internal search that predecisional distortions (discussed in the previous section) have
in decisions based on external search. Both predecisional distortion of external information
and QT-related biased memory retrieval suggest that the process of preference or inference construction is characterized by systematic
path dependency, contrary to the assumptions
of most mathematical models of judgment and
choice.
Consistent with a memory interference account, Danner et al. (2007) show that three or
more retrievals of a specific means towards a
goal will succeed in inhibiting competing means
for the same goal. It is worth noting that this
“discovery” in social cognition in the context
of habit formation and goals-means networks
coincides with experimental practice in proactive interference studies (e.g., Dougherty &
Sprenger 2006). Thus, memory retrieval is one
more way in which goals have been tied more
closely to decision making over the past decade.
Query theory (QT):
a process model of
valuation describing
how the order of
retrievals from
memory (“queries”)
play a role in judging
the value of objects,
emphasizing output
interference
Memory and Inference
Memory and support theory. Support theory (ST), proposed by Tversky & Koehler
(1994), models probability judgments as a
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Luce’s choice axiom:
the probability of
selecting one item over
another from a pool of
many items is a
function of only the
utilities of those two
items and is not
affected by the
presence or absence of
other items in the pool
Support theory: a
model of inference
about the probability
of an event that uses
the relative weight of
what we know and can
generate about the
event in question (its
“support”) and
compares it to what we
know and can generate
about all other
possible events
RH: recognition
heuristic
comparison of support for focal hypothesis A
(s(A)) with support for a set of alternative hypotheses B (s(B)), in the form of a ratio familiar from Luce’s choice axiom: p(A,B) =
s(A)/(s(A) + s(B). Support theory is a rational
model in the sense that it assumes that set B
includes only relevant alternative hypotheses,
i.e., hypotheses that have some probability of
occurring. Since competing hypotheses are often generated by associative memory processes
from long-term memory (Dougherty & Hunter
2003), irrelevant alternative hypotheses (that
have no possibility of occurring in the context
of interest) may well be generated and may affect probability judgments by occupying valuable slots in limited-capacity working memory
[referred to as inhibition failure by Dougherty
& Sprenger (2006)]. Irrelevant alternatives in
working memory may not be identified as irrelevant, referred to as discrimination failure
by Dougherty & Sprenger (2006), who provide
evidence for such failures using a proactive interference paradigm. A negative correlation exists between individual differences in workingmemory capacity and degree of subadditivity of
probability judgments. The judged probability
of a focal event (e.g., rain) is larger when compared to the implicit disjunction (not rain) than
when it is compared to the explicit disjunctions
(e.g., sunshine, snow, cloudy, all other), suggesting that people with greater working-memory
capacity are able to include more alternative hypotheses in the implicit disjunction condition
(Dougherty & Hunter 2003). In combination,
these and related studies suggest that augmentation of support theory with realistic assumptions about the retrieval and evaluation of alternative hypotheses can significantly increase
its predictive accuracy. Dougherty & Sprenger
(2006) also illustrate how measures of individual
differences can help distinguish among hypothesized judgmental processes.
Memory-based heuristics for inference. In
1996, Gigerenzer and Goldstein suggested the
take-the-best (TTB) strategy as both an accurate and easy procedure for inferences based on
memory retrieval. TTB mimics what is known
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as a lexicographic decision rule in choice, suggesting that good inferences can be made by using the most diagnostic cue(s) that distinguish
between two alternatives. Knowledge about cue
diagnosticity depends, of course, on metacognitive insight about past inferential accuracy. Initial simulations showed surprising levels of performance for a process that uses such limited
information. TTB performs particularly well
when the distribution of cue validities is highly
skewed. However, TTB is not the only heuristic
that does well. Simulations show that heuristics that are even simpler than TTB can do
quite well in the same environments (Hogarth
& Karelaia 2007). Other simple heuristics do as
well or better (Chater et al. 2003) in other environments. Examinations of TTB as a descriptive model of memory-based inference suggest
that it is not universally used, but also not infrequently employed, describing between 20%
and 72% of inferences (Broder & Gaissmaier
2007). More importantly, use of the strategy appears to vary in a way that is adaptive given the
environment, with more-intelligent decisions
makers being more adaptive (Broder 2003).
New developments are models that integrate
TTB and full information use along a continuum, specified by the amount of weight given
to the comparison of different attributes (Lee &
Cummins 2004), and generalizations that relax
the assumption that decision makers know the
exact cue weights (Bergert & Nosofsky 2007).
A similar story surrounds the recognition
heuristic (RH), posited as a powerful rule for
inference in cases in which only one of two
provided comparison alternatives is recognized,
and applied in tasks such as deciding which of
two cities is larger (Goldstein & Gigerenzer
2002). Initial demonstrations showed good performance over a wide range of domains, but
subsequent studies have delineated boundary
conditions. In a paradigm that teases apart
recognition and cue validity, Newell & Shanks
(2004) show that RH is abandoned when recognition is not the most reliable cue. Similarly,
the recognition heuristic is not used when
recognition can be attributed to other causes
(Oppenheimer 2003). Although it is clear that
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recognition can be a useful tool in inference, the
debate now seems to be whether recognition is
always used as a first stage in inference (Pachur
& Hertwig 2006) or whether recognition is simply one cue in inference that can be integrated
(Richter & Spath 2006) but has no special status. In choice, recent work on decision modes
(Weber et al. 2005a) identifies recognition as
a decision mode that uses identification of a
choice situation as a member of a class of situations for which a prescribed best action exists,
following in the tradition of image theory by
Lee Beach and work by James March in the
early 1990s.
Work in inference seems to be reaching a
conclusion similar to that of previous work in
choice by Payne and colleagues (1992). The
number of processes in the adaptive toolbox is
large, and their use is adaptive to task characteristics. The interesting questions are how processing strategies are selected and when they
succeed and fail. Answers to these questions
will come from explicit models of strategy selection (Rieskamp & Otto 2006) and more formal
and detailed models of the role of memory and
forgetting in inference (Dougherty et al. 1999,
Schooler & Hertwig 2005).
MULTIPLE INFORMATION
PROCESSES
Normative JDM models have an appealing simplicity. With an axiomatic foundation, they employ a small number of primitives, abstract from
content and context, and give rise to consistent
judgments and decisions across situations. Initial attempts to make these models psychologically plausible and better able to describe observed judgment and choice patterns coincided
with the cognitive revolution in psychology that
used the digital computer as its metaphor for
human information processing and contrasted
algorithmic with heuristic solutions. Normative model modifications thus focused on
cognitive shortcuts taken by limited-capacity
information processors. This repertoire of alternative cognitive strategies was first investigated in the context of preference by Payne
et al. (1992) and subsequently extended to inference tasks (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002).
In the context of preference, affective processes
have recently been added to the list of potentially adaptive strategies (Finucane et al. 2000,
Luce et al. 2000).
The Emotions Revolution
Though successful in many ways, the cognitive
revolution may have been too focused on analytic and computational processes. The emotions revolution of the past decade or so has
tried to correct this overemphasis by documenting the prevalence of affective processes,
depicting them as automatic and essentially
effort-free inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behavior. Review articles that describe the
role of emotions in risky choice and their
effort-reducing potential (Finucane et al. 2000,
Loewenstein et al. 2001) incorporate prior work
on emotional priming by Johnson and Tversky
in 1983 and on psychological risk dimensions
(Slovic 1999). Following Peters et al. (2006a),
we describe research on four functions of affect: as spotlight (discussed under Attention),
information, common currency, and motivator.
Affective Processes
Affect as information. Emotions experienced
while making a decision are incorporated as information into choices (Schwarz 2002). Positive
and negative past associations with available
choice outcomes thus contribute to new
decisions. Loewenstein et al. (2001) distinguish
between immediate emotions and anticipated/
expected emotions. Immediate emotions,
aroused either by task-relevant characteristics
or incidentally, and their effect on judgment
and choice are the topics of this section.
Choice-option–elicited immediate emotions are at the base of traditional economic
interpretations of utility as emotional carriers of value. Positive emotions increase value
and result in approach, whereas negative values decrease value and result in avoidance (see
Affect as Motivator below). The Iowa gambling
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task (Bechara et al. 1994) popularized the notion of a somatic marker that carries memories of the negative affect associated with losses
in high-risk gambles; these memories prevent
healthy respondents from choosing such gambles on subsequent trials. The absence of such
affective information [initially demonstrated in
frontal lobe patients and since then in other patient populations, including substance abusers
(Stout et al. 2004)] is associated with performance deficits in the form of increased choices
of disadvantageous risky gambles.
Incidental emotions (i.e., emotions unrelated to the judgment or decision at hand, typically elicited by a preceding event or activity)
have also been shown to influence choice. Alice Isen’s mood maintenance hypothesis from
1987 assumes that people in a good mood would
like to maintain this pleasant state and thus
try to avoid hard, analytic work and use cognitive shortcuts instead. Consistent with this
hypothesis, Au et al. (2003) found that financial market traders traded differently when in a
good or bad incidental mood (elicited by music).
Good mood resulted in inferior performance
and overconfidence, bad mood resulted in more
accurate decisions and more conservative trading. Chou et al. (2007) compared mood maintenance to mood priming to explain patterns
of risk taking in either a positive, negative, or
neutral incidental mood, and found evidence
mostly for mood priming (i.e., more risk taking
in a happy mood and less in a sad mood) for
both younger and older adults.
Incidental feelings influence judgments
or choice also by being misattributed to
having been elicited by the task at hand.
Misattribution, an old experimental paradigm
going back to Schwarz and Clore in 1983,
is still in active use. Men were shown to
misattribute their arousal after viewing photos
of attractive females to arousal generated by
the prospect of having to delay consumption
in a subsequent intertemporal financial-choice
task, and they therefore discounted future outcomes more strongly (Wilson & Daly 2004).
Misattributions of the absence of fluency, the
subjective feeling that forming a preference
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for a specific option is easy, as the result of
incidental characteristics (a hard-to-read type
font) have been shown to affects consumer
decisions (Novemsky et al. 2007). We seem
to have metacognitive awareness that these
misattributions can occur, as evidenced by the
fact that we use knowledge of other people’s
incidental mood states in strategically correct
ways (Andrade & Ho 2007).
Affect as common currency. Interpretations
of utility as the pleasure or pain associated with
the experience of outcomes (experienced utility) go back to Bentham, predating the current
economic interpretation of utility as inferred
from choice (decision utility). Contextual effects on risky choice have been explained in
decision affect theory as modifications of the
emotional reactions to obtained outcomes as
the result of pleasure or displeasure induced by
relative comparisons between the obtained and
counterfactual alternative outcomes (Mellers
et al. 1999). In this sense, experienced emotions provide a common currency on which the
effects of both different outcome dimensions
and variations in decision context can be integrated. Decision affect theory provides a unifying framework that incorporates special cases of
emotional reactions to counterfactual outcome
comparisons such as regret or disappointment
(Connolly & Zeelenberg 2002) or loss aversion
in its interpretation as affective reaction (Lerner
et al. 2004). To the extent that the output of
multiple processing channels needs to be combined, an affective common currency seems to
be a promising hypothesis.
Social psychological perspectives on JDM
also rely on affect as a common currency. When
people make a risky decision in a manner that
fits their self-regulatory orientation (e.g., a promotion or prevention focus, which can be either
chronic or situationally induced), they feel right
about the process. This value from fit has been
shown to transfer to their evaluation of the obtained outcome (Higgins 2005).
Affect as motivator. Just as preferences are
constructed, so is affect. Affect construal theory
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(Ellsworth & Scherer 2003) shows that the effect of affective reactions cannot be satisfactorily attributed to the emotions’ valence and
intensity, but rather is influenced by other situational appraisals. Emotions can be similar in
valence and intensity (like fear versus anger) but
result in very different judgments or choices
because they are associated with different action tendencies. Thus, Lerner & Keltner (2001)
show that fear increases risk estimates and riskaverse choices, whereas anger decreases risk
estimates and increases risk-seeking choices.
Similar results were found in a natural experiment, conducted after the 9/11 terrorist attack
in the United States (Lerner et al. 2003). In a
nationally representative sample of Americans,
those who scored higher on an anxiety scale
(fear) had greater perceptions of risk, and those
who scored higher on a desire-for-vengeance
scale (anger) had lower perceptions of risk up
to 10 weeks after the attack. Gender differences
in risk perception, with men perceiving fewer
risks, were largely accounted for by gender differences in self-reported emotions. Emotions
also affected endorsement of different terrorism policies.
Dual-Process Explanations
Dual-process models have a long history in the
social sciences. Adam Smith argued that behavior was determined by the struggle between
passions and an impartial spectator (Ashraf
et al. 2005). More recent psychological models
have distinguished between a rapid, automatic
and effortless, associative, intuitive process
(System 1), and a slower, rule-governed, analytic, deliberate and effortful process (System 2)
(Kahneman 2003). Ferreira et al. (2006) provide
experimental evidence for this dichotomy by
varying processing goals, cognitive resources,
priming, and formal training of respondents,
and show that the automatic and controlled
processes affected by these manipulations make
independent contributions to judgments and
choices under uncertainty. There is debate
about the extent and way in which the
two systems interact (Evans 2008, Keysers
et al. 2008). Serial interventionist models put
System 2 into a supervisory role because System 2 knows the analytic rules that the intuitive
System 1 is prone to violate and thus can intervene to correct erroneous intuitive judgments
(Kahneman 2003), but other relationships, including parallel-competitive horse-race models
(Sloman 1996), need to be considered.
Valuation of risky options. Both cognitive
( Johnson et al. 2007) and affective processes
(Lerner et al. 2004) have been shown to influence people’s evaluative judgments. Hsee &
Rottenstreich (2004) contrast valuation by feeling and valuation by calculation. Emotional reactions are assumed to be far more binary (i.e.,
elicited or not) than analytic assessments of either value or likelihood, with the result that,
for more emotionally charged choice options,
we observe both greater scope insensitivity and
a more highly nonlinear probability-weighting
function.
Risk taking. Behavioral researchers have provided psychological generalizations of the normative model of finance, which assumes that
the prices of risky investment options reflect a
tradeoff between risk and return that are more
affect based. In finance (e.g., the capital asset
pricing model), both risk and return are assumed to be immutable statistical properties
of the risky option, captured by the variance
and expected value of the outcome distribution.
Psychophysical risk-return models assume that
perceptions of risk and return are psychological constructs that can vary between individuals and as a result of past experiences and decision content and context. Perceived benefits
are often well predicted by analytic considerations such as expected returns based on past
returns (Weber et al. 2005b), but they also vary
as a function of interests or expertise (Hanoch
et al. 2006). However, perceived risk is less predicted by analytic considerations (such as expected volatility as a function of past volatility) and more by affective reactions related to
familiarity with the choice option (a domestic
stock with high name recognition) (Weber et al.
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2005b) or decision domain (Weber et al. 2002).
Observed risk taking is the result of a long list of
cognitive and affective evaluation and integration processes. For example, payoff sensitivity
as well as health and social risk taking as measured by a recent domain-specific risk-taking
scale (Weber et al. 2002) uniquely predict recreational drug use by college students (Pleskac
2008). Although some affective reactions and
their effect on risk taking are objectively justifiable [e.g., the cushioning effect of financially
supportive networks found in more collectivist
cultures (Weber & Hsee 1998)], others are not
(Slovic 1999).
Perceptions of risk and ambiguity also seem
to mediate the effect of narrow versus broad
choice bracketing (Read et al. 1999) on risk
taking (Venkatraman et al. 2006). Two studies
presented choice options in a segregated way
(narrow bracketing) or aggregated way (broad
bracketing). These studies found that perceived
riskiness [which loaded on affective variables,
such as worry and loss, as also found by Weber
et al. (2005b)] and perceived ambiguity (which
loaded on cognitive variables, such as uncertainty, lack of understanding, and information
needs) were distinct factors that independently
mediated the effect of presentation format on
preference.
Iowa gambling task. The Iowa gambling task,
mentioned above, assumes that somatic markers that carry memories of the negative affect
associated with losses in high-risk gambles prevent normal respondents from choosing such
gambles on subsequent trials. Busemeyer and
Stout (2002), however, show that both cognitive and affective evaluation and learning processes are needed to account for the choices
made by normal and abnormal populations with
the Iowa gambling task.
Dynamic risk-taking tasks. Much real-world
risk taking (e.g., binge drinking) involves repeated decisions where risk levels escalate as
the result of previous decisions. Estimates of
risk taking assessed in static risky-choice tasks
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ments very well (Wallsten et al. 2005). Several
assessment instruments have attempted to fill
this gap. The initial tool was devised by Slovic
in 1966 for use with children, who face the repeated choice between continuing in the game
by pulling one of a finite number of switches
that have a high (but decreasing) probability of
earning a gain, or stopping to claim the accumulated rewards. One of the switches (the “devil”)
terminates the game, with a loss of all accumulated rewards. Performance in this game predicts real-world risk taking of children when
crossing a street (Hoffrage et al. 2003).
The Columbia Card Task (Figner et al.
2008) is like the devil task in its nonstationary
riskiness, as an increasing number of cards (out
of 32) are turned over, but in addition, the task
varies the number of loss cards that terminate
the game as well as the gain and loss per gain
and loss card. In addition, the task allows for
net losses, not just the elimination of previous
gains. Thus, the Columbia Card Task allows
for an assessment of the sensitivity of respondents’ choices across conditions (i.e., the quality
of their information use) as well as their risk taking. In the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez
et al. 2002), points are gained with each puff
that incrementally inflates a balloon, with an increasing probability that the balloon may burst
and all acquired gains will be lost. Although it
is structurally equivalent to the devil task and
Columbia Card Task in that the risk of bursting increases with previous puffs, the Balloon
Analogue Risk Task does not explicitly inform
decision makers of this nonstationarity, and
Wallsten et al. (2005) find that participants misconstrue the task as stationary. Pleskac (2008)
focuses attention on the nonstationarity of risk
in his Angling Risk Task by specifying either
sampling with or without replacement (catch
and release versus catch and keep) and by varying the clarity of the water and thus knowledge
of remaining odds. Respondents are found to
use cognitive strategies in contingent and adaptive ways in this domain of dynamic risk taking, just as reported for choice task 25 years
ago (Payne et al. 1992) and for inference tasks
more recently.
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Intertemporal choice. Both cognitive and affective mechanisms have been demonstrated to
give rise to the discounting of future events.
The cognitive processes specified by QT, which
also explain the endowment effect and the status
quo bias, account for both individual differences
in discounting and for the observed asymmetry
in discounting when people accelerate or delay
consumption (Weber et al. 2007). An affect- or
impulse-based process for choices that allow for
immediate consumption is assumed to give rise
to hyperbolic discounting in Laibson’s (1997)
beta-delta model, with some neuroscience evidence corroborating the involvement of immediate affect (beta regions) in only such decisions,
with other more cognitive (delta) regions being
activated by all intertemporal tradeoff decisions
(McClure et al. 2004) but also some dissenting
opinions (Glimcher et al. 2007).
More impatience for choices involving immediate consumption is not always found when
controlling for length of delay. Read (2001) alternatively explains hyperbolic discounting as a
form of subadditivity of discounting: People are
less patient (per time unit) over shorter intervals regardless of when they occur. Zauberman
et al. (2008) find that people’s subjective perceptions of prospective duration lengths are nonlinear and concave in objective time and that
intertemporal choices reflect a relatively constant rate of discounting relative to subjective
time.
Self-other discrepancies. A dual-process
model also explains differences in the risky
decisions people make for themselves versus
those they predict others will make. Although
one’s own emotional reactions to choice
options are very accessible and salient, those
of others are not. Analytic considerations such
as differences in expected value, on the other
hand, can be assumed to apply equally to
oneself as well as to others. As a result, people’s
choices on the gain (Hsee & Weber 1997)
and loss side (Faro & Rottenstreich 2006) are
further away from risk neutrality than are the
predictions they make about the choices of
others. Evidence that this discrepancy (and
HOW MANY PROCESSES?
Dual-process models have enjoyed great success and popularity,
perhaps in part because we seem to be drawn to dualities, both biologically (with two eyes, ears, arms, and legs) and philosophically
(with point and counterpoint). Our review documents how dualprocess models have accounted for many judgment and decisionmaking phenomena. A more global perspective suggests, however, that ultimately a single system needs to integrate input from
two or more subsystems to move from deliberation to action. In
contrast, a more local perspective suggests a need for more than
two systems since, in addition to the distinction between a reflective and reflexive system, reflexive processes engage multiple
mechanisms, including automatic emotional reactions, semantic
priming, or automated action sequences (Evans 2008, Keysers
et al. 2008). Going into the future, computational modeling
of these different subsystems and their reciprocal interconnections will likely build on and possibly supersede dual-process
arguments.
misprediction) is due to a different mix of
affective and analytic considerations comes
from the fact that the discrepancy is larger
when predicting the decisions of abstract rather
than concrete others (Hsee & Weber 1997) and
is moderated by self-reported empathy (Faro
& Rottenstreich 2006). Regardless of whether
dual-process explanations will be supported by
neuroscience evidence (see sidebar How Many
Processes?), the distinction between affective
and cognitive processes has been very fruitful
at a conceptual level.
Dual-Representation Models
Knowledge representation is centrally connected to the psychological cognitive processes
that make use of them. Fuzzy trace theory
(Reyna 2004) accounts for apparent inconsistencies in inference and preference tasks by assuming that different cognitive processes can
take advantage of different memory representations of choice options, i.e., encodings at different levels of precision, as a function of age and
expertise (Reyna & Adam 2003). Dehaene et al.
(2004) find evidence for an inbred rudimentary
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Decision modes. Multiple-process assumptions underlie distinctions between qualitatively different modes of making decisions.
Goals are chronic (personality-, gender-, and
culture-based) and domain-specific, and they
influence people’s choice of affective, analytic,
or rule-based processes because these decision
modes differ in their effectiveness of satisfying material and nonmaterial goals (e.g., affiliation versus autonomy; Weber et al. 2005a).
Social norms dictate the use of different decision principles in different domains (e.g., moral
versus business decisions; Tetlock 2002). People seem to have metacognitive awareness that
the mode in which a decision is made carries diagnostic information about the decision
maker’s motivation. Recipients of a requested
favor evaluated the favor and favor granter differently depending on whether they thought
that the favor granter had decided based on
affect, cost-benefit calculation, or role-based
obligation (Ames et al. 2004).
LEARNING
Homo sapiens needs to survive in stochastic
and often nonstationary environments that require constant learning and updating. Although
learning is often vicarious and transmitted to us
in summarized form (similar to the prospectus
of an investment option, providing a distribution of past returns), learning from experience
still plays a powerful role in our judgments and
decisions. Learning, as a topic of JDM research,
may have been the proverbial baby that went
out with the bathwater when the cognitive revolution replaced behaviorism. Most choice theories, including PT and DFT, do not include
any learning processes (Pleskac 2008).
Elwin et al. (2007), in a historical summary
of learning from feedback, go back to the argu-
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ment made by Einhorn and Hogarth in 1978
that selective and incomplete feedback prevents us from accurate judgments and choices
in many decision environments. Addressing the
important and understudied topic of people’s
mental representation of feedback, they distinguish between positivist coding that represents
what one sees and constructivist coding that
represents what one believes, supplementing
perception with knowledge and theory. They
present evidence consistent with their constructivist representation that reinforces the view of
attention as an active process.
Reinforcement-learning rules of the sort
originally suggested by Bush and Mosteller in
1955 offer psychological process accounts for
arriving at rational (Bayesian) learning as well as
deviations. Reinforcement-learning rules have
recently been investigated in a variety of JDM
contexts. Fu & Anderson (2006) show that reinforcement learning provides an integrative explanation for a broad range of dependent measures in tasks from recurrent choice to complex
skill acquisition.
Erev (1998) revisits signal detection theory
and replaces its ideal observer cutoff with a
cutoff reinforcement-learning process, allowing him to account for phenomena from conservatism to probability matching and the gambler’s fallacy. Weber et al. (2004) show that
reinforcement learning in risky decisions that
are made from repeated personal experience
predicts risk sensitivity to be proportional to
the coefficient of variation of the risky options,
rather than its variance, consistent with both
animal and human data. Following March’s
1996 simulations that demonstrate that reinforcement learning in risky choice in conjunction with adaptive sampling gives rise to
PT’s pattern of risk aversion for gains and risk
seeking for losses, Denrell (2007) formalizes
adaptive sampling in risky choice, i.e., option
selection that utilizes the evaluations of choice
options that are constantly being updated in the
ongoing decision-by-experience process. The
model predicts that apparent risk taking and
risk avoidance can be the result of adaptive
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sampling, even when the decision maker has a
risk-neutral value function and learning is optimal, reinforcing the realization that the relationship between risk attitudes and observed
risk taking is more complex than envisaged
by expected utility (Weber & Johnson 2008).
Denrell’s (2007) model also predicts that information about foregone payoffs will affect
risk taking, consistent with other attempts to
incorporate counterfactual outcomes or fictitious play into reinforcement-learning models
(Camerer & Ho 1998). Finally, Erev & Barron
(2005) operationalize implicit decision-mode
selection as a reinforcement-learning process,
where past success with different modes dictates
their future use. They show that, in repeated
risky decisions from experience, their model accounts for the observed effect of payoff variability, the underweighting of rare events, and loss
aversion.
Practice ought to make perfect, and researchers have continued to look for evidence of optimal performance. Recently, such
performance has been reported for human
movement-planning tasks, where the tip of a
finger needs to be placed on a computer touch
screen so that gains will be incurred for hitting
indicated target areas and losses are avoided for
indicated penalty areas (Trommershauser et al.
2006). People learn to execute such pointing
responses in ways that resemble expected-value
maximization and are very accurate in selecting the higher expected-value option from a
pair of possible responses. These tasks can be
shown to be conceptually equivalent to choices
between money gambles, where people often
fail to achieve expected value or expected utility maximization (Erev & Barron 2005). More
research on the precise differences between this
paradigm and gambling choices is needed, but
some differences are apparent. There is clear
goal focus in the pointing task (hitting target
area and avoiding penalty area), the appearance
of a correct answer that can be found rather
than a preference to be expressed, a continuous space of response alternatives, and a large
amount of feedback.
Predictive Accuracy
Future states/experiences. Most decisions
are forecasts of how options will make us feel
in the future. This idea is captured by the distinction between decision utility (how we think
options will make us feel) and experience utility
(how experiencing those options actually feels).
People tend to underestimate the ease of adapting to lifetime changes such as a move from
California to Ohio, winning the lottery, or being turned down for tenure (Kahneman 2000).
Other systematic mispredictions of subsequent
experiences have recently been reported for regret (Sevdalis & Harvey 2007), loss (Kermer
et al. 2006), and time slack and time savings
(Zauberman & Lynch 2005).
Two mispredictions of time provide
cognitive-process explanations for intertemporal inconsistencies (in contrast to the affective
or dual-process explanation discussed above).
Zauberman & Lynch (2005) show that timemoney tradeoffs change over time because
people have more (and overly) optimistic
predictions about future time availability than
about money availability. Greater discounting
of costs in time than costs in money can lead
to housing/commuting time decisions that do
not maximize experienced well being. Trope &
Liberman (2003) show that we often mispredict
our preference among choice options that lie in
the future because we construe events that lie
in the future in more abstract and higher-level
terms than events in the near future or present.
Anticipation of negative emotional reactions
such as regret or negative reactions to loss after
outcome feedback is received helps to motivate
careful analysis of choice options and their possible outcomes (Connolly & Zeelenberg 2002).
It is also adaptive to have mechanisms in place
that minimize these negative feelings, ex-post,
as they decrease outcome satisfaction and consume processing capacity. The fact that people experience fewer negative emotions as they
get older (Mather & Carstensen 2003) suggests
that negative emotion regulation is an acquired
skill.
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Expected utility: the
average utility from
some risky choice.
Like expected value,
except that outcomes
are nonlinearly
transformed into
utilities, usually with
decreasing marginal
returns
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Events. Predicting future events is a challenging task, as documented by Tetlock (2005) in
a longitudinal study of expert political predictions. The accuracy of predictions of future
key political events is generally not much better than chance. However, experts who acquire
information broadly and on multiple topics,
and who contingently apply different prediction strategies (foxes, in Isaiah Berlin’s terms),
are more successful in predicting future events
than are experts who specialize in a small field
and apply a smaller number of strategies more
rigidly (hedgehogs).
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
DECISION MAKER
JDM research in psychology and economics
has been mostly interested in average or typical behavior. Exceptions to this are risky and
intertemporal choice, where individual differences in behavior have been examined and incorporated into normative models as parameters that capture the individuals’ taste for risk
and time delay. Risk attitude in particular (ranging from risk aversion to risk seeking) has sometimes been treated as a trait, despite a long literature showing that risk attitudes as measured by
expected utility lack the cross-situational consistency required of traits. Personality theory’s
insight that individual traits exist but interact
with situational variables explains existing results about the domain specificity of risk taking
without giving up on stable traits (see Weber
& Johnson 2008). Recent statistical advances
such as hierarchical linear modeling and related
Bayesian methods provide means to measure
and explain individual differences in behavior
in these more sophisticated ways.
Research over the past decade suggests that
individual and cultural differences in decision
making seem to be mediated by two classes
of variables: (a) chronic differences in values
and goals, presumably related to historical, geographic, or biological determinants, that focus attention on different features of the task
environment and its opportunities and constraints; and (b) differences in reliance on differ72
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ent automatic versus controlled processes, related to cognitive capacity, education, or experience. The review below is organized by
predictor variable (“what individual difference
dimension?”), describing for each which dependent measures (“what behavior?”) this individual difference moderates. Dependent measures for which individual differences have
been reported include (a) observed judgments
or choices, in particular reported perceptions
of risk, and risky and intertemporal choices;
(b) model-based parameters inferred from observed behavior, including risk aversion and loss
aversion; (c) the accuracy of judgments or inferences, as measured by their adherence to true
values; and (d ) the consistency of judgments
or choices across situations/frames. In some instances, what we list as predictor variables are
themselves shown to be predicted by other predictor variables.
Gender
Women appear to be more risk averse in
many contexts and situations (Byrnes et al.
1999, Jianakopolos & Bernasek 1998). When
the sources of this observed gender difference
in risk taking are unpacked, women perceive
the riskiness of choice options to be larger
in most domains (all but social risk; see Weber et al. 2002) rather than having a more
averse attitude toward risk as they perceive it. In
those (and only those) domains where they perceive the risks to be larger, they appear to be
more risk averse. Slovic (1999) summarizes evidence that observed gender differences in risk
taking are not essentialist (i.e., biological), but
rather the result of deep-seated affective comfort (or discomfort) with risk (feeling that it is
controllable, or not) that comes with lower social status in a society. Emotional discomfort
translates into larger perceptions of riskiness,
an affective mechanism that connects these individual differences in risk taking to situational
effects such as the home bias in investment decisions (Weber et al. 2005b) or gain/loss framing in medical informed-consent communications (Schwartz & Hasnain 2002). In contrast
to these reliable gender differences in risk taking, no consistent gender differences have been
reported on loss aversion or time discounting.
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Age
Because psychological processes have developmental trajectories, JDM research has shown
interest in comparing the decision processes
and competencies of children, adolescents,
younger, and older adults. Web-based experiments and field data have contributed to this
interest with JDM data from a wider range of
ages. Space limitations restrict us to a small subset of relevant studies and a focus on younger
versus older adults. Gaechter et al. (2007) show
that loss aversion measured in both risky choice
and riskless consumer choice increases with age,
with no significant gender effect. Older adults
have also been found to be more risk averse
( Jianakopolos & Bernasek 2006), though not
every study finds this effect. Evidence on age
effects on time discounting is also more mixed,
with some studies showing no effect and others
showing that both older and younger adults discount more than do middle-aged adults (Read
& Read 2004). Age also affects what information is encoded and utilized. Consistent with evidence on life-span changes in emotion regulation, Carstensen & Mikels (2005) show greater
effects of negative mood on the decisions of
younger adults and greater effects of positive
mood on the decisions of older adults.
sensation seeking as associated with risk taking. Levin et al. (2002) examined the effects of
personality traits on susceptibility to framing.
Attribute-framing effects (e.g., meat 90% lean
versus 10% fat) were larger for individuals low
in conscientiousness and high in agreeableness.
Risky framing effects (e.g., lives lost versus lives
gained) were larger for individuals high in conscientiousness and neuroticism.
Cognitive Traits/Styles
Cognitive reflection test. The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a three-item math-puzzle
test designed to elicit an incorrect “intuitive”
answer (generated by System 1) that needs
to be overridden by System 2 intervention
(Frederick 2005). Individual differences in people’s ability to do so are found to be correlated with greater patience (less discounting) in
intertemporal choices as well as risky choices
closer to expected value maximization (less risk
aversion for gains, less risk seeking for losses).
This suggests that normative choice models
may turn out to be descriptive for at least a
subset of the general population, those who
have a greater ability or inclination to use rational/analytic processing in their decisions. CRT
scores correlate moderately with conventional
IQ measures, some of which show higher correlations than the CRT with normative choices
in specific domains. However, the CRT is the
most consistent predictor across choice measures and by far the easiest test to administer.
Personality
Based on factor analyses in the 1960s and 1980s,
personality theory has focused on five traits in
recent years. Some JDM research has examined
whether people’s scores on the “big five” dimensions affects their decisions. Risk taking has
again been the most common dependent measure examined. Thus, Nicholson et al. (2005)
find that risk takers score high on extraversion
and openness and low on neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Nicholson
et al. (2005), as well as Zuckerman & Kuhlman
(2000) and Weber et al. (2002), also identify
Numeracy. Numeracy, defined as the ability
to process basic mathematical and probabilistic concepts and measured by a scale created
by Lipkus and colleagues in 2001, is uncorrelated with general IQ measures but has been
shown to be reduce susceptibility to framing effects and improved judgment accuracy
(Peters et al. 2006b). Somewhat counterintuitively, more-numerate individuals perform
more accurately because they derive stronger
and more accurate affective meaning from
numbers and their comparisons.
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Maximizing/satisficing/regret. Simon’s 1957
distinction between maximization and satisficing as a choice objective has also been turned
into an individual difference measure (Schwartz
et al. 2002). Scoring higher on the maximization part of the scale has been found to be a net
negative. Thus, maximizers find higher-paying
jobs but are less satisfied with their job choice
and experience, presumably because they are
more susceptible to regret (Iyengar et al. 2006).
de Bruin et al. (2007) also find the propensity
to regret and tendency to maximize to be negatively related to the reported quality of decision
outcomes and to decision-making competency,
described next.
Decision-making competency. Fischhoff
and colleagues have attempted to capture a
common skill component in the judgments
and choices made by adolescents (Parker &
Fischhoff 2005) and adults (de Bruin et al.
2007). Combining performance on seven JDM
tasks that can be scored for either accuracy
or consistency into a decision-making competency measure, they find that this score is
positively correlated with the reported quality
of decision outcomes, even when controlling
for IQ, age, and socioeconomic status. Older
respondents showed greater competency in
some of the seven tasks (recognition of social
norms and resistance to sunk costs) but did
worse on other tasks (applying decision rules
and framing effects) (de Bruin et al. 2007),
suggesting that there is more than a single
underlying competency factor.
INCREASING POLICY
RELEVANCE
One of the appeals of behavioral decision research has been that the questions that are at
the forefront of the research agenda are also, at
times, at the forefront of social concerns. Recently, we have seen an explosion of research
that applies principles from behavioral decision research to address applications in policy
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and other areas (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). As
we have argued, this increased translation from
laboratory research on judgment and choice to
the policy arena is facilitated by the increasing
psychological process orientation of the field.
Space constraints force us to be selective, focusing on health and wealth, and covering only
a small subset of applications of JDM insights
within those domains.
Health
Obesity is the result of thousands of small
choices that have the outcome that caloric intake exceeds the decision maker’s caloric expenditure. Wansink (2006) argues that these
choices are often made with little awareness
and shows in a series of clever experiments that
making consumption decisions more mindful
can change people’s eating behavior. More importantly, changes in the decision environment
that are cognizant of the simplifying evaluation
and choice processes people apply (e.g., serving potato chips in small, single portions rather
than a large bowl, because we evaluate consumption relative to bowl size) have the effect
of reducing consumption.
Another important social issue addressed by
JDM research has been the shortage of organs
relative to demand for life-saving transplants.
Johnson & Goldstein (2003) noticed that different European countries have different defaults for citizens who did not make an active
decision concerning their status as an organ
donor. They built upon prior work examining the effect of defaults and demonstrated—
with a Web-based survey and archival records
of organ-donation signups—that significantly
more people are willing to be donors when the
default is to be a donor (with the need to opt
out in order not to be a donor) than when an
active choice must be made to be a donor. They
also demonstrated that the actual rate of organ transplants is significantly larger in opt-out
than in opt-in countries (see also Gimbel et al.
2003). The observed effects are large, suggesting that the current shortage of some organs,
such as hearts, could be overcome by a change in
defaults.
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Wealth
Similar to organ donation, participation rates
in retirement savings plans are at levels judged
too low. In the United States in particular,
many employees are not saving toward their
retirement even when their employers provide
substantial financial incentives in the form of
matching contributions. When Madrian &
Shea (2001) changed the default action that was
implemented when employees did not make
an active decision to participate in a 401k plan
from the usual one of no savings contribution
to one of 3% of income contribution, participation of employees in the plan increased
from 37% to 86%. Inspired by this and similar
studies, the Department of Labor, with the help
of enabling legislation, has allowed employers
to change defaults. Thaler & Benartzi (2004)
address the same problem with an intervention
inspired by multiple behavioral-research
insights. Their save-more-tomorrow plan
capitalizes on discounting by asking people
to commit to saving in the future, and it
minimizes the impact of loss aversion by taking
the contributions out of future raises rather
than current income, as well as by making
contributing the default. Initial applications
have shown widespread adoption (by 78% of
those who are offered participation, with 80%
of them remaining in the program through four
pay raises), and savings rates have increased
from 3.5% to 13.6% of income. Retirement
savings is one clear example of where behavioral decision research is having significant
personal, business, and public policy effects.
Implications: The Behavioral
Advantage
In each of these applications of JDM theory, the
interventions suggested stand in contrast to interventions that might be suggested by standard
economics. In the case of retirement savings,
standard economic analysis suggests rather expensive government interventions (such as tax
incentives) or effortful (for both provider and
recipient) public education. The use of defaults
is not only more effective but also much less
costly. The same observation applies to organ donation, where the solutions suggested by
economists (markets of some sort or other financial incentives) rightfully generate a lot of
public controversy. Redesigns of the decision
environment in ways described in our examples provide the same amount of choice flexibility and autonomy to the decision maker
as do existing environments, but redirect, in
a psychological jiu-jitsu, potentially harmful
decision aversion to individually or socially desirable outcomes. Redesign of decision environments also follows directly from the psychological idea of constructed preferences, affects, and
inferences.
CONCLUSIONS
Historically, JDM research has taken normative economic and statistical models as its starting point and adjusted them, one small step at a
time, to keep the benefits of those models while
giving them greater predictive accuracy. This
incremental approach resulted in a proliferation
of task-specific models that provide better predictions of observed behavior than do normative models, perhaps at the price of parsimony
and impact on other social science disciplines.
However, our review suggests that the small incremental adjustments to economic models, in
their accumulation over the past 50 years, have
added up to and converge on a more psychological theory of JDM. In addition to being integrative by reducing a large number of models
and insights to a manageable list of underlying
perceptual, cognitive, and emotional considerations, a psychological process framework also
provides entry points for a better and possibly
causal understanding of JDM phenomena and
thus for intervention.
A recent review of our understanding of
heuristics by Shah & Oppenheimer (2008)
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makes a very similar point. Arguing persuasively that the word “heuristic” has been used
so indiscriminately as to have lost its meaning,
the authors show that defining heuristics within
an effort-reduction framework that is based in
cognitive information processes reduces conceptual redundancy and allows domain-general
principles to emerge. The integration and
grounding of JDM theories and phenomena
into psychological processes has been happening more at the cognitive end of psychology.
It is also important to connect JDM research
more firmly to theories and data about human
motivation and emotion provided by other areas of psychology. Heath and colleagues (1999),
for example, interpret goals as reference points,
arguing that goals are motivating because of basic cognitive and perceptual processes, and thus
illuminate the motivational properties of PT’s
value function. A focus on goals may provide
a natural way of further integrating social and
cognitive psychological insights. Goals play a
central role in self-regulation (Higgins 2005)
and have been shown to influence the way decisions are made, with the decision process in turn
affecting the decision outcome (Weber et al.
2005a). Cognitive investigations of judgment
and choice will benefit from addressing the focusing role of desires and goals. The impact
of work in social cognition on behavioral decision research will be greatly enhanced by considering the cognitive processes that mediate
reported behavior; we would encourage investigations that emphasize what the field knows
about finite attention and implicit memory, a
strategy that we believe contrasts with a focus
on unconscious processing (Dijksterhuis 2004).
The debates of previous decades about rationality have abated, giving way to the realization that a given behavior is “rational” or
not only within a specific definition of rationality and that there are several standards, each
having merits within a (different) set of goals
and constraints (Reyna et al. 2003, Tetlock &
Mellers 2002). Emerging instead is a realization that broad-scale characterizations of human judgment or choice as flawed or rational
are not particularly useful. The data often
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speak with greater clarity and less dissent
than polarized characterizations of them that
are designed to buttress ideological positions.
Consider, for example, the 1978 Lichtenstein,
Fischhoff and Slovic study of estimates of perceived lethality and the 1996 Gigerenzer and
Goldstein study of heuristics used in identifying the relative size of cities. The first study
is cited as evidence that people are often biased in their heuristic judgments, the second
as a demonstration of how good heuristic performance can be. In fact, judgment accuracy is
very similar for both tasks, with mean correlations between estimated and actual lethality
of around 0.7 and between estimated and actual city sizes of around 0.6. The types of errors made are also very similar in both data
sets. People overestimate the frequencies of
homicide relative to suicide, a result attributed
to greater availability due to media biases in
reporting. And German respondents choose
Dallas as the larger city too often, relative to San
Antonio, presumably due to greater availability
as the result of the eponymous television show
popular in Germany. A focus on understanding the causes of observed effects may be more
productive than interpretations of data along
ideological lines. Controversies of this sort are
only partially addressed and resolved by adversarial collaborations (e.g., Mellers et al. 2001),
which tend to focus on boundary conditions and
relative effects sizes rather than the existence
of shared or distinct mechanisms for the phenomenon under study.
The view of Homo sapiens as an adaptive decision maker has continued to receive support.
Although we are restricted by finite attentional
and processing capacity, we also are blessed
by an abundance of ways in which we can focus and utilize this finite capacity that extends
from goals to processes. We apply a wide repertoire of processing modes and strategies to our
choices and inferences in a fashion that is cognizant of our goals, capacities, and internal and
external constraints. In addition to strategies
that differ in effort and accuracy (compensatory
algorithms versus noncompensatory heuristic
shortcuts), the past 10 years of research have
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also considered the information (material versus nonmaterial considerations) and processes
(automatic versus controlled) used by different decision strategies. Whether identified decision strategies fall into two classes (Kahneman
2003) or along a continuum (Hammond 1996,
Svenson 2003), some decision strategies are
more automatic, associative, and affect laden,
whereas others involve either implicit or explicit attempts to consider the pros and cons
of different choice alternatives. Recent JDM
research has also examined a broader set of
goals/criteria assumed to underlie decision
makers’ implicit strategy selection, no longer
restricted to effort and accuracy, but also including self-concept and self-regulation, social goals, and internal and external needs
for justification. Content- and context-primed
attention to subsets of goals (Krantz &
Kunreuther 2007) and context- and pathdependent encoding, evaluation, and memoryretrieval processes have been shown to help
us to come up with a satisfactory choice option in a short amount of time and without
too much postdecisional regret. Predecisional
distortions in the form of information-search
or argument-generation processes that bias the
balance of evidence in adaptive ways help us do
so.
Functional-relationship explanations of deviations of behavior from normative models
(e.g., PT for risky choice, hyperbolic discounting for intertemporal choice) can be further
unpacked into psychological process explanations for observed regularities. Even though
PT and hyperbolic discount models do not
claim to be anything other than “as-if ” models, people often take them as literal, interpreting both loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting as emotion-mediated effects. Our review
has shown that, although affective processes
play a role in both cases, cognitive (perceptual, attention, and memory) processes account
for a large proportion of the variance in behavior ( Johnson et al. 2007, Weber et al. 2007,
Zauberman et al. 2008). A better understanding
of the determinants of attention as a function of
task, context, and characteristics of the decision
maker is clearly a promising direction for future
research (Payne et al. 2004).
To the extent that Annual Review articles
provide a “state of the union” evaluation of a
field, we declare that the JDM field, as it is entering early adulthood, is alive and well. It is
a vibrant research enterprise, which young researchers are joining in record numbers; graduate student enrollment in the Society for
Judgment and Decision Making grew by more
than 40% over the past five years. It is also
a global enterprise, with active research programs worldwide. Policy makers and institution builders in the private and public sector are
applying its insights. The media report on its
research, and popular books on the subject become bestsellers. With success comes responsibility. We encourage researchers to build on
the successes and advances covered in this review, which means emphasizing common insights, processes, and results just as much as
highlighting differences between models.
Incremental modifications of normative
economic models have given shape to a psychological theory of JDM. This current theory
shows the importance of understanding how
decision makers attend to provided information, seek out additional information both by
internal (memory) and external search, how information gets evaluated and integrated by both
cognitive and affective processes, and how all of
these stages are influenced by the decision environment (task, content, context) and the decision maker’s internal state (beliefs, values, goals,
prior experience). There is no question that this
view of JDM is complex and not easy to translate into mathematically or otherwise tractable
models. However, recent appeals to keep economics “mindless” (Gul & Pesendorfer 2005) to
maintain the simplicity and coherence of its theoretical framework strike us as a self-imposed
sentence of intellectual solipsism and policy irrelevance. The existing successes of a constructivist JDM research agenda that uses what we
know about the mind of the decision maker to
predict or modify consequential judgments and
decisions hold future promises that clearly outweigh the drawbacks of its complexity.
www.annualreviews.org • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
77
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Psychological process explanations have helped integrate JDM phenomena and provide
prescriptions for how to improve decision quality.
2. The emotions revolution has put affective processes on an equal footing with cognitive
processes.
3. Selective attention and information recruitment and retrieval processes explain the effects
of task, context, or prior history.
4. Internal or external evidence generation in constructed preference is path dependent.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009.60:53-85. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
by Rutgers University Libraries on 08/01/11. For personal use only.
5. Dynamic risk taking differs from static risk taking, and decisions from experience differ
from decisions from description.
FUTURE ISSUES
1. Goals versus utilities as the fundamental primitive of decision research.
2. Translation of attention into decision weights.
3. Origin and updating of reference points and the dynamics of multiple reference points.
4. Further understanding of individual, group, and life-span differences in performance on
JDM tasks.
5. Translation of JDM results to inform and improve public policy.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this
review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Preparation of this review was facilitated by fellowships of both authors at the Russell Sage Foundation and by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0352062) and the National
Institute of Aging (R01AG027931-01A2). We thank Susan Fiske, Reid Hastie, David Krantz,
Patricia Linville, Duncan Luce, and John Payne for helpful comments.
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Provides an example of
how simple changes in
choice architecture, in
this case the default
option, can produce
large and consequential
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update of decision field
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Annual Review of
Psychology
Contents
Volume 60, 2009
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009.60:53-85. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
by Rutgers University Libraries on 08/01/11. For personal use only.
Prefatory
Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions,
and Emerging Issues
Carroll E. Izard ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 1
Concepts and Categories
Concepts and Categories: A Cognitive Neuropsychological Perspective
Bradford Z. Mahon and Alfonso Caramazza ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣27
Judgment and Decision Making
Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
Elke U. Weber and Eric J. Johnson ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣53
Comparative Psychology
Comparative Social Cognition
Nathan J. Emery and Nicola S. Clayton ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣87
Development: Learning, Cognition, and Perception
Learning from Others: Children’s Construction of Concepts
Susan A. Gelman ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 115
Early and Middle Childhood
Social Withdrawal in Childhood
Kenneth H. Rubin, Robert J. Coplan, and Julie C. Bowker ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 141
Adulthood and Aging
The Adaptive Brain: Aging and Neurocognitive Scaffolding
Denise C. Park and Patricia Reuter-Lorenz ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 173
Substance Abuse Disorders
A Tale of Two Systems: Co-Occurring Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Disorders Treatment for Adolescents
Elizabeth H. Hawkins ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 197
vii
Therapy for Specific Problems
Therapy for Specific Problems: Youth Tobacco Cessation
Susan J. Curry, Robin J. Mermelstein, and Amy K. Sporer ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 229
Adult Clinical Neuropsychology
Neuropsychological Assessment of Dementia
David P. Salmon and Mark W. Bondi ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 257
Child Clinical Neuropsychology
Relations Among Speech, Language, and Reading Disorders
Bruce F. Pennington and Dorothy V.M. Bishop ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 283
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009.60:53-85. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
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Attitude Structure
Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities
John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 307
Intergroup relations, stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination
Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment
of Research and Practice
Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. Green ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 339
Cultural Influences
Personality: The Universal and the Culturally Specific
Steven J. Heine and Emma E. Buchtel ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 369
Community Psychology
Community Psychology: Individuals and Interventions in Community
Context
Edison J. Trickett ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 395
Leadership
Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions
Bruce J. Avolio, Fred O. Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 421
Training and Development
Benefits of Training and Development for Individuals and Teams,
Organizations, and Society
Herman Aguinis and Kurt Kraiger ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 451
Marketing and Consumer Behavior
Conceptual Consumption
Dan Ariely and Michael I. Norton ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 475
viii
Contents
Psychobiological Mechanisms
Health Psychology: Developing Biologically Plausible Models Linking
the Social World and Physical Health
Gregory E. Miller, Edith Chen, and Steve Cole ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 501
Health and Social Systems
The Case for Cultural Competency in Psychotherapeutic Interventions
Stanley Sue, Nolan Zane, Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, and Lauren K. Berger ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 525
Research Methodology
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2009.60:53-85. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
by Rutgers University Libraries on 08/01/11. For personal use only.
Missing Data Analysis: Making It Work in the Real World
John W. Graham ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 549
Psychometrics: Analysis of Latent Variables and Hypothetical Constructs
Latent Variable Modeling of Differences and Changes with
Longitudinal Data
John J. McArdle ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 577
Evaluation
The Renaissance of Field Experimentation in Evaluating Interventions
William R. Shadish and Thomas D. Cook ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 607
Timely Topics
Adolescent Romantic Relationships
W. Andrew Collins, Deborah P. Welsh, and Wyndol Furman ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 631
Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons
Marco Iacoboni ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 653
Predicting Workplace Aggression and Violence
Julian Barling, Kathryne E. Dupré, and E. Kevin Kelloway ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 671
The Social Brain: Neural Basis of Social Knowledge
Ralph Adolphs ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 693
Workplace Victimization: Aggression from the Target’s Perspective
Karl Aquino and Stefan Thau ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 717
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 50–60 ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 743
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 50–60 ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 748
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Psychology articles may be found at
http://psych.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml
Contents
ix