After Mubarak, Mubarak

“Whoever follows Mubarak will inevitably be weaker and less experienced than the man who has ruled the country for more than a quarter century.” After Mubarak, Mubarak? SAMER SHEHATA I n Egypt’s more than five thousand years of history, only a few pharaohs and Muhammad Ali, who ruled from 1805 to 1848, have been in power longer than Hosni Mubarak. The 80-year-old President Mubarak, who came to office after the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, has now ruled for more than 27 years. In a country with a median age of 25, this means the majority of Egyptians have known only one president. Moreover, Mubarak has never appointed a vice president. Thus it should come as no surprise, even to those who do not follow Middle Eastern politics closely, that Egypt in the not-too-distant future will experience a historic leadership transition. Speculation about such a succession has been nearly constant since a failed 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa. At certain times—when Mubarak has a birthday or a health crisis, or when elections are held—the speculation intensifies. Interest in the succession question is particularly acute because Egypt is the Arab world’s most populous country, strategically located and with considerable regional influence. What happens in Cairo will have repercussions far beyond Egypt’s borders—including in Washington. Egypt is a vital US ally. American warships frequently pass through the Suez Canal and US military aircraft are routinely granted permission to fly over Egyptian territory. The Egyptian government maintains the terms of the Camp David peace treaty with Israel and as a consequence receives billions of dollars annually in US economic and military assistance. Cairo plays a mediating role in the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process.” And Egypt’s security and intelligence agencies have cooperated in the Bush administration’s war on terror. The Egyptian succession could have profound consequences for US policy in the Middle East. Deteriorating economic conditions for the majority of Egyptians could complicate the succession process. Prices are high and people are angry. Record levels of inflation coupled with the government’s economic liberalization policies have resulted in unprecedented waves of economic and labor protests over the past two years. Bread shortages earlier in 2008 led to violence among people waiting in long lines for the cheap governmentsubsidized bread that makes life possible for the 40 percent of Egyptians who live below or close to poverty. And making the succession more dramatic still is that Mubarak’s son Gamal is apparently being groomed for the presidency. Rumors to this effect have long circulated and have made the transition even more controversial. Indeed, Egyptians have openly discussed the possibility of a father-to-son succession since Bashar alAssad was installed as Syria’s president following his father’s death in 2000. But how exactly will the succession take place? How will the transition affect the country’s stability? Will the elder Mubarak’s passing increase prospects for political reform? And what challenges is Egypt’s next ruler likely to face? HURRY, YOUNG MAN Gamal Mubarak, the younger of the president’s two sons, turns 45 in December 2008. After completing a BA and an MBA at the elite American University in Cairo, Gamal worked as an investment banker for Bank of America in Cairo and then in London. When he returned to Egypt in the mid-1990s he became increasingly prominent in public life, establishing a financial advisory firm and founding a nongovernmental organization fo- SAMER SHEHATA is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. 418 After Mubarak, Mubarak? U 419 cused on training Egyptian youth to compete in President Mubarak traveled to Germany to unthe global economy. dergo back surgery in the summer of 2004, and Gamal Mubarak’s involvement in politics, when he returned a new cabinet was appointed. though informal, steadily increased as well. He The cabinet was distinctive because it included was appointed to the prestigious US-Egypt Presia number of younger faces, several of them Gadent’s Council, part of an initiative established by mal’s associates. This was especially apparent Hosni Mubarak and former US Vice President Al in the cabinet’s economic, finance, and investGore to promote trade and strengthen relations ment portfolios. The independent press quickly between the two countries. Gamal began accomlabeled the new ministers “Gamal’s cabinet.” panying his father on trips to the United States, Since then, a number of others associated with to European capitals, and to the meetings of the the president’s son have also been appointed to World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. ministerial positions. Gamal in fact is not popular among Egyptians, In the late 1990s, Egyptian news reports indiand his popularity has declined since he came on cated that Gamal was planning, along with a few the political scene. He is associated with disliked prominent individuals from the ruling National economic reforms and with rich, fat-cat business Democratic Party (NDP), to establish a new political party. The new party, it was said, would be types who thrive in the ruling party. Yet Gamal’s “liberal” and pro-business. Although the initiative rise within the NDP has continued unabated. He was made one of the party’s three assistant secnever materialized, this was Gamal’s initial atretary generals in early 2006, while remaining tempt to enter formal politics and it foreshadowed as head of the influential Policies Secretariat. At his future ambitions. the 2007 NDP conference, His official political dea Higher Committee was but came in 2000 when he established—according to a was appointed to the NDP’s Senior officers could General Secretariat and be2005 constitutional amendcollectively reject the notion came head of its Youth and ment, this committee will of Gamal Mubarak as president. Development Committee. nominate the party’s candiIn that capacity, he traveled dates in future presidential the country giving speeches elections—and, not surpristo college students and other young people about ingly, Gamal was appointed to the committee. economic issues and domestic policies. Gamal Meanwhile, as Gamal and his associates have swiftly rose within the NDP and in 2002 was electgained leadership positions within the NDP, oldtime party stalwarts have lost ground. ed chairman of the party’s newly formed Policies Secretariat. At the time, the NDP’s secretary generMIND THE AMENDMENTS al described the new body as the party’s “beating In 2005 and 2007, the Egyptian parliament heart and mind.” The Policies Secretariat quickly passed much-heralded constitutional amendbecame the NDP’s center for policy directives and today remains the most significant political body ments that have altered the rules of the game in in the country. favor of Gamal’s potential succession. The 2005 As Gamal gained prominence in the party, he amendment created a constitutional mechanism and a group of like-minded colleagues attempted that may enable Gamal’s succession through the to change the NDP’s image from that of an oldruling party. The 2007 amendments, among othfashioned and corrupt government party into er things, expanded the government’s powers of one of a modern political organization. The slosurveillance, eliminated the independent judigan at the party’s 2002 general convention was cial supervision of elections, and placed further “New Thinking,” and increasing numbers of restrictions on the legal political participation of smartly dressed, well educated, younger profesthe Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s most powerful sionals from Cairo University’s prestigious Facopposition group. ulty of Economics and Political Science could be Hosni Mubarak initiated the 2005 constitutionseen moving up in the organization. As Gamal al change when he unexpectedly asked the parliaused the party as a vehicle for his own political ment to amend Article 76 of the constitution to ascension, the sections of the party connected to allow for multicandidate presidential elections for him also became more powerful. the first time in the country’s history. (Previously, 420 UÊ 1,, /Ê-/",9Ê UÊ iVi“LiÀÊÓään citizens had merely participated in presidential referendums in which they could cast “yes” or “no” votes on a candidate nominated by the NDPcontrolled parliament.) The 2005 amendment carried significant consequences for Egyptian politics, but it was not the radical, democratically transformative measure that its proponents claimed. Indeed, the amendment placed significant new restrictions on who could run for president. It required candidates to be high-ranking members of political parties that had existed for at least five years. It further mandated that parties had to hold at least 5 percent of seats in the parliament in order to nominate candidates. And it required nominees to have held leadership positions in their parties for at least one year before they could become eligible to run for office. Restrictions placed on independent candidates were even more severe. According to the amendment, independents need the endorsement of 250 elected officials—including 65 members of the parliament’s lower house, 25 members of the upper house, and 10 members of municipal councils in 14 different governorates (totaling 140 municipal councilmen)—in order to stand in elections. All these bodies are dominated by the NDP. The requirements are so restrictive that they essentially eliminate the possibility of independent presidential candidates. The measure was widely interpreted as an effort to prevent a Muslim Brotherhood candidate from competing in presidential elections as an independent. The amendment allowed an exception to the rules for the 2005 election—all registered parties were able to nominate candidates in the first presidential election. Without the exception, not a single political party—except the NDP—would have met the requirements needed to nominate candidates for president. The amendment, along with the exception, allowed Mubarak to “run” against nine other candidates in the 2005 election and to “win” a fifth six-year term, which is set to expire in 2011. In 2007, as 34 far-ranging constitutional amendments were enacted—including more restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood—Article 76 was further modified to allow parties with as few as 3 percent of the seats in the parliament to nominate candidates for presidential elections, compared to the previous 5 percent. And in elections held before May 1, 2017, political parties with just one seat in parliament will be eligible to nominate candidates from their higher boards. These exceptions potentially set up another farcical presidential election in 2011, in which weak and inconsequential parties would run candidates against the NDP. The Mubarak regime has portrayed the changes to Article 76 as democratic reforms of historical significance. They are hardly that. The amendments were a shrewd response to domestic and especially international pressure. This response allowed President Mubarak to give the appearance of undertaking reform while in fact gaining a fifth six-year term in office through putatively democratic elections, rather than an anachronistic presidential referendum. At the same time, the constitutional amendments removed the military from the succession process and laid the groundwork for a father-to-son succession—a classic case of pseudo-reform. HOW TO SUCCEED No one knows how or when a succession will take place. At the age of 80, Mubarak could survive until the next presidential election—or he could die tomorrow. No matter the timing, the succession seems likely to play out in one of four ways. In two of the scenarios, Gamal Mubarak becomes president. In the other two, a high-ranking military officer ends up in command. No other outcomes seem likely. In the first and most likely scenario, Hosni Mubarak announces—either well before the next scheduled presidential election or immediately preceding it—that he will step down. Mubarak declares that the time is right because he has served the country for many years and Egypt is now ready for a step forward on the path to democracy. The announcement is heralded as momentous by the government press, state intellectuals, and the regime-dependent business class. Some unease exists among the general public, and opposition figures criticize the maneuver as a ruse to install Gamal Mubarak as president, so “spontaneous” demonstrations in support of Gamal break out in Cairo. Rank-and-file NDP members urge him to run for president. Gamal initially refuses the call, but he is ultimately forced to accede to appeals by the public and his party that he serve the country. Of course he meets the eligibility requirements laid out in the twice-amended Article 76, and he soon becomes the NDP’s nominee for president. Business leaders endorse him, saying a Gamal Mubarak KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images After Mubarak, Mubarak? U 421 presidency will be beneficial for Egypt’s economic constitution stipulates) assumes limited powers growth. State intellectuals busily argue that Gauntil elections can be held. Still, as in the first mal possesses the requisite experience and skills scenario, “spontaneous” demonstrations in Cairo needed for the job and should not, simply because and other cities encourage Gamal to run for preshis father is president, be denied the right to comident. Also as in the first case, inconsequential pete for elected office. Several opposition parties, opposition parties field “competing” candidates including some that are completely unknown, in sham elections, and again Gamal emerges nominate candidates to play supporting roles in victorious. We can call this the “Syrian model,” this amateurish theatrical production. After a along the lines of Bashar al-Assad’s inheritance of short campaign, Gamal “wins” a controlled elecSyria’s presidency in 2000. Because the older Mubarak is not alive to ention that has the trappings of legality but is comsure a smooth transition, the second scenario is pletely devoid of legitimacy. accompanied by greater uncertainty and potenIndependent intellectuals, opposition parties, tially by increased turand the Muslim Brotherbulence. More actors are hood condemn the sham possibly willing to chalelection. The Brotherlenge Gamal’s inherihood refrains from taktance of power; some may ing to the streets, howevfeel emboldened to try to er, correctly calculating derail the plan. In this that the cost of direct respect, paradoxically, confrontation is too high Hosni Mubarak’s personwhen measured against ality poses perhaps the the low likelihood of biggest threat to Gamal’s successfully preventing becoming president. The Gamal from becoming octogenarian Mubarak, president. extremely risk-averse, Limited protests take has hinted that he will place in Cairo and other never step down from ofcities, including demonfice. Mubarak said twice strations by university in a 2006 speech before students and by Kifaya the parliament that he (Enough), the protest would stay in power “as movement founded in long as there is in my 2004 to oppose both chest a heart that beats President Mubarak and and I draw breath.” Yet Gamal’s “inheritance” of if Mubarak does not atpower. But none of the tempt a transition beprotests comes close to fore he dies, the probseriously destabilizing Gamal Mubarak ability that his son can the regime or threatening The prince-in-waiting? be installed as president national order. And with decreases significantly. Even the best-laid plans Hosni Mubarak alive in this scenario, the presicould go awry once the elder Mubarak is dead. dent’s hands remain on the levers of power during the hand-off. The father’s standing with the miliIF THE MILITARY WEIGHS IN tary and the security agencies remains intact, and The third scenario, like the second, begins with deals negotiated ahead of time can be enforced. Mubarak’s death and no vice president in place. Loyalties paid for in advance can be maintained. But before the sequence of events described in the The costs of defection are extremely high. The second scenario also leads to Gamal’s besecond scenario can fully unfold, a senior military coming president. The major difference is that in officer seizes control. This could happen in one of this scenario Hosni Mubarak dies before the next two circumstances. presidential election, without having appointed First, senior officers could collectively reject a vice president, and the prime minister (as the the notion of Gamal Mubarak as president. The 422 UÊ 1,, /Ê-/",9Ê UÊ iVi“LiÀÊÓään military is the most powerful and coherent institution in Egyptian society and, unlike any of the political parties, it enjoys a significant amount of legitimacy. But Gamal does not have a military background, as all previous Egyptian presidents have had. Recent reports suggest that Gamal has strengthened his ties to the military, but the highest echelons of the officer corps might still deem unacceptable the idea that a 45-year-old without military credentials, whose major qualification is that he is the president’s son, could become president and command the armed forces. Similarly, if Gamal Mubarak’s candidacy were considered threatening to the military’s or senior officer corps’ material interests, this could prompt action to prevent Gamal or another civilian from becoming president. The Egyptian military is deeply involved in a wide range of economic activities, from heavy manufacturing and light industry to agriculture and food production. Extensive government programs also afford the officer corps a comfortable standard of living. If a non-military succession threatened these arrangements, some in the armed forces could attempt to block a civilian from the presidency. A second circumstance in which a military officer could seize control relates to domestic stability. After Mubarak’s death, securing Cairo and other cities would be an immediate priority of the security forces. In the unlikely event that major disturbances occurred during the transition— sustained protests, social unrest, riots, or the destruction of property—a military officer might assume control on national security grounds. With tanks on the streets, a military commander could plausibly justify suspending the constitution in order to ensure domestic stability. When observers discuss the possibility of a military officer’s succeeding Mubarak, the name most often mentioned is that of Omar Suleiman, the director of intelligence. Suleiman—a former general, a veteran of both the 1967 and 1973 wars, and one of Mubarak’s closest confidantes—is deeply connected to both the military and the security services. He is also responsible for managing sensitive security aspects of Egypt’s involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a responsibility that has entailed participation in negotiations both between Palestinian factions and between Palestinians and Israelis. This assignment has earned him the trust of Washington and Tel Aviv. And unlike longstanding Defense Minister Mohammad Tantawi, who is generally dismissed as a possible suc- cessor because he lacks charisma and enjoys little regard within the army, Suleiman is considered smart, responsible, and serious. The fourth succession scenario—and the least likely—also ends with a military officer as president. In this instance, the president dies in office. But unlike the scenarios described above, Gamal Mubarak in this case is pushed aside and a high-ranking officer, most likely Suleiman, is nominated as an independent candidate in presidential elections following Hosni Mubarak’s death. Although truly independent candidates face seemingly insurmountable restrictions against running for president, it is not so difficult to imagine such a candidate succeeding as long as he enjoys the full backing of the military and the ruling party. The benefits of this scenario for the regime and the military are obvious: The messy illegality of an unconstitutional seizure of power, as described in scenario three, would be avoided. The same farcical elections among competing candidates could occur, but with victory guaranteed to the officer-candidate. THIS IS DEMOCRACY PROMOTION? Washington would be comfortable with either Gamal Mubarak or Suleiman. Both men are familiar to US officials and both are committed to maintaining the current US-Egyptian relationship. Many in Egypt, however, believe that Gamal has already gained the backing of the United States. And they have good reason to think so. His economic views are in line with Washington’s, the World Bank’s, and the International Monetary Fund’s. More importantly, he has made frequent trips to the United States for high-level discussions with American officials. Gamal visited Washington twice in 2003, meeting with then–National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Pentagon officials. He also accompanied his father to President George W. Bush’s Crawford ranch in 2004 and paid a “secret visit” to the White House in May 2006. During the 2006 trip he met with, all in the course of a single visit, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State Rice, Vice President Cheney, and President Bush. The visit would not have been reported publicly if not for a sharp Al Jazeera journalist who happened to spot Gamal, along with the Egyptian ambassador, entering the White House. The Egyptians later stated that Gamal was in the After Mubarak, Mubarak? U 423 United States on personal business (renewing his pilot’s license) and simply decided to drop by 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. This account is implausible; even heads of state rarely receive such a reception at the White House. When the succession plays out, it will be difficult for the United States to credibly claim neutrality in the process. If Gamal is “elected” president, a State Department spokesperson will likely be asked about the administration’s position during a daily press briefing. The spokesperson will likely declare—to an incredulous press corps—that the United States does not intervene in the domestic politics of other nations, that it maintains strong relations with Egypt, and that it encourages Egypt’s leaders to continue down the path of reform. So much for democracy promotion. tion or as an antidemocratic force, there can be little argument about the group’s recent history: The Brotherhood has consistently demonstrated a commitment to nonviolent political participation in the face of overwhelming regime repression. Moreover, the group has neither the organizational capacity nor the hardware needed to overthrow the regime. Any attempt at mass mobilization during the succession period—even nonviolent protest—would be met with overwhelming regime force, and the Brotherhood knows this. Conflict and tension are more likely to erupt between forces within the regime than between the regime and the opposition. Noticeable movement within the elite may occur, and one may expect a reshuffling of positions. Some regime insiders may remain while many old-timers are removed. (Likely candidates for removal include NDP chief Safwat alAPRÈS MOI, LITTLE CHANGE Sherif and old-time party boss Kamal al-Shazli.) The new ruler will be pressed on a wide range In the end, however, the difficulties facing of issues by political parties, opposition groups, Egypt’s next president will arise not primarily intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, during the succession period, but rather during journalists, and reform-minded judges. These the weeks and months that follow. Whoever folgroups and individuals will lows Mubarak will inevitably call for reducing the power of be weaker and less experithe executive branch, imposenced than the man who has The legal opposition parties ing presidential term limits, ruled the country for more are weak, internally divided, amending antiterrorist legthan a quarter century. The and dysfunctional. islation, enhancing judicial new president, after he has independence, reforming the secured power, will almost law governing NGOs, and certainly attempt to enhance eliminating prison sentences for journalists conhis standing and redress the legitimacy deficit victed of press offenses. They also will demand that will be inherent in a nondemocratic transia lifting of the Emergency Law. (In effect since tion. Egypt’s next ruler, like newly established 1981, it grants tremendous powers to the execuleaders elsewhere, will promise reform, commit tive and security forces to detain citizens withto democratization, and make assurances about out trial for extended periods, to censor and shut development. He will vow to reduce corruption down newspapers, and to prohibit strikes, demand pledge to increase the government’s respononstrations, and public meetings.) siveness to ordinary citizens. The new government will promise to carry out Fears of instability during the transition are some of these measures, possibly including the esprobably unfounded. Sustained nationwide protablishment of presidential term limits. Genuine tests are unlikely. Sporadic demonstrations on political reform, however, remains highly unlikely. university campuses and smaller protests by KiEgypt’s new ruler will not usher in democracy. As faya supporters will almost certainly occur, but the head of the Egyptian Organization for Human will not threaten the regime’s stability. The legal Rights once told me about the NDP reformers, inopposition parties are weak, internally divided, cluding Gamal Mubarak, they are willing to reform and dysfunctional. As opposition parties estabas long as reform does not mean losing power. lished within a semi-authoritarian system, they The current US-Egyptian relationship will alhave never aspired to power and are incapable of most certainly be maintained. The next Egyptian seriously challenging the regime. president will look for continued military, ecoSpeculation about a Muslim Brotherhood takenomic, and political support from Washington. over is also misguided. Whether one thinks of the The Camp David accords with Israel will remain Brotherhood as a progressive Islamist organiza- 424 UÊ 1,, /Ê-/",9Ê UÊ iVi“LiÀÊÓään intact, and we should expect no major geopolitical realignments out of Cairo. Meanwhile, the pace of Egypt’s economic reform could actually slow. Starting in 2004, the government initiated renewed efforts at economic reform, including subsidy cuts and privatization. These policies have come attached to significant social costs in a nation where the state traditionally has dominated the economy. If, in the immediate posttransition period, continued economic reform is deemed overly destabilizing, a new government could slow or suspend economic reform—as Egyptian governments have done in the past. Although who will emerge as Egypt’s next president remains uncertain, it is unlikely that Hosni Mubarak will be sorely missed. His accomplishments have been remarkably thin after 27 years in power. While other countries and regions have experienced significant political and economic development during this period, Egypt has largely languished. Democracy is no closer than when Mubarak entered office, Egypt’s regional influence has waned, corruption and human rights abuses are still common, and the majority of citizens remain poor and vulnerable. Egyptians are frustrated and yearning for change, yet the government has lost all credibility when it comes to political reform. Sadly, the upcoming political transition is unlikely to produce the type of change that Egyptians desperately desire and deserve. N