Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano y Arbitraje de Inversión

Spain Arbitration Review Review Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje Revista ARTÍCULOSdel Club Español del Arbitraje ARTÍCULOS El Arbitraje futuro delde Arbitraje de de inversiones conEuropea la Unión Europea como ElElfuturo del Arbitraje inversiones con lalaUnión Europea como l futuro del futuro del inversiones Arbitraje de con inversiones la Unión con Unión como Europea como Javier Díez-Hochleitner Javier Díez-Hochleitner Javier Díez-Hochleitner Javier Díez-Hochleitner nuevo actor. nuevo actor. uevo actor. nuevo actor. La Responsabilidad de los Árbitros y la Doctrina de los El futuro del Arbitraje de inversiones con la Unión Europea como Javier Díez-Hochleitner Tribunales Truncados Inconveniencia delde arbitraje de de inversión CIADI y de órganos Inconveniencia del arbitraje CIADI yyde nconveniencia Inconveniencia del actor. arbitraje del inversión arbitraje CIADI deinversión inversión y de órganos CIADI deórganos órganos Luis Cordón Procter nuevo regionales arbitrales para America Latina Andrés A.Valarezo Cervantes Valarezo regionales arbitrales para America Latina Andrés A. Valarezo egionales arbitrales regionales paraarbitrales America Latina para America LatinaObjectionsAndrés A. Cervantes Andrés A.Cervantes Cervantes Valarezo Class Arbitration: Here to stay? The Potential Inconveniencia del arbitraje de inversión CIADI y de órganos Julio César González Arango / Against Recognition and Enforcement of Class Arbitral Awards La regionales obligación de de decir verdad de peritos y testigos en en elen Gonzalo Jiménez-Blanco La verdad de yytestigos elel Gonzalo Jiménez-Blanco arbitrales para America Latina a obligación de Laobligación decir obligación verdad dedecir de decir peritos verdad y testigos deperitos peritos en el testigos Andrés A. Cervantes Valarezo Gonzalo Jiménez-Blanco Gonzalo Jiménez-Blanco Santiago Cruz Mantilla Under the New York Convention procedimiento procedimiento arbitral rocedimiento procedimiento arbitral arbitral arbitral La obligación de decir verdad de peritos y testigos en el Gonzalo Jiménez-Blanco Daniela Corchuelo Uribe Tutela in International Arbitration inley Colombia Elinternacional Arbitraje internacional layy nueva paraguaya de de ElElArbitraje internacional lalanueva ley l Arbitraje Arbitraje yinternacional la nueva yley paraguaya nueva ley deparaguaya paraguaya de procedimiento arbitral Antonio Moreno Rodríguez José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez Moreno José Antonio Rodríguez Moreno Rodríguez contratos internacionales contratos internacionales ontratos internacionales contratos internacionalesLatinoamericano y Arbitraje José AntonioJosé Nuevo Constitucionalismo El Arbitraje internacional y la nueva ley paraguaya de Andrés Cervantes Valarezo de Inversión José Antonio Moreno Francisco de Cossío Propiciando Mediación: Una propuesta Francisco González deRodríguez Propiciando Mediación: Una propuesta Francisco González Francisco deGonzález Cossío González deCossío Cossío contratos internacionales ropiciando Mediación: Propiciando Una Mediación: propuesta Una propuesta Duarte G. Henriques Third-Party Funding: A en Protected Investment?deldel laudos sobre Swaps laenjurisprudencia TSJ de de Los laudos sobre Swaps en lala jurisprudencia os laudosLos sobre Los Swaps laudos en sobre la jurisprudencia Swaps jurisprudencia del TSJ de delTSJ TSJ de Perales Francisco González de Cossío Pilar Perales Viscasillas Propiciando Mediación: Una propuesta Pilar Perales Viscasillas Pilar Viscasillas Pilar Perales Viscasillas Madrid Madrid Madrid Madrid A Counterclaim for the Investor’s Breach of International Los laudos sobre Swaps en la jurisprudencia del TSJ de Pilar Perales Viscasillas Coordinación: Bingen Amezaga Rafael Carlos del Human Rights Obligations? An Overview of Coordinación: Bingen Amezaga Coordinación: Bingen Coordinación: Amezaga Bingen Amezaga de de jurisprudencia Panorama francesa Madrid anoramaPanorama deUrbaser Panorama jurisprudencia dejurisprudencia jurisprudencia francesa francesa francesa Rosal Carmona V. Argentina Coordinación: Bingen Amezaga Sobre la posible retroacción del laudo y la Sobre lalaposible retroacción del laudo yylala obre la posible Sobre retroacción posible del retroacción laudo anulado del laudo yanulado laanulado anulado Panorama de jurisprudencia francesa Mauricio París / El Orden Público en las Nuevas Normas Procesales sobre dispar jurisprudencia de los Tribunales Superiores de dispar jurisprudencia de los Tribunales Superiores de ispar jurisprudencia dispar jurisprudencia de losdeTribunales los Superiores Tribunales deSuperiores de Mauricio Rapso Reconocimiento Laudosde Internacionales en Costa RicaPilar Pilar Perales Viscasillas Pilar Perales Viscasillas Perales Viscasillas Pilar Perales Viscasillas Sobre la posible retroacción del laudo anulado y la Justicia usticia Justicia Justicia dispar jurisprudencia de los Involving Tribunales Superiores de Nicolás CostábileViscasillas and Applicable Law in Arbitrations Third-Party Pilar Perales Arbitration and EUEU Competition New Rulings and New Arbitration and Law: New Rulings and New rbitration and Arbitration EU Competition and EUCompetition Law: Competition NewLaw: Rulings Law: New and New Rulings and New Justicia Anthony Lynch Santiago Martínez Lage Funding Agreements Santiago Martínez Lage Santiago Martínez Santiago Lage Martínez Lage Thoughts houghts Thoughts Thoughts Arbitration and EU Competition Law: New Rulings and New Jennifer L. Permesly, La Carga de la Prueba y la Admisibilidad en Santiago Martínez Lage ThoughtsInternacional: Asuntos que merecen una Diego Guevara y Arbitraje temprana Audiencia RECENSIÓN (Katia Fach) RECENSIÓN (Katia Fach) ECENSIÓN RECENSIÓN (Katia Fach) (Katia Fach) Pilar Prados Puchades in International Investment Arbitration, Corruption Investment Arbitration, orruptionCorruption in Corruption International Investment International Investment Arbitration, Ana Morales Ramos / Reporte sobreinin elInternational XII CongresoArbitration, Internacional del Club Español RECENSIÓN (Katia Fach) Oxford University Press 2014 Oxford University Press 2014 Oxford University Oxford Press University 2014 Press 2014 Llamazon Aloysius P.P.Llamazon Aloysius P.Aloysius Llamazon Aloysius Llamazon Luis BravoP.Abolafia / Antonio del Arbitraje, el XI Encuentro del CEA-40, el I desayuno de la Corruption in International Investment Arbitration, Alexandre Marín Marín Comisión Mujeres y los I Diálogos ADR Oxford University Press 2014 Aloysius P. Llamazon 5 N.º N.º 25/2016 55 6 66 6 530/2017 5 6 SPAIN ARBITRATION REVIEW Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje SPAIN ARBITRATION REVIEW Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje Director Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros Subdirectoras Pilar Perales Viscasillas Elena Gutiérrez García de Cortazar Comité de Redacción José María Alonso David Arias José Antonio Caínzos Bernardo Cremades Mercedes Fernández Juan Fernández-Armesto Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros Julio González Soria Antonio Hierro Jesús Remón Club Español del Arbitraje Ferraz, 43. 2.º izda. 28008 Madrid - España Tel.: 91 434 88 82 Fax: 91 377 46 69 e-mail: administracion@clubarbitraje.com http://www.clubarbitraje.com ISSN: 1888-4377 Depósito Legal: M-3838-2008 © CEA. Reservados todos los derechos. Preimpresión e Impresión: Campillo Nevado, S.A. Antonio González Porras, 35-37 28019 MADRID Printed in Spain Sumario ARTÍCULOS La Responsabilidad de los Árbitros y la Doctrina de los Tribunales Truncados (Luis Cordón Procter)..................................................................... 9 Class Arbitration: Here to stay? The Potential Objections Against Recognition and Enforcement of Class Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention (Julio César González Arango / Santiago Cruz Mantilla) . 19 Tutela in International Arbitration in Colombia (Daniela Corchuelo Uribe) ........................................................................................................... 49 Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano y Arbitraje de Inversión (Andrés Cervantes Valarezo) ............................................................................. 81 Third-Party Funding: A Protected Investment? (Duarte G. Henriques).... 101 A Counterclaim for the Investor’s Breach of International Human Rights Obligations? An Overview of Urbaser V. Argentina (Rafael Carlos del Rosal Carmona) ........................................................................................... 141 El Orden Público en las Nuevas Normas Procesales sobre Reconocimiento de Laudos Internacionales en Costa Rica (Mauricio París / Mauricio Rapso) ....................................................................................................... 153 Applicable Law in Arbitrations Involving Third-Party Funding Agreements (Nicolás Costábile and Anthony Lynch) ............................................... 165 La Carga de la Prueba y la Admisibilidad en Arbitraje Internacional: Asuntos que merecen una temprana Audiencia (Jennifer L. Permesly, Diego Guevara y Pilar Prados Puchades)......................................................... 183 Reporte sobre el XII Congreso Internacional del Club Español del Arbitraje, el XI Encuentro del CEA-40, el I desayuno de la Comisión Mujeres y los I Diálogos ADR (Ana Morales Ramos / Luis Bravo Abolafia / Antonio Alexandre Marín Marín) ................................................................... 207 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS Y LA DOCTRINA DE LOS TRIBUNALES TRUNCADOS Luis Cordón Procter1 Abstract: The Supreme Court of Spain recently issued a ruling stating the responsibility of two of the three arbitrators of an Arbitral Tribunal who decided and rendered an award by themselves excluding the third one. On the basis of this ruling, we analyse the track record of the whole proceeding: the award, the confirmed action to annul it by the High Court of Justice of Madrid, and the action claiming damages against the arbitrators that took place along First Instance, Appeal and Cassation appeal. Moreover, despite the fact the Supreme Court ruling did not apply to the relevant case, we are considering the truncated Tribunal doctrine, since it was raised by the appellant during the proceeding. Introducción En los procedimientos arbitrales tanto árbitros como instituciones arbitrales deben tener un ojo puesto en el artículo 21 de nuestra vigente Ley de Arbitraje2. Y no por temor, sino para percatarse de la importante responsabilidad que tienen frente a las partes que confían en ellos al encomendarles la resolución de sus discrepancias. Y decimos lo anterior porque recientemente irrumpía una sentencia de nuestro Tribunal Supremo, la número 102/2017, de 15 de febrero3, que resolvía sobre la responsabilidad de dos árbitros -Presidente del Tribunal y coárbitro designado por una de las partes- que dictaron un laudo prescindiendo del tercero -coárbitro designado por la otra parte- en el seno de un Tribunal Arbitral, entendiendo que dicho actuar suponía una temeridad proscrita por el artículo 21 de la Ley de Arbitraje. Una atenta lectura de la sentencia basta para constatar que el supuesto enjuiciado colma el artículo 21 de la Ley de Arbitraje, de hecho, casi lo desborda, porque a nadie escapa que emitir un laudo prescindiendo en las deliberaciones finales, en la votación, decisión y remisión final del laudo de uno de los miembros del órgano colegiado se muestra, cuanto menos, poco prudente. Pero no es el objetivo de estas líneas criticar dicha actuación particular, sino extraer conclusiones y aprendizajes que emergen del supuesto enjuiciado en dicha resolución. Lo que viene a decir la sentencia, en síntesis, es que un laudo dictado en el seno de un Tribunal Arbitral en que no haya intervenido uno de sus miembros en el proceso de deliberación y decisión final es un laudo incompleto por imperfecto. Esa imperfección se proyecta tanto de forma endógena en la gestación del proceso decisorio, como de forma exógena porque les veda a las partes seguridad jurídica ya que no van a poder recibir un laudo correctamente emitido. 1 2 3 Socio Litigación y Arbitraje Cases & Lacambra Ley 60/2003, de 23 de diciembre. Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 10 Cordón Procter Aclara la sentencia además que el supuesto enjuiciado no integra la denominada doctrina de los Tribunales truncados que, si bien analizaremos, adelantamos ya se trata de una conducta deliberadamente dinamitadora del procedimiento arbitral, y que puede llegar a desplegar el árbitro nombrado por una de las partes con pretensión de frustrar el buen fin del arbitraje. 1. Necesario repaso de los antecedentes. La anulación del laudo por vulneración del orden público. Antes de analizar la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo a que nos hemos referido sobre estas líneas que declara la responsabilidad de los dos árbitros por su actuar en la fase final del procedimiento arbitral, conviene repasar sus antecedentes. Solamente así podremos tener una fotografía lo más completa posible de lo realmente acontecido. En ese ejercicio partimos de la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid número 200/2011, de 10 de junio4, resolución que, estimando la acción de anulación por vulneración del orden público del laudo arbitral, es de la que podemos extraer con claridad el resumen de los hechos que quedaron probados y que resultaron determinantes, por su efecto prejudicial de cosa juzgada, para finalmente apreciar la responsabilidad de los árbitros en el procedimiento posterior. Así, el procedimiento de anulación sustanciado ante la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid trae causa del arbitraje precedente en que se discutía en relación con un contrato de distribución suscrito entre PUMA AG (en lo sucesivo, PUMA) y ESTUDIO 2000, S.A., contrato de fecha 12 de diciembre de 1994, procedimiento que finalizó con un laudo arbitral dictado el día 2 de mayo de 2010, otorgando una cuantiosa indemnización cercana a los 100 millones de euros. Del análisis pormenorizado de la sentencia se desprende que el procedimiento arbitral discurrió con normalidad hasta que el mismo encaró su recta final, esto es, hasta que llegó la fase crítica de toma de decisión en el seno del órgano colegiado. La sentencia5 declara probado que: Tal como resulta de lo actuado, después de un intenso proceso de discusión en el curso de reiteradas reuniones celebradas en el transcurso del proceso arbitral, tras la celebrada el 28 de mayo de 2010 se estuvo cerca de alcanzar una decisión del colegio por unanimidad, posibilidad de acuerdo unánime que, finalmente, quebró en el transcurso de la última sesión que tuvo lugar con participación de todos los árbitros, la tarde del 31 de mayo de 2010. El día 2 de junio se reunieron dos de los árbitros, el Sr. R. y el Sr. T.; fruto de dicha reunión es el laudo que fue notificado a las partes. El presidente del colegio arbitral, Sr. R., remitió copia del texto al tercer árbitro, Sr. G.I. (quien, como se ha indicado, no participó en la reunión en la que aquel se fraguó, a la que no fue convocado, constando a los demás miembros del colegio que se encontraba de viaje fuera de Madrid) el mismo día 2 de junio, a las 21:11, por email. También el día 2 de junio, a las 21:14, el secretario del colegio arbitral envió por idéntico conducto copia del referido texto como “ laudo definitivo” a los letrados de las partes, haciéndoseles llegar más tarde ese mismo día un ejemplar firmado por los Sres. R. y T., con la siguiente leyenda en la antefirma: “Este laudo es firmado, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 37.3 de la 4 5 Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 200/2011, de 10 de junio. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2011\256573. Fundamento de Derecho 4º Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 200/2011, de 10 de junio. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2011\256573 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS 11 Ley de Arbitraje , por D. L. J. R. G. y por D. M. T.R., formando entre ambos la mayoría de los miembros del Colegio Arbitral requerida por el citado artículo. No consta la firma de D. Santiago G.I. y M. por no haber prestado aún su conformidad al presente laudo, cuya notificación a las partes se considera no obstante conveniente realizar a la mayor brevedad posible, de acuerdo con el interés en tal sentido expresado por las mismas durante el presente arbitraje”. No existe controversia sobre estos hechos, que, por lo demás, se encuentran documentados en autos y han sido reconocidos por los miembros del colegio arbitral al ser examinados como testigos. Podemos extraer por lo tanto del relato de hechos probados anterior que hasta la tarde del 31 de mayo de 2010 el procedimiento no se había “viciado”, y es solamente lo ocurrido con posterioridad lo que se considera un supuesto que vulnera el orden público de forma tal que determina la anulación del laudo arbitral. ¿Y que ocurre con posterioridad a esa tarde de 31 de mayo del año 2010?. Pues resulta que ese día, a pesar de estarse cerca de alcanzar un acuerdo unánime, finalmente no se consigue y la decisión es diferida. Y es a partir de ese momento en el que se contamina todo el procedimiento, por cuanto dos de los árbitros -Presidente del Tribunal y co-árbitro nombrado por la parte- deciden mantener una nueva reunión solamente dos días después, reunión a la que no convocan al tercer árbitro del órgano colegiado constándoles además que éste último se encontraba de viaje fuera de Madrid6. En dicha reunión a dos se alcanza una decisión y se plasma en un laudo arbitral que se remite ese mismo día tanto al árbitro ausente como a las partes del procedimiento, tratando por eso de dar un halo de regularidad a su actuar mediante la inclusión de una mención en el laudo según la cual el mismo se firmaba de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 37.3 de la Ley de Arbitraje, en mayoría y constatando la ausencia de la firma del tercero de los árbitros por no haber prestado aún su conformidad al mismo. Aunque la sentencia no entra en este análisis, obviamente el contenido del artículo 37.3 de la Ley de Arbitraje no está pensando en un supuesto de conformidad diferida al laudo arbitral. Dicho precepto establece: Todo laudo deberá constar por escrito y ser firmado por los árbitros, quienes podrán dejar constancia de su voto a favor o en contra. Cuando haya más de un árbitro, bastarán las firmas de la mayoría de los miembros del colegio arbitral o sólo la de su presidente, siempre que se manifiesten las razones de la falta de una o más firmas. Es decir, el artículo transcrito no está pensado para deliberar, decidir y firmar un laudo en ausencia de uno de los miembros del colegio arbitral, para después recabar una presunta conformidad que, dicho sea de paso, no se sabe si se tendrá. La previsión legal lo que permite es que en el seno de un Tribunal Arbitral se flexibilice el formalismo de firma del laudo, permitiendo que lo firmen solamente la mayoría de los miembros o solamente su presidente, pero es obvio que siempre que dicho laudo haya sido deliberado y adoptado por todos ellos. Y el artículo, para permitir relajar dicha exigencia de firmas obliga a manifestar las razones por las que faltan una o más firmas, como pueden ser problemas de 6 Lo aquí descrito se extrae del relato de hechos probados de la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 200/2011, de 10 de junio. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2011\256573. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 12 Cordón Procter agenda para firmar, viajes o cualesquiera otros motivos objetivamente razonables. Pero nunca puede ser razón que la mayoría firme faltando la conformidad al contenido del laudo de uno de sus miembros. En ese sentido la doctrina7 tiene pacíficamente declarada la importancia de que el laudo revista forma escrita para que quede constancia de su contenido y de las firmas de los árbitros en los siguientes términos: “Resulta importante no solo que las partes conozcan el sentido del fallo sino su contenido, con el fin de demostrar la satisfacción de otros requisitos esenciales del laudo, como su motivación. La constancia de las firmas es igualmente un requisito fundamental encaminado a la satisfacción de la necesaria firma por los coárbitros o, en su defecto, la indicación de las razones que justifiquen su ausencia”. Y lo que está claro además es que con nuestra vigente Ley de Arbitraje la falta de firma de uno de los árbitros no conlleva que se adhieren a la opinión mayoritaria, como sí ocurría en el derogado artículo 33 de la anterior Ley de Arbitraje8 que sí recogía lo siguiente: “El laudo será firmado por los árbitros, que podrán hacer constar su parecer discrepante. Si alguno de los árbitros no lo firmase, se entenderá que se adhiere a la decisión de la mayoría”. Y consta probado que en su actuar los dos árbitros eran plenamente conscientes de lo anterior al incluir en el laudo la mención expresa de que el tercer árbitro no había prestado todavía su conformidad al mismo. Por tanto, a la vista de los hechos considera la sentencia que venimos analizando que el tercer árbitro resultó excluido de la última fase de deliberación y decisión aseverando: “No solo no se advirtió al Sr. G.I. de la celebración de la reunión de la que salió la decisión notificada a las partes como laudo , sino que tampoco se le permitió participar de otro modo ni influir en alguna medida en la conformación de la decisión final del órgano arbitral: tal como resulta del email del Sr. R. fechado el 2 de junio de 2010, el acuerdo alcanzado por este último y el Sr. T. se le presentó al Sr. G.I. como una decisión definitiva, que no admitía ningún tipo de contribución y que, además, iba a ser notificada de forma inmediata a las partes, como así acaeció, convirtiendo con ello en ilusoria incluso la posibilidad que se decía brindar al Sr. G.I. de formular un voto particular". Por tanto, el hecho de haber prescindido de uno de los árbitros en la última fase de deliberación, votación, dictado y remisión del laudo determina la anulación del laudo por entenderse vulnerado el orden público. Y en este sentido, si bien en otras ocasiones hemos podido discrepar de la laxa y holgada interpretación que ha llegado a hacerse del orden público, en este caso nos parece del todo acertada. Y es que entiende el Tribunal jurisdiccional que lo ocurrido en el caso enjuiciado vulnera principios o derechos fundamentales pues genera indefensión, y aunque la resolución no nos dice a quién se le causa, es evidente que está pensando en las partes destinatarias del laudo. 7 8 Seguimos en este punto los comentarios a la Ley de Arbitraje, editado por el Consejo General del Notariado, coord. Carlos González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón. Comentario al artículo 37.3 de la Ley de Arbitraje por Jose María Alonso Puig (pág. 737 y ss.). Ley 36/1988, de 5 de diciembre. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS 13 La sentencia9 concluye su argumentación en torno a la vulneración del orden público así: la indebida conformación de la decisión, mejor aún, del acto decisorio reflejado en el laudo que pone fin a la contienda (no se hace referencia a otra cosa en la demanda), entraña, sin duda, indefensión, proscrita por el artículo 24 de la Constitución, pilar esencial del orden público, susceptible por ello de fundamentar una acción de anulación del laudo. Por lo tanto, la sentencia analizada terminaba anulando el laudo de 2 de mayo de 2010 por haberse deliberado y adoptado en ausencia de uno de los miembros del Tribunal Arbitral. 2. La acción de responsabilidad de los árbitros que emerge tras la anulación del laudo arbitral. Abocadas las partes a un nuevo procedimiento arbitral tras la anulación del laudo de 2 de mayo de 2010 en los términos ya analizados, PUMA pulsó el botón y activó el contenido del artículo 21 de la Ley de Arbitraje ejercitando una acción de reclamación de daños y perjuicios contra el actuar de los dos árbitros pretendiendo una indemnización frente a cada uno de ellos de 750.000 -€, importe que había sido percibido por su desempeño en el procedimiento arbitral que fue objeto de anulación. Dicho procedimiento fue conocido en primera instancia por un Juzgado de Madrid, que en fecha 20 de septiembre de 2013 dictó sentencia10 íntegramente estimatoria de la demanda que en síntesis entendía conculcado por parte de los dos árbitros el artículo 21 de la Ley de Arbitraje en los siguientes términos: “los demandados incurrieron en un error manifiesto, grave e inexcusable, que integra la responsabilidad prevista en el art. 21 de la LA, e impone a estos la obligación de indemnizar a la actora con los daños y perjuicios causados que, cuanto menos, deben cuantificarse en las cantidades que percibieron de la demandante por el desempeño de su competido, pues debió tramitarse otro procedimiento arbitral, ya que el laudo fue declarado nulo por ser contrario al orden público, al haber infringido los demandados el principio de colegialidad”. Frente a dicha sentencia de primera instancia recurrieron en apelación los dos árbitros debiendo destacar aquí, por lo que más adelante se verá, que se despliega entre sus recursos como argumento el hecho de que el tercer árbitro actuó de forma obstruccionista en la fase final del arbitraje citando a tal fin la doctrina de los Tribunales truncados. La sentencia11 de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid que resolvió dicho recurso parte de la vinculación de los hechos probados en la sentencia de anulación del laudo que ya hemos analizado, declarando su efecto prejudicial de cosa juzgada y su inmutabilidad. Sobre la base de lo anterior, e incluso utilizando la analogía con lo que ocurre en el seno de los órganos colegiados en sede jurisdiccional, la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid que resuelve el recurso de apelación parte de la 9 10 11 Fundamento de Derecho 3º Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 200/2011, de 10 de junio. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2011\256573 Sentencia del Juzgado de Primera Instancia 43 de Madrid, de fecha 20 de septiembre de 2013. Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 449/2014, de 27 de octubre de 2014. Referencia Aranzadi JUR 2016\247028 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 14 Cordón Procter premisa siguiente12: “necesaria intervención del miembro del tribunal colegiado en la deliberación y votación final producida”. Y solamente un poco más adelante incluso afirma: “la participación e intervención en la deliberación y votación final de todos los miembros del tribunal arbitral o jurisdiccional es consustancial al principio de colegialidad”. Tras esos razonamientos, la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid termina desestimando sendos recursos de apelación, confirmando así la resolución del Juzgado de instancia y declarando la existencia de responsabilidad de los dos árbitros por temeridad en su actuar al considerar que13: “se produjo ese error manifiesto, grave e inexcusable de prescindir del tercer árbitro en la deliberación final y acuerdo adoptado, impidiendo su participación y voto formal y material del laudo, confundiéndolo con la facultad de adoptar el laudo por mayoría”. Se considera por tanto que el haber prescindido del tercer árbitro en la fase final del procedimiento se confunde con la facultad de adoptar un laudo en mayoría, y eso es determinante de la responsabilidad por una actuación temeraria. 3. Los recursos de casación contra la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid y la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo que los resuelve. Contra la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid que declaraba la responsabilidad de ambos árbitros se interpusieron sendos recursos extraordinarios por infracción procesal y recursos de casación, resultando en trámite de admisión ante el Tribunal Supremo inadmitidos los de infracción procesal y siguiendo adelante solamente los de casación, a los que se opuso en tiempo y forma PUMA. Los argumentos desplegados por los recurrentes en sus recursos de casación eran en esencia: (i).- haber calificado la actuación como temeraria prescindiendo en el análisis de la conducta de si hubo intencionalidad; (ii).- la asimilación de la temeridad al error manifiesto, grave e inexcusable. La sentencia14 del Tribunal Supremo entra a resolver ambos recursos de forma conjunta y basta una somera lectura para percatarse de que sube el tono de reproche frente a la actuación enjuiciada para acabar desestimando de plano los mismos. Despacha el primer argumento desplegado por los recurrentes manifestando que la temeridad no tiene que ser intencional y desarrolla lo anterior como sigue15: “La temeridad se identifica con una negligencia inexcusable, con un error manifiesto y grave, carente de justificación, que no se anuda a la anulación del laudo, sino a una acción arriesgada por parte de quienes conocen su oficio y debieron aplicarlo en interés de quienes les encomendaron llevar a buen fin el arbitraje”. 12 13 14 15 Fundamento de Derecho 3ª, apartado 2, de la Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 449/2014, de 27 de octubre de 2014. Referencia Aranzadi JUR 2016\247028. Fundamento de Derecho 3ª, apartado 3, de la Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid 449/2014, de 27 de octubre de 2014. Referencia Aranzadi JUR 2016\247028. Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Fundamento de Derecho 2º, apartado 3º Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS 15 Desde nuestro punto de vista lo que mejor define la actuación desplegada por los dos árbitros del razonamiento transcrito es precisamente la referencia a una “acción arriesgada”. Compartimos el criterio de que con su actuación los árbitros corrieron y aceptaron un riesgo. Correr un riesgo significa estar expuesto a no verificarse alguna cosa16. Y eso es precisamente lo que detona la temeridad que se les imputa y de las que se les hace responsables. Continúa la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo con la misma contundencia indicando17: “A una conducta de quien ignora con arreglo a una mínima pauta de razonabilidad los derechos de quienes encargaron el arbitraje y las atribuciones propias de los árbitros, desnaturalizando en suma el curso arbitral sin posibilidad de que pudiera salir adelante el laudo correctamente emitido, como así fue, con el consiguiente daño”. Lo anterior refleja el reproche que se les hace a los árbitros por haber permitido salir adelante un laudo imperfecto, con merma de seguridad jurídica para sus destinatarios, motivo que recordemos fue el que llevó a la anulación del laudo por vulneración del orden público. Y llegamos siguiendo el razonamiento de la sentencia a la siguiente frase que de forma lapidaria manifiesta: “A una conducta, en definitiva, insólita o insospechada que está al margen del buen juicio de cualquiera”. Huelgan mayores comentarios sobre dicha aseveración cuyo contenido breve resulta no obstante harto revelador del parecer del órgano jurisdiccional. En el mismo razonamiento de la sentencia continúa el alto Tribunal diciendo: “Llevar adelante la regla del dos contra uno obtenido mediante la eliminación del tercer árbitro de los debates y votación no es posible, ni está en la sentencia de 21 de marzo de 1991, que nada tiene que ver con este caso, puesto que en aquella existió deliberación y voto del laudo por parte de todos ellos, si bien fue redactado por quienes votaron a favor, lo que es distinto del hecho de que dos árbitros puedan excluir al tercero de la deliberación y votación del laudo”. Afirma por tanto el Tribunal Supremo que no es posible prescindir de uno de los árbitros en la fase de deliberación y votación del laudo, y es precisamente esa actuación la que implica una temeridad suficiente para activar la responsabilidad contenida en el artículo 21 de la Ley de Arbitraje y hacerles responder de los daños y perjuicios causados con su actuar, razón por la que se desestiman los recursos de casación. Puesto que en el argumentario desplegado por las representaciones de los dos árbitros se defendía su actuar cargando tintas sobre la actitud obstruccionista del tercer árbitro desplegada en la fase final del arbitraje, la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo aprovecha para tratar la doctrina de los Tribunales truncados, si bien acaba decidiendo que no resulta de aplicación y la desestima entendiendo que la actuación del tercer árbitro no puede ser incardinada en dicho supuesto. Lo tratamos seguidamente. 16 17 Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española. Fundamento de Derecho 2º, apartado 3º Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 16 Cordón Procter 4. La doctrina de los Tribunales truncados referida en la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo. Aprovecha la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo analizada para abordar al final de su fundamentación el hecho de que el supuesto enjuiciado no integra la conocida como doctrina de los Tribunales truncados. L a d o c t r i n a d e l o s Tr i b u n a l e s t r u n c a d o s h a c e t i e m p o q u e v i a j a internacionalmente, con distintas soluciones según nos encontremos ante una institución arbitral u otra, ante un arbitraje “ad hoc” o incluso ante la jurisdicción pues dicha doctrina tampoco le resulta ajena, motivo por el cual los recurrentes en su recurso ya citaban tanto resoluciones internacionales18 como las Directrices de la IBA19 para tratar de defender su actuación durante la fase final del arbitraje. La doctrina del Tribunal truncado se refiere a la situación en que en el seno de un Tribunal arbitral uno de los árbitros -que lo será de los nombrados por una de las partes que ya se vislumbran como menos favorecidas por el arbitraje- con una intención netamente obstaculizadora del procedimiento arbitral en una fase ya muy avanzada y cercano su final, articula su renuncia con la intención de favorecer a la parte que le propuso. El problema que surge entonces es dilucidar si debe recomponerse el Tribunal arbitral o bien si hay que seguir adelante con el Tribunal restante, del que se dice a partir de ese momento que se “trunca”. Las soluciones son distintas en los diferentes Reglamentos de las distintas instituciones arbitrales, si bien es cierto que el intento de los recurrentes en el caso que estamos analizando era interesante al invocar las Directrices de la IBA, que en lo que aquí interesa establecen20: Cuando un tribunal está compuesto por tres árbitros, puede ocurrir que un árbitro renuncie, se rehúse a cooperar o de alguna otra manera no participe en el procedimiento, en una etapa tardía y crítica (e.g., durante las deliberaciones). En tales circunstancias, reemplazarlo puede no ser una opción, ya que retrasaría e interrumpiría el procedimiento excesivamente. Sin embargo, a falta de una autorización específica, los dos árbitros restantes pueden no estar facultados para dictar un laudo válido y ejecutable. La mayoría (pero no todos) de los reglamentos de arbitraje permiten que los dos árbitros restantes en tal situación continúen como un tribunal “truncado” y dicten el laudo. Cuando las partes no escogen un reglamento de arbitraje (o cuando el reglamento escogido no aborda el tema), las partes pueden facultar en la cláusula arbitral a un tribunal “truncado” para proceder a dictar el laudo. Lo cierto es que nuestra Ley de Arbitraje no prevé una solución expresa a dicha situación, y como hemos adelantado sobre estas líneas la previsión del artículo 37.3 de la misma en relación con la falta de la firma del árbitro díscolo no permite seguir adelante con el arbitraje. No obstante lo anterior, la sentencia que venimos analizando no aborda la cuestión, lo que hubiera resultado muy interesante para conocer el criterio actual del Tribunal Supremo, puesto que parte del hecho probado de que la conducta en ese caso del tercer árbitro no fue obstruccionista o dilatoria en la tramitación. 18 19 20 Sentencia del Tribunal Federal de Suiza en el caso Ivan Milutinovic PIM vs Deutsche Babcock AG. IBA Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses. IBA Guidelines for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses, Guideline 6 (34). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS 17 Afirma21: “Hecho probado de la sentencia es que el tercer árbitro no mantuvo una conducta obstruccionista o dilatoria en la tramitación, intentando persuadir a los demás sobre su postura divergente, ni intervino en el debate decisorio final donde se dictó el laudo definitivo, forzando a los dos árbitros a dictar el laudo, por razón del tiempo transcurrido, teniendo en cuenta que no había finalizado el periodo de deliberación entre los árbitros y que no existía premura para dictar el laudo”. Y tras esto recoge la sentencia22 del Tribunal Supremo la fundamentación sobre este particular ya emanada de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid cuando manifiesta en relación con la doctrina de los Tribunales truncados lo siguiente: “tiene como finalidad esencial combatir los conciertos intencionados entre un árbitro y la parte que lo nombró, conciertos que se traducen en la necesidad de reintegrar el tribunal arbitral mediante la designación de un nuevo árbitro, lo que conlleva una objetiva dilación y, en su caso, la necesidad de volver a practicar las actuaciones ante el nuevo tribunal reconstituido, por razón de la dimisión o renuncia estratégica de aquel árbitro de parte”. Todo ello para terminar su decisión el Tribunal Supremo entendiendo que nada de eso ocurrió en el caso enjuiciado, donde el tercer árbitro nada hizo que impidiera funcionar al órgano colegiado, de forma que sí podrían haber deliberado, votado y dictado juntos el laudo arbitral, ya fuera por unanimidad o ya fuera por mayoría, pero con participación, eso sí, de todos ellos y no dejándolo a una suerte de conformidad diferida de la que en realidad no se disponía. Lo ocurrido, a saber, que no le fue permitido al tercer árbitro intervenir en el debate final, ni participar de la redacción del laudo justifica que se confirme la existencia de responsabilidad, fundamentalmente por haber sido excluido al haber mostrado disconformidad previa. 5. Conclusiones Como ya anunciábamos al comienzo de nuestra disertación, lo relevante del análisis realizado es poder extraer conclusiones y aprendizajes que emergen del caso examinado para así ser plenamente conscientes de las responsabilidades que nos atañen a fin de velar por la pureza del procedimiento arbitral de principio a fin. Así, podemos considerar el corolario de todo lo expuesto: —La importancia de velar por la pureza del procedimiento arbitral, y no perder fuerza ni energía llegado el final puesto que la actuación en el seno del Tribunal Arbitral analizada es considerada motivo para anular el laudo y declarar la responsabilidad de los árbitros, y así lo consideran los cuatro órganos jurisdiccionales intervinientes en el caso analizado. —Hemos visto que el común denominador de todas las resoluciones analizadas es que todos los integrantes del Tribunal Arbitral deben poder participar en el proceso de deliberación y adopción de las decisiones, sin que quepa pretender una suerte de conformidad diferida al laudo arbitral en cuya gestación no se ha participado. 21 22 Fundamento de Derecho 2º, apartado 4º Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Fundamento de Derecho 2º, apartado 4º Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 102/2017, de 15 de febrero. Referencia Aranzadi RJ 2017\400. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 18 Cordón Procter —La participación e intervención en la deliberación y votación final de todos los miembros del Tribunal Arbitral o jurisdiccional es consustancial al principio de colegialidad, razón que hace ineludible la participación de todos los integrantes del Tribunal en esa relevante fase final. —La ausencia de uno de los árbitros durante el desenlace del procedimiento arbitral -deliberación, votación y decisión- es un supuesto que nuestros Tribunales consideran genera indefensión suficiente como para conculcar el orden público. —La falta de firma del laudo por uno de los miembros del Tribunal Arbitral no implica per se una presunta adhesión a la opinión mayoritaria allí contenida, como sí ocurría con la derogada Ley de Arbitraje de 1988. —Se ha perdido una excelente oportunidad para conocer la postura actual del Tribunal Supremo en un supuesto de Tribunal truncado en que, de apreciarse efectivamente una conducta obstruccionista, dictaminara si sobre la base del artículo 37.3 se permite seguir adelante o bien si se debería reconstituir el Tribunal. —Es importante también recordar que al regular la cláusula arbitral se abre una excelente oportunidad para prever qué ocurre en caso de darse una situación de Tribunal truncado, según recomiendan las Directrices de la IBA. —En cualquier caso, lo expuesto nos recuerda también la importancia de disponer de un seguro de responsabilidad civil que proteja el actuar de los árbitros. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? THE POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CLASS ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION Julio César González Arango1 / Santiago Cruz Mantilla2 Resumen: El arbitraje de clase es un mecanismo de resolución de disputas colectivas, desarrollado principalmente en los Estados Unidos de América y de forma dispersa y limitada en otros países. Algunos comentaristas han anotado que el arbitraje de clase puede ser especialmente útil en el ámbito internacional, entre otras razones, por la posibilidad teórica de obtener el reconocimiento y ejecución de laudos arbitrales a través de la Convención de Nueva York. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha no hay casos reportados al respecto. Este artículo se propone analizar si el arbitraje de clase se vería beneficiado con la aplicación de la Convención de Nueva York, o si, por el contrario, existen potenciales objeciones insuperables al reconocimiento de laudos arbitrales de clase bajo la citada convención. Para ello, se hará un recuento de la evolución del arbitraje de clase en los Estados Unidos de América y en otras jurisdicciones, y seguidamente se analizará la viabilidad de las potenciales objeciones al reconocimiento y ejecución de laudos arbitrales de clase bajo la Convención de Nueva York. “Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.” California Supreme Court of Justice. Keating v. Southland Corp. 31 Cal.3d 584 [1982]. I. INTRODUCTION 1. Efficient large scale multi-party dispute resolution mechanisms are arguably essential in current times. The Deutsche Telekom case, in Germany, is an eloquent example of this. Between 2001 and 2003, Deutsche Telekom was sued in over 13,000 claims for alleged misrepresentation in its prospectus when it went public. The court in charge of all cases stated it would take 15 years to solve all of them and called for the enactment of new procedural rules to resolve collective disputes3. Subsequently, the German Parliament enacted the so called “KapMuG”, a temporary test legislation on collective redress, which is still temporarily into force, until 20204. 2. The Deutsche Telekom case, as well as so many others around the world, justify the existence of efficient resolution mechanisms for this sort of disputes. The answer to this necessity has been twofold: on the one hand, the enactment of legislation providing for class actions (or similar mechanisms) in some States, whether 1 2 3 4 Co-head of the Dispute Resolution practice at Philippi Prietocarrizosa Ferrero DU & Uría (Bogotá, Colombia). Senior Associate of the Dispute Resolution team of Philippi Prietocarrizosa Ferrero DU & Uría (Bogotá, Colombia). See: James M. Newland, Louise F. Moher and Lynda Morgan, ‘Multi-party litigation in Germany: the KapMuG in Action’. (2008) Class Action J. Vol VI no 4. pp. 424-425. See: Peter Bert, ‘Class Actions in Germany: KapMuG Extended until 2020 – Modest change of scope’. < http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2012/07/class-actions-in-germany-kapmug-exte nded-until-2020-modest-change-of-scope/> (accessed September 15th, 2017). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 20 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla following or not the United States of America (hereinafter, the “US”) Class Action Model5. And on the other hand, more predominantly in the US, class arbitration. 3. As it will be discussed in this paper6, class arbitration rose in the US in the decade of the 1980s and peaked in the decade of 2000, when two arbitral institutions, the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter, the “AAA”) and JAMS implemented class arbitration rules. There are also reports of class arbitrations or of decisions on its viability in other jurisdictions7. However, recent decisions of the US Supreme Court severely restrict class arbitration and suggest it might have lost momentum, at least in the US. 4. Class actions in general remain a contentious matter. While its supporters argue that they increase efficiency and consistency of results8 and help deterring corporate wrongdoing9; its contradictors -among them, the International Chamber of Commerce- allege that they violate due process and generate a risk of ‘legal blackmail’10. 5. Naturally, class arbitration has also many detractors, including the US Supreme Court of Justice, which has gone as far as sustaining that class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration”11. They face counter arguments from class arbitration supporters, that have predicted that class arbitration will expand internationally12 and have argued that it has the potential to be especially useful in the international context, inter alia because of the theoretical facility to obtain recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards via the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter, the “NY Convention”)13. 6. Nevertheless, to date there are no reported cases of recognition and enforcement of international class arbitral awards. Therefore, this paper will try to predict whether class arbitration would be truly benefitted from the application of the NY Convention to recognition of international class arbitral awards, or, if conversely, the current state of affairs regarding class actions and class arbitration around the world would hamper the probabilities to obtain recognition of class arbitral awards under the NY Convention. 7. For such purpose, this paper will be divided into the following sections: after this Introduction, Section II will refer to the history and evolution of class arbitra5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 See infra Section II(A)(ii). See infra Section II(A). See infra Section II(B). S.I. Strong, ‘Enforcing class arbitration in the international sphere: due process and public policy concerns’ (2008) 30 U Pa J Intl L 1, pp. 15 - 16 (Enforcing class arbitration) Deborah R. Hensler, ‘The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview’ in Deborah R. Hensler, Christopher Hodges, and Magdalena Tulibacka The Globalization of Class Actions (SAGE Publications, 2009), 9 (The Globalization of Class Actions) Freyer D H and Litt G A, ‘Desirability of International Class Arbitration’ (2008) Contemporary Issues in Intl Commercial Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers p. 171. See infra Section II(A)(iii). S.I. Strong, ‘Class arbitration outside the United States: Reading the tea leaves’ (2009) ICC Institute of World Business Law, Dossier VII - Multiparty Arbitration, Forthcoming; University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-36 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517272> accessed September 19th, 2017 (Class arbitration outside the US) S.I. Strong, ‘Resolving mass legal disputes through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada compared’ (2012) 37 North Carolina J of Intl L & Commercial Reg 922, pp. 942-943 (US and Canada compared) Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 21 tion and the state of the art both in the US and in other jurisdictions, Section III will exhaust an analysis on the likelihood of success of the potential objections that could be raised against recognition and enforcement of class arbitral awards under the NY Convention and Section IV will contain some closing remarks. II. CLASS ARBITRATION: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS 8. Class arbitration emerged in the US as reaction to some corporations’ extended practice of including arbitration clauses in their contracts of adhesion, with the intention to bind their costumers to solve their disputes individually, thus preventing the risk of being sued in class actions14. Ultimately, when US courts started to rule that class actions could proceed through arbitration, this practice backfired. 9. In this Section, we will summarize the evolution of class arbitration until current times. Firstly, we will focus on class arbitration’s evolution in the US, and subsequently, we will refer to some developments on the matter in other jurisdictions. A. CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE US 10. The history of class arbitration in the US can be segmented into three stages that we have called (i) the Early Stage, (ii) the Golden Years, and (iii) Stolt-Nielsen and its aftermath. (i) The Early Stage 11. Keating v. Southland Corp.15 (“Keating”) is considered to be the first decision ever in the US on class arbitration16. The case involved disputes between one franchisor (Southland) of convenience food stores and franchised operators. Each individual franchising agreement provided for arbitration. While Southland claimed each dispute to be submitted to arbitration on a franchisee-by-franchisee basis, the franchisees had sued Southland in individual and class actions and sustained that the arbitral clauses were not enforceable on adhesion grounds, and that the disputes were not arbitrable. The California Supreme Court held that the fact that the arbitral agreement was contained in a contract of adhesion did not per se make it unenforceable. Moreover, it referred to some of the plaintiffs’ request to order class arbitration which the lower court had not considered, and to support its decision of remanding the case for lower trial court to decide upon such request, it held that the trial court had to analyze whether arbitration would be a proper forum to assure fairness in the case. 12. Subsequently to Keating, while the US Supreme Court developed pro-arbitration case law17, State courts dissimilarly ruled on the possibility to adopt class 14 15 16 17 S.I. Strong, (US and Canada compared) (N. 11) p. 936. 31 Cal.3d 584 [1982]. Gary Born and Claudio Salas, ‘United States Supreme Court and class arbitration: A tragedy of errors, the Symposium’ (2012) J of Dispute Resolution Issue 1, p. 24. American Arbitration Association, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief in support of neither party before the Supreme Court of Justice of the United States in the Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et. al. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. No. 08-1198’ (2009) <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_bri efs_pdfs_07_08_08_1198_NeutralAmCuAAA.authcheckdam.pdf> accessed September 19th, 2017. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 22 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla arbitration18. That continued until 2003, when the US Supreme Court issued the ruling that would open the gates of what we have called the Golden Years of Class Arbitration: Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle19 (“Bazzle”). (ii) The Golden Years 13. In Bazzle the US Supreme Court had to decide upon whether class arbitration was allowed or not, considering the arbitration clauses in the contracts that led to the dispute did not expressly provide for it. The US Supreme Court faced the question of whether the silence of the arbitration clause meant class arbitration was forbidden, or on the contrary, if its silence entailed the viability of class arbitration. The US Supreme Court did not take a stand, but rather it ruled that it was not given to courts to decide, but only an arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to do so. 14. Bazzle prompted the expansion of class arbitration in the US. Firstly, pursuant to Bazzle some lower courts started to endorse class arbitration, in cases in which implicit consent could be inferred20. And secondly, it provoked two arbitral institutions, the AAA21 and JAMS, to issue specialized rules for class arbitration proceedings22, which deserve to be briefly addressed. 15. The AAA and JAMS’ class arbitration rules are adaptations to the arbitration realm of the US Class Action Model, set forth under Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure23, which can be summarized into the following elements: (i) a numerous group of plaintiffs, (ii) with claims derived under the same grounds; (iii) seeking uniform relief, (iv) represented by the same class counsel, and, perhaps most notably, (v) opt-out procedures, meaning that the final ruling will be binding to all members of the class, regardless if they participated in the proceedings of the class or not, unless they exclude themselves from it24. 16. Although they have slight differences to which we will refer below, both sets of rules are essentially similar and for purposes of this paper can be studied together. They are applicable to (i) any dispute arising out of an arbitral agreement providing for arbitration pursuant to them, (ii) whenever a court refers a matter pleaded as a class action to these institutions, or (iii) when a party to a pending arbitration before any of these institutions asserts new claims on behalf of or against a class. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 While class arbitration was allowed in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, courts in states like Alabama, Delaware or Washington came to the opposite conclusion. See: S.I. Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law (OUP, 2013) 9-10. (Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration) 539 U.S. 444 (2003). S.I. Strong (Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration) (n. 16), pp. 11-12. American Arbitration Association (n. 15), p. 9. The AAA issued the “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations” effective as of October 8th, 2003, available at: https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitr ations.pdf (accessed September 20th, 2017); JAMS issued the “Class Action Procedures” rules effective as of May 1st, 2009, available at: https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Proc edures-2009.pdf (accessed September 20th, 2017). S.I. Strong (Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration) (n. 16), p. 43 See: Janet Cooper Alexander, ‘An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States’, (Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective Conference, Geneva, July 2000) <https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf> (accessed September 15th, 2017) Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 23 17. Class arbitration rules of both institutions provide for four phases that are unique to this sort of proceedings: PHASE DESCRIPTION Construction of the Arbitration Clause Award In a partial award subject to immediate court review, the Arbitral Tribunal interprets the arbitration clause to decide if it permits the arbitration to proceed. Class Determination Award In a partial award subject to immediate court review, the Arbitral Tribunal decides on whether the class should be certified. Notice of Class Determination The Arbitral Tribunal shall direct that class members be provided “the best notice practicable under the circumstances”, that shall include a reference that class members may request exclusion, and how and when they can request it. Final Award Final decision on the merits of the dispute. It shall be reasoned, define the class with specificity, state to whom notice was sent, and-if it was the case-identify who were excluded from the class. Any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims shall not be effective unless approved by the arbitral tribunal. 18. As announced above, despite their overall similar structure, the AAA and JAMS class arbitration rules differ, in sum, on the following25: ISSUE AAA JAMS Are the parties allowed to proceed with the arbitration if the arbitral agreement is silent? Yes. The arbitral tribunal shall interpret the arbitration agreement in order to decide on the continuation of the proceedings. Is the Arbitral Tribunal required to render reasoned clause construction and class determination awards? Yes. These requirements are not expressly set forth under this set of rules. Do the proceedings stay if parties seek review of the clause construction award? Yes, the AAA rules set forth a 30-day stay of the proceedings. No, this stay is not provided under the JAMS rules. Have the parties any limitation regarding selection of arbitrators? Yes, at least one arbitrator must be selected from the AAA’s national roster of class action arbitrators. No. Are proceedings presumed to be confidential? No. Yes. 25 Following Meredith W. Nissen, ‘Class action arbitrations. AAA vs. JAMS: Different approaches to a new concept’ (2005) Dispute Resolution Magazine 19, pp. 19-20. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 24 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla 19. While, as the AAA has stated, prior to Bazzle few cases were carried out as class arbitrations26, when these specialized rules came into force, class arbitration erupted in the US: by 2012, over 307 class proceedings had been filed with the AAA27. Nevertheless, the growth of class arbitration would be interrupted by the 2010 US Supreme Court ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp.28 (“Stolt-Nielsen”). (iii) Stolt-Nielsen and its aftermath. 20. In Stolt-Nielsen the US Supreme Court vacated a Construction of the Arbitration Clause Award in a class arbitration under the AAA rules. The arbitral clause in the contracts underlying the dispute was silent on the viability of class arbitration, and pursuant to Bazzle the arbitral tribunal interpreted it and concluded class arbitration was admissible. The US Supreme Court held that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its powers by imposing its “own policy choice”, i.e. it did not inquiry for the parties’ intention to the arbitral agreement, but rather, it considered the arbitration clause’s silence was equivalent to an agreement to class arbitration. 21. The US Supreme Court questioned the arbitral tribunal’s application of Bazzle, and concluded, in sum, that Bazzle was not a binding precedent because the US Supreme Court had not reached a majority decision on the matters decided therein. Moreover, it considered that there were questions of law that although addressed in Bazzle, were not resolved, i.e. what standard should be applied to determine whether a contract allows class arbitration, and whether class arbitration had been properly ordered in the case at hand. The US Supreme Court addressed these questions and held that “An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration…is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties agreement to arbitrate. This is so because class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator. 29” 22. Stolt-Nielsen entailed a drastic modification to the legal framework upon which class arbitration had evolved until then in the US, granting leeway, for instance, to the possibility to expressly prohibit class arbitration through class arbitration waivers. One year after Stolt-Nielsen, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 30 (“Concepcion”), the US Supreme Court ruled on this issue. 23. In Concepcion the US Supreme Court upheld the validity of an arbitration clause requiring claims to be brought in the parties’ “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or a class member in any purported class or representative proceeding”, which had been held unconscionable by lower courts under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank. The US Supreme Court found that the Discover Bank rule was contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because it allowed consumers to demand class arbitration, and iterated Stolt-Nielsen to hold that changes from bilateral to class arbitration are “fundamental”. Class arbitration, the US 26 27 28 29 30 American Arbitration Association (Amicus Curiae) (n. 16) p. 10. S.I. Strong, ‘Does class arbitration “change the nature” of arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and the return to first principles’ (2012) Harvard L Rev 201, 206 (Does class arbitration change the nature of arbitration?) 599 US __ (2010). Ibid. 563 U.S. _ (2011). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 25 Supreme Court considered, “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”, and it added that, “arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” because it narrows the scope of judicial review of decisions within class action proceedings. 24. Concepcion has been highly criticized for its very discussable reasoning on what are the fundamental elements of arbitration31 and for its impact against consumers. Some said that Concepcion constituted an exit gate for companies to avoid class actions: “all they need do, the decision suggested, is use standard-form contracts that require two things: that disputes be raised only through the informal mechanism of arbitration and that claims be brought one by one.32” Ultimately, practice showed this appreciation was correct. According to the New York Times, between 2010 and 2014, “…of 1,179 class actions that companies sought to push into arbitration, judges ruled in their favor in four out of every five cases.33” 25. The US Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions regarding class arbitration has thus far followed its case law set forth under Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion34. This is a strong indicator that its restrictive approach towards class arbitration is likely to remain in the near future. B. CLASS ARBITRATION OUTSIDE THE US 26. Although sporadically, class arbitration has also been a matter of decisions, awards and statutes outside the US. In this subsection, we will go through them, country by country, in chronological order. (i) Colombia 27. In Valencia v. Bancolombia35 (“Valencia”) (2011) the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice decided upon an application for amparo of a minority group of shareholders of a bank that had sued it in a class action claiming alleged damages deriving from the bank’s merger with another financial institution 36 . The bank successfully filed a motion to dismiss claiming the enforcement of an arbitration agreement set forth under the bylaws of the bank. The claimants alleged this entailed a violation of their right to due process. The Colombian Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that in this specific case class arbitration 31 32 33 34 35 36 See Gary Born and Claudio Salas (n. 14) 21. Adam Liptak, ‘Supreme Court allows contracts that prohibit class-action arbitration’ The New York Times (New York, April 27, 2011) < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html?mcubz=3> accessed September 20th, 2017. See also: Editorial, ‘Gutting Class Action’ The New York Times (New York, May 12 2011) <13fri1.html?_r=0;0;;;0;http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/op > accessed September 20th, 2017. Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, ‘Arbitration everywhere, stacking the deck of justice’ The New ork Times (New York, Octobr 31st, 2015) < https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-t he-deck-of-justice.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0> accessed September 20th, 2017. See: (i) Oxford Health Plans LLC. v. Sutter, 569 U.S._2013; (ii) American Express Company, et. al., Petitioners v. Italian Colors Restaurant et. al., 570 U.S. __ 2013, and (iii) DirectTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S._2015. Supreme Court of Justice, Civil Chamber, (May 11 2001), Reporting Judge: Carlos Ignacio Jaramillo Jaramillo, File number: 1100122030002001-0183-01. S.I. Strong (Class Arbitration outside the US) (n. 10), p. 5. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 26 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla was admissible, as all member of the class had consented to the arbitration agreement by executing the bylaws of the bank. Nevertheless, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice considered obiter dictum that in general, arbitral tribunals should not have jurisdiction over class actions, considering they are opt-out procedures in Colombia, and therefore, its decision could not be binding to non-signatory members of the arbitral agreement. A final class arbitral award was issued in favor of the class37 which was subsequently upheld by Colombian courts38. (ii) Canada 28. Canada lingers between consumer protection legislation banning class arbitration over consumers’ disputes in some of its provinces39, including Quebec, Alberta40, and Ontario41, and other statutes that do not ban it, but neither allow it42. 29. One of those statutes is British Columbia’s Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA) that was subject to the Michelle Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc.43 Canada’s Supreme Court ruling (“TELUS”). The case concerned a cellular phone company which entered into several standard form contracts with different consumers, containing a mediation and arbitration clause which purported to waive any right of the plaintiff to commence or participate in a class action against TELUS. The plaintiff initiated class action proceedings alleging that TELUS falsely represented how it calculated air time for billing purposes. TELUS applied for stay upon the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court denied it, and held that in this specific case, “private and confidential arbitration” did not achieve the purposes of BPCPA. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that BPCPA encourages the use of well-publicized court actions, instead of private arbitration and that in arbitration consumers of a particular product “may have little opportunity to connect with other consumers who may share their experience and complaints and seek vindication through a well-publicized court action”, and that an arbitral tribunal would not have the power to order relief involving not only her particular relationship with the defendant but also with third parties. 30. Canada seems to have distanced itself from the US’s jurisprudence to take a pro-consumer approach regarding class arbitration. Consumer protection legisla- 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 Arbitration Center of the Bogota Chamber of Commerce. Arbitral Award of January 30th, 2004. See: Bancolombia S.A., “Bancolombia S.A. anuncia que Tribunal Superior de Bogotá declara infundado recurso de anulación interpuesto por el Banco” (Medellín, Colombia, March 5 2008) < https://www.grupobancolombia.com/wps/wcm/connect/d3a10bf4-7dd1-4d89-bfbf-077000c5 fd79/46_bancolombiaAnunciatribunalSuperiorBogotaRecursoAnulacion.pdf?MOD=AJPER ES&CVID=l2.flSf > (accessed September 20th, 2017). Prior to the enactment of this legislation, favorable decisions to class arbitration in consumer matters were reported. See: Kanitz v. Roger Cable Inc. 01-CV- 214404CP, 22 February 2002 of the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice; and Union des consommateurs v. Olivier Dumoulin, Dell Computer Corporation 2007 SCC 34, 13 July 2007 of the Canada Supreme Court of Justice. Michael Schafler and Amer Pasalic, ‘Is Canada ready for class arbitration?’ (ADRIC 2013 Gold Standard ADR, 2013) <http://www.dentons.com/~/media/PDFs/Insights/2013/October/Is%20Canada%20ready%2 0for%20class%20arbitration%20ADRIC%20version.pdf> accessed July 29 2015 S.I. Strong (US and Canada compared) (n. 11) 956. S.I. Strong (US and Canada compared) (n. 11) 948-949. Supreme Court of Canada, 33154, 18 March 2011. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 27 tion currently in force and TELUS suggest class arbitration, at least on consumer matters, will not be highly developed in Canada44. (iii) Spain 31. In contrast to Canada, Spain has enacted legislation that embraces arbitration as the preferred dispute resolution mechanism for consumers’ disputes45. Royal Decree 231/2008 sets forth a Consumer’s Arbitral System (“CAS”) with certain particularities, among them, (i) the CAS is organized into local and regional Consumer Arbitration Boards, which administer arbitral proceedings depending on whether the dispute has a local or a regional reach, (ii) arbitrators rule on ex aquo et bono basis, unless the parties agree otherwise, and (iii) the system is run upon gratuity for both consumers and companies. 32. Royal Decree 231/2008 also provides for class arbitration, in cases in which the same facts may have damaged a “determined or determinable” number of consumers. Upon its commencement, the defendant is given a 15-day term to express its acceptance on the proceedings to be carried out as class arbitration. If the defendant does not accept it, the proceedings will be archived. On the contrary, the members of the class will be notified via publications in local newspapers and will have a 2-month term to opt-in. The arbitral tribunal has a 6-month term to rule. 33. As commentators have correctly pointed out46, the constitutionality of the provisions on class arbitration of Royal Decree 231/2008 could potentially be put into question, taking into account that it does not require explicit consent of claimants with prior claims to the class arbitration, as it does with the defendant’s in order to proceed with class arbitration. Moreover, Royal Decree 231/2008 does not provide for what happens if the defendant remains silent after the 15-day term to accept class arbitration. (iv) Mexico 34. In a 2014 decision47 the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice granted an application for amparo to the members of a golf cub that had instituted class actions against the club after lower courts refused to assume jurisdiction over the class action because the contracts contained an arbitration agreement (the “Amparo Directo Ruling”). The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice raised three main arguments: firstly, it sustained that disputes concerning consumer rights were inarbitrable, as they are a matter of public policy under Mexican Law. Secondly, it took into account that while the contracts underlying the dispute had been entered between 2003 and 2005, class action legislation was enacted in Mexico in 2010. Therefore, it concluded that parties could not have agreed on class arbitration at the time of execution of the agreements. And thirdly, it considered individual arbitration proceedings would curtail the members of the class’s fundamental rights, as they could not obtain the benefits they sought via class action in class arbitration. Commenta44 45 46 47 Some opine that “Canada is not ready for class arbitration”, mainly because of the particularities of the Canadian legal system, that entails lack of uniformity among the provinces on the viability of class arbitration. See Michael Schafler and Amer Pasalic (n. 42) 5. S.I. Strong, ‘Collective Consumer Arbitration in Spain: A Civil Law Response to US-Style Class Arbitration’, Journal of International Arbitration, (©Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013, Volume 30 Issue 5) pp. 495-510. Ibid. pp. 504-505. Amparo Directo Ruling 33/2014, (Parties are kept confidential), Reporting Justice: Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 28 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla tors opine that this decision, even being an isolated precedent, could influence lower courts to rule upon future similar cases48. (v) Portugal 35. In a June 21st, 2016, ruling49 the Portuguese Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that had held that courts lacked jurisdiction over a dispute seeking the annulment of three SWAP contracts that the claimant had entered into with a bank. The bank challenged the jurisdiction of local courts upon an arbitral agreement contained in a Master Agreement covering all SWAP contracts. The Portuguese Supreme Court underlined the kompetenz-kompetenz principle to hold that arbitral tribunals are competent to rule on their own jurisdiction, unless the arbitral agreement is manifestly null or invalid. This would happen if no evidence is necessary to appreciate the grounds of annulment or invalidity (generally, if the arbitral agreement lacks formal requirements or the dispute is inarbitrable) and therefore, grounds for annulment of an arbitral agreement upon lack of consent cannot be manifest. Regarding arbitral agreements in contracts of adhesion, the lack of consent of a party to agree to an arbitral agreement contained in a Master Agreement cannot be manifest, and therefore an arbitral tribunal will have exclusive jurisdiction to decide upon the validity of the arbitral agreement. 36. Although the case does not directly involve class arbitration, the reaffirmation of the kompetenz-kompetenz principle regarding arbitration of disputes derived from contracts of adhesion could build up the bases upon which class arbitration could be viable under Portuguese Law, similarly to what happened with Bazzle in the US. C. Conclusion 37. Class arbitration’s “Golden Years” in the US, a period of approximately 10 years that commenced with Bazzle, matured with the specialized class arbitration rules of the AAA and JAMS, and peaked with hundreds of cases being administered by these two institutions; faded with Stolt-Nielsen, and subsequent decisions that hindered the development of class arbitration. Outside the US, few countries have had developments on class arbitration, and most of them linger between policy choices on whether class arbitration is an adequate dispute resolution mechanism for consumer protection matters (like Spain) or not (like Canada and Mexico). Only one class arbitration has been reported outside the US: Valencia, in Colombia. However, the circumstances surrounding it were very specific and the case law of the Colombian Supreme Court does not suggest it could extend its reach and scope, but rather, that it should have a limited one. The most recent decision that could pinpoint where class arbitration currently was reported in Portugal in 2016, and in it is a favorable one: the Portuguese Supreme Court reinforced the kompetenz-kompetenz principle in disputes derived from contracts of adhesion, similar to what happened in Bazzle. This, along Spain’s Royal Decree 231/2008 could grant leeway to developments on class arbitration in Europe in the future, although, as it will be discussed below50, it is likely that those developments would be marked by the reluctance of European countries to adopt the US Class Action Model. 48 49 50 Ibid. 301/14.0TVLSB.L1.S1 (Parties are kept confidential), Reporting Justice: Fernandes Do Vale. See infra Section III(A)(ii). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 29 III. ARE CLASS ARBITRAL AWARDS ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE NY CONVENTION? 38. As mentioned above, supporters of class arbitration argue its potential usefulness in the international scenario, inter alia because of the theoretical facility to obtain recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards via the NY Convention. The NY Convention is arguably one of the pillars of international arbitration. Ratified by 157 States in all corners of the world51, the NY Convention provides a uniform and predictable process to obtain recognition of international arbitral awards, setting forth both its requirements and the exhaustive grounds for refusal of enforcement. The NY Convention entails a significant advantage of arbitration vis-à-vis litigation52, considering there are no international instruments on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments ratified by such an overwhelming number of States as the NY Convention. Therefore, theoretically speaking, the NY Convention could indeed make class arbitration particularly useful to resolve class international disputes. 39. However, the current state of affairs on class arbitration rise doubts as to whether there would be hurdles to obtain recognition of international class arbitral awards under the NY Convention. First, to date there are no reported decision on recognition and enforcement of international class arbitral awards. Considering that in most countries class arbitration is undeveloped, it is yet to see which would be the approach of courts towards this mechanism. Second, class arbitration remains contentious in most of the few countries in which it has been developed to any extent. Third, although not to the extent of changing the nature of arbitration, class arbitration has some features that differentiate it from bilateral arbitration which might impact the application of the NY Convention over class arbitral awards. Finally, the issue of recognition and enforcement of class arbitral awards has not been broadly commented by scholars53. However, there has been some commentary on recognition and enforcement of US class action judgments abroad, mostly tending to conclude that such judgments would be unenforceable in civil law countries54. Thus, in this section we will analyze whether unsurmountable objections may be raised against recognition of class arbitral awards under the NY Convention. 51 52 53 54 See: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/list+of+contracting+states (last accessed October 2nd, 2017). Herbert Kronke, ‘Introduction: The New York Convention fifty years on: Overview and assessment’ in Herbert Kronke and others, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer L Intl 2010) 2. See S.I. Strong ‘The sounds of silence: are U.S. Arbitrators creating internationally enforceable Awards when ordering Class Arbitration in cases of contractual silence or ambiguity?’, (2009) 30 Michigan J Intl L 1017 (‘Sounds of Silence’). For example, these authors have suggested that US class action judgments would be unenforceable abroad: Andrea Pinna, ‘Recognition and Res Judicata of US class action judgments in European legal systems’ (2008) Erasmus L Rev Vol 1 Issue 2 31 (although this author concludes that ‘the hostility of European Legal systems…is progressively declining’ 59); Andrea Conzatti, ‘The Recognition of U.S. “Opt-out” class actions in China’ (2013) Georgetown J of Intl L Vol 44 642. On the other handsome opine that there would not be significant obstacles to obtain recognition and enforcement. For example, Fernando Gascón Inchausti, ‘Eficacia en España de sentencias y transacciones derivadas del ejercicio de una class action en Estados Unidos’ (2012) AFDUAM 16 261. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 30 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla A. Introductory remarks (i) The pro-enforcement policy underlying the NY Convention 40. The assessment on the likelihood of success of any of the objections to recognition and enforcement should be enlightened by the pro-enforcement policy underlying the NY Convention55, which has been endorsed and applied in a significant number of jurisdictions56 and entails that the NY Convention must be interpreted in the most favorable way towards obtaining its purpose, which is the circulation of arbitral awards. Therefore, signatory States have the obligation to recognize and enforce arbitral awards if the requisites set forth under the Convention are fulfilled. The only grounds to deny recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are exhaustively set forth under Article V of the NY Convention, should be narrowly interpreted and must be alleged and proved by the opposing party57. 41. According to professor S.I. Strong’s accurate remarks, consequently to the NY Convention’s pro-enforcement policy, “blanket objections” against enforcement “based on the special nature of class or representative proceedings” lack any grounds58. Therefore, class arbitral awards should receive the same treatment that any other arbitral award59. Thus, recognition and enforcement actions should be solved on a case-by-case basis: only concrete objections to class arbitral awards, based on the actual circumstances of each case, should be admissible. (ii) The US Class Action Model has not been broadly adopted around the world 42. Not only the current state of affairs on class arbitration, but also on collective redress mechanisms legislation around the world, must be considered to assess the potential objections that could be raised against recognition of international class arbitral awards. Two circumstances should be taken into account: firstly, that a relevant group of States do not provide for any sort of collective redress mechanisms60. And secondly, 55 56 57 58 59 60 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer L Intl 2014) 2914-2917. (International Commercial Arbitration) Including: (i) Colombia (Tampico Beverages Inc. v. Productos Naturales de la Sabana S.A. Alqueria, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Civil, Case nuymer SC9909-2017, July 11th, 2017, Reporting Justice: Aroldo Wilson Quiroz Monsalvo); (ii) France (Government of the Region of Kaliningrad v. Republic of Lithuania, Cour d’Appel, Paris, First Chamber, 18 November 2010. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2011 - Volume XXXVI); (iii) Kuwait (Contract party v. contract party, Supreme Appeal Court of Kuwait, Cassation Circuit, Not Indicated, 21 November 1988. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1997 - Volume XXII); (iv) Peru (Stemcor UK Limited v. Guiceve S.A.C., Corte Superior de Justicia, Lima, Case No. 878-2010, 28 April 2011. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX (van den Berg (ed.); Jan 2014); (v) Switzerland (X SA v. Z LLC, Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, 2nd Civil Law Chamber, 5A_754/2011, 2 July 2012. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII; and (vi) the US (Harold Leonel Pineda Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. d/b/a NCL, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 10-10367, 29 August 2011. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII). Gary Born (International Commercial Arbitration) (n. 52) 2914-2916. S.I. Strong ‘Enforcing class arbitration’ (n 6) 76. Ibid. For example, Switzerland and Austria. See: Felix Dasser and Sebastian Stolzke, ‘Switzerland’ in Paul G. Karlsgodt World Class Actions A Guide to Group and Representative Actions Around the Globe (OUP, 2012); Karlheinz Klema ‘Austria’ in LIBRALEX Members, ‘Class actions in Europe and the United States’ (2014) <http://www.libralex.com/publications/class-actions-in-europe-and-the-us> (last accessed October 3rd, 2017). Furthermore, with the exception of South Africa, most African countries have not adopted a class action model. See: Harvey L. Kaplan, William J. Crampton and Marc E. Shelley, ‘Class Action Development Overseas’ in Lise T. Spacapan and others, Product Liability Litigation Current Law, Strategies and Best Practices (Practising L Institute 2015) 7-20. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 31 that while the US Class Action Model61 has been followed by other common-law countries62, civil-law countries have transplanted it with substantial differences. 43. Civil law countries’ approach to protection of collective and diffuse rights differ in its philosophy from common-law countries. Both European and Latin American countries differentiate between two sorts of interest subject to protection through collective redress mechanisms63: on the one hand, there are “diffuse and collective” interests, which are common and indivisible (e.g. protection of a safe environment). In this case, the remedy for one person will be the remedy for all. On the other hand, there are “homogeneous individual” interests, which are individual rights arising from a common origin. These are divisible interests, which means that each claim can be pursued individually. Protection of diffuse and collective rights is a matter of public policy both in Latin America (in some States it is even set forth under the Constitution) 64 and Europe. 44. The approach to collective redress in civil law countries, then, derives in fundamental differences with the US Class Action Model. Indeed, the European Commission Recommendation No. 2013/396/EU OJ L 201/60 “on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law” (the “European Commission Recommendation”) states that “[e]lements such as punitive damages, intrusive pre-trial discovery procedures and jury awards, most of which are foreign to the legal traditions of most Member States should be avoided as a general rule.” However, those are not the only differences between both legal systems regarding collective redress mechanisms. In most civil law countries: (i) The matters that can be subject to collective actions are limited to an exhaustive list set forth under the law65. The European Commission Recommendation, for example, sets out that collective redress mechanisms are valuable in areas like consumer protection, competition, environment protection, protection of personal data, financial services and investor protection. (ii) Restrictions on standing to sue are common, especially in representative actions66. Most countries grant standing to governmental organizations or local authorities, consumer’s organizations or similar groups67. The rationale behind this is twofold: first, to prevent reckless claims, and second, it follows an imbedded idea in 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 See supra section II(A)(i). Canada, see: Garry D. Watson, ‘Class actions: the Canadian experience’ (2001) Duke J of Comparative and Intl L Vol 11 269, 272, and Australia, see: . Harvey L. Kaplan, William J. Crampton and Marc E. Shelley (n. 57) 7-43. See: US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, ‘Following each other’s lead. Law reform in Latin America’ (2014) 7 <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/FollowingEachOthersLead_Englis h.pdf> (last accessed October 3rd, 2017) and European Commission Recommendation No. 2013/396/EU OJ L 201/60 “on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law” Manuel A. Gomez, ’Will the birds stay South? The rise of class actions and other forms of group litigation across Latin America’ (2012) 43 The University of Miami Inter-American L Rev 481, pp. 492, 499, 502, 512-513, 518. Ibidem, p. 492. In Latin America, see: Manuel A. Gomez (n. 61) 499, 502, 512-513, 518. In Europe, see Gabrielle Nater-Bass ‘Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?’ (2009) 27 ASA Bulletin Issue 4 681, 691-692 Antonio Gidi, ‘The recognition of U.S. class actions abroad: the case of Latin America’ (2012) 37 Brook J Intl L 893, 911. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 32 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla most civil law countries that is the state, and not individuals, the responsible for the protection of collective rights68. (iii) Perhaps most importantly, procedures are “opt-in” rather than “opt-out” 69, meaning that a member of the class will only be bound by the ruling if it has expressly consented so . The ruling will not be binding for absent members, and in any case, they will be free to pursue their claims individually. 45. On another note, regulation of collective redress mechanisms is uneven across Asia. A considerable group of countries provide for class actions whether by not limiting them under their civil procedure rules or by setting them forth under special laws regulating matters as environment protection, consumers’ rights and securities70. It is not easy, however, to find a common standard in subjects like standing to sue, matters that can be subject to collective redress mechanisms or effects of the ruling. 46. To summarize, class actions are different all around the world, in terms of their objectives, scope, restrictions and overall, in terms of the policies underlying them. The different approaches towards collective redress mechanisms are likely to imbue local courts in their application of the NY Convention towards recognition and enforcement of international class arbitral awards. 47. Bearing these introductory remarks in mind, below we will analyze the potential objections that could be raised against recognition an enforcement of international class arbitral awards under the NY Convention. B. Potential objections to recognition and enforcement of international class arbitral awards under the NY Convention (i) Potential objections concerning the applicability of the NY Convention 48. A potential first obstacle to recognition and enforcement of international class arbitral awards under the NY Convention concerns its very applicability. Under Article I(3) of the NY Convention, contracting States are allowed to make a reservation that it will only be applicable to “differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration”. To date, one third of the NY Convention’s signatory States have adopted this reservation71. The issue at stake, then, is that class actions may arise from a wide spectrum of matters, including labor, antitrust and consumer disputes, which might not be considered “commercial” under domestic laws of the contracting State in which recognition is being sought72. 68 69 70 71 72 Harald Koch, ‘Non-class group litigation under EU and German Law’ (2001) Duke J of Comparative & Intl L Vol 11 355, 357. There are some exceptions: in Europe, Norway, Denmark and Belgium allow opt-out class actions under certain circumstances, and in Latin America, Colombian legislation sets forth opt-out procedures. See Antonio Gidi (n. 64) 927, 934. Harvey L. Kaplan, William J. Crampton and Marc E. Shelley (n. 57) 7-43. See also Jing Huey-Shao, ‘Class action mechanisms in Chinese and Taiwanese contexts - a mixture of private and public law’ (2014) Emory Intl L Rev 237. <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> (lst accessed October 2nd, 2017). S.I. Strong, ‘From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration’ (2010) J of the London Court of Intl Arbitration Vol 26 no 4 493, 525. (‘From class to collective’). Additionally the arbitrability of some of the types of disputes that frequently are brought to class arbitration is, in general, contentious. See: Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan, ‘Article V(2)’ in Herbert Kronke and others (n. 49) 355-363. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 33 49. Two contrasting cases may be useful to illustrate how different jurisdictions could move between the spectrum of granting a narrow or a wide interpretation on what should be considered “commercial” in order to apply the NY Convention. In one of the edges of the spectrum, the Amparo Directo Ruling in Mexico referred to above73, in which the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice held that disputes concerning consumer rights are a matter of public policy under Mexican law, and therefore inarbitrable. Courts in other Latin American countries could very likely share this approach, considering that the protection of diffuse and collective interests, including the protection of consumers’ rights, is a matter of public policy, set forth under their constitutions74. And in the other edge, the Rizalyn Bautista (Philippines) v. Paul Peralta (Philippines), Raymond Lovino (Philippines) and others US Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2005 decision75 in which the Court held that the disputes derived from an explosion on board of a Norwegian vessel that killed or injured several seamen were arbitrable, given that all of them were parties to an standard employment contract with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, that provided for arbitration in the Philippines. In its ruling, the Court concluded that the disputes arising out of the seamen’s employment contracts were “commercial” for purposes of the application of the NY Convention. 50. It is likely that the different policies underlying collective redress mechanisms in common-law and in civil-law countries might mark restrictive approaches towards whether class actions might be considered “commercial” for purposes of the application of the NY Convention. Thus, the “commercial reservation” could potentially be an obstacle to obtain recognition of class arbitral awards under the NY Convention. (ii) Potential objections concerning the composition of the arbitral authority 51. Article V(1)(d) of the NY Convention provides that a ground for refusal of enforcement is that “the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place”. This might be the “single most likely objection” to recognition and enforcement of class arbitral awards76, and indeed, several scenarios upon which this challenge could be raised are predictable. 52. A first likely scenario is that the arbitration agreement was silent on class arbitration. Local courts might opt between two different approaches: either referring the construction of the arbitration agreement to the arbitral tribunal, like the US Supreme Court did in Bazzle, or, interpreting that there cannot be an implicit intention of the parties to agree on class arbitration, like the US Supreme Court also did in Stolt-Nielsen. It is uncertain how influential Stolt-Nielsen and the US Supreme Court’s subsequent case law would be, however, cases like Valencia77 in which the Colombian Supreme Court upheld class arbitration on the specific grounds that it was proved that all class members were shareholders of the bank and therefore sig73 74 75 76 77 See supra section II(B)(iv). Manuel A. Gomez, (n. 61), p. 492. 03-15884. In: Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2005 - Volume XXX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 30 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2005) pp. 1071 - 1085 S. I. Strong, Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration (n. 16) 354. See supra Section II(B)(i). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 34 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla natories of the arbitration clause, indicate that there could be a restrictive approach towards silent clauses, given the importance of consent in international arbitration. Moreover, considering the Amparo Directo Ruling of the Mexican Supreme Court78, it is likely that silent clauses may be interpreted against recognition and enforcement in jurisdictions in which class actions have not been enacted or were not enacted at the time that the arbitral agreement was entered into, upon arguments that the parties could not have agreed to something that was not available for them under their legal systems. 53. Silent clauses might lead to another potential objection, related with the parties’ right to appoint their own arbitrator. This might be raised in class arbitral awards enforcement proceedings upon circumstances like the party was not able to decide individually on which arbitrator it had the intention to nominate, or having to choose an arbitrator from a list of the arbitral institution administering the class arbitration79. The likelihood of success of the latter might not be high, especially in cases in which the parties have submitted to the rules of arbitral institutions providing for class arbitration. Additionally, German Courts have denied this sort of objections holding that the “sole circumstance that Defendant had to choose an arbitrator from a pre-determined list is no basis for a violation” of its fundamental right to appoint one’s own arbitrator, and considering that the party had not raised objections in this regard during the proceedings80. 54. A second likely scenario related with the previous one is that the arbitral rules agreed upon do not provide for class arbitration proceedings. A possible argument against recognition under this scenario is that the chosen rules were not suitable to properly carry out class arbitration or to properly constitute an arbitral tribunal considering the special features of class arbitration. Counter argument is that nothing in the rules of the most prominent arbitration institutions restrict the possibility to undertake class arbitration81, but quite the opposite, most of them provide with provisions for aggregating claims. The test in this kind of situation would be whether the rules and how they were applied in the given case guaranteed the parties’ right to participate in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal under the applicable standards in each jurisdiction, and whether opposing party could have waived this objection during the proceedings or not82. 55. A third scenario is that the arbitral agreement contains a waiver of class arbitration that would have been declared invalid at the seat of the arbitration83. Opposing party to recognition and enforcement may request the waiver to be enforced within recognition proceedings, deriving in the application of this ground of refusal. Once again, it is hard to tell whether such a challenge would be successful. 78 79 80 81 82 83 See supra Section II(B)(iv). For example, Article 2(a) of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for class arbitration provides that “at least one of the arbitrators shall be appointed from the AAA’s national roster of class arbitration arbitrators.” Buyer v. Seller, Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt, 26 SchH 03/09, 12 October 2009’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 377 – 380. S.I. Strong ‘From Class to Collective’ (n. 16) 529-531. For example, in X AG v. Y AS, Bundesgerichtshof, 4 October 2010, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland estopped opposing party to recognition and enforcement from raising objections relating to the composition of the arbitral tribunal that were not raised within the proceedings. Available in Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2011 - Volume XXXVI S.I. Strong ‘Sounds of Silence’ (n. 50) 1060. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 35 Concepcion could influence courts abroad to sustain that the class arbitration waiver is enforceable. However, in some Latin American countries arbitration has a mixed juridical nature (contractual and jurisdictional)84 which equivalates access to arbitration to access to the administration of justice. Therefore, it is unlikely that a class arbitration waiver would be enforced in countries that have embraced this juridical nature of arbitration, or one in which arbitration is jurisdictional. (iii) Potential objections concerning violations of due process 56. Concerns on refusal of recognition and enforcement arising out of due process violation arise, firstly, from Article V(1)(b) of the NY Convention, that sets forth that recognition may be refused if “the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice to the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case”. Commentators have indicated that there is no guidance in the NY Convention or in preparatory works as to which is the applicable law to determine if there was a violation of due process: whether the laws applicable to the arbitration procedure or the laws regulating due process in the place of enforcement85. However, local courts have concluded that due process standards that this provision refers to, are the ones of the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought86. With regards to class arbitration, these two potential challenges are likely to arise when trying to enforce international class arbitral awards issued under opt-out procedures in jurisdictions that either do not provide for collective redress mechanisms or that provide for opt-in procedures. We will analyze each of them separately below. 57. Challenges against recognition upon improper notice may arise when the standards of notification in the class arbitral proceedings and in the jurisdiction in which enforcement is being sought differ. For instance, while the AAA and JAMS class arbitration rules provide for the “best notice practicable under the circumstances”, countries that do not provide for collective redress mechanisms may establish predetermined procedural steps in order to exhaust service of notice of a lawsuit, or, in countries providing for opt-out class actions, one standard of notification is to make a publication in wide reach media87. 58. Regardless of the standards of notification set forth under domestic laws, recent decisions in some jurisdictions show a lenient approach towards the requisite of “proper notice” under the NY Convention: (i) In Starlio Shipping Company Limited v. Eurocondal Shipping S.A. and others (2012), the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, Spain, refused opposing party’s objection that it had not been properly served because it had not received notice of the arbitration personally or by registered mail with acknowledgment of receipt at its domicile, but it had only received notice of the arbitration via fax88. The Court held that to refuse recognition, the violation of due process must be material, and in this case, defendant had not denied it received the faxes notifying it of the arbitration. Moreover, considering opposing party had not raised those objections within the proceedings. 84 85 86 87 88 For example, Colombia. See Colombian Constitution, Article 116. Andres Jana, Angie Armer and Johanna Klein Kranenberg, ‘Article V(1)(b)’ in Herbert Kronke and others (n. 49) 236-237. Ibid 238-239. For example, in Colombia. Law 472 of 1998 Articles 21 and 53. Starlio Shipping Company Limited v. Eurocondal Shipping S.A. and others, Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, Case No. 37/12, 15 March 2012’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 456 – 458. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 36 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla (ii) In Czech consultancy company v. German client (2012), the Higher Regional Court of Munich, Germany, recognized a Czech award, although it was not possible to communicate the request for arbitration to the German party and it did not appear in the proceedings89. Although the ground for refusal was not raised at the recognition stage, the court held that the arbitration tribunal had complied with the applicable arbitral rules by appointing a “receiver” that was notified of the proceedings. (iii) In Louis Dreyfus Commodities Brasil S.A. v. Leandro Volter Laurindo De Castilhos (2013), the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice refused opposing party’s challenge upon this ground for refusal and granted recognition of an ICA award90. Opposing party argued that since the arbitral proceedings were held abroad it had to be notified via letters rogatory. The Court held such requirement was not necessary in international arbitration and this requirement was sufficed with the communications that opposing party received via courier and email. (iv) In Autorobot-Strefa Sp. Z o.o. v. Sollers Elabuga Limited Liability Company (2014) the Russian Supreme Court granted recognition of an LCIA award in a case in which opposing party alleged improper notice because correspondence had been sent to its parent company and sole owner’s chief legal officer that had submitted his contact details with the LCIA91. While opposing party alleged this person lacked authority to represent the company, the Russian Supreme Court held that the LCIA reasonably assumed that he was representing opposing party’s interests. 59. In contrast with these cases, challenges upon this ground for refusal have been successful when there is real evidence that opposing party did not receive notifications and was in fact unaware of the arbitration. For instance, in Lenmorniiproekt OAO (Russian Federation) v. Arne Larsson & Partner Leasing Aktiebolag (2010), the Swedish Supreme Court denied recognition of a Russian ICAC award after it found that notice of the arbitration had been sent to the defendant’s former address and that the arbitrators ignored that the notification sent to that address had been returned92. Additionally, in Otkrytoye Aktsionernoye Obshestvo “Tomskneft” Vostochnoi Neftyanoi Kompanii v. Yukos Capital (2013) 93, the Court of Appeal of Paris, France, denied recognition of an ICC award rendered in the US, as it held that opposing party’s due process had been violated as the file did not contain proof of receipt of the defendant of several procedural orders within the arbitral proceedings. 89 90 91 92 93 Czech consultancy company v. German client, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 34 Sch 7/12, 21 June 2012, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 39 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2014) pp. 392 – 393. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Brasil S.A. v. Leandro Volter Laurindo De Castilhos, Supreme Court of Justice, SEC No. 6.335 – EX (2011/0072243-3), 21 March 2012’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 334 – 337. Autorobot-Strefa Sp. Z o.o. v. Sollers Elabuga Limited Liability Company, Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2014 and Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, 24 June 2014. In Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 39 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2014) pp. 483 - 485 Lenmorniiproekt OAO (Russian Federation) v. Arne Larsson & Partner Leasing Aktiebolag (Sweden), Högsta Domstolen [Supreme Court], Ö 13-09, 16 April 2010’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 456 – 457. Otkrytoye Aktsionernoye Obshestvo “Tomskneft” Vostochnoi Neftyanoi Kompanii v. Yukos Capital, Court of Appeal of Paris, 15 January 2013’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 373 – 375. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 37 60. Decisions like the abovementioned suggest that the “best notice practicable under the circumstances” standard could potentially meet the threshold recently applied by local courts when constructing this ground of refusal, provided that it could be proved that such notice was duly made and it was effective for purposes of informing about the arbitral proceedings. Nevertheless, the reluctance of civil-law countries against opt-out procedures as a matter of public policy may give rise to refusal of enforcement under Article V(2)(b) as it will be discussed below94. 61. Regarding challenge of enforcement when a party was “unable to present his case”, it has been said that what should be understood as “the ability to present one’s case” is not clearly determined under the Convention95: it could be understood as a ‘full opportunity’ or as a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to do so96. In class arbitration “non-representative parties have very few real opportunities to influence the shape of the case”97, and therefore, under a “full opportunity” approach challenges based on this ground of refusal have chances to be successful. 62. Again, the standards applied by local courts to construct this ground for refusal might differ. However, a 2009 decision of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, Germany, can enlighten a plausible approach to the construction of this ground for refusal, that would be favorable to enforcing class arbitral awards98. The Court granted recognition and enforcement of an ICA award despite opposing party’s allegations of the violation of due process, and held that: “Guaranteeing due process requires, also in arbitration, that on the one hand the party may give its view in respect of the subject matter of the case and the legal situation, and on the other hand that the arbitral tribunal takes note of the arguments of the parties and takes them into account for its decision, in so far as relevant. The principles of due process and of the obligation to give reasons do not require, however, that the arbitral tribunal examines all details of the arguments of the parties in the written reasons for its decision (…). Nor can it be concluded as a rule from the silence of the court that arguments have been not taken into account, unless the argument is clearly of crucial significance for the legal outcome [of the case]”. 63. The core of the question would be then, whether the actions of a representative of the class on behalf of an absent member satisfy its reasonable opportunity to present its case or not. In practice, it should be unlikely that recognition of a class arbitral award is refused upon this ground, unless opposing party could demonstrate that had it had “full opportunity” to present its-individual-case, its intervention in the proceedings or the evidence it could have submitted would have materially altered the final decision. 64. A final potential objection related to violations of due process might be raised upon Article V(c), which sets out that recognition might be refused if “the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the submission to arbitration…”. A likely case would be that opposing party challenges the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to issue a class arbitral award if the arbitral agreement was silent on class 94 95 96 97 98 See infra Section III(B)(iv). Andres Jana, Angie Armer and Johanna Klein Kranenberg (n. 49) 245. S. I. Strong Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration (n. 16) 352. S.I. Strong ‘Enforcing class arbitration’ (n. 6) 63. Buyer v. Seller, Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt, 26 SchH 03/09, 12 October 2009’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 377 – 380. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 38 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla arbitration: it could be alleged that the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction would have been limited to bilateral disputes arising out the relationships of each members of the class with the defendant. In a 2008 decision99, the Supreme People’s Court of China refused enforcement upon this ground. The case concerned an arbitral award resolving disputes arising out of an Option Agreement regarding the building of eight ships. Claimant had constituted eight single-vehicle companies that were to enter eight different contracts for purposes of shipbuilding. Chinese courts found that the arbitral tribunal had decided on matters outside the scope of the arbitral agreement contained in the Option Agreement because, although the arbitral tribunal found that the eight single-vehicle companies lacked standing, it found that the damages claimed by them fell within the scope of the arbitral agreement. The holding of this decision might be transposed to the class arbitration realm. Opposing party to recognition of a class arbitral award could potentially allege that, in class arbitration derived from silent clauses, the arbitral tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction if it grants damages to the members of the class, outside of the bilateral arbitral agreement existing between the members of the class, individually considered, and the defendant. (iv) Potential objections concerning the arbitrability of class-wide disputes and violations to public policy 65. The arbitrability of class-wide disputes might have an impact on the likelihood of obtaining recognition of international class arbitral awards considering Article V(2)(a) of the NY Convention that sets forth that recognition might be refused if the recognition authority finds that “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country”. Following Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll100, the answer to which matters are arbitrable under the domestic laws can be found in the case law of civil-law countries, and in statutes of civil-law countries. Civil-law countries have two different approaches to the matter: either they have broad notions of arbitrability (e.g. “any dispute of financial interest”101, or “any claim involving an economic interest”102), or they deem arbitrable any dispute that the parties can freely dispose of. 66. A likely objection to recognition of class arbitral awards could be that class-wide disputes are not arbitrable under the laws of the country in which recognition is being sought, either (i) because the disputes have no economic/financial interest per se or the parties are not entitled to freely dispose of them, or (ii) because class-wide disputes are of exclusive jurisdiction of local courts. 67. Regarding the first of these issues, potential concerns on the arbitrability of class-wide disputes may arise in civil-law countries, particularly if the class arbitration involves to any extent diffuse and collective interests. As it has been said above, these subjects are matter of public policy in several civil-law countries, and therefore it is likely that they would not be of free disposal of the parties. On the other hand, homogeneous individual interests might be arbitrable at least in theory 99 100 101 102 First Investment Corp v. Not indicated, Higher People’s Court, Fujian Province, 12 October 2007 and Supreme People’s Court, 27 February 2008’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 349 – 352. Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan Michael Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer L Intl, 2003), 193-196. Swiss Private International Law Statute, 1990, Article 177. German Arbitration Act, section 1030(1). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 39 (i.e. they might entail an economic/financial interest and thus, be of free disposal of the parties), however, in some civil law countries class actions might be considered a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of courts. The Valencia decision of the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice referred to above103 may serve to illustrate the point104: “…arbitral tribunals … are not competent, as a rule, to undertake group or class actions… because the decision…at least in Colombia, binds all persons who are in “uniform conditions for the same cause that caused individual damages” … Consider, for example, that with the occasion of the collapse of a building, more than a hundred people were affected and that twenty of them agreed with the builder to submit the claim for damages to the decision of arbitrators. In this case, as long as the process is limited to the definition of the controversy thus raised, there is no legal obstacle for the arbitral tribunal to be able to rule it. But if the group of twenty affected files a class action, it does not seem viable that arbitrators can assume jurisdiction over it because…if indefectibly its award…would ultimately affect the other affected members of the class, that is incompatible with the scope of the arbitration agreement, since those affected persons did not agree on the arbitral agreement, are not bound to recognize the award, and, what is more important, they have not declined state justice.”105 68. All in all, opt-out procedures may be inarbitrable in civil law jurisdictions, either because they could be considered to be against public policy, or because of practical procedural reasons: consequently to the inherent difficulties of proving that all members of the class consented to arbitration, it could be argued that this sort of disputes must be of the courts’ exclusive jurisdiction. 69. This also could lead to objections of violations to the public policy of the country in which recognition is being sought, pursuant to Article V(2)(b). Under the pro-enforcement policy, only a violation of “the forum’s state most fundamental notions of morality and justice106” should have the potential to frustrate recognition and enforcement. The core of the question is to determine whether the US Class Action Model would contravene public policy in civil-law countries in which recognition would be sought. 70. The first concern regarding public policy relates with the potential violations to due process, to which we referred above107. Due process could be a matter of public policy in most countries, and therefore, its violation could entail the application of this ground for refusal108. However, some authors suggest that the use of the public policy exception should be limited to “truly exceptional cases, as appears to have been contemplated by the drafters of the New York Convention109”, and therefore, it should be applied separately from grounds for refusal based on violations of due 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 See supra Section II(B)(i). Free translation. In Inkometal AG v. Koksno Hemijski Kombinat d. d., Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, AP-1199/05, 9 May 2006’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 37 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2012) pp. 166 – 168; Bosnian and Herzegovinan courts denied recognition because the award concerned immovable property in Bosnia and Herzegovinan territory, disputes that under national laws are of the exclusive jurisdiction of local courts. Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan ‘Article V(2)’ in Herbert Kronke and others (n. 49) 366. See supra Section III(B)(iii). For examples of violations to due process as a violation to public policy, see Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan (n. 103) 368-377. See S.I. Strong ‘From class to collective’ (n. 69) 543. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 40 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla process. Nevertheless, practice indicates that in several jurisdictions application and construction of both grounds are intertwined. 71. A second concern, and perhaps the most problematic one, pertains the difference between opt-out procedures under the US Class Action Model and opt-in procedures in most civil-law countries. This seems to constitute an insurmountable obstacle against recognition under this ground for refusal. With regards to the potential recognition of US class action judgments, it has been said, for instance, that because opting-out is a foreign concept in most Latin American countries “it would be fundamentally unfair and a denial of due process to bind absent class members who do not opt out of a class action conducted under the laws of a foreign country” 110. Similar but slightly more lenient considerations could be transposed to Europe, considering that the European Commission Recommendation reads that “the claimant party should be formed on the basis of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed (‘opt-in’ principle). Any exception to this principle, by law or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice.” Opt-out procedures are foreign to most civil-law jurisdictions because they shake their most elemental foundations of due process and procedural law: they imply affecting or benefiting a party that could have not appeared within the proceedings, and, perhaps more importantly, they eliminate the possibility for the members of the class to pursue their claims individually, thus limiting their right to access the administration of justice. All these elements can be potentially alleged to be basic and elemental to the public policy of the State in which recognition is being sought and class arbitration under the US Class Action Model would be radically incompatible with them. C. Conclusion 72. This exercise throws reasonable concerns on whether class arbitral awards could be enforceable under the NY Convention, mainly, in the scenario of trying to enforce a class arbitral award under the US Class Action Model in civil-law countries. 73. The first concern relates to the very application of the NY Convention in class-wide disputes that under certain laws might not be considered “commercial”. In this regard, it is uncertain how flexible would local courts be towards the application of the “commercial reservation” for enforcement purposes. 74. A second one, is related with objections for improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal, particularly in cases arising out of silent arbitral agreements. Bazzle, on the one hand, and Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, on the other one, delimit plausible interpretations of this ground for refusal. It is desirable, however, that the kompetenz-kompetenz principle is given priority and therefore, that the threshold to solve objections upon this ground is set high: only grave irregularities, truly material to the parties’ due process, should be considered. 75. A third concern has to do precisely with due process. In this regard, it should be likely that the “best notice practicable under the circumstances” standard set out under AAA and JAMS class arbitration rules could meet the requisites for enforcement under the NY Convention, especially in countries that have enacted collective redress legislation. On the other hand, the likelihood of success of 110 Antonio Gidi (n. 64) 942. Similar arguments have been raised to conclude that US class action judgments would not be enforceable in China and in Europe. See: Andrea Conzatti (n. 51) 671-673; Andrea Pinna (n. 51) 60. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 41 objections upon a party being “unable to present his case”, will depend on whether local courts interpret it as a “full opportunity” or as a “reasonable opportunity”, being the latter the one that seems closer to the pro-enforcement policy underlying the NY Convention. The procedural design for most collective redress mechanisms guarantees a “reasonable opportunity” to all parties involved, and therefore, if such is the interpretation, it is likely that a class arbitral award would overcome this objection. Concerns on violations of due process for reasons that the arbitral tribunal exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement seem more serious, especially in cases with silent arbitral agreements. If courts of recognition found that the arbitral agreement did not provide for class arbitration, it would most likely hinder recognition. 76. Also serious are the fourth group of concerns identified above, related to the inarbitrability of class-wide disputes under the laws of certain civil-law jurisdictions and violation to public policy. Objections concerning inarbitrability may be raised upon either because under local laws matters subject to class arbitration are inarbitrable, which could be highly likely in civil-law jurisdictions that have set out the protection of collective and diffuse rights as a matter of public policy, or because class-wide disputes could be considered of the exclusive jurisdiction of local courts, particularly if it cannot be proved that all members of the class consented to arbitration. This issue is intertwined with concerns regarding violation of public policy which are likely to arise from the divergences between common-law and most civil-law countries to enact opt-out or opt-in procedures. It seems improbable that courts from civil-law jurisdictions with no collective redress legislation or with no recognition of opt-out procedures (e.g. most European or Latin American countries) would enforce opt-out class arbitral awards given how foreign to their legal systems such type of procedure would be. IV. CONCLUSION: IS CLASS ARBITRATION HERE TO STAY? 77. If class arbitration is to be evaluated “in relation to its alternatives” it is doubtful, at least under the current status-quo, that class arbitration spreads in the international context soon. An interested party in pursuing class arbitration with international implications should assess all the potential obstacles towards obtaining recognition under the NY Convention. When doing so, it is likely to reach the conclusion that the divergent policies towards collective redress mechanisms between common-law and most civil-law countries, and particularly, the opposition of the latter to institute opt-out procedures seem to constitute an unsurmountable obstacle for obtaining recognition of class arbitral awards under the US Class Action Model in civil-law jurisdictions. Most States, however, continue to mature their legislation and policies towards a more robust protection of collective interests. The proliferation of non-US Class Action Model’s class actions could potentially serve for purposes of uniformity of collective redress mechanisms in civil-law jurisdictions. Once certain level of uniformity is reached, there could be room to achieve a certain degree of predictability regarding recognition and enforcement of class arbitral awards under the NY Convention: for instance, it would be more likely to obtain recognition of class arbitral awards following the US Class Action Model in common-law than in civil-law jurisdictions. Likewise, probabilities of recognition of class arbitral awards in civil-law jurisdictions would increase if they were issued under a class action model that follows a similar pattern than the one of the class actions legislation of the country in which recognition is being sought. Overall, arbitral tribunals might try to bear in mind remarks like the ones exposed Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 42 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla in this paper to render class arbitral awards as enforceable as they might be under the NY Convention under current circumstances. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Arbitral Awards 1. Luis Alberto Duran Valencia v. Bancolombia S.A., et. al., Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota. Arbitral Tribunal’s members: Alvaro Mendoza Ramirez, Jorge Cubides Camacho and Rafael H. Gamboa Serrano. (January 30th, 2004). Arbitration rules 2. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration (October 8th, 2003). 3. JAMS Class Action Procedures (May 1st, 2009). Cases Bosnia and Herzegovina 4. Inkometal AG v. Koksno Hemijski Kombinat d. d., Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, AP-1199/05, 9 May 2006’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 37 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2012) pp. 166 – 168. Brazil 5. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Brasil S.A. v. Leandro Volter Laurindo De Castilhos, Supreme Court of Justice, SEC No. 6.335 – EX (2011/0072243-3), 21 March 2012’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 334 – 337. Canada 6. Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc., Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 01-CV- 214404CP, 22 February 2002. 7. Union des consommateurs v. Olivier Dumoulin, Dell Computer Corporation, Supreme Court of Canada, 2007 SCC 34, 13 July 2007. 8. Michelle Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc., Supreme Court of Canada, 33154, 18 March 2011. China 9. First Investment Corp v. Not indicated, Higher People’s Court, Fujian Province, 12 October 2007 and Supreme People’s Court, 27 February 2008’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 349 - 352 Colombia 10. Valencia v. Bancolombia, Supreme Court of Justice, Civil Chamber, (May 11 2001), Reporting Judge: Carlos Ignacio Jaramillo Jaramillo, File number: 1100122030002001-0183-01. 11. Tampico Beverages Inc. v. Productos Naturales de la Sabana S.A. Alqueria, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Civil, Case nuymer SC9909-2017, July 11th, 2017, Reporting Justice: Aroldo Wilson Quiroz Monsalvo. France Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 43 12. Government of the Region of Kaliningrad v. Republic of Lithuania, Cour d’Appel, Paris, First Chamber, 18 November 2010. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2011 - Volume XXXVI. 13. Otkrytoye Aktsionernoye Obshestvo “Tomskneft” Vostochnoi Neftyanoi Kompanii v. Yukos Capital, Court of Appeal of Paris, 15 January 2013’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 373 - 375 Germany 14. Buyer v. Seller, Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt, 26 SchH 03/09, 12 October 2009’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 377 – 380. 15. Czech consultancy company v. German client, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 34 Sch 7/12, 21 June 2012, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 39 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2014) pp. 392 – 393. Kuwait 16. Contract party v. contract party, Supreme Appeal Court of Kuwait, Cassation Circuit, Not Indicated, 21 November 1988. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1997 - Volume XXII. Mexico 17. Amparo Directo Ruling 33/2014, (Parties are kept confidential), Reporting Justice: Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz. Peru 18. Stemcor UK Limited v. Guiceve S.A.C., Corte Superior de Justicia, Lima, Case No. 878-2010, 28 April 2011. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX (van den Berg (ed.); Jan 2014) Portugal 19. 301/14.0TVLSB.L1.S1 (Parties are kept confidential), Reporting Justice: Fernandes Do Vale. Russia 20. Autorobot-Strefa Sp. Z o.o. v. Sollers Elabuga Limited Liability Company, Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2014 and Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, 24 June 2014. In Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2014 - Volume XXXIX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 39 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2014) pp. 483 – 485 Spain 21. Starlio Shipping Company Limited v. Eurocondal Shipping S.A. and others, Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, Case No. 37/12, 15 March 2012’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 - Volume XXXVIII, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 38 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013) pp. 456 – 458. Sweden 22. Lenmorniiproekt OAO (Russian Federation) v. Arne Larsson & Partner Leasing Aktiebolag (Sweden), Högsta Domstolen [Supreme Court], Ö 13-09, 16 April 2010’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume XXXV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 35 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2010) pp. 456 – 457. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 44 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla Switzerland 23. X SA v. Z LLC, Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, 2nd Civil Law Chamber, 5A_754/2011, 2 July 2012. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII 24. X AG v. Y AS, Bundesgerichtshof, 4 October 2010 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2011 - Volume XXXVI, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 36 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2011) pp. 340 - 342 US 25. Keating v. Southland Corp., 31 Cal.3d 584 [1982]. 26. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 27. Rizalyn Bautista (Philippines) v. Paul Peralta (Philippines), Raymond Lovino (Philippines) and others, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 03-15884, 18 January 2005’, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2005 - Volume XXX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 30 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2005) pp. 1071 – 1085. 28. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 599 U.S. __ (2010). 29. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. __ (2011). 30. Oxford Health Plans LLC. v. Sutter, 569 U.S. __ 2013 31. American Express Company, et. al., Petitioners v. Italian Colors Restaurant et. al., 570 U.S. __ 2013. 32. DirectTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S._2015. 33. Harold Leonel Pineda Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. d/b/a NCL, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 10-10367, 29 August 2011. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2012 - Volume XXXVII). European Union Legal Sources 34. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, no 2013/396/EU OJ L 201/60. Statutes Colombia 35. Law 472 of August 5th, 1998, “por la cual se desarrolla el artículo 88 de la Constitución Política de Colombia en relación con el ejercicio de las acciones populares y de grupo y se dictan otras disposiciones.” Germany 36. German Arbitration Act, in force as of January 1st, 1998. Spain 37. Real Decreto 231/2008, de 15 de febrero por el que se regula el Sistema Arbitral de Consumo. Switzerland 38. Swiss Private International Law Statute, 1990. SECONDARY SOURCES Articles 39. Born G and Salas C, ‘The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: a tragedy of errors’ (2012) J Dispute Resolution 21. 40. Conzatti A, ‘The Recognition of U.S. “Opt-Out” Class Actions in China’ (2013) Georgetown J of Intl L Vol 44 642. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 45 41. De Hoyos Walther J E, ‘Class Action Suits vs. Arbitration Clause (Mexico)’ (2014) The Selected Wo r k s of Jorge E. de H o yo s Wa l t h e r, 5 <http://works.bepress.com/jorge_de_hoyos_walther/9/> accessed September 20th, 2017 42. Freyer D H and Litt G A, ‘Desirability of International Class Arbitration’ (2008) Contemporary Issues in Intl Commercial Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 171. 43. Gascon Inchausti F, ‘Eficacia en España de Sentencias y Transacciones derivadas del ejercicio de una Class Action en Estados Unidos’ (2012) 16 AFDUAM 261. 44. Gidi A, ‘The Recognition of US Class Judgments abroad: the case of Latin America’ (2012) 37 Brook J Intl L 893. 45. Gomez M A, ‘Will the birds stay south? The rise of Class Actions and other forms of Group Litigation across Latin America’ (2012) 43 The University of Miami Inter-American L Rev 481. 46. Hensler D R, ‘The future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding’ (2011) 79 Geo Wash. L Rev 306. 47. Howes T and Banks H, ‘A tale of two arbitration clauses: the lessons of Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter for the future of Class-Action Arbitration in the United States’ (2013) J of Intl Arbitration Vol 30 Issue 6 727. 48. Huey-Shao J, ‘Class Action mechanisms in Chinese and Taiwanese contexts - a mixture of Private and Public Law’ (2014) Emory Intl L Rev 237. 49. Koch H, ‘Non-Class Group Litigation under EU and German Law’ (2001) Duke J of Comparative & Intl L Vol 11 355. 50. Nater-Bass G, ‘Class Action Arbitration: a new challenge?’ (2009) 27 ASA Bulletin Issue 4 671. 51. Newland J M, Moher L F and Morgan L, ‘Multi-Party litigation in Germany: the KapMuG in Action’. (2008) Class Action J Vol VI no 4 424. 52. Nissen Meredith W., ‘Class action arbitrations. AAA vs. JAMS: Different approaches to a new concept’. (2005) Dispute Resolution Magazine 19. 53. Pinna A, ‘Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European Legal Systems’ (2008) 1 Erasmus L Rev 31. 54. Strong S I, ‘Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International sphere: Due Process and Public Policy concerns’ (2008) 30 U Pa J Intl L 1. 55. —‘Class Arbitration outside the United States: Reading the tea leaves’ (2009) ICC Institute of World Business Law, Dossier VII - Multiparty Arbitration, Forthcoming; University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-36 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517272> accessed September 19th, 2017. 56. - - ‘The sounds of silence: are U.S. Arbitrators creating internationally enforceable Awards when ordering Class Arbitration in cases of contractual silence or ambiguity?’, (2009) 30 Michigan J Intl L 1017. 57. - - ‘From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration’ (2010) J of the London Court of Intl Arbitration Vol 26 no 4 493. 58. — ‘Does Class Arbitration “change the nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and the return to first principles’ (2012) Harvard L Rev 201. 59. —‘Resolving Mass Legal Disputes through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada compared’ (2012) 37 North Carolina J of Intl L & Commercial Reg 922. 60. — ‘Collective Consumer Arbitration in Spain: A Civil Law Response to US-Style Class Arbitration’, Journal of International Arbitration, (©Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2013, Volume 30 Issue 5) pp. 495-510. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 46 González Arango / Cruz Mantilla 61. Watson G D, ‘Class Actions: the Canadian experience’ (2001) Duke J of Comparative and Intl L Vol 11 272. Books 62. Born G B, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer L Intl 2014). 63. Hensler D H, Hodges C and Tulibacka M, The Globalization of Class Actions (SAGE Publications 2009). 64. Kalrsgodt P G, World Class Actions A Guide to Group and Representative Actions Around the Globe (OUP 2012) 65. Kronke H and others, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer L Intl 2010) 66. Lew J D M, Mistelis L A and Kröll S M, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer L Intl 2003). 67. Spacapan L T and others, Product Liability Litigation Current Law, Strategies and Best Practices (Practising L Institute 2015) 68. Strong S I, Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law (OUP2013). Conference Papers 69. Cooper Alexander J, ‘An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States’, (‘Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective’ Conference, Geneva, July 2000) <https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf> accessed September 19th, 2017. 70. Schafler M and Pasalic A, ‘Is Canada ready for Class Arbitration?’ (ADRIC 2013 - Gold Standard ADR, 2013) <http://www.dentons.com/~/media/PDFs/Insights/2013/October/Is%20Canada%20rea dy%20for%20class%20arbitration%20ADRIC%20version.pdf> accessed September 29th, 2017 Official Materials 71. American Arbitration Association, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief in support of neither party before the Supreme Court of Justice of the United States in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et. al. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. No. 08-1198’ (2009) <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_previe w_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_1198_NeutralAmCuAAA.authcheckdam.pdf> accessed September 19th, 2017. OTHER SOURCES 72. Adam Liptak, ‘Supreme Court allows contracts that prohibit class-action arbitration’ The New York Times (New York, April 27, 2011) < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html?mcubz=3> accessed September 20th, 2017 73. Bancolombia S.A., ‘Bancolombia S.A. anuncia que Tribunal Superior de Bogotá declara infundado recurso de anulación interpuesto por el Banco’ (Medellín, Colombia, March 5 2008) <https://www.grupobancolombia.com/wps/wcm/connect/d3a10bf4-7dd1-4d89-bfbf-07 7000c5fd79/46_bancolombiaAnunciatribunalSuperiorBogotaRecursoAnulacion.pdf?M OD=AJPERES&CVID=l2.flSf> accessed September 20th, 2017. 74. Editorial, ‘Gutting Class Action’ The New York Times (New York, May 12 2011) <13fri1.html?_r=0;0;;;0;http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/op > accessed September 20th, 2017. 75. Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, ‘Arbitration everywhere, stacking the deck of justice’ The New York Times (New York, Octobr 31st, 2015) < https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stac Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? 47 king-the-deck-of-justice.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0> accessed September 20th, 2017. 76. LIBRALEX Members, ‘Class actions in Europe and the United States’ (2014) <http://www.libralex.com/publications/class-actions-in-europe-and-the-us> accessed October 3rd, 2017. 77. Peter Bert, ‘Class Actions in Germany: KapMuG Extended until 2020 – Modest change of scope’. < http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2012/07/class-actions-in-germany-kapmu g-extended-until-2020-modest-change-of-scope/> (accessed September 15th, 2017). 78. US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, ‘Following each other’s lead. Law reform in Latin America’ (2014) <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/FollowingEachOthersLead_ English.pdf> accessed July 29 2015 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA Daniela Corchuelo Uribe*1 Resumen:La acción de tutela es pieza fundamental para la garantía de los derechos fundamentales en el ordenamiento jurídico Colombiano. La Constitución colombiana reconoce el derecho de todas las personas a reclamar ante los jueces, mediante un procedimiento preferente, la protección inmediata de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, cuando quiera que estos resulten vulnerados o amenazados por la acción o la omisión de cualquier autoridad pública, siempre que el afectado no disponga de otro medio de defensa judicial. La Constitución delegó en el legislador la función de establecer los casos en los que la acción de tutela procede contra particulares encargados de la prestación de un servicio público. En virtud de esa delegación y en ejercicio de poderes extraordinarios, el artículo 42(8) del Decreto 2591 de 1991 prevé la procedencia de la acción de tutela contra los actos y omisiones de los particulares que actúen o deban actuar en ejercicio de funciones públicas. De acuerdo con el artículo 116 de la Constitución, los particulares pueden ser investidos transitoriamente de la función de administrar justicia en la condición de árbitros habilitados por las partes para proferir fallos en derecho o en equidad, en los términos que determine la ley. La administración de justicia, según el artículo 228 de la Constitución, es una función pública. Con fundamento en ello, la Corte Constitucional ha admitido la procedencia de la acción de tutela contra laudos arbitrales domésticos, para la protección del derecho al debido proceso, siempre que se haya agotado el recurso de anulación. Recientemente, en la sentencia SU-500 de 2015, la Corte extendió su doctrina sobre la procedibilidad de la acción al arbitraje internacional. De acuerdo con la Corte, la jurisdicción de los tribunales arbitrales está basada en el reconocimiento constitucional de la intención de las partes de someter sus disputas al arbitraje. Además, los laudos arbitrales están sujetos a la Constitución y, por tanto, al control judicial cuando quiera que vulneren derechos fundamentales. Esta sentencia plantea la cuestión de un mecanismo adicional de control sobre los laudos arbitrales dictados en Colombia, su consistencia con el sistema previsto en la Convención de Nueva York, y el impacto de dicho mecanismo en el logro del objetivo de hacer de Colombia un país atractivo como sede de arbitraje y de eliminar la desconfianza en el sistema jurídico colombiano. En este artículo se repasan las disposiciones que regulan el arbitraje internacional y la acción de tutela en Colombia, y la sentencia SU-500 de 2015, para, sobre esa base, analizar si existen bases legales para admitir la procedencia de la acción de tutela contra laudos arbitrales internacional, y cuáles serían las consecuencias de la aplicación de dicho control adicional sobre los laudos arbitrales en el arbitraje internacional. I. Introduction The Colombian Constitution of 1991 is part of a constitutional transformation in Latin America, which consisted in the substitution of the principle of legality for the constitutionality principle, according to which every manifestation of power, public or private, is subject to the Constitution. Within this framework, the tutela2 action is one of the most important devices to guarantee the submission to the fundamental constitutional rights.3 According to article 86 of the Constitution, every individual may claim the immediate protection of his fundamental constitutional rights whenever the latter are violated or threate- 1 2 3 * Daniela Corchuelo Uribe: Associate at Posse Herrera Ruiz, researcher and lecturer at Universidad Externado de Colombia. This article is based on the author’s master thesis at LL.M. in International Dispute Settlement (MIDS), under the supervision of Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler. The term tutela is translated as guardianship. However, such a translation is inaccurate since guardianship in a legal context refers to “The position of being legally responsible for the care of someone who is unable to manage their own affairs” (‘Guardianship’ www.oxforddictionaries.com). Therefore, a more appropriate translation would be protection or safeguard. Nevertheless, the term in Spanish will be kept throughout this text. cf Liliana Carrera Silva, ‘La acción de tutela en Colombia’ (2011) 5(27) Revista IUS, 72. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 50 Corchuelo Uribe ned by the action or omission of any public authority, if there are no other means of judicial defence. The same provision delegates the legislator the power to establish cases in which the action proceeds against individuals entrusted with providing a public service. By exercising such power, article 42(8) of Decree 2591 of 19914 established that tutela claims are admissible against acts and omissions of individuals when they act, inter alia, in the exercise of public functions. As part of the aforementioned constitutional transformation, Colombia, like most Latin American countries, incorporated in its Constitution a reference to arbitration.5 According to article 116 of the Constitution, which is contained in ‘Chapter I: The Structure of the State’ of ‘Title V: The Organization of the State’, individuals may be entrusted temporarily with the function of administering justice as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue decisions in law or in equity in the terms defined by the law. The administration of justice, pursuant to article 228 of the Constitution, is a public function. Indeed, the Colombian Constitution not only recognizes the agreement of the parties to solve their disputes through arbitration, but also states that arbitrators, even though private decision-makers, exercise the public function of administering justice. On these bases, the Colombian Constitutional Court, the highest court on constitutional matters, 6 has admitted tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards for the protection of due process rights, subject to the exhaustion of the setting aside recourse. The admission of those claims was preceded by a debate about the possibility of bringing tutela claims against judgments and judicial decisions, which was finally settled in favour of the admissibility of such claims. Recently, in the Judgment SU-500 of 2015, the Constitutional Court extended to international arbitration its considerations on the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards.7 According to the Court, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is based on the constitutional recognition of the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes. Moreover, arbitral awards are subject to the Constitution and, therefore, to judicial control whenever they violate fundamental rights. 4 5 6 7 Decree 2591 of 1991 was issued by the President of the Republic in virtue of the extraordinary power granted by Transitory Article 5 of the Constitution. The Decree has the force of a law, according to Transitory Article 10 of the Constitution. cf article 202 of Panama’s Constitution; article 258 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; article 43 of Costa Rica’s Constitution; articles 62 and 63 of Peru’s Constitution; article 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras; article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador; article 248 of Paraguay’s Constitution. Article 241 of the Colombian Constitution entrusted the Constitutional Court to safeguard the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution. For such a purpose, the Court exercises, inter alia, the functions of deciding on the petitions of unconstitutionality brought by citizens against the laws and revising the judicial decisions connected with the protection of constitutional rights. Even though it is not necessarily accurate, the term ‘admissibility’ will be used to refer to the term procedibilidad in Spanish. The requirements to which the admissibility of the tutela action is subject will be explained in Section III.C Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 51 The judgment raises the issue of an additional layer of control over international arbitral awards made in Colombia, its consistency with the system provided by the New York Convention, and the impact of such a mechanism in the achievement of the aim to make Colombia attractive as a seat of arbitration and to eliminate mistrust in the Colombian legal system. This article deals with this issue. After a brief presentation of the legal framework of both tutela claims and international arbitration in Colombia, and the background in which Judgement SU-500 of 2015 was rendered, it will be analysed whether, under the current legal regime, there is a legal basis to admit tutela claims against international arbitral awards, and which would be the consequences of the application of such a second layer of control over international arbitral awards. II. Legal framework The development of case law on the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards has been made, first, on the basis of the constitutionalisation of arbitration and, second, on the possibility to bring tutela claims against individuals entrusted with a public function. Accordingly, to understand the current state of affairs in Colombia and to assess the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards, it is fundamental to provide the reader with the legal framework governing both arbitration and tutela actions. A. Hierarchy of norms According to article 4 of the Constitution, every provision is subordinate to the Constitution. The legitimacy of the norms and acts issued by the State organs depends on the authority granted to each of them and the formal requirements, and on substantive alignment with the Constitution.8 Article 152 of the Constitution establishes different categories of law. It provides that certain areas such as the protection of fundamental rights and the administration of justice, which are considered of special interest, shall be regulated by means of statutory law [leyes estatutarias]. Those laws, according to article 153 of the Constitution, are subject to a stringent process of approval with respect to ordinary laws [leyes ordinarias].9 The Constitutional Court has argued that statutory laws have a special hierarchy, insofar as they are intended to regulate matters of cardinal importance to uphold the effectiveness of the constitutional principles and the achievement of the essential aims of the State.10 This reservation is relevant for the purposes of the issue discussed in Section . 8 9 10 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-006 of 1992. Statutory laws require an absolute majority of votes by the members of Congress for their approval, and are subject to prior review by the Constitutional Court. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-748 of 2011. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 52 Corchuelo Uribe B. Arbitration Colombia, like most Latin American countries, incorporated in its Constitution a reference to arbitration.11 This phenomenon, identified by scholars as the constitutionalisation of arbitration,12 has led courts to treat arbitration in Colombia from a jurisdictional perspective.13 This approach finds further support in Law 270 of 1996, which regulates the administration of justice. Colombia has a dualist system. Law 1563 of 2012 contains two separate sets of rules: one for domestic and another for international arbitration. The Third Section (articles 62 to 116), devoted to international arbitration, was drafted on the basis of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with the 2006 amendments. The New York Convention, incorporated to the national legislation of 1990 regulates the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 1. Article 116 of the Constitution The Colombian Constitution of 1991, currently in force, elevated arbitration to the constitutional level, stating in the last paragraph of article 116 that ‘Individuals may be entrusted temporarily with the function of administering justice (…) as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue verdicts in law or in equity in the terms defined by the law’.14 Article 116 is inserted in ‘Chapter I: The Structure of the State’ of ‘Title V: The Organization of the State’. This provision should be read in conjunction with article 228 of the Constitution, which states, ‘The administration of justice is a public function’.15 Indeed, the Constitutional Court has considered that, upon the parties’ authorization, arbitrators exercise a public function.16 Thus, the Colombian Constitution not only recognizes the agreement of the parties to solve their disputes through arbitration, but also states that arbitrators, even though private decision-makers, exercise the public function of administering justice. The Constitution does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitration. 2. Statutory Law of Justice Administration The jurisdictional conception of arbitration was reinforced by article 13(3) of Law 270 of 1996 Statutory of Justice Administration [Estatutaria de la Administración 11 12 13 14 15 16 cf article 202 of Panama’s Constitution; article 258 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; article 43 of Costa Rica’s Constitution; articles 62 and 63 of Peru’s Constitution; article 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras; article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador; article 248 of Paraguay’s Constitution. See Pablo Vallejo Rey, La autonomía del arbitraje doméstico desde la perspectiva constitucional en Colombia y puntuales análisis de derecho comparado Latinoamericano (2015) Revista de Derecho Público No. 34, 4. See Section III. Translation provided by Oxford University Press. Translation provided by Oxford University Press. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-244 of 2007. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 53 de Justicia],17 according to which individuals, when acting as arbitrators authorized by the parties, exercise a jurisdictional function. 3. Arbitration Act: Law 1563 of 2012 Law 1563 of 2012,18 whereby the Statute of National and International Arbitration was issued, adopted with minor modifications the UNCITRAL Model Law for international arbitration.19 Pursuant to article 62 of Law 1563 of 2012, the provisions set forth in ‘Third Section. International Arbitration’ apply, except for articles 70, 71, 88, 89, 90, and 111 to 116, if the place of arbitration is located in the territory of Colombia. Their application is subject to any bilateral or multilateral treaty in force in Colombia. Article 67 provides ‘In matters governed by this section, no court shall intervene except in the cases and for the purposes expressly provided in this section’.20 Regarding the challenge of an arbitral award, article 107 states that “Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be solely made by an application for setting aside on the grounds exhaustively listed in this section. As a result, the court shall neither rule on the merits of the dispute, nor evaluate the analysis of evidence, reasoning or interpretation of the arbitral tribunal”21. In the same way, article 79, which refers to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, states that the decision whereby the arbitral tribunal declares its lack of jurisdiction may only be challenged through an application for setting aside against the final award putting an end to the dispute.22 Before Law 1563 of 2012 was issued, international arbitration was governed by Law 315 of 1996, a precarious set of provisions that did not include, for instance, a specific regulation for the setting aside of awards rendered in international arbitration proceedings in which the seat was located in Colombia. Law 315 of 1996 only contained provisions related to the criteria for the internationality of arbitration, the applicable law, and the definition of foreign arbitral award. Law 315 of 1996 was compiled by Decree 1818 of 1998, a statute that compiled several laws that regulated the means for alternative dispute settlement. The same decree contained the provisions on setting aside recourse that were applied against both national and international awards until Law 1563 of 2012 entered into force. Pursuant to article 119 of Law 1563 of 2012, the Arbitration Statute entered into force on 12 October 2012, three months after its issuance. This law applies ‘only to arbitral proceedings commenced after its entry into force’. Arbitral proceedings pending on the date of entry into force continued to be governed by the provisions compiled by Decree 1818 of 1998. Accordingly, setting aside proceedings against 17 18 19 20 21 22 Modified by article 6 of Law 1285 of 2009. It is an ordinary law. One fundamental difference is that Law 1563 of 2012 did not adopt the term ‘commercial’ in article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Hence, the provisions on international arbitration are not exclusive for commercial disputes. Law 1563 of 2012 (Sections I-V) in Jan Paulsson and Lise Bosman (eds), ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1984, Supplement No. 74, May 2013). ibid. ibid. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 54 Corchuelo Uribe awards rendered under the old regime, even if commenced after Law 1563 of 2012 entered into force, are governed by the old provisions. 4. New York Convention Colombia adhered to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards23 in 1979, and incorporated it into the national legal order with Law 39 of 1990.24 Although it does not regulate setting aside of international arbitral awards, it does recognize the power of the courts of the seat of the arbitration to set aside the award. Indeed, article V(1)(e) establishes that recognition or enforcement of the award may be refused if the party against whom the award is invoked furnishes proof that ‘The award (…) has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made’. Article VII states that the courts may adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award if an application for the setting aside has been made to a competent authority referred to in article V (1) (e). Thus, the New York Convention envisages the primary jurisdiction of the place of arbitration, and the secondary jurisdiction of the place of enforcement of an arbitral award.25 This division of labour, as it will be explained in Section , must be taken into account to address the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards. C. Tutela claims The tutela action, provided in article 86 of the Constitution, is one of the most important legal devices to guarantee the submission of any manifestation of power, public or private, to the constitutional rights.26 The purpose of the action is the immediate protection of fundamental constitutional rights, such as due process, when there are no more legal suitable mechanisms to safeguard them. Although it is a subsidiary remedy, tutela ‘constitutes the main and most effective mean to protect fundamental rights’ [translation provided by the author].27 1. Article 86 of Constitution According to Article 86 of Constitution, every individual may claim, at any time and place, through a preferential and summary proceeding, the immediate protection of his fundamental constitutional rights whenever the latter are violated or threatened by the action or omission of any public authority. The same provision states that the action proceeds only when the claimant does not have access to other judicial means, except when the action is used as a transitory mechanism to avoid irreversible harm. The Constitutional Court has argued, on the basis of such provision, that tutela is a subsidiary action. It means that it can- 23 24 25 26 27 United Nations (1958). It is an ordinary law. cf Thomas H Webster, ‘Evolving Principles in Enforcing Awards Subject to Annulment Proceedings’, (2006) 23(3) Journal of International Arbitration, 201. cf Liliana Carrera Silva, ‘La acción de tutela en Colombia’ (2011) 5(27) Revista IUS, 72. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, ‘La acción de tutela con Colombia’ (1997) 3(1) Ius et Praxis, 165. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 55 not be used to replace other means of judicial defence or as an alternative mechanism.28 However, the existence of another judicial means does not exclude per se the tutela. It is necessary to determine whether the other mechanism is suitable and effective to obtain the required protection. Further, even if it is, tutela is available as a transitory mechanism when it is necessary to avoid irremediable harm. To determine if the latter condition is met, constitutional judges must consider case by case the imminence of the risk, the severity of the harm, and the urgency of a measure. 29 Accordingly, tutela is appropriate when other judicial means available are neither suitable nor effective to obtain protection or tutela is necessary as a transitory mechanism to avoid an irremediable harm.30 The last paragraph of Article 86 provides that the law will establish the cases in which tutela claims would proceed against individuals entrusted with providing a public service, or whose conduct may seriously and directly affect the collective interest, or with respect to whom the applicant may find itself in a state of subordination or vulnerability. 2. Decree 2591 of 1991 Decree 2591, enacted in the same year of the Constitution, regulates tutela in the development of article 86 of the Constitution. It was enacted by the President of the Republic, exercising the extraordinary powers granted by Transitory Article 5(b) of the Constitution.31 The decree, by virtue of Transitory Article 10 of the Constitution, has the force of the law. Article 42(8) of the decree states that the action is admissible against acts and omissions of individuals when the individual acts or should act in the exercise of public functions. Article 6(1) subparagraph 1 states that tutela is inadmissible when there are other resources or judicial means, unless it is used as a transitory mechanism to avoid irremediable harm. It specifies that the existence of such means shall be appreciated case by case, taking into account their efficacy and the circumstances of the applicant. There were two provisions in Decree 2591 that regulated tutela against judgments and other judicial decisions that put an end to court proceedings. First, article 11 stated that tutela had a statute of limitations of two months from the enforceability of the decision. Second, article 40 included several limitations to the 30 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-597 of 2015. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-597 of 2015. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-597 of 2015. 31 Transitory Article 5 28 29 The President of the Republic is endowed with specific extraordinary powers in order to do the following: (…) b. Uphold the right of citizens to protection; (...) Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 56 Corchuelo Uribe admissibility of the action.32 However, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional those provisions.33 It held that the admissibility of tutela claims against judgements was contrary to the principle of legal certainty, among other reasons. As will be explain in Section , the Court reconsidered its position afterwards. III. Tutela against domestic arbitral awards The admissibility of tutela actions against national arbitral awards was preceded by a debate about the possibility to bring tutela claims against judgments and judicial decisions. After the Constitutional Court settled the issue in favour of the admissibility of such claims, it extended its doctrine to domestic arbitration. In both cases, the admissibility of the action is subject to the fulfilment of the general and specific requirements of procedure stated by the Court. A. Admissibility of tutela claims against judgments and judicial decisions The Constitutional Court’s first approach, presented in Judgment T-006 of 1992, was that article 86 of the Constitution did not exclude from the scope of the tutela action the acts and omissions of the judges, but instead authorized claims against any public authority. The Court considered that, by virtue of the primacy of the Constitution,34 no act or omission from a public authority could prevail over the constitutional provisions. Hence, no act or omission could escape from the constitutional control.35 According to the judgment, the principle of res judicata does not have constitutional hierarchy, but legal. Therefore, it is subject to the constitutional provisions, including the entitlement to the immediate protection of fundamental rights. Accordingly, legal certainty cannot be preserved at the expense of a violation of fundamental rights.36 However, the Constitutional Court adopted a different approach in Judgment C-543 of 1992, ruling on the constitutionality of articles 11 and 40 of Decree 2591 of 1991. As it was mentioned in Section , the Constitutional Court declared those provisions, which referred to tutela claims against judicial decisions, contrary to the Constitution. The Court considered, first, that judicial proceedings are by definition intended to protect rights. Therefore, no one may allege he was deprived of the right to be heard if he enjoyed the opportunity of a process. Second, if tutela were available against judicial decisions, it would be contrary to the principle of res judicata, which is based on the principle of legal certainty. Third, the principle of autonomy and 32 33 34 35 36 It stated, for instance, that it was inadmissible to allege erroneous interpretation of the law or to challenge evidence, that the action only proceeded when the harm was a direct consequence of the dispositif, and that the filing of the claim did not suspend the enforcement of the judgment. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-543 of 1992. See Section on the hierarchy of norms. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-006 of 1992. ibid. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 57 functional independence, established in articles 22837 and 23038 of the Constitution, bars interferences in the exercise of the adjudicatory power from other judges and out of the proceedings of the legal recourses. Thus, the Court concluded that tutela was inadmissible against judicial decisions, except in cases of irremediable harm as a transitory mechanism, and subject to the final decision of the judge in the main proceedings. Regarding the construction of the term ‘public authority’ in article 86 of the Constitution, the Court stated that judges are included in that category. Hence, tutela is available against acts and omissions of judges that violate or threaten fundamental rights, but not against their decisions. Thus, for instance, an action may be filed to enjoin a judge has delayed the proceedings without justification to comply with the legal terms.39 With the decision of the Constitutional Court, the possibility of instituting proceedings against judicial decisions was closed. However, in subsequent judgments the Court adopted a new approach, which it tried to render compatible with the statement presented in Judgment C-543 of 1992 by introducing the doctrine of the de facto violations [vías de hecho]. According to this doctrine, tutela claims are admissible in protecting fundamental rights from de facto violations, namely from arbitrariness.40 The current position of the Court is that the action is admissible against judicial decisions in exceptional circumstances. Under the label of ‘specific requirements of procedure’, the Court has identified the type of error that may lead to granting the protection. Those defects do not necessarily imply arbitrariness, but a violation of fundamental rights.41 Notwithstanding the foregoing, sometimes the Court still uses the expression ‘vías de hecho’ to refer to the specific requirements of procedure. In the same vein, the Constitutional Court has admitted tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards. It has considered that the admissibility requirements are the same that apply to the action against judicial decisions. This, taking into account that arbitration is a ‘constitutionally legitimate mode of administration of 37 Article 228 38 The administration of justice is a public function. Its decisions are independent. Its proceedings will be public and permanent with the exceptions established by law, and through it substantive rights will prevail. Legal limits will be diligently observed and failure to apply them will be sanctioned. The functioning of the judiciary will be decentralized and autonomous. Article 230 In their decisions, the judges are bound exclusively by the rule of law. 39 40 41 Fairness, jurisprudence, and the general principles of law and doctrine are the auxiliary criteria of judicial proceedings. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-543 of 1992. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-079 of 1993. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 58 Corchuelo Uribe justice’ [translation provided by the author],42 the arbitral award is vested with the formal and substantial characteristics of a judgment,43 and arbitrators as well as judges exercise a public function.44 B. Admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards From article 116 of the Constitution,45 the Court has concluded, on one hand, that arbitral proceedings are subject to strict compliance with arbitration law and the respect of due process rights,46 and, on the other hand, that the principles of res judicata, legal certainty and judicial autonomy apply to arbitration proceedings.47 In Judgment T-244 of 2007, the Court claimed that the arbitral process is substantially a judicial process and the award equivalent to a judgment insofar as it puts an end to the proceedings and decides the dispute in a final manner. Moreover, the Court continued, arbitrators are vested temporarily in the public service of administering justice. Therefore, their acts and decisions are subject to the respect for fundamental rights, and tutela proceeds whenever the latter are violated.48 C. Requirements of procedure The Court has classified the requirements of procedure of the tutela against judicial decisions or arbitral awards in general and specific. The first category realizes the subsidiarity of the action, and includes the constitutional significance of the case, the immediacy of the action, the decisive effect of the alleged errors of procedure in the outcome of the decision, and the exhaustion of the means of defence available.49 The specific requirements are those defects that, if proved, lead to granting the remedy. 1. General requirements According to the Constitutional Court, the admissibility of tutela claims against judgments and arbitral awards is subject to the constitutional significance of the case, the immediacy of the action, the decisive effect of the alleged error of procedure in the outcome of the decision, and the exhaustion of other judicial means.50 The constitutional relevance supposes that the violation of due process rights is in issue, instead of a mere disagreement of the applicant with the reasons of the award. The decisive effect of the alleged defect of procedure in the decision is ba- 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-225 of 2010. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-431 of 1995. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-294 of 1995. It states, “Individuals may be entrusted temporarily with the function of administering justice (…) as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue verdicts in law or in equity in the terms defined by the law”. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-800 of 2004; Judgment T-790 of 2010. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-225 of 2010. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-244 of 2007. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005; SU-500 of 2015. ibid. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 59 sed on the premise that the object of the action is not reviewing the legality of the arbitral proceedings, but protecting fundamental rights.51 The immediacy of the action requires a reasonable period of time between the relevant fact that allegedly threatened or violated the fundamental right and the filing of the claim. Even though article 86 of the Constitution provides that the tutela may be brought at any time and place, the Constitutional Court has established that the nature of the action requires a reasonable period of time, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis by taking into account the circumstances of time, method and place.52 The Court has said that if it were to allow the filing of tutela claims after months or years after the issuance of the judicial decision, it would create uncertainty over those decisions.53 The same rationale applies to arbitral awards. As mentioned above, tutela proceeds whenever there are no more recourses or actions available to protect the fundamental rights involved. Particularly, the admissibility of the tutela action against arbitral awards is subject to the exhaustion of the setting aside recourse.54 Indeed, the Constitutional Court has considered that the recourse of annulment is intended to guarantee due process rights through review on the steadiness of the arbitral proceedings, and therefore it is suitable and effective to protect procedural rights.55 However, the Court has also recognized that the setting aside recourse does not cover any violation of due process rights, only the grounds included in the list, which has to be interpreted as a restrictive one. Hence, it has admitted that tutela may proceed against arbitral award without the exhaustion of setting aside proceedings when the alleged error does not fit into the grounds for annulment.56 In any case, it is required that the applicant exhausts the means of defence available before the arbitral tribunal.57 2. Specific requirements The specific grounds are the defects that may lead to granting judicial protection58 and therefore vacating the arbitral award:59 absolute lack of jurisdiction [defecto orgánico], grave error of procedure [defecto procedimental], error related to proof [defecto fáctico], and error in the interpretation or application of the law [defecto sustantivo].60 According to Judgment T-466 of 2011 of the Constitutional Court, there is an error in the interpretation or application of the law when (i) the arbitral tribunal ba- 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-500 of 2015. ibid. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-244 of 2007. ibid. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-972 of 2007. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-639 of 2003; T-996 of 2003; T-1228 of 2003. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-225 of 2010. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005. The Court also referred to other errors as the lack of reasons and the direct violation of the Constitution. However, in further judgments, the Court has considered those defects either as defects of procedure or as errors in the interpretation or application of the law. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 60 Corchuelo Uribe sed its decision in a provision that is manifestly inapplicable to the case, (ii) the award does not state the reasons or the reasons are manifestly unreasonable, (iii) the construction or application of a provision ignores a judgment with erga omnes effect that defined the scope of such provision, (iv) the tribunal disregarded relevant provisions in the construction of the one applied, or (v) the tribunal did not apply the applicable provision. The absolute lack of jurisdiction occurs when the arbitrators have manifestly acted beyond the jurisdiction set out by the parties or have ruled on a subject matter that is not capable of settlement by arbitration. The grave error of procedure arises when the arbitrators have completely disregarded the procedure and thereof have affected parties’ right to be heard. The defect related to proof originates when the arbitrators (i) have not assessed evidence decisive for the case, (ii) have assessed the evidence in a manner that violates fundamental rights, or (iii) have based the evidentiary assessment in a legal construction that is manifestly unreasonable. In any case, the error must be decisive in the outcome of the award.61 Although the Constitutional Court has stated there is substantial equivalence between arbitral awards and judicial decisions, it has also recognized that such equivalence is not absolute and that the analysis of the requirements of procedure must be stringent when an arbitral award is in issue. According to the Court, consent to arbitration implies the intention of the parties to keep their disputes out of the jurisdiction of national courts. The respect for that intention explains the restrictive nature of the setting aside recourse and the reinforced exceptionality of the tutela action against arbitral awards.62 Indeed, as the Court explained in Judgment SU-174 of 2007, the admissibility of the action against arbitral awards, aside from the general and specific requirements mentioned above, is subject to the respect for the arbitrators’ autonomy to rule on the merits of the dispute, the direct violation of fundamental rights, the exhaustion of the setting aside recourse, and the persistency of the error.63 When the violations alleged by the applicant concur with the grounds put forward in the setting aside proceedings, the judge should limit himself to determine whether due process rights were protected in the setting aside judgment.64 The admissibility of the action against arbitral awards is justified in the significance of the constitutional rights that tutela is intended to protect.65 Therefore, judges, when deciding tutela claims against arbitral awards, must take into account the autonomy of the arbitral tribunal to rule on the merits of the dispute and the will of the parties on the finality of the arbitral award. Tutela does not open the door for review of the decision on the merits. The tutela judge does not take the place of the arbitral tribunal in the interpretation and application of the law, in the evaluation of evidence, and in deciding the dispute.66 The jurisdiction of the judge is limited to 61 62 63 64 65 66 cf Constitutional cf Constitutional cf Constitutional cf Constitutional ibid. cf Constitutional Court, Court, Court, Court, Judgment Judgment Judgment Judgment T-466 of 2011. SU-500 of 2015. SU-174 of 2007. SU-500 of 2015. Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005; T-058 of 2009. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 61 the examination of the violation of fundamental rights through the assessment of general and specific requirements of procedure.67 D. Assessment The admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards is subject to criticism. It is arguable that the possibility to challenge the arbitral award when the setting aside recourse has not been successful and even for grounds that are different from those for annulment represents a State’s interference with the agreement of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. Pablo Rey Vallejo argues that the application of mechanisms of judicial control over arbitral awards that are not included in international instruments derives in the loss of arbitration autonomy in relation to the permanent jurisdiction. In his opinion, although the admissibility of tutela claims is a consequence of arbitration’s jurisdictional nature under Colombian law, it creates uncertainty.68 It can also be argued that it does not make sense to submit the jurisdiction of the courts to the strict limits of the grounds for setting aside, if there is still a broader range of defects that the losing party may invoke to challenge the award on the basis of the violation of fundamental rights. Nonetheless, the admissibility of tutela claims is fully justified from the constitutional framework of arbitration in Colombia. Pursuant to article 116 of the Constitution, arbitrators are individuals that exercise the function of administering justice. Article 228 of the Constitution provides that ‘the administration of justice is a public function’. Hence, it is clear that the Constituent Assembly considered that arbitrators exercise a public function. On that basis, the Constitutional Court has rightly held that arbitration is in substance a true judicial process and, therefore, subject to the strict application of due process rights.69 The constitutional characterization of arbitration and the legal framework of tutela action both explain the admissibility of such constitutional control over domestic arbitral awards. Given the substantial equivalence drawn in the Constitution between the power by which arbitrators are vested and the jurisdictional power, the only way to subtract arbitration from the constitutional control would be subtracting judicial decisions from the scope of admissibility of tutela claims. The arguments presented by the Constitutional Court in Judgment C-543 of 1992 that refuse the admissibility of tutela claims against judicial decisions, although reasonable, created a distinction between judges’ acts and judges’ decisions that lack constitutional support. In particular, it does not take into account that judges act mostly through decisions. Indeed, article 86 of the Constitution refers to the ‘action or omission of any public authority’. There is no room for any distinction between the different actions that judges may take in the exercise of their public power. The wording of article 86 of the Constitution is broad enough to suppose, without effort, that if the judges are public authorities, then tutela claims are admis- 67 68 69 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-500 of 2015. cf Pablo Vallejo Rey, La autonomía del arbitraje doméstico desde la perspectiva constitucional en Colombia y puntuales análisis de derecho comparado Latinoamericano (2015) Revista de Derecho Público No. 34, 4, 18-19. Constitutional Court, Judgment C-330 of 2000; C-1038 of 2002. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 62 Corchuelo Uribe sible against all their acts and omissions whenever they violate fundamental rights.70 Accordingly, given the current constitutional framework, the doctrine developed by the Constitutional Court on admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards is justified. The question is whether the same rationale should be applied or not to international arbitration. The next Section is devoted to this issue. IV. Tutela against international arbitral awards In a recent case, the Constitutional Court applied its case law on the admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards to a tutela action filed against an international arbitral award. However, the statements made by the Court must be considered with the caveat that the award was rendered before the entry into force of Law 1563 of 2012, and therefore the Constitutional Court did not deal with the provisions of the Arbitration Statute. This is important insofar as the previous arbitration law did not limit judicial intervention in international arbitration proceedings as articles 67, 97 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 do. A. Judgment SU-500 of 2015 In Judgment SU-500 of 2015, the Constitutional Court extrapolated its doctrine on the admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral award to international arbitration. This Section is devoted to discussing the decision. 1. Background On 24 April of 1995, Hidroeléctrica La Miel S.A., a Colombian mixed economy company, concluded a works contract with Consorcio Miel, a consortium comprised of five foreign companies, for the construction of a Hydroelectric Plant. The parties agreed to arbitration for the disputes that arose out of or in relation to the contract in accordance to the ICC Rules. They chose Bogota as the seat of the arbitration and Colombian law as the law applicable to the substance. Further, the parties stated that the award would shall be reasoned and will be final and without appeal.71 Hidroeléctrica La Miel S.A. assigned the contract to ISAGEN S.A., and the composition of the consortium changed before the dispute arose. At the request of some member companies of Consorcio Miel, an arbitral tribunal was constituted under the ICC Rules. On 2 July of 2010, the tribunal issued an award in which it declared its jurisdiction and ordered ISAGEN to pay compensation to Claimants. ISAGEN instituted setting aside proceedings before the Council of State, the competent Court, against the arbitral award. On 29 November of 2012, the Council of State declared the recourse unfounded, except for the allegation that the arbitral Tribunal had decided ex aequo et bono with respect to one of the claims. The finding led to the recalculation of the amount of compensation. The setting aside recourse was governed by Decree 1818 of 1998. 70 71 cf Catalina Botero Marino, ‘Acción de tutela contra providencias judiciales en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano’ (2002) Precedente, Anuario Jurídico. cf Third Section of the Council of State, Judgment of 29 November of 2012, File No. 11001-03-26-000-2010-00051-00(39332). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 2. 63 Tutela proceedings ISAGEN filed a tutela action against the arbitral award and the Council of State’s judgment for the violation of the fundamental right of due process. The applicant alleged that the Tribunal (i) lacked jurisdiction because there was not a valid arbitration agreement between the parties to the proceedings (defecto orgánico), (ii) failed to state the reasons for disregarding ISAGEN’s objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (defecto sustantivo), (iii) ignored its own procedural orders (defecto de procedimiento), and (iv) incurred errors in the taking and examination of evidence (defecto fáctico). Two member companies of the consortium, in their counter-memorial, argued that, according to the New York Convention, arbitral awards may only be challenged before the national courts of the seat of the arbitration through the setting aside recourse for the grounds listed in the law. They further stated that the possibility to vacate an arbitral award by means of the tutela action goes beyond what the Convention states, creates uncertainty in the international business field, and casts doubt on the Colombian judicial system. The first issue that the Constitutional Court analysed was whether the tutela could proceed. For that purpose, the Court stated its general considerations regarding the availability of the action against arbitral awards. The Court argued that the arbitral award is substantially equivalent to the judgment and is, in fact, a jurisdictional decision. It recalled its case law, which states arbitrators exercise a public service and, therefore, their acts and decisions are subject to tutela.72 It further reiterates the general and specific requirements of procedure against arbitral awards.73 From the several statements made in the judgment, two are particularly relevant for international arbitration. First, arbitral awards are subject to the Constitution, and therefore to the judicial control whenever they violate fundamental rights. Second, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is based on the constitutional recognition74 of the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes. It is up to the arbitrators to determine the scope of their jurisdiction in accordance with the principle of competence-competence. This power, according to the Court, implies that the objections to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal must be decided, in the first place, by the tribunal itself, and then by courts at the annulment stage if the objection fits into the grounds of the recourse. The Court claimed that tutela judges must consider those features of arbitration. The Court considered that the general requirements of procedure were met, except in relation to the alleged ignorance of the Tribunal’s procedural orders. With respect to such allegation, the Court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated that the supposed error was relevant for the outcome of the award. Taking into account that ISAGEN had exhausted the setting aside recourse on the same grounds, the Constitutional Court considered that its analysis should be focused on establishing whether due process rights were guaranteed in the setting aside proceedings or whether the Council of State violated such fundamental rights. It stated that its role was to exercise constitutional control over the effective- 72 73 74 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-244 of 2007. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005. Article 116 of the Constitution. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 64 Corchuelo Uribe ness of the setting aside recourse and, from a full review over the arbitration proceeding and the assessment made by the Council of State about them, to rule on the alleged violations. With regard to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, the Court went through the arguments presented in the award and those stated by the Council of State on the applicant’s objections. It concluded that both the arbitrators and then the Council of State, from a complete and reasonable analysis, found that the parties had given jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal, in accordance to article 116 of the Constitution. It declared that although it was possible to state alternative interpretations, as the ones claimed by ISAGEN, neither the tribunal nor the Council of State violated fundamental rights. In relation to the lack of reasons in the decision on the jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court held that both the arbitral tribunal and the Council of State covered the objections submitted by the applicant through a detailed analysis of the facts and the applicable law. It recalled that the tutela action could not be based on the mere disagreement of the applicant with the considerations stated in the arbitral award, as if it were an appeal. Finally, regarding the alleged error in the taking of evidence and the evidentiary assessment, the Court found that the same defects were alleged before the Council of State, which considered reasonable the justifications presented by the arbitrators and concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated the relevance of the errors, namely, that the outcome of the award would have been otherwise different. According to the Court, the object of the tutela is not to supersede the setting aside recourse. Therefore, it is not enough for the applicant to put forward the same arguments that failed in the annulment proceedings, but the applicant must demonstrate that although the grounds for annulment were proven, the judge, arbitrarily, disregarded them. In this case, the Court affirmed that the reproach made by the applicant was insufficient because it failed to prove the relation between the alleged errors and the outcome of the arbitral award. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court denied the tutela.75 3. Criticism Although the reasons outlined in the judgment follow the case law of the Constitutional Court as presented in Section , the decision may be subject to several criticisms. Particularly, the Court did not make any difference between domestic and international arbitration nor did it address the relationship between tutela claims and the New York Convention, although the issue was raised in the counter-memorial. a) The Court did not differentiate international arbitration from domestic arbitration It is to be regretted that the Court did not differentiate international arbitral awards from domestic arbitral awards. The Court did not address whether its doctrine on the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards was compatible or not with international arbitration. 75 Judges Alberto Rojas Ríos and Iván Palacio Palacio issued a dissenting opinion. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 65 Although domestic and international arbitration are both based on the parties’ autonomy, the latter faces issues that are aliens to domestic arbitration. For instance, the role of the seat of the arbitration, the source of the arbitrators’ adjudicative power, the possible concurrency of several laws, the intervention of at least two courts from different jurisdictions controlling the arbitral award, the concept of international public policy, and so on. The adoption of a dual system demonstrates that the Colombian legislator considered that there are differences between domestic and international arbitration that justify a different treatment. The Explanatory Memorandum of bill 18/2011 presented by the government,76 later approved by Congress as Law 1563 of 2012, states that the purpose of the set of rules on international arbitration was to increase the competitiveness of the country, to make it attractive as a seat of arbitration, and to eliminate mistrust in the Colombian legal system. In general terms, the degree of the parties’ autonomy and flexibility of the proceedings is higher for international arbitration. Regarding such differences, Claudia Benavides, for instance, highlights the value of article 64 of Law 1563 of 2012, which states that international arbitration issues not expressly regulated shall be decided pursuant to the general principles that inspire international arbitration. Benavides argues, ‘[e]xtending the rules designed for domestic arbitration to international arbitration may lead to unpractical and unfortunate situations’.77 In that sense, she considers that the merit of the aforementioned clause is that it prevents the application of domestic arbitration provisions to international arbitration cases when such domestic arbitration provisions ‘are not in line with the principles that inspire international arbitration’.78 Further, Benavides seems to suggest that in Colombia only domestic arbitration has jurisdictional nature. Indeed, regarding the legislative background of Law 1563 of 2012, she refers to an attempt in 2002 to implement a monist arbitral system.79 According to her report, ‘[t]he alleged jurisdictional nature of domestic arbitration imposed an important difficulty in the establishment of one unique system applicable to both domestic and international arbitration’.80 The suggestion finds some support in the aforementioned Explanatory Memorandum of bill 18/2011.81 Indeed, it states that one of the main purposes of the proposal is to strengthen and spread domestic arbitration in order to guarantee access to the justice administration without the need to resort to the judicial system. In judgment SU-500 of 2015, as mentioned above, the Constitutional Court pointed out that arbitral awards are subject to the Constitution, and therefore to judicial control whenever they violate fundamental rights. Such a general statement seems to overturn the idea that only domestic arbitration has a jurisdictional natu- 76 77 78 79 80 81 Bill 18 of 2011 – Senate. Claudia Benavides Galvis, ‘The Latin America Choice Between Monism and Dualism’ (2014) The Arbitration Review of the Americas. ibid. Bill 85 of 2002 – Senate. Claudia Benavides Galvis (n 76). Bill 18 of 2011 – Senate. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 66 Corchuelo Uribe re. Indeed, if both domestic and international arbitration are subject to article 116 of the Constitution, it means that both are jurisdictional in nature. However, from the reading of the judgment it is difficult to reach a conclusion, given the level of generality of the statement. Indeed, the assertion was copied from the case law on domestic arbitration, without framing it within the issue of the juridical consequences of the choice of the seat of the arbitration or the choice of the law applicable to the merits in international arbitration. The Constitutional Court did not explain why international arbitration is subject to the Constitution and, aside from the admissibility of tutela claims, what such submission implies. Even under the previous regime, the issue of the applicable law, characteristic of international arbitration, makes a difference between domestic and international arbitration.82 In this specific case, the arbitration was seated in Bogota, and the parties chose Colombian law as applicable to the merits. However, the question remains unanswered whether the submission to the Colombian Constitution, stated in general terms by the Court, came from the choice of the seat, the choice of the substantive law, or both. A second statement made in the judgment that goes against the idea that domestic and international arbitration are different in nature is that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal—in generic expression—is based on the constitutional recognition83 of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes. Irrespective of the accuracy of the assertion, the question of the source of the arbitrators’ adjudicative power in international arbitration was worthy of a deeper analysis. Indeed, the constitutionalisation of arbitration is not the general rule, but a Latin American tendency. For that reason, the answer is not straightforward. Regardless of the conclusion that the Court could have reached if it had analysed the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards, it does not seem appropriate to extrapolate the case law on tutela against domestic arbitral awards without any mention to the features of international arbitration. In favour of the Court, it can be argued that arbitration and setting aside proceedings were governed by Decree 1818 of 1998, under which the grounds for setting aside were the same for national and international arbitral awards, and therefore there was no room for any distinction between domestic and international arbitral awards. Under the previous regime, for instance, the ‘conflict with the international public policy of Colombia’ was not a ground for annulment.84 Further, Decree 1818 of 1998 did not provide the application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitration awards, as article 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 does. However, under the old legislation, the Colombian arbitration system was already dual, which means that the legislator had already recognized differences between domestic and international arbitration. Moreover, when the judgment was rendered, Law 1563 of 2012 had already entered into force. Therefore, it is questionable that the Court did not at least explain why it considered, if it was the case, irrelevant to address the admissibility of tutela claims in light of articles 67 and 107 82 83 84 cf article 2 of Law 315 of 1996, compiled in article 197 of the Decree 1818 of 1998. Article 116 of the Constitution. It is a ground for setting aside under article 108(2)(b) of Law 1563 of 2012. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 67 of Law 1563 of 2012,85 and to explain the difference, if any, between the previous regulation and the new Statute of Arbitration. In conclusion, to rule on the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards, the Constitution Court should have examined the distinction between domestic and international arbitration. Without such analysis, it seems that the Court just extrapolated its case law on domestic arbitration to the international scenario, without justification. b) The Court did not address the relationship between tutela claims and the New York Convention The second objection is that the Court did not address the argument put forward by two member companies of the consortium about the incompatibility of the tutela with the New York Convention, the creation of uncertainty in the international business field, and the credibility of the Colombian judicial system. Even if the Court were to conclude that the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards does not conflict with the New York Convention, it was expected that the Court elaborated on the relationship between constitutional control over international arbitral awards and the Convention. The Court should have addressed, for instance, whether under the New York Convention it is within the Contracting States’ autonomy to regulate primary jurisdiction over the arbitral award, whether the effect of tutela’s judgments when successful is equivalent to the setting aside, and whether the ground for denial of recognition and enforcement in article V(1)(e) of the Convention -referred to the setting aside of the award by a competent authority of the country in which the award was made- should be construed as including tutela judgments when successful. Judgment SU-500 of 2015 opened the door to more questions rather than providing answers. Further, given that the arbitration Consorcio Miel v. ISAGEN S.A. was not governed by Law 1563 of 2012, currently in force, the question on the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards can still be considered open. The next Section will deal with that question, on the basis of the legal framework as presented in Section . B. Are tutela claims admissible against international arbitral awards under the current legal framework? Article 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 states that ‘recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be solely made by an application for setting aside on the grounds exhaustively listed in this section’. The provision further establishes that ‘the court shall neither rule on the merits of the dispute, nor evaluate the criteria, analysis of evidence, reasoning or interpretation of the arbitral tribunal’. In line with this provision, article 67 of the same Statute states that ‘no court shall intervene except in the cases and for the purposes expressly provided in this section’. Article 42(8) of Decree 2591 of 1991 provides that tutela claims are admissible against acts and omissions of individuals when the individual acts or should act in the exercise of public functions. As explained in Section , according to the Colombian Constitution, arbitrators exercise a public function, and therefore their acts and omissions may be challenged through tutela claims. 85 In this regard, see Section IV.B.2. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 68 Corchuelo Uribe To address the issue of the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards under the current legal framework, the questions are, first, whether international arbitrators, when the arbitration takes place in Colombia, are subject or not to the same constitutional regime applicable to domestic arbitration; second, whether articles 67, 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 exclude or not the possibility to file tutela claims against international arbitral awards made in Colombia; and third, whether the New York Convention bars the possibility to file tutela claims against international arbitral awards. 1. Are international arbitrators subject to article 116 of the Colombian Constitution? The question on the application of article 116 of the Constitution to international arbitration or, what is the same, the jurisdictional nature of international arbitration in Colombia, depends on the juridical link that creates the choice of the seat of the arbitration and the applicable law. According to the traditional and dominant approach, the choice of the seat of the arbitration entails a connection with the legal system of the given country.86 This trend was incorporated in article 62 of Law 1563 of 2012, which states that the provisions on international arbitration set forth in the Third Section, except for some articles, ‘shall apply only if the place of arbitration is located in the territory of Colombia’. However, the link between the arbitration and the Colombian legal system when Colombia is chosen as the seat of arbitration is not limited to the application of the lex arbitri, namely Law 1563 of 2012. Colombian law applies to the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement in the absence of an agreement between the parties. Indeed, even though Law 1563 of 2012 does not contain a provision on the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement, article 108(1)(a) of Law 1563 of 2012 states that the arbitral award may be set aside if the arbitration agreement ‘is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under Colombian law’. This rule is in line with the strong tendency, also supported by article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention,87 that ‘the substantive validity of the arbitration clause should be governed by the law of the place of arbitration’.88 Under the Colombian legal order, Law 1563 of 2012 and the substantive rules that may govern the arbitration agreement are both subordinated to article 116 of 86 87 88 See Sébastien Besson, ‘Is there a real need for transcending national legal orders in international arbitration? Some reflections concerning abusive interference from the courts at the seat of the arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age?, (ICCA Congress Series Volume 17, Kluwer Law International 2013) 378; Alexander J Belohlávek, ‘Importance of the Seat of Arbitration in International Arbitration: Delocalization and Denationalization of Arbitration as an Outdated Myth’ (2013) 31(2) ASA Bulletin, 262, 265. Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention states the enforcement of the award may be refuse if the arbitration agreement ‘is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made’. Marc Blessing, ‘The Law Applicable to the Arbitration Clause’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention (ICCA Congress Series, Volume 9 Issue, Kluwer Law International 1999) 173. See also Piero Bernardini, ‘Arbitration Clauses: Achieving Effectiveness in the Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 69 the Constitution,89 which defines the type of function that arbitrators exercise when the parties agree to arbitrate, namely the public function of administering justice. Given that this provision does not differentiate between domestic and international arbitration, and regardless of the criticism that such regime deserves, there is no room to create any distinction under the existing legal framework. Eduardo Zuleta claims that the equivalence between arbitrators and public authorities, in which the Constitutional Court’s doctrine on the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards is based, does not apply in international arbitration. He argues that the choice of Colombia as the seat of the arbitration does not entail that the power of the arbitrators derives from the Constitution.90 Following Emmanuel Gaillard’s criticism to the representation that accounts for international arbitration as relegated to a component of a single national legal order,91 Zuleta, in agreement with Berthold Goldman, argues, ‘arbitrators do not have a forum’92.93 However, the fact that ‘arbitration remains very much a creature of states and of their legal systems’ cannot be overlooked.94 It is true that the arbitrators’ jurisdiction comes from the agreement of the parties. However, such agreement could not produce legal effects without the State’s recognition of the parties’ autonomy. Without claiming to be exhaustive on this complex issue, one example helps to illustrate this position. Most arbitration acts state that the arbitral tribunal has the authority to rule on its own jurisdiction.95 In exercising this power, the arbitral tribunal may decide that it does not have jurisdiction because the arbitration agreement is non-existent or null and void. In such a case, it is clear that the source of the arbitrators’ power to decide on their jurisdiction is not the arbitration agreement, but the lex arbitri. This is to say that international arbitration is not wholly disconnected from the state. Article 116 of the Colombian Constitution constitutes the primary source of the recognition of the parties’ autonomy to submit their disputes to arbitration. No arbitration taking place in Colombia or under Colombian law may disregard this provision. Thus, arbitrators exercise the public function of administering justice. In view of the above, it could be concluded that arbitrators’ acts are subject to tutela claims, in accordance with article 86 of the Constitution and article 42(8) of 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 Law Applicable to the Arbitration Clause’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention (ICCA Congress Series, Volume 9 Issue, Kluwer Law International 1999) 200. See Section on the hierarchy of norms. Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, ‘La colaboración de los jueces en el arbitraje internacional’ en Estatuto Arbitral Colombiano, Análisis y aplicación de la Ley 1563 de 2012 (Legis Editores S.A. 2013) 497. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 15. Berthold Goldman, ‘Les conflits de lois dans l’abitrage international de droit privé’ (1963) 109 Recueil des Cours, Académie de droit international de La Haye, 347. Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo (n ) 497-498. Luca G Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Remedies Against State Interference with International Arbitration’ (2016) 18(2) International Arbitration Law Review, 27. See, for instance, article 186(1) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law; Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 of United Kingdom; article 1432 of the Mexican Code of Commerce; article 1690 of the Belgian Judicial Code; article 41 of the Peruvian Legislative Decree No. 1071. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 70 Corchuelo Uribe Decree 2591 of 1991, which state that the tutela action proceeds against acts and omissions of individuals when the individual acts or should act in the exercise of public functions. If that were the conclusion, the application of the aforementioned provisions could not be overridden either by the agreement of the parties or by the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has deemed that the right to bring tutela claims is a fundamental one. According to the Court, the enjoyment of any fundamental right comprises the right to pursue its protection through tutela whenever the former is violated or threatened,96 subject to the conditions discussed in Section . Due process, as Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler points out in commentary on article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is identical to article 91 of Law 1563 of 2012, constitutes an overriding principle.97 Hence, its application is not subject to the will of the parties. In that sense, the right to claim the immediate protection of due process rights cannot be waived. However, the conclusion made in relation to the application of article 116 of the Constitution to international arbitration does not imply necessarily that international arbitral awards are subject to tutela claims. Indeed, to reach a conclusion on the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards, it is still necessary to consider the role of articles 67, 97 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 and the New York Convention. 2. Do articles 67, 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 preclude the possibility to submit tutela claims against international arbitral awards made in Colombia? Article 86 of the Constitution entrusted the legislator to decide in which cases tutela claims are admissible against individuals. By exercising such power and the authorization on the Transitory Article 5 of the Constitution, article 42(8) of Decree 2591 of 1991 established that tutela claims are admissible against acts and omissions of individuals when the individual acts or should act in the exercise of public functions. As explained in Section , arbitrators fall within that category. In contrast, articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 provide that setting aside is the only possible recourse against arbitral awards. Article 67 reinforces the exclusion of other recourses stating that there is not a place for judicial intervention in other cases than those established in Law 1563 of 2012. On this basis, it has been concluded that Law 1563 of 2012, which is lex specialis and lex posterior, excluded the tutela action against international arbitral awards.98 However, the answer is not straightforward. To reach such a conclusion it is necessary to examine, first, whether an ordinary law, as opposed to statutory law, may limit the right to claim the immediate protection of fundamental rights in light of the 96 97 98 cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-006 of 1992. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Identifying and Applying the Law Governing the Arbitration Procedure - The Role of the Law of the Place of Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention (ICCA Congress Series, Volume 9 Issue, Kluwer Law International 1999) 355. cf Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo (n 89) 500. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 71 reservation provided by article 152(1) of the Constitution.99 Second, it must be determined whether articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 exclude not only any other recourse against arbitral awards—different from the setting aside application—but also any other action, including tutela claims. a) Is the exclusion of tutela claims against international arbitral awards a matter reserved to statutory law? Pursuant to article 152(1) of the Constitution, “fundamental rights and duties of individuals and the proceedings and resources [sic] for their protection”100 shall be regulated by means of statutory law. In this regard, it can be argued that the establishment of any limitation to the constitutional entitlement to bring tutela claims in pursuit of the immediate protection of fundamental rights is a matter reserved for statutory law; character that Law 1563 of 2012 does not have101. It is true that the regulation of fundamental rights and the proceedings for their protection is reserved for statutory laws. However, the Constitutional Court has explained that the reservation must be interpreted in a restrictive manner.102 Indeed, the reservation does not apply with respect to every event related to fundamental rights, but in relation to the comprehensive regulation of fundamental rights, the regulation of the cornerstone of those rights, and the establishment of restrictions and exceptions that affect the core content of the rights.103 Further, in relation to the proceedings for the protection of fundamental rights, the Constitutional Court has said, first, that what shall be the subject matter of statutory law is the development of the proceedings and recourse for the direct and immediate protection of fundamental rights,104 and, second, that the reservation applies to the comprehensive regulation of constitutional mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights.105 In the light of these criteria, the exclusion of tutela claims against international arbitral awards does not seem contrary to the Constitution. Indeed, articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 do not regulate in a comprehensive manner the tutela and do not affect the core content of the right as defined in article 86 of the Constitution. Even though the provisions establish an exception to the admissibility of the action against the acts of individuals who exercise a public function, they cannot be considered as a restriction to the core content of the right, insofar as the Constitution left it up to the legislator to determine the cases in which tutela actions would proceed against individuals entrusted with providing a public service. b) Does the exclusion in articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 cover tutela claims? While it is true that articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 only refer to recourses –no to actions-, from the wording of article 67 of the Statute it is clear that the legisla- 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 See Section II.B.2. Translation provided by Oxford University Press. The Law 1563 of 2012 is an ordinary law. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-756 of 2008; C-748 of 2011; C-818 of 2011. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-818 of 2011. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-748 of 2011. cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-818 of 2011. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 72 Corchuelo Uribe tor’s aim is to shield international arbitration from the interference of state courts. Further, article 107 states that the setting aside recourse proceeds only on the grounds exhaustively listed in Law 1563 of 2012, and that the court shall not ‘evaluate the criteria, analysis of evidence, reasoning or interpretation of the arbitral tribunal’. According to the Explanatory Note of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the purpose of article 5, which is the same as article 67 of Law 1563 of 2012, is to limit courts’ involvement in international arbitration, considering “the fact that the parties to an arbitration agreement make a conscious decision to exclude court jurisdiction and prefer the finality and expediency of the arbitral process”.106 Moreover, the Explanatory Note defines the term ‘recourse’ in article 34 of the Model Law, which was the basis of drafting article 107 of Law 1563 of 2012, as “the means through which a party may actively ‘attack’ the award”.107 As explained in Section , by means of the tutela action, it is possible to challenge the arbitral award for different reasons, including errors on the interpretation and application of the substantive law, and the examination of the evidence. Therefore, it is clear that the legislator, when excluding any court interference except for the cases provided in the Statute of Arbitration, wanted to preclude the possibility of challenging the award by means of tutela claims. In view of the above, articles 67, 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 exclude the possibility of filing tutela claims against arbitral awards or any arbitral decision rendered in arbitral proceedings with seat in Colombia. This exclusion, as explained in Section , does not contradict the Constitution, considering that the regulation of cases in which tutela claims proceed against individuals entrusted with public functions was delegated by article 86 of the Constitution to the legislator. Even though from articles 67, 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 it is possible to reach the aforementioned conclusion, it is worth analysing whether the New York Convention plays any role in the assessment on the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards. 3. Does the New York Convention bar the possibility to challenge international arbitral awards by means of tutela claims? The New York Convention ‘lays down two obligations that are fundamental for the functioning of international arbitration: the obligation to uphold arbitration agreements and the one to enforce awards’108. However, the Convention does not dictate how states should deal with arbitration and setting aside. Those fields remain within the autonomy of states. According to the widespread view, the New York Convention provides for the architecture of international arbitration, which is based on the primary jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration and the secondary jurisdiction of the courts of the countries where enforcement is sought.109 106 107 108 109 UNCITRAL Secretariat, ‘Explanatory Note on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006’ [15]. ibid [45]. Luca G Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Remedies Against State Interference with International Arbitration’ (2016) 18(2) International Arbitration Law Review, 27. See W Michael Reisman and Brian Richardson, ‘The Present – Commercial Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice: Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Arbitration: The Next Fifty Years, ICCA Congress Series (Volume 16, Kluwer Law International 2012). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 73 In this regard, at a first glance it can be said that the tutela action does not interfere with the New York Convention, insofar as it remains within the scope of Contracting States’ autonomy on the regulation of the primary jurisdiction. However, the answer is not that simple. There are at least three considerations that militate against the admission of tutela claims against international arbitral awards. a) Mistrust in relation to the review at the enforcement stage As mentioned above, the Convention advocates a division of labour between the courts of the seat of arbitration and the courts with secondary jurisdiction. From the domestic point of view, the admissibility of tutela claims advocates for the protection of due process rights in arbitral proceedings, which is a legitimate aim. However, from an international perspective, such a second layer of control over international arbitral awards can be interpreted as a manifestation of distrust on the part of Colombia in relation to the review that courts with secondary jurisdiction do at the enforcement stage. Even though the right of those courts to review the arbitral award remains unaffected, the exacerbation of the role of the seat of arbitration may affect the perception of Colombia as an arbitration-friendly country. b) Unpredictability in the New York Convention’s system As mentioned in Section , Law 1563 of 2012 establishes the setting aside application as the exclusive recourse against international arbitral awards. According to the Explanatory Memorandum of bill 18/2011,110 later approved by Congress as Law 1563 of 2012, one of the highlights of the proposal was the consistency between its provisions on setting aside and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the New York Convention. The same document states that such provisions aim to promote legal certainty and the competitiveness of Colombia as a seat of arbitration. The fulfilment of such aims may be frustrated if the possibility to challenge international arbitral awards by means of tutela claims is admitted. While Law 1563 of 2012 excludes any recourse against international arbitral awards different from the setting aside application, there is not any legal provision in Colombian law that states that tutela claims against arbitral awards are admissible. Under this framework, individuals willing to choose Colombia as the seat of arbitration could rely on the fact that the arbitral award will not be subject to any other action or recourse. In the same way, courts with secondary jurisdiction could rely on the fact that if the annulment recourse failed, the arbitral award will not be subject to further control in the seat of arbitration. However, if tutela claims are admitted, the possibility of a decision setting aside the arbitral awards will remain open even after the enforcement of the arbitral award in another jurisdiction. Such a situation would increase the risk of conflicting decisions between courts with primary jurisdiction and courts with secondary jurisdiction. An even more complex scenario would be the case in which the parties have excluded the application for setting aside. According to article 107 subparagraph 2 of Law 1563 of 2012, ‘When neither party is domiciled [n]or resident 110 Bill 18 of 2011 – Senate. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 74 Corchuelo Uribe in Colombia, the parties may, through an express declaration (…), exclude the application for setting aside (…)’. 111 In case the Constitutional Court finds tutela claims admissible, the exclusion of the application for setting aside would not affect the right to file a tutela action against the arbitral award. This is based on the fact that fundamental rights are inalienable. 112 In this context, the prevailing party could not rely on the exclusion of the recourse, and again the risk of conflicting decisions would be present. In this sense, although the Convention does not dictate how States should exercise control over arbitral awards made in their territories, the application of an additional layer of control may create unpredictable situations, especially if such a second control is not clearly defined in the lex arbitri. This circumstance, as already mentioned, goes against the aim of promoting legal certainty and the competitiveness of Colombia as a seat of arbitration, pursued by the legislator with Law 1563 of 2012. c) Is the opposition to the enforcement a means of judicial defence? The opposition to the enforcement before the court of the country in which enforcement is sought could be considered as an additional judicial means that may bar the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards. While it is true that the refusal of the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award does not have ‘nullificatory’ consequences113, it does not mean that it is ineffective in the protection of due process rights. Even though under the New York Convention the prevailing party may seek the enforcement of the arbitral award in any Contracting State, it only makes sense to that party to seek enforcement in the country or countries in which the losing party has assets available to satisfy the award.114 If assets are only available in one State, ‘the party seeking enforcement of the award has no choice: for better or worse, he must seek enforcement of the award in that State’.115 As a consequence, if the enforcement is refused in the country or countries in which the losing party has assets, the award, even though it remains existent, will in reality not produce any legal effect. In that sense, the control exercised at the enforcement stage constitutes for the losing party an effective means of protecting its due process rights. Moreover, if the lack of universal effect were used to dismiss the effectiveness of the judicial means, no action or recourse would be deemed effective, including the setting aside recourse and the tutela. Indeed, some courts have considered that 111 112 113 114 115 Law 1563 of 2012 (Sections I-V) in Jan Paulsson and Lise Bosman (eds), ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1984, Supplement No. 74, May 2013). cf Constitutional Court, Judgment T-249 of 1998. See W Michael Reisman and Brian Richardson (n 108) 25. Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 628 [11.26]. ibid. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 75 the Contracting Parties of the New York Convention are not obliged to refuse the recognition and enforcement when the arbitral award has been set aside.116 Thus, even the setting aside recourse, considered suitable and effective for the protection of due process rights, does not necessarily have universal effect. It can happen that a foreign court seized to enforce an arbitral award made and set aside in Colombia decides to enforce the award notwithstanding the decision of the Colombian courts. The same can be said about a tutela judgment that vacates an arbitral award. Even if covered by the New York Convention, the ‘nullificatory’ decisions of the courts with primary jurisdiction do not guarantee that the arbitral award will not produce any effect if set aside. The effectiveness of any judicial control over arbitral awards is not absolute, insofar as in most cases there are at least two courts from different countries involved. It is under this perspective that the opposition to the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral awards must be analysed. Indeed, despite the fact that the refusal of recognition or enforcement in one country does not affect the award in itself, the possibility to resist the recognition or enforcement on the grounds listed in article V of the New York Convention or in the law of the country in which recognition or enforcement is sought could be considered as a means of judicial defence as well as the setting aside recourse. What is debatable is the value that a judicial means in a foreign court has from the constitutional perspective. Depending on the answer, the possibility of objecting to the enforcement may or may not bar the admissibility of a tutela action. 117 In conclusion, the New York Convention by itself does not preclude the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards rendered in Colombia. However, from both the points of view of the New York Convention’s system and Colombian law, there are reasons to reject the possibility of challenging international arbitral awards by means of the tutela action. As it will be explained in the following Section, the admissibility of tutela claims entails further consequences that should discourage the Constitutional Court from admitting the use of the tutela in international arbitration. 116 117 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. (Colombia), LeaseCo Group and others v. Electranta S.P. (Colombia), et al., United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit, 25 May 2007 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2008 Volume XXXIII (Kluwer Law International 2008); Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. PEMEX – Exploración y Producción, United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, 27 August 2013 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2013 Volume XXXVIII (Kluwer Law International 2013); Yukos Capital SARL v. OAO Rosneft, Cour d’appel d’amsterdam, 28 April 2009; Hilmarton Ltd v. OTV, Cour de Cassation, 23 March 1994; The Arab Republic of Egypt v. Chromalloy Aeroservices, Inc., Cour d’Appeal de Paris, 14 January 1997 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1997 Volume XXII (Kluwer Law International 1997) 691-692; PT Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia) v. Rena Holding, Cour de Cassation, 29 June 2007 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration Volume XXXII (Kluwer Law International 2007) 301. Pursuant to article 6(1) subparagraph 1 of Decree 2591 of 1991, the existence of means of judicial defence shall be appreciate case by case, taking into account their efficacy and the circumstances of the applicant. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 76 Corchuelo Uribe C. Consequences of the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards Taking into account that Judgment SU-500 of 2015 was rendered under the previous regime, the statements made by the Constitutional Court regarding the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards should be considered with caution, in the hope that when faced again with a claim against an international arbitral award, the Court will make the due analysis and reconsider its conclusion. In any case, it is important to bear in mind the consequences that the admissibility of tutela claims may involve. 1. Possibility to challenge the arbitral award for errors in the interpretation and application of the substantive law As mentioned in Section , through tutela claims it is possible to challenge an arbitral award for reasons that are not necessarily listed as a ground for annulment. Even though tutela judges do not rule on the merits of the dispute, they have jurisdiction, for instance, to examine whether the arbitral tribunal erred in the interpretation and application of the substantive law, or in the examination of the evidence. If so, the judge must grant the guardianship and vacate the arbitral award.118 The possibility of setting aside the award for errors that are not listed as grounds for the setting aside recourse, including substantive defects, is against the aim of limiting the courts intervention in arbitration. As the Constitutional Court has recognized, the powers of the courts in the setting aside recourse ‘are very restricted if compared with the powers of the constitutional judge to determine and decide on the violation of fundamental rights’ [translation provided by the author].119 Accordingly, the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards, notwithstanding the effort of the legislator in Law 1563 of 2012, excludes Colombia from the pro-arbitration trend that aims to protect arbitral proceedings from the interference of domestic courts. 2. Attractiveness of Colombia as a seat of arbitration As mentioned above, the architecture of international arbitration that emerges from the New York Convention is based on the primary jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration and the secondary jurisdiction of the countries where enforcement is sought.120 118 119 120 According to article 23 of Decree 2591 of 1991, when the tutela judge finds that the guardianship proceeds, it shall adopt the necessary measures to ‘restore the status quo ante’ [translation provided by the author]. Given that the judge cannot take the place of the arbitral tribunal in ruling on the merits of the dispute, vacating the award is the manner in which the status quo ante can be re-established. Cf Constitutional Court, Judgment C-590 of 2005; T-058 of 2009. Regarding the effect of the judgments of tutela against arbitral awards, see Daniela Corchuelo Uribe, Anulación de laudos arbitrales por errores sustanciales en Colombia (Universidad Externado de Colombia 2013) 69-72. Constitutional Court, Judgment T-058 of 2009. See W Michael Reisman and Brian Richardson (n 108). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 77 Regardless of the importance given to the place of the arbitration, from any approach either the territorial or the transnationalist,121 the fact is that the seat is of decisive importance,122 inter alia, for the annulment of the award.123 It is widely acknowledged that ‘[t]he attitude of the state and its courts towards arbitration is possibly one of the most important facts to consider when selecting a seat’.124 Queen Mary University of London conducted empirical surveys in which they asked corporate counsel to rate the importance of a list of factors that normally influence their choices about the place of the arbitration. 125 According to Loukas Mistelis, by far the most significant consideration was the legal infrastructure of the seat, ‘including not only the domestic arbitration law, but also the experience and record of that jurisdiction in enforcing both arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, and also the perception of the seat and its legal system as neutral and impartial’.126 Within the legal infrastructure, the neutrality and impartiality of the jurisdiction and the ‘arbitration friendliness’ of a seat were the most influential considerations.127 In the same vein, scholars have pointed out the domestic law on arbitration as the primary consideration when choosing the seat of arbitration.128 Gary Born, for instance, argues that ‘much more significant than logistical convenience and cost (…) is the effect of the law of the arbitration seat on the arbitration’.129 The Colombian legislator was aware of the importance of the legal structure when approving Law 1563 of 2012. The set of rules on international arbitration in Law 1563 of 2012 was drafted on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law, with the aim to increase the competitiveness of the country, to make it attractive as a seat of arbitration, and to eliminate mistrust in the Colombian legal system.130 As explained earlier,131 articles 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 establish the setting aside application as the exclusive recourse against international arbitral awards. Further, article 67 of the same Statute states that judicial intervention is only admissible in the cases provided for in the same law. Those provisions, as sta- 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 Regarding the two approaches, see, among others, Alexander J Belohlávek, ‘Importance of the Seat of Arbitration in International Arbitration: Delocalization and Denationalization of Arbitration as an Outdated Myth’ (2013) 31(2), ASA Bulletin, 262, 265-269. See Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International 2014) 2051-2062 cf Loukas Mistelis, ‘The Arbitral Seat: Important Features and the Relevance of Law’ (2012) 23 American Review of International Arbitration, 407, 413. Michael Hwang and Fong Lee Cheng, ‘Relevant Considerations in Choosing the Place of Arbitration’ (2008) 14(2) Kluwer Law International, 195, 201. cf Loukas Mistelis (n 122). ibid 407. ibid 408. See, among others, Alexander J Belohlávek (n 120) 275. Gary B Born (n 121) 2052. cf Bill 18 of 2011 – Senate. See Section IV.B.2. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 78 Corchuelo Uribe ted by the government in the Explanatory Memorandum of bill 18/2011132 and later approved by Congress as Law 1563 of 2012, are consistent with the New York Convention, and are intended to promote legal certainty and the competitiveness of Colombia as a seat of arbitration. It is difficult to assess, without evidence, whether the possibility to challenge the arbitral award when the setting aside recourse has failed is welcome by any individual or corporation willing to submit their disputes to arbitration. However, taking into account that they tend to consider the ‘arbitration friendliness’ of a seat, it can be inferred that any additional control over arbitral awards may discourage the choice of Colombia as a seat of arbitration. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that there is not any legal provision in Colombian law that states tutela claims are admissible against arbitral awards, either domestic or international. The Constitutional Court on the basis of several constitutional and legal provisions has constructed the admissibility of those claims.133 Regardless of the Court’s consideration on that matter, the fact is that the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards when the arbitration takes place in Colombia runs counter to the legal certainty pursued by Law 1563 of 2012. In this sense, the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards may discourage the selection of Colombia as seat of arbitration. This issue and the others mentioned above134 must be taken into account whenever the Constitutional Court has to analyse again the admissibility of the tutela in international arbitration. V. Conclusion In Judgment SU-500 of 2015, the Constitutional Court extended to international arbitration its doctrine regarding the admissibility of tutela claims against arbitral awards. The Court, without presenting any consideration on the differences between domestic and international arbitration, stated that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is based on the constitutional recognition of the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes. It further argued that arbitral awards are subject to the Constitution and, therefore, to judicial control whenever they violate fundamental rights. The statements made by the Constitutional Court in the aforementioned judgment should not be considered as current case law under the law in force, since it was rendered under the previous arbitration regime, which is substantially different from the current Statute of Arbitration. However, the judgment is relevant insofar as it raises the issue of an additional layer of control over international arbitral awards made in Colombia, its consistency with the system provided by the New York Convention, and the impact of such a mechanism in the achievement of the aim to make Colombia attractive as a seat of arbitration, and the elimination of mistrust in the Colombian legal system. 132 133 134 Bill 18 of 2011 – Senate. See Section III. See Sections IV.A.3, IV.B.2, IV.B.3, IV.C.1 and IV.C.2. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA 79 The constitutional provisions that are the bases of the case law on the admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards are equally applicable to international arbitration, given that the former does not make any distinction. However, it does not mean that international arbitral awards are subject to tutela claims. As mentioned, article 86 of the Constitution entrusted to the legislator the determination of the cases in which tutela claims are admissible against individuals. By exercising such power, Decree 2591 of 1991 established that tutela claims are admissible against acts and omissions of individuals when they act in the exercise of public functions. However, Law 1563 of 2012, which is lex specialis and lex posterior, excludes the possibility of filing tutela claims against international arbitral awards by providing the setting aside application as the exclusive recourse, and barring judicial intervention in other cases than those established in Law 1563 of 2012. Furthermore, there are several reasons that militate against the possibility of challenging international arbitral awards by means of the tutela action, being the most important that the admissibility of tutela claims may discourage the election of Colombia as a seat of arbitration, considering that the legal infrastructure, including the arbitration friendliness and legal certainty, is the primary consideration when choosing the seat of arbitration. It is hoped, when faced again with a tutela claim against an international arbitral award, that the Constitutional Court will address the issue by taking into consideration not only the differences between domestic and international arbitration, but also the aim, pursued by Law 1563 of 2012, to protect international arbitration from judicial interference, make Colombia attractive as a seat of arbitration, and eliminate mistrust in the Colombian legal system. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO Y ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN Andrés Cervantes Valarezo*1 Abstract: This paper aims to analyze in more depth the arguments presented in a previous article on the inconvenience of ICSID arbitration and regional arbitration bodies for Latin America but this time under the prism of the New Latin American Constitutionalism. (1999), Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) to differentiate it from other constitutional processes in the region. The common denominator shared by these three Latin American constitutions is the rejection to international investment arbitration under ICSID. The second purpose of the paper is to determine if this constitutional rejection to the ICSID investment arbitration is justified. Key words: Investment Arbitration – latinamerican Constitutionalism – ICSID- UNASUR I. INTRODUCCIÓN Este trabajo tiene como objeto analizar con mayor profundidad los argumentos presentados en un artículo previo sobre la inconveniencia del arbitraje CIADI y de órganos arbitrales regionales para América Latina pero esta vez bajo el prisma del Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano (NCL)2. De tal suerte, el propósito será caracterizar a este constitucionalismo, que como sostengo solo lo integrarían las constituciones de Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008) y Bolivia (2009) para diferenciarlo de otros procesos constitucionales en la región. El denominador común que comparten estas tres constituciones latinoamericanas es la aversión al arbitraje internacional de inversiones, al menos, en su estado actual donde la mayor cantidad de controversias de este tipo es sustanciada en un arbitraje administrado por el CIADI. El segundo propósito del trabajo es determinar si esta aversión constitucional al arbitraje de inversión CIADI se encuentra justificada. Para alcanzar los objetivos propuestos estructuraré el trabajo de la manera siguiente. Primero, analizaré el concepto de NCL brindado por varios autores con el objeto de determinar las principales características de este constitucionalismo y para determinar que una de ellas, muy poco estudiada, es su posición ante el arbitraje de inversión. En segundo lugar, analizaré las cláusulas de integración latinoamericanas muy comunes en el NCL y un segundo tipo de cláusulas constitucionales a las que me referiré como “de aislamiento” por las cuales el poder originario prohíbe al legislador la cesión de jurisdicción en el derecho internacional de inversiones. Luego, haré una introducción muy básica del arbitraje de inversión para determinar su importancia en las economías latinoamericanas. Posteriormente, analizaré críticamente el arbitraje CIADI especialmente en temas relativos a 1) la asimetría del sistema; 2) la crisis estructural del órgano, que falla en asegurar la independencia e imparcialidad de los árbitros; 3) la falta de transparencia procesal; 4) la falta 1 2 * Doctorando en Derecho en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra (España). Número ORCID: 0000-0003-4644-3977. Observaciones bienvenidas a andres.cervantes@upf.edu Cervantes, A (2016). “Inconveniencia del arbitraje de inversión CIADI y de órganos regionales arbitrales para América Latina”. Revista Internacional de Arbitraje no. 24, Ene-Jun/2016. Colombia. págs. 105-124. Disponible en: https://www.academia.edu/29051056/INCONVENIENCIA_DEL_ARBITRAJE_DE_INVERS I%C3%93N_CIADI_PARA_LATAM Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 82 Cervantes Valarezo de coherencia del sistema; y, 5) la relación entre arbitraje de inversión y derechos humanos. Finalmente, realizaré un balance entre el CIADI y la Corte de Inversiones que se debate al interior del UNASUR. II. NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO El nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano (NLC) es una denominación que refiere a varios de procesos constituyentes en la región durante los últimos años del siglo XX y los primeros del siglo XXI, entre los que se incluye a Brasil (1988), Costa Rica (1989), México (1992), Paraguay (1992), Perú (1993), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998 y 2008), Venezuela (1999) y Bolivia (2009) puesto que estos nuevos ordenamientos constitucionales comparten características comunes distintas del constitucionalismo liberal clásico de los Estados europeos. A pesar de esto, no existe consenso entre los autores sobre si todos los procesos constitucionales arriba citados pueden ser efectivamente agrupados bajo esta categoría por tres variables: en algunos casos el proceso fue de reforma parcial mientras que en otros el proceso tuvo como objeto la expedición de una nueva constitución y el ejercicio del poder originario. Igualmente, existen diferencias entre los años de expedición de las constituciones así como una gran diversidad en las ideologías políticas que inspiraron los textos (SALAZAR, 2013)3. Sin perjuicio de lo dicho, es aceptado por la mayoría de autores, que los procesos constituyentes de Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008) y Bolivia (2009) forman parte del NLC puesto sus textos constitucionales comparten una serie de características, entre estas, haber sido dictadas en años recientes y de manera sucesiva, por lo que han servido unas a otras como modelos en la redacción de las constituciones posteriores, por lo que comparten una ideología política y económica común –el llamado Socialismo del Siglo XXI- así como la legitimación democrática de la constitución aprobada (VICIANO -MARTÍNEZ, 2010)4. Igualmente, sería característica de este NCL un largo catálogo de derechos sociales “con la declarada intención para combatir la desigualdad y la exclusión social” (SALAZAR,2013)5. Asimismo, Roberto Gargarella señala que el NCL se caracteriza por la apertura al indigenismo y el reconocimiento de plurinacionalidades (GARGARELLA, 2011)6, sin embargo, me parece que un elemento definitorio de estas constituciones ha pasado desapercibido: su rechazo al arbitraje internacional de inversión es un elemento común en todas ellas. 2.1. Cláusulas de integración y “cláusulas de aislamiento” Como señala acertadamente J.C. Herrera las cláusulas de integración son “las disposiciones normativas que contemplan la posibilidad de ceder parte de la sobe- 3 4 5 6 Salazar Ugarte, P. (2013). “El nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano (una perspectiva crítica)”. Luis Raúl González Pérez y Diego Valadés (coords.), El constitucionalismo contemporáneo. Homenaje a Jorge Carpizo, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, págs. 348-350. Pastor, R. V., & Martínez Dalmau, R. (2010). Aspectos generales del nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano. El Nuevo Constitucionalismo en América Latina: memorias del encuentro internacional el nuevo constitucionalismo (desafíos y retos para el siglo XXI). Quito: Corte Constitucional Del Ecuador, 9-44. Salazar Ugarte, P. (2013), pág. 354. Gargarella, R. (2011). “El constitucionalismo latinoamericano y la sala de máquinas de la Constitución (1980-2010)”. Gaceta Constitucional, 48, pág. 299. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 83 ranía de un Estado a una institución o ente, ya sea del orden regional o internacional”. Estas disposiciones tienen rango constitucional y permiten a los Estados ceder competencias y delegan voluntariamente poderes soberanos en busca de la integración latinoamericana (HERRERA, 2016)7. J.C. Herrera continua clasificando las cláusulas constitucionales de integración en tres (3) clases: aquellas de mayor apertura, donde existe un imperativo constitucional de integración claro; cláusulas de apertura intermedia, donde se autoriza la cesión de soberanía aunque sin hacer referencia ningún órgano en concreto pero “es posible extraer el nivel de vocación integradora por medio de la generalidad de la redacción”; y, finalmente, cláusulas de menor apertura, donde el texto constitucional “guarda silencio relación con la integración regional o la posibilidad de pertenecer a un órgano supranacional” pero que sin embargo reconoce ciertas facultades a los órganos del poder constituido, como el legislativo o el ejecutivo, en relación a la negociación, aprobación y ratificación de tratados internacionales, sin embargo, no existe en la constitución una voluntad constituyente en relación a la integración regional o la cesión de soberanía a un ente concreto, lo que podría traducirse en la ausencia de un mandato de optimización8. Una característica importante del NCL señalada por J.C. Herrera es que las constituciones de Ecuador, Venezuela y Bolivia contienen cláusulas de “mayor apertura” con la integración en varios ámbitos siendo prueba de ello el hecho de que estos tres Estados son parte de UNASUR que busca la integración política, económica y comercial, la transferencia de conocimiento y tecnología, la cooperación en materia de migración, la integración financiera y energética, entre otras. Cuestión similar sucede con MERCOSUR9. De otro lado, bajo el término de “cláusulas de aislamiento” nos referimos a normas constitucionales de los Estados del NCL que de manera expresa prohíben la integración, entendida como cesión de soberanía a órganos internacionales. Me parece, en este punto, que podría elaborarse una sub clasificación puesto que existen cláusulas de aislamiento “absolutas”, que prohíben sin posibilidad de excepción la cesión de competencias mientras a órganos internacionales mientras que las “relativas” permiten la cesión de competencias bajo ciertas condiciones contenidas en la misma norma constitucional. Una de las características del NLC, que como se dijo para generalmente pasa inadvertida, es la aversión de los Estados que lo componen hacia el arbitraje de inversión administrado por órganos arbitrales internacionales. Ejemplo de ello, es la prohibición absoluta contenida en la constitución boliviana vigente. Bolivia (2009): Art. 366.- Todas las empresas extranjeras que realicen actividades en la cadena productiva hidrocarburífera en nombre y representación del Estado estarán sometidas a la soberanía del Estado, a la dependencia de las leyes y de las autoridades del Estado. No se reconocerá en ningún caso tribunal ni jurisdicción extranjera y no podrán invocar situación excepcional alguna de arbitraje internacional, ni recurrir a reclamaciones diplomáticas. 7 8 9 Herrera, J. C. (2016). “Las cláusulas de integración en las constituciones de Suramérica: 200 años después de la Carta de Jamaica”. Colombia Internacional, (86), pág. 168. Herrera, J. C. (2016), pág. 171. Venezuela se constituyó en el primer Estado latinoamericano en adherir al tratado constitutivo, en 2006, y más recientemente Bolivia, en 2015. En MERCOSUR, Venezuela es un Estado Parte, Bolivia se encuentra en proceso de adhesión para obtener la precitada calidad mientras Ecuador tiene la calidad de Estado asociado. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 84 Cervantes Valarezo Art.320. Toda inversión extranjera estará sometida a la jurisdicción, a las leyes y a las autoridades bolivianas, y nadie podrá invocar situación de excepción, ni apelar a reclamaciones diplomáticas para obtener un tratamiento más favorable. Las constituciones del NCL también contemplan cláusulas de aislamiento “relativas”, como en el caso de la constitución ecuatoriana del año 2008 que permite el arbitraje internacional de inversiones siempre y cuando aquel sea administrado por “instancias arbitrales regionales” o cuando el órgano jurisdiccional sea “de designación de los países signatarios” lo que no excluye una integración supra-continental pero que establece un requisito que impide constitucionalmente a Ecuador ser parte del CIADI puesto que en la designación de los árbitros tiene poder de decisión también el inversionista extranjero y en algunos casos también el mismo CIADI10. Un sector minoritario de la academia sostiene que la constitución ecuatoriana no prohíbe el arbitraje “de inversión” sino únicamente el “contractual” y el “comercial”, sin embargo, ello contradice la práctica estatal puesto que recientemente Ecuador denunció todos los TBI que mantenía vigentes con más 12 naciones –luego de firmar un Acuerdo Comercial con la Unión Europea- aduciendo que iniciaría nuevas negociaciones para corregir también la vaguedad y ambigüedad de los tratados. Ecuador (2008): Art. 422.- No se podrá celebrar tratados o instrumentos internacionales en los que el Estado ecuatoriano ceda jurisdicción soberana a instancias de arbitraje internacional, en controversias contractuales o de índole comercial, entre el Estado y personas naturales o jurídicas privadas. Se exceptúan los tratados e instrumentos internacionales que establezcan la solución de controversias entre Estados y ciudadanos en Latinoamérica por instancias arbitrales regionales o por órganos jurisdiccionales de designación de los países signatarios. No podrán intervenir jueces de los Estados que como tales o sus nacionales sean parte de la controversia. En el caso venezolano, la constitución es ambigua respecto a si es posible que el Estado sea parte contratante del CIADI puesto que la arbitrabilidad de la controversia variará, en primer lugar, dependiendo de si la controversia tiene origen en un contrato “de interés público” y en segundo término “si no fuere improcedente de acuerdo con la naturaleza de los” contratos en cuestión. Sin embargo, cabe destacar que Venezuela se incorporó al CIADI en el año 1995 y que la denuncia de la convención CIADI se materializó en años posteriores a la entrada en vigencia de la constitución de 1999. Venezuela (1999): Art. 151.- En los contratos de interés público, si no fuere improcedente de acuerdo con la naturaleza de los mismos, se considerará incorporada, aun cuando no estuviere expresa, una cláusula según la cual las dudas y controversias que puedan suscitarse sobre dichos contratos y que no llegaren a ser resueltas amigablemente por las partes contratantes, serán decididas por los tribunales competentes de la República, de conformidad con sus leyes, sin que por ningún motivo ni causa puedan dar origen a reclamaciones extranjeras. 10 Como sucede, por ejemplo, con los comités ad-hoc de anulación donde tres árbitros de la lista CIADI, distintos a los que conocieron la controversia principal, son designados por el Presidente de la institución. Para más información, véase el artículo 52 del Convenio CIADI. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 85 Lo interesante es que los únicos tres Estados que han denunciado la convención CIADI y han renunciado a su jurisdicción son Bolivia en 2007, Venezuela en 2012, y Ecuador en 2009, como consecuencia de la entrada en vigencia de las nuevas constituciones del NCL. De otra parte, los restantes miembros de UNASUR y de Latinoamérica permanecen como miembros del CIADI –salvo Brasil y Surinam que nunca se adhirieron- y ello sin duda representa una característica excluyente de otros procesos constitucionales en la región. Por otra parte, Argentina firmó el convenio en mayo de 1991; Paraguay en julio de 1981; Uruguay en mayo de 1992. En el resto de países de América del Sur, el convenio del CIADI entró en vigencia en 1969; en Guyana, en octubre de 1991; en Chile en septiembre de 1993, en Perú en 1995 y en 1997 en Colombia (MORENO-PAREDES, 2010)11. III. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN Y EL CIADI El derecho internacional de inversiones es hoy en día una rama autónoma del derecho internacional público –y no del derecho privado como argumentaremos en lo posterior- que ha permitido a personas naturales y jurídicas litigar en contra de los Estados, lo que resulta particularmente interesante considerando que la única analogía posible al día de hoy es el litigio en casos de violaciones de derechos humanos ante órganos supranacionales como la Corte Interamericana (CorteIDH) o el Tribunal Europeo de derechos humanos (TEDH). La inversión extranjera directa constituye para los Estados un medio para su desarrollo económico y social y generalmente estas inversiones están estrechamente relacionadas con sectores estratégicos como recursos naturales, petróleo, minería, energía, construcción de obra pública, entre otras. A través de tratados bilaterales (TBIS) o multilaterales de inversión o comercio, e inclusive mediante contratos celebrados bajo legislación local, los Estados receptores de la inversión garantizan a sus titulares ciertos estándares especiales de tratamiento: 1) la prohibición de la expropiación de facto o de indirecta –de iure- de la inversión; 2) garantizar un trato justo y equitativo al inversionista; 3) trato nacional y prohibición de discriminación; y, 4) brindar protección y seguridades plenas a la inversión (REINISCH,2008)12. Sin embargo, este panorama no siempre fue así. Hasta 195913, a falta de los mencionados instrumentos internacionales, en caso de que una controversia surgiera entre el Estado y el inversionista extranjero, este último tenía dos opciones: litigar ante la jurisdicción local del Estado receptor o solicitar protección diplomática de su gobierno, con el objeto de iniciar una negociación o disputa legal entre Estados14. 11 12 13 14 Moreno-Paredes, E. (2010), “El Arbitraje de Inversional en América del Sur: Propuesta de Creación de un Centro Alternativo de Arbitraje de la Estructura Internacional de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas”, 42 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 175 (2010), pg.190. Disponible en: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol42/iss1/7 Reinisch, A. (Ed.). (2008). “Standards of investment protection”. Oxford University Press. En 1959 se suscribió el primer tratado de protección de inversiones extranjeras entre Alemania y Pakistán. Ese tratado era una evolución de los tratados de amistad, comercio y navegación (TACN); hoy en día se considera un hito en el arbitraje de inversión. Por ejemplo, con motivo de una alegada expropiación, Bélgica otorgó protección diplomática a accionistas belgas de una compañía canadiense y demandó a España ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited – Bélgica c. España–, 1970 I.C.J. Decisión de 5 de Febrero de 1970. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 86 Cervantes Valarezo En 1966, bajo el auspicio del Banco Mundial, se suscribió la Convención del Centro Internacional de Arreglos de Disputas de Inversiones (CIADI) también conocida como la Convención de Washington por la cual se instituye un sistema adversarial de solución de controversias que permite a los inversionistas extranjeros demandar directamente al Estado receptor. Por supuesto, la única excepción de este principio es la existencia de una cláusula que exija el agotamiento previo de la jurisdicción local15: unlike any other treaty, investment treaties often remove the duty of the individual to exhaust local remedies before an international claim can be brought. This is critical because it operates to eclipse the conventional role of the domestic legal system in mediating between the international and domestic spheres. Further, this removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies is entirely unique to investment treaty arbitration (VAN HARTEN, 2008)16 De esta manera, las cláusulas que exigen a los inversionistas extranjeros agotar los recursos internos permitieron consolidar la doctrina Calvo por la que los extranjeros no pueden solicitar intervención diplomática en la solución de sus controversias con el Estado receptor17. Si bien el CIADI no es la única institución de arbitraje de inversión, debido a la existencia de múltiples foros, entre estos, la Corte de Arbitraje de la Cámara Internacional de Comercio (CCI) y la Corte de Londres de Arbitraje Internacional (LCI), es la más importante a nivel mundial puesto que ciento cincuenta y tres (153) Estados han ratificado la Convención de Washington, siendo el CIADI la institución que sustancia la mayoría de las controversias inversionista-Estado. IV. ¿CRISIS ESTRUCTURAL DEL CIADI? 4.1. Apariencia de independencia e imparcialidad El sistema de arbitraje CIADI enfrenta, sostiene Van Harten, problemas estructurales relativos a la apariencia de independencia e imparcialidad de los árbitros que deciden la disputa entre el inversionista y el Estado. El arbitraje de inversión es una industria de servicio en la que solo los inversionistas, que son firmas multinacionales, tienen la facultad de activar un sistema asimétrico demandando a los Estados el pago de millonarias indemnizaciones por la violación de las garantías de su inversión18. Entonces, sería lógico suponer que un inversionista no acudirá al CIADI sin la mediana certeza de que su reclamo prosperará. Esta asunción llevaría a concluir 15 Artículo 26 de la Convención CIADI: “…un Estado Contratante podrá exigir el agotamiento previo de sus vías administrativas o judiciales, como condición a su consentimiento al arbitraje conforme a este Convenio”. 16 Van Harten, G. (2008), pg. 8. Salvo que el Estado receptor de la inversión, perdedor en el arbitraje, no haya acatado el laudo dictado por el tribunal o haya dejado de cumplirlo. Véase el artículo 27 del Convenio CIADI. Con excepción del caso Nicaragua c. Barceló Hoteles & Resorts (2008), en este caso el Estado demandó al inversionista por incumplimiento de contrato ante el CIADI, reclamando daños cuantificados en 30 millones de dólares. El procedimiento terminó por un acuerdo alcanzado por las partes. Como bien señala Ferreres Comella “También un Estado puede presentar una reclamación contra un inversor, pero ello es muy poco frecuente en la práctica” y ello es básicamente por el carácter limitado de las obligaciones objetivas del inversionista. Ferreres, V (2014). “Arbitraje, democracia y Estado de Derecho: Algunas reflexiones sobre la teoría de Owen Fiss. 17 18 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 87 que los árbitros designados por los inversionistas dependan económicamente de éstos puesto que se requiere de demandas para que la industria arbitral funcione, ya que los inversionistas no los designarán en controversias futuras si los árbitros tienen reputación de absolver Estados y negar demandas de inversionistas (VAN HARTEN, 2016)19. Aquí debo hacer una salvedad, lo dicho no implica que todos los árbitros sean parcializados y dependientes de los inversionistas sino únicamente que el sistema favorece esta percepción, esto generalmente no ocurre el poder judicial porque los jueces tienen cargos fijos durante un determinado número de años y un salario fijo, al contrario de los árbitros. Dicho esto, el informe histórico de casos del CIADI (2017) revela que los tribunales CIADI en un 29% de casos declaran sin lugar la totalidad de la reclamación; en un 25% declinan la jurisdicción; en 1% de casos declaran que la demanda “carece manifiestamente de mérito jurídico” y que tan solo en un 45% de casos dan lugar “parcial” o “totalmente” al demandante. Ello bien podría ser porque los árbitros, argumenta Ferreres, buscan mantener un equilibrio en el sistema, que tampoco podría funcionar sin los Estados (FERRERES, 2014). Sin embargo, también es necesario considerar que el 91% de los inversores demandantes provienen de países económicamente desarrollados, como Estados Unidos, Canadá, Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Europa occidental y Japón. En claro contraste, tan solo una minoría del 6% corresponde a demandas presentadas por inversionistas nacionales de países de economías en desarrollo, dentro de las cuáles se encuentran incluidos los países de América Latina (ZABALO, 2012)20. Coincidentemente, el informe del CIADI de 2017, muestra que los árbitros, conciliadores y miembros de los comités ad-hoc elegidos pertenecen en un 47% a países de Europa occidental, en un 21% a América del Norte, y sólo un 11% a América el Sur21. El hecho de que la mayoría de árbitros CIADI provengan de Europa occidental, Norteamérica y otras economías desarrolladas, conlleva a que los inversionistas sean juzgados por sus nacionales22 o por personas que comparten valores, formación e intereses regionales, circunstancias que además de afectar la apariencia de imparcialidad de los árbitros demuestra que América Latina y sus inversionistas, que son una minoría en lo que respecta al uso del sistema, no se encuentren representados de manera equitativa a los demás grupos. A diferencia de los jueces, los árbitros son designados caso por caso y no están impedidos de ejercer su profesión como abogados o asesores en otras controversias. Ello repercute gravemente en la apariencia de imparcialidad e independencia de los árbitros puesto que podrían existir casos de conflictos de interés. Por ejemplo, Ecuador recusó al árbitro Guido Tawil en el caso Murphy c. Ecuador III puesto que se había desempeñado previamente como co-representante de la firma King and Spalding 19 20 21 22 Van Harten, G. (2007). “Investment treaty arbitration and public law”. OUP Catalogue, pg.172. Zabalo, P. (2012). “América Latina ante las demandas inversor-Estado”. Revista de economía mundial, Vol. 31. Estadística de carga de casos CIADI versión 2017-1. Págs. 11-12. Disponible en: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-1%2 0(Spanish)%20Final.pdf En principio, las partes no pueden designar como árbitros a sus ciudadanos nacionales. Sin embargo, con frecuencia y de acuerdo al reglamento CIADI, esta regla es obviada por mutuo consentimiento de las partes de acuerdo al artículo 39 de la Convención CIADI. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 88 Cervantes Valarezo en los casos Azurix Corp. v. Argentina23 y Enron c. Argentina, firma de abogados que luego lo nominaría para ser árbitro en la controversia contra Ecuador. Y como consecuencia de que “el mercado de árbitros” se excesivamente reducido, talvez por un hermetismo voluntario -solo 15 árbitros, procedentes de Europa, los EUA o Canadá, han resuelto el 55% de todas las disputas conocidas basadas en TBIS (EBERHARDT – OLIVET, 2013)24- provoca que estos árbitros expresen públicamente su opinión sobre un punto de derecho, como académicos o como abogados de parte, y que luego deban resolver casos similares pero esta vez en función de árbitros: ello constituye una forma de prejuzgamiento25. Igualmente, no deja de ser preocupante que las recusaciones sean resueltas por los otros miembros del tribunal cuando el grupo de árbitros es minúsculo26. Otra de las fallas estructurales de independencia en el CIADI, según Van Harten, se vuelve evidente presenta cuando existe desacuerdo de las partes respecto del árbitro que se desempeñará como Presidente del Tribunal, su designación queda en potestad de la autoridad nominadora del CIADI, ejercida por el Presidente del CIADI de acuerdo al artículo 38 del convenio; y, la designación podría ser influenciada por intereses externos puesto que siendo el Presidente un funcionario ejecutivo, debe responder al Banco Mundial, que es controlado mediante sistema de votación, por los países exportadores de capital. Esta facultad no debe ser menospreciada, en razón de que el Presidente del Tribunal arbitral usualmente redacta el proyecto del laudo y además tiene potestad dirimente en caso de opiniones divididas. 4.2. Derecho público y control de convencionalidad Otra crítica interesante – y a mi juicio más relevante que la expuesta previamente- es que los árbitros al conocer una disputa inversionista-Estado pueden determinar la responsabilidad de este último, juzgando si su normativa interna, entendida como legislación y actos administrativos, constituyen una expropiación indirecta de los activos y expectativas legitimas del inversor, o si la regulación es discriminatoria, pudiendo de este modo incluso, cuestionar la validez de normas tributarias, ambientales, sanitarias, de comercio exterior, de publicidad; y, virtualmente cualquier norma en el sistema jurídico que afecte a la inversión, inclusive reformas constitucionales que afecten la inversión. Curiosamente, los árbitros realizan una especie de control de convencionalidad, que en la actualidad solo realizan los Tribunales regionales de Derechos Humanos, 23 24 25 26 Casos CIADI No. ARB/01/12, No. ARB/01/3 Eberhardt, P y Olivet, C (2013) “Cuando la Injusticia es negocio”, TNI/CEO. Disponible en: https://www.tni.org/files/download/cuando_la_injusticia_es_negocio-web.pdf “A court of law must be free and, in my opinion, is required to consider whether one of its judges has expressed views or taken positions that create the impression that […] he may be deemed to have prejudged one or more of the issues bearing on the subject-matter of the dispute before the court. That is what is meant by the dictum that the fair and proper administration of justice requires that justice not only be done, but that it also be seen to be done”. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Proceedings, Order of 30 January 2004, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, at para. 10. Un aspecto positivo del proyecto de arbitraje UNASUR (2014) es que establece que en ningún caso la recusación de un árbitro será resuelta por los miembros restantes del tribunal sino por otra autoridad. Una traducción no oficial del proyecto puede encontrarse en: Sarmiento, M. G. (2015). “The 2012 Draft Constitutive Agreement of the Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes of the UNASUR”. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698574. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 89 y de ser el caso condenan al Estado al pago de una indemnización económica (VAN HARTEN, 2008)27. De esta manera, en el ínterin de la controversia arbitral, los inversionistas ejercen presión en la toma de decisiones eminentemente públicas. Por ejemplo, la tabacalera Philipp Morris inició varios arbitrajes en contra de Uruguay y Australia por la normativa de empaquetado de cigarrillo, que exigía que el 80% de la cajetilla llevará advertencias de salud sobre las consecuencias probadas de la consumición del producto. Con este antecedente, el inversionista intimó a que países como Canadá y Noruega “interrumpieran la discusión sobre la normativa relacionada” y “advirtió al gobierno de Reino Unido que de tomar decisiones similares se arriesgaría a indemnizaciones millonarias”28. Sin duda alguna, este es otro caso que refleja la colisión entre derechos constitucionales (libertad de empresa vs. derecho a la salud) 29. Pocos autores cuestionan que el arbitraje de inversión tenga relevancia pública e inclusive constitucional, donde la colisión de derechos fundamentales y los intereses de los inversionistas es evidente. Por ejemplo, el derecho humano al agua ha sido materia de más de doce arbitrajes, diez contra Argentina, dos contra Tanzania y uno contra Bolivia. A fines de 1999, cuando el gobierno boliviano intentó refinanciar los servicios de agua de su tercera ciudad más grande, Cochabamba, el Banco Mundial instó a que este servicio sea privatizado, motivo por el cual se entregó en concesión la empresa municipal de agua a la inversionista extranjera Aguas del Tunari S.A. , lo que ocasionó un aumento entre el 50% y el 100% en las tarifas de agua; y, la aprobación de la ley boliviana no. 2029 que permitía a la empresa monopolizar todas las fuentes de agua de la ciudad, incluidos pozos y sistemas agrícolas. Estos hechos que dieron inicio a la llamada “guerra del agua” (SHULTZ, 2008)30. Sin embargo, en este arbitraje se negó la participación a través de un amicus curiae a ciudadanos y ONGS bolivianas a pesar de las especiales características de esta controversia31. 27 28 29 30 31 “For this reason, investment treaty arbitration is best analogized to judicial review in public law because it involves an adjudicative body having the competence to determine, in response to a claim by an individual, the legality of the use of sovereign authority, and to award a remedy for unlawful state conduct. Alternatively, it could be said that the adjudicative body issues a decision that has important consequences for the state, for the individual, and for others affected by what the decision means for the authority and conduct of the state, whether they are affected as taxpayers, employees, consumers, recipients of government programs, beneficiaries of regulation, and so on”. Van Harten, G. (2008). “A case for an international investment court”. All Papers. Osgoode Hall Law School of York University pg. 6. Procuraduría General del Estado – Ecuador (2016). “Una visión crítica del arbitraje de inversiones desde la experiencia de Ecuador”, pg. 133. Disponible en:http://www.pge.gob.ec/images/publicaciones/2016/libroArbitraje/espaniol_low.pdf CIADI, Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) vs. Uruguay (Caso CIADI No.ARB/10/7). Mediante laudo de 8 de julio de 2016, el tribunal rechazó la demanda de la tabacalera que exigía $25 millones de dólares en daños, concluyendo que Uruguay no violó el TBI invocado para la demanda puesto que había hecho uso de medidas regulatorias legítimas. Un buen recuento histórico puede encontrarse en Shultz, J. (2008), “La guerra del agua en Cochabamba y sus secuelas”. Desafiando la globalización, pg. 18. “Because the arbitration arises out of actions by the Government of Bolivia to guarantee public order and access to water, the Tribunal’s decision in this case could implicate core government functions. The decision could also alter the legal obligations that apply to the Government of Bolivia when it regulates to protect public order and human health, as well as the economic and other factors it takes into account when deciding whether to do so”. Petición de amicus curiae presentada por la Coordinadora para la defensa del agua y la vida en agosto del 2002. Disponible en: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0018.pdf Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 90 Cervantes Valarezo Lo que resulta especialmente preocupante es que “ningún tribunal nacional está autorizado para fiscalizar la validez del laudo. Los tribunales nacionales, además, no pueden negarse a ejecutar el laudo, pues el Convenio de Nueva York de 1958, que enumera algunos motivos para negar la ejecución de un laudo bajo el Derecho nacional, no resulta aplicable (FERRERES, 2014)”32. Aquello implica que en caso de una condena, el Estado deba reformar su regulación o afrontar futuras demandas de otros inversionistas. Esta atribución está en manos de personas que tienen formación en derecho comercial y no en derecho público y que además son ajenos a los efectos económicos y sociales de sus fallos sobre la sociedad civil del Estado demandado. ¿Son los árbitros las personas indicadas para resolver estas cuestiones? El problema no es que estos temas sean resueltos por un tribunal internacional sino que sean resueltos por un tribunal privado sin medios de control democrático ni de rendición de cuentas, esenciales en democracia33. Quisiera reflexionar brevemente sobre la importancia de esta cuestión. Sin duda alguna, una condena económica a un Estado tiene un efecto disuasorio muy importante en la política estatal dado que el laudo puede ser ejecutado forzosamente por medios altamente efectivos (BORN, 2011)34. Al contrario de lo que sucede con los tribunales de “primera generación” como llama Gary Born a aquellos sin medios de ejecución forzosa –entre estos los tribunales de derechos humanos, la Corte Internacional de Justicia, la Corte Permanente de Arbitraje y el Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar- existen tribunales a los que Born llama de “segunda generación”, como los tribunales arbitrales CIADI y los de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) donde la ejecución forzosa, aún contra Estados soberanos, no provoca dificultades. De tal suerte, el artículo 54 de la Convención de Washington señala que “todo Estado Contratante reconocerá al laudo dictado conforme a este Convenio carácter obligatorio y hará ejecutar dentro de sus territorios las obligaciones pecuniarias impuestas por el laudo como si se tratare de una sentencia firme dictada por un tribunal existente en dicho Estado” por lo que todos los activos que posea un Estado, incluyendo reservas bancarias en el extranjero, pueden ser objeto de la ejecución (VAN HARTEN, 2008)35. 32 33 34 35 Ferreres, V. “Arbitraje, democracia y Estado de Derecho: Algunas reflexiones sobre la teoría de Owen Fiss”, pg. 4. Disponible en: https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/SELA14_Ferreres_CV_Sp.pdf Último acceso 08/05/2017. Argentina propuso incluir en el Proyecto para la constitución de un Centro de solución de disputas Inversor-Estado UNASUR una disposición que obligue a los árbitros a considerar el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos al momento de resolver la disputa cuando ello resulte aplicable. Sin embargo, Chile y Perú rechazan esta posibilidad. Born, G. (2011). “A new generation of international adjudication”. Duke L.J, 61, 775. Pg. 867. “Unlike other decisions or awards in public law, investment treaty awards are enforceable in the courts of as many as 160 countries with limited opportunity for judicial review, in particular for errors of law or unreasonable choices made by the arbitrators (i.e., other than jurisdictional errors or serious procedural impropriety). As a result, the arbitrators are authorized to interpret important questions of public law without the possibility of review or correction by a court, whether domestic or international”. Van Harten, G. (2008), pg. 8. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 4.3. 91 Falta de transparencia Las audiencias, los documentos, las intervenciones de las partes e incluso el laudo en sí mismo son, por regla general, confidenciales36. Una de las críticas más importantes al sistema CIADI es que aun cuando estos son tribunales arbitrales privados resolviendo cuestiones de derecho público operen en los límites del secretismo. Si la adjudicación, especialmente en cuestiones de interés general, no es totalmente abierta y transparente se vuelve inmune al escrutinio público, por lo que cuestiones que afectan a la comunidad toda podría terminar decidiéndose en secreto. Por estos motivos, Van Harten señala que la transparencia es condición previa de la independencia del juzgador. Es lamentable que el CIADI no admita amicus curiae, presentados por organizaciones no gubernamentales o la sociedad civil, para que expresen su opinión en controversias que les afectan directamente. En Aguas del Tunari S.A (2005) c. República de Bolivia alrededor de trescientas ONG´S y miembros de la sociedad civil solicitaron al tribunal de arbitraje CIADI que se les permita expresar su posición sobre el proceso y que se hicieran públicos los documentos y las audiencias que se llevarían a cabo, dado que aquello aportaría transparencia y experiencia técnica al proceso37. Sin embargo, esa decisión no estaba en manos del tribunal arbitral sino de las partes procesales dado que el reglamento de arbitraje CIADI dispone en la regla 37 aquello requiere de mutuo acuerdo entre las partes. El inversionista demandante no accedió por lo que se negó a varias ONGS y ciudadanos su participación y conocimiento del proceso. La decisión, aunque reglamentaria sigue siendo lamentable puesto que se debatían cuestiones de evidente interés público y de derechos humanos. El extremo de la confidencialidad en el arbitraje de inversión, que bajo ningún concepto podría equiparse al comercial donde esta confidencialidad estaría justificada por la naturaleza privada de la controversia, llega a que inclusive el laudo arbitral permanezca confidencial salvo acuerdo de ambas partes38. Ello acarrea otro tipo de problemas puesto que la CorteIDH ha señalado que los ciudadanos tienen derecho a la información y al control de las acciones del gobierno ¿viola el Estado al cumplir el procedimiento CIADI el derecho a la información y al control de la acción de gobierno por parte de sus ciudadanos?39 36 37 38 39 Igualmente, en Suez c. Argentina el procedimiento se mantuvo confidencial por la negativa del inversionista. En este caso se discutió la terminación del contrato de concesión y la legalidad del congelamiento de las tarifas de agua por parte del gobierno argentino durante la crisis del 2006, por supuesto, el congelamiento tarifario afectó la inversión de Suez. Lo lamentable es que en esta controversia, en la que se analiza la legalidad, proporcionalidad y necesidad de medidas públicas para garantizar el derecho al agua no se garantice el debate público más amplio posible. Aguas del Tunari S.A (2005) c. República de Bolivia Caso CIADI No.ARB/02/3. Véase el artículo 48 del Convenio CIADI. “…la acción del Estado debe guiarse por los principios de difusión y transparencia en la administración pública, que permiten que todas las personas sujetas a su jurisdicción ejerzan el control democrático de dichas acciones, para que puedan cuestionar, investigar y considerar si las funciones públicas se están llevando a cabo de manera adecuada”. CorteIDH, caso Claude Reyes y otros Vs. Chile. Sentencia de 19 de septiembre de 2006 (Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 92 Cervantes Valarezo 4.4. Falta de coherencia y precedentes jurisprudenciales Las amplias potestades conferidas a los árbitros se ejercitan además bajo un control mínimo dado que los laudos CIADI son inapelables por lo que no existe la posibilidad de que un tribunal de alzada corrija los errores de derecho y de interpretación de los árbitros40. En este punto es necesario señalar aunque es característico del arbitraje ser de única instancia, sin embargo, no existen buenas razones para que se mantenga así en el caso del derecho internacional de inversiones. En el caso de controversias civiles o comerciales los tribunales arbitrales locales –de tradición civil romana- están obligados a aplicar el precedente jurisprudencial desarrollado por la judicatura nacional puesto que la ley aplicable es la misma y el intérprete por excelencia sigue siendo el juez. Ello garantiza coherencia en la adjudicación. Empero, en el derecho internacional de las inversiones la interpretación del derecho aplicable se encuentra fuera del alcance de los jueces y monopolizado por el arbitraje de inversión, donde no existe stare decisis. Y ello debe preocupar tanto a Estados como a inversionistas extranjeros (VAN HARTEN, 2005)41. Por otro lado, de acuerdo al artículo 52 de la Convención CIADI el recurso de nulidad procede únicamente por causales taxativas y en su mayoría de carácter procesal, estas son (a) que el Tribunal se hubiere constituido incorrectamente; (b) que el Tribunal se hubiere extralimitado manifiestamente en sus facultades; (c) que hubiere habido corrupción de algún miembro del Tribunal; (d) que hubiere quebrantamiento grave de una norma de procedimiento; o (e) que no se hubieren expresado en el laudo los motivos en que se funde. Además el rol de un comité ad hoc de anulación es limitado, confinado a evaluar la legitimidad de un laudo y no su corrección. Finalmente, es necesario destacar que las causales (a) y (c) no tienen (mayor) aplicación práctica. Por estos motivos, este recurso es sencillamente insuficiente para garantizar el doble conforme. La coherencia y la previsibilidad de las decisiones no se encuentra garantizada –no existe consenso, ni siquiera entre los árbitros, sobre este tema. Así en el laudo de Vivendi c. Argentina incluyeron otras dieciocho decisiones en las que se había rechazado la misma objeción estatal, para realzar la consistencia de la decisión en cuestión. De otro lado en SGS c. Filipinas, el tribunal arbitral señaló que “no debían seguirse precedentes, ya que por definición todos los TBI son distintos. Además sostuvo que no hay razón para que el tribunal que interviene en un caso anterior decida la suerte de los subsiguientes casos”42. De otro lado en Machala Power c. Ecuador, el tribunal arbitral dijo que las decisiones “deben buscar adoptar un desarrollo armonioso del derecho de inversiones y por tanto llenar las legítimas expec- 40 41 42 Artículo 53 de la Convención CIADI: “El laudo será obligatorio para las partes y no podrá ser objeto de apelación ni de cualquier otro recurso, excepto en los casos previstos en este Convenio. Las partes lo acatarán y cumplirán en todos sus términos…”. “A lack of coherence in the law of investor protection is not desirable for investors because it creates difficulties in predicting the extent to which an investor enjoys legal security in a particular jurisdiction. It may prompt investors to initiate claims that turn out to be unfounded, thus wasting time and money where an arbitration tribunal interprets broadly worded standards more restrictively than the investor anticipates. But by far the greater hazards of interpretive uncertainty fall upon states. States alone can be ordered to pay damages for violating an investment treaty”. Van Harten, G. (2005). “Private authority and transnational governance: the contours of the international system of investor protection”. Review of International Political Economy, 12(4), Pg. 616. Procuraduría General del Estado – Ecuador (2016). “Una visión crítica del arbitraje de inversiones desde la experiencia de Ecuador”, pg. 134. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 93 tativas de la comunidad de Estados e inversionistas de certeza del imperio del derecho”43. La falta de stare decisis ha generado decisiones contradictorias el CIADI a pesar de que los hechos, el Estado demandado y el derecho aplicable sean los mismos. Por ejemplo, Como una reacción a la crisis económica argentina originada en 1999, el gobierno decidió suspender el ajuste tarifario y congelar las tarifas de distribución de gas. Por ello CMS Gas Transmission Company (CMS) y LG&E Energy Corporation iniciaron arbitrajes bajo las reglas CIADI. Tanto en el caso CMS como en el LG&E el gobierno argentino alegó estado de necesidad como un eximente de responsabilidad de acuerdo al derecho internacional y el TBI entre Argentina y Estados Unidos. En ambos casos, el derecho sustancial aplicable era el mismo, sin embargo, en el laudo de CMS se rechazó la defensa de Argentina mientras que en el laudo de LG&E se lo admitió parcialmente44. V. INCONVENIENCIA DEL ARBITRAJE REGIONAL UNASUR En este panorama, América del Sur45, es una región supremamente importante para el arbitraje de inversión a nivel global, de acuerdo a las estadísticas del propio CIADI abarca el 24% de las controversias que se someten al centro. En este sentido, supera por mucho a regiones como Asia del Sur y Oriental y el Pacifico (8%); Medio Oriente y África del Norte (10%); África Subsahariana (15%); Europa occidental (7%); América del Norte –Canadá, EEUU y México- (5%) y también más que Centroamérica y el Caribe (6%). De hecho la única región que supera mínimamente la cantidad de casos sometidos al CIADI es Europa Oriental y Asia Central (25%). Además, el 25% de las controversias tienen origen en inversiones en petróleo, gas y minería y otro 17% en el sector de la producción de energía, que son sectores claves de la economía de varios Estados latinoamericanos, como Ecuador y Venezuela, ambos miembros de la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP)46. En el mes de junio de 2009, durante la 39º Sesión de la Asamblea General de la Organización de Estados Americanos, el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Ecuador, propuso que UNASUR crease un centro de arbitraje regional alternativo al CIADI (FIEZZONI, 2011)47. En diciembre de 2010 en Guyana, los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los países miembros de UNASUR, decidieron por unanimidad que Ecuador presida el grupo de trabajo sobre solución de controversias e inversiones. Actualmente el pro- 43 44 45 46 47 CIADI, Noble Energy & Machalapower Cia. Ltd. vs. Ecuador y Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, Caso CIADI No. ARB/05/12, Decisión en Jurisdicción, 5 de marzo de 2008, párrafo.50 Franck, S. (2005) “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions”, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521. Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss4/10 Región geográfica conformada por Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haití, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, República Dominicana, Uruguay y Venezuela. Estadística de carga de casos CIADI versión 2017-1. Págs. 11-12. Disponible en: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-1%2 0(Spanish)%20Final.pdf Fiezzoni, S. (2011)"The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace ICSID Arbitration." Beijing Law Review 2.03, pg. 135-143. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 94 Cervantes Valarezo yecto se encuentra en etapa de desarrollo, para su posterior aprobación por parte de los Estados miembros de UNASUR48. Entre las características más notables, contrarias a las tendencias establecidas por el arbitraje CIADI, el proyecto señala que la jurisdicción del Centro de Arbitraje permite a los Estados excluir de la materia arbitrable a disputas relacionadas a ciertos sectores económicos o a ciertos inversionistas (FACH- TITI, 2016)49. Una versión anterior del proyecto excluía materias de salud pública, impuestos y energía salvo que el Tratado o contrato de inversión establezcan lo contrario. Igualmente, la antigua versión del proyecto establecía que, en los arbitrajes no se podría decidir sobre la legitimidad de leyes internas de los Estados miembros ni de sus efectos económicos (FIEZZONI, 2011)50. La versión actual del proyecto establece que en caso de que una de las partes no designe un árbitro o no alcancen un acuerdo sobre quien ejercerá la presidencia del Tribunal, la Dirección General del centro de solución de disputas UNASUR lo nombrará por sorteo. De otro lado, los árbitros tienen la obligación de consolidar dos o más procedimientos donde se decida la misma cuestión de derecho y se establece un sistema de precedentes vinculantes. En relación con la transparencia del proceso, las reglas establecen que todos los procedimientos de arbitraje deben ser públicos, ello incluye documentos, registros, evidencia, audiencias y laudos, excepto aquellos que se relacionan con la defensa y seguridad de los Estados (FIEZZONI, 2011). En garantía de la coherencia de las decisiones, se establece además un recurso de apelación (FACH- TITI)51. En el artículo 20 de la nueva versión proyecto de arbitraje UNASUR 2014 se reconoce a los laudos arbitrales como de obligatorio cumplimiento, debiendo ser ejecutados sin necesidad de homologación local. Sin embargo, Brasil sugirió que se establezca a la homologación con la legislación nacional como requisito. Ello eventualmente permitiría a los Estados negar la ejecución de los laudos expedidos en violación del orden público interno o cuando la controversia sea inarbitrable, ambas causales reconocidas en el artículo V de la Convenio de Nueva York de 1958 lo que implica un desincentivo e inseguridad para el inversionista extranjero puesto que de otro lado los laudos CIADI son de cumplimiento obligatorio y 48 49 50 51 Los miembros de UNASUR son Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, Uruguay y Venezuela. “Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the abovementioned article allow states to notify the depositary of the CA (UNASUR General Secretariat, pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 2) that they do not accept to submit certain disputes or situations to the jurisdiction of the Centre, because of either the actors or the specific investment sector involved in the dispute…” Fach, K-Titi, C. (2016), “UNASUR Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Comments on the Draft Constitutive Agreement”. Investment Treaty News Quarterly (ITN), Volume 7, Issue 3, August 2016. “The jurisdiction of the Centre precluding disputes concerning health, education, taxation, energy, the environment and others, unless expressly stated otherwise in the relevant treaty or contract. In no circumstances an arbitral tribunal will have jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the internal laws of a UNASUR member State. This preclusion also extends to the economic effects of a general norm”. Fiezzoni, S. (2011)"The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace ICSID Arbitration." Beijing Law Review 2.03, pg. 140. “Particularly novel with respect to the current system of investment arbitration under ICSID is the content of Article 31 of the CA, which outlines an appeal against the arbitral award. If such appeal is maintained in the final version of the CA, the parties will be allowed to file an appeal within 120 days if the award contains an error in the application or interpretation of the law applicable to the dispute”. Fach, K-Titi, C. (2016). Pg. 3. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 95 existen métodos de ejecución realmente efectivos52. Bajo el sistema actual, los inversionistas pueden ejecutar los activos que el Estado receptor mantenga en cualquier otro Estado parte del CIADI sin que aquellos puedan denegar la ejecución bajo ningún argumento, como se señaló anteriormente. Dado que la República del Ecuador es ponente del proyecto y que el artículo 422 de la Constitución ecuatoriana se refiere a “órganos jurisdiccionales de designación de los países signatarios” y a “jueces” en materia de solución de disputas de inversión, es probable que en lugar de un sistema arbitral se establezca uno de jueces permanentes, nombrados por los Estados de la región, lo que constituye la principal preocupación de los árbitros CIADI en la actualidad, dado que no podrían ser designados caso por caso ni por los inversionistas ni por los Estados. Sin embargo, de acuerdo al artículo 17 de la nueva versión del proyecto que data del año 2014, se prevé que el Centro de arbitraje UNASUR tenga una lista de árbitros, que se conformaría a través de la nominación de los Estados contratantes, pudiendo cada Estado nominar hasta 5 árbitros que pueden ser sus nacionales. De otro lado, en el artículo 16 del nuevo proyecto se establece que el Estado y el inversionista designarán cada uno un árbitro y que el presidente del Tribunal será designado por mutuo acuerdo. El hecho de que los Estados demandados sean los que designen los árbitros que decidirán la disputa planteada por el inversionista extranjero, provocará idéntica sensación que litigar ante un tribunal nacional del Estado receptor, que es precisamente lo que todo inversionista extranjero busca evitar. Sin perjuicio de ello, los Estados procuran aminorar esta percepción manteniendo el sistema de arbitraje en lugar de una corte permanente y permitiendo al inversionista designar a un árbitro, con las limitaciones antedichas. En este escenario, es previsible al menos una apariencia de parcialidad de los árbitros en favor de los Estados dado que en ausencia de recursos económicos serían los Estados quienes financien la operación del centro de manera proporcional. Ello es particularmente preocupante puesto que podría condicionar el buen funcionamiento del arbitraje de inversión. Igualmente, el factor de la nacionalidad de los árbitros designados podría afectar su imparcialidad e independencia puesto que las disputas planteadas por inversionistas extranjeros son controversias que de estimarse a su favor repercutirían gravemente en la economía y en la sociedad que ellos, como ciudadanos de la región integran. En general, parecería que la influencia de los sistemas en el nombramiento de árbitros, sumado al financiamiento de la institución, que en el caso CIADI corresponde al Banco Mundial y en el Proyecto Regional de Arbitraje correspondería al UNASUR y en segundo término a los Estados, constituye el eje del debate, a mane- 52 Para ejemplificar este punto, a través del proceso de homologación “conforme a la legislación local” se podrían establecer requisitos más gravosos como los contemplados en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 o aquellos que los Estados requieran a través de sus constituciones o leyes. Esto se evidencia, por ejemplo, en el caso de Ecuador donde el artículo 104 del Código Orgánico General de Procesos (COGEP) establece entre otros varios requisitos que: “se acredite…que la parte demandada fue legalmente notificada y que se haya asegurado la debida defensa de las partes” y que “para efectos del reconocimiento de las sentencias y laudos arbitrales en contra del Estado, por no tratarse de asuntos comerciales, deberá además demostrarse que no contrarían las disposiciones de la Constitución y la ley”. Y ello abre una caja de pandora. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 96 Cervantes Valarezo ra de una lucha por control. De tal suerte, Fráncico Orrego Vicuña, arbitro CIADI nacional de Chile, expresó respecto del proyecto de arbitraje UNASUR que: …el resultado sería una especie de foro de arbitraje contra la inversión, ofreciendo una alternativa al CIADI y a otras instancias que se perciben como demasiado favorables a los inversores. No creo que sea una buena idea, puesto que una institución así se consideraría con casi total seguridad como demasiado favorable al Estado y eso no sería satisfactorio para los inversores53. Otra de las críticas estructurales a este proyecto es que bajo ningún precepto los árbitros o jueces UNASUR podrán decidir sobre la legitimidad de leyes internas de los Estados miembros ni de sus efectos económicos; aquello implicaría una ablación de los reclamos más frecuentes realizados por inversionistas extranjeros (no discriminación, no confiscación, trato justo y equitativo) y un blindaje en favor de los Estados para adoptar virtualmente cualquier medida54. Además, con respecto a los miembros del UNSAUR, es importante recordar que Brasil es el país que atrae la mayor cantidad de capital en materia de inversión extranjera directa55. Dado que este país nunca ha ratificado TBI alguno ni tampoco es parte del CIADI, es probable que tampoco forme parte del proyecto de arbitraje UNASUR y aquello supone un gran revés para que el proyecto resulte atractivo a nivel mundial56. De igual manera, Bolivia, pese a participar en la elaboración del proyecto, ha declarado anteriormente que no aceptará métodos adversariales en la solución de disputas de inversión –lo que excluye tanto a árbitros como a jueces- y por tanto los mencionados Estados analizan participar únicamente en métodos de solución de controversias como mediación o negociación. VI. UNA CORTE INTERNACIONAL DE INVERSIONES Es difícil negar que tanto el sistema de solución de disputas inversor-Estado CIADI, así como el propuesto por UNASUR presentan serias y fundadas preocupaciones sobre su independencia, reflejada en su diseño institucional. En este panorama, se ha impulsado un debate a nivel internacional para determinar si debe crearse una Corte Internacional de Inversiones o si por el contrario debe perfeccionarse el modelo CIADI. Sin duda alguna existen importantes contribuciones tendientes a mejorar el sistema actual como crear un órgano de apelación CIADI o que 53 54 55 56 Ross, A. (2010). “From ICCA to the icecaps: an interview with Francisco Orrego Vicuña”. Disponible en: http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1029533/from-icca-to-the-icecaps-an-interview-w ith-francisco-orrego-vicu%C3%B1a Último acceso 08/05/2017 La excepción de política pública, como defensa del Estado, es importante para proteger intereses colectivos. Entre estas se encuentran las relacionadas a la balanza de pagos, tributos, seguridad nacional. Esta excepción se encuentra reconocida en otros métodos de solución de disputas como el de la Organización Mundial de Comercio. Pero una prohibición absoluta de revisar actos de Estado causaría abuso, discrecionalidad e inseguridad. UNCTAD, (2015) “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Transformation of the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead”, pg. 7. Disponible en: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciiem4d3_en.pdf El mayor receptor de inversión extranjera directa de América Latina y el Caribe sigue siendo el Brasil, que recibió $75.000 millones de dólares en 2015. Ver el informe CEPAL “la inversión extranjera directa en América Latina y el Caribe del año 2016”. Disponible en: http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/40213/7/S1600664_es.pdf Último acceso 08/05/2017 Brasil, sin embargo, ha participado en la negociación del proyecto del Centro de Arbitraje UNASUR. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 97 todos los árbitros sean nombrados de mutuo acuerdo por el Estado y el inversor (KALB, 2005)57, sin embargo, a largo plazo la creación de un nuevo sistema parece ser lo más adecuado. La constitución de una Corte Internacional de Inversiones tendría como principal ventaja la unificación del derecho internacional en esta materia mediante la interpretación y aplicación uniforme y obligatoria de los distintos TBIS vigentes por parte del pleno de la Corte, cuyas decisiones causarían stare decisis, sentando certeza jurídica y resolviendo una de las principales preocupaciones tanto de los Estados como de los inversionistas58. Además, el acto constitutivo de la Corte Internacional de Inversiones bien podría ser la oportunidad de negociar un Tratado Multilateral de Inversiones (MAI) puesto que, como es conocido, el derecho internacional de inversiones se encuentra regulado por legislación aplicable caso por caso debido a la proliferación de TBIS a nivel mundial provocada por el “…fracaso a fines de los 90’ de la iniciativa de la Organización de Países para el Desarrollo Económico (OECD) para crear un tratado multilateral sobre inversiones (MAI)” y es por ello que “ hasta el momento no existe una regla o tratado multilateral que regule en forma centralizada y homogénea el Derecho Internacional de las Inversiones (DII)”… (KUNDMULLER, 2006)59. En lo que respecta a la independencia e imparcialidad del órgano, creemos que lo más apropiado es desistir de la institución del arbitraje, cuya característica primigenia es la libertad de escoger al juzgador; y, optar por el nombramiento de jueces designados para servir durante un periodo específico de años, con un honorario fijo, sin que puedan ejercer su profesión como abogados o asesores durante su mandato. Aún más importante, este sistema permite mantener un régimen de auditoria institucional sobre situaciones que podrían llegar a causar conflictos de interés y de ninguna forma obsta el derecho de los inversionistas a solicitar una recusación. Ahora bien, los jueces pueden ser nominados por los Estados, pero elegidos por una organización internacional en base a méritos y guardando un equilibrio entre nacionalidades, representación continental y género, como sucede en el caso de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (POSNER – YOO, 2005)60. Lo rescatable del CIADI y UNASUR con relación a la coherencia del sistema, son los recursos de nulidad y apelación respectivamente, que en nuestra opinión deberían incorporarse en la eventual creación de una Corte Internacional de Inver- 57 58 59 60 Kalb, J. (2005). “Creating an ICSID Appellate Body”. UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Affairs. 179. Me parece que es la vía por la que, muy lentamente, transita el derecho internacional de inversiones. Prueba de ello es el Acuerdo Integral de Economía y Comercio entre Canadá y la Unión Europea (CETA) acordado en 2013 por el cual se crea un Tribunal permanente de inversiones y un tribunal de apelación, en la que se exige a los miembros del tribunal los mismos requisitos de elegibilidad que a los jueces de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Kundmuller, F. “El arbitraje del CIADI y el Derecho Internacional de las Inversiones: un nuevo horizonte.” Lima Arbitration. N (2006): 1-2006. Esta propuesta debe analizarse detenidamente, el éxito del arbitraje de inversión se debe a su capacidad de resolver simultáneamente una gran cantidad de casos. En caso de una Corte Internacional con jueces permanentes esta atractiva característica podría arriesgarse. Posner, E.A; Yoo, J. C. (2005). “Judicial independence in international tribunals”. California Law Review, pg. 1-74. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 98 Cervantes Valarezo siones, visto el derecho de las partes a la doble instancia, que consta reconocido en varios instrumentos internacionales61. Con respecto de la ejecución de los fallos que se expidan, consideramos que lo más adecuado es mantener el sistema CIADI, por el cual se considera que los fallos equivalen a aquellos dictados por cortes nacionales y en consecuencia no requieren posterior homologación ni puede rechazarse su ejecución, pudiendo hacer efectiva la sentencia contra los activos que el Estado condenado mantenga en cualquier otro Estado parte del convenio. También es adecuado el establecimiento de amicus curiae y de publicidad procesal de las audiencias, las pruebas y documentos presentados durante un procedimiento de arbitraje de inversión. No podemos ignorar el hecho que la mayoría de estas disputas envuelven cuestiones de interés general y, en ciertos casos, inclusive cuestiones relativas a derechos humanos, por lo que no pueden ser aplicados los mismos estándares de confidencialidad que a un arbitraje estrictamente privado (FACH, 2012)62. Aún más importante, las indemnizaciones que pagan los Estados a los inversionistas en esta clase de controversias son financiadas a través del pago de impuestos por parte de los ciudadanos, quienes tienen, como mínimo, un derecho a conocer los por menores de por qué fondos públicos que deben destinarse a la mejora de la educación, salud, alimentación, entre otros derechos económicos sociales y culturales con los que el NCL se encuentra fuertemente comprometido, están siendo destinados al pago de una indemnización a un inversionista extranjero. Sin duda alguna, los frágiles presupuestos generales de los Estados latinoamericanos pueden verse seriamente comprometidos por un laudo arbitral y ello puede provocar en la práctica un incumplimiento estatal de obras públicas y la garantía de DESC. Consideramos que el sistema propuesto por UNASUR, en el que los tribunales internacionales tienen vedado juzgar sobre la legislación interna de los Estados, constituiría virtualmente un blindaje para los demandados, teniendo en cuenta que estos generalmente actúan no de facto sino de iure, amparados en leyes o mediante actos administrativos. El establecimiento de una Corte Internacional de Inversiones tiene como principal ventaja delimitar el alcance de la protección al inversionista así como causales de justificación que puedan invocar los Estados. Bajo este modelo no es posible deslegitimar el hecho de que un tribunal internacional controle la legislación interna de un Estado puesto que el este último, en ejercicio de su soberanía, así lo habría aceptado expresamente; y, aún más importante, porque concurren garantías institucionales que aseguran un juicio justo. Por ello, solo la integración política sumada a la denuncia masiva de la convención CIADI por parte de una mayoría de Estados y el desuso intencional de las distintas instituciones ar- 61 62 “The experts discussed the notion of an appeals mechanism in IIAs and considered the idea that having a right to appeal was a due-process guarantee that disputing parties should have, which existed in other international litigation mechanisms”. UNCTAD, (2015) “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Transformation of the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead”, pg. 11. Disponible en: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciiem4d3_en.pdf “Many commentators argue that the specific characteristics of international investment arbitration justify the introduction of exceptions to the confidentiality and privacy principles governing international commercial arbitration. The same approach has been suggested by some arbitral tribunals. For example, in United Parcel Service v. Canada, the tribunal stated: “It recalls as well the emphasis placed on the value of greater transparency for proceedings such as these. Such proceedings are not now, if they ever were, to be equated to the standard run of international commercial arbitration between private parties.” Fach Gómez, K. (2012). “Rethinking the role of amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: how to draw the line favorably for the public interest”, Fordham Intl. L.J, Vol.35 (2). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN 99 bitrales disponibles, garantizarían el éxito de una Corte Internacional de Inversiones, de jurisdicción obligatoria. VII. CONCLUSIONES En años recientes, varios países latinoamericanos entre los que se encuentran Ecuador, Venezuela y Bolivia, como consecuencia de procesos constitucionales, denunciaron la Convención CIADI por considerar que la referida institución esta funcionalmente parcializada a favor de los inversionistas. Así, desde el 2009 hasta la fecha la UNASUR trabaja en un proyecto de solución de disputas inversor-Estado a nivel regional, como alternativa al CIADI. El presente trabajo sostiene que tanto la continuidad de Latinoamérica en el CIADI así como el arbitraje UNASUR resultarían inconvenientes para la región. Las críticas contra el CIADI, reseñadas por la más autorizada doctrina podrían resumirse en que este: 1) constituye un sistema asimétrico, donde los inversionistas se desempeñan siempre como demandantes y los estados siempre como demandados. 2) El sistema carece de transparencia y apertura hacia la opinión pública, aun cuando se debatan cuestiones de interés general y de derechos humanos. 3) La falta de coherencia y precedentes vinculantes, dado que no existe recurso de apelación, lo que conlleva a fallos contradictorios y a la dispersión del derecho de inversiones. Por otro lado, el sistema propuesto por UNASUR cuenta con varias desventajas: 1) Ni Brasil ni Bolivia aceptan el arbitraje de inversión, lo que haría a la institución menos atractiva. 2) Existen serias limitaciones sobre lo que constituye materia arbitrable y se prohíbe al tribunal revisar la legislación y actos de Estado del demandado. 3) Se dificulta el exequatur de los fallos dictados, pudiendo ser negados por cuestiones de orden público –y ello abre una caja de pandora-. 4) De optar por la judicialización, los Jueces serían designados por Estados latinoamericanos lo que a los ojos del inversionista extranjero sería una Corte dependiente y parcializada. Sostenemos que a largo plazo, la creación de una Corte Internacional de Inversiones, combinando lo mejor del CIADI y del proyecto UNASUR, es la medida idónea para reemplazar legítimamente al CIADI y dotar al derecho de internacional de inversiones de unidad, coherencia, independencia e imparcialidad. Por supuesto ello demanda de una voluntad internacional inexistente al día de hoy, donde la fragmentación del derecho internacional es la regla y la globalización es la excepción63. 63 “Acknowledging that considerable political will was required for the creation of a court, the experts examined whether it would be feasible to set up a court in a plurilateral context based on the initiative of a selected group of countries, with the possibility of other countries joining at a later stage. A few experts considered multilateral initiatives more promising in ensuring the legitimacy and representativeness of a permanent institution”. UNCTAD, (2015) “Report of the Expert Meeting on the Transformation of the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead”, pg. 12. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? Duarte G. Henriques Resumen: Entre tantos escritos dedicados al fenómeno de financiación de litigios por terceros, muy pocos detallan una característica específica de este modelo de negocio. Mucho más que una faceta oculta, es una característica general que constituye un principio fundamental del derecho: el derecho de acceso a la justicia. Este aspecto puede tener un impacto potencial en el arbitraje de inversión: sirviendo como una cápsula para nuevas perspectivas en el ámbito de financiación de litigios por terceros, puede llevarnos a considerar que una inversión de financiación de un tercero es una inversión protegida según los tratados internacionales de protección de inversiones. Por otro lado, la consideración de los desarrollos recientes y la experiencia de los productos financieros en el entorno del arbitraje de inversiones también puede proporcionar motivos adicionales para postular dicha protección. Este artículo intenta evaluar si esta protección puede otorgarse a modelos de financiación de litigios por terceros. Palabras clave: third-party funding; sistema de solución de diferencias entre inversores y Estados; derecho de acceso a la justicia I. Introduction 1. The modern business model of third-party funding in arbitration (both commercial and investment arbitration) is undoubtedly one of the hot-topics amongst scholars and commentators. Not without propriety, the phenomenon has even warranted the close attention of investment tribunals. Indeed, as we will see below, the appearance of external funders may raise issues related to the integrity of the arbitral tribunal, and of the proceedings themselves, because their presence may cause conflicts of interests that could lead to a subsequent annulment of the award. Further, investment tribunals have dealt not only with issues of disclosure of the existence of third-party funders, but also with the impact that these new players may produce in arbitration as far as costs and security for costs are concerned. It can also be suggested that third-party funding may contribute to an increase in claims against host States, particularly unmeritorious ones, which raises intricate questions related to the legitimacy of the mechanisms currently available to solve disputes between foreign investors and host states. These are obviously sentiments that conjure up pejorative connotations regarding third-party funding and third-party funders.1 2. As a matter of fact, under the guise of “implications” or more emphatically “concerns” that third-party funding may raise in the arena of investment arbitration, some flag a “suspicion” levelled against these players when referring to them 1 In his dissenting opinion of July 13, 2017, in Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1), Kamal Hossain refers to third-party funding as a form of “champerty in its most odious form” (see dissenting opinion, para 73, p. 30, award of July 21, 2017). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 102 G. Henriques as “loan sharks”2 and “vulture investors”.3 The metaphor contained in the now famous words of Gavan Griffith on RSM v Santa Lucia, where he described third-party funding as a ‘business venture’ led by ‘mercantile adventurers’ that embrace the ‘gambler’s Nirvana: Heads I win, and Tails I do not lose’, is not therefore unsurprising.4 If those words are not exactly described as an accusation, they are not far from it, and certainly will prompt in most readers’ minds the notion that third-party funding poses serious risks to the integrity of the adjudicatory function of arbitral tribunals. 3. On the other hand, one of the most intricate and delicate issues in the investment arbitration realm is to ascertain whether an investment is included in the scope of a relevant international instrument for protection of foreign investments and, more specifically, whether such an investment is afforded the protection of the mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising therefrom. In order to obtain such protection, a set of criteria must be met (for instance, requisites related to the nationality of the investor, and the location of the investment, to name a few). 4. The combination of these two arenas of discussion prompts us to take a step further and ask whether an investment made by a third-party funder in a claim brought by an investor against a host State may qualify as a relevant investment and, therefore, if it may obtain protection of its own. By way of illustration, let us imagine that a claimant was funded by a third party to pursue its claim and that this claimant was awarded damages as a result of the arbitration proceedings brought against the host State. The funding agreement contemplated a share of the proceeds to be paid to the funder. If this share of the proceeds is somehow subject to a State measure—for instance, a ban on expatriation of funds or the enactment of a new tax imposed on that share—could the third-party funder initiate a separate arbitration against that State, or could it even be granted standing of its own in the pending arbitration? 5. Most international instruments for the protection of foreign investments contain a “catch-all” provision to the effect of considering that an investment is “every kind of asset”. This general clause will in principle be followed by an illustrative list of “assets” considered to be “investment”, such as “movable and immovable property” or “loans, claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value.”5 As long as one does not take the view that this list, rather than being merely “illustrative”, is “exhaustive” regarding possible investments, it would be relatively easy to draw the conclusion that a funding arrangement made by a third-party funder may be considered a separate “investment”. 2 3 4 5 Douglas R. Richmond, ‘Litigation Funding: Investing, Lending, or Loan Sharking’ (2005) 17 Prof. Law. Symp. Issues and Daniel Brook, ‘Litigation by Loan Shark’, Legal Aff. (Sept. – Oct. 2004), accessible at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/feature_brook_sepoct04.msp, last accessed on 25 January 2017. Mark Kantor, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: An Essay About New Developments’(2009) 24(1) ICSID Rev. 65, 66. RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/10, Assenting Reasons of Gavan Griffith (12 August 2014) paras 12–14. This formulation may be found in the bilateral investment treaty between Slovakia and Greece, to point out just a single case. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 103 However, if the investment arbitration is brought within the ICSID setting, intricate questions may arise as to whether its additional jurisdictional requisites have been met. Further, some investment treaties require a nexus between the investment and the territory of the host contracting state. For instance, Art. 26(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty refers to investments made in the “Area” of the host state, and Art. 1101(1)(b) of the North American Free Trade Agreement speaks of ‘investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party’. 6. At first glance, it seems that the criteria laid down by ICSID tribunals do not allow us to consider that an investment made by a third party meets the requirements regarding the protection of an “investment”. Indeed, can we consider that such an “investment” made a “special contribution to the economy of the host State”6? Can we consider that there is a territorial link to the host State? 7. Notwithstanding, there is one specific feature of the third-party funding business model which is worthy of a closer look. Rather than a hidden facet, it is a real overarching characteristic, amounting to a fundamental principle of law: the right of access to justice. This aspect may have a potential impact in investment arbitration: serving as a capsule for new perspectives on the third-party funding realm, it may lead us to consider that a third-party funding investment could be considered a protected investment. 8. Moreover, as we will see below, third-party funding structures have been protected at unexpected levels, and have produced effects that we may consider to be “external” to the initial underlying legal relationship (consider the Essar v Norscot case referred to below). Hence, considering third-party funding investments to be included in the notion of “protected investments” for the purposes of a relevant international instrument might be just a matter of adding a further layer of protection to foreign investments. 9. Lastly, investment tribunals have accorded protection to financial instruments, such as negotiable instruments, working capital, derivatives and sovereign bonds acquired in the secondary market, where the nexus with the economy and territory of the host state can cause anxiety. Therefore, one may question whether third-party funding ought not to be equated to such financial products and, consequently, whether they deserve a similar level of protection. 10. The goal of this article is precisely to ascertain whether the current state of affairs in investment arbitration allows protection to be accorded to investments made by third-party funders, and whether the new developments in third-party funding, coupled with the consideration of experiences in the financial sector and the right of access to justice, support such a notion. In doing so, we will focus on the jurisdictional requirements related to the definition of an “investment” and also on the requisite territory, leaving aside considerations on the issues related to jurisdiction “ratione personae” and “ratione temporis”, and also issues related to consent. Indeed, despite being fundamental in assessing the tribunals’ jurisdiction, these issues have already been addressed thoroughly in 6 See, for instance, Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction (17 May 2007). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 104 G. Henriques the context of the generic framework applicable to investment disputes.7 Moreover, considering that third-party funding assumes many shapes and forms and, accordingly, that it may be conducted through special purpose-vehicles, this analysis must be done on a case-by-case and fact-dependent basis. 11. In this endeavour, we will first look briefly at the landscape of the protection that tribunals have accorded to foreign investments, and more specifically the issues related to the jurisdictional criteria (“ratione materiae” and “ratione loci”) applied in the context of investment arbitrations. We will see that these tribunals have not always held consistent views, which would leave the door open to broaden the scope of protection (II). In order to assess whether the recent developments in third-party funding may hold any weight regarding the protection accorded by investment treaties, we need to provide a broad overview of the traditional concerns related to this industry (III). This will be followed by an analysis of recent developments in third-party funding, and then discussion of the possible impact that these developments may have in considering its protection as investments (IV). We will then address the role of the finance industry in investment arbitration, and assess whether a parallel may be drawn in respect of third-party funding (V). After, we will consider the principle of access to justice (VI) and then discuss third-party funding as a promoter of this access (VII). We will then consider its possible impact of third-party funding as a protected investment (VIII), address how and when can a separate claim by a third-party funder be put forward (IX) before concluding. II. Generic Considerations Related to the Definition of an Investment 12. In order to benefit from the protection afforded to foreign investments, an investment must be classified as … an “investment”. Tautological as it may appear, the postulation of such an assertion may prove a difficult task. In the words of Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, [T]he complexity of the current debate on the term ‘investment’ arises out of its simple, non-defined use in the jurisdictional clause of the ICSID Convention (Art 25). One approach to the interpretation of ‘investment’ in Article 25 will orient itself to the definitions in investment treaties, the other to its understanding in the economic literature. In effect, the latter approach requires two separate examinations (‘a double keyhole approach’): one under the BIT, the other under Article 25.8 This complexity may also be reflected in two possible approaches to the definition of a relevant “investment”. The first one, of a legal kind and subjective by nature, will look at the specific language used in the bilateral or multilateral treaty for protection of investments. The second, more objective and tied to the “economic parlance”, leaves the ‘interpretation and application to the practice of states and tribunals.’9 Be it as it may, a certain “investment” must have been made by a physical or legal entity that is a national of a contracting State in the territory of another State party to that international instrument. 7 8 9 See inter alia Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) paras 151-161, 284-325 and 328-342. Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 61. ibid. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 105 13. As said, the first approach will lead us to consider the specific language of the relevant treaty. Usually, those international instruments provide for a broad catch-all clause. The language of those clauses is of course of a legal character, and as such is capable of encompassing numerous different “assets”. However, some treaties provide for language with an economic significance attached.10 In any event, the term “investment” is referred to in an ‘open-ended way that ensures a high degree of flexibility in application.’11 14. If the arbitration is brought under the UNCITRAL rules, there are no additional jurisdictional requirements, and the investment tribunal will have jurisdiction to hear any claim that satisfies the requirements of the investment treaty.12 An illustration of international instruments providing for additional jurisdictional requisites may be found in the ECT (Art. 26(1)) and NAFTA (Art. 1101(1)(b)), which require a territorial link. 15. In addition to these definitional requirements, if the investor resorts to arbitration under the ICSID framework, some criteria must also be met. Indeed, Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention—which stands at the forefront of a heated debate surrounding the meaning of investment—provides that The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. This provision has been read as requiring the following elements for an investment dispute to be ‘eligible for ICSID arbitration: (a) a dispute must be a legal dispute and arise out of an investment; (b) the dispute must involve, on the one hand, either a Contracting State or one of its subdivisions or agencies specifically designated to ICSID and, on the other hand, a national of another Contracting State; and (c) all parties to the dispute must consent in writing to have the investment dispute submitted to ICSID.’13 16. The conundrum here lies in defining what an investment must be in order to benefit from the protection of the ICSID’s jurisdiction. Because there is no other provision in the ICSID Convention defining what an “investment” should be for the purposes of assessing this jurisdiction threshold, there are several understandings related to the concept, not all of them following the “ordinary meaning” criterion of Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly, one has to look specifically at the case law and assess whether tribunals have followed an understanding that could lead us to consider that a third-party funding investment fulfils the jurisdictional requisites. 17. In general terms, investment tribunals do not find it difficult to require an economic notion of “investment” as a set of ‘several interrelated economic activities 10 11 12 13 See examples Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 63-64. Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson and Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration, (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer) 65. Katia Yannaca-Small, Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (New York, Oxford University Press 2010) 95. Reed, Paulsson and Nigel Blackaby (n 10) 24. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 106 G. Henriques each of which should not be viewed in isolation’.14 This is a formulation that can be found in CSOB v Slovakia, where the Tribunal considered that a loan qualified as an investment.15 However, not every “interrelated economic activity” amounts to an investment in the sense of Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, as the Award made in 1997 in the Fedax v Venezuela case shows.16 18. Indeed, after considering that a broad meaning should be given to the notion of investment, the Tribunal went on to assess whether a particular operation was an “ordinary commercial transaction” not deserving protection. In doing so, the Tribunal resorted to a list of five criteria that should be met: duration, regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, substantial commitment and a significance to the host State’s development. Looking at the fact-specifics of the case, the Tribunal concluded that six “promissory notes” issued by the Government of Venezuela amounted to an “investment”.17 19. The objective approach taken in Fedax was subsequently followed in Salini v Morocco, thus giving birth to the now famous “Salini test”.18 In assessing whether the investment made by “Salini” was protected (and was not an ordinary commercial transaction), the Tribunal considered that such investment should be analysed according to the definition of the relevant “BIT” (in that case, the “BIT” between Italy and Morocco), but also according to a set of typical characteristics of an “investment”. In Salini the Tribunal considered the following elements: contribution, duration, risk of the transaction, and contribution to the economic development of the host State. The dispute in Salini related to a contract for the construction of a highway in Morocco, which was thus recognised as an “investment”. 20. In later cases, arbitral tribunals adopted similar objective approaches, and held that supremacy must be given to the Washington Convention over any particular provision in a contract or “BIT”. Applying the “Salini test” in Joy Mining v Egypt, the Tribunal considered that a bank guarantee would be ‘simply a contingent liability’, therefore lacking the characteristics of an “investment”.19 In Mitchell v Congo, the ad hoc Committee annulled the Award that had been made on 9 February 2004, thus excluding Mr. Patrick Mitchell’s law offices and legal practice from the definition of “investment”. On that occasion, the Committee 14 15 16 17 18 19 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 61. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (24 May 1999) para 72. Fedax N.V. v The Republic of Venezuela, Case No. ARB/96/03, Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (11 July 1997) paras 21-33. See Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 66. See Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco, Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001). See Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction (6 August 2004) para 44. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 107 considered that the ‘[a]rbitral Tribunal forced the concept of investment in the case at hand in order to affirm its jurisdiction.’20 Similar application of this approach was taken in SGS v Pakistan,21 Bayindir v Pakistan,22 Jan de Nul v Egypt,23 Saipem v Bangladesh,24 and AES v Argentina, the latter containing a formulation of the “Salini test” which is as concise as it is comprehensive and clear: [t]hey realize contribution in capital over a reasonably lengthy period of time for the economic development of the host State, an operation AES has accepted to share the inherent risks which it presents.25 21. The objective and rather narrow interpretations of the concept of investment adopted in the cases noted above were not taken as constituting a binding precedent, and the understanding underpinning them is far from undisputed. Indeed, in subsequent cases, this approach was questioned for being inconsistent with the broad understanding of the definition of investment contained in bilateral investment treaties and also in Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, which does not refer to any criteria similar to the “Salini test”, or any others. Consideration as to the right to access the jurisdiction of ICSID was also put on the table. 22. As a result, in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania the Tribunal considered that a ‘(…) more flexible and pragmatic approach to the meaning of “investment” is appropriate, which takes into account the features identified in Salini, but along with all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the instrument containing the relevant consent to ICSID.’26 27 23. Subsequently, in the decision on the annulment application in the Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia case, the ad hoc Committee considered that if the meaning of investment were left only to Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and no regard was paid to the BIT at stake, that would produce a result that was difficult to ‘reconcile with the intentions of the Governments of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in concluding their Agreement’.28 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 See Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Annulment Decision (1 November 2006) para 46. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (6 August 2003) para 133, footnote 153. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction (14 November 2005) paras 130–138. Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction (16 June 2006) paras 90–96. Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures (21 March 2007) paras 98–106. AES Corporation v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (26 April 2005) para 88. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008) para 316. For a brief commentary on the Biwater case, see Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘‘Biwater,’ Classic Investment Bases: Input, Risk, Duration’ (2008) 240 (126) New York Law Journal, <www.nylj.com> accessed on 31 January 2017. Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Annulment Application (16 April 2009) para 62. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 108 G. Henriques 24. In subsequent cases, tribunals followed this approach. For instance, in the Fraport v Philippines29 or in the case of M.C.I. Power v Ecuador, where the Tribunal went as far as to postulate that, (…) the requirements that were taken into account in some arbitral precedents for purposes of denoting the existence of an investment protected by a treaty (such as the duration and risk of the alleged investment) must be considered as mere examples and not necessarily as elements that are required for its existence.30 25. As an alternative to the consideration of a rigid set of criteria, such as the test deployed in Salini, some tribunals have adopted a mitigated view, dispensing with the requisite “contribution to the host State’s development”. This was the case of SGS v Dominican Republic, where the Tribunal held that a transfer of ownership over a company for a price of USD 2 was still an investment relevant for the purposes of the BIT at stake.31 One could hardly regard the consideration of USD two as a “contribution” to the economy or development of the host State, the Dominican Republic. 26. Another example is given in Sabes Fakes v Turkey, where the Tribunal considered that ‘(…) the criteria of (i) a contribution, (ii) a certain duration, and (iii) an element of risk, are both necessary and sufficient to define an investment within the framework of the ICSID Convention.’32 In the same vein, the tribunal in Alpha v Ukraine considered that, [t]he contribution-to-development criterion (…) brings little independent content to the inquiry’ and ‘(…) invites a tribunal to engage in a post hoc evaluation of the business, economic, financial and/or policy assessments that prompted the claimant’s activities. It would not be appropriate for such a form of second-guessing to drive a tribunal’s jurisdictional analysis.33 27. The overview of the case law shows us that there is little agreement as to the definition of “investment”, and particularly as to the characteristics that an investment must display in order to obtain the jurisdictional protection under the ICSID Convention and applicable international instruments.34 In any event, it seems that the understanding that is taking hold consists of a combination of the subjective, 29 30 31 32 33 34 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award (16 August 2007) para 305. M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and New Turbine Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award (31 July 2007) para 165. See also Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award (30 July 2009), RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award (13 March 2009), and Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and Others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision (8 March 2010). Société Générale in respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este, S.A. v. The Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 792, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction (19 September 2008) paras 32-35. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award (14 July 2010) para 110. Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award (8 November 2010) paras 313-314. A recent formulation for investment, is proposed by Achim-Rüdiger Börner: ‘(..) investment is the allocation of capital and/or assets by private parties for employment in a gainful, profitable enterprise. The notion of “enterprise” already caries the element of assumption of risks, be it production risk, market risk or similar risk associated with the entrepreneurial endeavor. This definition excludes the allocation of merchandise or services in fulfillment of a sale or service contract (…).’Achim-Rüdiger Börner, ‘Simple Truths on the Right to Regulate and the Duty to Pay’ (2017) 15 SchiedsVZ 6. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 109 party-consent based approach that looks at the wording of the relevant instrument for the protection of foreign investments, on the one hand, and the objective, self-contained approach that takes into account the specific jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID Convention, on the other.35 At the same time, when resorting to the objective elements of an “investment”, a flexible approach should be adopted, and no restrictions should be introduced other than requiring the three criteria of “contribution, risk and duration”. It remains to be seen to what extent this combined approach is suitable to address the question of whether third-party funding can be considered a relevant investment. Nonetheless, an additional layer of difficulty arises in this assessment. 28. In fact, some international instruments require that the investment must have been made in the territory of the host State (Art. 26(1) of the ECT, and Art. 1101(1)(b) of the NAFTA cited above) 29. The requisite territory is fairly easy to set out: ‘there must be a territorial connection to the respondent host State so that the investment is within the domestic jurisdiction of the host state.’36 Moreover, [t]he territorial connection between the claimant’s contribution of capital and an investment enterprise in the host state must be direct rather than indirect or consequential.37 30. In line with this, respondent states often contend that the “investment” at hand did not meet the requisites set forth in the applicable treaty because the investment had not been made in that State’s “territory”. In Alpha v Ukraine, the respondent alleged that the Claimant ‘did not engage in “economic activity” in the “territory” of Ukraine but instead made payments directly to Pakova in Cyprus.’38 However, the tribunal “elevated substance over form” and agreed with the Claimant that, [f]or purposes of the UABIT, it is the “activity” that must take place “in the territory” of Ukraine and not necessarily the flow of funds that allows that “activity” to take place.39 Accordingly, although the funds had travelled to the distant shores of Cyprus, the Tribunal decided that ‘(…) Alpha’s payments related to Pakova’s work on floors 8-12 of the Hotel were “in connection with the economic activity of [Claimant] in the territory of” Ukraine.’ 40 31. This understanding had been adopted in SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines,41 where the tribunals considered that the “pre-shipment inspection” services of 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 76. ibid. ibid 191. Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine (n 32) para 261. ibid para 279. ibid para 285. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (n 20) and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (29 January 2004). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 110 G. Henriques the goods to be exported to the respondent States met the requisite territorial connection, notwithstanding they had been delivered outside the territory of those States. 32. The complexity of the requisite territory is exacerbated in cases involving dematerialised negotiable financial instruments, working capital, derivatives and sovereign bonds acquired in the secondary market. Cases such as Fedax v Venezuela, Abaclat v Argentina, Deutsche Bank v Sri Lanka, and Ambiente Ufficio v Argentina,42 show that the tribunals have considered as investments a category of “assets” which possess a feeble territorial link with the host State, and which only questionably can be classified as “investments” under the definition provided for in the applicable treaty. 33. Precisely because the third-party funding phenomenon poses questions regarding the requisite territorial connection and the classification under the definitional provision of the relevant treaty, the cases related to finance products may bring a different perspective as regards the protection of investments made by third-party funders. 34. Further, there are cases where the third-party funding itself was connected to financial products. In this respect, two examples provided by Jonas von Goeler are noteworthy.43 The first interesting example is the attempted issue of securities made by Crystallex in 2011: after initiating an ICSID arbitration against Venezuela, it announced that it was selling securities worth US$120 million linked to the proceeds of a future favourable award.44 The second is the securitisation operation whereby EuroGas, Inc. had purchased an option to buy shares in Belmont Resources, Inc. against a share of the proceeds of an arbitration claim that it subsequently brought under the ICSID framework against the Slovak Republic.45 These examples show that the funding of claims can even be the subject of securitisation structures and other kinds of financial operations, giving rise, in turn, to other potential relevant investments. 35. Potentially, these experiences may be used as an analogy when assessing whether third-party funding falls within the definition of “investment”. For this reason, we shall dedicate the next section to look more closely to the cases involving financial products. 44 The case Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. Arb/07/8), could have been another example. Indeed, in its ‘Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 November 2014)’ the tribunal remitted the assessment of the territorial link to the merits of the case, but the proceedings were eventually dismissed in 2015 for lack of payment of the required advances. See Jonas von Goeler, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration and its Impact on Procedure (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law 2016) 112. ibid. See also 45 http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/claimant-sells-securities-linked-to-icsid-awards/. The press release published by Crystallex is no longer available online. EuroGas Inc. and Belmont Resources Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14. 42 43 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 111 III. The Parallel with Arbitration in Finance and Banking 36. A different host of considerations may be found in the context of the intersection between investment arbitration, and financial and banking institutions.46 As said above, the current landscape of investment arbitration in financial and banking matters demonstrates that arbitral tribunals are open to considering broad notions of investment under a relevant international instrument, thus including in that notion different products such as negotiable instruments, working capital, derivatives and sovereign bonds, to name just a few. 37. As mentioned above, in Fedax v Venezuela the Tribunal considered that ‘(…) loans qualify as an investment within ICSID’s jurisdiction, as does, in given circumstances, the purchase of bonds.’47 Addressing the requisite territorial link to the host State, the Tribunal concluded that, although it is usual that the transfer of funds is made into the territory of the host State, [i]t is a standard feature of many international financial transactions that the funds involved are not physically transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but put at its disposal elsewhere. In fact, many loans and credits do not leave the country of origin at all, but are made available to suppliers or other entities. The same is true of many important offshore financial operations relating to exports and other kinds of business. 48 The critical point was, however, the fact that those funds were made available by the beneficiary of the credit—in this case the Government of Venezuela—as a means of meeting its budgetary needs.49 The Tribunal agreed upon the verification of such a requisite. 38. Regarding a subsequent case (Abaclat v Argentina50), it was noted that the “decision signals the availability of ICSID arbitral tribunals to holders of security entitlements dissatisfied with the manner in which a State has accomplished its sovereign debt restructuring.”51 In fact, the Tribunal in that case held that, with regard to an investment of a purely financial nature, the relevant criteria cannot be the same as those applying to an investment consisting of business operations and/or involving manpower and property. [They] should be where and/or for the benefit of whom the funds are ultimately used, and not the place where the funds were paid out or transferred. Thus, the relevant question is where the invested funds 46 47 48 49 50 51 For further research and considerations, see the recent Report of the ICC Task Force on Financial Institutions and International Arbitration, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/2016/Financial-Institutions-and-International-Arbitrat ion-Report/, last accessed on 18 December 2016. Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela (n 15) para 29. ibid para 41. ibid. Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (4 August 2011). Giuseppe Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration and the Eurozone Crisis’ (2013) 40/4 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 331. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 112 G. Henriques ultimately made available to the Host State and did they support the latter’s economic development.52 The Tribunal was obviously building upon the considerations left in Fedax regarding the requisite territorial nexus. 39. Likewise, in Deutsche Bank AG v Sri Lanka, the Tribunal took a similar view as regards a commodity hedging agreement entered into with the German bank, and considered that, the Hedging Agreement is an asset. It is a legal property with an economic value for Deutsche Bank. It is a claim to money which has been used to create an economic value.53 As regards the requisite territorial connection with the host State, the Tribunal drew completely from Abaclat to reach the conclusion that the hedge agreement at stake met the “territorial nexus condition”.54 40. In Ambiente Ufficio v Argentina, the Tribunal had to deal with a dispute that arose in connection with a series of bonds issued by the Argentine Republic. In this case, Argentina contended, inter alia, that the Centre was in want of jurisdiction to hear the case because the bond issuance could not be understood as a qualified investment for the purposes of the Argentina – Italy BIT.55 When considering this issue, the Tribunal entertained no doubt that ‘(…) bonds / security entitlements such as those at stake in the present proceedings fall under the term investment.’56 By adopting an approach based on the analysis of the ‘general unity of an investment operation’ and looking at the ‘economic substance of the operation in question in a holistic manner’57, the Tribunal was, [c]onvinced that the process of issuing bonds and their circulation on the secondary, i.e. financial, markets in the form of security entitlements are to be considered an economic unity and must be dealt with as such a unity for the purpose of deciding whether disputes relating to financial instruments of this kind “aris[e] directly out of an investment” and are therefore covered by Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention and Art. 1 of the Argentina-Italy BIT.58 Furthermore, the Tribunal considered that, even if the jurisdiction threshold ought to resort to the “Salini criteria”59—the appropriateness of which might nevertheless be criticisable—the business at stake would still meet the five elements test: ‘(a) the existence of a substantial contribution, (b) the project should have a certain duration, (c) participation in the risks of the transaction beyond the mere risk arising from a commercial transaction, (d) regularity of profit and 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 See Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic (n 49) para 374. Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award (31 October 2012). Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic (n 49) paras 288, 291. “Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Italy for the Encouragement and Protection of Investments of 22 May 1990”. Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (formerly Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 February 2013) para. 471. ibid para 428. ibid para 429. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrate S.p.A. v. Morocco (n 17). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 113 return for the investors as well as (e) significance of the operation for the host State’s development.’60 41. Regarding the question of how to ‘(…) assess where an investment was made, the criterion must be to whose economic development an investment contributed.’61 In such a circumstance, the Tribunal found that the respondent State had been the beneficiary of the investment in hand, and as such, concluded for the existence of the necessary territorial connection. 42. This illustration of cases related to financial products could not end without mentioning the 2015 Poštová banka v. Greece case,62 precisely because it signals a shift in the understanding of investment tribunals towards sovereign bond issuances. The central issue considered was whether provisions such as the one interpreted and applied on this occasion contain a mere illustrative list of cases where the investment is deemed to be protected or whether there is an additional meaning to be given to such list. 43. The thema decidendum in this case relates to an issuance of Greek government bonds, governed by Greek Law. These bonds were dematerialised, and were restricted to the participants in the system administered by the Greek Central Bank, but could nevertheless be assigned to non-participant investors. Poštová banka did not intervene as a participant but had purchased five series of Greek bonds. The Poštová banka and its Cypriot major shareholder brought an ICSID arbitration against Greece under the Slovakian – Greece BIT. The arbitral tribunal was confronted with the challenge of determining if these series of sovereign bonds would qualify under the definition of “investment” of the said “BIT”. 44. The Tribunal considered that, while the definition of “investment” contained in the “BIT” would be broad enough to include a sovereign bond, a meaning was to be given to the list contained in the definitional provision. When interpreting such provision, the Tribunal took the Vienna Convention into account, which requires a treaty provision to be interpreted “...in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”63 In doing so, the Tribunal considered that if the broad definition would suffice to include investments not expressly provided for in that list, then the examples of that list would be redundant. This rationale would mean that to classify an investment as protected, the treaty would have to set forth an express provision to that effect or at least contain a provision similar to this kind of “investment”. 60 61 62 63 ibid paras 482-487. Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 55) para 499. Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award (9 April 2015). For further considerations on Poštová banka, see Georges Affaki, The Greek Sovereign Debt Rescheduling, EU Bail-in and Investment Arbitration, September 2015, available at http://www.affaki.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Issue5_2015_September.pdf, last accessed on 4 December 2016. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) art 31(4). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 114 G. Henriques 45. Subsequently, the Tribunal relied on that list to determine whether the Greek Government Bonds fitted into any of the categories contained therein, and concluded that those sovereign bonds could not equate to any “company debenture” (for the purposes of Art. 1(1)(b) of the relevant BIT) nor to “claims of money” (Art. 1(1)(c)). The underlying consideration was that there existed no privity, as Poštová banka was in no way party to any agreement entered into with Greece because it had acquired the bonds in question from an intermediary in the secondary market. 46. In the words of the Tribunal, [U]nlike creditors in a loan, the creditors of bonds may change several times in a matter of days or even hours, as bonds are traded. The tradability of loans or syndicated loans is generally limited, and precisely because loans are generally not tradable, they are not subject to the restrictions or regulations that apply to securities.64 (...) loans involve contractual privity between the lender and the debtor, while bonds do not involve contractual privity.65 Considering these aspects, the Tribunal decided it was in want of jurisdiction to hear the case. 47. Although the decision of the Tribunal in Poštová banka rested almost exclusively on the analysis of the definition of investment provided for in the treaty at hand, it nevertheless contained interesting elements: the Tribunal found that the investment could not fit into any of the categories listed in the treaty because Greece had not entered into a contract with the “investor”; further, the Tribunal seems to have given a great deal of relevance to the fact that the bonds at stake were “tradable”, that is, freely negotiable. Can we draw the conclusion that, at least for financial products, we need to look at investments that are “non-tradable” and are a result of the bargain between the host State and the investor? Arguably, the privity character would be of considerable relevance. However, to consider that the investment must have been entered into with the host State would be a step too far that would leave numerous investments beyond the scope of protection provided for in virtually every treaty for the protection of investments. 48. Be it as it may, the current landscape of banking and financial matters in investment arbitration elicits the conclusion that arbitral tribunals have generally recognised financial instruments as “protected investments”. The relevance of this is that often these financial products do not relate to any specific asset or enterprise situated in the territory of the host State, and the funds deriving therefrom are not always channelled to the territory of that host State. As we will see, this feature is crucial in third-party funding because, in some cases, it is very unlikely that any funds will be channelled to the territory of the respondent host State. Moreover, when the Tribunal in Poštová banka considered that the Greek Government Bonds were not considered a protected investment, it nevertheless opened the door to a different outcome, if the investment had the character of privity and non-tradability. 64 65 Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic (n 61) para 337. ibid para 338. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 115 Another trend that seems to be followed by arbitral tribunals when assessing the existence of an investment in finance and banking matters, is the adoption of a liberal or, at least, a flexible and pragmatic approach. To be sure, a rigid and strict cumulative test approach, such as the one adopted in Salini, would hardly allow the financial instruments that are the subject-matter of some of the cases mentioned above to qualify within the scope of the investment for jurisdictional purposes. 49. This background prompts the question of whether the same reasoning could be replicated in the case of an investment made by a third-party funder. In order to discuss this possible scenario, one needs to look into the third-party funding phenomenon, its current status and the latest developments in its arena. IV. The Issues Commonly Raised Regarding the Third-party Funding Industry 50. Broadly speaking, and without any concern for definitional precision, third-party funding typically exists when a natural or legal entity, external to the underlying legal relationship in dispute, provides financial support to one of the parties,66 according the funder the right to perceive an advantage linked to the award. One feature of this business model that is commonly observed is that if the claim fails, the funded party is not obliged to compensate or repay the funder’s investment: it is “risk-free” funding for the funded party. As a result, the funder will typically exert some control over the dispute to a greater or lesser degree. 51. As a consequence of the existence of these typical features, especially the control exerted over the dispute, concerns about the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, and about the integrity of the proceedings, may arise.67 Indeed, third-party funding may create conflicts of interests between the members of the tribunal and the funder. For those reasons, the duty to disclose any tie to a third-party funder is gaining general acceptance in soft law (see the 2014 version of the “IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests”), in institutional rules,68 and also in orders made by arbitral tribunals, to name but a few examples.69 Anecdotal evidence also shows that the funders themselves are prone to disclose the existence of the funding arrangement and the identity of the funder. While concurring with this high-level disclosure, they also 66 67 68 69 Usually, third-party funders channel funds to a claimant. However, the funding of a respondent is not unconceivable, as is shown in the case of the Bloomberg Foundation and its ‘Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’ providing funds to the respondent state Uruguay in the investment arbitration brought by Phillip Morris. von Goeler (n 42) 253-291; Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2014) 199; Valentina Frignati, ‘Ethical implications of Third-party Funding in International Arbitration’ (2016) 32/3 Arbitration International 505-522. See the Guidelines for third-party funding of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Hong Kong Arbitration Center, available at https://hkarbitration.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/cietac-draft-guidelines-17-may-16.pdf, last accessed on 17 December 2016. See also the Administrative Resolution No. 18/2016 of the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Brazilian CCBC, available at http://www.ccbc.org.br/Materia/2890/resolucao-administrativa-182016, last accessed on 16 December 2016. See Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inºaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, Procedural Order No. 3 (12 June 2015) accessible at Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 116 G. Henriques note that there is no record of any award being annulled on account of lack of disclosure of the existence of a third-party funding structure.70 52. Other questions are intertwined, such as the preservation of confidentiality inherent to the arbitration proceedings,71 questions as to the assessment and decisions on applications for security for costs, and questions related to the allocation of the costs of arbitration.72/73 53. Furthermore, we may well say that investment arbitration carries with it some prejudices deriving from the lack of transparency, the handling of public interests in private chambers, and the outcomes often favourable to investors to the detriment of host States—to name but a few criticisms that can be levelled against investment arbitration. To add insult to injury, the emergence of third party funders in the investment arbitration setting may raise suspicions as to the increase in unmeritorious claims brought against the States, and an increase in the litigation against the State altogether, and it may also be seen as a potential source of abuse of process. Arguably, these criticisms weigh against opening the concept of “investment” to third-party funding structures. V. New Developments and a New Mindset Regarding Third-party Funding 54. As an immediate reflex to these criticisms, the recent Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) entered into between Canada, the European Union, and its Member States sets forth a few provisions related to third-party funding74 in the investor-State-dispute settlement mechanism: ‘where there is third-party funding, the disputing party benefiting from it shall disclose to the other disputing party and to the Tribunal the name and address of the third party funder’, and the ‘disclosure shall be made at the time of the submission of a claim, or, if the financing agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is made after the submission of a claim, without delay as soon as the agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is made’ (Art. 8.26 CETA). Other international investment instruments set forth specific provisions related to third-party funding.75 55. These provisions, although they are a clear form of regulation (which is met with severe opposition from some sectors of the third-party funding industry), are 70 71 72 73 74 75 www.italaw.com/cases/documents/3173, last accessed on 16 December 2016. Christopher P. Bogart, ’Third-party financing of international arbitration’, The European Arbitration Review 2017 (Global Arbitration Review), accessible at http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/third-party-financing-international-arbitration/, last accessed on 25 January 2017. von Goeler (n 42) 293-329. See von Goeler (n 42) 333-366, 369-423. See also the ‘ICCA-QMUL Task Force on Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration Subcommittee on Security for Costs and Costs’, 2015, available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/6/09700416080661/tpf_taskforce_security_for_costs_ and_costs_draft_report_november_2015.pdf, last accessed on 25 January 2017. On a panorama of third-party funding in investment arbitration and the issues arising therefrom, see Jean-Christophe Honlet, ‘Recent decisions on third-party funding in investment arbitration’, ICSID Review, Vol. 30, No. 30 (2015), paras 699-712. Third-party funding is defined as ‘any funding provided by a natural or legal person who is not a party to the dispute but who enters into an agreement with a disputing party in order to finance part or all of the cost of the proceedings either through a donation or grant, or in return for remuneration dependent on the outcome of the dispute.’ (Art. 8.1 CETA). For instance, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement [January 2016] ch 8, art 2. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 117 still at a minimal level because they are limited to the obligation to disclose a minimum of details pertaining to the funding arrangements. The scope is therefore very narrow, and it is obviously aimed at safeguarding the integrity of the arbitration proceedings by limiting the chances of conflicts of interests between the funders and the appointed arbitrators. Further aspects of the intervention of third-party funders could and should be addressed, more particularly where issues of costs, and security for costs, are at stake. Other issues should follow as well. 56. All these concerns or implications have led to a considerable amount of discussion among third-party funders, as well as among scholars and practitioners.76 A “school of thought” that seems to have emerged is pointing to the need for regulation of this business model.77 Such regulation has already surfaced in some important instruments, as we have seen above. 57. As a result of this backdrop, we may suggest that some sort of regulation in the new generation of international instruments is to be expected, including not only provisions to impose disclosure of external funding, but also a definitional provision of “protected investment” to address specifically the third-party funding structures. 58. To date, the existence and evolution of the third-party funding industry in the dispute resolution setting has traditionally been divided between those jurisdictions where it was regulated to the extent of being prohibited under the doctrine of “champerty and maintenance”,78 and those jurisdictions where it was simply unregulated. Traditionally, the common law jurisdictions considered third-party funding a structure akin to a champertous business and would therefore consider the funding agreements made by third parties null, and would criminally prosecute those who carried out such business. 59. That was the landscape in countries such as Australia some decades back, and also Singapore and Hong Kong.79 On the other end of the spectrum, civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, Switzerland and France, did not provide for a legal framework applicable to the third-party funding industry.80 76 77 78 79 80 Mick Smith, ‘Mechanics of Third-Party Funding Agreements: a Funder’s Perspective’, in Lisa Bench Nieuwveld & Victoria Shannon (eds), Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2012) 19, 37. See also William W. Park & Catherine A. Rogers, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: The ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force’, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 42-2014, available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=2507461, last accessed on 25 January 2017. Rogers (n 66) 182. Nick Rowles-Davies, Third-Party Litigation Funding (Oxford University Press 2014) 23, 76. For a historical overview, see Max Radin, ‘Maintenance by Champerty’(1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48, available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol24/iss1/6, last accessed on 26 January 2017. See also Jason Lyon, ‘Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation’ (2010) 58 U.C.L.A. Law Review 571, 579. For in-depth analysis on the legal status of third party funding, see the Consultation Paper released in 19 October 2015 by the Third Party Funding for Arbitration Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/tpf.htm, last accessed on 3 December 2016. von Goeler (n 42) 111; Rowles-Davies (n 77) 83. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 118 G. Henriques 60. Currently, whilst the status is basically the same in civil law jurisdictions, the scenario is rapidly changing in some common law jurisdictions.81 Australia has been very permissive regarding third-party funding since the Campbells’ case in 2006, which eventually led to express legislation from the Australian government exempting third-party funding from regulation, subject to requirements of properly handling possible conflicts of interest. In Canada, in July 2013, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered the use of third-party funding acceptable, subject to disclosure and approval by the courts of the funding agreement, which in any event must not accord the funder the right to interfere with the control of the case and with the client / attorney relationship.82 In the UK, the crime of champerty and maintenance has been abandoned since the Criminal Law Act 1967. The industry in the UK basically remains self-regulated by the Code of Conduct of the Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales, and the English courts have consistently accepted the use of third-party funding in both the litigation and arbitration settings. In the US, the third-party funding in litigation is permitted in a number of States. 83 61. More importantly, the jurisdictions of Hong Kong84 and Singapore85 have recently introduced legislative initiatives aimed at banning the prohibition of champerty and maintenance in the case of a third-party funding arrangement and avoiding the nullity of the contracts entered into with third-party funders for the purposes of funding claims. These caveats, however, seem to apply to arbitration only.86 In this respect, the Singaporean Government expressly considered that ‘introducing third-party funding in Singapore for international arbitration will allow international businesses to use the funding tools available to them in other centres, 81 82 83 84 85 86 For in-depth analysis on the legal status of third party funding, see the Consultation Paper released in 19 October 2015 by the Third Party Funding for Arbitration Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/tpf.htm, last accessed on 3 December 2016. See Bayens v Kinross Gold Corporation, 2013 ONSC 4974. See Rowles-Davies (n 77) 76-86. On 30 December 2016, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong gazetted a New Bill to Amend the Arbitration Ordinance and the Mediation Ordinance to “ensure that third party funding of arbitration and mediation is not prohibited by the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty; and to provide for related measures and safeguards.” The New Bill is available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/bills/b201612301.pdf, last accessed on 26 January 2017. See also Final Report of the Third Party Funding for Arbitration Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (Final Report), accessible at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/rtpf.htm, last accessed on 3 December 2016. See Civil Law (Amendment) Bill No. 38/2016, (07-11-2016), available at https://www.parliament.gov.sg/sites/default/files/Civil%20Law%20(Amendment)%20Bill% 2038-2016.pdf, last accessed on 26 January 2017. See also Consultation Paper available at https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/public-consultations/public-consultatio n-on-the-draft-civil-law—amendment—bill-2016.html, last accessed on 3 December 2016. In the case of Hong Kong the Bill also applies to mediation proceedings. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 119 and promote Singapore’s growth as a leading venue for international arbitration.’87/88 62. As said, those initiatives take into account the fact that third-party funders help develop the arbitration, and that competing jurisdictions which do not bar third-party funding are taking the lead.89 As a result of the perception of this “race”, one might suggest that there is also a new mindset of the players in international and investment arbitration when approaching the implications brought about (and the “concerns” raised) by this business model. When speaking about a new “mindset” we are thinking more precisely that the third-party funding industry is building its own legitimacy in the international and investment arbitration settings. This phenomenon is of course linked to a sort of “liberalisation” of the use of third-party funding at different levels of the dispute resolution framework. The recent legislative initiatives of Singapore and Hong Kong reported above evidence this “liberalisation”. However, this new mindset stems not only from the progress illustrated above but also from other areas where new developments have occurred. 63. We might look at these developments as a reflection of a trend towards an open environment. In other words, these new developments show that third-party funding structures are starting to leave an area that was considered to be restricted to “club members”. Indeed, one of the characteristics of third-party funding has been that a significant volume of information related to third-party funding operations has been kept secret. Although the existence of third-party funding can lead to the idea that the claimant has put a meritorious claim forward (on account of the rigorous and thorough assessment of the case that third-party funders carry out, and of the fact that these funders will only fund claims with high chances of success), traditionally parties and funders prefer to keep the confidentiality of the bargain. Not only is the existence of the funding to be kept out of the public eye, but also the identity of the funder, and the details of the funding arrangement. 64. As a result, many of the details that abound in works dedicated to the subject make reference to “anecdotal evidence”.90 This environment, however, is changing. A few recent examples illustrate this idea. 87 88 89 90 See Consultation Paper available at https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/public-consultations/public-consultatio n-on-the-draft-civil-law—amendment—bill-2016.html, last accessed on 3 December 2016. See Civil Law (Third Party Funding) Regulations 2016, at ‘Prescribed dispute resolution proceedings’, available at https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/TPF%20-%20Annex%20B.pdf, last accessed on 3 December 2016. Notwithstanding, the Irish Supreme Court decided in Persona Digital Telephony Ltd & ors v The Minister for Public Enterprise & ors ([2017] IESC 27) that third-party funding was still unlawful and to be in violation of the ancient concept of “maintenance and champerty”. As a matter of illustration, showing references to anecdotal evidence, see also Park and Rogers, (n 75), 3, 5, 8-9. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 120 G. Henriques 65. Under English Law, a court judge may make third party cost orders,91 which was the case of the decision in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd. (2005), where the court considered that, (…) where (…) the non-party not merely funds the proceedings but substantially also controls or at any rate is to benefit from them, justice will ordinarily require that, if the proceedings fail, he will pay the successful party’s costs.92 66. In 2014, the court judge ordered a third-party funder to pay the costs of the proceedings in the now famous Excalibur case.93 The Excalibur decision was upheld on 18 November 2016 by the Court of Appeal, with Lord Justice Tomlinson saying that, A litigant may find himself liable to pay indemnity costs on account of the conduct of those whom he has chosen to engage – e.g. lawyers, or experts [who] may themselves have been chosen by the lawyers, or witnesses… The position of the funder is directly analogous.94 In the US, a court judge had also decided in the same direction.95 67. If these examples show some negative outcomes for the funders, the very recent case of Essar v Norscot points in a different direction, but in any event demonstrating some side effects of a funding arrangement. In this case, J. Waksman QC confirmed an award made by Sir Philip Otto in an ICC arbitration seated in London, where the arbitrator considered the financing arrangement that Norscot had entered into with a third-party funder to be “costs” incurred by the claimant to pursue its claim. The arbitrator further considered that the whole amount payable to the third-party funder (i.e. 300% of the funding or 35% of the damages recovered, whichever was greater) should also be included in those costs. Therefore, the third-party funder was awarded its “uplift”, via a costs order.96 68. It is worth noting, as we have written elsewhere, that this case is disturbing in many ways, and leaves the arbitration system in distress, for several reasons.97 On the one hand, the arbitrator awarded the claimant the third-party funder’s “uplift” or “windfall” and in our view this could convey a notion of unjust enrichment or a double (or triple or more) recovery. On the other hand, there is no limit, other than what might be considered “reasonable” by each arbitrator, to this “uplift” being included in a “party’s cost” term sheet, and therefore it opens the door to consider any amount payable on such account. 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 See Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) and Rule 45.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 of the UK commenced on 26 April 1999. Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 3055 (CA). See Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc. [2014] EWHC 3436 (Comm). See Excalibur Ventures v Texas Keystone and others [2016] EWCA Civ 1144. See Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, Florida 3.º District Court of Appeal, decision of 2 December 2002, n. 3D07–3128, 3D07–3130, 36 So. 3d 691. See Essar Oilfield Services Limited v. Norscot Rig Management Pvt Limited [2016] EWHC 2361 (Comm). Full transcript of the decision available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2016/2361.html, last accessed on 3 December 2016. See this author’s post on Kluwer Arbitration Blog: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/10/15/the-essar-v-norscot-case-a-final-argument-forthe-full-disclosure-wingers-of-tpf-in-international-arbitration/. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 121 In a nutshell, this decision ‘produces an unjust outcome, it is a strong deterrent to arbitration, and is potentially damaging to the third-party funding industry.’98 69. One could now add that this decision seems to have shaken Lord Jackson’s views on third-party funding: ‘‘the use of third-party funding (unlike the use of conditional fee agreements (CFAs)) does not impose additional financial burdens upon opposing parties.’99 70. More importantly, this decision may produce even worse results in the context of investment disputes. Indeed, it should be noted that the main factor that drove Sir Philip Otto to award the funder’s “uplift” seems to have been the respondent’s conduct prior to the initiation of the arbitration (and during the proceedings), which was characterised as “exploitative”. According to the allegations in the records, ‘Essar had set out to cripple Norscot financially by resolutely refusing to make payment’, thus intending to exert, and in fact exerting, commercial pressure on Norscot ‘before and throughout the arbitral process and it was a David and Goliath battle, and such conduct forced Norscot’s managing director to re-mortgage his home for the best part of $1 million.’100 71. We do not believe that much elaboration and substantiation will be needed to show that numerous cases of disputes brought by investors against host States arise precisely on similar grounds to those described in Essar. How would the conduct of a State such as the expropriation of “Las Cristinas” in Crystallex101 be characterised in this context? This consideration should even be underscored as we know that Sir Philip Otto’s award was made in an ICC arbitration and, accordingly, was subject to the scrutiny of the ICC Court. 72. More to the point, if we look at the rules of the SCC (Art. 44 of the 2010 Rules)102, the UNCITRAL Rules (Art. 40)103, and the ICSID rules (Art. 61)104, one can easily concede that arbitral tribunals constituted under those frameworks are accorded a substantial degree of discretionary powers to award costs on an indemnity basis, such as was the Essar case. Applying the rationale in Essar is but a small step forward, and a matter of assessing its “reasonableness” and “appropriateness”, and the causal link with the need to fund the claim. Hence, it is not beyond any reasonable standard to think that the Essar outcome may well be replicated in the context of investment disputes. 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 ibid. See Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (2009) 117. See Essar Oilfield Services Limited v. Norscot Rig Management Pvt Limited (n 94). See Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2. Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce of 2010. The UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration as revised in 2013. Rules of Arbitration of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 122 G. Henriques 73. The Essar v Norscot case may well be an explosive combination for the investment arbitration setting, and may well pave the way for new claims under many international investment agreements. Be it as it may, this decision at least holds the benefit of rendering almost undisputable any request and subsequent order for disclosure of third-party funding in any arbitration, lest to allow “surprises” at the very end of the proceedings. Be it as it may, this decision shows that third-party funding structures are “coming out of the darkness” and building their own legitimacy. 74. As suggested, this new environment helps build a new legitimacy for the third-party funding industry. Yet, we must add another element to this perspective: that of the right of access to justice, and the role third-party funding plays in it, especially in the context of investment arbitration. VI. The Relevance of the Right of Access to Justice 75. The notion of access to justice is one of the most fundamental features in dispute resolution, and the funding of claims by third parties often warrants an effective enjoyment of such right. Indeed, as we will see below, the situation is particular stringent in the context of investment arbitration: not only can the costs of initiating and maintaining an investment case be “prohibitive” to some parties, but more importantly virtually every set of arbitration rules applies severe consequences for the lack of payment in advance of costs, namely the dismissal or refusal to administrate the case. The questions that arise in this context can be set out simply: what happens when one of the parties does not pay his or her share on the costs of the investment arbitration? Should (or can) the case be dismissed? Or, conversely, should the principle of access to justice and of the prohibition of denial of justice override any specific provision to the effect of dismissing or not accepting the claim? We will address these questions below. 76. The right of access to justice is one of those cases where common sense ideas provide a better explanation than elaborate reasoning: everyone is entitled to his or her day in court and a right without remedy is no right at all. As the U.S. Supreme Court has put it, the ‘right to sue and defend in the courts’ is a ‘fundamental principle’ in organised societies, one that is ‘conservative of all other rights’ and ‘lies at the foundation of orderly government.105 Of course, the right of access to justice is not (and must not be) restricted to this simple notion. In order to effectively and completely enjoy such right, everyone has a right to resort to a dispute resolution body, to effective remedy, to timely adjudication of his / her dispute, to a fair and equitable trial, and to an efficient and effective delivery of Justice. Thus, the access to justice does not only require the actual access to a court, but also demands that this access provides a resolution of a dispute in an efficient and timely fashion, and that all the parties are treated fairly and equitably. 105 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 123 77. Not surprisingly, the notion of the right of access to justice (and prohibition of denial of justice) is recognised in several international legal instruments, such as the Energy Charter Treaty (for instance, Art. 13 relating to the standard applicable to expropriations). Most notably, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial has been recognised as a fundamental human right in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 47 of the EU Charter). In European human rights law, the right of access to justice is enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Further international instruments recognise and protect this right: Articles 2 (3) and 14 of the United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). More prominently, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of 10 December 1948, provides that: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. (Art. 8), And Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. (Art. 10). 78. In municipal law, access to justice is recognised as one of the principles underpinning the constitutional instrument of numerous jurisdictions. It has been reported that the number of constitutions expressly recognising access to courts as a fundamental feature rose from 63 constitutions in 1946 to the figure of 188 in 2006.106 79. International (including investment) tribunals have addressed the principle and corollaries deriving from this fundamental human right, although not always in the same fashion, but almost always with respect to issues of state immunity and requirements of exhaustion of local remedies. The Loewen and Mondev cases are prominent in this respect.107 80. Indeed, in the first case, the Loewen Group had lost a case where the jury awarded $ 500 million in damages and punitive damages to the plaintiff. An appeal against that verdict was available but the losing party had to post a security of 125% of that amount in order to suspend the award during the appeal. In light of such costs, Loewen eventually settled the case with the plaintiff but nevertheless it subsequently started an investment arbitration against the United States alleging 106 107 See Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Access to Justice’ (2013) 93 Boston University Law Review 2033-2093. See Loewen Group Inc. and Raymond Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, 26, Award (26 June 2003). Accessible at www.icsid.org, last accessed on 13 November 2016. See Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 Oct. 2002), 42 ILM (2003) 85. Another example of disregard of the right of access to justice may be found in Barcelona Traction (Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, brought by Belgium against Spain – 1970 ICJ Report 4, accessible at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf, accessed 15 November 2016). See, discussing access to justice as a principle of law, Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’ (2009) 20/3 European Journal of International Law 729-747. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 124 G. Henriques discriminatory treatment, expropriation, and breach of fair and equitable standards under the NAFTA. The Tribunal dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of exhaustion of the local remedies. 81. In the second case, Mondev had secured a favourable jury verdict against the City of Boston (and a municipal state entity), but in the appeal the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that verdict on grounds of domestic sovereignty of local regulatory authorities. The ICSID tribunal before whom the case was brought considered that the right of access to justice was not denied by the application of the sovereignty immunity exception. 82. The right of access to justice has been identified as a customary international law concept and its counter-face—denial of justice—has been defined as a state’s “administration of justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner.”108 Access to justice is thus recognised as a general principle of law in the sense of Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (a principle of law recognised by ‘civilized nations’), and is applicable by international investment tribunals.109 Hence, literature, case law and international instruments clearly point to the conclusion that the right of access to justice is of a fundamental character, innate and inseparable from human nature. 83. In cases such as Mondev and Loewen, the right of access to justice has appeared as the subject-matter of disputes that have mainly arisen in the context of decisions of states (or state-related entities) affecting the private entities’ right of access to justice. In those cases, denial of justice has generally been questioned as a violation by host states of the standards of protection of international investments agreements. But how has this issue been dealt with by international tribunals when the right of access to justice arises in the context of an impecunious party before the commencement of (or during) am investment dispute? 84. First of all, it should be noted that the amounts at stake in arbitration generally, and in investment arbitration more particularly, are not negligible. On the contrary, the advance on costs is well beyond the amount of any advance that a party must make in litigation before state courts in virtually every jurisdiction. Indeed, when engaged in a dispute with a foreign State, the parties tend to retain high profile legal teams. The arbitrators’ fees and the costs of the institution chosen to administrate the case are high. To make it clear, investment arbitration is very expensive, especially for a party that has been deprived of its investments or assets. 85. As David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon pointed out, ‘ISDS cases have averaged over USD 8 million with costs exceeding USD 30 million in some ca- 108 109 See Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005) 62, n 91. See Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 17, citing Fraport v Philippines, Decision on Annulment (23 December 2010) paras 197-208, 218-47 on the “right to be heard”. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 125 ses’.110/111 These authors gave Abaclat112 as an example, in which the Claimants spent around USD 27 million, while the expenditure of Argentina was about USD 12 million. In the meantime, the figures of the Yukos case have surfaced, reporting that the Claimants spent some USD 79 million, plus GBP 1 million, while Russia spent some USD 27 million in costs.113 86. Recent surveys, such as those conducted by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators114 and the ICC115, point out that a percentage of around 80% of the total costs of a case are allocated to parties’ costs (legal fees, experts fees, other evidentiary expenses, and ancillary expenditures), while only 20% are costs with the arbitration itself (arbitrators’ fees and administrative expenses).116 87. To make things worse, in investment arbitration claimants often face a situation where they have become deprived of assets that could have served as collateral in common financing structures, and have been dispossessed of the disposition of funds that was available to them. Further, the financial support available to impecunious parties as part of legal aid programmes in State courts and / or the financial mechanisms similar to those existing in the Court of Arbitration for Sport117 are not replicated in investment arbitration. It is thus no surprise that a wealthy investor, the owner of a gold mining company in the host State, who is suddenly expropriated of his assets in that country, becomes impecunious and incapable of pursuing his claim for restitution or compensation, even before the host State’s courts. Actually, this was what happened in the case of Crystallex,118 which is paradigmatic in many respects, including in that it illustrates a situation where the investor would have been prevented from pursuing the case if no external financial support had been given to it. We may dispense with the details of that case, but it is worth noting that the funding structure 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 See Gaukrodger, D. and K. Gordon ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Invesment Policy Community’ (2012) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2012/03, 19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-em. These authors indicate also that the costs of ISDS arbitration are not a deterrent for small and medium investors, although “smaller claims—worth less than several million dollars—could not be pursued effectively in such a high cost system”—see op. cit. at 23. Survey of 143 available ISDS arbitral awards listed on the www.italaw.com website, as of August 2011. Gaukrodger and Gordon (n 108). See Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. the Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award (18 July 2014) para 1847, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1175, last accessed on 27 January 2017. See ‘CIArb Costs Of International Arbitration Survey 2011’ (International Arbitration Attorney Network, 2011) 2 <https://international-arbitration-attorney.com/cost-of-international-arbitration/> last accessed on 27 January 2017. See the ‘ICC Commission Report - Decisions on Costs in International Arbitration’ (ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 2015 Issue 2, 2015) 3 http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2015/Decisions-on-C osts-in-International-Arbitration—-ICC-Arbitration-and-ADR-Commission-Report/ last accessed on 27 January 2017. Gaukrodger and Gordon (n 108).19. See CAS Legal Aid guidelines, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/legal-aid.html, last accessed on 27 January 2017. See Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (n 99). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 126 G. Henriques provided by Tenor Capital proved successful in that Crystallex was awarded compensation of around USD 1.3 billion.119 The impecuniosity of a claimant has a direct and crucial impact on the investor’s right of access to justice and to an effective means of remedy.120 88. As a matter of principle, virtually every set of institutional rules applicable to arbitration sets forth that the parties are bound to pay an advance on costs and that, should a party fail to do so, the other is invited to pay the entire amount of the advance on costs. If such payment is not made within the designated time, the tribunal or the institution may suspend or even terminate the case. This is true in relation to international commercial arbitration, but also in the framework applicable to investment disputes.121 89. Specifically, in the context of investment disputes, a party may face financial distress or even become impecunious not only before initiating a dispute, but also during the proceedings. In such event, the case may be suspended or terminated. 90. Accordingly, in Quadrant Pacific v Costa Rica, the Tribunal dismissed the claim after the investors failed to pay the costs of the arbitration.122 The same occurred in Commerce Group v El Salvador and RSM v Grenada, where the Tribunal ordered that these cases be discontinued.123 91. In the context of international commercial arbitration, the trend seemingly points to considering that other principles of the arbitration law override the right of access to justice. It has been reported that the French Court of Appeals annulled a decision of the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, acting as jui d’appui, that had considered that the decision of the ICC withdrawing the claim on account of a lack 119 120 121 122 123 ibid, Award (4 April 2016), available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1530, last accessed on 27 January 2017. Discussing the issue of impecuniosity in several jurisdictions, see ‘Financial Capacity of the Parties: A Condition for the Validity of Arbitration Agreements?’, Schriftenreihe Der August-Maria-Berges-Stiftung Fur Arbitrales Recht 16 (Frankfurt and Main: Peter Lang 2004), in particular Gerhard Wagner (‘Poor Parties and German Forums: Placing Arbitration under the Sword of Domocles?’), Andreas Reiner (‘Impecuniosity of the Parties and its Effect on Arbitration – From the Perspective of Austrian Law’), and Emmanuel Gaillar (‘Impecuniosity of the Parties and its Effect on Arbitration – A French View’). See also Patricia Zivkovic, ‘Impecunious Party in International Arbitration Proceedings and its Rights under Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) Journal of Constitutionalism & Human Rights 1-2(7), ISSN 2351-6283 online, Klaus Sachs, ‘Insolvency Proceedings and International Arbitration’ (2013) 1 Collected Courses of the International Academy for Arbitration Law 1 and Detlev Kuhner, ‘The Impact of Party Impecuniosity on Arbitration Agreements: The Example of France and Germany’ (2014) 31/6 Journal of International Arbitration, paras 807-818. See ICC (Art. 36(5) ICC Arbitration Rules 2012), SCC (Art. 45(4) SCC Arbitration Rules 2010), UNCITRAL (Art. 43(4) UNCITRAL Rules 2010), and ICSID (Arbitration Rule 45 and, more particularly, Regulation 14-Direct Costs of Individual Proceedings, of the Administrative and Financial Regulations), to name but a few provisions. See Quadrant Pacific Growth Fund L.P. and Canasco Holdings Inc. v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/08/1, Order (27 October 2010) accessible at < http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0696.pdf>. See Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Order (28 August 2013) available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/2217 and RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Order (28 April 2011) available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/941. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 127 of payment of the advance on costs following a notification to do so amounted to a denial of justice. The Claimant in that ICC arbitration had alleged before the jui d’appui that he had become incapable of paying that advance on costs and, not without subsequent substantial criticism, the judge ordered the ICC to proceed with the arbitration notwithstanding that failure to pay the advance on costs.124 The Court of Appeals resorted to procedural arguments and did not address the fundamental issue of one party (or both parties) being incapable of paying the advance on costs, seemingly rendering the latter principle overridable by procedural considerations. In the same vein, in SARL Lola Fleurs v. Société Monceau Fleurs, the Paris Court of Appeals considered that the right of access to justice would not suffice to render inoperable an arbitration clause where one of the parties had become impecunious.125 92. Conversely, in LP v. Pirelli the French Supreme Court affirmed that the decision of an arbitral tribunal to refuse to hear the counterclaims of a party that failed to pay the advance on costs may amount to a violation of the right of access to a judge and to the principle of fair and equal treatment.126 93. The scenario where the claim collapses if the advance on costs is not made in due time may be found across the globe—except perhaps in Germany. Likewise, in the context of investment arbitration, there are no known decisions to the effect of ordering the continuance of the proceedings even though one of the parties had refused to pay or was not capable of paying its share of the advance on costs. VII. Third-party Funding as a Promoter of Access to Justice 94. In terms of financial resources allocated to a dispute resolution mechanism, the parties may play on a levelled field, or exactly the opposite may be the case, where the bargaining and financial power of one of the parties by far outweighs the financial status of the other party. Often, a party may have wanted to retain “top-flight” hourly counsel to deal with its case, but was unable to do so due to a sudden expropriation of its assets or to another venture that exhausted all its financial resources. Likewise, a financially resourceful party resisting a meritorious claim might well be willing to spend any amount of money to pursue a strategy aimed at derailing the case and thus dragging out the service of justice. As a result, the weaker party will most likely be forced to settle the case to his detriment, or will simply be unable to start arbitration. 95. For this reason, Lord Jackson’s remarks in his Final Report on the Review of Civil Litigation Costs are pertinent and acute: access to justice entails that those with meritorious claims (whether or not ultimately successful) are able to bring those claims before the courts for judicial resolution 124 125 126 See ICC v. S.A.R.L. Projet Pilote Garoubé, Paris Court of Appeal, 24 May 2016, no. 15/23553, commented in http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/11/15/impecuniosity-and-denial-of-justice-walking-o n-eggshells/ . See decision of the Paris Court of Appeal, 26 February 2013, no. 12/12953, cited in Gabrielle Kaufman-Kholer and Antonio Rogozzi, International Arbitration Law And Practice in Switzerland (Oxford 2015) 16, n 63. See, decision of the “Cour de Cassation”, Civ. 1re, in LP v. Pirelli, of 28 Mar. 2013, no. 11-27.770, reversing the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal, 17 Nov. 2011—accessible at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITE XT000027251564&fastReqId=230507661&fastPos=1 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 128 G. Henriques or post-issue settlement, as the case may be. It also entails that those with meritorious defences (whether or not ultimately successful) are able to put those defences before the courts for judicial resolution or, alternatively, settlement based upon the merits of the case.127 96. At the same time, Lord Jackson asserts not only that ‘access to justice is only possible if both parties have adequate funding’, but more importantly that, it is now recognised that many claimants cannot afford to pursue valid claims without third-party funding; that it is better for such claimants to forfeit a percentage of their damages than to recover nothing at all; and that third-party funding has a part to play in promoting access to justice.128 97. Indeed, the funding structures provided by third parties allow immediate access to a channelling of financial facilities. Moreover, the typical structures used by third-party funders make this business model quite attractive to funded parties: the funding arrangement does not provide for any reimbursement of the amounts spent by the funder. It is pure non-recourse funding. 98. It is true that some hesitations of the parties may surface when the remuneration of the third-party funder is considered: typically, the funder will be remunerated in a certain percentage calculated over the proceeds (usually between 30% and 50% of the proceeds) or according to a multiple calculated upon the amounts spent by the funder (usually, for each USD put in as “investment” the funder will receive USD three). This may lead the parties to think that, when entering into this kind of structure, they are forfeiting a substantial portion of their claims. In turn, these hesitations will be compensated by the circumstance that the funder will not be paid if the claim fails. 99. Thus, most impecunious parties, who would not otherwise be able to pay the costs of bringing a dispute against a host State, will prefer to give away a part of their expected proceeds against the supply of a financing stream. The funder will then assume and pay every cost connected with bringing such a claim. 100. The benefits of third-party funding in terms of access to justice now seem clear.129 For obvious reasons, the appearance of a third-party funder allows an impecunious party to overcome its financial distress and pursue its claim. The examples already given demonstrate that third-party funding is a powerful tool in guaranteeing access to justice. Often, it is the only means that a party may resort to in order to seek a remedy. 101. As a result, the investment arbitration setting may experience the impact of considering the role that a third-party funder plays when facilitating the right of access to justice. When a financially distressed party is prevented from pursuing its claim against a host State if it is not helped by a third-party funder, then the right of access to justice is at stake, and relevance must be given to the helping financial structure, as a consequence. 127 128 129 See Lord Justice Jackson (n 97) 41. See Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report (2009) 160, 15.1.1. On a slightly different perspective, see John P. Rossos, ‘Access to Justice: Using Third Party Financing to Fulfil the Promise of Class Action Litigation’ (December 2008) 5/1 The Canadian Class Action Review 100-120. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 129 The fact that third-party funding promotes the right of access to justice, in addition to its crucial role in guaranteeing such right, leads to the emergence of a fundamental cover for each and every right: the cloak of legal-ethical and social-economic relevance. Indeed, every right must be exercised in accordance with its legal-ethical and social-economic significance, and the right of access to justice provides such relevance to the investments made by third-party funders. 102. Conversely, there are cases where third-party funding is sought by disputants for reasons other than those related to the right of access to justice. Parties may resort to an external funder not because they would not otherwise be able to pay the costs of the case, but because there are other kinds of financial needs that may occur along the way during the normal course of their business. For instance, they may use this mechanism for reasons related to cash flow management or because they wish to use their financial resources in other areas of their business, such as day-to-day financial needs, or to channel funds to other investments. In these cases, the image of access to justice becomes blurred and its contribution to classifying third-party funding as a relevant foreign investment is highly disputable. 103. In sum, when third-party funding is resorted to because the right of access to justice is at stake, relevance must be given to this financing structure. Because investment arbitration costs can often be prohibitive, the lack of external financial support may amount to a denial of justice — if, in a given case, that particular mechanism for solving disputes is the only one available to the investor. For this reason, and because the third-party funding phenomenon is not only becoming more open to the public but also being recognised in jurisdictions that once banned it, one may argue that there is a new legitimacy built around this business model. This legitimacy could be the necessary cloak for business models entered into by third-party funders to be considered included in the definition of “investment” for the purposes of the relevant treaty. 104. More to the point, as we have seen above, the third-party funding industry is producing examples of investments that may well be qualified as “assets” or “tradable values”, thus prompting a notion of a certain “commoditisation” of claims. In financial, economic and commercial terms, investments made by third party funders have an independent and proper value. Also, a third-party funding investment may even be recognised as a separate portion of damages to be awarded (Essar case). Again, third-party funding might well be a “protected investment” under certain circumstances. 105. The extent to which this business model may be considered a “bundle of rights in property”130 acquired by the funder, thus being a protected investment, is the question that now follows. 130 We borrow the words of Douglas (n 6) 161, “Rule 22”. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 130 G. Henriques VIII. Third-party Funding as a Protected Investment 106. Third-party funding, like any other business, can be subject to the very same mishaps as any other investment that has been submitted to the investment arbitration dispute resolution mechanisms. Consider the Essar case in the context of an investment dispute: had the investment made in that claim, by a foreign third-party funder, been subjected to a host State’s measure entailing the violation of a standard of protection of foreign investments (for example, unfair measures imposing sanctions or otherwise forbidding repatriation of funds), we would easily concede that there was a protected investment worth compensating. Therefore, the ultimate question arises: can a third-party funding structure avail itself of the protection accorded to foreign investments under international instruments? 107. There is a caveat to make to this inquiry. Often, third-party funders “acquire” a claim related to an investment. Either by entering into an agreement with the original investor prior to the initiation of the case, or by making such a deal after the proceedings are commenced, the funder will acquire a standing of its own by way of subrogation, assignment or transfer of title over the claim. 108. These cases are not of great concern to our analysis. In any event, it is worth noting that, generally, investment tribunals have held that the assignment of a claim subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings does not have any impact, and therefore the funder will not lose any entitlement to the original claim.131 109. Investment tribunals have held that such a transfer was irrelevant even if the assignment took place before the commencement of the proceedings.132 110. Coming back to our question—is third-party funding a separate protected investment?—it has been affirmed that this would be a “rather imaginative interpretation”, partially because the ‘funder’s lack of involvement in the subject matter of the investment dispute prevents its inclusion as a party in the arbitral proceedings.’133 111. In line with this view, in GEA v Ukraine the Tribunal held that an ICC Award would not qualify as “investment”. It can be said to the detriment of a pos- 131 132 133 See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic (n 14), Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. And Compagnie Generale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (21 November 2000), and Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S.A. And Autobuses Urbanos del Sur, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 December 2012). In El Paso v Argentina, the assignment of the claim took place ten days after the commencement of the proceedings, with no relevant impact on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (see El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 April 2006). See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration V (079/2005), Final Award (12 September 2010); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award (17 March 2006); Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. et al. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration No. 24/2007, Award (20 July 2012). To the contrary understanding, see Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. - Dipenta v. Republique Algerienne Democratique Populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award (10 January 2005) and Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (29 May 2009). See von Goeler (n 42) 420. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 131 sible parallel to be drawn from this case that the ICC Award was related to settlement and repayment agreements. 112. However, the issue might not be settled yet. Indeed, on a previous occasion, the arbitral Tribunal in Saipem v Bangladesh seemed to have left the door open to consider that an arbitral award rendered in commercial arbitration could amount to an investment as “credit for sums of money or any right for pledges or services having an economic value connected with investments, as well as reinvested income” for the purposes of the Italy / Bangladesh BIT.134 Undoubtedly, the tribunal was prepared to consider it as an “indirect investment”. 113. Conversely, in a very recent dissenting opinion in Teinver & Autobuses v Argentina, Kamal Hossain rejected the notion of a third-party investment being considered protected under the BIT in question: ‘Burford may have “invested” in the present arbitration proceedings by agreeing to fund the legal expenses but such an “investment” based on speculating on the prospect of obtaining a substantial portion the proceeds of any award resulting from a pending arbitration cannot be treated as protected “investment” under the BIT. The BIT guarantees the rights of “investors” who have made an “investment” in the territory of the host state. The BIT is not intended to enable payment of awards to third party funders who are not “investors” and who have no protected “investment”, and who only come into the situation in the circumstances described above to advance funds in order to speculate on the outcome of a pending arbitration.’135 114. In any event, the considerations elaborated on above —in particular, third-party funding as a guarantor of the right of access to justice—might shed another kind of light when assessing the requisites of eligibility as a protected investment. Let us then frame the inquiry, starting with the usual wording provided for in investment treaties. 115. As said, the vast majority of the available IIAs contain a catch-all definition: ‘”investment” means every kind of asset’ is the most common wording of the general clause) followed by an illustrative list of “assets” considered to be “investment”’. 116. This simple formulation would allow us to include an investment made by a third-party funder as a protected “investment”, if not for other reasons, because it is indeed a “claim to money” or a claim “to any performance under contract having a financial value” (and in some cases, such as the one we will address below, it would even fall into the category of “movable property”). This, however, does not suffice and would be too simplistic a notion. Indeed, as we have seen above, there is also a requisite territory involved—most international instruments require that the investment must have been made “in the territory” of the other contracting state. Further, in the context of ICSID arbitration, additional jurisdictional requisites have to be met. 117. In the abstract, there are a few groups of cases where the consideration of a “protected investment” will not raise any considerable doubt in light of the set of 134 135 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 23) paras 113-114. See dissenting opinion of July 13, 2017, in Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1), para 72, p. 30, award of July 21, 2017). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 132 G. Henriques criteria that is currently applied by investment tribunals and advocated by scholars and commentators. The considerations that will follow below will be drawn out of the conclusions of the cases illustrated above, and therefore we will assume that a ‘combination of the flexible versions of the two approaches’ [objective and party-based] might ‘best serve as the proper framework’ for such a definitional task.136 We just have to couple the verification of the requisite territory with that combination. 118. Hence, assuming a flexible and practical approach based on the three-fold test (contribution, duration and risk), one may not deny that third-party funding involves an intrinsic risk: the outcome of the dispute is uncertain by nature. Third-party funding also entails a contribution: the funder will pay the costs of the arbitration (legal fees, arbitrators’ fees, administrative costs, taking of evidence costs, and so forth). This contribution is considerable, taking into account that arbitration costs are not negligible. Further, the fund channelling is also long-lasting, usually surviving several fiscal years. 119. On the other hand, an investment made by a third-party funder can be considered “immovable property”, “shares in and stock and debentures of a company”, or even a “claim to money”. 120. Based on these assumptions, let us turn back to the core question of whether a third-party funding investment may be classified as a relevant “investment” under both the jurisdictional ICSID criteria, and the definitional provision of a given relevant treaty. Let us look also into some hypothetical cases. 121. Indeed, consider the case of a third-party funder settled in a given State, operating overseas via a local company. If the State hosting this company expropriates the premises and shuts down the operation unlawfully and / or without equitable compensation, or otherwise produces similar measures as regards the shares owned by the third-party funder in the local company, one cannot reasonably deny the causation of damage to an “investment”. The same holds true in the case where the State in question passes tax legislation to the effect of aggravating the income tax regime for foreign citizens. In the abstract, this investment is capable of meeting the criteria that has been applied in virtually every case that has been recognised as a protected investment (duration, contribution, and risk), and it further is capable of meeting the territorial nexus requirement. Clearly, this situation would not differ much from the expropriation of “Las Cristina’s” made by the Government of Venezuela, where the investor was deprived of all its assets that were located in the host State. More to the point, a state measure such as the ones here raised would undoubtedly amount to a violation of the standards of protection accorded by clauses such as prohibition of expropriation without equitable compensation, the right to fair and equitable treatment, and others that the particulars of the case might show. 122. Consider also the case where a foreign funder—who is not resorting to a local affiliate or the like (and therefore, has not established a local physical operation)—is providing financing to local companies to pursue their claims in litigation 136 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 7) 76. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 133 before State courts and / or in arbitration (either international or domestic) proceedings taking place “in situ” or located elsewhere. It may even do that through “portfolio financing” (that is, the funder provides funds to a pool of cases, rather than just to a particular one or a few of them). The funds were channelled into the territory of the State where those procedures are taking place, and the parties were assisted through this in-bound financial structure that provided them with funding for their cases: for instance, the funder made wire transfers into the lawyers’ bank accounts, and wire transfers to the local institution administering the arbitration. The funder made those payments during a considerable amount of time—the time that those proceedings took place in arbitration and / or litigation in the State in question. According to the funding structure, the funder was entitled to a share of the proceeds (in this case this would be the “asset” of the investor). Let us now imagine that the host State, after all these investments were made, passes legislation to the effect of banning from its territory third-party funding activities undertaken by foreign entities. Wouldn’t this measure amount to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard (or similar)? Hadn’t there been a contribution to the funder’s business, with a certain degree of duration and risk? Wasn’t the channeling of funds made into the territory of that host State? Wasn’t the funder entitled to a “claim to money” before that measure was taken? One can hardly deny it. 123. This example might well be replicated in the context of the financing of foreign States in disputes brought by them against other States or against private entities. The same would hold true if a given State was funded by external funders in defending claims brought against it by other States or private entities. This is a possibility that may well occur with developing countries. In a comparable situation, isn’t the funder entitled to claim its agreed share of the proceeds? 124. We can also take into account the case where the third-party funder has funded an investment claim and afterwards proceeds to a “commoditisation” or otherwise a “securitisation” operation out of that “investment” (see cases cited above EuroGas, Inc. and Crystallex). A State’s measure affecting this claim, and therefore, the securitisation of this claim (for instance, through legislation or administrative resolution to the effect of banning repatriation of funds, or even banning the sale and distribution of this financial product on the market) will likely amount to a protected investment harmed by such state’s measure. 125. Arguably, these last cases are no different from regular investments. The conundrum, however, lies at the very heart of the investment arbitration claims: can funding of an investment arbitration claim be classified as a separate investment? Just by way of illustration, the Crystallex case shows that the third-party funder providing financial resources to pursue that claim is entitled by agreement entered Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 134 G. Henriques into with the investor to receive 35% of the proceeds of that claim.137 Is that share a protected investment, and will it provide the funder with proper standing in the case or in a separate arbitration? At first sight, this case seems similar to the ones illustrated above. Arguably, it would meet the three-fold test, generally accepted according to the current state of affairs (risk, contribution, and duration), and would fit into the definitional provision of the relevant treaty as, at least, a “claim to money”. Yet, there are noticeable differences that leave us at pains to answer our core question. 126. Indeed, the Claimant in this case is a Canadian corporation, the investor’s funder is a US company (Tenor Capital), and the Respondent is the Republic of Venezuela. However, the claim was brought before the ICSID, in Washington, and not in the courts of Venezuela. Moreover, counsel to Claimant are not based in Venezuela, and if some of the team’s members reside in this country, it is unlikely the payments are made in or through the Venezuelan banks. Accordingly, where or what is the territorial link in this case? 127. On the other hand, how could this “investment” possibly be harmed by a measure taken by the Government of Venezuela? Which standard of protection could possibly have been violated by Venezuela? 128. One of the core issues is the consideration of the nexus between the investment and the territory of the host State. In a case such as the one illustrated above it will be extremely difficult to detect such connection. However, as we have seen before, investment tribunals have already considered that an investment does not lose its character if the funds are not channelled into the territory of the host State. Cases such as Fedax and Abaclat illustrate this notion.138 Nonetheless, those cases referred to a situation where the money had not entered the territory of the respondent State but nevertheless was made available to it for the pursuit of the State’s needs. On the other hand, the case of Poštová banka showed that the crucial element that was missing in that situation was the privity of contract between the investor and (in that case) the host State—which is a link that undoubtedly is missing in virtually every funding structure. 129. This, however, might not be a sufficiently convincing deterrent. Firstly, the rational adopted by the Tribunal in Poštová has completely forgotten that international financial products such as the sovereign bonds of Greece may be—and actually are—offered in the secondary market, where the brokers and intermediaries play a crucial role in disseminating those products. Further, the funds were ultimately made available to the host State because someone had paid for the bonds, and those funds had arrived one way or the other to the state’s accounts. Without placement of those issuances in overseas markets, through intermediaries and brokers, the operation might have not been successful, or even possible. Purchase of finan- 137 138 See the decision of the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, of 16-04-2012 authorising the funding agreement with Tenor Capital (Re Crystallex International Corporation, 2012 ONSC 2125 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fr167>, retrieved on 2017-01-26). Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela (n 15) para 29; Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic (n 49). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 135 cial instruments such as the one in Poštová occur in the way the international financial market works. 130. Secondly, more often than not, foreign investors make investments in host States without entering into any kind of bargain with the host state. Hence, the privity element of the investment, and the purported contractual connection with a host State, is a misplaced and misleading requisite. 131. As a matter of principle, the experiences in finance products can serve to build the notion that the funds need not be channelled directly to the host State in question. Why should a contractual relationship with the host State be required? 132. Besides that, as we noted above, at least one tribunal was prepared to accept an arbitral award as an “indirect investment”.139 This means that if the relevant instrument of protection of foreign investments does not expressly require that an investment must have been made “directly” in the territory of the contracting parties, then a notion where an investment in a claim would be considered as a separate “indirect” investment is conceivable. For instance, the 2003 BIT between Germany and China sets forth that the ‘[t]erm “investment” means every kind of asset invested directly or indirectly by investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party (…)’ – Art. 1(1). It further provides that an “investment” includes, not exclusively, ‘[c]laims to money or to any other performance having an economic value associated with an investment’ (Art. 1(1)(c) of the Germany – China BIT). This wording may be found in many other international investment treaties. 133. Further, the consideration of the right of access to justice and the fundamental role third-party funders may play in a given situation may allow the extension of the scope of protection beyond the strict terms of the territorial requisite. Indeed, a State’s measure is capable of producing a situation where the investor will be completely deprived of its assets and of any means to seek redress, even before the local courts. More to the point, due to the lack of securities or collateral to be provided in a “traditional” financing structure, the investor may be forced to resort to third-party funders, as they are apt to run the risk of funding a case in a non-recourse fashion. The Crystallex and the Essar cases show how an investor or claimant may be forced to resort to financing arrangements with entities willing to take the risk of funding a case without the respective obligation to repay such provision of funds. One may therefore suggest that in these cases, and where the third-party funding provides the access to justice to the investor, this investment could be relieved from the requisites related to the territorial link because, most evidently, the financing will not be provided within the territory of the host State but, nevertheless, is inextricably linked to the protection of the investment at stake. 134. The second kind of issue raised above relates to the question of how the investment made in a claim by a funder could be subjected to a State’s measure affecting its value or depriving the funder of it. This question, however, needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, as it may vary tremendously from one situation to another. 139 See Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 23). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 136 G. Henriques In any event, we may think that measures such as imposing extra requirements for developing the industry of third-party funding in the host State, or even prohibiting it for foreign investors, and also the host State adding barriers to the repatriation of funds earned by the funder, may amount to measures to the detriment of the funder. For instance, if a given foreign investor is awarded damages by an ICSID tribunal and the amounts awarded are made available to the investor in a local bank institution—therefore allowing the investor the enjoyment of such sums—but nevertheless that host State passes legislation or any other kind of administrative resolution to the effect of prohibiting the third-party funder from receiving its share of the proceeds, arguably this may amount to a measure affecting the right of the funder, in spite of the funded investor having been fully compensated. 135. Again, the standards of protection violated by the host State may vary from one case to another. The situations illustrated above may constitute a violation of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or even of the ‘prohibition of expropriation without due compensation’. These standards and also the promotion and protection of foreign investments obligations—the illustration of which may be found in the Germany-China 2003 BIT—may also be put on the table: [N]either Contracting Party shall take any arbitrary or discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party.140 [I]nvestments by investors of either Contracting Party shall not directly or indirectly be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party (hereinafter referred to as expropriation) except for the public benefit and against compensation. 141 136. Another standard of protection—to which reference has been made in the previous sections—may be found, for instance, in Art. 6 of the 1989 BIT between Egypt and Italy: Repatriation of Capital and Returns: (1) Each Contracting State shall guarantee, without undue delay and after the performance of all fiscal obligations the transfer in any convertible currency of: (a) the net profits, dividends, royalties, technical assistance and technical service fees, interests and other income, accruing from any investment by an investor of the other Contracting State; (b) the proceeds accruing from the total or partial sale or total or partial liquidation of any investment made by an investor of the Contracting State; (c) funds in repayment of borrowings; (d) the earnings of nationals of the other Contracting State deriving from their work and service in connection with an investment in its territory and maritime zones, in accordance with its national laws and regulations.(…) Arguably, an “investment” made by a third-party funder may fit into one of these categories, at least as a “net profit (…) accruing from any investment (…).’ 140 141 See Germany-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (2003) art 2(3). ibid art 4(2). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 137 IX. How and When to Claim the Third-party Funding Investment 137. Besides the generic requirements noted above, it is worth considering two additional aspects. The first is to assess how a third-party funding investment may be recovered (and if a funder can exercise its right on its own). The second issue is to determine the procedural moment when this right must or can be exercised. These two issues seem to be intertwined: if the funder is allowed to claim protection for its investment, it must do so in a manner consistent with a regular procedural unfolding. Indeed, considering the link between the funder’s claim and the investor’s claim, the funder may only exercise its right in a manner consistent with the pending procedure or with the outcome of the funded claim. Put differently, it is unthinkable that a funder would be allowed to bring its own claim before the funded party has done so. 138. Thus, the first possible option is for the claimant (investor) and the funder to start joint proceedings, each of them putting forward their own claim. A second option would be for the claimant-investor to bring an ancillary claim either on behalf of the funder or as a matter of its own damage or costs, on account of its obligation to share the proceeds or otherwise to compensate the funder for the investment it has made to pursue the claim. This latter situation is shown by the Essar case, although in this case the funder’s share was considered under the issue of costs determination and more specifically under the doctrine of costs on an indemnity basis. 139. The second possible situation may arise out of the framework applicable to ancillary claims in investment arbitration. This is generally admissible. Indeed, Art. 46 of the ICSID Convention sets forth that, except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre. In the same line, Rule 40 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules states that, Rule 40 Ancillary Claims (1) Except as the parties otherwise agree, a party may present an incidental or additional claim or counter-claim arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute, provided that such ancillary claim is within the scope of the consent of the parties and is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre. (2) An incidental or additional claim shall be presented not later than in the reply and a counter-claim no later than in the counter-memorial, unless the Tribunal, upon justification by the party presenting the ancillary claim and upon considering any objection of the other party, authorizes the presentation of the claim at a later stage in the proceeding. (3) The Tribunal shall fix a time limit within which the party against which an ancillary claim is presented may file its observations thereon. The ICSID Secretariat’s Explanatory Notes to the Arbitration Rules provide that for Arbitration Rule 40, in order to ascertain whether a claim meets the test that claims must arise “directly” out of “the subject-matter of the dispute”, one must be able to affirm that the “factual connection between the original and the ancillary claim is so close as to require the adjudication of the latter in order to achieve the fi- Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 138 G. Henriques nal settlement of the dispute, the object being to dispose of all the grounds of dispute arising out of the same subject matter”. 140. For illustrative purposes, one could point to the Klöckner v. Cameroon case, where the Tribunal considered it to be a crucial requirement to hear an ancillary claim that a “close connection factor” was present, and that the “reciprocal obligations had a common origin, identical sources and an operational unity”, so that they ‘were assumed for the accomplishment of a single goal and are thus interdependent.’142 As other examples where tribunals have ruled upon ancillary claims applications, the CMS Gas, the LG&E, and the Enron cases, all against Argentina, come to mind.143 141. In the case of a third-party funding structure set up for the purposes of bringing an investment claim, one cannot deny that there is a “close connection factor” with the original claim. Whether this investment meets the remaining requirements (common origin of reciprocal obligations, accomplishment of a single goal, interdependency, and others that might be devised) is a matter of interpretation—or of perspective of interpretation—of the particular funding arrangement at stake. In any event, the consideration of the right of access to justice and the role a third-party funder may play in that respect potentially elicits such “close connection factor”. 142. A third possible way for funders to bring their own claim against a host State would be to accord them a proper standing in the case, not ab initio as initially suggested, but rather after the proceedings are commenced. This would only be possible where the applicable framework allowed for a joinder of third parties. 143. However, it seems to be clear that the joinder of third parties in ICSID arbitration has not been permitted yet, and it certainly may not be conjured without the express consent of all the parties in dispute. Indeed, notwithstanding the broad powers conferred under Art. 44 of the ICSID to arbitral tribunals to conduct the proceedings, there is no express provision with such effect, which contrasts with other institutional regulation applicable to arbitration. Therefore, arbitral tribunals have exercised their powers to conduct the proceedings in a restrictive manner, and have not allowed the joinder of third parties. In Churchill v. Indonesia, the Tribunal denied the application of a third party (the Government of the Regency of East Kutai) to join the claim, noting precisely the 142 143 See Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award (21 October 1983) in 2 ICSID Reports 65. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (17 July 2003); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International, Inc. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (30 April 2004); Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) (2 August 2004). See also Itera International Energy LLC & Itera Group NV v. Georgia (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/7), Decision on Admissibility of Ancillary Claims (4 December 2009). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? 139 want of consent (in that case, of the Claimant) and the lack of express provision in the ICSID Convention to admit such joinder.144 144. Under the 2012 Arbitration Rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, the opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any of those parties.’145 Other institutional rules set forth similar provisions.146 145. Therefore, in the current state of affairs an application made by a third-party funder to join a pending case is hardly admissible, which is not to say that arbitral tribunals might not start broadening their powers in this respect so as to accommodate new needs arising out of the budding of the third-party funding industry. 146. A final possible way is for third-party funders to start their own “post award” claim. This means that a new arbitration by funders would be initiated against the host State. This route raises concerns, however, about the res judicata effects of the award made in the arbitration between the funded party and the host State. The funder was not a party to the initial funded arbitration case and, therefore, the threefold identity test would fail, and the funder would not be covered by the res judicata effects. 147. The purpose of this article is not to address the effects of lis pendens and of res judicata in investment arbitration, but one cannot avoid noting that the situation of third-party funders in this respect may be assimilated to that of the group of companies. The answer can be no different, as Zachary Douglas has put it: A host State cannot be expected to defend a barrage of concurrent or consecutive claims relating to precisely the same prejudice to a single investment. Nor can it be right for a host State to defend consecutive claims in relation to the same investment by different members of the group of claimant companies until an award favourable to the group is procured.147 Indeed, the claim of the third-party funder is so tightly linked with the investor’s initial claim, almost as if they were merged one into the other, that the funder should be obliged to accept the external effects of the “force de la chose jugée”. Therefore, in principle revising the entire case must not be admitted and the final award must be accepted “as is”. 144 145 146 147 See Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Procedural Order No. 2 (5 February 2013). See also See G. Kaufmann-Kohler et al., ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in Investment Arbitration: How Can Multiple Proceedings Arising from the Same or Related Situations be Handled Efficiently?’ Final Report on the Geneva Colloquium held on 22 April 2006, 21 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 59 (2006) (Annex AL RA7). PCA Rules (2012) art 17(5). For instance, ICC Rules (2012) art 7 and SIAC Rules (2013) art 24(1). See Douglas (n 6) 309. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 140 G. Henriques X . Conclusions 153. Looking at the current setting in international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration, it is fair to conclude that third-party funding is gaining a growing relevance, so as to be considered capable of producing effects beyond the circle of the legal relationship between the funder and the funded party (such as the securitisation of a funding and the Essar case). Moreover, procedural effects may also affect third party funders in other ways (such as in the Excalibur case). Further, third-party funding may play a fundamental role in the right of access to justice, thus highlighting an inextricable link between the necessity of the funding and the funded claim. At the same time, the facilitation of the right of access to justice provides the necessary cloak of legal-ethical, and social-economic relevance which the exercise of any right must be covered with. Last but not the least, the parallel with the experiences of investment arbitration in finance and banking matters elicits the notion that investment tribunals are open to recognise numerous shapes and forms of financial instruments as “protected investments”. Take the example of sovereign dematerialised bond issuances, even when purchased on the secondary market. The experience in this field also shows that arbitral tribunals often adopt a more liberal or, at least, a more flexible and pragmatic approach. Thus, it seems that all these factors are contributing to pave the way to consider third-party funding to be protected investments. In any event, the consideration of a third-party funding investment as “protected” requires a flexible and practical approach in the qualification assessment, but one can arguably posit that, on grounds of principles, these funding business models may amount to a disbursement of financial resources (contribution), with a reasonable durability (duration) and a considerable degree of uncertainty (risk). Hence, in theory, it is possible to ascertain the requirements for jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention. The requisite territory link may also be broadened on account of the principle of access to justice. Further, when assessing the consent for arbitration requirements and the notion of investment itself under the relevant international investment agreement, it is also theoretically admissible to consider that a third-party funding falls under the specific provisions defining protected investments, in the very same fashion as investment tribunals have done regarding financial instruments. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 A COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR’S BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS? AN OVERVIEW OF URBASER V. ARGENTINA Rafael Carlos del Rosal Carmona*1 Resumen: Una de las críticas más frecuentes de los detractores del arbitraje de inversión es el desequilibrio entre las protecciones de las que goza el inversor y las limitadas opciones del Estado para reclamar frente al inversor. En el actual contexto de creciente preocupación sobre los posibles problemas del arbitraje de inversión, el laudo del caso Urbaser es destacable no solo porque confirma que el Estado puede presentar una reconvención contra el inversor en determinadas circunstancias, sino porque afirma que el inversor puede estar sujeto obligaciones legales conforme a los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos. Aunque la reconvención fue finalmente rechazada por cuestiones de fondo, se trata probablemente de la primera decisión a nivel internacional que admite que un inversor puede tener obligaciones derivadas directamente de esta clase de tratados. Dada la importancia de esta afirmación, este artículo examina brevemente las cuestiones analizadas por el tribunal tanto en relación con los aspectos jurisdiccionales como de fondo. I. INTRODUCTION Investment arbitration has been especially criticized in recent times. Some scholars and the public opinion in general seem to perceive it as an imbalanced system which unjustly favors the investor. Among the main criticisms, opponents of the system mention the disregard of investment tribunals to human rights issues, as well as the lack of remedies for the State in case of investor’s misconduct.2 It is precisely because of this negative context that the decision in Urbaser v. Argentina3 is particularly relevant. In this case, the investor had entered into a concession contract with Argentina for the provision of drinking water and sewage services in Buenos Aires. After the dispute arose and the investor initiated its claim before ICSID pursuant to the relevant bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”),4 Argentina filed a counterclaim based on the alleged violation by the investor of international human rights obligations. Although the counterclaim was dismissed on the merits, the tribunal asserted its jurisdiction over the counterclaim and, in an unprecedented finding, affirmed that the investor could be subject to human rights obligations arising directly from international treaties. 1 2 3 4 * Rafael Carlos del Rosal Carmona, LL.M., is an International Case Counsel at the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), a division of the American Arbitration Association, Inc. (AAA). The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of the ICDR/AAA or any of its employees. See, e.g., Ina C. Popova & Fiona Poon, From Perpetual Respondent to Aspiring Counterclaimant? State Counterclaims in the New Wave of Investment Treaties, 2 BCDR Int’l Arb. Rev. 223, 223-24 (2015); James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 77, 77-79 (2007). Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter “Urbaser”]. Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Oct. 3, 1991, 1669 U.N.T.S. 202 [hereinafter “Argentina-Spain BIT”]. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 142 Del Rosal Carmona Due to the importance of such decision, in this article I aim to briefly summarize and analyze the award’s main arguments and conclusions on the counterclaim. For such purposes, the article mirrors to a good extent the structure used in the award to study the counterclaim. Thus, I will separately deal with the jurisdictional and the substantive aspects of the counterclaim in sections II and III respectively, followed by a short conclusion in section IV. II. JURISDICTION OVER COUNTERCLAIMS The first question was whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim by the respondent State. The ICSID Convention specifically envisages the possibility of counterclaims,5 but only if they (i) arise directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute, (ii) they are within the scope of the consent of the parties, and (iii) they are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre. However, the question of whether States could file treaty-based counterclaims was once unclear,6 and the fact that the first counterclaims brought before ICSID arose out of contracts did not help to clarify the matter.7 Nonetheless, the latest decisions on this topic seem to confirm that, depending on the wording of the dispute resolution clause and the connection with the investment, treaty-based counterclaims can be entertained.8 This approach was followed by the tribunal in Urbaser. Thus, the tribunal commenced its analysis focusing on the broad scope of the dispute resolution provision in the BIT.9 It noted that such provision encompassed disputes between a contracting State and an investor from the other contracting State, and that it allowed either party to the dispute to initiate arbitration proceedings.10 Consequently, the tribunal concluded that Argentina’s offer to arbitrate contained in the BIT was broad enough to include counterclaims. In this regard, it should be noted that the tribunal correctly endorsed the line of reasoning according to which Article 46 of 5 6 7 8 9 10 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other State, Art. 46, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 232 (1995). See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. The Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted case, Decision on Jurisdiction (May 10, 1988), 3 ICSID Rev. 166 (1988); Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Award (Dec. 22, 1989), 5 ICSID Rev. 166 (1990). See, e.g., Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Dec. 14, 2014), ¶¶ 655-667, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf; Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (August 11, 2015). See Argentina-Spain BIT, Art. X(1) (“Disputes arising between a Party and an investor of the other Party in connection with investments within the meaning of this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties to the dispute.”). For the tribunal’s analysis, see Urbaser, ¶¶ 1143-44. Id. at Art. X(3) (“The dispute may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal in any of the following circumstances: a) At the request of either party to the dispute …”). However, initiation of arbitration by the State would require the investor’s specific consent, as the BIT is only an offer from the State to arbitrate, which is generally accepted by the investor through the filing of a claim under the BIT. See José Antonio Rivas, ICSID Treaty Counterclaims: Case Law and Treaty Evolution, Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt., Jan. 2014, at 5-6. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR´S BREACH 143 the ICSID Convention does not suffice to assert jurisdiction over a counterclaim,11 and that additional consent must be found in the specific wording of the dispute resolution provision.12 The tribunal then turned to claimant’s acceptance of the State’s offer to arbitrate.13 It explained that claimant never indicated any form of limitation to its consent to arbitrate, and it confirmed that even if an indication of limited consent existed, the investor cannot exclude the possibility of a counterclaim simply by expressing limited consent. This idea was reinforced by the fact that the UNCITRAL Rules (which are also included as arbitration rules available under the BIT, apart from the ICSID Rules) envisage the possibility of counterclaims too,14 with no hint in the UNCITRAL Rules or in the BIT that claims and counterclaims should be decided in different proceedings. Thus, the tribunal found that the investor’s acceptance had to perfectly match the State’s offer, or otherwise consent to arbitrate would not be formed. This is an interesting and relatively new approach. Some commentators had argued that, even if the dispute resolution provision in the BIT is broad enough to encompass counterclaims, the investor could theoretically accept the offer to arbitrate but specifically exclude the possibility of counterclaims from its consent to arbitration.15 The tribunal rejected such possibility, considering that in such situation there would be no agreement to arbitrate at all. This approach is appropriate from both a public and private law perspective. From a public international law perspective, consent has always been regarded as absolutely essential to exercise jurisdiction, and its existence requires a preponderance of arguments in its favor.16 If an offer to arbitrate includes the possibility of counterclaims, it is not hard to imagine that the host State could successfully argue that acceptance of such possibility was a necessary condition of its offer, and that any deviation from the original offer should be deemed as a counteroffer.17 The BIT’s goal of protecting investment cannot serve as a justification to exclude counterclaims either, as such goal is effectively achieved by the substantive protections it contains, not by some sort of protection against the State’s procedural rights in the dispute. In addition, the possibility of asymmetrical procedures still constitutes an exception to the general principle of procedural 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 See Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award (Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter “Roussalis”], ¶¶ 859-77; Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar. Serv. GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8 (Mar. 1, 2012), ¶¶ 431-32. This view is more consistent with the nature of the ICSID Convention as a framework treaty requiring additional consent from the States, as well as with the wording of Art. 46 of the ICSID Convention (which requires the counterclaim to be within the jurisdiction of ICSID). See, e.g., Jean E. Kalicki, Counterclaims by States in Investment Arbitration, Inv. Treaty News, Jan. 2013, at 3, 4. However, affirming that Art. 46 of the ICSID Convention suffices to entertain treaty-based counterclaims by States, see Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award (Jun. 21, 2012), ¶¶ 267-85; Roussalis, Separate Opinion of W. Michael Reisman (Dec. 7, 2011). See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1145-48. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010) [hereinafter “UNCITRAL Rules”], among other articles, Arts. 4(2)(e) and 21(3). See Christoph H. Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 756 ¶ 94 (2nd ed., 2009). See, e.g., Juan José Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of Justice 50-53 (2015). See Andrea Marco Steingruber, Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi: Consent and Arbitral Tribunal Competence to Hear Counterclaims in Treaty-based ICSID Arbitrations, 28 ICSID Rev. 291, 297 (2013). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 144 Del Rosal Carmona equality,18 therefore requiring a detailed analysis of the specific wording of the dispute resolution clause.19 From a private international law perspective, practice in international commerce and international instruments confirms that an acceptance which limits material terms of an offer does not generally suffice to form a mutual agreement.20 While these private law elements certainly are not applicable to acceptance in the context of a BIT, they serve as an additional argument to confirm that even from a private law approach the outcome would be the same, and an investor should not be surprised by the fact that it cannot alter an essential term of the offer like the right to pursue counterclaims. Regarding the requirement that the counterclaim had to be connected to the investment,21 the tribunal found sufficient connection both from a factual and a legal perspective.22 Factually, the tribunal noted that both the claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same investment (or alleged lack thereof) pursuant to the concession contract between the parties. Interestingly, the tribunal clarified that the close factual connection alone would suffice to meet this requirement.23 Still, the tribunal also established that there was also sufficient legal connection because the counterclaim was not based purely on domestic law, but also on international law.24 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Emphasizing the importance of this principle, see, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The International Court of Justice 82 (2016); Ricardo Ugarte & Thomas Bevilacqua, Ensuring Party Equality in the Process of Designating Arbitrators in Multiparty Arbitration: An Update on the Governing Provisions, 27 J. of Int’l Arb. 9 et seq (2010). See Roussalis, ¶¶ 868-69. In the general context of international arbitration, it is also remarkable that the possibility of asymmetrical arbitration clauses is still controversial. See Lauren D. Miller, Is the Unilateral Jurisdiction Clause No Longer an Option? Examining Courts’ Justifications for Upholding or Invalidating Asymmetrical or Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses, 51 Tex. Int’l L. J. 321; Álvaro López de Argumedo Piñeiro & Constanza Balmaseda Serrat-Valera, The Disputed Validity of Hybrid and Asymmetric Clauses in Europe: A Review of the Decision of the High Court of Appeal of Madrid of 18 October 2013, 19 Spain Arb. Rev. 55 (2014). See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Art. 19(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 58; UNIDROIT Principles 2010, Art. 2.1.11(1), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf. Note that, technically, this is generally considered a matter of admissibility, not jurisdiction. See Schreuer, supra note , at 751 ¶¶ 72-73; Anne K. Hoffmann, Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration, 28 ICSID Rev. 438, 442 (2013). See Urbaser, ¶ 1151. This seems to be adopted from the case law of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). As an example of this influence, see Goetz, ¶ 273. It should be noted that, although the case law from the ICJ suggests that both a factual and egal connection is required, some commentators argue that this approach is not adequate for an international tribunal, which by definition is not a permanent court. Regarding the ICJ’s approach on this issue, see, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 1011 ¶ 35 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012); Constantine Antonopoulos, Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice132-35 (2011). However, affirming that the requirement of the legal connection should be interpreted broadly or even not be deemed necessary, see Hege Elisabeth Veenstra-Kjos, Counterclaims by Host States in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt., Jul. 2007, at 43-44; Dafina Atanasova et al., The Legal Framework for Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 31 J. of Int’l Arb. 357, 387-89 (2014); Hoffman, supra note 19, at 452. By making this additional determination, the tribunal probably intended to make clear that the reasoning precluding the counterclaim in Saluka is not applicable to this case. See Saluka Inv. B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim (May 7, 2004) [hereinafter “Saluka”], ¶ 79, dismissing the counterclaim because “[t]he legal basis [of the] counterclaim is to be found in the application of Czech law, and involves rights and obligations which are applicable, as a matter of the general law of the Czech Republic, to persons subject to the Czech Republic’s jurisdiction.” Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR´S BREACH 145 Finally, the tribunal also rejected some other general objections raised by claimant. In particular, it considered (i) that preliminary requirements like the alleged obligation to negotiate could not apply to the counterclaimant if they had not barred the investor’s claim;25 (ii) that despite the relatively late filing of the counterclaim, such filing was within the term indicated in the ICSID Rules26 (i.e., no later than in the counter-memorial);27 and (iii) that the alleged lack of rights granted to the State in the BIT does not suffice to exclude a counterclaim prima facie based on the BIT.28 III. MERITS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM A. Applicable Law The tribunal first addressed claimant’s “principled objection” that the BIT, due to its asymmetric nature, confers no rights to the host State, and therefore no investor’s obligation arises from it.29 The tribunal dismissed such objection noting that, while the BIT’s main focus is the protection of investments, nowhere does it indicate that the host State is deprived of any right. In fact, the BIT at least contemplates procedural rights of the State in the dispute resolution provisions (for example, the possibility of filing a counterclaim). However, the tribunal acknowledged that the legality requirement does not impose a general obligation on the investor to comply with all of the host State’s laws, which would make any breach of the host State’s domestic law a potential basis for a counterclaim under the BIT.30 Consequently, the tribunal proceeded to consider whether the BIT should be regarded in isolation, or in conjunction with other sources of international law.31 The tribunal decided in favor of the latter.32 The tribunal reasoned that since both the State and the investor could bring claims in accordance with the broad wording of the dispute resolution clause, there must be some rights which could serve as the basis for a State counterclaim. Otherwise, this broad wording of the dispute resolution provision would have no meaning. In fact, the tribunal emphasized that the scope of the clause for disputes between the State and an investor (“disputes arising between a Party and an investor of the other Party in connection with investments within the meaning of this Agreement”)33 was broader than the 25 26 27 28 29 30 See Urbaser, ¶ 1149. Id. at ¶ 1150. See ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings [hereinafter “ICSID Rules”], Art. 40(2). See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1152-54. Id. at ¶¶ 1182-84. As an example of an uncommon case where the relevant treaty imposed such obligation on the investor, see Al-Warraq, ¶¶ 662-63. 31 See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1185-86. 32 Id. at ¶ 1187. See Argentina-Spain BIT, Art. X(1). 33 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 146 Del Rosal Carmona scope of the clause for State to State disputes (disputes “relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement”).34 Thus, the tribunal concluded that the BIT could not be viewed in isolation.35 The tribunal confirmed that the governing law clause in the BIT36 instructed it to apply not only the BIT itself, but also, “where appropriate,” other treaties between the Contracting States and general principles of international law. On this aspect, the tribunal interpreted the “where appropriate” reference as merely requiring a connection between those other treaties or general principles of international law and the BIT, although a more accurate reading of this sentence would be that the BIT requires other treaties and general principles of international law to be connected to the investment rather than the BIT itself (which is rather redundant once they are already included in the governing law clause). It should be noted that the tribunal also avoided ascertaining any hierarchical relation between the different sources of applicable law, considering all of them equally applicable.37 The award then confirmed that excluding sources other than the BIT would deprive the governing law clause and the dispute resolution provision of meaning.38 The tribunal based such decision on the fact that a good faith interpretation pursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter “VCLT”)39 required it to interpret the treaty in a manner that provides them with effective meaning. As an additional illustration of this, the tribunal mentions how Article VII(1) of the BIT allows the application of more favorable terms included in other treaties or in general international law. Hence, the tribunal concluded that the BIT could not be regarded in isolation, but necessarily also with regard to general international law. This conclusion is unsurprising, as several tribunals have refused to consider a BIT completely in isolation, with some awards even citing decisions of international human rights courts where they deemed it adequate.40 Finally, the tribunal also raised additional points to reinforce its conclusion that other treaties (such as human rights treaties) can be applicable to investment disputes.41 Thus, the award further focused on how the governing law clause in the BIT requires it to decide the dispute also on the basis of other treaties in force between the Contracting States and general principles of international law, a conclusion also supported by an interpretation of the BIT in accordance with “[a]ny relevant rules 34 Id. at Art. IX(1). 35 See Urbaser, ¶ 1188. 36 See Argentina-Spain BIT, Art. X(5). Discussing the need to apply international law, both in BITs with and without governing law clause, see, respectively, Ole Spiermann, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 107-10 (Peter T Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID Rev. 375, 408-11 (2003). 37 38 39 40 41 See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1189-92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter “VCLT”], May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Jul. 8, 2016), ¶ 399, ¶ 532; Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures (Mar. 21, 2007), ¶¶ 130-32. See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1200-03. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR´S BREACH 147 of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”42 This is also consistent with Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, which allows the parties to choose the governing law, and absent party agreement provides for the application of “such rules of international law as may be applicable.” The tribunal also mentioned that norms of ius cogens would be applicable to investment disputes too, as otherwise it would contradict Article 53 of the VCLT.43 B. 1. International Human Rights as the Basis for the Counterclaim Applicability of General Human Rights Obligations to Corporations Once confirmed that other treaties and general international law can form the basis of a counterclaim, the next step was to study if a counterclaim for breach of international human rights can be asserted. The tribunal’s decision on this aspect is groundbreaking due to the tribunal’s finding that the investor (a corporation) can be subject to international human rights obligations. Thus, the award engaged in length in a number of arguments supporting the idea that corporations are bound by international human rights obligations.44 While acknowledging that corporations were not traditionally recognized as subjects of international law,45 the tribunal considered this approach to be less relevant nowadays. It argued that if investors can rely on rights granted under general international law, the possibility of also being subject to obligations cannot be automatically rejected. Following this line of reasoning, the tribunal searched for possible sources of obligations for the investor. Albeit recognizing its non-binding character, the tribunal mentioned the growing importance in international law of corporate social responsibility (referencing specifically the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights),46 which highlights the corporations’ human rights responsibilities. In addition, the award emphasized how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter the “Universal Declaration”) recognizes the rights of “all” or “everyone[,]”47 while also establishing that “[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of” such rights,48 a wording the tribunal considered includes corporations. The tribunal also mentioned the International Labor Office’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy (hereinafter the “Tripartite Declaration”), which states that all parties to such declaration should respect the Universal Declaration 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 See VCLT, Art. 31(3)(c). However, it should be noted that the tribunal does not specify if it considers that any human rights treaties are considered ius cogens. See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1193-99. See, e.g., James R Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 122 (8th ed. 2012); Sir Robert Jennings et al., Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 1 Peace 846-46 § 374 (Sir Robert Jennings et al. eds., 9th ed. 2008). See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Annex U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). See Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter “Universal Declaration”], Arts. 1, 21(2), and 25(1), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Id. at Art. 30. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 148 Del Rosal Carmona and the corresponding international covenants.49 Finally, the tribunal also referred to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter “ICESCR”), which acknowledges the right of “everyone” to “an adequate standard of living”50 and to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”51 The tribunal equally mentioned that the ICESCR establishes that “[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights” included in the ICESCR.52 For the tribunal, these provisions were sufficient to conclude that corporations have an obligation not to act against human rights. The question of whether corporations can be subject to treaty-based human rights obligations is a controversial topic in international law.53 Arguments based on the Universal Declaration and the Tripartite Declaration are usually dismissed due to their non-binding nature. This obstacle can be overcome by making reference to the ICESCR instead, as it is binding and includes some provisions very similar to those in the Universal Declaration.54 However, the main problem with the tribunal’s approach is that it is not completely consistent with the literal wording of Article 5(1) of the ICESCR, as well as with its traditional interpretation. Hence, the article establishes that “[n]othing in the present Covenant” may be interpreted as granting any right to act with the goal of destroying human rights. This wording, which is also present in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”),55 has traditionally been interpreted as a provision to prevent abuse of the rights included in those covenants, rather than a general obligation not to disturb human rights.56 Certainly, it could be argued that an interpretation of the article like the one made by the tribunal is possible, and it could find support within the covenant to the extent that its preamble57 recognizes that individuals (arguably, including corporations) are “under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance” of the rights recognized in the covenant. Nonetheless, this would contradict the traditional meaning attributed to this provision, and 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 Int’l Lab. Org., Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy [hereinafter the “Tripartite Declaration”], Principle 8, adopted by the Governing Body at its 204th Session (Nov. 1977). See International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter “ICESCR”], Art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3. Id. at Art. 12(1). See ICESCR, Art. 5(1). See, e.g., Tineke Lambooy & Marie-Eve Rancourt, Shell in Nigeria: From Human Rights Abuse to Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 Hum. Rts. & Int’l Legal Discourse 229, 257-58 (2008); Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: The Limits of Direct Corporate Responsibility, 4 Hum. Rts. & Int’l Legal Discourse 66, 74 (2010). Compare Universal Declaration, Art. 30, with ICESCR, Art. 5(1). See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter “ICCPR”], Art. 5(1), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See, e.g., Ben Saul, at al., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials 263-67 (2014); Hannes Cannie and Dirk Voorhoof, The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?, 29 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 54, 56-57 (2011). Note that Art. 31(2) VCLT explicitly mentions that the preamble is included part of the context in which the treaty should be interpreted. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR´S BREACH 149 maybe even its literal meaning, which seems to reduce its scope of application to abuse of other rights recognized in the ICESCR. 2. Obligations of Corporations in connection with the Human Right to Water The tribunal then proceeded to examine if, in the particular case, the claimant was under any human rights obligation in connection with the right to water.58 Both Urbaser and Argentina agreed that the right to water is recognized as a human right,59 and that the State has an obligation to provide access to water, but Argentina also argued that the investor, after entering into the concession contract for the provision of water services was also bound by such obligation. The tribunal rejected Argentina’s argument. It acknowledged that the investor is under an obligation to abstain from violating international human rights,60 which arguably could serve as the basis for a counterclaim in other cases, but it reasoned that no international law rule imposed any performance obligation on the investor in connection with the right to water. The award devoted significant time to illustrate how it is the State’s responsibility to provide access to water, and to ensure that adequate accountability mechanisms are in place if private parties are involved in water services. Consequently, the tribunal affirmed that neither the ICESCR nor any other international law rule contained any obligation for the investor to guarantee access to water, even if the investor concluded a contract with the State to provide services affecting the right to water. Despite the counterclaim’s dismissal, the tribunal’s finding that the investor is under a general obligation to abstain from affecting human rights could impact future cases, although the specific scope of this obligation remains unclear. Hence, assuming the tribunal’s approach (which is, as previously explained, highly contested), the investor would have an obligation to avoid disturbing the rights recognized under the ICCPR and the ICESCR.61 It is not difficult to imagine situations where the investor’s employees may violate the civil and political rights of local individuals, like the right to life62 or liberty.63 However, it is harder to imagine a potential violation of economic and social rights by the investor, given that it is the State which is under an obligation to ensure these rights. Arguably, a breach by the investor could arise from its conduct hampering the State’s performance of its obligations under the ICESCR. For instance, this breach could arguably happen if the investor providing water services decided to suddenly cease to provide the services without granting the State a reasonable opportunity to remedy the consequent lack of access to water. This conduct could fall within the broad interpretation of Article 5(1) of the ICESCR made by the tribunal, but even then it would still not be clear to what extent the State should have set up mechanisms to prevent that sudden withdrawal. 58 59 60 61 62 63 See Urbaser, ¶¶ 1204-11. Art. 12(1) and Art. 11(1) of the ICESCR serve as the basis for the recognition of the right to water as a human right. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). See Urbaser, ¶ 1210. Note that Art. 5(1) of the ICCPR is similar to Art. 5(1) of the ICESCR. See ICCPR, Art. 6. See ICCPR, Art. 9. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 150 Del Rosal Carmona C. The Concession Contract As Argentina relied on international human rights obligations to assert its counterclaim, it is no surprise that its argument failed once the tribunal confirmed the investor was under no performance obligation under international law. The tribunal explained that the right to water focuses on access to water rather than on the quality of the water services. It then applied this approach to the case explaining that any potential breach of the investor’s obligations in connection with the right to water would arise from the lack of investment for expansion of the water network, as opposed to improvement of the existing one. However, the tribunal found that the investor breached no obligation related to the expansion of the network. The tribunal reiterated that the investor was under no human rights obligation to perform the expansion work because, even though the concession could have an impact in the right to water, that did not elevate the contractual obligations to the level of international law obligations. The award then explained that it was Argentina who was in charge of supervising and directing Urbaser, but it did not do so due to a policy change on how water services were provided. Besides, the tribunal noted how Argentina lacked any regulatory or legal mechanisms to ensure compliance with the contractual commitments in the short and mid-tem. As a result, the tribunal dismissed Argentina’s counterclaim. The award then finished with a rather surprising reasoning regarding the right to damages.64 Thus, after all the aforementioned arguments, the tribunal explains that the State failed to determine any legal basis for any individual’s claim for damages under international human rights law, and that the lack in international law of a “duty of reparation” from a breach of international human rights would suffice to dismiss the claim. Such an approach seems inconsistent with international law and procedural efficiency. First, it appears the tribunal thought that a specific remedy must be referenced in the applicable treaty. This idea contradicts the general understanding that a breach of international law generally requires a remedy of some kind.65 Second, when asserting the lack of an “individual’s right to claim damages” the tribunal ignored that a State can pursue a claim under international law on behalf of its nationals, as evidenced by the numerous cases on diplomatic protection.66 If the tribunal’s understanding is that the lack of an individual right to claim deprives it of jurisdiction, such approach also contradicts the principle that jurisdiction over a dispute includes jurisdiction over remedies.67 Finally, the tribunal’s conclusion is also surprising in terms of procedural efficiency because it would to make the pre- 64 65 66 67 See Urbaser, ¶ 1220. See, e.g., Factory at Chorzów Case (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29, affirming that “the Court observes that it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation … and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.” For a relatively recent example of diplomatic protection, see, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Demo. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J. Rep 639 (November 30). See Rosalyn Higgins, Themes and Theories Selected Essays, Speeches and Writings in International Law 1106 (2009). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR´S BREACH 151 vious extensive discussion on human rights unnecessary, as the case could have been decided simply based on this last paragraph.68 IV. CONCLUSION The award is a remarkable development in the relation between investment arbitration and international human rights, but its impact on future decisions is uncertain. On the one hand, the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the investor could be subject to international human rights obligations may encourage the filing of this kind of counterclaims, which may contribute to present investment arbitration as a more balanced system where the investor may also be held accountable. On the other hand, counterclaims by the host State are still rare, especially based on human rights violations. Furthermore, the tribunal’s reasoning challenges the conventional interpretation of Article 5(1) of the ICESCR and of human rights conventions generally. Although there is a growing demand for solutions to keep corporations accountable for human rights violations, such a radical change in interpretation might be regarded as unjustified by subsequent tribunals, which in perspective would make this case simply a peculiar outlier. Therefore, it is impossible to predict if other tribunals will follow the approach adopted by this award or not, but it is clearly a new and relevant contribution to the general debate about corporations and human rights. 68 In the tribunal’s own words, “[t]his would be a reason sufficient to dismiss Respondent’s Counterclaim.” Urbaser, ¶ 1220 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 EL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES SOBRE RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAUDOS INTERNACIONALES EN COSTA RICA Mauricio París1 / Mauricio Rapso2 Abstract: The public policy exception is one of the most frequent bases for refusing the recognition of a foreign award. However, public policy has been described as “an unruly horse”, given the lack of consensus on its definition at an international level. Thus, the doctrinal debate about public policy scope for the recognition of a foreign award has resulted in the submission to the international public policy. Nonetheless, the adoption of the new Costa Rican Code of Civil Procedure causes an indetermination on which kind of public policy must apply in the country, as the grounds for refusal of a foreign award enforcements. The authors propose a solution to the issue, in accordance with the goals of New York Convention, Panama Convention, and UNCITRAL Model Law. I. EL PROBLEMA CON EL ORDEN PÚBLICO NO ES AJENO EN COSTA RICA Dotar de contenido al orden público ha sido un dolor de cabeza tanto para doctrinarios como para jueces, por resultar ser un concepto jurídico indeterminado. No resulta una casualidad que diferentes autoridades judiciales lo han calificado como el “niño terrible del Derecho Internacional Privado”3 o como un “caballo indomable”4. Por su parte, Federico de Castro5 dedicó al orden público una serie de curiosos calificativos que son usualmente citados por la doctrina para caracterizar este concepto, que calificaba de “enigmático y desconcertante”. Decía que: “tratar de definir el orden público es aventurarse en arenas movedizas”, “un suplicio para la inteligencia” “cabalgar en un caballo fogoso que nunca se sabe dónde llevará” o “caminar por un camino cubierto de espinas”. A pesar de lo anterior, es precisamente en dicha indeterminación es que radica su utilidad, ya que debe ser interpretado caso por caso. El que una de las mentes más preclaras del Derecho haya pasado tan mal rato analizando el concepto de orden público, ya nos hace pensar en lo complejo de la tarea de conceptualizar esta figura, que podríamos calificar como reciente, si su origen napoleónico se compara con la mayoría de las figuras de nuestro sistema jurídico, prevenientes del Derecho Romano. 1 2 3 4 5 Socio de Expertis Legal Costa Rica. Máster en Asesoría Jurídica de la Empresa (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid). Profesor de las cátedras de Derecho Internacional Privado y Derecho Comercial Internacional en la Universidad de Costa Rica. Abogado asociado de Expertis Legal Costa Rica. Licenciado en Derecho (Universidad de Costa Rica). Entrenador de equipos de la Universidad de Costa Rica participantes en el Moot Madrid y en la Competencia Internacional de Arbitraje. KAHN-FREUND, citado por: MORENO RODRÍGUEZ, José Antonio: “Derecho aplicable y arbitraje internacional”. España, Thomson Seuters Aranzadi, 1era edición española (2014). Pág. 414. Caso Richardson v. Melish, citado por JIMÉNEZ-BLANCO, Gonzalo: “El orden público como excepción al reconocimiento y ejecución de laudos extranjeros”. En: Spain Arbitration Review, 2010, volumen 8. Pág. 73. DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Federico: “Notas sobre las limitaciones intrínsecas de la autonomía de la voluntad. La defensa de la competencia. El orden público. La protección del consumidor”. En: Anuario de Derecho Civil, 1982, vol. IV, Págs. 1021 y siguientes. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 154 París / Rapso La Convención de Nueva York sobre el Reconocimiento y Ejecución de las Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras de 1958 –en lo sucesivo Convención de Nueva York–, la Convención Interamericana sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional de 1975 –en adelante Convención de Panamá– y la Ley Modelo de la CNUDMI sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional6 –en lo sucesivo Ley Modelo–, incorporan la violación al orden público como causal para la denegatoria del reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero, en los tres casos, en términos muy similares de redacción. Sin embargo, los alcances del “niño terrible” del Derecho Internacional Privado no se encuentran delimitados por ninguna de las tres anteriores. La discusión no es ajena a la realidad costarricense, país el cual, además de haber adoptado las tres normas mencionadas anteriormente como parte de su ordenamiento jurídico, utiliza en sus procesos de reconocimiento de laudo extranjero su normativa procesal civil. La ley vigente en la materia realmente no incide en lo absoluto en la interpretación de la causal de orden público; no obstante, tal situación está próxima a cambiar. En abril de 2016 se adoptó en Costa Rica un nuevo Código Procesal Civil, que entrará en vigor en octubre de 2018. Esta norma, que procura una justicia más expedita mediante la implementación del sistema procesal por audiencias, también contiene disposiciones novedosas en materia de Derecho Internacional Privado, especialmente en lo referido al orden público, en especial en cuanto a la diferenciación entre los conceptos orden público internacional y orden público nacional. No obstante, una técnica poco feliz provocó lo que consideramos una indebida implementación del concepto en la norma, alejada de la tendencia internacional sobre el tema. A pesar de que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, órgano encargado de resolver las solicitudes de reconocimiento de laudo extranjero, no ha tenido una posición específica sobre el concepto de orden público en esta materia; la entrada en vigencia del nuevo Código Procesal Civil costarricense la hará aún más incierta. Sin embargo, con el presente trabajo, además de exponer el problema contenido en el artículo 99.2 de la nueva norma procesal civil, se tratará de plantear una solución sobre el tipo de orden público a aplicar en este tipo de procedimientos. Para ello, se iniciará explicando el concepto de orden público, así como sus diferentes tipos y concepciones. Posteriormente, se analizará el tema desde la perspectiva de la solicitud de reconocimiento de laudo extranjero, de acuerdo a los principales postulados a nivel internacional. Asimismo, se analizará el contenido del nuevo Código Procesal Civil, en materia de reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros y la causal de orden público. Finalmente, se planteará una propuesta sobre el concepto de orden público que debe aplicar la Sala Primera de Costa Rica, al momento de analizar un reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero. II. APROXIMACIÓN A LA IDEA DE ORDEN PÚBLICO Y SUS DISTINTAS CONCEPCIONES El orden público ha sido objeto de múltiples interpretaciones, en virtud de su utilidad a nivel internacional. Opera como un concepto válvula que concede al ope- 6 Adoptada por Costa Rica mediante Ley No. 8937 de 27 de abril de 2011. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES 155 rador jurídico la facultad de interpretarlo de acuerdo a las circunstancias históricas, sociales y culturales de un lugar y un momento determinado. Funciona también como una muralla que protege a los Estados de sentencias, leyes o laudos que no sean compatibles con las instituciones o las bases del ordenamiento jurídico local. Su importancia ha provocado que múltiples juristas hayan tratado de dar una definición de dicha figura, y así tratar de explicar sus alcances. Por ejemplo, en un caso de cita obligatoria sobre el tema en el arbitraje comercial internacional, un tribunal estadounidense dijo: “El reconocimiento de laudos arbitrales extranjeros debe ser denegado (con base en el orden público) solo cuando dicho reconocimiento pueda violar las más básicas nociones de moralidad y justicia del Estado foro”7. En otro reconocido voto, las cortes alemanas resolvieron que un laudo contraviene el orden público cuando viola una norma que afecta las bases de la vida pública y la economía alemanas, e irreconciliablemente contradice la percepción alemana de justicia8. La concepción de la jurisprudencia latinoamericana sobre el orden público guarda relación con lo expresado en las autoridades jurisdiccionales citadas anteriormente. Por ejemplo, la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, Chile, lo ha caracterizado en los siguientes términos: “…el orden público es el núcleo, el aspecto central y más sólido y perdurable del orden social. Es el conjunto de aquellas características y valores de la convivencia que una sociedad considera como “no negociables” y se le identifica por lo mismo con la coexistencia ordenada, segura, pacífica y estabilizada de una sociedad”9. La jurisprudencia costarricense también ha aportado elementos para poder llegar a un concepto uniforme del orden público. La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia definió el concepto así: “El concepto jurídico de orden público es indeterminado, flexible, dinámico y de difícil definición. No obstante, puede entenderse como el conjunto de principios inspiradores de un ordenamiento jurídico reflejo de los valores esenciales de una sociedad en un momento dado. Existen varias clases de orden público. La clasificación más importante distingue entre orden público interno y orden público internacional”10. Como bien reconoce el último caso citado, existen distintas clasificaciones del orden público. Lo anterior se debe a que el concepto puede ser utilizado en múltiples circunstancias, lo que provoca necesariamente que el concepto adquiera otro contenido. En algunas jurisdicciones se ha realizado una distinción entre los conceptos de orden público doméstico y orden público internacional. Esta distinción proviene del Derecho Internacional Privado y no es necesariamente reconocida en todos los Estados. 7 8 9 10 Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito de los Estados Unidos de América, en el caso Parson & Whittemore Overseas v. Societé Générale de L’Industrie du Papier. La cita ha sido traducida libremente, su original indica: “Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied (on the basis of public policy) only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.” Oberlandesgericht Munich, 34 Sch 019/05, 28 de noviembre de 2005. Citado en la Guía de UNCITRAL sobre la Convención de Nueva York, disponible en: http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/ Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, resolución del 28 de junio de 2016. ROL 11.466-2015. Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, voto número 76-2001, de 19 de enero de 2001. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 156 París / Rapso El concepto de orden público doméstico corresponde al conjunto de normas locales que revisten dicho carácter, es decir, que expresamente son denominadas como normas de orden público, y por ende de carácter imperativo, limitativas de la autonomía de las partes11. Por otra parte, el orden público internacional, también llamado en la doctrina como orden público absoluto o cláusula de reserva, es un concepto más amplio que se referiría más bien a un -en palabras del Tribunal Supremo del Reino de España-: “…conjunto de principios jurídicos, públicos y privados, políticos, económicos, morales e incluso religiosos, que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación del orden social en un pueblo y en una época determinada”12. La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Colombia ha caracterizado al orden público internacional como: “…los principios básicos o fundamentales de las instituciones, a lo cual servirán de ilustración: la prohibición del ejercicio abusivo de los derechos, la buena fe, la imparcialidad del tribunal arbitral y el respeto al debido proceso”13. Esta categoría del orden público nace del derecho internacional privado, como el mecanismo de defensa que permite al juzgador no utilizar una norma extranjera que hubiera correspondido conforme al mecanismo conflictual, por violación a los valores e intereses fundamentales del Estado14. Algunos autores atribuyen a Federico Carlos de Savigny el desarrollo científico de este concepto –aunque sin llamarlo así-, destacando su aplicación limitada a dos supuestos puntuales que él mismo calificaba como excepciones al principio general de aplicación obligatoria del derecho extranjero, a saber: la norma rigurosamente obligatoria y la institución desconocida15. Lo vital de este concepto –y su diferenciación con el orden público interno- es que tiene un sentido negativo, al no permitir la aplicación de un derecho extranjero en el país. El orden público interno tiene un sentido positivo, pues busca la utilización de estas normas imperativas dentro del territorio. Esta diferenciación ha implicado en el Derecho Internacional Privado el aceptar que la ley extranjera aplique, aunque choquen con sus normas imperativas nacionales, siempre y cuando sea acorde a los principios básicos y esenciales en los cuales se basa su ordenamiento jurídico. Entonces, aun cuando su denominación puede generar confusión, el orden público internacional es un concepto eminentemente local, y que no debe confundirse con lo que es dado en llamarse orden público trasnacional. Este último se refiere a un orden público realmente internacional, el cual reúne los principios fundamenta- 11 12 13 14 15 MEDINA CASAS, Héctor: “El orden público internacional en el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros: Concepto difuso de aplicación restrictiva”. En: Revista arbitraje PUCP, 2014, Número 4. Pág. 155. Tribunal Supremo del Reino de España, Sentencia 3608, 30 de mayo de 2007. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Colombia, Sala Civil, Rad. 2007-1956, 27 de julio de 2011, citada por: MEDINA CASAS, Héctor Mauricio: “El orden público internacional en el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros: concepto difuso de aplicación restrictiva” En: Revista Arbitraje Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014, No. 4/2014. MORENO RODRÍGUEZ, José Antonio: Óp. Cit. Págs. 421-422. BIOCCA, Stella; CÁRDENAS, Sara; BASZ, Victoria: “Lecciones de Derecho Internacional Privado. Parte general”. Segunda Edición. Editorial Universidad, Buenos Aires, 1997. Pág. 130. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES 157 les comunes de una comunidad de derechos nacionales, que necesariamente serían aceptados por los Estados16. A pesar de que esta diferenciación no es aceptada por todos los Estados, sin duda alguna no hacerlo resulta ser excepcional. La posición predominante en la actualidad es reconocer ambas categorías; y las jurisdicciones latinoamericanas así lo han realizado. La Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago ha deslindado los conceptos de orden público doméstico o interno del internacional en los siguientes términos: “De suerte que se podría decir que mientras el “orden público interno o relativo” es aquel que se aplica a todas las personas nacionales o domiciliadas, son inderogables por parte de los particulares, quienes no pueden renunciar a ellos o debilitarlos en virtud de un acuerdo. Por su parte el “orden público internacional o absoluto” es aquel que se impone a todos sin excepción porque mediante él se tutelan grandes intereses considerados esenciales por el legislador”17. Si bien son las cortes locales quienes llenan de contenido en cada caso concreto el concepto de orden público internacional, algunos instrumentos internacionales incluyen aspectos que constituyen por ley orden público internacional. En Costa Rica, una de ellas es el Código de Bustamante18, que le otorga dicha calificación a varias disposiciones, como las normas de rango constitucional (Art. 4), reglas generales sobre propiedad (Art. 117), las que impiden establecer pactos, cláusulas o condiciones contrarias a las leyes, la moral y el orden público (Art. 175), entre otros. Como ya ha indicado MEDINA CASAS: “En los países parte de esta convención (sic), las reglas indicadas configuran un punto de partida en la delimitación del concepto”19. En consecuencia, aunque complejo de delimitar, la legislación costarricense ya contiene algunas materias que por disposición de ley deben ser consideradas como de orden público internacional, no sólo por así disponerse expresamente en el Código de Bustamante, sino porque el estar incluidas en dicho instrumento internacional, demuestra, por sí solo, un consenso internacional sobre la existencia de un principio en la materia. Lo cierto es que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, así como la jurisprudencia nacional, aceptan la diferencia entre los conceptos y, como veremos, se refuerza dicha diferenciación con la aprobación del nuevo Código Procesal Civil. 16 17 18 19 SILVA ROMERO, Eduardo. Citado por: MEDINA CASAS, Héctor: Óp. Cit. Págs.154-155. Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, resolución del 28 de junio de 2016. ROL 11.466-2015. El Código de Derecho Internacional Privado adoptado en La Habana, Cuba en 1928, más conocido como Código de Bustamante, en honor a su redactor, el cubano Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante. Dicha codificación, además de ser considerada el primer código completo de Derecho Internacional Privado en ser redactado, destaca por su extensión (437 artículos) y por la gran variedad de materias reguladas. Pese a su ambicioso alcance, en la práctica el Código de Bustamante tiene un impacto muy modesto, no sólo por el número de países que lo ratificaron, sino principalmente por las importantes reservas que aplicaron los países ratificantes, que en el caso de Costa Rica implican una reserva expresa de todo cuanto pueda estar en contradicción con la legislación doméstica, por lo que la aplicación práctica del Código Bustamante en Costa Rica es únicamente subsidiaria en aquellos supuestos en donde exista vacío en las escasas normas de Derecho Internacional Privado contenidas en el Código Civil y en algunos otros cuerpos legales. MEDINA CASAS, Óp. Cit. Pág. 157. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 158 París / Rapso III. EL TRATAMIENTO INTERNACIONAL DE LA CAUSAL DE ORDEN PÚBLICO PARA DENEGAR EL RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAUDOS EXTRANJEROS Por las disposiciones de la Convención de Nueva York, el concepto del orden público ha adquirido gran relevancia en el arbitraje internacional, específicamente en los temas de la anulación y el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. La falta de determinación de los alcances del concepto ha provocado no solo revisiones del fondo del laudo en estos procesos, sino también una falta de uniformidad poco deseable en el ámbito internacional. Ante esta situación, se ha pretendido la máxima delimitación posible del concepto. Previo a analizar las posiciones internacionales sobre el tema, es importante tener claro lo indicado por la propia Convención de Nueva York. En su literalidad, el artículo V.2.b de dicha norma señala: “Artículo V (…) 2. También se podrá denegar el reconocimiento y la ejecución de una sentencia arbitral si la autoridad competente del país en que se pide el reconocimiento y la ejecución, comprueba: (…) b) Que el reconocimiento o la ejecución de la sentencia serían contrarios al orden público de ese país” (el resaltado es propio). De acuerdo al desarrollo doctrinario y jurisprudencial del orden público, observamos que la Convención de Nueva York deja el portillo abierto: ¿Se refiere al orden público interno o internacional? Como se indicó en el apartado anterior, ambos conceptos son locales, por lo que ambos integran el orden público de cada país. Ante dicha situación, existen fuertes discusiones internacionales sobre si un laudo que contraríe una norma imperativa no debe reconocerse con base en la causal bajo estudio. ¿Cuál de los términos resulta conveniente utilizar conforme a los fines de la Convención de Nueva York? En el año 2002, la Intenational Law Association (ILA) emitió un reporte denominado: “Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards”, que es el producto de seis años de estudio en materia de orden público de un comité especialmente formado para tal propósito, enfocado en los efectos del orden público en materia de ejecución de laudos arbitrales20. Estas recomendaciones, que están dirigidas a las cortes locales, representan un aporte valioso para el correcto entendimiento de la figura de orden público en un contexto internacional. Las Recomendaciones apoyan el concepto de orden público internacional, en los términos expuestos en apartado anterior, y reconocen el derecho de las cortes locales de determinar qué constituye orden público en sus respectivas jurisdicciones, así como cuando un laudo arbitral debe ser reconocido o no, particularmente dado que la ejecución podrá requerir el soporte de los poderes de policía del Estado21. La Recomendación 1(e) establece, por ejemplo, que la buena fe y la prohibición del abuso del derecho son ejemplos de principios sustantivos fundamentales del orden público. Por lo anterior, la ILA concluye que el orden público internacional es el que debe tomarse utilizarse para analizar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero. Sin 20 21 Este reporte fue publicado en la Revista Arbitration International, Vol. 19, No2. Págs. 249-263. Disponible para descarga digital en la página web: http://arbitration.oxfordjournals.org/content/19/2/249. Recomendación 1 (c), Pág. 255 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES 159 embargo, ¿cuál es el trasfondo de dicho reporte? Se ha considerado que el objetivo es evitar que el laudo extranjero no sea reconocido por razones puramente internas, con base en normas escritas que tienen una función de ataque22. Y es que el carácter excepcional del orden público internacional que limita de la misma forma en un foro determinado la eficacia de una ley extranjera como la de un laudo extranjero. La corriente descrita anteriormente ha sido adoptada por múltiples jurisdicciones como Estados Unidos, India, Suiza, Francia y Alemania, al señalar que el reconocimiento debe ser rechazado bajo la causal del orden público cuando la ejecución viole las más básicas nociones de moral y justicia del foro23. La aceptación de tal premisa es tal, que el Código de Procedimientos Civiles francés, en el actual artículo 1520 –anteriormente el numeral 1502–, señala expresamente como causal para denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero en Francia que este sea contrario al orden público internacional. Es por los motivos anteriormente expuestos que es prácticamente unánime a nivel doctrinario que no todo laudo extranjero contrario a una norma imperativa del foro justifica el rechazo de su reconocimiento24. La función correctiva de la figura pretende que el Estado del foro imponga sus puntos de vista en situaciones internacionales, al satisfacerse sus intereses en el comercio transfronterizo, sin necesidad de aplicar normas de derecho local, que han sido elaboradas para situaciones particularmente domésticas25. El Código de Comercio de Costa Rica presenta una serie de ejemplos clásicos, en cuanto al interés doctrinal y jurisprudencial que existe en utilizar el orden público internacional para denegar el reconocimiento de laudo extranjeros. Uno de ellos se encuentra en su artículo 498, que resulta ser una típica norma imperativa de dicho ordenamiento jurídico, limitativa al pacto de tasas de interés en contratos de préstamo mercantil. La limitación se centra en la imposibilidad que existe para las partes de acordar una tasa de interés moratoria superior en un treinta por ciento a la tasa de interés corriente aplicable. La norma anteriormente señalada fue creada para limitar pactos realizados en relaciones comerciales de índole doméstica, pero que tiene un carácter mandatorio, limitativo de la autoridad de la voluntad de las partes. No obstante, coincidirá con nosotros el lector, tal disposición no constituye un principio fundamental de los valores de la sociedad costarricense. Ante tal situación, es evidente que la aplicación de un tipo de orden público u otro afecta necesariamente la decisión final sobre el reconocimiento o no de un laudo. Si el concepto a aplicar fuera el de un orden público interno o meramente local, los árbitros tendrían una compleja y engorrosa (por no calificar de imposible) tarea de dictar laudos que sean acordes con las normas imperativas de todos los posibles países de ejecución del laudo. Por lo tanto, la determinación del orden público in- 22 23 24 25 FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, José Carlos; ARENAS GARCÍA, Rafael; ASENSIO, Pedro: “Derecho de los Negocios Internacionales”. Quinta Edición. Iustel, Madrid, 2006. Pág. 753. BLACKABY, Nigel; PARTASIDES, Constantine; REDFERN, Alan; HUNTER, Martin: “Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration”. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Inglaterra. Sexta Edición (2015). Pág. 644. SAVAGE, John; GAILLARD, Emmanuel: “Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration”. Kluwer Law International, Estados Unidos, Primera Edición (1999). Pág. 996. MORENO RODRÍGUEZ, José Antonio: Óp. Cit. Págs. 423-424. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 160 París / Rapso ternacional como la causal para rechazar la ejecución de un laudo extranjero resulta vital, para alcanzar los objetivos de la Convención de Nueva York, como lo son la eficacia del arbitraje y su uniformidad. IV. LA INDOMABILIDAD DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN EL NUEVO CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL COSTARRICENSE El proceso de reconocimiento de laudo extranjero en Costa Rica actualmente está regulado por cuatro cuerpos normativos: (i) la Convención de Nueva York; (ii) la Convención de Panamá; (iii) la Ley No. 8937 de 25 de mayo de 2011, sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional basada en la Ley Modelo; y (iv) la Ley No. 7130 de 16 de agosto de 1989, Código Procesal Civil. Cabe destacar que las cuatro normas contemplan causales para denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero. Sobre este tema en particular, la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial internacional costarricense es una versión pura de Ley Modelo, lo cual provoca que los tres primeros instrumentos normativos mencionado anteriormente contemplan las mismas causales para rechazar el reconocimiento de laudo extranjero. Es importante recordar que, en cuanto a la causal del orden público, el reconocimiento podrá ser denegado en caso de ser contrario al de Costa Rica; sin especificar si se refiere al orden público doméstico o internacional. Por su parte, el Código Procesal Civil que se encuentra actualmente vigente no contempla causales para denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero; sino que estipula requisitos para otorgarlo. El artículo 705 contempla como uno de ellos que el laudo extranjero no sea contrario al orden público, sin especificar a cuál tipo se refiere: ¿Al orden público de Costa Rica o transnacional? En caso de que sea al orden público de Costa Rica, ¿Se utiliza el doméstico o el internacional? Tales incógnitas no son resueltas expresamente por esta norma; no obstante, por lo dispuesto en los demás cuerpos legales que regulan el tema, debe entenderse que se refiere al costarricense. Ahora bien, en nuestro criterio, el orden público que actualmente debe utilizarse en Costa Rica para el reconocimiento de laudo extranjeros es el internacional. Tal conclusión se extrae de lo dispuesto en el artículo 2A de la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, que estipula lo siguiente: “ARTÍCULO 2 A.-Origen internacional y principios generales 1) En la interpretación de la presente ley habrá de tenerse en cuenta su origen internacional y la necesidad de promover la uniformidad de su aplicación y la observancia de la buena fe. 2) Las cuestiones relativas a las materias que se rigen por la presente ley, que no estén expresamente resueltas en ella, se dirimirán de conformidad con los principios generales en que se basa la presente ley” (el resaltado es propio). Esta norma permite determinar que el artículo 36.1 de la Ley de bajo estudio que establece las causales para denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero en Costa Rica, debe ser interpretada conforme a los principios internacionales, mediante una aplicación uniforme. Al tomarse en cuenta las posición doctrinal y jurisprudencial explicadas en el apartado anterior, sobre la utilización del orden público internacional en materia de reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros; debe concluirse que el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense acepta la aplicación del carácter internacional del orden público. Y es que aceptar esta interpretación provoca que Costa Rica esté tutelando la eficacia y la uniformidad del arbitraje internacional. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES 161 Sin embargo, como se indicó anteriormente, el nuevo Código Procesal Civil costarricense que entrará en vigor en el mes de octubre de 2018, incorpora a nuestro ordenamiento nuevas disposiciones relacionadas al reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros en el país. Asimismo, este Código representa un cambio en múltiples cuestiones internacionales, como la competencia internacional de los tribunales costarricenses, la aplicación de la ley extranjera en dicha jurisdicción, entre otras. El estudio de las normas internacionales que regula el nuevo Código Procesal Civil arroja una duda particular. Los artículos 98 y 99.2 de esta norma realizan una diferenciación interesante, nunca antes vista en una normal procesal nacional. Por un lado, el numeral 98, referente a la aplicación de un Derecho extranjero por parte de la jurisdicción nacional, estipula lo siguiente: “Artículo 98.- Normativa aplicable. Tratándose de cooperación judicial internacional se aplicarán las disposiciones de los tratados y los convenios internacionales vigentes y en su ausencia la normativa nacional. En ningún caso se aplicará de oficio el derecho extranjero, salvo si las partes fundan su derecho en una ley extranjera y acreditan legalmente su existencia, vigencia, contenido e interpretación. Cuando sea aplicable, el derecho extranjero deberá interpretarse como lo harían los tribunales del Estado a cuyo orden jurídico pertenece. Solo se podrán declarar inaplicables los preceptos de la ley extranjera, cuando estos contraríen manifiestamente los principios esenciales del orden público internacional en los que el Estado asienta su individualidad jurídica. Los procesos, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza, se sujetarán al ordenamiento nacional” (el resaltado es propio. La adopción de esta norma en los términos expuestos resulta un gran avance en materia de Derecho Internacional Privado para Costa Rica. Dicha norma de conflicto resulta ser uniforme con los principales postulados sobre el tema, tanto así que se refiere al orden público internacional como la excepción para que una ley extranjera no sea aplicada. No obstante, los aplausos para el legislador cesan al analizar este artículo en conjunto con el 99.2. Este último establece los nuevos requisitos para el reconocimiento de sentencias y laudos extranjeros, y lo hace en los siguientes términos: “Artículo 99.- Eficacia de sentencias y laudos extranjeros (…) 99.2. Requisitos de la solicitud de reconocimiento. Para el reconocimiento de sentencia y laudos extranjeros deberán cumplirse los siguientes presupuestos: (…) 4. La pretensión invocada no debe ser competencia exclusiva de los órganos jurisdiccionales costarricenses, debe tener conexión con Costa Rica y no ser manifiestamente contraria al orden público nacional” (el resaltado es propio). La lectura conjunta y literal de dichas normas deja muchas dudas, entre ellas: ¿A qué se refiere el artículo 99.2.4 con el término orden público nacional? ¿Por qué se diferenció entre orden público nacional e internacional? ¿El legislador tiene la intención de que las normas imperativas costarricenses impidan el reconocimiento de una sentencia o laudo extranjero?26 26 Consideramos que la inclusión de los laudos en la misma norma que se refiere al reconocimiento de sentencias extranjeras era del todo innecesaria al existir una Ley de Arbitraje Internacional que regula la materia, y es un resabio del Código Procesal Civil previo que re- Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 162 París / Rapso Para comenzar, ¿Cuál es el significado de orden público nacional? Es controvertido. No necesariamente es un sinónimo de orden público interno o doméstico; pues como se comprobó en el apartado anterior, pues tanto el carácter interno como internacional del orden público pertenecen a un Estado particular y, por tanto, son términos nacionales. La premisa anterior se refuerza con lo dispuesto tanto la Convención de Nueva York como la Convención de Panamá y la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional costarricense, que utilizan el orden público de Costa Rica como causal para denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero. La interpretación sistemática de los cuatro cuerpos normativos aplicables al reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros permite concluir que el término “nacional” se utiliza como homólogo al orden público de Costa Rica. Sin embargo, la interpretación sistemática del nuevo Código Procesal Civil permite concluir que la intención del legislador era utilizar los términos nacional e internacional como antónimos. Primero, porque existe doctrina que utiliza el término de orden público nacional como sinónimo del interno27. Segundo, por el contenido del artículo 98 del propio nuevo Código Procesal Civil de Costa Rica. Al utilizarse el término de orden público internacional en dicho artículo, se puede concluir que, si el legislador hubiese deseado que este también aplicase al reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros, así lo hubiese estipulado expresamente en el numeral 99.2.4. Por lo tanto, la diferenciación realizada por el legislador en las dos disposiciones bajo estudio en el nuevo Código Procesal Civil provoca un retroceso del país en la promoción del arbitraje a nivel internacional. Sin duda alguna, si con la entrada en vigencia del nuevo Código Procesal Civil costarricense en octubre del año 2018, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia utiliza como base normas imperativas para denegar el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros, la visión de país frente a la comunidad internacional se verá desmejorada. V. LA NORMATIVA ESPECIAL EN MATERIA DE ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL DEBE PREVALECER SOBRE LA GENERAL. Costa Rica se ha visto beneficiada del desarrollo internacional y la promoción de la uniformidad del arbitraje internacional. La adopción de la Ley Modelo como parte de su ordenamiento jurídico permite encontrar en ella soluciones a la desafortunada técnica legislativa del nuevo Código Procesal Civil. Mediante el principio lex specialis, consideramos que la causal de orden público siempre debe ser analizada bajo su carácter internacional, a pesar de los problemas que podría traer el nuevo Código Procesal Civil. Lo anterior se concluye en virtud de que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe aplicar para el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, y solo supletoriamente, el Código Procesal Civil, en virtud del principio apuntado anteriormente. Esta conclusión se ve respaldada por lo contenido en el ya mencionado artículo 2 A de la Ley Modelo, pues con base en este, existe una obligación del operador legal de promover la uniformidad del arbitraje internacional. Esto necesariamente implica aplicar las disposiciones relaciona- 27 gulaba ambos casos. GONZÁLEZ DE COSSÍO, Francisco. “Orden público en México”. Club Español del Arbitraje, San José, Costa Rica (2011). Pág. 5. Extraído de: http://www.gdca.com.mx/PDF/arbitraje/ORDEN%20PUBLICO%20EN%20MEXICO.pdf Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES 163 das a este tema conforme a los principales postulados existentes a nivel internacional. Como se apuntó a lo largo de la sección tercera del presente trabajo, la tendencia internacional actual es de interpretar que el orden público al que se refieren la Convención de Nueva York, la Convención de Panamá y la Ley Modelo es el internacional, y es este el que debe aplicar, con el fin de permitir una mayor eficacia del arbitraje. Referente a este tema, es importante tomar en consideración las palabras del profesor MORENO RODRÍGUEZ: “… esta tendencia de no dejar de lado laudos arbitrales merced a argumentos meramente localistas so pretexto de un supuesto “orden público” emergente de reglas autóctonas, obviamente coadyuva a que circulen válidamente decisiones que se amparan en principios internacionales o soluciones de tinte universal”28. VI. A MANERA DE CONCLUSIÓN. En el complejo andamiaje jurídico sobre el cual se ha edificado el arbitraje comercial a nivel internacional, algunas figuras jurídicas mantienen un carácter meramente local como parte del respeto a la soberanía de cada Estado. El concepto general de arbitrabilidad y el de orden público son parte de ellos, y funcionan ambos como barreras que impiden que ciertas materias en el primer caso, y que ciertas decisiones en el segundo, puedan ser conocidas mediante arbitraje o ejecutadas en un determinado estado. En el caso del orden público, en su concepto indeterminado radica precisamente su utilidad, pero dicha indeterminación conceptual debe conllevar aparejado un análisis muy concienzudo por parte de las cortes locales cuando deban aplicarlo, ya que el análisis puede llevar a interpretaciones incompatibles con el objeto propio del arbitraje como mecanismo eficaz de solución de conflictos internacionales. En Costa Rica, el limitado marco normativo y el escaso número de reconocimientos de laudos extranjeros ha provocado que el estado de la cuestión del orden público sea cuando menos embrionario. No obstante, el nuevo Código Procesal Civil arroja luces y sombras sobre la materia que requieren una integración normativa adecuada e inteligente por parte de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia cuando le corresponda conocer del reconocimiento de los laudos extranjeros que puedan contener una violación al orden público costarricense. BIBLIOGRAFÍA Doctrina BIOCCA, Stella; CÁRDENAS, Sara; BASZ, Victoria: “Lecciones de Derecho Internacional Privado. Parte general”. Segunda Edición. Editorial Universidad, Buenos Aires, 1997. BLACKABY, Nigel; PARTASIDES, Constantine; REDFERN, Alan; HUNTER, Martin: “Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration”. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Inglaterra. Sexta Edición (2015). DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Federico: “Notas sobre las limitaciones intrínsecas de la autonomía de la voluntad. La defensa de la competencia. El orden público. La protección del consumidor”. En: Anuario de Derecho Civil, 1982, vol. IV, Págs. 1021 y siguientes. FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, José Carlos; ARENAS GARCÍA, Rafael; ASENSIO, Pedro: “Derecho de los Negocios Internacionales”. Quinta Edición. Iustel, Madrid, 2006. 28 MORENO RODRÍGUEZ, José Antonio: Óp. Cit. Pág. 463. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 164 París / Rapso JIMÉNEZ-BLANCO, Gonzalo: “El orden público como excepción al reconocimiento y ejecución de laudos extranjeros”. En: Spain Arbitration Review, 2010, volumen 8. MEDINA CASAS, Héctor: “El orden público internacional en el reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros: Concepto difuso de aplicación restrictiva”. En: Revista arbitraje PUCP, 2014, Número 4. MORENO RODRÍGUEZ, José Antonio: “Derecho aplicable y arbitraje internacional”. España, Thomson Seuters Aranzadi, 1era edición española (2014). Revista Arbitration International, Vol. 19, No2. Págs. 249-263. Disponible para descarga digital en la página web: http://arbitration.oxfordjournals.org/content/19/2/249. SAVAGE, John; GAILLARD, Emmanuel: “Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration”. Kluwer Law International, Estados Unidos, Primera Edición (1999). GONZÁLEZ DE COSSÍO, Francisco. “Orden público en México”. Club Español del Arbitraje, San José, Costa Rica (2011). Pág. 5. Extraído de: h t t p : / / w w w . g d c a . c o m . m x / P D F / a r b i t r aje/ORDEN%20PUBLICO%20EN%20MEXICO.pdf Jurisprudencia Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito de los Estados Unidos de América, en el caso Parson & Whittemore Overseas v. Societé Générale de L’Industrie du Papier. Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, resolución del 28 de junio de 2016. ROL 11.466-2015. Oberlandesgericht Munich, 34 Sch 019/05, 28 de noviembre de 2005. Citado en la Guía de UNCITRAL sobre la Convención de Nueva York, disponible en: http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/ Tribunal Supremo del Reino de España, Sentencia 3608, 30 de mayo de 2007. Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, voto número 76-2001, de 19 de enero de 2001. Normas Código sobre Derecho Internacional Privado (La Habansa, 1028) Código Procesal Civil (San José, 1989). Código Procesal Civil (San José, 2016). Convención sobre el Reconocimiento y la Ejecución de las Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras (Nueva York, 1958). Convención Interamericana sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional (Panamá, 1975). Ley Modelo de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional (Viena, 1985). Ley sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional basada en la Ley Modelo de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional (San José, 2011). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 APPLICABLE LAW IN ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS Nicolás Costábile and Anthony Lynch Resumen: El financiamiento por terceros o “third-party funding” (“TPF”) de disputas ha aumentado en relevancia y popularidad en los últimos años. Desde el 2012, tanto el número de casos como la cantidad de empresas financiadoras ha aumentado 500%. En gran parte, la causa de su creciente popularidad es porque promueve el acceso a la justicia a compañías o individuos que por sí solos no podrían hacer valer sus derechos ante los órganos jurisdiccionales (tanto judiciales como arbitrales). Otra razón es que les da la opción a compañías que, teniendo recursos suficientes, prefieren minimizar el riesgo y la incertidumbre que supone una disputa, librándose del costo del proceso y dejándolo en manos del financista a cambio de un porcentaje de lo conseguido en la disputa. A pesar del creciente uso y popularidad de TPF en al arbitraje internacional, no existe una regulación uniforme. Por un lado, dentro de los países de “common law” existen diferentes posturas: mientras algunos reconocen TPF expresamente y lo regulan legislativamente, otros lo han dejado en manos de sus magistrados, que, superando previas concepciones que prohibían este tipo de prácticas, lo han aceptado con ciertos límites. Por otro lado, la mayoría de los países de derecho civil no lo regulan expresamente pero tampoco lo prohíben, dejando la puerta abierta para su uso. Las diferentes posturas hacia la regulación de TPF toman especial relevancia en el arbitraje internacional, donde diferentes leyes pueden ser (y en muchos casos son) tomadas en consideración por los árbitros para decidir diferentes aspectos de la disputa por su grado de conexión con la controversia. Por ejemplo, en un arbitraje pueden estar en juego a la misma vez: la ley acordada por las partes en el contrato para la regulación de los aspectos de fondo, la ley que regula el acuerdo arbitral, la ley del lugar de la sede del arbitraje o incluso la ley que regula el contrato de financiamiento. El alcance de la ley aplicable en materia de arbitrajes que involucren TPF, por lo tanto, resulta esencial para determinar con mayor certeza cuestiones fundamentales de la controversia como, por ejemplo: la validez misma del acuerdo de financiamiento, cuestiones procesales derivadas de la presencia del financista, el reconocimiento y la ejecución del laudo arbitral o incluso cuestiones de carácter ético. Este articulo analiza cuáles son las leyes potencialmente aplicables a estos aspectos en el arbitraje internacional y sus consecuencias en las distintas etapas de una controversia. I. Introduction 1. Third-party funding (“TPF”) has become an increasingly popular instrument to finance disputes. Since 2012, both the number of funding agreements and the number of funders has increased by 500%.1 Broadly speaking, third-party funding is understood as the “provision of non-recourse financing to cover all or part of the costs and disbursements necessary for pursing a claim (such as legal fees, expert fees, arbitrator and administrative costs and, in some cases, even operating costs to support the existence of the claimant entity so that the claim may be pursued), in exchange for a financial interest in any favourable award that issues from the claim.”2 1 2 James Delaney, ‘Mistakes to Avoid When Approaching Third-Party Funders, 14 April 2014, Global Arbitration Review’ <http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1033321/mistakes-to-avoid-when-approaching-third-party-funders> accessed 15 June 2017. Aren Goldsmith and Lorenzo Melchionda, ‘Third Party Funding in International Arbitration: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know (But Were Afraid to Ask).’ [2012] (1) International Business Law Journal, pp. 56. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 166 Costábile / Lynch These funds are usually provided by companies who have no other connection with the dispute.3 The financial interest in a favourable award usually involves a portion of the proceeds of the successful case, a multiple of the financed costs, or an amount calculated using a combination of both.4 This broad definition includes financing of disputes for both claimants and respondents,5 as well as a wide range of financing agreements that may fall under this “umbrella term”.6 2. The effects of TPF are far reaching. Besides its practical advantage of providing sufficient resources for a party in a dispute, TPF has been promoted as a way of improving access to justice. In effect, TPF can level the playing field by allowing claimants a chance of redressing the damages they have suffered in an effective way to which they would not have had access to otherwise.7 On the other hand, and following more recent trends, TPF can offer corporate litigants and even corporate defendants a cost effective alternative to hedge litigation risks and even operate as a form of “after-the-event insurance” by reducing the effects that uncertain ongoing litigation may have on a company. 8 However, these positive effects are tempered both by the risk of an unregulated increase in speculative and frivolous claims and the development of secondary markets of legal claims.9 3. The wide range of laws and conduct rules potentially applicable to an international arbitration, added to the conflicting stances of national laws towards TPF, create uncertain scenarios in which arbitral proceedings can produce dissimilar outcomes. As discussed below, the presence of a third-party funder in an arbitral procedure poses a series of complex contractual, procedural and ethical issues10, which are addressed by sometimes conflicting approaches by different national laws. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Maya Steinitz, ‘Whose Claim is This Anyway - Third-Party Litigation Funding’ (2011) 95(4) Minnesota Law Review, pp. 1276. Maxi Scherer, ‘Out in The Open? Third-Party Funding in Arbitration, 26 July 2012, Commercial Dispute Resolution News ‘ <https://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/out-in-the-open-third-party-funding-in-arbitration> accessed 15 June 2017. Goldsmith (n 2) 54. Other forms of TPF include success based legal fee arrangements, insurance policies, loan agreements, corporate finance instruments, factoring, legal aid, strategic third-party funding. See, Jonas Von Goeler, Third-Party funding in international arbitration and its impact on procedure (Kluwer Law International 2016) pp. 427. Steinitz (n 3) 1271-1272. Ibid. 1311. Steinitz (n 3) 1271-1272. Funders argue that concerns regarding the financing of speculative claims lack merit, as over 80 per cent of applications for funding are rejected. See Delaney (n 1). Victoria Shannon, ‘Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation’ (2015) 36(3) Cardozo Law Review, pp. 865. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 167 II. third party funding in domestic laws 4. Although most domestic laws and arbitration rules do not specifically regulate TPF in international arbitration, 11 various jurisdictions have taken different approaches towards it, such as: (1) directly prohibiting any form of litigation funding, (2) allowing it under some circumstances, or (3) considering it a valid mechanism due to lack of provisions stating otherwise. Considering that in international arbitration there is an array of potentially applicable bodies of law12 or rules of professional conduct, it is important to understand what the most common regulatory approaches towards TPF are, and how these approaches affect international arbitration. A review of domestic approaches -and of the rationale behind some of their provisions- provides a clearer appreciation of the relevance of the applicable law, and shows the consequences that may result from limitations to TPF under such law. A. The Approach of Common Law Jurisdictions 5. Traditionally, third party funding has been prohibited in common law countries by the doctrines of maintenance and champerty both as a crime and a tort. Maintenance refers to the funding or providing of financial assistance to a holder of a claim, which allows the claim to be legally pursued, when the funder or provider of financial assistance holds no connection or valid interest in the claim itself. 13 Champerty takes it one step further by adding that the funder or financial provider has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the claim. 14 Here the funder provides the money in exchange for a portion of the damages should the claim prevail.15 6. The apprehensive attitude of some common-law jurisdictions towards TPF has been eloquently articulated in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd where the Australian High Court held that: “Institutions like [the funders], which are not solicitors and employ no lawyers with a practicing certificate, do not owe the same ethical duties. No solicitor could ethically have conducted the advertising campaign which [the funders] got [the plaintiff] to conduct. The basis on which [the funders] are proposing to charge is not lawfully available to solicitors. Further, organisations like [the funders] play more 11 12 13 14 15 Stravos Brekoulakis, ‘The impact of third party funding on allocation of costs and security for costs applications: The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force Report, 18 February 2016, Kluwer A r b i t r a t i o n B l o g ’ < h t t p : / / k l u w e r a r b i t r a t i o n b l o g . c o m / 2 0 1 6 / 0 2 / 1 8 / t h e - i mpact-of-third-party-funding-on-allocation-for-costs-and-security-for-costs-applications-the-icca-queen-mary-task-force-report> accessed 15 June 2017. For example: (i) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement; (ii) the law of the seat of arbitration; (iii) the law governing the substance of the dispute; (iv) the law governing the procedure; and/ or (v) the law of the place of enforcement. See Carolyn Lamm and Eckhard R. Hellbeck, ‘Third-party funding in investor-state arbitration- Introduction and Overview’ in Bernardo M. Cremades and Antonias Dimolitsa (eds), Third Party Funding in International Arbitration (2013), pp. 102. Improper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th edition. An agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the claim, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th edition. Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, “Third Party Funding – Maintenance and Champerty – Where is it Thriving?, 7 November 2011, Kluwer Arbitration Blog”, < http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2011/11/07/third-party-funding-maintenance-and-champe rty-where-is-it-thriving/>, accessed 24 July 2017. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 168 Costábile / Lynch shadowy roles than lawyers. Their role is not revealed on the court file. Their appearance is not announced in open court…In short, the court is in a position to supervise litigation conducted by persons who are parties to it; it is less easy to supervise litigation, one side of which is conducted by a party, while on the other side there are only nominal parties, the true controller of that side of the case being beyond the court’s direct control.”16 7. However, during the past decade the principles of champerty and maintenance have been liberalized in some common-law jurisdictions, particularly in the context of international arbitration. Somewhat ironically, England, Wales, Australia, and some States of the United States, where champerty and maintenance had been traditionally applied, have become the leading jurisdictions for the operations of funders and the conclusion of funding agreements. Despite this more relaxed stance towards champerty and maintenance, TPF agreements are still somewhat restricted in England and Wales, in particular regarding the degree of control that a funder may exert over a claim or its interference with the client-attorney relationship. 17 8. Other recent developments in common law countries include a Civil Law Amendment Bill passed on 10 January 2017 in Singapore, abolishing the common law tort of champerty and maintenance which had prevented TPF from being used in the country. This amendment specifically provides that in certain proceedings –including international arbitration- TPF will not be illegal.18 A similar bill has been recently passed in Hong Kong.19 9. In addition to champerty and maintenance, there are other figures which contain some similar elements to TPF that should be considered when assessing the legality of TPF, namely contingency fees and claim assignment. Although the differences between contingency fees, claim assignment and TPF are important,20 the first two are relevant to assess the general stance that courts of certain jurisdictions may have towards the different possible forms of TPF, and hence, its potential validity under the law that may be applicable to a dispute. Where a funding agreement contains certain elements prohibited under a particular law, there is a risk that the agreement may be deemed null and void. For example, with the objective of dis- 16 17 18 19 20 Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 487 (Austl.) (Callinan & Heydon, JJ., concurring). This was the first decision in Australia that held that litigation funding was not an abuse of process. Willem H. Van Boom, Third-Party Financing in International Investment Arbitration, (2011) Erasmus School of Law, pp. 37. Singapore Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2017, 10 January 2017, Sections 5A & 5B. Douglas Thomson, ‘Third-party funding gets all clear in Hong Kong, 14 June 2017, Global Arbitration Review’ <http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1142879/third-party-funding-gets-all-clear-in-ho ng-kong> accessed 24 July 2017. See Steinitz (n 3) 1294 and Shannon (n 10): 882. Claim assignment contains elements that differ from TPF as it involves a complete transfer of the claim, by which the assignee gains total control. This is not the case in TPF, where the party to the claim retains its ownership over it, although not necessarily full control. On the other hand, contingency fees involve the provision of a service for a fee as opposed to a non-recourse investment as in the case of TPF. Moreover, contingency fees do not involve the participation of a third party, and do not cover any costs apart from counsel’s fees, while the involvement of a funder is of the essence in a TPF agreement. TPF will also usually cover all costs, including arbitrator’s fees, experts, procedural costs, or any other that the parties may agree upon. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 169 couraging frivolous claims and avoiding conflicts of interest21, a jurisdiction may not allow the use of contingency fees, by which counsel invest the value of their services in a case, conditioning its remuneration to the case’s outcome.22 10. Likewise, a potentially applicable law may prohibit the assignment of claims,23 due to the principles of champerty and maintenance and to avoid speculation. If a TPF agreement involves some degree of transfer of rights over the claim or assignment, such agreement could also be deemed null and void under some jurisdictions..24 B. The Approach of Civil Law Jurisdictions 11. In several civil law countries, where maintenance and champerty are not part of the legal tradition and where no specific regulations for TPF are available, TPF is understood to be permissible. This approach may derive either from considering TPF as an existing contractual typology, as in the case of Germany, or by considering TPF as valid due to the principle of party autonomy and the lack of prohibition therein. 12. In Germany, for example, TPF is usually qualified as an atypical silent partnership, where the party to a dispute remains in control of the proceedings and the decisions involved with it, while the “silent” party provides for funding to achieve a common goal. The funder may only exert control in its relationship with the funded party, but not directly in the actual management of the dispute.25 In other European civil law jurisdictions such as Switzerland and France, TPF is also considered a legitimate means of financing claims despite there being no regulation to the effect.26 Likewise, no Latin American countries have enacted specific provisions for TPF. In general, in Latin America it is understood that given the lack of express regulation, TPF should be considered as permitted and valid as per party autonomy.27 13. Given the lack of specific regulation in some jurisdictions and even in whole regions such as Latin America, it is worth considering these jurisdictions’ approach to legal figures that contain similar elements to TPF. Two common legal 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Van Boom (n 21) 31-32. Von Goeler (n 6) 51. Such is the case of the assignment of personal injury claims in the throughout USA, and of the assignment of professional malpractice and fraud claims in several states of the USA. See Anthony J. Sebok ‘The Inauthentic Claim’ (2011) 64(1), Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 61-142. In the case of the United Kingdom, in general, a cause of action itself may not me assigned, as this would violate rules on maintenance and champerty. See Adam Deacock ‘Assignment of a Claim or Cause of Action,’ Practical Law UK. Van Boom (n 21) 31-32. Von Goeler (n 6) pp. 59. In the case of France, although TPF is rarely used, and funder will need to comply with restrictions which only allow clients or their agents to make payments to attorneys. See Victoria Shannon and Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2012 pp. 211-212 and pp. 222. See ‘Arbitration 2016 - Latin Lawyer’ (Latinlawyer.com, 2017) <http://latinlawyer.com/know-how/topics/1000195/arbitration-2016> accessed 15 June 2017. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 170 Costábile / Lynch concepts in most Latin American jurisdictions are claim assignment28 and contingency fees.29 14. TPF agreements in Latin America may be subject to mandatory rules that govern similar legal concepts. The effects that the presence of a TPF may have on an arbitration will ultimately depend on the precise terms of the agreement. If the TPF agreement includes some of the essential elements of other figures such as the assignment of claims, the main risk involved is that national courts may consider it as the latter, and not as an unspecified contract freely agreed by party autonomy. If so, TPF may be unduly restricted, and the terms that exceed a valid claim assignment, for example, considered in breach of domestic provisions. As will be addressed below, this could even threaten the validity, recognition, or enforcement of an award in such cases in which national courts apply a broad interpretation of the concept of public policy. 15. Although the stance of certain jurisdictions towards TPF is beyond the objective of this article and has been reviewed elsewhere,30 the above developments provide context for the discussion below. The different positions described set the territory within which funders may operate within different jurisdictions. Accordingly, it would not be surprising for parties to “shop” for TPF-friendly jurisdictions to avoid certain legal restrictions or the risk of engaging in voidable contracts.31 III. RELEVANCE OF applicable law in THIRD PARTY funded arbitration 16. There are different stages in a dispute at which arbitral tribunals and national courts may need to decide which law to look at to decide specific issues that may arise in relation to TPF arrangements. This is not always a straightforward task as there might be several different laws that may have a connection to the dispute. For example, the substantive law agreed by the parties in the contract, the law of the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of arbitration and potentially the law agreed in the TPF arrangement between the funder and the party to the arbitration. Below we have identified a few issues that may arise during a dispute in relation to TPF. A. Validity of the Funding Agreement 17. A funding agreement is usually comprised of one or more written contracts subject to substantive provisions of contract law of a jurisdiction the parties have 28 29 30 31 For example, in Chile, as per articles 1911 et seq. of the Civil Code, claim assignment is valid. However, the assignee will only be entitled to claim the amount that he has paid for the assignment. Article 1208 of Peru’s Civil Code contemplates a similar figure. In Brazil, legislation also permits a party to assign credits and contractual positions. In the case of Chile, as per the rules of the Bar Association (an entity of voluntary membership) contingency fees are not reprehensible in principle. In Argentina, Article 4 of law 21.839 on Professional Fees for Lawyers and Clerks expressly allows fees that involve a participation in the result of a particular service. These fees may not exceed 40% of the total proceeds obtained. It is also common practice in Brazil. See Shannon Nieuwveld (n 30), Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2012). The ability to avoid specific legal systems has been posed as one of international arbitration’s most valuable characteristics. See Queen Mary University, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 171 chosen or, if they have not done so, that which a judge or arbitrator has deemed applicable.32 In principle, due to the principle of privity of contracts (or res inter alios acta in civil law jurisdictions), the validity or invalidity of the TPF agreement would not have any consequences to any party other than the funder and the party to the arbitration. There are cases, however, where tribunals and national courts may need to scrutinize this as it may directly affect the outcome of the dispute or certain aspects of it, such as a security for costs request.33 18. First, national courts may need to assess whether a TPF agreement is valid or not under the law of the seat. The potential invalidity of such agreement may encourage the losing party to apply for the setting aside of the award before the national courts of the seat of arbitration. In most cases, an application to set aside an award issued in funded proceedings will be based on procedural grounds34 or on conflicts with public policy of the seat of arbitration.35 The former will be addressed in more detail below. As for the latter, it is possible that in certain jurisdictions a losing party may attempt to set aside an award arguing that funding for litigation has been obtained by a contract that breaches mandatory law, or that is illegal. Such illegality or breach of mandatory law would lead to an award that contravenes public policy of the State where it is rendered. 19. Although frequently invoked, applications to set aside an arbitral award based on conflicts with public policy are unlikely to succeed as these grounds are limited to unacceptable violations of essential rules of law or fundamental principles.36 The same is true for arbitrations involving TPF. 20. Second, an invalid TPF agreement may result in the lack of recognition and enforcement of the award. In this case, the assessment of the validity of a TPF agreement may be conducted at two different stages: a. By the tribunal, once it knows that there is a TPF agreement in place, to prevent potential challenges at the enforcement stage. This could occur as, in addition to the duty to adjudicate a decision,37 tribunals have a duty to render an award that is enforceable.38 To avoid any kind of risk regarding the efficacy of the award and its chances of being successfully enforced,39 a tribunal may consider public policy of the place where enforcement will most probably be pursued, and in particular, whether restrictions based on public policy would probably be extended to awards obtained in a third-party funded dispute.40 Although the tribunal cannot possibly predict where the award will be enforced, there might be cases when the likely place of enforcement 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Shannon (n 10) 885. See below at paras. 32-37. For example, on Article 34(2)(a)(iii) and (iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. For example, on Article 34(2)(b)(ii). Judgment of 18 November 2004, SA Thalès Air Défence v. GIE Euromissile, 2005 Rev. arb. 751, 757 (Paris Cour d’appel). Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International 2014) pp. 1985. Born (n 42) 1992. George A. Bermann, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, in Franco Ferrari and Stefan Kroll (eds) Conflict of laws in International Arbitration, 2011 pp. 332-334. Aren Goldsmith and Lorenzo Melchionda, L. Third Party Funding in International Arbitration: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know (but Were Afraid to Ask) Part Two [2012] (2), International Business Law Journal, pp. 229. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 172 Costábile / Lynch could be evident from the circumstances of the dispute.41 This exercise, however, may be excessively burdensome for the tribunal and may cause delays and increase costs. Therefore, tribunals will be likely inclined to avoid this type of analysis. b. By national courts, when enforcement is sought. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the competent authority of the country where it is sought finds that recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country. When denial of recognition and enforcement is argued on such grounds, Article V(2)(b) should be interpreted as establishing an exceptional escape device based on local public policy rather than uniform international standards.42 21. In theory at least, the application of public policy considerations regarding the lawfulness of a TPF agreement may result in denial of recognition or enforcement.43 In effect, some national courts have denied recognition and enforcement of awards based on contracts considered illegal under mandatory law.44 In the case of TPF, this could occur where prohibitions of champerty and maintenance are still in force, and where TPF is considered both to be illegal and in breach of public policy.45 However, there are no known cases in this regard, and commentators have stated that non recognition and enforcement of an award based on the illegality of a funded arbitration (in breach of public policy) is unlikely.46 22. The notion of what constitutes a breach of public policy may vary with time. A clear example may be seen in Unruh v Seeberger,47 where, even before the recent legislative modifications mentioned above, the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong held that what constituted maintenance and champerty in Hong Kong had evolved with time in parallel with changes in public policy considerations to allow some exceptions to the general prohibitions of these offences. These exceptions would allow TPF agreements in litigation involving third parties with a legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation, cases where access to justice considerations apply, or in other cases such as insolvency litigation. Hence, what had been historically considered a breach of public policy could, under more modern considerations, be allowed.48 The court additionally held that “[t]he Hong Kong court should not strike down an agreement on the grounds of maintenance or champerty where 42 For example, where the parties only have assets in one jurisdiction. Gary B. Born, ‘The Principle of Judicial Non-Interference in International Arbitration Proceedings’, (2014) Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014, pp. 1017. 43 Van Boom (n 21) 43. 44 Born International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 3675. This is the case of Ireland, where the Supreme Court recently confirmed a decision holding that TPF is unlawful as “there is a prohibition on an entity funding litigation in which it has no independent or bona fides interest, for a share of the profits.” And that “it is clear that third party funding arrangements cannot be viewed as being consistent with public policy in this jurisdiction”. See Persona Digital Telephony Ltd & anor -v- The Minister for Public Enterprise & ors. [2017] IESC 27. Mississippi and Illinois state law provide that maintenance is illegal. Laurent Levy and Regis Bonnan, ‘Third-party Funding in International Arbitration: Towards Mandatory Disclosure of Funding Agreements?’ in Bernardo Cremades and Antonias Dimolitsa (eds), Third Party Funding in International Arbitration (2013), pp. 81, and Willem H. Van Boom (n 21) 52. Unruh v Seeberger (2007) 10 HKCFAR 31. The Law Reform Commission Report, ‘Third party funding for arbitration sub-committee, consultation paper, October 2015’, pp. 7-8. 41 45 46 47 48 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 173 it is to be performed in relation to judicial or arbitral proceedings in a jurisdiction where no such public policy objections exist."49 23. This decision showed the more lenient approach of some courts towards traditional prohibitions of third party funding, and the unwillingness to apply public policy considerations to deny validity of a funding agreement in international arbitration, even when prohibitions of champerty and maintenance were still in force. Particularly, if the funding agreement was to be performed in a jurisdiction where such agreement is valid. Therefore, although there is a risk that under certain applicable laws funding agreements may be considered against public policy and recognition or enforcement of an award may be denied on this basis, this risk is relatively low. B. Procedural Issues 24. Even though third-party funders are not parties to the arbitration agreements that give rise to arbitration proceedings, they are often involved -to different degrees depending on the specific case- in such proceedings. The limits to third-party funders’ role in arbitral proceedings vary between different jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, such as Australia, allow funders to engage in close control of the funded party’s actions.50 On the other hand, English law, for example, discourages control of proceedings by funders. This is one of the remaining vestiges of maintenance and champerty.51 Similarly, in Switzerland, the leading case rendering TPF permissible conditioned such permissibility to the independence of the party’s lawyers.52 25. As discussed below, differences like these may also be perceived in other procedural matters such as disclosure of the TPF arrangement, costs, independence and impartiality, and document disclosure. Such matters will usually be governed by the law of the seat of arbitration, as in most cases when parties select the place of arbitration, unless expressly agreed otherwise, they have simultaneously and implicitly chosen the law of the arbitration. This implicit selection of procedural law also includes a recognition of the authority of the courts of the seat to supervise those proceedings.53 26. However, there may be circumstances in which other laws may be deemed applicable. This is more likely to occur when the arbitral tribunal is faced with choice of law decisions or when enforcement of an award is sought in a place other than that of the seat of arbitration. The law chosen by the parties to govern their TPF agreement, however, will rarely (if ever) have any relevance at this stage. 49 50 51 52 53 Unruh v Seeberger (2007) 10 HKCFAR. This permissible level of control by the funder derives from Campbell’s Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41. Shannon (n 10) 897; and Steven Friel, Jonathan Barnes and Lara Bird, ‘Litigation Funding in England and Wales, 19 December 2016, Getting the Deal Through’ <https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/94/jurisdiction/65/litigation-funding-2017-england-wales> accessed 15 June 2017. BGE 131 I 223 and Supreme Court decision 2C_814/2014. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 1532-1533. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 174 Costábile / Lynch 1. Disclosure of TPF Arrangements 27. There has been significant debate surrounding the need for disclosure of TPF arrangements in international arbitration.54 In fact, more than 75% of the respondents in the Queen Mary 2015 International Arbitration Survey were in favour of mandatory disclosure of the use of TPF. However, as in other topics related to TPF, there are no provisions on the issue in both national arbitration laws and international arbitration institutional rules. 28. While in the context of litigation some jurisdictions have rules requiring TPF to be disclosed, and some national courts have issued orders to this effect,55 the same cannot be said for arbitration. In fact, commentators have held that there are no generally accepted rules or practice in international arbitration requiring a party to disclose the existence of TPF.56 29. The recent amendments to the professional conduct rules for lawyers in Singapore and the (more recent) amendment to the Arbitration Ordinance in Hong Kong are an important exception to the above. In Singapore, the new provisions impose an obligation on practitioners to disclose to the court or tribunal and to all other parties in the proceedings the existence of a TPF agreement and the identity of the third-party funder.57 In Hong Kong, the new legislation requires funded parties to disclose to their counterparties and to the relevant court and tribunal the existence of a funding agreement and the name of the funder.58 30. From a different perspective, there is no agreement as to the authority of arbitral tribunals to order the disclosure of TPF arrangements. Except for the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, no other institutional rules have provisions dealing with the powers of tribunals to order the disclosure of TPF arrangements. Under the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, the arbitral tribunal is expressly empowered to order the disclosure of the existence of a TPF 54 55 56 57 58 See, for example, Scherer (n 4), Levy (n 51) pp.78-94, and William Stone, ‘Third Party Funding in International Arbitration: A Case for Mandatory Disclosure?’, [2015] (2) Asian Dispute Review pp. 62 – 70. Federal Court of Australia Practice Note CM 17, 2011; 2013 decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89. Similarly, Wall v the Royal Bank of Scotland plc 2016 EWHC 2460 (Comm). In the latter, the High Court based its order to disclose on CPR 25.14(2)(b), which does not explicitly allow disclosure of the identity of the third-party funder but permits courts to order security for costs against third parties. The court held that where it had the power to order a remedy it should also have the power to make the remedy effective through ancillary orders. It concluded that such power included orders requiring that the identity of the third-party funder be revealed. Levy (n 51) 78-79. The IBA has issued non-binding Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration which deal with the presence of a TPF at General Standard 6(b) and 7(a). Amended Singapore Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, Section 49A. New sections 98T and 98U of the Honk Kong Arbitration Ordinance. The new legislation carves out an exception from Hong Kong’s statutory arbitral confidentiality obligations for situations where a party is seeking funding for an arbitration. See Douglas Thomson, ‘Third-party funding gets all clear in Hong Kong, 14 June 2017, Global Arbitration Rev i e w ’ < h t t p : / / g l o b a l a r b i t r a t i o n r e v i e w . c o m / a r t i c l e / 1 1 4 2 8 7 9 / t h i r d - p a r t y - f u nding-gets-all-clear-in-hong-kong> accessed 24 July 2017. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 175 arrangement and/or the identity of the third-party funder.59 The arbitral tribunal may also order, where appropriate, disclosure of the funder’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings and whether the funder has committed to undertake adverse costs liability.60 31. Some tribunals or courts may find it necessary to issue orders to disclose the existence or even the identity of a third-party funder when deciding on applications for security for costs, an award on costs or even when deciding on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.61 2. Costs 32. One of the main areas where third party funding may become relevant to the arbitration proceedings is when it comes to the allocation of costs -both applications for security for costs and/or final orders on costs. In some jurisdictions courts can issue orders for costs against funders or include them in costs proceedings despite them not having signed the arbitration agreement.62 However, the possibility of ordering funders to pay security for costs raises controversy among commentators, some of which have stated that arbitral tribunals lack authority to issue such costs orders against third-party funders, as they are not a party to the arbitration agreement. They argue that the fact that funders have some involvement in the proceedings should not be construed as a manifestation of an agreement to arbitrate.63 Moreover, the sole presence of a funder should not be reason enough for granting security for costs.64 33. On the other hand, some authors suggest that where a claimant appears to be unable or unwilling to comply with an adverse costs decision and its claim is financed through TPF, there would be “exceptional circumstances” which may in principle lead to an order for security for costs.65 Arbitral tribunals have also used the manifest insolvency of a claimant as a basis to include funders in orders for security for costs.66 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 SIAC IA Rules, Rule 24.l SIAC IA Rules, Rule 24.l. See, for example, Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inºaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, Procedural Order No. 3, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6; South American Silver Limited (Bermuda) v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-15 (SAS v. Bolivia), Procedural Order No. 10 dated 11 January 2016, paragraph 79. For example, in England and Wales, courts consider that if a third-party funder has a relevant influence in the arbitral proceedings, it may include it in security for costs orders. See Shannon (n 10) 897. Brekoulakis (n 16), and Levy (n 51) 84. William Kirtley and Koralie Wietrzykowski, ‘Should an Arbitral Tribunal Order Security for Costs When an Impecunious Claimant Is Relying upon Third-Party Funding?’ (2013) 30(1) Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 29; and Brekoulakis (n 16). Nadia Darwazeh and Adrien Leleu, ‘Disclosure and Security for Costs or How to Address Imbalances Created by Third-Party Funding’ (2016) 33(2) Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 143. ICC Arbitration seated in Berne between X S.A.R.L., Lebanon (Claimant), and Y A.G., Germany, Procedural Order No. 3 of July 4, 2008, 28 ASA Bull 21 (2010). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 176 Costábile / Lynch 34. In the case of final allocations of costs, in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc67 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales confirmed a decision that ordered several funders to pay indemnity costs, and even held that, when it is just, orders for costs could be issued against parent companies of funders. A further recent development related to costs involving TPF is the England and Wales commercial court decision in Essar v Norscot. Here, the court held that the arbitral tribunal had the power to order the Respondent to pay the costs of the Claimant’s third party funder after a successful award. The court held that the amount owed to the funder was included under “other costs of the parties” as provided in section 59(1)(c) of the English Arbitration Act.68 35. In investment arbitration, the connection between the existence of a funding agreement and the apportioning of costs by the arbitral tribunal has been dealt with by both arbitral awards and institutional rules. In Sehil v. Turkmentistan,69 the tribunal ordered the disclosure of both the identity of the funder and of the nature of the funding arrangement based on an indication by the respondent that it would be applying for security for costs, although at that stage it was unclear whether the application would be based on the Claimants’ inability to pay the Respondent’s costs and/or the existence of a third-party funder.70 36. Rule 33.1 of the SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules empowers the Tribunal to consider any third-party funding arrangements in apportioning the costs of the arbitration. No other institutional rules include any such express power, although such power would arguably fall within the arbitral tribunal’s general discretion to apportion the costs of the arbitration between the parties.71 For example, one SCC tribunal has taken into account third-party funding arrangements in deciding the allocation of costs between the parties.72 37. Most likely, the law of the seat of arbitration will be applicable to orders for security for costs and final allocations of costs. In Essar v Norscot the courts of England and Wales confirmed an arbitral award issued in an ICC arbitration in London. The decision was challenged under section 68(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 on grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers. As discussed above, the court denied the challenge based in its interpretation of the provisions on costs of the English Arbitration Act. This is a good example of cases where tribunals will base their decisions on the interpretation given to national arbitration laws of the place of the arbitral seat, where no specific legal provisions granting arbitral tribunals powers to oblige third-party funders in orders for security for costs and/or final costs allocations exist. 67 68 69 70 71 72 [2016] EWCA Civ 1144. Essar Oilfields Services Ltd v Norscot Rig Management Pvt Ltd [2016] EWHC 2361 (Comm). Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inºaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, Procedural Order No. 3, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6. Ibid. at paragraphs 8-10. SCC Rules, Art. 49(6) empowers the arbitral tribunal, at the request of a party, to apportion the costs of the arbitration between the parties, having regard to the any other relevant circumstances of the case. Similarly, article 33.2 of the HKIAC Rules provides that “[t]he arbitral tribunal may apportion all or part of the costs of the arbitration… between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case”. Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. et al v. The Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration No. 24/2007, Award of 20 July 2012, para. 223. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 177 3. Independence and Impartiality of the Tribunal 38. A further procedural issue arises from arbitral tribunals’ obligations of independence and impartiality found in most arbitration laws.73 A tribunal’s impartiality or independence may be compromised with the presence of a third-party funder, as conflicts of interest between the arbitrator and the funder may arise. This may occur in several situations, such as when an arbitrator is appointed in other cases funded by the same funder, when the arbitrator has acted as counsel or expert in other proceedings funded by a particular funder or when an arbitrator is or has been a member of the advisory panel of a funder that selects potential investments.74 It is not unusual for arbitrators to act as counsel in particular cases and later as arbitrators in others,75 and therefore the possibilities of conflicts of interest arising from interactions with a funder increase significantly. 39. First, a tribunal may need to consider whether the disclosure of the presence of TPF arrangements is necessary to determine whether independence and impartiality is compromised, and whether it has the authority to do so. As mentioned above, despite some jurisdictions having rules that require TPF to be disclosed or that allow national courts to issue orders to such effect in litigation, there is no uniform standard for international arbitration. In some investment arbitration cases tribunals have ordered parties to disclose the identity of the funder to ensure the integrity of the process and to determine if any conflicts of interest arise from the existence of a third-party funder.76 The decisions in this area, however, are few and not fully reconcilable. 40. Second, the court deciding on the setting aside of the award due to alleged lack of impartiality and independence of the tribunal in connection to the presence of a third-party funder, would likely apply the law of the seat of arbitration. 77 Similarly, the law of the seat of arbitration would be applicable in the case of removal of arbitrators. Most national arbitration laws establish the standard of impartiality and independence for the removal of an arbitrator in arbitral proceedings seated in that jurisdiction.78 41. The lack of independence and impartiality of the tribunal due to the presence of a third-party funder may be used to oppose recognition and enforcement un- 73 74 75 76 77 78 Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 1761. A representative example of these broad requirements is article 12(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law which provides that: “An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties”. James Egerton Vernon, ‘Taming “Mercantile Adventurers”: Third Party Funding and Investment Arbitration – A Report from the 14th Annual ITA-ASIL Conference, 21 April 2014, Kluwer Arbitration Blog’, <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/04/21/taming-the-mercantile-adventurers-third-party-funding-and-investment-arbitration-a-report-from-the-14th-annual-ita-asil-conference> accessed 15 June 2017. Shannon (n 10) 888. Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inºaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, Procedural Order No. 3, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6 and South American Silver Limited v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, Procedural Order No. 10, PCA case No. 2013-15. Born International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 1824-1825. See UNCITRAL Model Law article 34. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 1824-1825. See UNCITRAL Model Law article 1(2), 12(2) and 13(3). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 178 Costábile / Lynch der Article V of the New York Convention. Opposition to enforcement may lead to different applicable laws, depending on what sub-paragraph of Article V is used as the legal grounds to support such application. First, under Article V(1)(b), where a tribunal’s partiality might be considered to deny a party the opportunity to present its case, it is generally understood that courts will need to apply an international standard of impartiality and independence. Second, under Article V(1)(d), if the arbitral tribunal was not constituted in accordance with the parties’ agreement, a court will need to consider either the law governing the arbitration agreement or the law of the seat of arbitration. Finally, if the exception in Article V(2)(b) is used on considerations of procedural public policy, courts will need to apply the law of the recognition and enforcement forum.79 4. Document Disclosure 42. Different jurisdictions also have conflicting approaches to lawyer-client-privilege, and in particular, to the client’s ability to waive this privilege.80 The presence of a third-party funder introduces an external element to the lawyer-client relationship and raises questions as to whether the documentation accessed by the third-party funder is covered by privilege and therefore exempt from requests for discovery of documents. These communications may be relevant for Respondents, and hence protection from discovery becomes a priority for Claimant’s lawyers and funders.81 43. Under English and Welsh law, the transfer of documents and communications between counsel and client to a third party will be considered a waiver of privilege, as the confidentiality of the documentation is lost. However, privilege may be protected by expressly stating that such transfer does not amount to a waiver of privilege and that the third party receiving such documentation is bound to keep its confidentiality. A third-party funder may also be considered to share a “common interest” of those documents and information, and hence to be covered by privilege.82 44. In the case of the United States, a jurisdiction with robust discovery principles, funders are wary of exposing their documents and communications to discovery.83 In the US at least one court has held that a request for discovery of documents may be granted in connection with documents provided to potential third-party funders. This decision considered that transfer of documents to the potential third-party funder was a waiver of legal and work-product privileges.84 45. On the other hand, in civil law countries such as France, lawyers are subject to professional secrecy, under which they cannot disclose information obtained from the client. However, the client may disclose this information as he wishes. Hence, the information held by the client and a third-party funder may be required 79 80 81 82 83 84 Ibid. 3594-3595. For example, in many common-law jurisdictions a client may waive its privilege, while in some civil law jurisdictions said privilege is considered an issue of professional secrecy which escapes from a client’s scope of autonomy. Stone (n 64) 64. Meriam Alrashid, Jane Wessel and John Laird, ‘Impact of Third Party Funding on Privilege in Litigation and International Arbitration’ (2012) 6(2) Dispute Resolution International, pp. 108. Stone (n 64) 64. Leader Technologies, Inc v Facebook, Inc, 719 F Supp 2d 373. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 179 to be disclosed in legal proceedings.85 It is important to bear in mind that discovery of documents and extensive document production is not customary in civil law jurisdictions. 86 This naturally reduces the amount of attention given to the issue of confidentiality and privilege in these jurisdictions. 46. As in the case of other issues discussed above, in the context of international arbitration there is no uniform standard regarding document disclosure. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law allows the parties freedom to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal, which may include rules on document disclosure. Failing such agreement, the Model Law confers considerable discretion to the tribunal in the determination of rules of evidence.87 Given this discretion, and the fact that there may be several potentially applicable laws, the arbitral tribunal will need to engage in a choice-of-law analysis. The potentially applicable laws include the law of the arbitral seat or the law selected by the parties to govern the substance of the dispute or the arbitration agreement. The tribunal may also consider the law of the place where discovery is sought, the law of the place where counsel is qualified or the law of the domicile of the party claiming privilege. The latter may be considered with the objective of applying the law with the closest connection to the dispute and, in particular, to the expectations of the parties.88 It is very unlikely that a tribunal would consider the law chosen to govern the TPF arrangement between the party to the arbitration and its respective funder to determine issues of document disclosure. 47. In all, it is likely that the tribunal will consider the public policy rationale on which laws on professional secrecy or privilege are based with the objective of issuing an enforceable award.89 Again, there is a chance that a party may attempt to set aside an award at the place of the arbitration or to deny enforcement in another forum based on due process or public policy considerations as addressed above. However, some commentators have held that it is unlikely that national courts will find that the presence of a third-party funder in an international arbitration violates public policy solely because lawyers have breached their professional duties.90 85 86 87 88 89 90 Alrashid (n 95) 116. Ibid. 101-130. UNCITRAL Model Law Article 19(2) “…The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.” Alrashid (n 95) 126-127 Ibid. 126-127. Levy (n 51) 81. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 180 Costábile / Lynch C. Ethical Issues 48. One of the most important concerns that arise from the presence of a third-party funder is the difficulty for tribunals and courts to supervise their conduct. Funders do not owe the same ethical duties as counsels. While the funders are generally not bound by ethical rules and may bypass rules on abuse of process, counsel are subject to professional conduct rules, which, as will be discussed below, may be those of their home countries, or those of the seat of arbitration.91 These national laws or professional conduct rules usually regulate issues related to conflicts of interest, confidentiality and fees, among others.92 49. One of the more pressing ethical issues that must be considered in the presence of a third-party funder in relation to counsel is the potential influence that may lead to a breach of a party’s counsel professional conduct obligations. This may occur, for example, when as per the funding agreement, the funder must approve settlement agreements. Counsel may propose an agreement based on its client’s interests in compliance with its professional conduct duties, but such a deal may not be in line with the funder’s interests and therefore not approved.93 In these cases, it could be argued that counsel could potentially breach its ethical obligation by opting for the funders interests rather than those of its client, particularly as it is the former who will pay its fees. 50. Ethical issues such as the conflict of interest described above should also be addressed in consideration of potentially conflicting applicable laws or rules. Counsel may be subject both to their home professional conduct laws or ethical rules as well as to those of the seat of arbitration. It is important to identify these conflicts to avoid issues of inequity and unfairness in the arbitral procedure that may arise when counsel to one party is bound to more flexible conduct rules than counsel to the other.94 51. The underlying problem in the case of ethical issues is the lack of clarity as to whether counsel is subject to the law of his home country or to the law of the arbitral seat.95 As stated by Catherine Rogers, “[i]nternational arbitration dwells in an ethical no-man’s land. Often by design, arbitration is set in a jurisdiction where neither party’s counsel is licensed. The extraterritorial effect of national ethical codes is usually murky, as is the application of national ethical rules in a nonjudicial forum such as arbitration… [w]here ethical regulation should be, there is only an abyss.”96 As seen above, the presence of a third-party funder creates greater risk of breaching professional conduct rules. This uncertain scenario results in that, to obtain any degree of certainty, the applicable law to ethical issues in international arbitration will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the particular provisions of the potentially applicable rules. 91 92 93 94 95 96 Valentina Frignati, ‘Ethical implications of third-party funding in international arbitration’ [2016] (32) Arbitration International, pp. 511-512. Shannon (n 10) 888. Ibid. 905-906. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (n 42) 2856. Ibid. 2871 et seq. Catherine A. Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration’, (2002) 23(2) Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 342-341. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 ARBITRATIONS INVOLVINGTHIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS 181 IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 52. The use of TPF as a mechanism to finance disputes has had important effects on litigation and international arbitration. It has taken some common law countries to revise and relax their traditional restrictions to maintenance and champerty; it has led to legislative amendments and to the creation of non-binding guidelines; it has been addressed by arbitral tribunals and national courts; and it is slowly being incorporated into arbitration rules. Whether it is seen as an advantageous mechanism which can level the playing field for claimants and defendants who could have not had access to justice otherwise, or as a figure that allows the proliferation of speculative claims, its increasing presence in international arbitration is undeniable. 53. Yet, many issues regarding TPF in international arbitration remain uncertain. It is therefore crucial for funders and parties entering into funding arrangements to know the risks to which they would be exposed depending on the issue at stake and the potential applicable law to such issue. To this effect, funders and funded parties may have to revise the approach of several legal systems that may come into play in an international arbitration, the restrictions or prohibition of other similar figures, and even the rationale behind such legislation. Although daunting, anticipating the choice-of-law analysis which an arbitral tribunal or a national court may be forced to apply will allow funded parties and funders to select the more appropriate funding mechanism for a specific dispute and the precise terms of the funding agreement. Doing so is the only effective way to reduce the risk of undesired regulation and unexpected outcomes. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL: ASUNTOS QUE MERECEN UNA TEMPRANA AUDIENCIA Jennifer L. Permesly, Diego Guevara y Pilar Prados Puchades1 Abstract: This article reviews and comments on the current approach in international arbitration to the issues of burden of proof, standard of proof, and admissibility of evidence. The authors examine how current arbitral rules, practices, and procedures address proof and evidentiary issues. They then explore how the procedural “flexibility” inherent in international arbitration may lead to a reduction in the rigor and attention used by tribunals when approaching these issues. Finally, the article suggests ways in which arbitrators, counsel, and parties might maintain procedural flexibility while placing increased emphasis on those proof and evidentiary issues that may have a critical effect on the outcome of an arbitration. I. Introducción La resolución de cualquier disputa depende de una cuestión fundamental: si la parte que sostiene determinada pretensión ha cumplido con su “carga de la prueba” en relación a su pretensión. Lograr este objetivo requiere que la parte haya presentado pruebas suficientes y de suficiente credibilidad como para convencer al tribunal. En principio, si no lo ha logrado, la parte no podrá salir vencedora en el proceso. Considerando la importancia de este elemento, es curioso que este tema no sea casi nunca discutido en el arbitraje internacional. En el Congreso del Consejo Internacional para el Arbitraje Comercial (ICCA, por sus siglas en inglés) celebrado en Miami en 2014 se realizó una encuesta entre profesionales que habían actuado como abogados o árbitros en arbitrajes internacionales. Los resultados de esta encuesta mostraron que quienes trabajan en arbitraje “frecuentemente consideraban temas vinculados a la carga de la prueba como determinantes” en los arbitrajes.2 Este mismo grupo de personas indicó que los tribunales arbitrales “sólo ocasionalmente” definían estos estándares con antelación.3 Parece ser que, aunque los temas rela- 1 2 3 Jennifer es counsel en la oficina de Nueva York de Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP. Diego es socio de Walsh Guevara LLP. Pilar es abogada de la firma de abogados española Cuatrecasas. Todos se especializan en arbitraje internacional con énfasis en Latinoamérica. Los autores agradecen a los asociados de Chaffetz Lindsey Justinian Doreste y Farrell Brody su excelente trabajo finalizando los borradores de este capítulo. Las opiniones expresadas en este capítulo pertenecen exclusivamente a sus autores y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de sus bufetes o los clientes que representan. Franck, Susan D.: “Precision and Legitimacy in International Arbitration: Empirical Insights from ICCA”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 10 de septiembre de 2014, disponible en http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/ 2014/09/10/precision-and-legitimacy-in-international-arbitration-empirical-insights-from-icca/ (presentando los resultados preliminares de la encuesta) (traducción del autor) (énfasis añadido). Específicamente, la respuesta más común, dada por el 34,9% de los entrevistados, fue que los temas relacionados con la carga de la prueba eran “frecuentemente” determinantes en el caso. La segunda respuesta más común, representando el 31,8% de las respuestas, fue que estos temas eran “algunas veces” determinantes. Franck, Susan D., Freda, James, et al.: “International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision and Justice”, en Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 2015, p. 63 (presentando los resultados de la encuesta con mayor detalle). [Franck et al.: “Demographics, Precision and Justice”] Ver Frank: “Precision and Legitimacy” (traducción del autor). Los porcentajes específicos fueron que el 36,9% de los participantes expresaron que “ocasionalmente” los tribunales enunciaban la carga de la prueba. Y, el 25,8% de los participantes expresó que los tribunales “nunca” comunicaban la carga de la prueba. Franck et al.: “Demographics, Precision and Justice”, p. 63. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 184 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades cionados con la carga de la prueba son de gran importancia, no están siendo comunicados o discutidos en un típico arbitraje internacional. En muchos sistemas legales nacionales, la presentación y evaluación de la prueba se guía por cuidadosas y a menudo exhaustivas reglas sobre la carga de la prueba y su admisibilidad. En contraste, la postura predominante en el arbitraje internacional es que las reglas de procedimiento en materia de prueba tienen poca relevancia, y que el tribunal debería rechazar los estándares aplicables en los procedimientos locales en favor de un flexible y maleable procedimiento arbitral. Subrayando esta tendencia hacia la flexibilidad surge la idea de que los árbitros deben ser considerados como diestros y experimentados defensores de “la búsqueda de la verdad,” y en consecuencia debería permitírseles considerar toda prueba presentada ante él y simplemente aplicar su “sana crítica” para determinar la correcta solución del caso. Con estos principios rectores en mente, un arbitraje habitualmente comienza con el tribunal y las partes trabajando conjuntamente para desarrollar procedimientos que regularán la exhibición de documentos, la declaración de los testigos y la presentación de la prueba documental. Sin embargo, los árbitros y las partes tienden a pasar por alto ciertos asuntos relacionados con éstos, aunque más abstractos, como la tasación de la prueba o los estándares que el tribunal va a aplicar para determinar la credibilidad que aporta un documento u otro elemento probatorio, salvo que éstos se conviertan en la base de una controversia. Tales disputas pueden surgir en la fase de exhibición de documentos, pero sucede frecuentemente que el verdadero debate sobre la suficiencia y credibilidad de la prueba no se aborde hasta la audiencia misma, una vez que todas las pruebas han sido ya presentadas por las partes e incluidas en el expediente del caso. ¿Tiene efecto este modelo de flexibilidad en los resultados del arbitraje? Sabemos que los estándares que regulan la carga de la prueba y la admisibilidad de evidencia pueden ser muy diferentes en distintos países. Además, está desarrollándose una creciente corriente doctrinal en torno a la influencia que ejerce el subconsciente de los árbitros. Esta línea de pensamiento destaca una tendencia a basarse inconsciente e involuntariamente en evidencias que deben ser excluidas del expediente del arbitraje. Sin reglas claras o principios rectores para guiar a los árbitros y a las partes, ¿podemos prevenir esas inclinaciones de una manera coherente? En este artículo, tratamos de revisar y resumir los procedimientos y prácticas existentes en el arbitraje internacional relacionadas con: (i) la carga de la prueba; (ii) el estándar probatorio; y (iii) la admisibilidad de la prueba. Para hacerlo, evaluamos si los actuales y flexibles modelos de carga y estándar de la prueba en el arbitraje son suficientes, o si una mayor claridad mejoraría el proceso de toma de decisiones. Nuestra tesis es esta última y sostenemos que puede resultar valioso tratar los asuntos relacionados con la prueba entre los árbitros y las partes en las primeras etapas del arbitraje, no sólo para equiparar las posibilidades de las partes y fomentar la integridad e imparcialidad del proceso, sino también para, en última instancia, velar por la eficacia del laudo arbitral y protegerlo de eventuales impugnaciones. Al centrar la discusión en estos puntos concretos, consideramos que la flexibilidad característica del arbitraje queda preservada, y a su vez se promueve la claridad y fiabilidad del proceso arbitral.4 4 En este respecto, las recomendaciones de este capítulo están en línea con las recomendaciones de otros comentaristas que buscan que el tribunal arbitral tenga mayor comunicación con las partes al inicio del arbitraje sobre el caso, incluyendo los méritos de la disputa, a fin de minimizar las sorpresas y entender mejor qué tipo de información el panel arbitral considera importante. Ver, por ejemplo, Kaplan, Neil: “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Change It”, en 80 Arbitration, Issue 2, 2014, p. 174 (proponiendo una audiencia formal después de la primera ronda de alegatos); Partasides, Constantine y Vesel, Scott: “Una Audiencia de Revisión del Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 185 II. La carga de la prueba La carga de la prueba se puede definir como la obligación de comprobar la veracidad de los hechos que fundamentan una determinada pretensión o defensa.5 El término “carga de la prueba” a menudo se usa de forma genérica para referirse a dos conceptos distintos: (i) a quién incumbe convencer al juez de determinado supuesto, lo cual es tratado en esta sección I, y (ii) qué tipo de prueba o qué cantidad es necesaria para establecer la convicción suficiente. En este capítulo, nos referimos al segundo concepto como el “estándar de la prueba” o “estándar probatorio”, el cual abordaremos en la sección III. Tanto en la tradición del derecho civil como en la del derecho anglosajón, rige el principio general que la parte que afirma un supuesto tiene la obligación de persuadir al juez sobre la veracidad del mismo.6 Si no logra hacerlo, el supuesto se desconsidera y cualquier principio legal que se funde en aquel supuesto será necesariamente desestimado. Este precepto es conocido en muchos países por su fórmula latina onus probandi est qui dixit, o sea, “la carga de la prueba recae sobre el que afirma”, y tiene una aceptación prácticamente universal. Tal vez a causa de la universalidad del principio, son escasos los reglamentos de las instituciones arbitrales internacionales que mencionan explícitamente este concepto. Un ejemplo donde sí aparece es el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional (“CNUDMI”). En su artículo 27.1 se establece que, “cada parte deberá asumir la carga de la prueba de los hechos en que se base para fundar sus acciones o defensas.”7 Las Reglas Sobre Práctica de Prueba en el Arbitraje Internacional de la International Bar Association, o IBA (en adelante “Reglas de la IBA”),8 no especifican a quién corresponde la carga de la prueba, pero en el texto que recoge los comentarios ofi- 5 6 7 8 Caso, o el Arbitraje en dos actos”, Boletín del Centro de Arbitraje de la Industria de la Construcción, junio de 2015, disponible en http://www.caic.com.mx/boletines%202015.html. Ver, por ejemplo, Smith, Jennifer y Nadeau-Séguin, Sara: “The Illusive Standard of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration”, en Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 2015, p. 134. [Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”] (explicando que está bien establecido que en el arbitraje internacional cada parte tiene la carga de probar los hechos que apoya su pretensión o defensa). Ver, por ejemplo, 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review Subcommittee, Commentary on the revised text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, 2010, p. 6. En forma similar, el Reglamento de Arbitraje Institucional del Centro de Arbitraje Internacional de Hong Kong (HKIAC, por sus siglas en inglés) dispone que, “[c]ada parte tendrá la carga de probar aquellos hechos en los que apoye su reclamación o defensa.” HKIAC, Reglamento de Arbitraje Institucional, Art. 22.1. La versión del año 2010 del Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional del Centro Internacional para la Resolución de Disputas (“CIRD”) tiene una provisión prácticamente igual a la del HKIAC. CIRD, Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional, 2010, Art. 19.1 (“[c]ada parte tendrá la carga de probar los hechos en los cuales funde su demanda o escrito de contestación.”). Tal vez reflejando la naturaleza aceptada de este principio, el Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional del CIRD publicado en el año 2014, no contiene la misma provisión. Ver CIRD, Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional, 2014, Artículos 20 y 21. Las Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba son una revisión de las Reglas de la IBA sobre Práctica de Prueba en el Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, publicadas en 1999. Asimismo, estas últimas reglas fueron precedidas por las Reglas Suplementarias de la IBA que Regulan la Presentación y Recepción de Prueba en el Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, emitidas en 1983. Ver IBA, Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, p. 2 (prólogo). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 186 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades ciales que acompañan estas reglas encontramos la siguiente declaración9: “Las Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba empiezan con el principio de que cada parte deberá presentar los documentos de que disponga y en los cuales quiere apoyar sus pretensiones. Esta disposición refleja el principio, generalmente aceptado tanto en los países de derecho civil como de derecho anglosajón, que las partes tienen la carga de presentar la evidencia que apoya su caso.”10 Si bien puede parecer demasiado obvio lo anterior, deja abierta la pregunta de cómo una parte que quiere sostener su carga de prueba en el arbitraje internacional puede hacerlo. En los tribunales nacionales de las jurisdicciones de derecho anglosajón, una parte puede iniciar una demanda confiando en el procedimiento de “discovery” (o exhibición de documentos) para buscar las pruebas que puedan respaldar su pretensión; de ese modo está cumpliendo con su obligación de la carga de prueba. En los tribunales nacionales de las jurisdicciones de derecho civil, el juez actúa como inquisidor, y puede insistir en la puesta a disposición de informaciones para desarrollar el relato de los hechos y determinar si la carga puede ser, o no, satisfecha. Estas dos opciones parecen significativamente más limitadas en el arbitraje internacional. Nunca había existido una sugerencia seria acerca de que las limitaciones clásicas en “discovery" o en la examinación por el tribunal sean bastante significativas para perjudicar a las partes en la formación de su caso o para afectar al tribunal en su búsqueda de la verdad. De todas maneras, vale la pena considerar si los mecanismos actualmente vigentes en el arbitraje para recopilar y evaluar la evidencia son suficientes para permitir a las partes satisfacer su carga de prueba. En esta sección, discutiremos en primer lugar las limitaciones que existen para obtener documentos de las partes reticentes o de terceros con información relevante, y luego exploraremos el uso de las inferencias adversas como una oposición a estas limitaciones. A. Limitaciones a la exhibición de los documentos en el arbitraje internacional11 El mecanismo más claro para satisfacer la carga de prueba reside en la presentación de los propios documentos y testigos. Pero esto no es siempre suficiente: el in- 9 10 11 Se puede constatar en otras reglas la aceptación implícita del principio antes mencionado. Por ejemplo, el Artículo 26(2) del Reglamento de Arbitraje del Instituto de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Estocolmo dice que, “[e]l Tribunal Arbitral podrá ordenar a una parte que identifique la evidencia documental que pretende usar y que especifique las circunstancias que pretenden ser probadas por esta evidencia.” (Traducción del autor) (“The Arbitral Tribunal may order a party to identify the documentary evidence it intends to rely on and specify the circumstances intended to be proved by such evidence.”); CIADI, Reglas de Arbitraje, Regla 33 (“. . . cada parte . . . dará al Secretario General, para su transmisión al Tribunal y a la otra parte, información precisa con respecto a la prueba que se propone presentar . . . juntamente con una indicación de los asuntos sobre los cuales versará dicha prueba.”); CCI, Reglamento de Arbitraje, Art. 4.3 (“La Solicitud deberá contener . . . c) una descripción de la naturaleza y circunstancias de la controversia que ha dado origen a las demandas y los fundamentos sobre la base de los cuales las demandas han sido formuladas; . . . La demandante podrá presentar con la Solicitud cualquier documento o información que considere apropiado o que pueda contribuir a la resolución eficiente de la controversia.”). Commentary on the revised text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, p. 6 (traducción del autor) (énfasis añadido). Emulando las Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, usamos el vocablo “exhibición” para referirnos al proceso a través del cual las partes solicitan y proveen evidencia documental entre sí. Ver Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, Definiciones (“Solicitud de Exhibición de Documentos’ significa la petición por escrito de una Parte para que otra Parte exhiba Documentos”) (énfasis en la fuente). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 187 tercambio de los documentos disponibles de la parte opuesta y las repreguntas a los testigos de la contraparte también pueden ser vitales para probar el caso. La mayoría de las reglas de las instituciones arbitrales proporcionan mecanismos a través de los cuales una parte puede exigir documentos de la parte contraria.12 Además, las Reglas de la IBA sirven como una guía que las partes pueden adoptar en su arbitraje. Estas instrucciones buscan cerrar la brecha entre los enfoques de derecho civil y derecho anglosajón en relación al tratamiento de algunas cuestiones probatorias, así como buscan orientar al tribunal arbitral sobre asuntos tales como la exhibición de documentos y la admisibilidad de testimonios o sobre documentos protegidos por algún privilegio legal. Las Reglas de la IBA establecen que “dentro del plazo fijado por el Tribunal Arbitral, cualquier Parte podrá presentar al Tribunal Arbitral y a las otras Partes una Solicitud de Exhibición de Documentos”13 y definen los elementos que esta solicitud deberá contener.14 Las Reglas son explícitas en cuanto a que las partes tienen que pedir una “concreta y específica categoría de Documentos requeridos que razonablemente se crea que existen"; y que también necesitan sustentar esta solicitud con “una declaración de por qué los documentos requeridos son relevantes para el caso y sustanciales para su resolución” así como con “una declaración sobre las razones por las cuales la parte solicitante supone que los documentos requeridos están en poder, custodia o control de otra parte.”15 En la práctica, se aplican estas reglas limitando el alcance de la exhibición de documentos. Por ejemplo, considera el enfoque de Yves Derains, quien sugiere que la parte que pida documentos de la contraparte debe tener la carga de la prueba acerca de esos mismos documentos. En otras palabras, cuando una parte no tiene la carga de la prueba en relación a la cual pide los documentos, el tribunal tiene la libertad de denegar el pedido. Esto podría ser necesario, según Derains, para evitar una “avalancha” de documentos en los procedimientos arbitrales.16 Existen también ciertas limitaciones en el poder de los tribunales arbitrales para obtener documentos y otras pruebas de partes reticentes y terceros. En los tribunales nacionales, el tribunal normalmente tiene acceso a medidas coercitivas para obligar a actuar a la parte reacia a cumplir con sus deberes de exhibición de documentos (calificando el comportamiento de una parte como desacato e imponiendo sanciones). La parte también puede pedir el auxilio del tribunal doméstico para ob- 12 13 14 15 16 El Reglamento de Arbitraje del CIRD, por ejemplo, declara que “[e]l tribunal podrá ordenar a una parte que ponga a disposición, previa petición a tal efecto, documentos que estén en su poder, siempre que la parte solicitante no tuviera acceso a esos documentos … y sean relevantes y sustanciales para la resolución del caso.” CIRD, Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional, 2014, Art. 21.4. De un modo menos específico, el Artículo 27.3 del Reglamento de Arbitraje de la CNUDMI dispone que, “[e]n cualquier momento de las actuaciones, el tribunal arbitral podrá exigir, dentro del plazo que determine, que las partes presenten documentos u otras pruebas.” De manera similar, el Reglamento de Arbitraje del CCI establece que, “[e]n todo momento durante el proceso arbitral, el tribunal arbitral podrá requerir a cualquiera de las partes para que aporte pruebas adicionales.” CCI, Reglamento de Arbitraje, Art. 25.5. Disposiciones similares también se pueden ver en CIADI, Reglas de Arbitraje, Regla 34(2) y HKIAC, Reglamento de Arbitraje Institucional, Art. 22.3. IBA, Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, Art. 3.2. IBA, Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, Art. 3.3. IBA, Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, Art. 3.3. Ver Jaffe, Dulani y Stute: “Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite to Document Production Under the 2010 IBA Rules: An Obituary” p. 1-2. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 188 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades tener la citación de terceros para que éstos produzcan ciertos documentos que están en su poder. Asimismo, una parte puede solicitar al tribunal que ordene la comparecencia en audiencia de un testigo ajeno al proceso, para que se le pueda examinar y comprobar su conocimiento, exactitud y credibilidad de los hechos que relata. Este tipo de medidas coercitivas son más difíciles de obtener en el arbitraje internacional. En la mayoría de los casos, aun cuando un tribunal arbitral ordene a una parte cumplir con una petición de revelación, sus órdenes no cuentan con el mismo nivel coercitivo que un tribunal doméstico en derecho anglosajón, donde, por ejemplo, una parte podría tener que pagar una multa importante al no cumplir con las órdenes del tribunal.17 Obtener información es aún más difícil cuando la misma está en poder de terceros no involucrados en el arbitraje. Las Reglas de la IBA comprenden inclusive los procedimientos a seguir cuando una parte busca documentos que están en poder de terceros, pero resulta claro que el tribunal sólo puede adoptar medidas que estén “legalmente disponibles”, las cuales son, en la práctica, muy limitadas.18 Es cierto que algunos países tienen leyes que permiten a los árbitros ordenar la comparecencia de un testigo o la exhibición de documentos en el procedimiento arbitral. La interpretación de esas leyes suscita un gran debate y no siempre conduce a la obtención de los documentos que la parte o el árbitro solicita.19 Del mismo modo, también es cierto que algunos tribunales nacionales, incluyendo los de los Estados Unidos, aplican leyes que permiten asistir a un tribunal arbitral o a una parte de un arbitraje en la obtención de pruebas de partes o de otras fuentes sujetas a la jurisdicción del tribunal nacional.20 Sin embargo, estos procedimientos suelen ser costosos para las partes, y no hay garantías de que el tribunal efectivamente conceda la petición. 17 18 19 20 Ver generalmente los comentarios de Carolyn Lamm en el Congreso de ICCA 2014, discutido en Trevino, Clovis, “ICCA 2014: Pleading and Proof of Fraud and Comparable Forms of Abuse”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 17 de abril de 2014, disponible en http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/17/icca-2014-pleading-and-proof-of-fraud-and-comparable-forms-of-abuse/. IBA, Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, Art. 3.9 (“Si una de las Partes desea que se exhiban Documentos de una persona u organización que no sea parte del arbitraje y respecto de la cual la Parte no pueda obtener los Documentos por sí misma, tal Parte podrá solicitar, dentro del plazo fijado por el Tribunal Arbitral, que se tomen cualesquiera medidas legalmente disponibles para obtener los Documentos requeridos, o pedir permiso al Tribunal Arbitral para adoptar tales medidas por sí misma.”). Por ejemplo, la Sección 7 de la Ley Federal de Arbitraje de los EE.UU., provee que los árbitros “podrán convocar por escrito a cualquier persona a que se presente en frente de ellos, o cualquiera de ellos, como testigo, y que en el caso apropiado traiga consigo cualquier libro, registro, documento o papel, que pueda ser determinado como evidencia pertinente en el caso.” 9 U.S.C. § 7 (traducción del autor). Aun así, los tribunales en los EE.UU. están divididos sobre si esta normativa permite órdenes sobre la exhibición de documentos antes de la audiencia arbitral; tema que actualmente no está resuelto. En los EE.UU., una ley federal, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, le permite a un tribunal federal ordenar la exhibición de documentos que van a ser usados en conexión con procesos internacionales, pero los tribunales en los EE.UU. están divididos sobre si esta ley puede ser usada para la asistencia de procedimientos de arbitraje comercial internacional. Por consiguiente, no está para nada claro que las solicitudes hechas bajo esta ley serán otorgadas por el tribunal federal. Para más información sobre la ley 28 U.S.C. § 1782, ver Committee on International Commercial Disputes, New York City Bar Association, “28 U.S.C. §1782 as a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International Commercial Arbitration – Applicability and Best Practices”, 2009, disponible en www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/1782_Report.pdf. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE B. 189 La “inferencia adversa” como opción alternativa Aunque la disponibilidad de medidas para obtener pruebas que respalden la carga de la prueba sea, de algún modo, limitada en arbitraje internacional, una parte que soporta la carga de la prueba pero no puede obtener los documentos que necesita tiene al menos un potente remedio a su disposición: la inferencia adversa. Los árbitros internacionales tienen en la mayoría de los casos el poder de utilizar una inferencia adversa en contra de la parte que no ha acatado sus órdenes.21 Una inferencia adversa se asemeja a la inversión de la carga de la prueba, y habitualmente surge cuando una parte es requerida para revelar documentos pero se niega a hacerlo sin una excusa razonable.22 Bajo esta premisa, el tribunal arbitral está facultado a inferir que la parte tiene algo que ocultar y por ello se permite aplicar una presunción en contra de la parte rebelde. En un ejemplo clásico, el árbitro puede suponer que los hechos se han ocultado porque serían desfavorables a la parte que se ha negado a producir los documentos que los constatan. En un escenario más extremo, en función del tipo e importancia de los documentos perseguidos, el tribunal puede hasta descalificar otras pruebas facilitadas por la parte rebelde como consecuencia de su negativa a facilitar la documentación. Las inferencias adversas tienen gran trascendencia en el arbitraje internacional porque pueden asegurar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de revelación, en consecuencia, fortalecer la eficacia y la justicia del arbitraje internacional.23 No obstante, algunos han puesto en duda si es prudente usar las inferencias adversas para satisfacer algunos elementos de la carga de la prueba que corresponde a la parte no rebelde. La preocupación reside en que, en un caso extremo, la parte sin pruebas ni argumentos vencedores propios pueda aun así iniciar un arbitraje contemplando solicitar documentos probatorios de la contraparte y, ante la reticencia (o incapacidad) de la contraparte, convencer al tribunal de que se pronuncie a su favor en cualquier caso sobre la base de las inferencias adversas. Este problema lo abordó extensamente Jeremy Sharpe en su artículo “Drawing Adverse Inferences from the Non-production of Evidence.”24 En el artículo, Sharpe plantea que un tribunal puede, en algunas ocasiones, utilizar inferencias adversas de forma que una parte pueda satisfacer legítimamente su carga de prueba, pero sólo bajo ciertas condiciones. Sharpe sugiere que los tribunales emprendan un riguroso “test” antes de otorgar una inferencia adversa.25 Dos elementos de este test caben ser recalcados. El primero es que la parte que solicita la inferencia adversa debe mostrar indicios razonables de su reclamo. El segundo es que la parte que solicita la inferencia adversa debe aportar “toda la prueba disponible que corrobore la infe- 21 22 23 24 25 Por ejemplo el Artículo 9.5 de las Reglas de la IBA sobre la Prueba, establece que “[s]i una Parte no suministrare, sin explicación satisfactoria, un Documento requerido en una Solicitud de Exhibición de Documentos que ella no hubiera objetado en debido tiempo o no presentara un Documento que el Tribunal Arbitral hubiera ordenado aportar, el Tribunal Arbitral podrá inferir que ese Documento es contrario a los intereses de esa Parte.” Ver Born, Gary B.: International Commercial Arbitration (2a ed.), Kluwer Law International, 2014, § 16.02, pp. 2391-93. (resumiendo el uso de inferencias adversas en el arbitraje internacional). [Born: International Commercial Arbitration]. Ver Sharpe, Jeremy K.: “Drawing Adverse Inferences from the Non-production of Evidence”, en Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, p. 550. Id. p. 549. Id. p. 551. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 190 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades rencia buscada.”26 Estos criterios procuran garantizar que la parte que solicita la inferencia adversa mantenga, hasta cierto punto, su obligación de satisfacer su carga de la prueba. En conclusión, aunque existen ciertas limitaciones en la forma de obtener documentos necesarios en el arbitraje internacional, los árbitros tienen el mecanismo de la inferencia adversa que sirve para contrarrestar los intereses. Si se maneja de manera meticulosa y rigurosa, la inferencia adversa seguirá siendo el mecanismo preferido de los tribunales arbitrales para balancear dos objetivos contrapuestos: (i) promover el intercambio de documentos que puedan ser necesarios para cumplir con la carga de la prueba de una parte y (ii) al mismo tiempo asegurar que la parte con la carga de la prueba no abuse del proceso de exhibición. III. El estándar probatorio Aunque hay una aceptación prácticamente universal del principio que establece que la parte que inicia un reclamo o defensa soporta la carga de probar ese reclamo o defensa, no existe un consenso general sobre qué estándar de prueba debe cumplir esa parte para vencer en su reclamo o defensa. El estándar probatorio se puede definir como el grado de convicción que tiene que formarse en la mente de la persona encargada de decidir la existencia de un hecho para que éste estime como verdadero el hecho fundado en determinada prueba.27 Cuanto más elevado sea el estándar probatorio, más difícil será para una parte probar un hecho, pero con más seguridad estará la persona encargada de la decisión acerca de la existencia del hecho alegado.28 El estándar probatorio suscita poca atención en el arbitraje internacional. Las reglas de las instituciones arbitrales usualmente no abordan el problema,29 y los árbitros raramente requieren a las partes incluir una discusión sobre el estándar de prueba aplicable en sus escritos. Asimismo es raro que el tribunal trate el tema del estándar de la prueba en una orden procesal inicial.30 La cuestión acerca de si la prueba presentada era suficiente para probar un reclamo o defensa es, a menudo, discutida únicamente cuando los árbitros están en la fase de discusión del laudo, y, aún en este punto, puede no escogerse explícitamente un estándar o mencionarlo siquiera en el laudo arbitral. Los tribunales que han tratado el estándar de la prueba no suelen explicar qué estándar están utilizando, o cómo van a evaluar la prueba que les ha sido presentada al tribunal. Por ejemplo, un ex presidente del Tribunal de Reclamos de 26 27 28 29 30 Id. Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, p. 135. Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, p. 175 (explicando que en los países que siguen el derecho anglosajón el estándar probatorio refleja una determinación sobre los distintos costos derivados de que el tribunal erre en su determinación). Por ejemplo, el Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional del CIRD en su artículo 20.6 establece que, “[e]l tribunal decidirá sobre la admisibilidad, relevancia, materialidad, e importancia de las pruebas.” Al igual, el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la CNUDMI reza en su artículo 27.4, “[e]l tribunal arbitral determinará la admisibilidad, la pertinencia y la importancia de las pruebas presentadas.” Además la Ley Modelo de la CNUDMI sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, adoptado por lo menos en 50 países, en su artículo 19.2 dispone que “[a] falta de acuerdo, el tribunal arbitral podrá . . . dirigir el arbitraje del modo que considere apropiado. Esta facultad conferida al tribunal arbitral incluye la de determinar la admisibilidad, pertinencia y el valor de las pruebas.” Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, p. 134. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 191 EE.UU.-Irán resumió así la carga de la prueba aplicada en arbitraje internacional: “La carga de la prueba es convencerme.”31 Pero en un arbitraje internacional el tribunal puede estar compuesto por integrantes de diferentes tradiciones legales, y los abogados y las partes involucrados en el arbitraje pueden ser a su vez de otras tradiciones legales. La cuestión es, entonces, determinar si aquello que podría convencer a un árbitro es suficiente para convencer a otro. En el derecho anglosajón el estándar de la prueba más aceptado es el de la “preponderancia de la prueba”.32 Bajo este estándar el juez o jurado se tiene que dar por convencido de que la prueba aducida permite creer que para cada hecho determinado, es más probable que sea veraz que lo contrario. Este estándar se conoce también como “el balance de las probabilidades”.33 Si la balanza se inclina a favor de la parte que tiene la carga de la prueba, la carga se tiene por satisfecha. El estándar de prueba en los países con sistemas de derecho civil incorpora elementos más subjetivos que se expresan en términos no-probabilísticos.34 En Francia, por ejemplo, el estándar que se aplica es la “íntima convicción” del juez (“l’intime conviction du juge”).35 Esta formulación subraya la calidad subjetiva – “íntima” – del estándar, donde el énfasis está puesto en la persuasión del juez en cuestión.36 En Alemania se aplica un estándar que se conoce como la “valoración libre” de la prueba (“freie Beweiswürdigung”).37 En España y muchos países de América Latina el estándar de valoración de la prueba se llama la “sana crítica”.38 La expresión “la sana crítica” proviene de las leyes españolas de mediados del siglo XIX,39 y bajo este estándar, el juez puede tener en cuenta toda la prueba presentada durante el proceso y formar su convicción sobre los hechos según su propio criterio.40 Estos 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 von Mehren, George M. y Salomon, Claudia T.: “Submitting Evidence in an International Arbitration: The Common Lawyers Guide”, Journal of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 291 (traducción del autor) [von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”] (citando Selby, Jamison M.: “Fact-Finding Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The View from the Trenches”, en Lillich, Richard B. ed.: Fact Finding Before International Tribunals: Eleventh Sokol Colloquium, 1992, p. 144). Este término también se conoce como la “probabilidad prevalente”. Ver Taruffo, Michele: “Verdad, prueba y motivación en la decisión sobre los hechos” en Serie Cuadernos de Divulgación de la Justicia Electoral, 2013, p. 61. [Taruffo: “Verdad, prueba y motivación”]. Waincymer, Jeff: Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration § 10.4.3, Kluwer Law International, 2012, p. 766. [Waincymer: Procedure and Evidence]. Engel, Christoph: “Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law”, en Vermont Law Review, Vol. 33, 2009, p. 440. [Engel: “Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction]. Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, p. 141. Taruffo, Michele: “Rethinking the Standards of Proof”, en American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, 2003, p. 667. [Taruffo: “Rethinking the Standards of Proof”]. Id.; Paúl, Álvaro: “Sana Crítica: The System for Weighing Evidence Utilized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, en Buffulo Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 18, 2012, p. 211 n.75. [Paúl: “Sana Crítica”]. Paúl: “Sana Crítica”, p. 211. (“Los académicos generalmente definen sana crítica como un sistema en el que el juez tiene la obligación de valorar el peso de las pruebas según las reglas tanto de la lógica como la experiencia”) (traducción del autor); ver también Taruffo: “Verdad, prueba y motivación”, p. 89. Palacio, Lino Enrique: Manual de Derecho Procesal Civil, (17a ed.), LexisNexis/ Abeledo-Perrot, Buenos Aires, 2003, p. 422 [Palacio: Manual de Derecho Procesal Civil]; Paúl: “Sana Crítica”, p. 197. Cordero, Jaime Laso: “Lógica y Sana Crítica”, en Revista Chilena de Derecho, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2009, p. 144 disponible en http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34372009000100007 (“[L]a sana crí- Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 192 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades estándares tienen en común la evaluación interna y personal del juez, en lugar de la norma inmutable y externa utilizada en derecho anglosajón. La comunidad arbitral no ha logrado un consenso sobre la pregunta de si estos modelos diferentes en el estándar de la prueba pueden resultar en inconsistencias en el proceso de toma de decisiones en el arbitraje. Algunos insisten en que los estándares son sustancialmente diferentes. El derecho anglosajón requiere nada más que la balanza se incline hacia un lado u otro, mientras que el enfoque del derecho civil requiere un estudio más riguroso de la prueba para asegurar que el juez esté completamente convencido.41 Los académicos que comparten esta visión insisten en que un árbitro de tradición continental juzga la prueba según un estándar más alto que la preponderancia de la evidencia, y busca algo más “subjetivo”, y – en consecuencia - elusivo.42 Por lo tanto, la respuesta “que las partes me convenzan” podría entrañar significados muy diferentes según la persona, dentro del mismo arbitraje. Otros se oponen a esa idea, argumentando que la diferencia es puramente semántica, y que en la práctica, los jueces tanto del derecho civil como del derecho anglosajón deciden los asuntos de la prueba de forma muy similar. La experiencia de varios comentaristas es que para fines prácticos, los árbitros de una y otra tradición abordan los arbitrajes con una concepción similar de la prueba: la parte que sostiene la carga de la prueba debe convencer al tribunal de que es más probable que su demanda o contestación esté legal y fácticamente sustentada que lo contrario.43 Sin importar cómo finalmente se resuelve esta cuestión, en esta sección abordamos dos áreas específicas que pueden requerir más claridad: (i) la pregunta de si el estándar de la prueba debería ser tratado como una cuestión de derecho adjetivo o derecho sustantivo y (ii) la evaluación de los estándares de prueba “especiales”, que no siguen el típico “balance de la evidencia” y que realmente pueden afectar la decisión arbitral. 41 42 43 tica . . . es un sistema de valoración libre de la prueba pues el juez no está constreñido por reglas rígidas que le dicen cuál es el valor que debe dar a ésta, pero tampoco decide únicamente en base a los dictámenes de su fuero interno.”). Tales discusiones se han desarrollado incluso dentro de la tradición civil donde el nombre de este estándar probatorio varía por país, por ejemplo, “libre convicción” (en Brasil) o “prudente apreciación” (en Italia). Palacio: Manual de Derecho Procesal Civil, p. 422. Taruffo: “Rethinking the Standards of Proof”, p. 665 n.26 (“Una revisión reciente de la jurisprudencia italiana en relación con este tema muestra que los tribunales italianos al decidir casos civiles adoptan normas muy flexibles de prueba, en base esencialmente a la discreción del juez, sin ninguna referencia a la norma de la prueba más allá de toda duda razonable”) (traducción del autor). Waincymer: Procedure and Evidence § 10.4.3, p. 766. Waincymer: Procedure and Evidence § 10.4.3, p. 766 (“Como ha sido expresado, es probable que no haya ninguna diferencia entre los estándares del derecho civil y anglosajón, pese a algunos comentarios al contrario”) (traducción del autor); von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”, p. 291 (“De cualquier manera, la mente estratégica del abogado debe recordar que en todos los casos, el verdadero estándar general es y debe ser un test de la preponderancia de la prueba”) (traducción del autor); Redfern, Alan, et al.: “The Standards and Burden of Proof in International Arbitration”, en Arbitration International, Vol. 10, 1994, p. 335 (“Pero a pesar de las diferentes formulaciones el resultado práctico parece ser el mismo en ambos sistemas. En todos los casos el nivel general es y debe ser una prueba de la preponderancia de la evidencia.”) (traducción del autor); Schweizer, Mark: The civil standard of proof – what is it, actually?, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, julio de 2013, p. 5; comparar Clermont, Kevin M. y Sherwin, Emily, “A Comparative View of Standards of Proof”, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 50, 2002, p. 243, y Taruffo: “Rethinking the Standards of Proof”, p. 659; ver también Engel: “Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction, pp. 436-37. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE A. 193 Estándares probatorios “especiales” Aceptando, por el momento, el argumento de que las diferencias entre el derecho civil y el derecho anglosajón no son tan significativas en el típico arbitraje comercial, es necesario admitir que las diferencias entre los enfoques de prueba se evidencian claramente en los arbitrajes donde hay un estándar de prueba especial o elevado a ser aplicado para un reclamo o defensa específica. En ciertas circunstancias, una parte argumenta que un estándar más alto o bajo debería aplicarse, debido a la naturaleza de las alegaciones que se busca probar. Es en esas circunstancias donde la claridad y certidumbre en relación al estándar de prueba resultan particularmente importantes. i. Alegaciones de fraude – un estándar más elevado En los casos de fraude, corrupción y otros actos similares, existen muchos enfoques diferentes para estas mismas cuestiones. Algunos países tienen un estándar mayor cuando se trata de casos de fraude y otras irregularidades graves. Un ejemplo destacable es el de los EE.UU., donde los alegatos de fraude, soborno y actos similares requieren ser probados de manera “clara y convincente.”44 Otros países como Inglaterra, Canadá y Australia no tienen un estándar distinto para estos casos – manteniendo el balance de las probabilidades como el estándar – pero resaltan que el alegato de fraude (su probabilidad en general por ejemplo), deberá ser tomado en cuenta al juzgar si ha sido presentada prueba suficiente.45 Por último, muchos países de tradición civilista no parecen tener un estándar distinto para casos de fraude ni hacen mención de consideraciones especiales al momento de juzgar estas alegaciones.46 44 45 46 Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, pp. 139-40 (resumiendo los principales tipos de casos que se juzgan en los EE.UU. usando el estándar de la prueba “clara y convincente”). Reichert, Klaus: “Introduction to the Session Treaty Arbitration: Pleading and Proof of Fraud and Comparable Forms of Abuse”, en Jan van den Berg, Albert (ed.): Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series, Vo. 18, Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 437 (Inglaterra) (“Aunque en casos civiles existe solamente el estándar probatorio del balance de las probabilidades, éste es un estándar que se emplea flexiblemente. En particular, cuanto más grave es la acusación o más graves son las consecuencias si la acusación es probada, más fuerte tendrá que ser la evidencia antes de que un tribunal encuentre que la acusación ha sido probada bajo el balance de las probabilidades.”) (citando R (N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2005] EWCA Civ 1605, [2006] QB 468, 497-8, para. 62) (traducción del autor); Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, pp. 140-41 (Australia) (“dada ‘la percepción convencional de que los miembros de nuestra sociedad no se involucran normalmente en una conducta fraudulenta o criminal, un tribunal no debería fácilmente encontrar que, basado en el balance de las probabilidades, una parte en un pleito civil ha sido culpable de tal conducta”) (citando Neat Holdings Pty Ltd. v. Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd., 110 ALR 449, 450 (1992)) (traducción del autor); Code, Brett: “The civil standard of proof confirmed: Always proof on a balance of probabilities but now mindful of the mysterious ‘inherent’ probabilities or improbabilities”, ABlawg.ca blog, 13 de noviembre de 2008, (Canadá) disponible en http://ablawg.ca/2008/11/13/the-civil-standard-of-proof-confirmed-always-proof-on-a-balance-of-probabilities-but-now-mindful-of-the-mysterious-inherent-probabilities-or-improbabilities/. Algunos comentaristas afirman que los países de tradición civilista tienen un estándar más alto para casos de fraude. Ver von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”, p. 291 (resaltando que “[t]anto los sistemas del derecho civil como anglosajón reconocen estándares de la prueba elevados para el soborno y otros tipos de fraude”) (traducción del autor); Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”, p. 491 (“Cuando graves denuncias de irregularidades están involucradas, sin embargo, ambos sistemas generalmente exigen un estándar de la prueba elevado”) (traducción del autor). Pero no está claro si estos comentaristas están diciendo que los países de tradición civilista tienen específicos Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 194 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades Quizás como reflexión de esas diferencias, los tribunales arbitrales también tienden a aplicar una extensa variabilidad en los estándares probatorios. El estándar usado más frecuentemente es el estándar elevado o de pruebas “claras y convincentes.”47 Por ejemplo, un estudio de 25 laudos arbitrales concluyó que en 14 ocasiones se usó un estándar de prueba elevado.48 El segundo estándar más común es el del balance de la probabilidad, el cual ha sido descrito por un autor como una tendencia creciente en arbitraje internacional para casos de fraude49 y ha recibido el apoyo de la doctrina y varios tribunales. 50 Por último, algunos laudos han utilizado el concepto civilista de la convicción del juez,51 mientras que otros han mencionado que en ciertas circunstancias el estándar de prueba prima facie puede ser suficiente.52 Según este último estándar, después de presentar ciertas pruebas sobre fraude, corrupción, o una causa similar, la carga de la prueba se le transferiría a la otra parte para que presente evidencias demostrando que no hubo irregularidades.53 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 estándares para casos de fraude que son más altos que su estándar común, o si simplemente el estándar común en estos países es más elevado que la preponderancia de la evidencia. Nueber, Michael: “Chapter I: The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability, Corruption in International Commercial Arbitration – Selected Issues”, en Zeiler, Gerold, et al. (eds.): Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2015, Manz’sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2015, pp. 6-7 (“Los tribunales arbitrales, tanto en casos comerciales como de inversión utilizan un estándar de la prueba elevado, por ejemplo, al exigir que las pruebas sean ‘claras y convincentes’ para probar alegatos de soborno”) (traducción del autor); Rose, Cecily: “Questioning the Role of International Arbitration in the Fight against Corruption”, en Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 31, Issue 2, Kluwer Law International, 2014, p. 196 [Rose: “Questioning the Role”] (“El estándar más frecuentemente empleado es pruebas claras y convincentes”) (traducción del autor); Llamzon, Aloysius y Sinclair, Anthony C.: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration: Standards Governing Issues of Corruption, Fraud, Misrepresentation and Other Investor Misconduct”, en Jan van den Berg, Albert (ed.): Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series, Vol. 18, Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 492 (“Los tribunales de arbitraje internacional en términos generales han adoptado estándares probatorios elevados.”) (traducción del autor) [Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”]. Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, pp. 150-51. Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”, p. 495 (hablando del caso Rompetrol). Lamm et al.: “Pleading and Proof of Fraud”, p. 563 (señalando que “el tribunal de Rompetrol sugirió que los tribunales deberían evaluar todas las pruebas en contexto para determinar si es más probable que un hecho sea veraz que lo contrario”) (traducción del autor); Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”, p. 494 (“aunque estamos de acuerdo generalmente con la premisa de que cuanto más seria es la acusación, más confianza debe haber en las pruebas en que uno se respalda . . ., esto no necesariamente significa un estándar probatorio más alto.”) (traducción del autor) (alteración en original) (citando Libananco v Turkey, CIADI Caso No. ARB/06/8 (2 de septiembre de 2011)). Rose: “Questioning the Role”, p. 196 (resaltando que “[e]n el caso CCI Nro. 7047, por ejemplo, el tribunal explicó que ‘debe estar convencido de que realmente hay un caso de soborno.”) (traducción del autor). Wilske, Stephan y Fox, Todd J.: “Part I: International Commercial Arbitration, Chapter 26: Corruption in International Arbitration and Problems with Standard of Proof: Baseless Allegations or Prima Facie Evidence?”, en Kröll, Stefan Michael et al. (eds.): International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution, Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 500-501. Id. p. 501 (citando el caso CCI Nro. 6497 que dice “La parte que presenta los alegatos puede introducir ciertas pruebas relevantes para apoyar sus alegaciones, sin que estos elementos sean realmente concluyentes. En tal caso, el tribunal puede, en casos excepcionales, solicitar que la otra parte presente pruebas contrarias, si es algo posible y no muy gravoso. Si la otra parte no presenta tales pruebas contrarias, el tribunal arbitral podría concluir que los hechos alegados han sido probados”) (traducción del autor). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 195 El hecho de que diversos estándares de prueba estén siendo utilizados en el arbitraje de inversiones genera la posibilidad de que las mismas acciones sean o no sean penalizadas dependiendo de qué estándar se está aplicando. Esta preocupación salió a la luz en el caso de Siag v. Egipto,54 en el cual, la mayoría del tribunal utilizó el estándar de prueba “clara y convincente” y decidió que la prueba no había cumplido con el estándar.55 La opinión discrepante utilizó un estándar más flexible y, bajo éste, decidió que sí había pruebas suficientes para constatar el fraude.56 ii. Cuantificación de daños – un estándar disminuido Hay también una clara tendencia en el arbitraje internacional a aplicar un estándar disminuido en algunas circunstancias; la más común es la cuantificación de los daños y perjuicios. Esta tendencia parece estar basada, en parte, en un principio legal de aceptación generalizada que permite que a la parte que demuestra que ha sido perjudicada no le sea denegada el resarcimiento del daño sufrido simplemente porque la cuantía de los daños no puede ser fijada con absoluta certeza. La respuesta más adecuada en ese caso es que se dicte un laudo razonable sobre los daños, a pesar del posible margen de error en la cuantificación.57 Desafortunadamente, algunos tribunales han aplicado este principio para generalizar una aceptación de la reparación de daños y perjuicios aun cuando su prueba es realmente escasa. En ciertos casos, los daños se han determinado en base a principios de equidad simplemente dividiendo por la mitad los daños pretendidos o redondeando la cifra al importe razonable más próximo.58 Sin lugar a dudas, la menor rigurosidad de los árbitros a la hora de cuantificar los daños y perjuicios, puesta de manifiesto ante la recurrente falta de explicación del razonamiento llevado a cabo y del uso extendido del principio de equidad, evidencia la existencia de lagunas acerca del estándar legal en el que debe basar el árbitro su razonamiento a la hora de determinar el daño. 59 Estos vacíos invitan a reflexionar sobre qué medidas ayudarían a tratar con más rigurosidad los temas de la carga y el estándar de la prueba. 54 55 56 57 58 59 Laudo, Waiguh Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. La República Árabe de Egipto, CIADI Caso No. ARB/05/15, 1 de junio de 2009, disponible en http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf. Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”, p. 493. Opinión Discrepante del Profesor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Waiguh Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. La República Árabe de Egipto, CIADI Caso No. ARB/05/15, 1 de mayo de 2009, pp. 4-5, disponible en http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0787.pdf; ver Llamzon y Sinclair: “Investor Wrongdoing in Investment Arbitration”, p. 493. Ver, por ejemplo, Kantor, Mark: Valuation for Arbitration: Compensation Standards, Valuation Methods and Expert Evidence, Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. 111 [Kantor: Valuation for Arbitration]; Landolt, Phillip y Neal, Barbara Reeves: “Burden and Standard of Proof in Competition Law Matters Arising in International Arbitration”, en Blanke, Gordon y Landolt, Phillip (eds.): EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, § 5-012. von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”, p. 291. Ver Kantor: Valuation for Arbitration, p. 117 (hablando de la posibilidad de impugnación de laudos que no evalúen los daños de forma rigurosa). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 196 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades B. ¿Derecho adjetivo o sustantivo? Una solución potencial para aliviar las variaciones mencionadas en la sección anterior reside en discutir, muy temprano en el arbitraje, cual estándar probatorio deben aplicar los árbitros a las cuestiones “especiales” que deban afrontar. Otra solución es considerar si el estándar de la prueba se debe tratar como un tema sustantivo o adjetivo, es decir, procesal.60 Si se considera como un tema procesal entonces es más apropiado que las reglas que gobiernan el proceso del arbitraje decidan el estándar apropiado. Si en cambio se considera un tema sustantivo, las reglas de la jurisdicción que rigen el fondo de la disputa, la lex causae, serían la fuente del estándar.61 Hay poco consenso sobre si el estándar de prueba forma parte del derecho sustantivo o adjetivo. Algunos argumentan que la mejor solución es que la carga y el estándar probatorio se traten como tema sustantivo.62 Hay varias razones para ello, entre las principales, se destaca la relativa falta de orientación en las reglas de las instituciones arbitrales sobre la carga y el estándar probatorios, la previsibilidad del derecho sustantivo elegido por las partes, el hecho de que la carga de la prueba tiene un efecto sustancial en la evaluación de la misma demanda, y que la cuestión de la carga de la prueba concierne a la totalidad del tribunal arbitral (a diferencia de una resolución procesal que a veces puede ser tomada por su presidente unilateralmente). No todo el mundo comparte esta visión. Por ejemplo, Gary Born ha sugerido que el derecho sustantivo no debería regir por completo el estándar de la prueba, ya que los estándares pueden ser influenciados por reglas procesales, entre ellas, las relativas a la exhibición de pruebas.63 El asunto no es puramente académico. Como vimos en la sección previa, las jurisdicciones nacionales pueden aplicar diferentes estándares de prueba para ciertos asuntos, reflejando su propia política acerca de cuándo van a requerir que las partes comprueben determinados asuntos haciendo uso de un estándar más elevado. Algunos pequeños pero significativos cambios en el enfoque podrían marcar la diferencia al elevar la carga de prueba al nivel de importancia y claridad que merece. 60 61 62 63 Born: International Commercial Arbitration, § 15.09[B], p. 2315 (“Se puede alegar que determinar la carga [y el estándar] de la prueba presenta preguntas sobre la elección de la ley aplicable. Específicamente, los tribunales deben decidir si aplican la ley de la sede del arbitraje (basado en la teoría de que la carga de la prueba es un tema de ‘procedimiento’), la ley que gobierna el fondo del arbitraje, o algún estándar internacional.”) (traducción del autor). Smith y Nadeau-Séguin, “The Illusive Standard”, p. 150 (“Si el estándar de la prueba se considera una cuestión de derecho sustantivo, siendo parte así de la demanda o defensa, existe un buen argumento al respecto de que no se le debería estar permitido al tribunal utilizar cualquier otro estándar sin el consentimiento de las partes”) (traducción del autor). Ver Smith y Nadeau-Séguin: “The Illusive Standard”, p. 149 (concluyendo que hay razones apremiantes por las cuales la ley aplicable al fondo de la disputa debería regir las cuestiones sobre el estándar de la prueba). Born: International Commercial Arbitration, § 15.09[B], p. 2315 (“Un punto de vista frecuentemente expresado es que temas sobre la carga de la prueba deberían ser subsumidos a la ley sustantiva de fondo: reglas sobre la carga de la prueba están a menudo conectadas con reglas sustantivas, y con frecuencia distorsionaría estas reglas separarlas. Al mismo tiempo, algunas reglas sobre la carga de la prueba son el resultado de temas procesales (como es por ejemplo la disponibilidad de procesos de exhibición de documentos); es importante tomar esto en cuenta al momento de asignar la carga de la prueba. El mejor punto de vista es que el tribunal debería asignar la carga de la prueba basado en su estimación de las reglas sustantivas aplicables y los procedimientos adoptados en el arbitraje.”) (traducción del autor). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 197 En primer lugar, es responsabilidad de las partes evaluar si el estándar de prueba va a requerir atención específica o podría cambiar el resultado de una determinada pretensión y, si la respuesta es afirmativa, llevar el asunto a la atención del tribunal.64 El árbitro puede que no tenga plena certeza o visión acerca del estándar de la prueba que resultará apropiado en un asunto complejo hasta que las partes hayan discutido el asunto. Por esta razón, es lógico y conveniente que sean las partes quienes tengan primero la responsabilidad de discutir frente al tribunal arbitral el estándar apropiado de la prueba, y a través de este diálogo clarificar el asunto al inicio del proceso. En esas conversaciones iniciales, las partes deberían dialogar no sólo sobre la carga y el estándar generalmente aplicable, sino también sobre cualquier tipo de estándar específico que consideren que aplica a las alegaciones (por ejemplo, un estándar probatorio elevado para acreditar una alegación de corrupción, o un estándar menos rígido para la cuantificación de daños y perjuicios). El tribunal también puede decidir si va a considerar el tema un asunto procesal o regulado por la ley sustantiva. Ello asegurará que las partes y el tribunal compartan un concepto común respecto a la prueba y a la incumbencia de justificar sus pretensiones. Asimismo, las partes y el tribunal deben volver a la discusión sobre la carga y el estándar de la prueba más adelante en el caso, antes de la audiencia final. Además, el tribunal debe aplicar efectivamente los estándares elegidos por las partes o los que resultasen de aplicación por imperio de la ley, de forma rigurosa en sus deliberaciones y en el laudo. Finalmente, el tribunal debería considerar si estima la prueba en función de los estándares que aplican en el arbitraje para asegurar que los árbitros no están viciados a causa de su formación en el derecho sustantivo, sino que están, por el contrario, haciendo un sincero esfuerzo para respetar el estándar elegido para el caso, lo cual asegura una cierta coherencia entre los árbitros. Para resumir, es importante que las partes y el tribunal reconozcan la complejidad que puede existir dentro de la determinación de la carga de la prueba para ciertos tipos de reclamos, y que se establezcan muy claramente ante las partes las expectativas en cuanto a la prueba. Las partes y el tribunal deberían discutir estos temas temprano en el arbitraje, y el tribunal, que debe mostrar que es consciente del asunto, reflexionará sobre el mismo y decidirá la cuestión en el laudo final. IV. La admisibilidad de la prueba Una pregunta relacionada con la carga y con el estándar probatorio es la admisibilidad de la prueba. La “admisibilidad” de la prueba determina si la evidencia presentada debería ser considerada o no. El concepto involucra clásicamente dos principios básicos: (i) si la evidencia es relevante – esto es, si prueba o refuta un hecho importante para una decisión jurídica; y (ii) si la evidencia es confiable – esto es, si proviene de una fuente considerada fidedigna. Estos principios tienen como meta crear un filtro frente a la información que pueda influir sobre el juzgador evitando así la consideración de datos que no son completamente veraces o relevantes para la disputa en cuestión. 64 Redfern, Allan et al.: “Standards and Burden of Proof in International Arbitration”, en Arbitration International, Vol. 10, 1994, pp. 349-50 (sosteniendo que debería haber un dialogo abierto entre las partes y el tribunal sobre la carga de la prueba). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 198 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades En los sistemas jurídicos nacionales, la admisibilidad suele regirse por normas explícitas. Por ejemplo, a lo largo de los siglos, el derecho anglosajón viene recopilando normas que excluyen ciertos tipos de prueba con el fin de resguardar la integridad del razonamiento del jurado. A través de los años, estos conceptos se han aplicado asimismo a las disputas que no cuentan con jurado. Del mismo modo, existen ciertas reglas, aunque menos desarrolladas, sobre la admisibilidad de la evidencia en los sistemas del derecho civil continental. Cuando se trata de admisibilidad, el consenso general parece ser que los órganos de arbitraje internacional no deberían estar sujetos a los mismos estándares de admisibilidad que los tribunales locales. Ciertamente, algunos comentaristas llegarán a decir que las reglas de evidencia “no tienen lugar” en el arbitraje internacional.65 En palabras del Juez Azevedo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia: Sería ir demasiado lejos para una corte internacional insistir en una prueba directa y visual, rechazando la admisión, pensándolo bien, de una cantidad razonable de presunciones humanas en aras de alcanzar aquella condición moral, ésta es, la certidumbre moral y humana con la que, pese al riesgo de errores ocasionales, una corte de justicia debe estar conforme.66 Incluso árbitros de sólida tradición anglosajona comparten este punto de vista. Por ejemplo, en el arbitraje Pelletier (EE.UU. v. Haití), que data del año 1885, el árbitro William Strong, un ex juez del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, presidió un arbitraje con abogados de tradición anglosajona en una parte y abogados de tradición civilista en la otra. Durante la fase probatoria del procedimiento, el Juez Strong informó a las partes que las reglas “técnicas” de derecho anglosajón sobre la prueba no eran aplicables al caso, y que en relación a la admisión de documentos, “les otorgaría tan solo el peso que aparentemente merecieran.”67 De manera más general, informó a los abogados que “estaría dispuesto a actuar sobre cualquier prueba que satisfaga su intención en relación a los hechos”.68 Las reglas de varias instituciones arbitrales refuerzan la postura de que los árbitros deberían tener amplia discreción sobre la admisión de pruebas. Por ejemplo, como señalamos anteriormente, el Artículo 19.2 de la Ley Modelo de la CNUDMI sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional dispone que los poderes del “tribunal arbitral incluye[n] [el] de determinar la admisibilidad, la pertinencia y el valor de las pruebas.” De igual manera, el Artículo 34(1) de las Reglas de Arbitraje del CIADI dispone que: “El Tribunal decidirá sobre la admisibilidad de cualquier prueba rendida y de su valor probatorio.” Disposiciones sustancialmente iguales se encuentran en el Reglamento de Arbitraje Internacional del CIRD y en el Reglamento de Arbitraje de la CNUDMI.69 65 66 67 68 69 Economou, George C.: Admissibility and Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, Cyprus Arbirtation and Mediation Centre, noviembre de 2012. Opinión Discrepante del Juez Azevedo, Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (1949), pp. 90-91. Moore, John Bassett: History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States Has Been a Party, Vol. 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898, p. 1753. Id. p. 1752. Ver CIRD, Procedimientos Internacionales de Resolución de Disputas (en vigor desde el 1 de junio de 2014), art. 20.6 (“El tribunal decidirá sobre la admisibilidad, relevancia, materialidad, e importancia de las pruebas.”) y CNUDMI, Reglamento de Arbitraje (2010), Art. 27.4 (“El tribunal arbitral determinará la admisibilidad, la pertinencia y la importancia de las pruebas presentadas.”). Ver también la Sección III.B, supra. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 199 Debido a esta falta de guías específicas, es bastante frecuente que los tribunales arbitrales aborden cuestiones sobre admisibilidad solamente cuando la prueba es cuestionada por una de las partes. Las órdenes de procedimiento arbitrales normalmente establecen una fecha varias semanas antes de la audiencia, o al principio de la misma, donde las partes pueden cuestionar cualquier prueba que haya sido presentada en el arbitraje o alegar que cierta prueba no debería ser considerada. Si la prueba no es cuestionada, entonces el tribunal no examinará de forma independiente su admisibilidad. La falta de reglas de admisibilidad en el arbitraje internacional plantea dos problemas: (i) la posibilidad de que la prueba convenza al tribunal, inclusive en el supuesto de que el tribunal la considere improcedente y tenga la intención de desestimarla;70 y (ii) la posibilidad de que tanto partes como árbitros procedentes de distintas tradiciones legales puedan tener conceptos radicalmente distintos sobre la aptitud de la prueba y el peso que se le debe atribuir. En esta sección, vamos a explorar la tendencia hacia la admisibilidad de la prueba en el arbitraje internacional y los efectos que una amplia admisión puede tener en arbitraje. A. La evaluación flexible de la prueba Hay dos conceptos que afectan la admisibilidad de la prueba en el arbitraje: una visión general respecto a la flexibilidad y discreción de los árbitros y la importancia de asegurar que cada parte sea totalmente escuchada. En la práctica, los árbitros tienden a ser reacios a excluir evidencias a pesar de estar facultados para hacerlo. Es muy común que permitan a las partes presentar toda la prueba que éstas estimen conveniente, incluyendo aquellas de relevancia o veracidad dudosas.71 Esta tendencia tiene dos motivos: el primero es la confianza que el árbitro tiene en sus propias habilidades para valorar la prueba, ponderando la prueba válida y desestimando la defectuosa; el segundo – el cual es el enfoque de este apartado – es la preocupación del árbitro acerca de la consecuencia de que si no admite toda la prueba, el laudo pueda ser anulado por un tribunal local en los términos de la Convención de Nueva York.72 La Convención de Nueva York, que rige el reconocimiento y ejecución de laudos internacionales, proporciona escasas bases para impugnar laudos, pero entre ellas figura el inciso b) del párrafo 1 del Artículo V que dispone que se podrá dene- 70 71 72 Sussman, Edna: “Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological Influences and What You Can Do About Them”, en American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2013, p. 492. von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”, p. 290 (“La experiencia demuestra que los árbitros tienen mucha reticencia a restringir pruebas que pueden ser presentadas, y normalmente prefieren pecar por permitirles a las partes presentar pruebas de dudosa relevancia.”) (traducción del autor); Pilkov, Konstantin: “Evidence in International Arbitration: Criteria for Admission and Evaluation”, en Arbitration, Vol. 80, Issue 2, 2014, p. 149 (lo mismo) [Pilkov: “Evidence in International Arbitration”]. Convención sobre el Reconocimiento y la Ejecución de las Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras, 10 de junio de 1958, art. V, numeral 1, inciso b. Ver Pilkov: “Evidence in International Arbitration”, p. 149 (“Los árbitros tienen en cuenta que su laudo puede ser desestimado si una parte no pudo ‘hacer valer sus medios de defensa’. . . [P]odemos concluir que cualquier decisión de excluir pruebas basadas en la irrelevancia de la prueba trae consigo un riesgo significativo, a menos que las pruebas sean claramente irrelevantes.”) (traducción del autor). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 200 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades gar el reconocimiento y ejecución de un laudo si la parte contra la cual se invoca el laudo “no ha podido . . . hacer valer sus medios de defensa.”73 Al observar los efectos reales de esta disposición nos damos cuenta de que ejerce una presión sobre los árbitros, estimulándolos a admitir pruebas dudosas por precaución,74 pues aunque se puede denegar reconocimiento a un laudo a causa de no haber admitido algunas pruebas, resulta poco probable que ocurra lo mismo en caso de que los árbitros hubieran considerado pruebas inadecuadas. En las palabras de un autor: La parte que pretenda impugnar un laudo porque el tribunal recusó la admisión de cierta prueba, y por lo tanto lesionó el derecho de aquella parte de presentar el caso, tiene la posibilidad de prevalecer. En cambio, es mucho más difícil convencer a un juez de que un tribunal arbitral se equivocó al admitir una prueba pero no supo ponderar correctamente su significado.75 En lugar de excluir la prueba, es mucho más común que los árbitros la admitan pero al sopesar su valor tomen en cuenta cuestiones de valor. Por ejemplo, si hay preguntas acerca de la credibilidad de la prueba, el tribunal dará poco o ningún “peso” a la prueba en la preparación de su decisión, pero no la va a excluir del proceso arbitral. De manera supletoria o a veces como una alternativa a este proceso, las partes también pueden plantear dudas o cuestiones sobre la idoneidad o credibilidad de ciertas pruebas mediante el proceso de confrontación. Si no se puede demostrar una base para la prueba o su autenticidad, entonces la contraparte puede sugerir que el tribunal le otorgue significativamente menor peso. De este modo, la prueba no se “excluye” del proceso arbitral íntegramente, pero se plantean serias dudas sobre su valor probatorio. 73 74 75 (énfasis añadido). En los EE.UU., aunque los tribunales reconocen la amplia flexibilidad que tienen los árbitros sobre temas procesales, cuando las reglas sobre la prueba efectivamente le niegan a una parte tener una audiencia justa, los tribunales han denegado reconocimiento a laudos arbitrales. Ver por ejemplo Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“la decisión del panel de no continuar las audiencias . . . equivale a una injusticia fundamental y a una mala conducta suficiente para revocar el laudo”) (traducción del autor); Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992) (denegando ejecución de un laudo cuando el tribunal había “llevado al [demandado] a pensar que había utilizado un método apropiado para probar su reclamo” pero después “rechazó el reclamo del [demandado] por falta de pruebas”) (traducción del autor); Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (“La prueba efectivamente excluida por el árbitro era tanto ‘central como decisiva’ para la posición de la Compañía; por consiguiente, la negativa del árbitro de considerar esta prueba fue, como el tribunal de distrito concluyó, ‘tan destructiva para el derecho de [la Compañía] de presentar [su] caso, que permite anular el laudo arbitral”) (traducción del autor); Hall v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 511 F.2d 663, 664 (5th Cir. 1975) (“La presentación de su defensa es un derecho básico del debido proceso.”) (traducción del autor). von Mehren y Salomon: “Submitting Evidence”, p. 290 (“Los árbitros están guiados por la preocupación de que su laudo sea anulado bajo la Convención de Nueva York, la cual declara que un tribunal nacional puede denegar el reconocimiento de un laudo extranjero arbitral si una parte ‘no ha podido . . . hacer valer sus medios de defensa.”) (traducción del autor). Pilkov: “Evidence in International Arbitration”, p. 147 (traducción del autor). Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE B. 201 Las Reglas de la IBA reflejan el consenso actual sobre los asuntos probatorios En lo que respecta a la admisibilidad de la prueba, las Reglas de la IBA se consideran “el estándar de oro” para asuntos de prueba en arbitrajes.76 Tienen el propósito de conservar la flexibilidad del tribunal y al mismo tiempo dar una orientación acerca de las categorías de evidencia que pueden requerir una limitación o exclusión. Las partes y el Tribunal pueden escoger la adopción de esas Reglas para su arbitraje – y en la práctica, esa adopción es bastante común en los arbitrajes internacionales. Las Reglas comienzan de manera similar a las reglas de muchas instituciones arbitrales, haciendo mención a que: “El Tribunal Arbitral determinará la admisibilidad, relevancia, importancia y valor de las pruebas.”77 Pero a diferencia de otros reglamentos donde básicamente ésta es toda la orientación que se da, el Artículo 9.2 de las Reglas dispone que: “El Tribunal Arbitral podrá excluir, a instancia de parte o de oficio, la prueba o la exhibición de cualquier Documento, declaración, testimonio oral o inspección por cualquiera de las siguientes razones: a) falta de relevancia o importancia suficiente o utilidad para la resolución del caso; b) existencia de impedimento legal o privilegio bajo las normas jurídicas o éticas determinadas como aplicables por el Tribunal Arbitral; c) onerosidad o carga excesiva para la práctica de las pruebas solicitadas; d) pérdida o destrucción de un documento, siempre que se demuestre una razonable probabilidad de que ello haya ocurrido; e) confidencialidad por razones comerciales o técnicas que el Tribunal Arbitral estime suficientemente relevantes; f) razones de especial sensibilidad política o institucional que el Tribunal Arbitral estime suficientemente relevantes (incluyendo pruebas que hayan sido clasificadas como secretas por parte de un gobierno o de una institución pública internacional); o g) consideraciones de economía procesal, proporcionalidad, justicia o igualdad entre las Partes que el Tribunal Arbitral estime suficientemente relevantes.”78 Estas reglas proporcionan pautas para determinar la admisibilidad de pruebas, y permiten, mas no requieren, excluir la prueba que encuadre en alguna de las categorías anteriores.79 76 77 78 79 Aunque las Reglas de la IBA son consideradas generalmente como la codificación de la buena práctica emergente, algunos comentaristas las han criticado por favorecer principios del derecho anglosajón o por no alcanzar el equilibrio adecuado entre la tradición civilista y la anglosajona. Ver Waincymer: Procedure and Evidence, p. 759. Reglas de la IBA, Art. 9.1. Reglas de la IBA, Art. 9.2. Curiosamente, existe una diferencia entre el lenguaje utilizado en la versión inglesa (la cual es la versión oficial) y la versión española. La versión inglesa usa la palabra “shall”, que denota un sentido imperativo, sugiriendo que el tribunal debe excluir la prueba que se encuadre en esas categorías, sin discreción alguna. La versión española, en cambio, usa la palabra “podrá”, otorgando potestad al tribunal para decidir o no en este sentido. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 202 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades También se incluyen la posibilidad de utilizar el mecanismo de “in camera review” por un perito independiente e imparcial para asegurar que los árbitros no miren evidencias que podrían tener influencia en el caso.80 En la práctica, la adopción de las Reglas de la IBA suele ser útil para limitar la presentación de la prueba que corresponde a una de las categorías enumeradas más arriba. Como mínimo, estas reglas proporcionan a las partes y al tribunal un lenguaje común que pueden usar en el momento de discutir la admisibilidad de una prueba dada. Además, las Reglas de la IBA proporcionan directrices útiles sobre un asunto que es especialmente sensible a las diferencias culturales: los privilegios legales. El Artículo 9.3 del reglamento establece criterios que los árbitros deben observar al considerar una solicitud de inadmisibilidad basada en un privilegio o algún otro impedimento legal.81 El objeto de estas disposiciones es resolver las diferencias que pueden surgir entre las partes respecto a qué información goza de privilegio legal o por alguna otra razón debe estar exenta de exhibición. Consideran el concepto de privilegio legal derivado de ambas tradiciones, anglosajona y civilista. Por ejemplo, el inciso (b) demuestra el entendimiento del privilegio legal (reconocido en algunos sistemas) que aplica a negociaciones que tienen por objeto un posible acuerdo extrajudicial (a veces denominado el privilegio de la negociación). El inciso (c) expresa el principio rector de que deben tomarse en cuenta las expectativas que tenían las partes y sus asesores legales respecto del privilegio o impedimento legal en el momento en que supuestamente surgió. Nótese que la aplicación del criterio puede obligar a las partes a presentar pruebas sobre sus pareceres e intenciones en el momento en que el privilegio legal se originó, así como sobre las normas que rigen los privilegios legales derivados de los sistemas jurídicos que imperan sobre su conducta. C. El efecto de una amplia admisión de evidencia en el arbitraje Las Reglas de la IBA han aportado mucha claridad y coherencia en el manejo de la prueba. Pero resulta interesante apuntar que estas reglas parecen tener una concepción más próxima a la asistencia del tribunal a la hora de tomar decisiones sobre el proceso de exhibición de pruebas, en vez de evaluar la prueba que ya ha sido presentada por una parte. Por ejemplo, no existe una regla que trate sobre la autenticidad o el origen del documento. Además, las reglas en relación a la confidencialidad o la onerosidad de la exhibición de la prueba son claramente irrelevantes en la situación donde una parte busca presentar la prueba en cuestión, pero al mismo tiempo existen dudas sobre si el tribunal debe considerarla. Con respecto a la primera posibilidad, investigaciones recientes han comprobado la importancia de excluir del conocimiento del juzgador cualquier evidencia improcedente. Por ejemplo, un estudio del año 2012 realizado sobre una muestra de aproximadamente 400 árbitros mostró a un grupo de árbitros una prueba que podría perjudicar el caso para una parte, pero la prueba era obviamente inapropiada desde una perspectiva legal. Los otros árbitros, el grupo de “control,” no recibieron esta prueba. Los resultados del estudio mostraron que los árbitros que recibieron la prueba inapropiada pero decidieron excluirla por razones legales, estaban sin embargo influidos por ella y eran más proclives a decidir contra la parte desfa- 80 81 Reglas de la IBA, Art. 3.8. Reglas de la IBA, Art. 9.3. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 203 vorecida por esa prueba, en contraposición al grupo de “control”.82 Esto suscita dudas sobre si los árbitros deberían considerar una orientación más rigurosa respecto a la admisibilidad, tomando las diligencias debidas para excluir completamente la prueba de su valoración cuando la misma no sea admisible.83 La segunda preocupación tiene que ver con el hecho de que los pronunciamientos sobre admisibilidad pueden variar ampliamente entre las diferentes jurisdicciones, y estas diferencias permiten suponer que las partes de un arbitraje sean sometidas a enfoques considerablemente diferentes. Contrariamente al estándar de prueba, está generalmente aceptado que las reglas probatorias se rigen por el procedimiento arbitral, y que las reglas locales no se aplican en el arbitraje.84 Pero algunas reglas probatorias locales tienen un aspecto mucho más sustantivo en naturaleza, y pueden influir la estrategia de las partes en el caso por completo.85 Un ejemplo extremo sería la contemplación de la prueba que puede y debe ser considerada para llegar a la correcta interpretación de un contrato comercial. En términos generales, la perspectiva anglosajona busca obtener el significado “razonable” u “objetivo” de una cláusula contractual en base a la redacción escogida por las partes del contrato.86 Esta metodología tiende a excluir de la consideración probatoria cualquier documento o comunicación que no sea el propio contrato. Esta postura contrasta con la de las jurisdicciones civilistas, que buscan determinar la “verdadera o subjetiva intención” de las partes contratantes.87 Para cumplir este objetivo, las comunicaciones pre-contractuales son parte esencial de los registros probatorios. Existen otras divergencias entre las posturas frente a los asuntos de la admisibilidad en las diferentes jurisdicciones que podrían resultar en diferencias “sustantivas”. Por ejemplo, el privilegio legal del que gozan las comunicaciones entre un abogado y su cliente puede variar drásticamente de una jurisdicción a otra, al igual que la postura mantenida acerca de las comunicaciones realizadas con objeto de negociar un acuerdo extrajudicial. Las Reglas de la IBA pueden ofrecer una guía en este sentido, pero si las partes no las adoptan o el tribunal no las aplica rígidamente, puede que las partes encaucen el arbitraje desde campos de juego muy distintos, lo que implica desventajas para una u otra. 82 83 84 85 86 87 Id. Es solamente un ejemplo de la creciente línea de pensamiento relativa a las influencias subconscientes en la toma de decisiones arbitrales. Estos estudios acuerdan que los árbitros no son inmunes a influencias impropias y no intencionales derivadas de la evidencia que puede ser disputada como “impropia” y no debe ser aceptada en el arbitraje. Blackaby, Nigel et al.: Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 387. Waincymer: Procedure and Evidence, p. 796. Ver 11 Williston on Contracts § 31:1 (4a ed.). En Estados Unidos, esta regla – denominada “parol evidence rule” – es bastante estricta y dispone que la prueba extrínseca no es admisible para esclarecer el significado o interpretacón de una cláusula contractual, salvo o hasta que las partes hayan demostrado que la cláusula es en sí tan ambigua y no admite cualquier interpretación objetiva de manera que es necesario recurrir a la prueba extrínseca para determinar el significado subjetivo. Cuando la cláusula no es ambigua, no se le permite al juzgador utilizar otros recursos más allá del propio contrato para interpretar los términos contractuales. Mulcahy, Carol: “What Does It Mean? Contractual Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration”, en Dispute Resolution International, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 16-17. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 204 Permesly / Guevara / Prados Puchades La pregunta, entonces, es similar a la que se refiere a la carga de la prueba: ¿Hay una necesidad de mayor claridad y consistencia en el tratamiento de cuestiones de admisibilidad por parte de los tribunales arbitrales? Muchos autores responderían a esta pregunta con un claro y rotundo “no”. Las reglas que prohíben el testimonio de oídas, que requieren que se presente solamente “la mejor prueba” (es decir, documentos originales) o que ordenan la autenticación de documentos normalmente son consideradas como suficientes fuera del “sistema” de arbitraje, y se puede decir que hasta impiden la búsqueda de la “verdad” que forma la base del proceso arbitral. Un autor ha sugerido que las únicas pruebas que deberían quedar excluidas completamente son categorías muy específicas como: (i) pruebas cuya admisión violaría políticas públicas aceptadas internacionalmente (como lo son pruebas fraudulentas u obtenidas a través de métodos criminales); o (ii) pruebas cuya admisión causaría daños irreparables, como lo es la revelación de secretos comerciales.88 Otros insisten, en cambio, en que hay circunstancias en las cuales las pruebas deberían claramente ser excluidas debido a la existencia de serias dudas sobre su origen, relevancia o veracidad, al igual que no se le debería permitir a las partes presentar un testimonio irrelevante o potencialmente perjudicial sin que antes el tribunal tuviera oportunidad de decidir sobre la admisión del mismo. La clave, entonces, es asegurarse de que la “flexibilidad” en el examen de la prueba no se convierta en una falta de cuidado o rigor en la evaluación de la misma. Aunque la admisibilidad de la prueba debería ser tratada como un tema de procedimiento arbitral, ello no significa que las partes no deben ser informadas precisamente acerca de qué procedimientos o reglas de admisibilidad el tribunal escogerá para regirse. En lugar de decidir cuáles reglas el tribunal va a aplicar para estimar la evidencia solo durante la audiencia o en el proceso de redactar el laudo, el tribunal y las partes deberían acordar unas pautas sobre la admisibilidad de la prueba en las etapas iniciales del arbitraje, antes de que toda la evidencia probatoria sea introducida en el expediente del caso. Esto generará un mayor rigor y perspectiva al presentar la prueba, ya que las partes sabrán con antelación bajo qué estándares la admisibilidad de la prueba en cuestión será juzgada. Por ejemplo, al tribunal le cuesta relativamente poco comentar sobre la prueba privilegiada al inicio del arbitraje. Algunos comentaristas sugieren que el privilegio legal debe ser definido por el derecho del país que tiene la conexión más estrecha con la disputa. Otros sugieren que el tribunal podría querer aplicar el principio de la nación “más favorecida” al privilegio, lo que asegura que el tribunal contempla todos los documentos y evidencias con el privilegio aplicado en el país que tiene las reglas de privilegio más estrictas.89 Pero aun cuando el tribunal no quiere establecer ninguna regla firme de privilegio, quedan áreas donde la definición del privilegio puede tener una importancia especial. Para considerar un ejemplo muy básico, con respecto al intercambio de documentos entre el abogado, su representado y el perito de parte, las diversas jurisdicciones aplican normas diferentes al determinar si borradores y documentos gozan de algún privilegio legal. A falta de directrices proporcionadas por el tribunal arbitral, es posible que en un arbitraje, las partes contrarias partan de puntos diferentes y desiguales. Por ejemplo, uno 88 89 Pilkov: “Evidence in International Arbitration” p. 150. Kirtland, Cowley y Lilley: “Call for clearer guidance over conflict of privilege rules”, p. 3. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE 205 puede optar por no intercambiar comentarios con el perito de parte, motivado por el recelo de que tales comentarios puedan ser objeto de una orden de exhibición mientras que el abogado de la parte contraria puede optar por una comunicación plena y libre con el perito de parte bajo el supuesto de que los comentarios y documentos intercambiados gozarán del privilegio legal. El tribunal podría establecer si los documentos intercambiados por los abogados y los peritos están sujetos a privilegio legal o podría considerar pedirles a las partes que expresen un acuerdo común sobre la admisibilidad de documentos intercambiados entre el abogado y el cliente. Estas aclaraciones básicas al inicio del arbitraje fijarán el alcance que la revelación de documentos tendrá para las partes, estableciendo qué documentos tendrán, de otro modo, naturaleza privilegiada. Un segundo tema, a menudo omitido pero también importante, es la autenticidad de los documentos. Con frecuencia los tribunales aceptan todos los documentos presentados por las partes, aún sin información adecuada acerca de su origen. En circunstancias apropiadas, los árbitros pueden sugerir a las partes que cuando haya prueba documental disponible para justificar una determinada alegación, la parte debe producir esa prueba documental en primer lugar, en vez de basarse en pruebas secundarias como la declaración de un testigo. Esto fomentará que las partes preserven sus pruebas y sean rigurosas a la hora de localizar y presentar el mejor apoyo disponible para acompañar su pretensión. Dada la preocupación apuntada anteriormente acerca de la influencia que las pruebas erróneamente admitidas pueden tener incluso en los árbitros con las mejores intenciones, vale la pena que los temas probatorios más relevantes del caso sean abordados al inicio del arbitraje. De esta manera se minimiza la posibilidad de que una parte presente pruebas que, de acuerdo con las leyes aplicables a la disputa, claramente no deberían ser consideradas. V. Conclusión Este capítulo empezó haciendo hincapié en una de las características más importantes del arbitraje internacional: su flexibilidad hacía preguntas en torno a la prueba, como la carga y estándar de prueba y la admisibilidad de la evidencia. Sin embargo, existen circunstancias en las que estos asuntos se beneficiarán de más precisión. Como discutimos anteriormente, hay situaciones en las cuales una parte necesitará la ayuda de un tribunal – por ejemplo en la forma de inferencias adversas – para cumplir con su carga de prueba. Hay otros ejemplos en los que el estándar probatorio podría influir la decisión de los árbitros sustancialmente, y por lo tanto va a requerir más atención o más claridad antes de que proceso esté demasiado avanzado. Además, hay ciertos aspectos de la admisibilidad y estimación de la evidencia – como la evaluación de privilegios y el fondo y veracidad de documentos – que podrían ser tratados antes de que el tribunal contemple la evidencia y ya quede influido por su existencia. Una temprana discusión centrada en estas cuestiones proveería claridad y precisión en la materia. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 Reporte sobre el XII Congreso Internacional del Club Español del Arbitraje, el XI Encuentro del CEA-40, el I desayuno de la Comisión Mujeres y los I Diálogos ADR Ana Morales Ramos / Luis Bravo Abolafia / Antonio Alexandre Marín Marín Abstract: On 18 to 20 June 2017, Madrid welcomed the 12th International Conference of the Club Español del Arbitraje (Spanish Club of Arbitration). This year's conference, which gathered 430 participants from 26 different countries, dealt with hot topics of substantive law in arbitration. The panelists, among which there were numerous widely renowned practitioners, discussed both from a domestic perspective, as well as from an international one, issues relating to the enforcement and interpretation of contracts, force majeure, hardship and corruption in arbitration. In addition to the five panels of the conference, the Under Forty group of CEA, named CEA-40, held its 11th Meeting where younger arbitration practitioners discussed where they were heading to. For the first time, the Conference also included a Women's Breakfast organized by the Women's Commission of CEA together with Arbitral Women and Equal Representation in Arbitration (The Pledge), where cognitive biases in arbitration were discussed. Following the closing of the Conference, the 1st ADR Dialogues were held. Los días 18 a 20 de junio de 2017 se celebró en Madrid el XII Congreso Internacional del Club Español del Arbitraje (CEA) bajo el título “El derecho sustantivo. Un tema en ebullición”. Esta edición del Congreso contó con 430 participantes de 26 países, cinco mesas redondas y otros eventos adicionales, tales como el XI Encuentro del CEA -40, los I Diálogos ADR y el primer evento de la Comisión Mujeres. El Congreso fue inaugurado por Rafael Catalá, Ministro de Justicia, Francisco J. Vieira, Presidente del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid, Juan Fernández-Armesto, Presidente del CEA y Julio González-Soria, Presidente del Comité Organizador del XII Congreso del CEA y Vicepresidente del CEA. Durante sus palabras de bienvenida, Juan Fernández-Armesto anunció que el CEA tiene entre sus próximos objetivos la elaboración de un Código de Buenas Prácticas y la creación de un Observatorio CEA del arbitraje, así como continuar fomentando el crecimiento de España como sede de arbitraje y el uso del Derecho español como derecho de referencia en las transacciones internacionales. Por su parte, Rafael Catalá mostró la predisposición del Ministerio a estudiar las recomendaciones del CEA, en particular, en relación con posibles modificaciones de la Ley de Arbitraje que puedan contribuir a su mejora. La primera mesa redonda versó sobre “El Cumplimiento de los Contratos” y contó con Julio González-Soria, como moderador, Jesús Almoguera, María José Menéndez, Elena Otero-Novas y Fernando Pantaleón, como ponentes. En primer lugar, Almoguera analizó la buena fe que ha de regir la actuación de las partes durante la negociación de un contrato. Sobre esta cuestión, se refirió a las diferencias entre los sistemas jurídicos del Civil Law, en los que existe la obligación de actuar de buena fe, y los del Common Law, en los que se entiende que este deber generaría inseguridad jurídica y un incremento de la litigiosidad. A continuación, Pantaleón analizó el distinto enfoque que presentan los sistemas jurídicos del Civil Law y los del Common Law en relación con el cumplimiento específico como remedio ante un incumplimiento. Pantaleón señaló que si bien se trata del remedio de preferencia en los sistemas de Derecho continental, la indemnización de daños y perjuicios lo es en los países de tradición anglosajona. A modo de ejemplo se refirió Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 208 Morales / Bravo / Marín a una cita de Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., renombrado jurista americano, quien afirmó que, para el Derecho inglés, un contrato es una promesa de pagar daños si no se cumple. Tanto Pantaleón como Menéndez coincidieron en que, dadas las posturas diametralmente opuestas, la unificación entre los sistemas del Civil y Common Law es muy complicada. Seguidamente, Menéndez analizó la moderación de las cláusulas penales en vía judicial exponiendo que, aunque los países de tradición civilista permiten la moderación judicial por desproporción de la pena fijada, España es la excepción a la regla, al permitir, exclusivamente, que el juez modere la pena pactada cuando concurra un incumplimiento parcial. Menéndez y Pantaleón comentaron la novedosa Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo español, de 13 de septiembre de 2016, que abrió la puerta a analizar la validez de la cláusula penal en caso de que sea total y absolutamente desproporcionada en relación con cualquier criterio razonable. A este respecto, los ponentes reconocieron las dificultades que supone tratar de determinar los motivos que llevaron a las partes a pactar una determinada penalidad. Por último, Otero-Novas ofreciendo una visión más empresarial, abogó por la noción de la compensación plena (“full compensation”) al tratar el tema de la compensación por pérdida de oportunidad. Otero-Novas se refirió al impacto que los daños derivados de un incumplimiento tienen en la capacidad productiva de una empresa y la relevancia de la pérdida de oportunidad de haber realizado una inversión distinta de la frustrada. Partiendo de que el dinero –y su inversión– es el principal activo productivo de una empresa, defendió la procedencia de aplicar fórmulas de capitalización compuesta al cálculo de intereses, así como que el interés a utilizar no debe ser el legal del dinero sino uno que refleje el retorno estimado/previsible de la inversión. A este respecto, Pantaleón defendió que la compensación por la mora debe ser el coste de obtener una financiación alternativa. La segunda mesa redonda la conformaron, Alfonso Iglesia, como moderador, e Yves Derains, Lourdes Flores, Carlos Gutiérrez García y Datuk Professor Sundra Rajoo, como ponentes. En esta mesa se discutió sobre la figura de la fuerza mayor, así como sobre su uso y abuso. Gutiérrez comenzó analizando los requisitos clásicos de la fuerza mayor y refiriéndose a una conocida Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo español de 2014, en la que el Alto Tribunal afirmó que la crisis económica, por sí sola, no constituye una causa de fuerza mayor. Respecto del ámbito internacional, señaló que los supuestos que dan lugar a la fuerza mayor y sus efectos no son uniformes, aunque el principio de la autonomía de la voluntad constituye un principio homogeneizador que permite regular en cada contrato los supuestos y efectos de fuerza mayor. Por su parte, Sundra Rajoo definió la fuerza mayor como una criatura de naturaleza contractual en el Common Law -aunque la ley de contratos de Malasia de 1950 prevé la figura en su sección 57-, recomendando que las partes siempre redacten una cláusula de force majeure en lugar de dejar la cuestión a la regulación legal. En relación con el uso de esta defensa en países iberoamericanos, Flores expuso que ésta es aplicada por los tribunales de forma restrictiva, y aunque se diferencia entre caso fortuito y fuerza mayor, ambas figuras tienen el mismo efecto, la exoneración del deudor. Por su parte, Derains expuso el estado de esta cuestión en Francia y destacó la importancia que tiene dentro de esta materia la transmisión del riesgo y los INCOTERMS elegidos por las partes. Derains explicó también que, aunque la huelga fue una circunstancia admitida como exonerante de responsabilidad durante el siglo XIX, en el siglo XX dejó de tener este carácter, como norma general, al ser legalizada. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 REPORTE SOBRE EL XII CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DEL CEA 209 La tercera mesa redonda versó sobre la figura de la “excesiva onerosidad”, y contó con Carlos de los Santos, como moderador, y por Borja Iriarte, Julio César Rivera (h), Aníbal Sabater y Emilio Paolo Villano, como ponentes. Iriarte realizó un repaso de la jurisprudencia más destacada del Tribunal Supremo español desde que se analizó por primera vez la cláusula rebus sic stantibus en 1940, hasta nuestros días. Iriarte calificó la ocurrencia de crisis económicas como algo inseparable de la actividad empresarial y, por tanto, previsible. Sin embargo, puntualizó que lo imprevisible es el momento en el que se van a producir, así como su intensidad. Por su parte, Rivera destacó que en la última revisión de esta materia realizada en Argentina se eliminaron las referencias a la “imprevisibilidad” y al “deber de renegociación”, sin que ello suponga que hayan sido completamente excluidos. Sabater indicó que esta figura cuenta también con previsiones legales en Estados Unidos tanto en la Sección 2.615 del Código de Comercio Uniforme, como en la Sección 261 del Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Por último, Villano explicó que mientras que en Italia la figura está regulada en la legislación doméstica -Artículos 1467 a 1469 Código Civil italiano-, en Bélgica esta institución no está regulada, y deja a las partes la determinación de lo que se ha de entender por excesiva onerosidad sobre la base del principio de pacta sunt servanda. La cuarta mesa redonda, celebrada en la mañana del 20 de junio bajo el título “Interpretación de las normas de derecho interno y de los tratados internacionales. ¿Son los mismos criterios o son mundos separados?”, contó con Alexis Mourre, como moderador, Miguel Virgós, Andrea Carlevaris, Bernardo Cremades y Ángel Carrasco, como ponentes. En primer lugar, Virgós explicó las reglas de interpretación establecidas en los artículos 31 y 32 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados. Virgós, citando el Laudo de jurisdicción en el caso de Aguas del Tunari c. Bolivia, se refirió a la interpretación prevista en el artículo 31 como “un proceso de círculos concéntricos”, en la que prima la interpretación objetiva. Seguidamente, Carlevaris coincidiendo con Virgós, apuntó que “dos tercios de los laudos se refieren a la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, pero no la aplican”. Por su parte, Cremades expresó su conformidad con la reciente decisión del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea en la que determinó, en relación con el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Singapur, que la Comisión Europea no puede concluir un acuerdo comercial sin la ratificación individual de cada uno de los Estados de la Unión Europea. A continuación, Cremades enfatizó la importancia de las declaraciones interpretativas como herramienta de un Estado para aclarar el sentido o el alcance de un tratado, con posterioridad a su firma. Por último, Carrasco señaló que mientras las normas de interpretación de los tratados bilaterales de inversión suelen ser más abiertas o amplias debido a las mayores dificultades existentes para alcanzar un consenso en su redacción, las normas internas de los Estados suelen ser más específicas y/o concretas. La quinta y última mesa redonda versó sobre “Los efectos de la corrupción sobre los contratos en el arbitraje”, y la conformaron Mercedes Fernández, como moderadora, José María Alonso, Cristina Coto, Jonathan C. Hamilton y Emmanuel Kaufman, como ponentes. En primer lugar, en relación con la procedencia de investigar la existencia de corrupción en el arbitraje por parte del árbitro, Alonso distinguió entre los casos en los que existe denuncia por una parte (en cuyo caso, el tribunal tiene obligación de investigar) y aquéllos en los que no se produce denuncia alguna. En relación con Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 210 Morales / Bravo / Marín este supuesto, señaló la importancia del principio de justicia rogada en yuxtaposición con la obligación del árbitro de dictar un laudo ejecutable. A juicio de Alonso, la investigación de oficio por el tribunal ha de ser una medida excepcional sólo en el supuesto de que existan, prima facie, indicios de corrupción. Por otro lado, en caso de que haya prueba indiciaria de que el objeto de un arbitraje sea el lavado de dinero, Coto expuso que el tribunal debería investigar el posible fraude, aunque señaló que no todas las jurisdicciones obligan a denunciar este hecho ante las autoridades. Alonso añadió que en aquellos países donde sí existe tal obligación, el tribunal que conscientemente no toma medidas al respecto, podría incluso ser imputado como cooperador necesario del delito. Por su parte, Hamilton analizó las consecuencias de alegaciones de corrupción. A título ilustrativo, Hamilton se refirió a la evolución en esta materia entre el caso de Plama c. Bulgaria iniciado en 2003 donde el tribunal mostró una mayor pasividad en la investigación de la posible existencia de fraude; y el caso de Metal-Tech c. Uzbekistán decidido en 2013, en el que el tribunal adoptó un rol más activo, solicitando información adicional sobre las alegaciones de corrupción, para terminar rechazando su jurisdicción al entender suficientemente probadas las alegaciones de corrupción en relación con la inversión del Metal-Tech lo que la hacía contraría al derecho de Uzbekistán y, por tanto, exenta de protección bajo el tratado de inversión. Por último, Kaufman se refirió a los criterios en materia de prueba. Dentro de los posibles estándares a aplicar respecto a la prueba necesaria para probar la existencia de corrupción, se decantó por el criterio de evidencias circunstanciales o indirectas. XI ENCUENTRO DEL CEA-40 Como en ediciones anteriores, con carácter previo al Congreso, el 18 de junio de 2017 se celebró el XI Encuentro del CEA-40, titulado “Visiones internacionales del arbitraje: ¿hacia dónde vamos los jóvenes?”. El encuentro fue inaugurado por Juan Fernández-Armesto, quien, siguiendo el espíritu del artículo “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” publicado por John Maynard Keynes en 1930, ofreció a los asistentes una predicción sobre el futuro del arbitraje internacional en los próximos treinta años. Fernández-Armesto vaticinó que durante este periodo sobrevendrán cambios relevantes dentro del sector: el Derecho local se verá diluido a favor del derecho contractual internacional, el proceso arbitral se caracterizará por una mayor simplicidad y oralidad, así como por una mayor transparencia en la designación de los árbitros y sus decisiones, y, por último, el idioma y la especialización se convertirán en factores clave que tenderán a “compartimentar” los arbitrajes. La primera mesa redonda, moderada por Diego Gutiérrez, se centró en las técnicas para ser un buen “arbitralista” y contó con Jean Marguerat y Sofía Parra como panelistas. Marguerat se refirió a la importancia de elegir de forma correcta la sede del arbitraje, en la medida en que este elemento determina la lex arbitri. Marguerat enfatizó la importancia de elegir una sede neutral que cuente con tribunales pro-arbitraje, así como de tener en cuenta ciertas consideraciones culturales a la hora de elegir sede en Oriente Próximo. Respecto del nombramiento de los árbitros, Marguerat cuestionó la pertinencia de establecer tribunales de tres árbitros en procedimientos de baja cuantía, y señaló entre los criterios esenciales a la hora de elegir a un árbitro: su disponibilidad, los idiomas que domine, su experiencia, la confianza que genere y su capacidad para influir en la formación de la voluntad del tribunal. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 REPORTE SOBRE EL XII CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DEL CEA 211 Parra se refirió a Dubái como sede de arbitraje, señalando que, aunque en los últimos años ha dado pasos importantes hacia su modernización, una reciente reforma de su Código Penal permite que un árbitro pueda ser condenado a penas privativas de libertad por incumplimiento de su deber de neutralidad. Parra también analizó algunas técnicas de comunicación escritas, refiriéndose a la importancia de tener en cuenta el objetivo del documento a la hora de emplear un estilo que incorpore un mayor o menor grado de persuasión, preparar la teoría del caso identificando los puntos en disputa y fijando los elementos clave que convierten la posición de una parte en ganadora, y emplear una estructura y estilo adecuados. La segunda mesa redonda estuvo moderada por Elena Gutiérrez García de Cortázar y conformada por Leonor Díaz-Córdoba, de la London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA); José María Fernández de la Mela, de la Corte Española de Arbitraje; Ziva Filipic, de la Corte de Comercio Internacional (CCI) (participación remota); Valeriane Oreamuno, de Swiss Chambers; Juliana de Ureña, de la Corte de Arbitraje de Madrid (CAM); y Gonzalo Stampa, de La Corte Civil y Mercantil de Arbitraje (CIMA). En ella, Gutiérrez García de Cortázar lanzó preguntas a los ponentes para contrastar las prácticas de las diferentes instituciones arbitrales en relación con distintos temas de actualidad. Sobre el nombramiento de árbitros, la mayoría de las instituciones indicaron que cuentan con un sistema de listas abiertas sujeto a la confirmación del nombramiento por la corte, siendo la principal excepción CIMA, cuyas listas son cerradas y la designación se realiza por orden de turno. Respecto a las designaciones de mujeres como árbitros, la mayoría de las instituciones manifestaron contar con una política activa para fomentar la incorporación de mujeres-árbitro, habiendo suscrito el “Equal Representation in Arbitration Pledge” -a excepción de CIMA-. Refiriéndose a las estadísticas de 2016, el porcentaje de mujeres-árbitro osciló entre un 30% (en el caso de la Corte de Arbitraje de Madrid, la Corte Española de Arbitraje y Swiss Chambers) y un 15-20% (CCI y LCIA, respectivamente). Sin embargo, la mayor parte de estos porcentajes fueron debidos a las designaciones realizadas por las cortes. La mayoría de las instituciones coincidió en no contar con una política formal de promoción de los árbitros jóvenes, aunque defendieron fomentar la incorporación de nuevos árbitros. CIMA, por su parte, apuntó haber modificado su reglamento en esta línea y anunció que en un corto periodo de tiempo publicará una lista de árbitros jóvenes. En relación con las medidas cautelares, todas las cortes afirmaron contar con la figura del árbitro de emergencia, así como con la posibilidad de adoptar medidas cautelares ex parte, a excepción de la Corte de Arbitraje de Madrid, la Corte Española de Arbitraje y la CCI. La sesión concluyó con un coloquio en el que se discutió sobre la posibilidad de unificación de las instituciones españolas ante la incertidumbre que ello genera en el extranjero. Varias instituciones respondieron estar abiertas a discutir la posibilidad de integración, aunque se comentaron algunas importantes dificultades jurídicas que este proceso conllevaría. El último bloque del Encuentro se dividió en varios debates, con un formato en el que dos ponentes debatieron desde posiciones contrapuestas sobre un tema de actualidad. Así, Eléonore Caroit y Nicolás Costábile discutieron sobre la cautio judicatum solvi (security for cost) en el arbitraje internacional; Esperanza Barron y Dá- Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 212 Morales / Bravo / Marín maso Riaño, sobre la pertinencia de que sean las partes quienes nombren a los árbitros; Guillermo Bayas y Yuri Mantilla, sobre la posibilidad de limitar los documentos cuya producción se puede requerir a aquellos sobre los que el solicitante tenga la carga de la prueba; Marie-Isabelle Barretto y Alina Sartogo, sobre las inferencias negativas que puedan extraerse ante la negativa de una parte a presentar las pruebas requeridas por el tribunal; Inés Vázquez y Rubén Maestre, sobre la importancia de los terceros no firmantes del convenio arbitral; y Marc Cavaliero y José Páez, sobre el consentimiento implícito de los atletas en el arbitraje deportivo. I DESAYUNO MUJERES CEA CON ARBITRAL WOMEN Y EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION (THE PLEDGE) Tras su reciente constitución el pasado 18 de mayo de 2017, la Comisión Mujeres del CEA celebró, en el seno del XII Congreso, el I Desayuno Mujeres bajo el título “Júzgame con mente abierta – si puedes”, en colaboración con Arbitral Women y Equal Representation in Arbitration (The Pledge). El panel, moderado por Elena Gutiérrez García de Cortázar y Deva Villanúa, se centró en los sesgos cognitivos de los árbitros y contó con las intervenciones de Alexis Mourre, Sabina Sacco y Patricia Saiz, como ponentes. Sacco comenzó la ponencia destacando la importancia de analizar cómo toman los jueces y árbitros sus decisiones, refiriéndose a un doble sistema: un primer sistema intuitivo, automático, de pensamiento rápido, y un segundo sistema caracterizado por ser deliberativo, deductivo y de pensamiento lento. Sacco apuntó que el modelo más aceptado es el modelo de superación de la intuición (intuitive override) de acuerdo con el cual, el juzgador toma decisiones intuitivas que posteriormente corrige mediante la deliberación racional. En este contexto, Sacco presentó los sesgos cognitivos como errores de juicio sistemáticos, normalmente causados por un heurístico. Por último, Sacco analizó (i) el sesgo retrospectivo o tendencia a sobrestimar la predictibilidad de hechos pasados (hindsight blinder); (ii) el sesgo de confirmación o tendencia a dar mayor peso a información o pruebas que confirman creencias anteriores (confirmation blinder); y (iii) el sesgo de coherencia (coherence blinder). A continuación, Mourre se refirió primero a la importancia de la diversidad para la CCI, indicando que la situación actual no es aún la deseada y que la CCI persigue alcanzar la paridad en todas las instancias. Asimismo, subrayó la importancia de ampliar el grupo de árbitros a fin de evitar retrasos e ineficiencias en la llevanza de los arbitrajes. Mourre describió el proceso mental de los árbitros como una primera instancia intuitiva o visual, seguida de la construcción de la lógica de la decisión. A estos efectos, señaló que el actual diseño del proceso arbitral favorece el proceso intuitivo ya que la práctica de la prueba se ha convertido en un proceso meramente ilustrativo, más que de análisis de la prueba. Continuando con los sesgos cognitivos introducidos por Sacco, Saiz se refirió en primer lugar al sesgo de anclaje (anchoring blinder) por el cual el juzgador busca un punto de referencia en el que anclarse y posteriormente hacer ajustes. El problema en estos casos surge cuando el punto de anclaje es irrelevante o cuando no se realizan los ajustes adecuados. Saiz describió también el sesgo de contexto (frame blinder) y el sesgo de edad (age blinder). En el debate, el público y los ponentes discutieron acerca de la mejor forma de garantizar la activación el sistema deliberativo en la toma de decisiones. Saiz señaló que, para asegurar la activación de ese segundo sistema, es preciso que los árbitros cuenten con tiempo suficiente. A estos efectos, Mourre abogó por la transparencia a Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 REPORTE SOBRE EL XII CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DEL CEA 213 la hora de promover la eficiencia en la llevanza de los procedimientos y se mostró contrario a imponer un número máximo de designaciones simultáneas a los árbitros dadas las grandes diferencias en tamaño y complejidad de las disputas. Finalmente, Sacco sugirió que los secretarios arbitrales pueden, dentro de sus funciones, ayudar a corregir los posibles sesgos dado que disponen de más tiempo que los árbitros. I DIÁLOGOS ADR Tras la clausura del Congreso, Juan Fernández-Armesto, Presidente del CEA, y Mercedes Tarrazón, Socia Directora de Jones Day, procedieron a la apertura y presentación de los I Diálogos de ADR. La primera mesa llevó por título “Experiencias comparadas” y contó con Gilberto A. Guerrero-Rocca, como moderador, Andrea Bandini, Nathalia Mazzonetto, Julio César Rivera y Mercedes Tarrazón, como ponentes. En esta mesa, los ponentes se refirieron a la situación actual de la mediación en diferentes países. Así, Bandini explicó la situación de la mediación en Italia; Mazzonetto, en Brasil; Rivera, en Argentina; y Tarrazón, en Estados Unidos. Las conclusiones de esta mesa vinieron de la mano de Álvaro López de Argumedo, quien señaló que dos de los ejes del éxito de la mediación son su obligatoriedad y la existencia de incentivos. Con base en lo discutido en el panel, concluyó que la mediación es más exitosa en aquellos países donde es obligatoria. En cuanto a los incentivos positivos, se refirió a los mediadores expertos, a la presencia de las partes en la mediación, a los beneficios fiscales o al uso del case evaluation norteamericano; mientras que entre los incentivos negativos mencionó el ejercicio de la mediación sin la presencia de las partes, las multas por no mediar, el derecho a resarcimiento en costas si el resultado es inferior al de la mediación, y la imposición de costas aún con la obtención de un resultado favorable. La segunda y última mesa titulada “reflexiones desde la judicatura” la conformaron Francisco M. Serrano, como moderador, Mª Lourdes Arastey Sahún, Agustín Azparren, Mercedes Caso Señal y Francisco Pañeda, como ponentes. Cada uno de los ponentes expuso su experiencia personal con la mediación respecto de un ámbito específico de la judicatura. Caso explicó su experiencia en el ámbito gubernativo, refiriéndose a la esencialidad del papel del líder como impulsor de la mediación; Azparren trató la mediación civil en el ámbito judicial, refiriéndose a las reticencias que suscita en muchos abogados; Arastey expuso su visión de la mediación en el ámbito laboral, indicando que, en su opinión, es el método idóneo de resolución de disputas; por último, Pañeda explicó su positiva experiencia en la mediación concursal. Las conclusiones de esta mesa fueron a cargo de Pascual Ortuño, quien puntualizó la dificultad de realizar adecuadamente mediación intra-judicial con la carga de trabajo actual de los jueces. Seguidamente, consideró necesario dar pasos hacia el sistema americano, en el que son los funcionarios del juzgado los que analizan y determinan qué asuntos son susceptibles de ser sometidos a mediación. Asimismo, remarcó la dificultad de concluir exitosamente una mediación una vez que el litigio ya ha comenzado. Por último, Ortuño coincidió en la importancia de fomentar la mediación desde el sistema educativo. Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 215 INDICE New Table of Contents LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ÁRBITROS Y LA DOCTRINA DE LOS TRIBUNALES TRUNCADOS Luis Cordón Procter 1. Necesario repaso de los antecedentes. La anulación del laudo por vulneración del orden público 2. La acción de responsabilidad de los árbitros que emerge tras la anulación del laudo arbitral 3. Los recursos de casación contra la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Madrid y la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo que los resuelve 4. La doctrina de los Tribunales truncados referida en la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 5. Conclusiones 10 13 14 16 17 CLASS ARBITRATION: HERE TO STAY? THE POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CLASS ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION Julio César González Arango / Santiago Cruz Mantilla I. INTRODUCTION II. CLASS ARBITRATION: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATUS 19 21 A. CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE US (i) The Early Stage (ii) The Golden Years (iii) Stolt-Nielsen and its aftermath 21 21 22 24 B. CLASS ARBITRATION OUTSIDE THE US (i) Colombia (ii) Canada (iii) Spain (iv) Mexico (v) Portugal 25 25 26 27 27 28 C. CONCLUSION 28 29 III. ARE CLASS ARBITRAL AWARDS ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE NY CONVENTION? A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. (i) The pro-enforcement policy underlying the NY Convention (ii) The US Class Action Model has not been broadly adopted around the world B. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CLASS ARBITRAL AWARDS UNDER THE NY CONVENTION (i) Potential objections concerning the applicability of the NY Convention (ii) Potential objections concerning the composition of the arbitral authority Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 30 30 30 32 32 33 216 (iii) Potential objections concerning violations of due process (iv) Potential objections concerning the arbitrability of class-wide disputes and violations to public policy C. CONCLUSION IV. CONCLUSION: IS CLASS ARBITRATION HERE TO STAY? 35 38 40 41 TUTELA IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN COLOMBIA Daniela Corchuelo Uribe I. INTRODUCTION II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 49 51 A. Hierarchy of norms B. Arbitration 1. Article 116 of the Constitution 2. Statutory Law of Justice Administration 3. Arbitration Act: Law 1563 of 2012 4. New York Convention C. Tutela claims 1. Article 86 of Constitution 2. Decree 2591 of 1991 51 52 52 52 53 54 54 54 55 III. TUTELA AGAINST DOMESTIC ARBITRAL AWARDS 56 A. Admissibility of tutela claims against judgments and judicial decisions B. Admissibility of tutela claims against domestic arbitral awards C. Requirements of procedure 1. General requirements 2. Specific requirements D. Assessment IV. TUTELA AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS A. Judgment SU-500 of 2015 1. Background 2. Tutela proceedings 3. Criticism B. Are tutela claims admissible against international arbitral awards under the current legal framework? 1. Are international arbitrators subject to article 116 of the Colombian Constitution? 2. Do articles 67, 79 and 107 of Law 1563 of 2012 preclude the possibility to submit tutela claims against international arbitral awards made in Colombia? 3. Does the New York Convention bar the possibility to challenge international arbitral awards by means of tutela claims? C. Consequences of the admissibility of tutela claims against international arbitral awards 1. Possibility to challenge the arbitral award for errors in the interpretation and application of the substantive law 2. Attractiveness of Colombia as a seat of arbitration V. CONCLUSIÓN 56 58 58 58 59 61 62 62 62 63 64 67 68 70 72 76 76 76 78 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 217 NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO Y ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN Andrés Cervantes Valarezo I. INTRODUCCIÓN II. NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO 2.1. Cláusulas de integración y “cláusulas de aislamiento” III. ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN Y EL CIADI IV. ¿CRISIS ESTRUCTURAL DEL CIADI? 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. Apariencia de independencia e imparcialidad Derecho público y control de convencionalidad Falta de transparencia Falta de coherencia y precedentes jurisprudenciales V. INCONVENIENCIA DEL ARBITRAJE REGIONAL UNASUR VI. UNA CORTE INTERNACIONAL DE INVERSIONES VII. CONCLUSIONES 81 82 82 85 86 86 88 91 92 93 96 99 THIRD-PARTY FUNDING: A PROTECTED INVESTMENT? Duarte G. Henriques I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. INTRODUCTION GENERIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE DEFINITION OF AN INVESTMENT THE PARALLEL WITH ARBITRATION IN FINANCE AND BANKING THE ISSUES COMMONLY RAISED REGARDING THE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING INDUSTRY NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND A NEW MINDSET REGARDING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING THE RELEVANCE OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS A PROMOTER OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS A PROTECTED INVESTMENT HOW AND WHEN TO CLAIM THE THIRD-PARTY FUNDING INVESTMENT CONCLUSIONS 101 104 111 115 116 122 127 130 137 140 A COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE INVESTOR’S BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS? AN OVERVIEW OF URBASER V. ARGENTINA Rafael Carlos del Rosal Carmona I. INTRODUCTION II. JURISDICTION OVER COUNTERCLAIMS III. MERITS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM A. Applicable Law B. International Human Rights as the Basis for the Counterclaim 1. Applicability of General Human Rights Obligations to Corporations 2. Obligations of Corporations in connection with the Human Right to Water C. The Concession Contract IV. CONCLUSIÓN Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 141 142 145 145 147 147 149 150 151 218 EL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN LAS NUEVAS NORMAS PROCESALES SOBRE RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAUDOS INTERNACIONALES EN COSTA RICA Mauricio París / Mauricio Rapso I. EL PROBLEMA CON EL ORDEN PÚBLICO NO ES AJENO EN COSTA RICA 153 II. APROXIMACIÓN A LA IDEA DE ORDEN PÚBLICO Y UUS DISTINTAS CONCEPCIONES 154 III. EL TRATAMIENTO INTERNACIONAL DE LA CAUSAL DE ODEN PÚBLICO PARA DENEGAR EL RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAUDOS EXTRANJEROS 158 IV. LA INDOMABILIDAD DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN EL NUEVO CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL COSTARRICENSE 160 V. LA NORMATIVA ESPECIAL EN MATERIA DE ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL DEBE PREVALECER SOBRE LA GENERAL 162 VI. A MANERA DE CONCLUSIÓN 163 APPLICABLE LAW IN ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AGREEMENTS Nicolás Costábile and Anthony Lynch I. INTRODUCTION II. THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN DOMESTIC LAWS 165 167 A. The Approach of Common Law Jurisdictions B. The Approach of Civil Law Jurisdictions 167 169 III. RELEVANCE OF APPLICABLE LAW IN THIRD PARTY FUNDED ARBITRATION A. Validity of the Funding Agreement B. Procedural Issues 1. Disclosure of TPF Arrangements 2. Costs 3. Independence and Impartiality of the Tribunal 4. Document Disclosure C. ETHICAL ISSUES IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 170 170 173 174 175 177 178 180 181 LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA Y LA ADMISIBILIDAD EN ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL: ASUNTOS QUE MERECEN UNA TEMPRANA AUDIENCIA Jennifer L. Permesly, Diego Guevara y Pilar Prados Puchades I. INTRODUCCIÓN II. LA CARGA DE LA PRUEBA 183 185 A. Limitaciones a la exhibición de los documentos en el arbitraje internacional B. La “inferencia adversa” como opción alternativa III. EL ESTÁNDAR PROBATORIO 186 189 190 A. Estándares probatorios “especiales” i. Alegaciones de fraude – un estándar más elevado ii. Cuantificación de daños – un estándar disminuido B. ¿Derecho adjetivo o sustantivo? 193 193 195 196 Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 219 IV. LA ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA PRUEBA 197 A. La evaluación flexible de la prueba B. Las Reglas de la IBA reflejan el consenso actual sobre los asuntos probatorios C. EL EFECTO DE UNA AMPLIA ADMISIÓN DE EVIDENCIA EN EL ARBITRAJE V. CONCLUSIÓN 199 201 202 205 REPORTE SOBRE EL XII CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DEL ARBITRAJE, EL XI ENCUENTRO DEL CEA-40, EL I DESAYUNO DE LA COMISIÓN MUJERES Y LOS I DIÁLOGOS ADR Ana Morales Ramos / Luis Bravo Abolafia / Antonio Alexandre Marín Marín Revista del Club Español del Arbitraje - 30/2017 5 6