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Metaphilosophy, 2010
Abstract: According to the Veridicality Thesis, information requires truth. On this view, smoke carries information about there being a fire only if there is a fire, the proposition that the earth has two moons carries information about the earth having two moons only if the earth has two moons, and so on. We reject this Veridicality Thesis. We argue that the main notions of information used in cognitive science and computer science allow A to have information about the obtaining of p even when p is false.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2016
Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2010
In this essay, I pesent a new argument for the imposszbility of definmg truth by speafyzng the underlyzng structural property ali and only true proposttions have in common The set of consulerations I use to support this clazm take as thar inspiration Alston's recent argument that tt is trn possible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant Accordmg to what Alston calls the" mtensional argument", epistenuc def= tons are inconststent with the Tschema or the principie that tt is true that p if, and only tf, p Smce the ...
Episteme
This paper develops a novel account of the nature of disinformation that challenges several widely spread theoretical assumptions, such as that disinformation is a species of information, a species of misinformation, essentially false or misleading, essentially intended/aimed/having the function of generating false beliefs in/misleading hearers. The paper defends a view of disinformation as ignorance generating content: on this account, X is disinformation in a context C iff X is a content unit communicated at C that has a disposition to generate ignorance at C in normal conditions. I also offer a taxonomy of disinformation, and a view of what it is for a signal to constitute disinformation for a particular agent in a particular context. The account, if correct, carries high stakes upshots, both theoretically and practically: disinformation tracking will need to go well beyond mere fact checking.
Beginning with Linda Zagzebski in 1994, some philosophers have argued that there can be no solution to the Gettier counterexamples within the framework of a fallibilist theory of knowledge. If true, this would be devastating, since it is believed on good grounds that infallibilism leads to scepticism. But I argue here that these purported proofs are mistaken and that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is both cogent and fallibilist in nature. To show this I develop the notion of evidence of a state of affairs, a crucial concept in the truthmaker theory. I also argue that a common principle of the transmission of evidence through entailment is false, and the cause of much of the trouble.
We consider some of the different ways to develop a semantics in which statements are evaluated at partial possibilities rather than possible worlds; we explore the question of how these different semantical schemes are related; and we argue for the surprising conclusion that classical logic can only be properly accommodated within such a semantics by allowing possible worlds to be among the partial possibilities.
In trying to understand secrets and lies we define the truth as embed-ded in a surjective mapping of secrets onto lies. For every secret there is at least one lie. Individuals are badged into types: there is a set of individual's type = {H, L ,T}: honest type (H), liar type (L) and truth telling type (T). Secrets and lies are signalled by an individual's type. Truth is embedded in a topological neighbourhood of secrets and lies, signals and type. So the task at hand is to explain the truth by arguing that a no-truth equilibrium exists and honesty may not be the best policy. Paradoxically, Mr L, by not keeping to type and Mr T by telling a 'white lie' are engaged in telling the truth by telling a lie in the neighbourhood of no-truth.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing
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