Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) Can Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Provide Explicit Moral Action Guidance? 1. Abstract This paper focuses on one of the major criticisms made to Aristotle's virtue ethics, namely that it lacks explicit moral action guidance. The same criticism has been addressed to later developments of virtue ethics. There have been several attempts to overcome this objection and to demonstrate that modern theories of virtue ethics do provide principles of right action. In this paper, I discuss mainly two such major attempts: the exemplarist approach and the virtue rules approach. My aim is to examine whether, if applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, these two approaches can provide a convincing answer to the criticism that Aristotle’s ethics does not offer explicit moral action guidance1. 1.1 A summary of Aristotle’s virtue ethics In the Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle begins his discussion with the argument that Eudaimonia is the supreme human good and the ultimate aim in life. Aristotle gives three arguments as to why he believes this is so. Firstly, Eudaimonia is most final because all other things are desired for the sake of it. Secondly, it is selfsufficient because nothing needs to be added to it to make it more complete. Lastly, it is most desirable because nothing can be added to make it more desirable (NE I, 7, 1097b20-b21). Aristotle then goes on to link Eudaimonia with what he argues the distinctive human function is. According to Aristotle’s ergon argument, which is used to find the human good through the human function, everything in the universe has a reason of existence, a function, and the good of each thing lies in the effective performance of its function. For Aristotle, the function of human beings is the activity of the soul that exhibits virtue (NE I, 7, 1098a16-a17). Although Aristotle argues that the human good is connected with the distinctive human function to act rationally in accordance with virtue, he has not elaborated on why the human function that is connected with the human good has to be distinctive of humans. He has also not elaborated on why he chooses rational activity in accordance with virtue as the human function, instead of any other 1 I want to thank Prof. Theodore Scaltsas (University of Edinburgh) and Dr. Andrew Mason (University of Edinburgh) for all their help, guidance and constant support. Page 1 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) distinctive ability of humans, such for example as the ability to create fire or pursue unlimited wealth and power. Nonetheless, Aristotle quite probably took for granted that most would agree that rational activity in accordance with virtue is the function of human beings and that only through its effective performance can one reach Eudaimonia2. Aristotle then goes on to describe the conditions of virtuous agents. In his view, the agent who acts in accordance with virtues must act from knowledge, must choose the right act for its own sake and must act from a firm and stable character (NE II, 4, 1105a30-1105b). Aristotle in the above passage is arguing that a virtuous agent will never act out of chance, will never act on the basis of someone else’s encouragement or advice because she already possesses all the necessary knowledge and will never do the right act for any other reason than for its own sake. Aristotle also gives a definition of the concept of virtue. According to him, virtue is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean between two vices and determined by reason (NE II, 6, 1007a1-a2). According to Aristotle, the correct and appropriate course of action or feeling in a given situation is determined by the reason by which a man of practical wisdom (phronesis) would determine it (NE II, 6, 1107a2-a3). For Aristotle, the mean is not mathematically determined because some virtues are closer to some vices than others and thus it must always be determined by the particulars of each case. Aristotle also distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues. He argues that one part of the soul, the intellect, has reason in the full sense, while, although appetites themselves are not rational, the part of soul that has appetites is responsive to reason. He considers that as there are two parts of the human soul, there are accordingly two kinds of virtue, moral and intellectual (NE, VI, 1, 1139a1-a5.). According to Aristotle, moral virtues are virtues whose locus is the appetites. On the other hand, intellectual virtues are virtues which like the moral virtues are needed for the best life and most importantly include the virtue of practical wisdom. Sarah Broadie, argues in a similar fashion: “One might have expected Aristotle to attempt to cover this sort of gap in his argument…in any case, whether because this seems a fruitless dialectic or for some other reason, Aristotle makes no effort to strengthen his starting point” (Broadie and Rowe, 2011, p.13). 2 Page 2 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) 1.2 The criticism against Aristotle’s virtue ethics There are several authors who argue that the most important weaknesses of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and all modern theories of virtue ethics is that they lack explicit moral action guidance. That is that Aristotle does not come up with a list of rules for how we ought to act that will cover every, or at least the vast majority of, cases. Robert Louden, for example, argues that “Owing to the very nature of moral virtues, there is thus a very limited amount of advice on moral quandaries that one can reasonably expect” (Louden, 1984, p.229). Louden argues that the absence of explicit moral action guidance is a major weakness for an ethical theory. I think that whether one believes that the lack of explicit moral action guidance is a weakness for an ethical theory depends on what one believes that the purpose of an ethical theory is. Louden explicitly states that the primary purpose of an ethical theory is to provide explicit moral action guidance and argues that “People have always expected ethical theory to tell them something about what they ought to do” (Louden, 1984, p.205). From such a viewpoint Louden is justified in arguing that the lack of explicit moral action guidance in virtue ethics is a weakness. David Solomon also views the lack of explicit moral action guidance in virtue ethics as a theoretical weakness. He argues that “It is in the very nature of the virtue ethics that it cannot provide the kind of determinate guidance for action that is required in an adequate normative ethics” (Solomon, 1997, p.170). For Solomon, “Normative ethics is undoubtedly supposed to have a practical point” (Solomon, 1997, p.169), a practical point which according to him Aristotle’s virtue ethics and all modern developments of virtue ethics lack. However, Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not lack a practical point altogether. Solomon may be right that it lacks determinate guidance for action but virtue ethics, and in particular Aristotle’s virtue ethics, have other kind of practical applications in fields such as moral education. Aristotle has not provided us with explicit guidance in all moral matters, but his discussion of concepts such as Eudaimonia, the human function, akrasia and justice have a definite merit and can be of practical use. Nevertheless, although I do not agree with Solomon that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks a practical point, it seems that Solomon is right in arguing that it lacks explicit moral action guidance, and if one agrees with Solomon and Louden that the primary purpose of an ethical theory is to provide explicit moral guidance then Aristotle’s virtue ethics has indeed a major weakness. Page 3 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) Other authors, who also consider that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance, do not address their criticism to the overall theory but to certain specific concepts that seem to deprive Aristotle's theory of explicit moral action guidance. Bernard William, for example, argues that “The doctrine of the mean is best forgotten” as it does not offer anything to guide our moral actions (Williams, 1985, p.85). William is right in pointing out that to a large extent Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is to be blamed for the lack of explicit moral action guidance in his ethics. According to Aristotle, virtue lies in a mean between two vices, but the mean cannot be determined mathematically or known beforehand as sometimes virtues are closer to one vice than another and thus can only be determined by the particulars of every situation only by those agents that possess practical wisdom. Jerome Schneewind also argues that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance. Schneewind focuses his criticism on Aristotle’s description of the virtuous agent. He argues that, although virtue theorists focus more on the moral agent and her virtuous character than on a set of rules or laws, “He (Aristotle) does not suggest criteria which anyone and everyone can use to determine who is a virtuous agent and who is not” (Schneewind, 1990, p.62). Thus, for Schneewind this lack of a way to distinguish the virtuous agents is one of the primary reasons why virtue theorists cannot argue that Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not lack explicit moral action guidance. 1.3 Revival of the interest in Aristotle’s virtue ethics If we accept that Aristotle’s virtue ethics has such a major weakness, the ensuing question is why today it is viewed as a very important ethical theory. Two of the most prominent authors who are to a great extent responsible for the revival of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the second part of the twentieth century are Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre3. Anscombe in her article “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958 stirred a lot of interest and discussion around Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Anscombe’s argument that we should move back to an Aristotelian conception of ethics revived the interest of authors in Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Still, she argues that in order to move back to Anscombe and Macintyre are not the only ones responsible for the revival of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and the development of modern theories of virtue ethics. Amongst others, Philippa Foot for example, is often also accredited for being one of the founders of modern virtue ethics. See for example Foot’s book “Virtues and Vices” (1978). 3 Page 4 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) Aristotle’s virtue ethics we must first “… have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.” (Anscombe, 1958, p.1). MacIntyre is also to a large extent responsible for the revival of interest in Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the second part of the twentieth century, but most importantly is responsible for the development of modern theories of virtue ethics. MacIntyre, in his book “After Virtue” (1981), carries Anscombe’s viewpoint further. He criticizes modern theories of ethics and, like Anscombe, urges for a return to an Aristotelian conception of ethics. He argues, however, that Aristotle’s virtue ethics has certain elements which are outdated and in need of modernization. MacIntyre’s call for a modernization of Aristotle’s virtue ethics is greatly responsible for the development of modern theories of virtue ethics. However, virtue ethicists had now to find ways to defend virtue ethics from the criticism that they lack moral action guidance. The responses of virtue ethicists to such a criticism can be broadly separated into two kinds. On the one hand, there are those who in defense of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and virtue ethics in general, argue that the purpose of an ethical theory is not to provide explicit moral action guidance. Those authors argue that explicit moral action guiding rules which apply to every particular case are not possible. On the other hand, other virtue ethicists argue that Aristotle’s virtue ethics and virtue ethics in general do in fact offer explicit moral action guidance that can help the moral agent find the correct course of action in every possible scenario. Although I will briefly discuss, at a later stage, the viewpoint that a demand from an ethical theory to provide explicit moral action guidance is illegitimate, my purpose for now is to focus on the latter defense of virtue ethics, namely that virtue ethics do provide explicit moral action guidance. 2. The exemplarist approach to virtue ethics In what follows, I present and discuss two models of the exemplarist approach to virtue ethics, one proposed by Linda Zagzebski and one proposed by Julia Annas. While their models are somewhat different, they both adopt the idea that we can use virtuous agents as exemplars. My aim is to present the arguments of both authors, then examine whether the exemplarist approach can be applied to Aristotle’s virtue Page 5 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) ethics and finally to argue that the exemplarist approach cannot provide a solution to the criticism that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance. 2.1 The exemplarist virtue theory of Linda Zagzebski Zagzebski, in her article “Exemplarist Virtue Theory” (2010), argues that functioning as a manual for decision making is not the primary purpose of an ethical theory. She argues that the primary purpose of an ethical theory is to explain and justify moral beliefs and practices, showing which beliefs and which practices are justified and which are unjustified (Zagzebski, 2010, p.43). Zagzebski may be right in arguing that theories of ethics should not have as a primary aim to provide explicit moral action guidance, but this is not sufficient enough to discard the criticism that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance. Even if one accepts that explicit moral guidance in an ethical theory is of secondary importance, one could still argue that explicit moral action guidance is expected from an ethical theory and something that we should look for. In line to her general claim that the purpose of an ethical theory is not to provide moral action guidance, Zagzebski adopts an exemplarist approach and considers that one can get guidance through the examples of virtuous agents. She argues that through narratives of both fictional and real persons we learn that some people are admirable and worth imitating (Zagzebski, 2010, p.51). According to her, moral learning, similarly to other forms of learning, is acquired through imitation. She argues that we identify people worthy of our imitation through the emotion of admiration and that exemplars are people that are most admirable and thus most imitable (Zagzebski, 2010, pp.51-52). Hence, moral action guidance and moral learning come through a process of admiration and imitation. 2.2 The exemplarist virtue approach of Julia Annas Annas presents and discusses her exemplarist approach to virtue ethics in her article “Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing” (2004). She criticizes ethical theories which try to provide specific rules that aim at guiding moral action. She argues that “When it comes to working out the right to do, we cannot shift the work to a theory, however excellent, because we, unlike the theory are always learning, and so we are always aspiring to do better” (Annas, 2004, p.74). Annas argues that virtue Page 6 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) ethics have the advantage of avoiding this problem as “It directs us, as we are wondering what to do, towards emulating people who are braver, more generous and generally better than we are…” (Annas, 2004, p.73). Annas produces an exemplarist account which involves the virtuous agent, right action and the relevant developmental process (Annas, 2004, p.68). She argues that such an approach emphasizes the importance of practice in moral matters. She points out that Aristotle in a specific passage in the Nicomachean Ethics4 urges us to think of becoming virtuous along the lines of becoming a builder and learning to be moral is similar to acquiring a practical skill. By applying the builder analogy to moral matters she argues that “The beginning builder has to learn by picking a role model and copying what she does, repeating her actions.” (Annas, 2004, p.69) and also that “We start as learners dependent on models and progress to acquire our own understanding” (Annas, 2004, p.69). Annas’ exemplarist approach differs from the exemplarist approaches of others authors because in her approach virtuous people serve as exemplars, not simply for knowing what to do, but for the development of a skill by which we become better at making moral judgements. 2.3 Applying the exemplarist approach to Aristotle’s virtue ethics Despite the similarities of the two approaches, Annas’ exemplarist approach is directly aimed at defending modern virtue ethics while Zagzebski’s exemplarist theory is not limited to virtue ethics but can be applied to other ethical theories as well (Zagzebski, 2010, p.54). However, the question is whether either of these approaches can provide an adequate response to the criticism raised against Aristotle’s virtue ethics in particular. Aristotle in his description of virtue argues that the mean must always be determined by the particulars of each case and that a man who possesses practical wisdom would always be able to recognize what is good in each particular case and what the appropriate course of action or feeling is. Accordingly, although Aristotle most likely did not intend it, one may argue that moral agents who possess practical wisdom can be used as exemplars and as guides to moral action, at least at a beginner’s level. 4 Annas identifies the specific passage as NEII 1. Presumably she refers to sections NE II, 1, 1103b10b13 and NE II, 1, 1103a33-1103b. Page 7 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) 2.4 Problems of the exemplarist approach and its application to Aristotle's virtue ethics Still, there are some problems in Zagzebski’s and Anna’s exemplarist approaches, at least if we try to apply them to Aristotle’s ethical theory and, in spite of their merits, we cannot consider them as providing an adequate enough answer to the criticism against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. The main problem of the exemplarist approach as a solution to the criticism that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance is that Aristotle has not given us a way to distinguish the virtuous from the non-virtuous. As it has been already mentioned, Schneewind, arguing in a similar way, points out that “He (Aristotle) does not suggest criteria which anyone and everyone can use to determine who is a virtuous agent and who is not” (Schneewind, 1990, p.62). How can then one claim that we can use people that possess virtue as a moral guide, even at a beginner’s level, if we have no certain way of knowing who the virtuous people are? In order to illustrate my argument, I will give two examples showing the difficulties in distinguishing the virtuous agents. First, let us imagine a case where a moral agent has to choose between two completely different courses of action. On the one hand, a person who he admires, urges him to choose the first of two alternatives, or the moral agent imagines that the person he admires would choose that particular alternative. On the other hand, another person who the moral agent also admires urges him to choose the second alternative instead, or the moral agent imagines that the second person he admires would choose an opposite course of action than the first. What should the moral agent do in such a scenario? The moral agent may admire both persons equally, but only one of the two is right (assuming one of the two is right and not both wrong) since according to Aristotle there is only one correct course of action in a given situation. He says, for example, that “Again it is possible to fail in many ways…while to succeed is possible only in one way” (NE II, 6, 1106b28-b33). It seems that since we have no reliable way to identify the virtuous agent, there is high risk of following the wrong advice and thus end up with wrong moral guidance which seems to me even worse than no moral guidance at all. As a second example let us imagine a case that does not involve two, but only one possible exemplar. This person who the moral agent again admires may urge the moral agent to follow a specific course of action, or the moral agent imagines that the person he admires would follow this specific course of action. But what if that person Page 8 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) who the moral agent admires and believes to be a virtuous agent is not actually virtuous? Again in such a case we end up with wrong moral guidance. Annas replies to this objection by arguing that we can identify who the virtuous agents are in the same way “…that we identify good pianists and builders” (Annas, 2004, p.73). However, such a reply does not resolve the problem, because just as in the case of builders, there is high probability that one may misjudge people and hence be led to believe that a person is virtuous while he/she is not, especially at a beginner’s level. There are a lot of examples5 in our lives showing that we are prone to draw false conclusions about the people that surround us. One could argue that within the context of Annas’ developmental exemplarist approach, this is acceptable because once we develop our own understanding we will be able to question our role models. However this is not the case when we apply Anna’s exemplarist approach to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. For Aristotle, in order to become virtuous one must do the virtuous thing (NE II, 5, 1105b8-b9) and “…without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good” (NE II, 5, 1105b10-b11). It seems therefore that Annas’ exemplarist approach, when applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, fails to help us develop our own moral understanding because if by imitating the wrong role model we are led to a vice, according to Aristotle’s virtue ethics we will never become virtuous and we will never thus be in a position to do the virtuous thing. Annas argues that the unhelpful vagueness of the ideally virtuous agent is not a problem for her approach. She argues that it is not the ideally virtuous agent that we are appealing for guidance, but people that are "...braver, more generous and so on than we are" (Annas, 2004, p.72). However, for Aristotle a person either possesses virtues or does not; a person, for example, is either courageous or not, that is he either meets the conditions that for Aristotle a man who possesses the virtue of courage has or he does not6. And if a person possesses virtue, due to the unity of virtues, is fully and ideally virtuous (NE VI, 13, 1144b32-b34). Thus the vagueness of the ideally virtuous agent, especially if the non-virtuous agent cannot do what is virtuous without 5 For example, there are a lot of cases where one is led to believe that a person is for example honest, only to find out at a later point that he is not. 6 He must for example “face and fear the right things and for the right motive in the right way and at the right time, he must feel confidence under the corresponding conditions” (NE III, 7, 1115b17-b19) and “endure and act as courage directs for a noble cause” (NE III, 7, 1115b22-b24). Page 9 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) the help of exemplars, is a problem if we try to apply Annas’ approach to Aristotle's virtue ethics. Zagzebski also admits that we have no guarantee that the person we admire is worth our admiration and imitation. However, she argues that our disposition to admiration is a human function like memory and vision for which we cannot have a guarantee that they are trustworthy. According to Zagzebski, all we can do is to try and use this faculty as conscientiously as we can (Zagzebski, 2010, p.52). Still, the human disposition of admiration is an emotion rather than a cognitive faculty, and as such is even less trustworthy than faculties such as memory and vision and again, isn’t admiration a response to something we have already found out rather than a way of finding something out? Hence, the disposition to admiration does not give us a clear, accurate and reliable way of identifying virtuous people. Exemplars cannot provide our sole basis of moral judgment since it is not clear how we can recognize them with any certainty. Unless we have a reliable way of identifying virtuous people, there will be a lot of cases where people may believe that a person is virtuous and following him be led to non-virtuous actions. Aristotle himself has not given us a way to distinguish virtuous people; he has only argued that the virtuous agent who possesses phronesis will be always able to find the mean in every given situation. Most would agree that moral guidance from ethical theories must be reliable, accurate and easily accessible. An ethical theory that has a high probability to mislead us into imitating (and learning from) people who are not worthy of our admiration does not seem as a plausible alternative. Unless we are imitating virtuous agents, according to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we will never develop our own moral understanding and become virtuous ourselves. All in all, the exemplarist approach to virtue ethics cannot provide a solution to the criticism that Aristotle’s ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance, mainly because we have no reliable way of identifying virtuous agents. I have argued that neither Annas’ exemplarist approach nor Zagzebski’s exemplarist theory can overcome this problem. Page 10 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) 3. The virtue rules approach to virtue ethics The second approach to virtue ethics that I am going to discuss is the virtue rules approach with the purpose to assess whether it can provide a convincing solution to the criticism that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance. According to Hursthouse, the criticism that virtue ethics cannot provide moral guidance the way that the deontological and the utilitarian theories do is based on a misconception (Hursthouse, 2001, p.26) and betray an inadequate grasp of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991, p.223). Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics answer questions such as “What should I do?” as well as questions as “What sort of person should I be?” by coming up with rules and principles that we can use as moral guidance (Hursthouse, 1991, p.227). Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics provides specification of “right action” as each virtue generates a positive instruction and each vice a prohibition (Hursthouse, 2001, p.36) and hence the moral agent may employ her concept of the virtues and vices directly, rather than imagining what some hypothetical exemplar would do. Thus, for Hursthouse (similarly to the case of the exemplarist approach) it is not the theory in itself that guides action, but rather the theory tells us where to look for guidance, which in the case of her approach, is in the description of the virtues and vices themselves 7. 3.1 Applying the virtue rules approach to Aristotle’s virtue ethics In the Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle gives us a list of virtues and their corresponding vices. For example, he identifies the virtue of courage and its corresponding vices, rashness which shows an excess of courage and cowardice which shows a deficiency of courage. Aristotle also identifies other virtues such as temperance, magnificence, good temper, etc. Aristotle has thus given us a list of virtues which one could argue that we can use as a guide to moral action without having to rely on exemplars. The list of virtues that Aristotle identifies also helps us avoid a criticism that is usually raised by authors against the virtue rules approach, namely that we do not know which character traits are virtues (Hursthouse, 1991, p.228). This criticism aims at showing that virtues cannot be used as a moral guide since in modern theories of virtue ethics there is a disagreement amongst authors as to which character traits are For example, according to Hursthouse’s approach, an agent who is following the virtue of courage, must do what is courageous and must refrain from doing what is cowardly and what is rash. 7 Page 11 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) virtues. Hursthouse does provide an answer to this criticism, although in the case of Aristotle’s virtue ethics such a criticism does not hold as we already know which character traits are virtues, namely the ones that Aristotle has already identified as such8. All in all, it seems that the virtue rules approach can be applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics as Aristotle has given us a list of virtues and their corresponding vices. Thus, one could argue that the virtue rules approach can provide an answer to the criticism that Aristotle’s virtue ethics lacks explicit moral action guidance. 3.2 Problems of the virtue rules approach and its application to Aristotle’s virtue ethics Still, despite the merits that a virtue rules approach to Aristotle’s virtue ethics may have, there are certain problems in the application of such an approach to his theory, and that does not allow it to provide an answer to the criticism raised against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. The first problem of adopting a virtue rules approach to virtue ethics is that it does not after all provide explicit moral action guidance. If we take for example the case of the virtue of courage, according to the virtue rules theory it gives us a positive instruction to be courageous. However, it does not specify how to be courageous. It only urges us to be courageous. Thus, if one accepts the demand that a theory should give us explicit moral action guidance, one cannot claim that the virtue rules approach succeeds in doing so. Such an approach only gives us general guidelines that in specialized cases may fail to successfully guide our moral actions. Still, even if one disagrees with my assessment of the extent of moral guidance that one can get from such an approach, there is a major problem if we attempt to apply it to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. For Aristotle, the virtue lies in a mean between two vices which is determined by the reason by which a mean of practical wisdom (phronesis) would determine it. For Aristotle, the mean in each case has to be determined by the particulars. But if virtue is a mean between two vices that has to be determined by the particulars of each case and by the reason by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it, how can one argue that we can use virtue as a Aristotle’s list of virtues and vices are derived by applying the doctrine of the mean to various kinds of action and feeling. 8 Page 12 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) guide to our moral action? And if a man needs phronesis to determine the virtue, how can we claim that we can use it as a guide to our moral action? For Aristotle, since the virtues do not exist in separation from each other (NE VI, 13, 1144b32-b34), it follows that a virtuous person also possesses phronesis. Therefore in order to be able to determine the virtues, a moral agent needs to be virtuous already. But if a man needs to be virtuous to be able to determine the virtues, he is already in a position that does not need explicit moral action guidance. On the other hand, if a man who is not virtuous cannot determine the virtues, how can he use them as a guide to action? In order to illustrate my argument I will discuss the example of the virtue of courage. According to the virtue rules approach the virtue of courage gives us a positive instruction to be courageous. However, let us assume that we stand on the battlefield alone and two enemies are attacking us. Should we stand and fight or should we run? One could argue that we should fight because it is the courageous thing to do and it is what the virtue of courage instructs us to do. However, one could argue that standing and fighting against two enemies is not courageous but the excess related to this virtue, i.e. rashness, which according to the virtue rules approach, is prohibited. If on the other hand, one argues that we should run as it is rashness to stand and fight, one could counterargue that running is cowardice and thus a vice. It seems to me that the correct course of action depends on the particulars. For example, in the specific case it depends on whether we are armed, whether we are highly trained, whether allies are nearby, what is at stake, etc. But, according to Aristotle, only the virtuous agent who possesses practical wisdom would be able to determine the correct course of action and the mean where the virtue lies in the specific example. Replying to an objection that virtue rules are inferior to deontological rules as far as children are concerned, Hursthouse argues that “mothers’ knee rules” such as “Don’t lie” and “Keep promises” are not excluded from theories of virtue ethics. She argues that “virtue ethics not only comes up with rules, but, further, does not exclude the more familiar deontologist’s rules” (Hursthouse, 2001, p.39). Can these “mothers’ knee rules” supplement and strengthen the virtue rules approach? It believe that in the case of Aristotle’s virtue ethics they cannot because even if Aristotle did recognize these “rules”, he would certainly not see them as universally valid, given his emphasis on perception and the wise person’s judgment. Page 13 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) One could argue that Hursthouse does not aim to show that virtue ethics can provide explicit moral action guidance, but rather aims at arguing that they do at least have something to say about how we should act. I agree with Hursthouse that virtue ethics do have something to say about how we should act, but I do not believe that the virtue rules approach can, when applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, provide a solution to the criticism that it lacks explicit moral action guidance. Those who criticize Aristotle’s virtue ethics for lack of explicit moral action guidance, would not be satisfied with an approach that holds that Aristotle’s virtue ethics does have something to say about right action but still in cases where we are in doubt it fails to guide our action. 4. A combination of the exemplarist approach and the virtue rules approach In order to claim that Aristotle’s virtue ethics and virtue ethics in general do not lack explicit moral guidance, one could argue that a better option than either the exemplarist approach or the virtue rules approach may be a combination of the two. Such a combination is analogous to the case of a coach who trains an athlete. The coach, like the exemplar, shows the correct approach to the athlete but he also tells the athlete which rules to follow9. At a first examination a combination of the two approaches looks stronger than each approach separately. Such a combination offers more explicit moral action guidance since it enables one to use both exemplars and virtues as a moral guide. However, at a closer inspection, at least in the case of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, one realizes that such a combination does not offer a persuasive enough solution either. And the reason is the unavoidable fact that such a combination does not only “inherit” the strengths of each approach but also their weaknesses. On the one hand, in the application of such a combination to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we still do not know who the virtuous agents are and the virtue rules approach cannot help us solve this problem. Surely the virtuous agents act in accordance with the virtues, but for Aristotle the virtue has to be determined by the particulars. Thus one could not argue that we can determine who the virtuous agents are through the virtues themselves, because only the virtuous agent can determine the mean where the virtues lies in each particular situation. It seems to me that since the non-virtuous 9 This analogy and the possibility of a combination of the two approaches were first brought to my attention by Prof. Theodore Scaltsas. Page 14 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) agents cannot determine the virtue, they are also unable to determine the virtuous agents through the virtue. Therefore, the non-virtuous agent is still left without explicit moral action guidance. He is still unable to determine the virtuous agents with enough certainty. On the other hand, in the case of such a combination, the exemplarist approach cannot help overcome the weaknesses of the virtue rules approach when applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. For Aristotle, the correct and appropriate course of action or feeling in a given situation is determined by the reason by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it. So, since Aristotle has not given us a way to identify virtuous agent, we cannot use the agents who possess virtues as a tool to determine the virtues themselves. Therefore, since the virtues have to be determined by the reason by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it, the non-virtuous agent still cannot determine the virtue and is thus left again without explicit moral action guidance. In order to illustrate my argument let us again imagine the example of the soldier standing on the battlefield, being attacked by two enemies and contemplating whether she should stand and fight or run. In the case of the combination of the two approaches, someone who the agent admires urges her to for example to stand and fight or the agent imagines that the person she admires would do so. The agent also knows that there are two vices which are prohibited (rashness and cowardliness) and a virtue which is the correct course of action (courage). Does the agent have enough moral action guidance in such an example to lead her choose the correct course of action? I believe she does not. First of all, the agent may decide to do what the person she admires would do or urges her to do, but it is very likely that she is again imitating a non-virtuous agent. Secondly, the fact that the agent knows that there are two vices and a virtue does not help her be any more certain that she is doing the virtuous thing. In order for the combination of the two approaches to provide a response to the criticism against Aristotle’s virtue ethics, it must guide our actions correctly, if not in every possible moral scenario, at least in the vast majority of cases. But I believe that the combination of the two approaches would fail to provide the tools to guide us to the correct course of action in more than just a few cases. What is worse, in the many cases that it would fail to lead us to the correct course of action, it would have pushed us towards a vice. Page 15 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) 5. Other responses to the criticism As I have already mentioned, when it comes to answering this criticism, authors in favor of virtue ethics are divided into those who consider that virtue ethics do not lack explicit moral action guidance and those who argue that the demand from an ethical theory for explicit moral action guidance is illegitimate. I will now discuss some of the arguments of authors who hold this latter line of defense to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Sarah Broadie and John McDowell defend Aristotle’s ethics by arguing that a demand for reliable and accurate moral action guidance that is applicable successfully in the vast majority of cases cannot be met by any theory of ethics. McDowell for example argues that “It is sometimes complained that Aristotle does not attempt to outline a decision procedure for questions about how to behave. But we have good reason to be suspicious of the assumption that there must be something to be found along the routes he does not follow” (McDowell, 1979, pp.347-348). Broadie in a similar fashion argues that Aristotle’s theory shows us that “no kind of natural response neutrally described is either right or wrong in itself. This always depends on the particulars” (Broadie, 1991, p.102). In essence, both McDowell and Broadie argue that Aristotle does not provide us with an explicit moral guide on how to act because a chart of specific moral action guidance that can be applied successfully in the vast majority of cases is impossible. One could counterargue that other ethical theories, such as the deontological and the utilitarian theories, give explicit moral action guidance which can be used in every possible scenario. Still, one in favor of Aristotle’s virtue ethics could reply that there are numerous examples where the explicit moral guidance of these theories fails to guide us properly in particular circumstances, a weakness which Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not have. Kant’s deontological ethics, for example, are widely seen as claiming that we ought never to lie, a claim which in many cases yields counterintuitive results, as for example in the case of the inquiring murderer objection. On the other hand, utilitarianism also seems sometimes to yield counterintuitive results. For example, one could argue that according to certain versions of utilitarianism, in the case of a crime that has been the cause of rioting in a city, one should frame an innocent person for the crime, if such an action results in restoring peace in the society and helps in saving lives. Page 16 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) We can also interpret ethical intuitionists as arguing in a similar way to the criticism made against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. George Edward Moore, for example, argues that “the search for “unity” and “systems” at the expense of truth is not a proper business of philosophy” (Moore, 1903, p.270). One could claim, following Moore’s arguments, that the search for explicit moral action guidance which provides unity and creates a system at the expense of truth is not what we should demand of an ethical theory. Harold Arthur Pritchard addresses specifically the criticisms against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. He argues that some are dissatisfied by Aristotle’s ethics because “…Aristotle does not do what we as Moral Philosophers want him to do, viz., to convince us that we really ought to do what in our non-reflective consciousness we have hitherto believed we ought to do, or, if not, to tell us what, if any, are the other things which we really ought to do, and to prove to us that he is right.”(Prichard, 1912, p.33). Pritchard does not consider this demand legitimate. He argues that “The sense that we ought to do certain things arises in our unreflective consciousness, being an activity of moral thinking occasioned by the various situations in which we find ourselves.” (Prichard, 1912, p.34). Lastly, William David Ross criticizes ethical theories such as Kant’s deontological ethics and the utilitarian theory of ethics arguing that they oversimplify moral life. He argues that our moral responsibilities are not “… principles by the immediate application of which our duty in particular circumstances can be deduced” (Ross, 1939, FE84). Ross argues that objective ethical truths become clear to us when we reach moral maturity, or as Aristotle argues when (and if) we become virtuous. In the end, Ross argues that decision regarding what to do, just as Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean ethics, “rests in perception” (NE II, 9, 1109b23). Conclusion All in all, Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not offer explicit moral action guidance no matter how one tries to approach the issue. However, whether this lack of explicit moral guidance is indeed a weakness or a positive aspect of an ethical theory depends on what one expects of an ethical theory. If one believes that an ethical theory can successfully guide our moral action in all possible, or at least the vast majority of, particular incidents of our moral life, then one is right to argue that the lack of explicit moral action guidance is a weakness. If on the other hand, one believes that morality Page 17 of 18 Alkis Kotsonis (MSc Dissertation 2014, Short Version – University of Edinburgh) is too complex and too dependent on the particulars of each case to be successfully guided by ethical theories, then one is right to argue that the lack of explicit moral action guidance in Aristotle’s virtue ethics is not a weakness, but a theoretical strength. I am inclined to agree with the latter. References Annas, J. 2004. Being virtuous and doing the right thing. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 78 (2): pp. 61-75. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy, vol. 33 (124): pp. 1-19. Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford University Press. Broadie, S., and Christopher R. eds. 2011. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press. Crisp, R. 2000. Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. Foot, P. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Blackwell. Hursthouse, R. 1991. Virtue theory and Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 20 (3): pp. 223246. Hursthouse, R. 2001. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press. Johnson, R. N. 2003. Virtue and Right. Ethics 113.4: pp. 810-834. Louden, R. B. 1984. On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 21 (3): pp. 227-236. MacIntyre, A. C. 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, 3rd Edition. McDowell, J. 1979. Virtue and Reason. The Monist, vol. 62 (3): pp. 331-355. Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press. Prichard, H. A. 1912. Does Moral Philosophy Rest On A Mistake? Mind XXI.81: pp. 21-37. Ross, W. D. 1939. The Foundations of Ethics. Clarendon Press. Schneewind, J. B. 1990. The Misfortunes of Virtue. Ethics, vol. 101 (1): pp. 42-63. Swanton, C. 2011, “Virtue Ethics”, in Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics, New York: Continuum, pp. 190–213. Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and limits of philosophy. Harvard University Press. Zagzebski, L. 2010. Exemplarist Virtue ethics. Metaphilosophy, vol. 41 (1-2): pp. 41-57. Zagzebski, L. 2004. Divine Motivation Theory. Cambridge University Press. Page 18 of 18