- School of Politics, Philosophy, & Public Affairs
Washington State University
801 Johnson Tower
PO Box 644880
Pullman, WA 99164-4880 - 4064590326
- Virtue Ethics, Virtue Epistemology, Moral Psychology, Virtues (Moral Psychology), Virtues and Vices, Epistemology, and 22 moreMoral Epistemology, Social Epistemology, Ethics, Business Ethics, Applied Ethics, Business & Ethics, Normative Ethics, Aristotle's Ethics, Animal Ethics, Philosophy of Punishment, Capital Punishment, Skill Acquisition, Expertise, Self-regulation, Self Regulation, Wisdom, Philosophy Of Law, Philosophy of Criminal Law, Philosophy of Law, Political Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, and Moral and Political Philosophyedit
- Matt Stichter is an Associate Professor of Philosophy in the School of Politics, Philosophy, & Public Affairs at Wash... moreMatt Stichter is an Associate Professor of Philosophy in the School of Politics, Philosophy, & Public Affairs at Washington State University. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Bowling Green State University in 2007. He pursues research at the intersection of moral psychology, virtue ethics, and the philosophy of expertise. He has published many articles and chapters on the “virtue-as-skill” thesis, arguing that the development of virtue should be understood as a process of skill acquisition, and he draws on the psychological research on self-regulation and expertise to formulate this thesis. He recently published a book on this topic, The Skillfulness of Virtue: Improving Our Moral and Epistemic Lives, with Cambridge University Press (2018). He has been part of interdisciplinary grants on the topic of "Civic Virtue and 'True' Selves: Finding Authenticity in the Complexities of Human Public Life" for The Self, Virtue & Public Live research initiative; as well as on the topic of “Understanding Virtue and Virtue Development in the Context of Heritability Information” for the Genetics & Human Agency research initiative. He has published in journals such as the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Journal of Moral Education, Journal of Philosophical Research, Journal of Positive Psychology, Journal of Value Inquiry, Res Publica, and Synthese.edit
Recent models of wisdom in philosophy and psychology have converged on conceptualizing this intellectual virtue as involving metacognitive processes that enable us to know how to live well and act morally. However, these models have been... more
Recent models of wisdom in philosophy and psychology have converged on conceptualizing this intellectual virtue as involving
metacognitive processes that enable us to know how to live well and act morally. However, these models have been
critiqued by both philosophers and psychologists on the grounds that their conceptions of wisdom are redundant with other
constructs, and so the concept of wisdom should be eliminated. In reply, I defend an account of wisdom that similarly conceptualizes
wisdom as involving metacognitive processes, but without being subject to the critique that wisdom is redundant.
To isolate what’s unique about wisdom, I examine the self-regulatory processes that are relevant for being effective in striving
to achieve our goals and draw further insights from the research on skill acquisition and expertise. This framework reveals
that the unique contribution that wisdom can make beyond these other processes is in setting and revising our conceptions
of living well and the constitutive virtues, and so the concept of wisdom is not redundant. In addition, this account can help
to resolve two other areas of contention in wisdom research, which is accounting for the connection between wisdom and
moral motivation, as well as the role of emotion in wisdom. A goal-oriented approach provides insight into factors influencing
moral motivation due to distinctions in the ways goals are formulated, and for a better understanding of the connection
between emotion and wisdom I endorse enactivist accounts that maintain that emotions are embodied appraisals connected
to our deeply held cares and values.
metacognitive processes that enable us to know how to live well and act morally. However, these models have been
critiqued by both philosophers and psychologists on the grounds that their conceptions of wisdom are redundant with other
constructs, and so the concept of wisdom should be eliminated. In reply, I defend an account of wisdom that similarly conceptualizes
wisdom as involving metacognitive processes, but without being subject to the critique that wisdom is redundant.
To isolate what’s unique about wisdom, I examine the self-regulatory processes that are relevant for being effective in striving
to achieve our goals and draw further insights from the research on skill acquisition and expertise. This framework reveals
that the unique contribution that wisdom can make beyond these other processes is in setting and revising our conceptions
of living well and the constitutive virtues, and so the concept of wisdom is not redundant. In addition, this account can help
to resolve two other areas of contention in wisdom research, which is accounting for the connection between wisdom and
moral motivation, as well as the role of emotion in wisdom. A goal-oriented approach provides insight into factors influencing
moral motivation due to distinctions in the ways goals are formulated, and for a better understanding of the connection
between emotion and wisdom I endorse enactivist accounts that maintain that emotions are embodied appraisals connected
to our deeply held cares and values.
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Despite practical wisdom being central to accounts of virtue, there are still many competing conceptions of it, partly because it has been assigned so many roles to play in generating moral knowledge and acting in accordance with that... more
Despite practical wisdom being central to accounts of virtue, there are still many competing conceptions of it, partly because it has been assigned so many roles to play in generating moral knowledge and acting in accordance with that knowledge. I argue that to get clear on what practical wisdom specifically consists in, we need to disentangle the different roles assigned to this concept. First, several elements attributed to practical wisdom can already be accounted for by virtues of self-regulation. Second, on a skill model of virtue, we find several other elements already present in the development of skill acquisition and expertise. This allows us to then narrow down to what is unique to practical wisdom. Practical wisdom requires thinking about your goals and actions relative to an overall conception of what it is to live well as a person, as well as critical reflection on your conception of living well. Furthermore, even after having refined the scope of practical wisdom in this way, it is unlikely that being practically wise will be the product of a single intellectual virtue. Rather, practical wisdom may end up consisting in the exercise of several intellectual virtues, working in connection with each other.
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Research Interests: Psychology and Virtue
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One approach to conceptualizing virtue is to compare and contrast virtues with skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The knowledge of someone with a virtue is purported to be analogous to the... more
One approach to conceptualizing virtue is to compare and contrast virtues with skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The knowledge of someone with a virtue is purported to be analogous to the knowledge of the expert in a skill. Since the study of expertise is concerned with understanding the development of skill acquisition from the stages of novice to expert, it has the potential to shed light on the acquisition of virtue. This thesis has gained traction in contemporary virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Determining whether this thesis is plausible requires answering three central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? Third, is there evidence that virtue development tracks skill acquisition? This chapter explores these questions and poses some answers to them.
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Research Interests: Situationism and Virtue
Research Interests: Psychology and Virtue
Psychological research has revealed that there is a strong tendency for people to believe that they have a ‘true self’, and to believe that this true self is inherently morally good. This would see...
Research Interests:
The Skillfulness of Virtue provides a new framework for understanding virtue as a skill, based on psychological research on self-regulation and expertise. Matt Stichter lays the foundations of his argument by bringing together theories of... more
The Skillfulness of Virtue provides a new framework for understanding virtue as a skill, based on psychological research on self-regulation and expertise. Matt Stichter lays the foundations of his argument by bringing together theories of self-regulation and skill acquisition, which he then uses as grounds to discuss virtue development as a process of skill acquisition. This account of virtue as skill has important implications for debates about virtue in both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Furthermore, it engages seriously with criticisms of virtue theory that arise in moral psychology, as psychological experiments reveal that there are many obstacles to acting and thinking well, even for those with the best of intentions. Stichter draws on self-regulation strategies and examples of deliberate practice in skill acquisition to show how we can overcome some of these obstacles, and become more skillful in our moral and epistemic virtues.
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In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates ( N = 230), the... more
In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates ( N = 230), the expression of civic hope predicted the perceived authenticity of civic actions (e.g., voting), which in turn predicted the motivation to engage in them. In a longitudinal on-line study that began 8 weeks prior to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election ( N = 308 MTurk workers), overall expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting and the motivation to vote. In addition, expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting, which in turn positively predicted the likelihood of reporting that one did vote. These findings indicate that a sense of civic hope and the experience of authenticity in political contexts may be important for democratic engagement.
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Authenticity is often defined as the extent to which people feel that they know and express their true selves. Research in the psychological sciences suggests that people view true selves as more morally good than bad and that this... more
Authenticity is often defined as the extent to which people feel that they
know and express their true selves. Research in the psychological sciences suggests that people view true selves as more morally good than bad and that this “virtuous” true self may be a central component of authenticity. In fact, there may be reasons to suspect that authenticity serves as a cue that one’s behaviors are virtuous, and feelings of authenticity may help sustain virtuous actions. However, in previous research, operationalizations of virtue may not clearly capture virtue as virtue theorists might recognize it. The possibility that feelings of authenticity keep people oriented toward virtuous activities is compatible with theorizing, but the precise ways that it might do so has not received direct conceptual or empirical scrutiny.
We propose an interdisciplinary hypothesis of how feelings of authenticity
could function to serve as a feedback mechanism for virtuous behavior.
Feelings of authenticity could play a role in sustaining motivation to engage in virtuous activity insofar as the experience of subjective authenticity encourages one to approach that activity or environment in the future. Furthermore, virtuous behavior incorporates a few key elements that are predictive of experiencing subjective authenticity. We review emerging research that offers initial support for the idea that authenticity may guide sustained and virtuous civic action and develop a theoretical framework that positions authenticity as integral to sustained virtuous behavior.
know and express their true selves. Research in the psychological sciences suggests that people view true selves as more morally good than bad and that this “virtuous” true self may be a central component of authenticity. In fact, there may be reasons to suspect that authenticity serves as a cue that one’s behaviors are virtuous, and feelings of authenticity may help sustain virtuous actions. However, in previous research, operationalizations of virtue may not clearly capture virtue as virtue theorists might recognize it. The possibility that feelings of authenticity keep people oriented toward virtuous activities is compatible with theorizing, but the precise ways that it might do so has not received direct conceptual or empirical scrutiny.
We propose an interdisciplinary hypothesis of how feelings of authenticity
could function to serve as a feedback mechanism for virtuous behavior.
Feelings of authenticity could play a role in sustaining motivation to engage in virtuous activity insofar as the experience of subjective authenticity encourages one to approach that activity or environment in the future. Furthermore, virtuous behavior incorporates a few key elements that are predictive of experiencing subjective authenticity. We review emerging research that offers initial support for the idea that authenticity may guide sustained and virtuous civic action and develop a theoretical framework that positions authenticity as integral to sustained virtuous behavior.
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Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Epistemology, Moral Psychology, Aristotle, and 15 moreVirtue Ethics, Virtues (Moral Psychology), Morality (Social Psychology), Moral Development, Happiness, Moral Philosophy, Moral Education, Self-determination theory (Education), Happiness and Well Being, Happiness Studies, Virtue, Morality, Self Determination Theory, Eudaimonia, and Psychology Of Happiness
Research Interests: Psychology and Virtue
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with... more
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly
higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much
as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the
conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to selfimprove
over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new
and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one’s level of skillfulness in leading a
virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal
needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract,
internally motivated and promotion- rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the
moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of
abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a
self-regulated process of virtue acquisition.
higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much
as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the
conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to selfimprove
over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new
and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one’s level of skillfulness in leading a
virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal
needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract,
internally motivated and promotion- rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the
moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of
abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a
self-regulated process of virtue acquisition.
Research Interests:
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with... more
The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to selfimprove over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one's level of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract, internally motivated and promotion-rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a self-regulated process of virtue acquisition.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Situationism and Virtue
Research Interests:
In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates ( N = 230), the... more
In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates ( N = 230), the expression of civic hope predicted the perceived authenticity of civic actions (e.g., voting), which in turn predicted the motivation to engage in them. In a longitudinal on-line study that began 8 weeks prior to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election ( N = 308 MTurk workers), overall expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting and the motivation to vote. In addition, expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting, which in turn positively predicted the likelihood of reporting that one did vote. These findings indicate that a sense of civic hope and the experience of authenticity in political contexts may be important for democratic engagement.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Moral Psychology, Aristotle, Virtue Ethics, and 14 moreVirtues (Moral Psychology), Morality (Social Psychology), Moral Development, Happiness, Moral Philosophy, Moral Education, Self-determination theory (Education), Happiness and Well Being, Happiness Studies, Morality, Self Determination Theory, Eudaimonia, Eudaimonic Well-Being, and Psychology Of Happiness
Self-determination theory, like other psychological theories that study eudaimonia, focuses on general processes of growth and self-realization. An aspect that tends to be sidelined in the relevant literature is virtue. We propose that... more
Self-determination theory, like other psychological theories that study eudaimonia, focuses on general processes of growth and self-realization. An aspect that tends to be sidelined in the relevant literature is virtue. We propose that special focus needs to be placed on moral virtue and its development. We review different types of moral motivation and argue that morally virtuous behavior is regulated through integrated regulation. We describe the process of moral integration and how it relates to the development of moral virtue. We then discuss what morally virtuous individuals are like, what shape their internal moral system is expected to take and introduce moral self-concordance. We consider why morally virtuous individuals are expected to experience eudaimonic well-being. Finally, we address the current gap in self-determination theory research on eudaimonia.
Research Interests: Moral Psychology, Aristotle, Virtue Ethics, Self-Determination Theory, Virtues (Moral Psychology), and 15 moreMorality (Social Psychology), Moral Development, Happiness, Moral Philosophy, Self-determination theory (Education), Aristotle's Ethics, Happiness and Well Being, Happiness (Psychology), Happiness Studies, Morality, Self Determination Theory, Eudaimonia, eudaimonia, Aristotle' Ethics, Eudaimonic Well-Being, and Psychology Of Happiness
Despite practical wisdom being central to accounts of virtue, there are still many competing conceptions of it, partly because it has been assigned so many roles to play in generating moral knowledge and acting in accordance with that... more
Despite practical wisdom being central to accounts of virtue, there are still many competing conceptions of it, partly because it has been assigned so many roles to play in generating moral knowledge and acting in accordance with that knowledge. I argue that to get clear on what practical wisdom specifically consists in, we need to disentangle the different roles assigned to this concept. First, several elements attributed to practical wisdom can already be accounted for by virtues of self-regulation. Second, on a skill model of virtue, we find several other elements already present in the development of skill acquisition and expertise. This allows us to then narrow down to what is unique to practical wisdom. Practical wisdom requires thinking about your goals and actions relative to an overall conception of what it is to live well as a person, as well as critical reflection on your conception of living well. Furthermore, even after having refined the scope of practical wisdom in th...
Research Interests:
One approach to conceptualizing virtue is to compare and contrast virtues with skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The knowledge of someone with a virtue is purported to be analogous to the... more
One approach to conceptualizing virtue is to compare and contrast virtues with skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The knowledge of someone with a virtue is purported to be analogous to the knowledge of the expert in a skill. Since the study of expertise is concerned with understanding the development of skill acquisition from the stages of novice to expert, it has the potential to shed light on the acquisition of virtue. This thesis has gained traction in contemporary virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Determining whether this thesis is plausible requires answering three central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? Third, is there evidence that virtue development tracks skill acquisition? This chapter explores these questions and poses some answers to them.
Research Interests: Psychology and Virtue
SYNOPSIS Objective. We investigated associations between adults’ beliefs about the heritability of virtue and endorsements of the efficacy of specific parenting styles. Design. In Studies 1 (N = 405) and 2 (N = 400), beliefs about both... more
SYNOPSIS Objective. We investigated associations between adults’ beliefs about the heritability of virtue and endorsements of the efficacy of specific parenting styles. Design. In Studies 1 (N = 405) and 2 (N = 400), beliefs about both the genetic etiology of virtuous characteristics and parenting were assessed in samples of parents and non-parents. In Study 3 (N = 775), participants were induced to view virtue as determined by genes or as determined by social factors. Heritability beliefs and authoritarian parenting endorsements were subsequently measured. Results. Study 1 and Study 2 converged to reveal that tendencies to view characteristics as determined by genes were positively associated with endorsement of authoritarian parenting styles. This association occurred independent of individual differences in essentialism and right-wing authoritarianism. Study 3 revealed that exposure to genetic accounts of virtue increased beliefs that virtue is caused by genes, which in turn was positively associated with endorsements of authoritarian parenting responses to child problem behavior. Exposure to genetic accounts of virtue increased endorsement of authoritarian parenting among parents, but was unrelated to authoritarian parenting among non-parents. Conclusions. These studies suggest that genetic accounts of virtuous characteristics reliably relate to more positive beliefs about harsh and controlling parenting practices, illuminating an unrecognized cognitive factor associated with authoritarian parenting endorsement.
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In this paper, we provide an overview of our ongoing project in the Genetics and Human Agency Initiative sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation. Our project focuses on the ways that lay beliefs about the heritability of virtue... more
In this paper, we provide an overview of our ongoing project in the Genetics and Human Agency Initiative sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation. Our project focuses on the ways that lay beliefs about the heritability of virtue influence reasoning about the nature of virtue, parenting behaviors, and the development of virtue in children. First, we provide philosophical perspectives on the nature of virtue and suggest that viewing virtue as a malleable skill may have important advantages. Next, we review theory and research that highlights the ways that lay heritability beliefs potentially undermine conceptualizations of virtue as a malleable skill. Finally, we discuss how lay heritability beliefs might ultimately affect parent-child interactions and child virtue development. The paper thus provides a brief description our project's theoretical foundation and a general look at the empirical questions it will tackle.
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There are many philosophical problems surrounding experts, given the power and status accorded to them in society. We think that what makes someone an expert is having expertise in some skill domain. But what does expertise consist in,... more
There are many philosophical problems surrounding experts, given the power and status accorded to them in society. We think that what makes someone an expert is having expertise in some skill domain. But what does expertise consist in, and how closely related is expertise to the notion of an expert? In this paper I inquire into the nature of expertise, by drawing on recent psychological research on skill acquisition and expert performance. In addition, I connect this research on expertise to the larger context of psychological research on human cognition, as it will illuminate some of the differing elements of expertise. This allows me to then critique philosophical accounts of expertise, by showing how they make unwarranted assumptions about skills and expertise. Finally, I note the ways in which being credited as an expert can diverge from the possession of expertise itself. This can help us resist some of the power dynamics involved with those deemed to be experts.
Research Interests: Psychology and Expertise
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Psychological research has revealed that there is a strong tendency for people to believe that they have a ‘true self’, and to believe that this true self is inherently morally good. This would see...
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One of the hallmarks of virtue is reliably acting well. Such reliable success presupposes that an agent (1) is able to recognize the morally salient features of a situation, and the appropriate response to those features and (2) is... more
One of the hallmarks of virtue is reliably acting well. Such reliable success presupposes that an agent (1) is able to recognize the morally salient features of a situation, and the appropriate response to those features and (2) is motivated to act on this knowledge without internal conflict. Furthermore, it is often claimed that the virtuous person can do this (3) in a spontaneous or intuitive manner. While these claims represent an ideal of what it is to have a virtue, it is less clear how to make good on them. That is, how is it actually possible to spontaneously and reliably act well? In this paper, we will lay out a framework for understanding how it is that one could reliably act well in an intuitive manner. We will do this by developing the concept of an action schema, which draws on the philosophical and psychological literature on skill acquisition and self-regulation. In short, we will give an account of how self-regulation, grounded in skillful structures, can allow for t...
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On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires... more
On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one's failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone's life, and we will all have to learn from these experiences. However, despite the importance of being able to learn from our mistakes, this is very difficult in practice, given that failure of any kind can be distressing, and especially so for moral failure. The distress created by a recognition of moral failure often prompts responses of anger, avoidance, or defensiveness; rather than attempts to make amends and when necessary to work on self-improvement. The most potentially distressing response to moral failure is shame, as it is often associated with defensiveness. It is here where emotion regulation will be important to manage that distress, and I focus on the skill of emotion differentiation. I argue that emotion differentiation is a promising strategy for distinguishing the emotions we may experience in the wake of failure, including shame, and to encourage those emotions that motivate self-improvement. Thus, emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition. Introduction On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I want to focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which, in short, is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one's failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. The distress prompted by the prospect of having acted wrongly can often cause defensiveness in response, rather than attempts to redress the wrong and work on changing oneself for the better. Given that accounts of virtue as skill have been laid out elsewhere, I will not cover that ground again here. 1 However, in this paper I will be adding to these accounts by grounding an account of skill within the larger framework of the psychological research on self-regulation. 2 Self-regulation theories cover both the considerations involved with setting goals and striving to accomplish those goals. 3 Since skill acquisition is essentially a sophisticated form of self-regulation, this approach will shed further light on the nature of skill and thereby virtue. In the case of skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where in such practice you are attempting to improve by correcting past mistakes, overcoming your current limitations, and learning how to tackle new challenges. If you do not do this, you remain at a fixed level of skill development. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone's life, and we will all have to learn in part from experience. But increasing our skillfulness in virtue will require that we can both acknowledge those failures, as well as learn from them by making genuine attempts to improve ourselves. This is important in both cases of
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This paper provides an overview of the issues and themes that were discussed on an interdisciplinary panel which occurred at the American Philosophical Association’s pacific division meeting in April of 2017. The panel focused on the... more
This paper provides an overview of the issues and themes that were discussed on an interdisciplinary panel which occurred at the American Philosophical Association’s pacific division meeting in April of 2017. The panel focused on the connections between the VIA classification of virtues and character strengths in psychology and virtues and the Aristotelian approach to virtue in philosophy. Three key themes emerged from the papers presented at this panel: 1) the nature of the relationship between virtues and character strengths on the VIA model; 2) the extent to which the conceptions of virtues and character strengths are best understood as universal or culturally-embedded; and 3) the reliability of using self-report measurements to measure character strengths. This paper serves to frame papers that resulted from that panel and were incorporated into this special issue of the Journal of Positive Psychology.
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The Skillfulness of Virtue provides a new framework for understanding virtue as a skill, based on psychological research on self-regulation and expertise. Matt Stichter lays the foundations of his argument by bringing together theories of... more
The Skillfulness of Virtue provides a new framework for understanding virtue as a skill, based on psychological research on self-regulation and expertise. Matt Stichter lays the foundations of his argument by bringing together theories of self-regulation and skill acquisition, which he then uses as grounds to discuss virtue development as a process of skill acquisition. This account of virtue as skill has important implications for debates about virtue in both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Furthermore, it engages seriously with criticisms of virtue theory that arise in moral psychology, as psychological experiments reveal that there are many obstacles to acting and thinking well, even for those with the best of intentions. Stichter draws on self-regulation strategies and examples of deliberate practice in skill acquisition to show how we can overcome some of these obstacles, and become more skillful in our moral and epistemic virtues.