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Ian James Kidd

University of Nottingham, Department Of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I am assistant professor at Nottingham Philosophy, and previously worked at Durham and Leeds.

I work on social and virtue epistemology, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, and comparative philosophy, and draw freely upon the analytic, Continental, and Asian traditions. Main topics include:

- the experience and value of illness
- the nature of a religious life
- beauty, virtue, and character
- epistemic injustice
- epistemic virtues and vices
- exemplarist virtue theory
- classical Chinese philosophy
- scientism and anti-scientism
- contingency and pluralism in science
- the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend

I am committed to improving the representation of women and other under-represented groups in academic philosophy. I was founder-chair of the Durham Philosophy Department's Diversity and Inclusion Group (DIG) and Equality and Inclusion Officer for the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at Leeds and am a Friend of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK.

My website: https://sites.google.com/site/dfl2ijk/

.
Supervisors: Prof Robin Hendry and Prof David E. Cooper
Address: Department of Philosophy
University of Nottingham
Nottingham
UNITED KINGDOM

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Books by Ian James Kidd

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

by Jose M Medina, Ian James Kidd, and Gaile Pohlhaus

Edited volume on Epistemic Injustice forthcoming in February

Wittgenstein and Scientism

by Ian James Kidd and Jon Beale

Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms wa... more Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms was ‘scientism’: what he described as ‘the overestimation of science’. This collection is the first study of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism - a theme in his work that is clearly central to his thought yet strikingly neglected by the existing literature.
The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked.
An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture.

The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice

by Ian James Kidd, Jose M Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus

Science and the Self: Animals, Evolution, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley

Mary Midgley is one of the most important moral philosophers working today. Over the last thirty ... more Mary Midgley is one of the most important moral philosophers working today. Over the last thirty years, her writings have informed debates concerning animals, the environment and evolutionary theory. Midgley also transcends many intellectual boundaries, drawing upon philosophy, poetry, science and common sense. Her work is characterised by philosophical rigour and sensitivity to biological science and has transformed our understanding of human beings by emphasising our ‘creatureliness’ without compromising our humanity. Midgley’s work also enjoys a wide popular readership, ensuring her position as one of the leading modern public intellectuals. These essays offer critical reflections upon Midgley’s work and further developments of her ideas. The contributors include many of the leading commentators on her work, including distinguished figures from the disciplines of philosophy, biology, and ethology. The range of topics includes the moral status of animals, the concept of wickedness, science and mythology, the Gaia Hypothesis, and Midgley’s relationship to modern moral philosophy. It also includes the first complete bibliography of Midgley’s writings. The volume is the first major study of its kind and brings together distinguished contributors from the many disciplines which Midgley’s work has influenced. It will provide a clear account of the themes and significance of her work and its implications for ongoing debates about our understanding of our place within the world.

Reappraising Feyerabend

"This volume has three aims. First, to reassess the early work of Paul Feyerabend in the light of... more "This volume has three aims. First, to reassess the early work of Paul Feyerabend in the light of contemporary developments in history and philosophy of science. Second, to consider themes in his neglected later work, including recently published material. Third, to reconsider Feyerabend's place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship.

Contributors: Matthew Brown, Paul Churchland, Matteo Collodel, Robert Farrell, Stefano Gattei, Ron Giere, Helmut Heit, Struan Jacob, Ian James Kidd, Philip Kitcher, Martin Kusch, Gonzalo Munévar, Eric Oberheim, and John Preston."

Historiography and the Philosophy of the Sciences

Mystery and Humility in Religious Practice

by Ian James Kidd and Guy Bennett-Hunter

This collection explores the themes of mystery and humility in contemporary philosophy of religio... more This collection explores the themes of mystery and humility in contemporary philosophy of religion. Both are established features of Christian religious thought and practice, as well as in other Western and Asian religious and philosophical traditions. A sense of the ‘mystery’ of the world, it intuitively seems, ought to encourage the epistemological virtue of ‘humility’, but how this can be cashed out philosophically and in religious practice, is less clear. The contributors will focus on the role of practice in philosophy of religion, reflected in the breadth of cultural, aesthetic and practical manifestations of humility in the face of the mysterious: Eastern and Western, aesthetic and religious.

Papers by Ian James Kidd

Kidd, I. J., Spencer, L., & Harris, E. (2023). Epistemic Injustice Should Matter to Psychiatrists. Philosophy of Medicine, 4(1).

by Lucienne J Spencer, Ian James Kidd, and Eleanor Harris

Philosophy of Medicine, 2023

Phenomenology, Neurology, Psychiatry and Religious Commitment

Neurology and Religion, 2019

Humility and History

Think, 2014

I argue that amongst its many benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent resource for th... more I argue that amongst its many benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent resource for the cultivation of certain intellectual virtues, most notably gratitude, humility, and justice. Acquaintance with the history of philosophy can, therefore, be edifying, in the sense of being conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues. These virtues can be cultivated in many ways, but the history of philosophy offers unique means for securing them, and some familiar pedagogical and intellectual uses of the history of philosophy in fact reflect its edifying functions.

Paul Feyerabend, The Tyranny of Science, ed. Eric Oberheim. London: Polity, 2011. Pp. xii+153. ISBN 978-0-7456-5190-3. £12.95 (paperback)

The British Journal for the History of Science, 2011

Confucianism Curiosity and Moral Self Cultivation

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic vir... more I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this paper, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology.

Capital Epistemic Vices

Antiscientism in Mary Midgley (1919-2018)

Scientism in Mary Midgley (1919-2018)

Epistemic Injustice and Religion

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, 2017

This chapter charts various ways that religious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victim... more This chapter charts various ways that religious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice. Religious persons and communities can commit, or can suffer, epistemic injustices. Miranda Fricker, for instances, mentions religion as a ‘dimension of social activity’ that prejudices could track but does not focus upon it (2007, 27). A religious identity can invite others’ prejudice and entail activities and experiences that others might find difficult to make sense of, while also shaping a person’s epistemic sensibilities. The practices of testifying to and interpreting experiences take a range of distinctive forms in religious life – for instance, if the testimonial practices require a special sort of religious accomplishment or if proper understanding of religious experiences is only available to those with authentic faith. But it is also clear that religious communities and traditions have been sources of epistemic injustice – for instance, by conjoining epistemic and spiritual credibility in ways disadvantageous to ‘deviant’ groups. I explore the ways that epistemic injustice and religion can interact and focus mainly in the major monotheistic religions that are culturally dominant in the modern West.

/ Science in the Media Rethinking Feyerabend : The ‘ ‘ Worst Enemy of Science ’ ’ ?

The relationship between science and the philosophy of science is likely to be judged a contested... more The relationship between science and the philosophy of science is likely to be judged a contested one. Certainly many philosophical debates may seem oblique to the uninitiated (and even then, perhaps still!), whilst recent intellectual debacles have tended to portray philosophers of science in a poor light. During the 1990s, for example, the ‘‘Science Wars’’ erupted over the question of whether scientific theories provided true, objective descriptions of reality, or whether they were simply arbitrary ‘‘constructions,’’ mere mythologies on a par with ancient Greek theogony or medieval magic [1]. There is some truth to such charges, some of it certainly attributable to an unhealthy certain intoxication with trendy theories (like ‘‘relativism’’ and ‘‘constructionism’’). Yet even if those charges are not always justified, and even if the majority of the philosophy of science is informed and responsible, it remains true that philosophers of science who pitch into debates about the scienc...

‘“What’s So Great About Science?” Feyerabend on the Ideological Use and Abuse of Science

This chapter argues that Paul Feyerabend&#39;s philosophical views on the relationship betwee... more This chapter argues that Paul Feyerabend&#39;s philosophical views on the relationship between science and society, and his conception of the purposes of the discipline of philosophy of science, was shaped by the Cold War in two ways. First, Feyerabend was reacting against the artificial confinement of the agenda and professional identity of the philosophy of science that the Cold War had imposed; the exclusion of the socially engaged aspects of that discipline prompted Feyerabend to engage, albeit dramatically and hyperbolically, with questions about the value and authority of science that had, alas, been stifled. The second way reflected the role that science played in the ideological ‘clash of ideas’ that marked the intellectual dimension of the Cold War. Feyerabend argued that ideological struggles for the honorific status of being a scientific society were premature in the absence of robust answers to the question what science is, and what’s so great about it, but that insistence provided the foundations for a much wider claim. Feyerabend steadily expanded the scope of critical citizenship to encompass not only science, but any other intellectual, cultural, or political traditions, values, and ideals one might consider. Taken together, these point to what one might call &#39;critical citizenship&#39; - a conception of political and epistemic freedom in terms of informed consent to a cognitive and cultural authority, rather than to zealous adoption of whatever ideology happened to prevail in one’s society at the time—even the liberal democratic ideology of a scientific culture. To ask &#39;what&#39;s so great about science&#39; is therefore not the motto of an anti-science radical, but a invitation to critically reflect upon the dominant cognitive authority of late modern cultures.

Epistemic Injustice and Psychiatry

Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject (a knowe... more Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject (a knower, a reasoner, a questioner) by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others (testifying) or making sense of one’s experiences (interpreting). It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than the healthy. This paper claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors for epistemic injustice in psychiatric patients are outlined: global and specific. Some suggestions are made to counteract the effects of these contributory factors, for instance we suggest that physicians should participate in groups where the subjective experience of patients is explored, and learn to become more aware of their own unconscious prejudices towards psychiatric patients. Co-authored with Havi Carel and Paul Crichton

Doing Away With Scientism

Most people agree that science is a good thing, and that scientism, by contrast, is a bad thing. ... more Most people agree that science is a good thing, and that scientism, by contrast, is a bad thing. But justifying those sentiments is hard work owing to the complexities and uncertainties surrounding those two terms. But two things are clear. The first is that whatever science is – and that is a large and on-going debate – it does not need scientism to merit our admiration and appreciation. The second is that, given the poor state of public understanding of science, society does not need scientism either, especially when there are real enemies of science - like climate change deniers - to tackle as a matter of urgency. Science is great stuff without overheated rhetoric and aggrandising myths and inflated hopes and fancies - so let's do away with scientism.

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

by Jose M Medina, Ian James Kidd, and Gaile Pohlhaus

Edited volume on Epistemic Injustice forthcoming in February

Wittgenstein and Scientism

by Ian James Kidd and Jon Beale

Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms wa... more Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms was ‘scientism’: what he described as ‘the overestimation of science’. This collection is the first study of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism - a theme in his work that is clearly central to his thought yet strikingly neglected by the existing literature.
The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked.
An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture.

The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice

by Ian James Kidd, Jose M Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus

Science and the Self: Animals, Evolution, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley

Mary Midgley is one of the most important moral philosophers working today. Over the last thirty ... more Mary Midgley is one of the most important moral philosophers working today. Over the last thirty years, her writings have informed debates concerning animals, the environment and evolutionary theory. Midgley also transcends many intellectual boundaries, drawing upon philosophy, poetry, science and common sense. Her work is characterised by philosophical rigour and sensitivity to biological science and has transformed our understanding of human beings by emphasising our ‘creatureliness’ without compromising our humanity. Midgley’s work also enjoys a wide popular readership, ensuring her position as one of the leading modern public intellectuals. These essays offer critical reflections upon Midgley’s work and further developments of her ideas. The contributors include many of the leading commentators on her work, including distinguished figures from the disciplines of philosophy, biology, and ethology. The range of topics includes the moral status of animals, the concept of wickedness, science and mythology, the Gaia Hypothesis, and Midgley’s relationship to modern moral philosophy. It also includes the first complete bibliography of Midgley’s writings. The volume is the first major study of its kind and brings together distinguished contributors from the many disciplines which Midgley’s work has influenced. It will provide a clear account of the themes and significance of her work and its implications for ongoing debates about our understanding of our place within the world.

Reappraising Feyerabend

"This volume has three aims. First, to reassess the early work of Paul Feyerabend in the light of... more "This volume has three aims. First, to reassess the early work of Paul Feyerabend in the light of contemporary developments in history and philosophy of science. Second, to consider themes in his neglected later work, including recently published material. Third, to reconsider Feyerabend's place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship.

Contributors: Matthew Brown, Paul Churchland, Matteo Collodel, Robert Farrell, Stefano Gattei, Ron Giere, Helmut Heit, Struan Jacob, Ian James Kidd, Philip Kitcher, Martin Kusch, Gonzalo Munévar, Eric Oberheim, and John Preston."

Historiography and the Philosophy of the Sciences

Mystery and Humility in Religious Practice

by Ian James Kidd and Guy Bennett-Hunter

This collection explores the themes of mystery and humility in contemporary philosophy of religio... more This collection explores the themes of mystery and humility in contemporary philosophy of religion. Both are established features of Christian religious thought and practice, as well as in other Western and Asian religious and philosophical traditions. A sense of the ‘mystery’ of the world, it intuitively seems, ought to encourage the epistemological virtue of ‘humility’, but how this can be cashed out philosophically and in religious practice, is less clear. The contributors will focus on the role of practice in philosophy of religion, reflected in the breadth of cultural, aesthetic and practical manifestations of humility in the face of the mysterious: Eastern and Western, aesthetic and religious.

Kidd, I. J., Spencer, L., & Harris, E. (2023). Epistemic Injustice Should Matter to Psychiatrists. Philosophy of Medicine, 4(1).

by Lucienne J Spencer, Ian James Kidd, and Eleanor Harris

Philosophy of Medicine, 2023

Phenomenology, Neurology, Psychiatry and Religious Commitment

Neurology and Religion, 2019

Humility and History

Think, 2014

I argue that amongst its many benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent resource for th... more I argue that amongst its many benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent resource for the cultivation of certain intellectual virtues, most notably gratitude, humility, and justice. Acquaintance with the history of philosophy can, therefore, be edifying, in the sense of being conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues. These virtues can be cultivated in many ways, but the history of philosophy offers unique means for securing them, and some familiar pedagogical and intellectual uses of the history of philosophy in fact reflect its edifying functions.

Paul Feyerabend, The Tyranny of Science, ed. Eric Oberheim. London: Polity, 2011. Pp. xii+153. ISBN 978-0-7456-5190-3. £12.95 (paperback)

The British Journal for the History of Science, 2011

Confucianism Curiosity and Moral Self Cultivation

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic vir... more I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this paper, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology.

Capital Epistemic Vices

Antiscientism in Mary Midgley (1919-2018)

Scientism in Mary Midgley (1919-2018)

Epistemic Injustice and Religion

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, 2017

This chapter charts various ways that religious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victim... more This chapter charts various ways that religious persons and groups can be perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice. Religious persons and communities can commit, or can suffer, epistemic injustices. Miranda Fricker, for instances, mentions religion as a ‘dimension of social activity’ that prejudices could track but does not focus upon it (2007, 27). A religious identity can invite others’ prejudice and entail activities and experiences that others might find difficult to make sense of, while also shaping a person’s epistemic sensibilities. The practices of testifying to and interpreting experiences take a range of distinctive forms in religious life – for instance, if the testimonial practices require a special sort of religious accomplishment or if proper understanding of religious experiences is only available to those with authentic faith. But it is also clear that religious communities and traditions have been sources of epistemic injustice – for instance, by conjoining epistemic and spiritual credibility in ways disadvantageous to ‘deviant’ groups. I explore the ways that epistemic injustice and religion can interact and focus mainly in the major monotheistic religions that are culturally dominant in the modern West.

/ Science in the Media Rethinking Feyerabend : The ‘ ‘ Worst Enemy of Science ’ ’ ?

The relationship between science and the philosophy of science is likely to be judged a contested... more The relationship between science and the philosophy of science is likely to be judged a contested one. Certainly many philosophical debates may seem oblique to the uninitiated (and even then, perhaps still!), whilst recent intellectual debacles have tended to portray philosophers of science in a poor light. During the 1990s, for example, the ‘‘Science Wars’’ erupted over the question of whether scientific theories provided true, objective descriptions of reality, or whether they were simply arbitrary ‘‘constructions,’’ mere mythologies on a par with ancient Greek theogony or medieval magic [1]. There is some truth to such charges, some of it certainly attributable to an unhealthy certain intoxication with trendy theories (like ‘‘relativism’’ and ‘‘constructionism’’). Yet even if those charges are not always justified, and even if the majority of the philosophy of science is informed and responsible, it remains true that philosophers of science who pitch into debates about the scienc...

‘“What’s So Great About Science?” Feyerabend on the Ideological Use and Abuse of Science

This chapter argues that Paul Feyerabend&#39;s philosophical views on the relationship betwee... more This chapter argues that Paul Feyerabend&#39;s philosophical views on the relationship between science and society, and his conception of the purposes of the discipline of philosophy of science, was shaped by the Cold War in two ways. First, Feyerabend was reacting against the artificial confinement of the agenda and professional identity of the philosophy of science that the Cold War had imposed; the exclusion of the socially engaged aspects of that discipline prompted Feyerabend to engage, albeit dramatically and hyperbolically, with questions about the value and authority of science that had, alas, been stifled. The second way reflected the role that science played in the ideological ‘clash of ideas’ that marked the intellectual dimension of the Cold War. Feyerabend argued that ideological struggles for the honorific status of being a scientific society were premature in the absence of robust answers to the question what science is, and what’s so great about it, but that insistence provided the foundations for a much wider claim. Feyerabend steadily expanded the scope of critical citizenship to encompass not only science, but any other intellectual, cultural, or political traditions, values, and ideals one might consider. Taken together, these point to what one might call &#39;critical citizenship&#39; - a conception of political and epistemic freedom in terms of informed consent to a cognitive and cultural authority, rather than to zealous adoption of whatever ideology happened to prevail in one’s society at the time—even the liberal democratic ideology of a scientific culture. To ask &#39;what&#39;s so great about science&#39; is therefore not the motto of an anti-science radical, but a invitation to critically reflect upon the dominant cognitive authority of late modern cultures.

Epistemic Injustice and Psychiatry

Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject (a knowe... more Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject (a knower, a reasoner, a questioner) by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others (testifying) or making sense of one’s experiences (interpreting). It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than the healthy. This paper claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors for epistemic injustice in psychiatric patients are outlined: global and specific. Some suggestions are made to counteract the effects of these contributory factors, for instance we suggest that physicians should participate in groups where the subjective experience of patients is explored, and learn to become more aware of their own unconscious prejudices towards psychiatric patients. Co-authored with Havi Carel and Paul Crichton

Doing Away With Scientism

Most people agree that science is a good thing, and that scientism, by contrast, is a bad thing. ... more Most people agree that science is a good thing, and that scientism, by contrast, is a bad thing. But justifying those sentiments is hard work owing to the complexities and uncertainties surrounding those two terms. But two things are clear. The first is that whatever science is – and that is a large and on-going debate – it does not need scientism to merit our admiration and appreciation. The second is that, given the poor state of public understanding of science, society does not need scientism either, especially when there are real enemies of science - like climate change deniers - to tackle as a matter of urgency. Science is great stuff without overheated rhetoric and aggrandising myths and inflated hopes and fancies - so let's do away with scientism.

Varieties of Philosophical Misanthropy

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2021

I argue that misanthropy is systematic condemnation of the moral character of humankind as it has... more I argue that misanthropy is systematic condemnation of the moral character of humankind as it has come to be. Such condemnation can be expressed affectively and practically in a range of different ways, and the bulk of the paper sketches the four main misanthropic stances evident across the history of philosophy. Two of these, the Enemy and Fugitive stances, were named by Kant, and I call the others the Activist and Quietist. Without exhausting the range of ways of being a philosophical misanthrope, these four suffice to justify my main claim that misanthropy should not be seen specifically in terms of hatred and violence. We should attend to the varieties of philosophical misanthropy, especially since doing so reveals a deeper phenomenon I call the misanthropic predicament.

The Predicament of Patients

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2021

In this paper we propose that our understanding of pathocentric epistemic injustices can be enric... more In this paper we propose that our understanding of pathocentric epistemic injustices can be enriched if they are theorised in terms of predicaments. These are the wider socially scaffolded structures of epistemic challenges, dangers, needs, and threats experienced by ill persons due to their particular emplacement within material, social, and epistemic structures. In previous work we have described certain aspects of these predicaments, such as pathocentric epistemic injustices and pathophobia. A wider systematic perspective is needed to integrate these and other concepts. By thinking predicamentally, we can better understand the interrelated social, epistemic, and practical obstacles experienced by ill persons and connect the many concepts available for theorising them (microaggessions, epistemic injustices, and so on).

Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, 2017

Confidence, Humility, and Hubris in Victorian Scientific Naturalism

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2017

Most historians explain changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of soc... more Most historians explain changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the virtue of epistemic humility in nineteenth century intellectual culture, focusing on claims about the humility or hubris of the Victorian scientific naturalists.

Epistemic corruption and the research impact agenda

Theory and Research in Education, 2021

Contemporary epistemologists of education have raised concerns about the distorting effects of so... more Contemporary epistemologists of education have raised concerns about the distorting effects of some of the processes and structures of contemporary academia on the epistemic practice and character of academic researchers. Such concerns have been articulated using the concept of epistemic corruption. In this article, we lend credibility to these theoretically motivated concerns using the example of the research impact agenda during the period 2012–2014. Interview data from UK and Australian academics confirm that the impact agenda system, at its inception, facilitated the development and exercise of epistemic vices. As well as vindicating theoretically motivated claims about epistemic corruption, inclusion of empirical methods and material can help us put the concept to work in ongoing critical scrutiny of evolving forms of the research impact agenda.

Creativity in science and the ‘anthropological turn’ in virtue theory

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2020

I argue that philosophical studies of the virtues of creativity should attend to the ways that ou... more I argue that philosophical studies of the virtues of creativity should attend to the ways that our conceptions of human creativity may be grounded in conceptions of human nature or the nature of reality. I consider and reject claims in this direction made by David Bohm and Paul Feyerabend. The more compelling candidate is the account of science, creativity, and human nature developed by the early Marx. Its guiding claim is that the forms of creativity enabled by the sciences are ultimately valuable insofar as they advance our emancipation from a state of existential alienation. I end by encouraging future investigations of such vertical explanations of the significance of certain virtues in the context of scientific enquiry.

Mathematical practice and epistemic virtue and vice

Synthese, 2020

What sorts of epistemic virtues are required for effective mathematical practice? Should these be... more What sorts of epistemic virtues are required for effective mathematical practice? Should these be virtues of individual or collective agents? What sorts of corresponding epistemic vices might interfere with mathematical practice? How do these virtues and vices of mathematics relate to the virtue-theoretic terminology used by philosophers? We engage in these foundational questions, and explore how the richness of mathematical practices is enhanced by thinking in terms of virtues and vices, and how the philosophical picture is challenged by the complexity of the case of mathematics. For example, within different social and interpersonal conditions, a trait often classified as a vice might be epistemically productive and vice versa. We illustrate that this occurs in mathematics by discussing Gerovitch’s historical study of the aggressive adversarialism of the Gelfand seminar in post-war Moscow. From this we conclude that virtue epistemologies of mathematics should avoid pre-emptive jud...

TBC - Philosophy of Religions: Cross-Cultural, Multi-Religious Approaches (Leeds - summer 2018)

I sketch three general modes of religious aspiration and the ways that they generate different ty... more

Historicising Vice Epistemology (Leiden - January 2018)

A talk on historicised vice epistemology for a conference on the history of epistemic vices, 1600... more

TBC - aggression, vice, and public debate (Cardiff - November 2017)

A conference on humility, aggression, and epistemic vice in debate.

TBC - Exemplars and Exemplarism (Genoa - October 2017)

Appraising Metaphors for Philosophical Practice (Munich - August 2017)

I propose a virtue-based strategy for appraising metaphors for philosophical practice. Metaphors ... more I propose a virtue-based strategy for appraising metaphors for philosophical practice. Metaphors exploit structural associations between philosophising and other activities – like combat – and s implicitly specific character traits, whether virtues or vices. But good metaphors are rich enough to specify a range of traits, so attention should be directed at the ways that those metaphors are ‘unpacked’. I show that ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphors can specify a set of virtues, as well as the vices that critics usually point to. If so, criticism should be directed at the ways we unpack and interpret such metaphors, not at the metaphors themselves.

Part of a panel on Virtuous Adversariality with Catarina Dutilh-Novaes, Matthew Duncombe, and Andrew Aberdein.

TBC (with Havi-Carel) Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice (Sheffield - July 2017)

TBC - likely on social epistemology, epistemic injustice, and illness

Epistemic Corruption and Education: A Vice-Epistemological Account (Sheffield June 2017)

I argue that much of modern education is 'intellectually corrupting', insofar as it tends to prod... more

Feyerabend on the Deep Contingency of Science (Nottingham - June 2017)

This talk constructs a doctrine of the deep contingency of science from the later writings of Pau... more This talk constructs a doctrine of the deep contingency of science from the later writings of Paul Feyerabend. A sense of deep contingency upsets confident claims about the privileged epistemic status of the sciences as we have inherited them. If so, contingency can provide an argument for epistemic pluralism and proliferation.

Exemplars, Virtues, and the Cosmos (Oklahoma - April 2017)

I argue for a form of virtue ethics in which the virtues are human embodiments of qualities or fe... more I argue for a form of virtue ethics in which the virtues are human embodiments of qualities or features of the cosmos - of the ultimate grounds or source of the world. The exemplar - the sage - is a person who embodies in human form excellent features of the cosmos. Although evident in Western traditions such as Stoicism and Neoplatonism, such 'cosmic virtue ethics' finds its fullest form in Daoism. If so, then these traditions offer a distinctive 'two-stage' or 'cosmic' mode of emulation: a person emulates the sage, who is themselves emulating qualities or aspects of the source or grounds of reality (the Logos, the One, the Way). This become obvious when we consider parallels within those traditions of the virtues of the sage and the qualities of the cosmos, for instance, in the intimate relation for Daoists of de and Dao. Cosmic emulationism of this sort offers new and interesting ways to think about the ways that virtue and human flourishing can be rooted in or responsive to the wider order of things.

Deep Conceptions of Epistemic Vice (Pacific APA - April 2017)

I argue that certain epistemic vices are ultimately rooted in a conception of the nature of reali... more

Illness, Edification, and Autonomy

According to a venerable tradition, certain experiences of illness can be edifying, conducive to ... more According to a venerable tradition, certain experiences of illness can be edifying, conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues. This frames the moral significance of experiences of illness in virtue ethical terms, but that is a style of ethics usually defended for shifting attention away from autonomy onto other concepts, such as flourishing or care. If so, how shall we understand the relationship between a edificationist conception of illness and autonomy? I sketch out one way of thinking about this, inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre, that plays on the suggestion that the moral priority assigned to autonomy should be relaxed for human beings whose mode of life is significantly characterised by 'dependence, affliction, and vulnerability'. If so, the moral priority for those at the end-of-life should not be to strive for autonomy, but to quietly cultivate the 'virtues of dependence'. I will explore rather than endorse this claim.

Epistemic Corruption and Pathologies of Public Discourse (Copenhagen - December 2016)

Pathologies of Public Discourse

In this talk, I draw upon current work on virtue and vice epistemology to argue that certain path... more In this talk, I draw upon current work on virtue and vice epistemology to argue that certain pathologies of public discourse can be usefully understood using the concept of epistemic corruption. The first part of the talk presents an account of this concept, while the second provides a concrete case study of epistemic corruption in public discourse — namely, the concerted attacks on climate scientists by a variety of economically and ideologically motivated ‘doubt-mongers’, of the sort described by Eric Conway and Naomi Oreskes. I end by replying to some worries about epistemic corruption, and argue that applying it to public discourse will require integration of epistemological and empirical researches.

Epistemic Corruption in Science: A Vice Epistemological Account (Singapore - December 2016))

Many things can be meant by the term 'epistemic corruption in science' because there are many way... more Many things can be meant by the term 'epistemic corruption in science' because there are many ways that science or scientists can be corrupted. I offer a vice-epistemological account, according to which something is epistemically corrupting if it creates conditions that are conducive to the development and exercise of epistemic vices.

'Taking "Inner Beauty" Seriously' (Oxford Brookes)

Although beauty nowadays if often defined in physical or erotic terms, some people talk of knowin... more Although beauty nowadays if often defined in physical or erotic terms, some people talk of knowing people who have a beautiful soul, beautiful character, or an ‘inner beauty’ Such talk is often scoffed at, but it was widely entertained by the ancient philosophers of Greece, India, and China, and many people today continue to take talk of the ‘moral beauty’ of certain persons seriously. I defend the idea of inner beauty by exploiting the connections between beauty and virtue. Using mainly religious examples, I argue that certain persons are beautiful because their bodily comportment effectively expresses their virtues – moral qualities or excellences of character, like compassion, kindness, and humility. I defend this claim against a couple of objections and end by suggesting that inner beauty deserves to be taken more seriously within modern discourses of beauty.

Epistemic Corruption and Education

Some students are often conservatively overcautious. Often teachers feel they cannot tell certain... more Some students are often conservatively overcautious. Often teachers feel they cannot tell certain truths to their students. Sometimes academics feel compelled to be dishonest when promoting the ‘impact’ of their research. Such concerns are part of a critical discourse about education that often uses a rhetoric of ‘corruption’, of certain sorts of education having bad effects upon students’ character. But it is unclear just what that term means, in a way that limits the critical force of that rhetoric. In this paper, I offer an account of the concept of ‘epistemic corruption’, and apply it to educational debates. My general claim is that certain educational aims, practices, structures, or policies are epistemically corrupting if they create conditions conducive to the development and exercise of epistemic vices – dogmatism, insensibility, or conformity, say. I argue that many features of modern educational cultures are corrupting and offer three specific case studies to illustrate this.

Appraising Metaphors of Illness (Bristol)

This talk asks what sorts of criteria should inform our production, selection, and use of various... more This talk asks what sorts of criteria should inform our production, selection, and use of various metaphors for illness – as a battle, war, journey, and so on. After distinguishing some general cognitive and aesthetic criteria, a broader set of criteria are identified that focus on the potential morally corrupting effects of certain metaphors. I argue that, although critics are right to raise moral criticisms, their real target should not be certain metaphors, but rather certain cultures and practices of metaphorising. Specifically, those cultures and practices are corrupting in the sense that they encourage the exercise of various vices, most obviously those opposed to what Bernard Williams called the virtues of truth. If so, there are virtues of metaphorising illness that ought to be taken seriously

‘Following the Way of Heaven’ – Exemplars, Emulationism, and Daoism (Nottingham)

Many religious traditions identify certain people as being exemplars of the religious life – sain... more Many religious traditions identify certain people as being exemplars of the religious life – saints, sages, gurus, zhenren, and others – whose role is to inspire and guide others. But religious exemplars are often very different from one another in character and conduct, such that there is philosophical work to do in understanding the different conceptions of exemplarity in different traditions. In this talk I use use Linda Zagzebski’s recent work on exemplarist virtue theory to describe a specific mode of religious exemplarity that I dub ‘emulationism’. Certain traditions identify the exemplar as someone who successfully emulates qualities of the deep nature of reality, which, when manifested by human beings, are virtues. I then illustrate these claims with a tradition where emulationism is best developed – Daoism.

Education, Edification, and Epistemic Corruption (Edinburgh)

It is often argued that the cultivation of epistemic virtues should be a central and explicit aim... more It is often argued that the cultivation of epistemic virtues should be a central and explicit aim of education: that is, education ought to be edifying, conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues. I defend this by sketching the contrary claim that conceptions of education should be criticised because they are corrupting, conducive to the development and exercise of epistemic vices. If the concept of epistemic corruption plays an important role in current critical discourse about education, then this might give us new reasons to take seriously edificationism.

A Deep Conception of Epistemic Vice (Cardiff)

Intellectual Vices

I sketch an account of the virtue of epistemic humility and then sketch three of its vices of def... more

What Is A Religious Exemplar? Religion, Emulation, and the Cosmos

All of the world’s religious traditions recognize certain persons as being exemplars of the relig... more All of the world’s religious traditions recognize certain persons as being exemplars of the religious life – those whose lives manifest moral or spiritual accomplishment to an advanced or superlative degree. Such religious exemplars include Buddhist boddhisattvas, the Christian saints, Daoist daoshi, and other sage-like figures whose character and comportment manifest, inter alia, enlightenment, holiness, or ‘attunement to dao’. But the nature and roles of religious exemplars within their respective traditions remains understudied, at least in philosophy of religion, despite their being obviously central to religious modes of beliefs, practice, and life.

I therefore offer an analysis of the nature of religious exemplars which takes its inspiration from the defense of ‘exemplarist virtue theory’ recently offered by Linda Zagzebski. Central to her account is the general claim that people learn moral and spiritual qualities through encounters with exemplars - those people who exemplify specific virtues or ‘ways of life’, say. Such encounters inspire admiration for the person, which can modulate into a desire to emulate that exemplar – to take them as a model – which in turn starts a process of personally-inflected moral growth. For Zagzebski, exemplarism offers a general account of the process of moral education, neutral with regard to specific religious or metaphysical frameworks. Although that is true as far as it goes, I argue that specifically religious exemplars are distinct in at least one important way.

The distinction lies with the concept of emulation. In Zagzebski’s account, emulation occurs between people: one person recognizes another person as an exemplar of a virtue, say, and emulates them, taking them as a model in an effort to ‘take on’ or learn that virtue. I suggest that this is true as far as it goes for religious exemplars, but that it does not go far enough – for in many religious traditions, there is a further ‘two-stage’ mode of emulation. Aspirants emulate a religious exemplar, but the exemplar is themselves emulating something further - God, dao, the cosmos, etc. – whose qualities, when embodied by human beings, are ‘excellences’ - virtue, de, etc. I offer several cases, from Western and Asian traditions, of striking parallels between the virtues of the exemplar and the qualities of the cosmos. A Stoic sage is rational, efficient, and never acts without purpose: just like the ‘divine logos’ of the kosmos, which they are emulating. A Daoist sage is active, spontaneous, and non-contending: just like the dao itself, which they are emulating – and so on.

Such parallels are not coincidental: they illustrate the ‘cosmic’ mode of emulation that is - I suggest - distinctive to religious exemplars, at least in some traditions. I end by setting up some further questions about ‘cosmic emulation’, and by concluding that exemplarism has much to offer philosophy of religion – not least by helping explain the nature and role of religious exemplars in their traditions.

Religion, Belief, and Ethics (Leeds)

I led seminars on rebirth, the nature of religious belief, magic and superstition, and other topi... more

A Key Thinker in Philosophy of Religion: In Dialogue (Leeds)

This eleven week course is a critical exploration of the work of John Hick. Topics include theodi... more

Modern Philosophy I (2013-2014)

A second-year course on early modern philosophy - I lectured on Renaissance humanism, the rise of... more

Knowledge and Reality (2011-2012)

Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science

Topics in the Philosophy of Medicine (2008-2010)

Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Science (2009-2010, 2015)

Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (2008-2009, 2009-2010)

Philosophy of Religion (2009-2010, 2012-2015)

Ethics and Values (2008-2009, 2009-2010)

Science and Religion (2008-2009)

Philosophy of the Sciences (2008-2009, 2009-2010)

Philosophy of the Sciences (2008-2009, 2009-2010)

Reading Philosophy (2007-2008)

Diversity, Education, and Resistance (Edinburgh - April 2017)

Philosophy of Education and Diversity in Philosophy,

People often resist efforts to improve the intellectual and demographic diversity of philosophy. ... more

Strategies of Resistance and How to Counteract Them (Manchester - May 2017)

Why Philosophy Isn't (Yet) Just (Nottingham 2016)

Philosophy aspires to be critical, self-reflective, and alert to the ways that bias, prejudice, a... more Philosophy aspires to be critical, self-reflective, and alert to the ways that bias, prejudice, and dogmatic conservatism corrupt the ways we think about and organise our communities. Noble as this ideal is, the history and current state of philosophy shows that we fall short of it, for a variety of reasons. In this talk, I give examples of failures of diversity and inclusion in philosophy, and what we can do about them.

Implicit Bias and Stereotype Threat (Edinburgh)

A talk on implicit bias and steps to counteract it.

How We Create 'Chilly Climates' in our Classrooms, and What to do About Them

A community – including a classroom – has a ‘climate’, and ample data shows that these are too of... more A community – including a classroom – has a ‘climate’, and ample data shows that these are too often uncomfortable for, even inhospitable to, the members of certain groups, especially women and black and minority ethnic students and colleagues. After explaining the concept of a ‘chilly climate’, I explain some of the ways that they are generated by our behaviours, and what we can do to try to make these climates more hospitable for everyone.

Chilly Climates and the 'Nice Bloke Trap'

I give an introduction to the concept of a 'chilly climate' and the related problem of the 'nice ... more I give an introduction to the concept of a 'chilly climate' and the related problem of the 'nice bloke trap'. Social communities have climates that are often perceived as 'chilly' by certain of their members. Understanding this is liable to be frustrated if members of those communities fall into the 'nice bloke trap'.

Chilly Climates and the 'Nice Bloke Trap'

This talk explains the concept of a 'chilly climate' and how it relates to the 'nice bloke trap',... more

Nice Blokes and Implicit Bias

When confronted by reports about philosophy's 'demographic problem', many people - men as well as... more

Philosophy, Sexism, and Activism

Philosophy is unusual among arts and humanities disciplines because it is dominated by men. This ... more Philosophy is unusual among arts and humanities disciplines because it is dominated by men. This fact ought to provoke deep concerns, especially given philosophy's inherited self-image as the rational, critical enterprise, par excellence. I start by sketching some of the factors that generate and sustain philosophy’s ‘demographic problem’, including implicit bias, ignorance and naiveté, disciplinary conservatism, and overt sexism. I then argue that responding practically and intellectually to the demographic problem is an urgent task for contemporary philosophers, both as a corrective to entrenched, on-going patterns of exclusion, and as a necessary step towards the realisation of philosophy’s self-image as a form of disciplined intellectual practice devoted to the improvement of human life.

Gender Action in Philosophy

There are many obstacles to efforts to improve the representation of women in philosophy, ranging... more There are many obstacles to efforts to improve the representation of women in philosophy, ranging from cognitive biases, disciplinary conservatism, worries about time and effort, and overt misogyny. I discuss some effective ways to respond effectively to those obstacles, paying special attention to 'resisters' - those who obstruct, oppose, or otherwise try to resist efforts to improve the representation of women in philosophy.

Implicit Bias - Undergraduate Skills and Training Workshop

by Ian James Kidd and Sarah Wieten

A workshop on implicit bias and stereotype threat as part of the Durham Philosophy undergraduate ... more

Why Do People Resist Efforts to Improve the Representation of Women in Philosophy?

This paper describes four main types of ‘resister’ – persons who delay, obstruct, dilute, or othe... more This paper describes four main types of ‘resister’ – persons who delay, obstruct, dilute, or otherwise try to weaken efforts to improve the representation of women (and other underrepresented groups) in philosophy. The efficacy of counter-resistance often depends upon a proper understanding of the type of resister at hand, since there are different reasons for resistance, and better and worse ways to respond to them. The first type are the ‘naifs’ – those who deny the fact, extent, or severity of the ‘demographic problem’ because they are empirically or conceptually naïve: ignorant of the statistical data, psychological phenomena like implicit bias, and lacking crucial concepts, such as ‘chilly climate’. The second are ‘conservatives’, who resist because they want to protect (certain aspects of) current norms, structures, and cultures that they perceive to privilege them. They might be averse to the investment of effort needed to do the ameliorative work, or like things ‘the way they are’, or want to maintain a system that privileges them. The third type are ‘the proud’, who resist because they perceive in calls to respond to the ‘demographic problem’ an actual or perceived challenge to their professional pride, intellectual integrity, or moral character. The fourth type of resister – the worst – are the ‘misogynists’, those who resist because they are hostile to women, derive satisfaction from acting injuriously towards them, and wish to preserve a social and disciplinary culture where such behaviours are possible. A person can belong to more than one type and also switch type, especially under critical pressure from others. I describe these four types and sketch some ways to effectively challenge them.

Implicit Bias and Stereotype Threat

I outline the psychological work on implicit bias and stereotype threat, and then detail some eff... more

Diversity and Inclusion in Small-Group Teaching

I outline the problem of gendered seminar dynamics: of how subtle (or not so subtle) psychosocial... more

Implicit Bias and Stereotype Threat (UC Cork)

Introduction: Wittgenstein and Scientism

by Jon Beale and Ian James Kidd

Wittgenstein and Scientism (London: Routledge), 2017

Book webpage: https://www.routledge.com/Wittgenstein-and-Scientism/Beale-Kidd/p/book/9781138829398

Let's Open Up Debate about Lockdowns

by Matthew Ratcliffe and Ian James Kidd

The Critic, 2020

This is the last in a trilogy of articles, aimed at a general audience, which together raise a nu... more This is the last in a trilogy of articles, aimed at a general audience, which together raise a number of concerns about extreme social restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic. This final article is the longest of the three. It sets out, in detail, our position on "lockdowns".

https://thecritic.co.uk/lets-open-up-debate-about-lockdowns/

Welcome to Covidworld

by Matthew Ratcliffe and Ian James Kidd

The Critic, 2020

This opinion piece, aimed at a broad readership, questions commonplace attitudes concerning the C... more This opinion piece, aimed at a broad readership, questions commonplace attitudes concerning the Covid-19 pandemic and associated social restrictions. The article focuses on the unfolding situation in the UK and was written in late September 2020. It is the cover story in the November 2020 issue of *The Critic* and is also freely available on-line:

https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/november-2020/welcome-to-covidworld/