Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to kno... more Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to know the world are always situated, accompanied by such things as desires, beliefs, and interests that guide and shape what it is we discover and perhaps even what we can know. If this is the case, how is one to be receptive to that which is outside of the purview of one's current understanding of the world? Some feminists have argued that in order to know more effectively and more broadly we need to make our knowledge communities as diverse as possible so as to insure the greatest possible range of discovery. Others have argued that we need to begin by adopting the perspectives of those marginalized by society. These suggestions of where we ought to begin our inquiry, however, do not adequately guide us in how we ought to proceed. In both cases (beginning with diverse communities or focusing on the experiences of those marginalized), it is critical that we know and understand others as a condition for broadening the range of our sources of knowledge. Knowing others is a crucial yet often neglected epistemological problem. In this paper I begin by examining some problems that can arise with how we understand others. Drawing on the work of Cora Diamond, I suggest some possibilities that may help us with the problems sketched in the first part. Finally I argue that developing the virtue of care is critical if we are to further our possibilities for knowing the world in general.
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights Patricia Williams notes that when people of color are asked to ... more In The Alchemy of Race and Rights Patricia Williams notes that when people of color are asked to understand such practices as racial profiling by putting themselves in the shoes of white people, they are, in effect, being asked to, ‘look into the mirror of frightened white faces for the reality of their undesirability’ (1992, 46). While we often see understanding another as ethically and epistemically virtuous, in this paper I argue that it is wrong in some cases to ask another to attempt to understand certain positions or lines of thought. In developing my argument I draw on the work of Maria Lugones to argue for a view of agency that is epistemically interdependent. I examine the case described by Patricia Williams to demonstrate specifically how the understanding requested in this case unfairly undermines both epistemic and non-epistemic agency. I distinguish appropriate requests for understanding from inappropriate requests so as to make clear that I am not suggesting that it is wrong to make such requests when the understanding sought after is difficult, painful, or even when it forces one to reconsider the meaning of one’s actions. Finally, I examine an example from Susan Brison to show how strategic refusals to understand may provide a pathway toward new ways of knowing and being in resistance to oppressive regimes.
Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se de... more Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se demande dans quelle mesure le philosophe du langage ordinaire ouvre la voie a une critique sociale. En reponse au scepticisme, l'A. montre que Wittgenstein concoit la possibilite d'une contestation politique qui met en evidence la responsabilite cognitive de l'individu au sein de la societe civile actuelle.
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Mira... more This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like status and (2) testimonial injustice necessarily treats its victim as a subject, albeit a truncated subject. Drawing on the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir, I demonstrate that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in terms of a subject/other relation, or a relation that circumscribes the subjectivity of its victim within the confines of the perpetrator’s subjectivity. Using these conceptual resources to examine the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice not only avoids the problems I raise with the notion of epistemic objectification, but also greatly enhances our understanding of testimonial injustice, and consequently of what more epistemically just relations look like.
This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignor... more This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as active ignoring, and the use of ignorance as resistance to oppression. In addition, this chapter questions whether the frame of ignorance continues to be helpful for resisting epistemic oppression and considers an alternative frame for tracking the infringements on epistemic agency and autonomy highlighted in the literature on ignorance.
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Mira... more This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like status and (2) testimonial injustice necessarily treats its victim as a subject, albeit a truncated subject. Drawing on the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir, I demonstrate that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in terms of a subject/other relation, or a relation that circumscribes the subjectivity of its victim within the confines of the perpetrator’s subjectivity. Using these conceptual resources to examine the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice not only avoids the problems I raise with the notion of epistemic objectification, but also greatly enhances our understanding of testimonial injustice, and consequently of what more epistemically just relations look like.
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. sit... more I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention to the way in which situatedness and interdependence work in tandem, I develop an understanding of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world.
Ludwig Wittgenstein held a contradictory, queer position in Bloomsbury. He was in several homerot... more Ludwig Wittgenstein held a contradictory, queer position in Bloomsbury. He was in several homerotically-charged close friendships with men, including John Maynard Keynes, yet he was awkward in the cosmopolitan company of Bloomsbury and derided at Cambridge by second-generation Bloomsberry Julian Bell. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein was concerned with themes that occupied the Bloomsbury Group, such as the difficult process of making sense and the importance of aspectival perception in meaning-making – a key component of Bloomsbury thought from Roger Fry’s cubism to Virginia Woolf’s experimental fiction. Moreover, concern for the difficulties of making sense connect both Wittgenstein and Bloomsbury to contemporary queer theory’s concern for problems of intelligibility, such as Judith Butler’s. Detloff and Pohlhaus explore these themes and their importance for our perception of what Bloomsbury means today.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2016
I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own... more I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rhetoric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of things move democratic knowers (epistemically speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some of the ways in which Stanley speaks about the marginalized populations he aims to support.
Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to kno... more Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to know the world are always situated, accompanied by such things as desires, beliefs, and interests that guide and shape what it is we discover and perhaps even what we can know. If this is the case, how is one to be receptive to that which is outside of the purview of one's current understanding of the world? Some feminists have argued that in order to know more effectively and more broadly we need to make our knowledge communities as diverse as possible so as to insure the greatest possible range of discovery. Others have argued that we need to begin by adopting the perspectives of those marginalized by society. These suggestions of where we ought to begin our inquiry, however, do not adequately guide us in how we ought to proceed. In both cases (beginning with diverse communities or focusing on the experiences of those marginalized), it is critical that we know and understand others as a condition for broadening the range of our sources of knowledge. Knowing others is a crucial yet often neglected epistemological problem. In this paper I begin by examining some problems that can arise with how we understand others. Drawing on the work of Cora Diamond, I suggest some possibilities that may help us with the problems sketched in the first part. Finally I argue that developing the virtue of care is critical if we are to further our possibilities for knowing the world in general.
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights Patricia Williams notes that when people of color are asked to ... more In The Alchemy of Race and Rights Patricia Williams notes that when people of color are asked to understand such practices as racial profiling by putting themselves in the shoes of white people, they are, in effect, being asked to, ‘look into the mirror of frightened white faces for the reality of their undesirability’ (1992, 46). While we often see understanding another as ethically and epistemically virtuous, in this paper I argue that it is wrong in some cases to ask another to attempt to understand certain positions or lines of thought. In developing my argument I draw on the work of Maria Lugones to argue for a view of agency that is epistemically interdependent. I examine the case described by Patricia Williams to demonstrate specifically how the understanding requested in this case unfairly undermines both epistemic and non-epistemic agency. I distinguish appropriate requests for understanding from inappropriate requests so as to make clear that I am not suggesting that it is wrong to make such requests when the understanding sought after is difficult, painful, or even when it forces one to reconsider the meaning of one’s actions. Finally, I examine an example from Susan Brison to show how strategic refusals to understand may provide a pathway toward new ways of knowing and being in resistance to oppressive regimes.
Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se de... more Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se demande dans quelle mesure le philosophe du langage ordinaire ouvre la voie a une critique sociale. En reponse au scepticisme, l'A. montre que Wittgenstein concoit la possibilite d'une contestation politique qui met en evidence la responsabilite cognitive de l'individu au sein de la societe civile actuelle.
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Mira... more This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like status and (2) testimonial injustice necessarily treats its victim as a subject, albeit a truncated subject. Drawing on the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir, I demonstrate that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in terms of a subject/other relation, or a relation that circumscribes the subjectivity of its victim within the confines of the perpetrator’s subjectivity. Using these conceptual resources to examine the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice not only avoids the problems I raise with the notion of epistemic objectification, but also greatly enhances our understanding of testimonial injustice, and consequently of what more epistemically just relations look like.
This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignor... more This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as active ignoring, and the use of ignorance as resistance to oppression. In addition, this chapter questions whether the frame of ignorance continues to be helpful for resisting epistemic oppression and considers an alternative frame for tracking the infringements on epistemic agency and autonomy highlighted in the literature on ignorance.
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Mira... more This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like status and (2) testimonial injustice necessarily treats its victim as a subject, albeit a truncated subject. Drawing on the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir, I demonstrate that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in terms of a subject/other relation, or a relation that circumscribes the subjectivity of its victim within the confines of the perpetrator’s subjectivity. Using these conceptual resources to examine the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice not only avoids the problems I raise with the notion of epistemic objectification, but also greatly enhances our understanding of testimonial injustice, and consequently of what more epistemically just relations look like.
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. sit... more I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention to the way in which situatedness and interdependence work in tandem, I develop an understanding of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world.
Ludwig Wittgenstein held a contradictory, queer position in Bloomsbury. He was in several homerot... more Ludwig Wittgenstein held a contradictory, queer position in Bloomsbury. He was in several homerotically-charged close friendships with men, including John Maynard Keynes, yet he was awkward in the cosmopolitan company of Bloomsbury and derided at Cambridge by second-generation Bloomsberry Julian Bell. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein was concerned with themes that occupied the Bloomsbury Group, such as the difficult process of making sense and the importance of aspectival perception in meaning-making – a key component of Bloomsbury thought from Roger Fry’s cubism to Virginia Woolf’s experimental fiction. Moreover, concern for the difficulties of making sense connect both Wittgenstein and Bloomsbury to contemporary queer theory’s concern for problems of intelligibility, such as Judith Butler’s. Detloff and Pohlhaus explore these themes and their importance for our perception of what Bloomsbury means today.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2016
I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own... more I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rhetoric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of things move democratic knowers (epistemically speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some of the ways in which Stanley speaks about the marginalized populations he aims to support.
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Papers by Gaile Pohlhaus
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