No. 18
November 2017
Untangling Chinese Aid in Africa: Does the
‘Aid for Trade’ Hypothesis hold True?
Samar Tyagi
ICS OCCASSIONAL PAPER NO. 18
Untangling Chinese Aid in Africa: Does the ‘Aid for Trade’ Hypothesis hold True?
Author: Samar Tyagi
First published in 2017
© Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi
Institute of Chinese Studies
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Delhi 110 054, INDIA
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Samar Tyagi is pursuing his Ph.D. in Economics at the Department of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee. He was an intern at the Institute of Chinese
Studies (ICS) during June-July 2014 and worked on analyzing trends in the Sino–Indian bilateral
trade. His other works dealt with the role of currency manipulation in India’s growing trade deficit
with China and regional income inequality in China. This paper - originally titled 'Tracking Chinese
Aid in Africa: A Panel Data Analysis' - was awarded the Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea Award, given to
the best paper presented during the 9th edition of the ICS' flagship All India Conference of China
Studies held in Mumbai 2016.
Contact: samartyagi9@gmail.com
Untangling Chinese Aid in Africa: Does the ‘Aid for Trade’
Hypothesis hold True?
Abstract
China’s economic engagements with Africa have generated a great deal of hyperbole.
China gives an enormous amount of aid to African countries in the form of grants,
interest-free loans and concessional (or preferential) loans. Officially, the total Chinese
aid to Africa has increased to US$10.13 billion (2012) from a paltry sum of US$ 2.77
billion (2000).
Meanwhile, the total bilateral trade between African countries and China has increased
20 times from US$11 billion (2000) to US$221 billion (2014). This increased trade is led
by African countries and surprisingly, China ran a trade deficit with them. This study
tracks Chinese aid flows to each country of Africa during the period 2000-2012 and
probes its role in increasing bilateral trade between them. Findings reveal that a one
per cent increase in aid allocation to Africa is associated with 0.6 per cent increase in
bilateral trade, signifying that the ‘aid for trade’ hypothesis holds true.
Keywords: Comparative Study, China
Globalisation, Aid, Natural Resources
and
Africa,
International
Trade,
Introduction
“We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss what they
want to do, and then they just do it... There are no benchmarks or
preconditions….” Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone ambassador to Beijing, 2005 (cited in
Zafar 2007).
Chinese foreign aid sparks much debate (Council for International Development 2015). In
2013, the Chinese government provided an annual figure of RMB 40 billion, or US$6.4
billion,1 for its global aid budget (Information Office of the State Council 2014). From
1990s onwards China started to play an increasing role as a donor. Chinese aid to Africa
increased to US$10.13 billion (2012) from US$2.77 billion (AidData 2015). Apart from aid,
China’s total multi-lateral trade with African countries has increased from US$11 billion
(2000) to more than US$221 billion (2014) 2, an increase of twenty times in a short span
of 14 years (UN Comtrade 2015).
This study endeavours to decode China’s ‘aid allocation’ in Africa vis-à-vis sector and
across countries. This paper is a preliminary study of China’s aid flows to African
countries during 2000-2012. It also tests the ‘aid for trade’ hypothesis and draws
implications for African countries. The following section deals with the literature review
while the third section lays out the aims, objectives, research design and methodology
1
Transparency and lack of data is an issue. There are different estimates by scholars. Usually, official figures of
Chinese aid are underestimated.
2
Data for aid is available only for the period 2000-2012.
adopted in this study. Section four reveals major findings, followed by policy
implications and the conclusion.
Literature Review
Deborah Brautigam (1998, 2009, 2010 and 2011) appreciates China’s role as an ‘aiddonor’ as Africa was deserted by the West on various fronts and China has provided not
only monetary help but also technical know-how. Brautigam having made numerous field
visits to Chinese sponsored projects in Africa concludes that China’s current aid
activities are not motivated by short-term commercial or strategic interests.
Pettersson and Johansson (2011) have shown in their study of 184 countries between
1990 and 2005 that bilateral aid is not only positively correlated with donor exports, as
suggested by earlier studies, but also positively associated with recipient exports to
donors. The aid-trade link is particularly strong for donor exports to Sub-Saharan African
countries and for recipient exports of strategic materials.
Strange et al. (2013) have estimated Chinese aid flows to African countries. The paper
discusses the challenges of quantifying Chinese development activities, introduces
AidData’s Media-Based Data Collection (MBDC) methodology, provides an overview of
Chinese development finance in Africa as tracked by the new database, and discusses
the potential and limitations of MBDC as a resource for tracking development finance.
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) have examined the effects of aid on growth with crosssectional and panel data. They ‘found little robust evidence of a positive (or negative)
relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth’ and ‘no
evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments’. They also
found no evidence ‘that certain forms of aid work better than others’.
Zafar (2007) notes that China presents both an opportunity for Africa to reduce its
marginalization from the global economy and also a challenge for it to effectively
harness the influx of resources to promote poverty-reducing economic development at
home.
Previous studies conducted on China’s aid flows to Africa lack a country-wise data
approach. Researchers differ if the aid allocation program of China is for gaining access
to African markets (Zafar 2007) or for development purposes (Brautigam 2009). This
study firstly, endeavours to estimate China’s aid to every African country sector-wise
and compare with bilateral trade to look for possible links. Second, this study uses the
latest data available about Chinese aid flows to Africa extracted from AidData 3, for
which data was compiled using local African media sources.
A Critique of China’s White Papers on Foreign Aid
3
AidData was formed in 2009 as a partnership between three institutions – the College of William and Mary,
Development Gateway and Brigham Young University.
The Chinese Government released its first White Paper on Foreign Aid in April 2011,
and a second one in July 2014.4 The first White Paper gives an overview of Chinese
foreign aid from the 1950s to 2009. The second White Paper provides the same for the
period 2010-2012. China says it is providing foreign aid to ‘help recipient countries to
strengthen their self-development capacity, enrich and improve their peoples’
livelihood, and promote their economic growth and social progress’ (Information Office
of the State Council 2011). Chinese aid is provided in three main forms: grants, interestfree loans and concessional (or preferential) loans. The key actors are the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), China Eximbank, and China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(Information Office of the State Council 2011).
By the end of 2009, China had provided a cumulative total of RMB 256.29 billion
(US$39.3 billion) of aid, with approximately 41 per cent in grants, 30 per cent in
interest-free loans and 29 per cent in the form of concessional loans (Information Office
of the State Council 2011). It also provides a breakdown of Chinese aid resources
according to its geographical distribution (Figure 2), and distribution according to
income level for the year 2009 (Figure 3).
Figure 1
Sectoral Distribution of Concessional Loans from China at the end of 2009
Agriculture
4.30%
Industry
16.10%
Public Facilites
3.20%
Others
6.50%
Energy and
resources
development
8.90%
Economic
infrastructure
61.00%
Source: Information Office of the State Council 2011
Major sectors, i.e., economic infrastructure (61 per cent), industry (16.1 per cent),
energy and resource development (8.9 per cent), agriculture (4.3 per cent) among
others have received the major chunk of the total Chinese aid to all the countries in the
world (Figure 1).
A part of the conclusion is worth quoting:
4
Both White Papers do not reveal aid allocation at country-level. Instead, they give aggregate figures for all recipient
countries. The two White Papers were released by the Information Office of the State Council in China, under the
name ‘China’s Foreign Aid’ in 2011 and 2014 respectively.
‘China has a long way to go in providing foreign aid. The Chinese government will make
efforts to optimize the country’s foreign aid structure, improve the quality of foreign
aid, further increase recipient countries’ capacity in independent development, and
improve the pertinence and effectiveness of foreign aid (Information Office of the State
Council 2011).
This first White Paper has certain limitations. There is no mention of aid effectiveness,
monitoring and evaluation strategies or result-based management. There is also no clear
statement defining what China considers and calculates as ‘aid’ although on initial
reading the terminology and details seem comparable to the OECD/DAC (Development
Assistance Committee) definitions that are used for aid from ‘traditional donors’(Brant
2011).
Figure 2
Geographical Distribution of China’s Foreign Aid Funds in 2009
Asia
32.80%
Europe
Africa
0.30%
45.70%
Others
4.50%
Oceania
4.00%
Latin American
and the Caribbean
12.70%
Source: Information Office of the State Council 2011
As Figure 2 shows, Africa alone got 45.7 per cent of the total Chinese aid in 2009 as per
China’s White Paper on Aid (2011). Other beneficiaries includes Asia (32.8 per cent) and
Latin America and the Caribbean countries (12.7 per cent) while figure 3 below shows
that China has given 39.7 per cent share of its total aid to least developed countries.
During 2010-12, China provided US$14.41 billion of aid in three forms: grant, interestfree loan and concessional loan (Figure 4). Chinese aid reached 121 countries, including
51 in Africa, 30 in Asia, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Europe and 9 in
Oceania.
The White Paper focuses on two key themes: ‘helping improve people's livelihood’ and
‘promoting economic and social development’. The second emphasises on improving
infrastructure, strengthening capacity building, promoting trade development, and
strengthening environmental protection.
Figure 3
Distribution of China’s Foreign Aid according to the Income Level of Recipient
Countries in 2009
Low and medium
income countries
19.90%
Least developed
Countries
39.70%
Other low-income
Countires
23.40%
Medium and highincome countries
11.00%
Others 6.00%
Source: Information Office of the State Council 2011
Finally, the White Paper devotes significant attention to regional and international
cooperation. In 2010-2012, China contributed a total of US$285 million to multilateral
organisations, including the UN, the World Bank, IMF and Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Information Office of the State Council 2014).
Figure 4
Decomposition of Chinese Aid Flows
Grant 36.20%
Concessional
Loan
55.70%
Interest Free
Loan
8.10%
Source: Information Office of the State Council 2014
In brief, the 2014 White Paper is heavy on cumulative detail and light on country
specifics, but it is a definite improvement on the broad overview of the first White
Paper (Brant 2014)
Aims, Objectives and Methodology
This paper aims to estimate China’s aid flow to each African country sector-wise during
2000-2012 and correlate the results with trade data to look for possible links. Objectives
are:
a) Testing of ‘aid for trade’ hypothesis.
b) Finding how aid is allocated on a cross-country and sector basis
c) Composition of China’s trade with top aid recipient countries of Africa
In terms of methodology, this empirical study relies on the data compiled by the College
of William and Mary (USA),5 in the form of a database6 by using thousands of media
reports on Chinese-backed projects in Africa from 2000-2012. The database includes
information on 1,954 projects in over 50 African countries and on US$84.81 billion in
commitments of official finance.
Another important variable is trade. Data for trade is extracted from various editions of
China Statistical Yearbook released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics and UN
Comtrade. Next, the share of each African country in the total Chinese aid flow to Africa
during 2000-2012 is calculated and top five countries are selected for further analysis.
Then, aid and trade data is correlated to estimate association and to see whether trade
flows determine aid allocation. Further, bilateral trade is analysed to assess the nature
of trade and economic relationship.
China’s Aid Flows to Africa
Total aid flows from China to Africa during 2000-2012 reached US$84.81 billion7 in 2009
currency rates (AidData 2015). China gave the maximum aid in 2007, totalling US$15.2
billion (see Figure 5). In the following year, aid flows declined to US$3.38 billion, rising
again in 2009 to reach US$13.2 billion. In subsequent years, annual flows moderated to
US$10 billion with minor fluctuation of 10 per cent in both directions.
A simple correlation coefficient8 between Chinese aid to Africa and their bilateral trade
for the period stood at 0.6. For aid and Chinese exports to Africa the coefficient stood
at 0.65 and 0.56 for aid and Chinese imports from Africa. Put differently, 1 per cent
increase in Chinese aid to Africa is associated with 0.6 per cent increase in bilateral
trade, 0.56 per cent increase in Chinese imports from Africa and 0.65 per cent increase
in Chinese exports to Africa.
5
This database is freely accessible at http://china.aiddata.org/
China has not revealed country-wise aid details. Therefore, this database prepared out of news media articles
published in local African countries is an appropriate approach to deal with China’s aid flows.
7
It also includes concessional loans and all aid flows from China to Africa.
8
Simple correlation coefficient is used to measure association between two variables, i.e., quantum of change in one
variable with one per cent change in another variable. Here, simple correlation coefficient is estimated for China and
Africa as a whole. When it was computed for China and individual African countries, the results were spurious as aid
allocation in subsequent years was not uniform. A more standard panel data regression model can be applied to
capture the causal relationship between aid and trade, which is beyond the scope of the present work.
6
Figure 5
China’s Aid Flows to Africa, 2000-2012
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Grand Total
2000
Aid flows (in billion US $)
Total aid flows from China to Africa
Source: AidData (2015)
A further decomposition of Chinese aid flows to Africa (Figure 6) reveals that only six
countries of Africa, i.e., Ghana, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Angola
and the Republic of Congo, accounted for half of China’s total aid flows to Africa during
2000-2012. This means that Chinese aid is unevenly distributed across Africa. The nature
of economic engagements of top five countries with China is studied intensively through
bilateral trade relationship for the period 2000-2014.
Figure 6
China’s Aid Flows to Major African Countries, 2000-2012
Others
49.84
Angola
5.48
Congo, D.R.
9.21
Congo, R.
5.29
Ethiopia
9.39
Ghana
14.26
Sudan
6.53
Source: AidData (2015)
Out of the top six aid recipient countries, Angola, Republic of Congo and Democratic
Republic of Congo are also the top African exporters to China.
China’s Trade with African countries
China’s bilateral trade with Africa (see Figure 7) has increased from US$11 billion (2000)
to US$221.66 billion (2014) and then decreased to US$178.79 billion (2015). China, the
world’s largest trade surplus country, surprisingly ran a trade deficit with Africa to the
tune of US$9.6 billion in 2014 and enjoyed a surplus of US$38.28 billion in 2015. This is
possibly due to the crash in the prices of oil and other minerals which China buys from
Africa.
A further disaggregation of Sino-African bilateral (China Statistical Yearbook 2014) trade
reveals that only five countries accounted for 63.33 per cent of the total Sino-African
bilateral trade in the year 2012. South Africa leads the list with 31.02 per cent of the
total bilateral trade, followed by Angola (17.09 per cent), Nigeria (6.46 per cent), Egypt
(4.86 per cent) and Algeria (3.89 per cent).
The list of countries remains the same when we rank the countries in terms of top
market destinations for China. China’s top five export destinations (China Statistical
Yearbook 2014) in Africa account for only 50.89 per cent of its total exports to whole
Africa. The list is topped by South Africa, cornering 18.14 per cent of total African
imports from China, followed by Nigeria (12.98 per cent), Egypt (9.01 per cent), Algeria
(6.49 per cent) and Angola (4.27 per cent).
Figure 7
Sino-African Trade, 2000-2015
250
200
150
Exports
100
Imports
50
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (various years)
However, the order changes when all African countries are ranked on the basis of top
exporters to China. The top five African countries have a share of around 75 per cent of
the total African exports to China. Again, South Africa leads with a 41.2 per cent share,
followed by Angola (27.22 per cent), Republic of Congo (4.86 per cent), Zambia (2.59
per cent) and Democratic Republic of Congo (2.34 per cent).
It is noticeable that China’s trade flows to and from Africa is restricted to a small set of
countries. Similarly, half of the total Chinese aid flows to Africa accrued to only six
countries.
In the following section, China’s trade with top aid recipient countries in Africa is
studied more intensively. This will help us in assessing the true nature of the economic
relationship between China and the African countries.
What does China Trade with Top Aid Recipients in Africa?
Ghana
Ghana, with a per capita annual income of US$1620 in 2014 (World Bank 2015),
equivalent to India’s per capita income, has grown at a remarkable pace. Its per capita
income was only US$340 in 2000 (World Bank 2015). Ghana achieved a maximum GDP
growth rate of 14 per cent per annum in 2011 but slowed down to 4.2 per cent per
annum in 2014. The role of aid and trade cannot be negated in this growth journey.
Apart from Chinese aid, Ghana has received development assistance from the World
Bank and other countries too.
Ghana received the highest share (14.26 per cent) of the total Chinese aid flows to
Africa during 2000-2012 (see Figure 6), totalling US$12 billion (2009 currency rates).
China exported goods worth US$5.31 billion and imported goods worth around US$1.29
billion and enjoyed a trade surplus of US$4.02 billion, i.e., a trade deficit for Ghana
(Figure 8).
China’s trade with Ghana resembles a typical colonial relationship; buying raw materials
and selling back manufactured items. China’s top exported commodities to Ghana fall
within the following categories: a) electrical equipment, b) nuclear reactors, boilers,
machinery, c) articles of iron and steel and other such categories which constitute value
added products.
Figure 8
China’s Trade with Ghana, 2000-2015
6000
5000
Exports
3000
Imports
2000
Trade Balance
1000
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
In Million US $
4000
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
On the other hand, Ghana sold raw materials which fall under a) Mineral fuels, b) ores,
slag, c) wood and articles of wood, d) cocoa and other such categories which are just
raw materials and command a very low price compared to the imported Chinese
products. Table 1 lists major export and import items from China to Ghana during the
year 2015.
Table 1
Top Export and Import Items in China-Ghana Trade, 2015
S.No. Export item
Value in Import Item
million
US$
Electronic 800.78
Mineral
Fuels,
oils,
distillation
products,
etc.
Value in
million
US$
968.59
1
Electrical,
Equipment
2
Nuclear Reactors, boilers, 430.18
machinery, etc.
Ores, slag and ash
3
Articles of iron or steel
287.97
Commodities
not 96.52
specified according to
kind
4
Iron and Steel
279.50
Wood and articles of 55.86
wood, wood charcoal
5
Vehicles other than railway 254.40
tramway
Cocoa
and
preparations
6
Furniture, lighting, signs, 246.71
prefabricated buildings
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, 5.50
grain, seed, fruit, and
others
7
Plastics
thereof
Fish,
crustaceans, 3.11
molluscs,
aquatic
invertebrates
8
Footwear, gaiters and the 242.83
like, parts thereof
Copper
thereof
9
Ceramic Products
Edible vegetables and 0.87
certain roots and tubers
10
Articles
of
accessories,
crochet
and
articles 246.50
214.17
apparel, 169.98
knit
or
Rubber
thereof
and
and
108.45
cocoa 52.93
articles 1.59
articles 0.81
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
During 2000-2012 China financed (or is still financing) around 114 projects9 in Ghana.
Major sectors included agriculture, forestry and fishing, communications, energy
generation and supply, education, water supply and sanitation, transport and storage,
government and civil society activities. Similarly, there are a number of other projects
that are being financed through loans, with repayments being made in the form of
minerals that are extracted with China’s help.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia was the second-largest aid recipient of China’s total aid flows to Africa during
2000-2012. China exported goods worth US$3.44 billion and imported around US$380.29
million, enjoying a trade surplus of US$3.06 billion vis-à-vis Ethiopia in 2015. Major
items among China’s exports to Ethiopia included value-added manufactured products
like electrical equipment, nuclear reactors, iron and steel, vehicles and railways among
others. Ethiopia exported oilseeds, fruits, raw hides and skins, leather, animal fodder,
mineral ores, footwear, lac, gums, resins, coffee, tea and spices to China. None of the
top ten goods sold to China belonged to the value-added category. Like Ghana, Ethiopia
too sold raw materials to China and purchased manufactured items from them.
Ethiopia accounted for 9.39 per cent of the total Chinese aid flows to Africa during
2000-2012, totalling US$7.96 billion. China has financed (or is financing) around 106
projects during this period. Major sectors include transport and storage, energy
generation and supply, health, agriculture, forestry and fishing, banking and financial
services, trade and tourism, communications, government and civil society, education,
industry, mining and construction.
Figure 9
China’s Trade with Ethiopia, 2000-2015
4500
4000
3500
3000
In million US $
2500
2000
Imports
1500
Exports
1000
500
0
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2015)
9
Henceforth, data drawn for all aid projects discussed in subsequent country–wise analysis is from
AidData (2015).
Table 2
China’s top traded items with Ethiopia, 2015
S.
No.
1
Export Item
Value
in Import Item
Value
in
million US$
million US$
Electronic 869.36
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, 289.12
grain, seed, fruit, etc.
2
Nuclear
boilers,
etc.
Reactors, 414.65
machinery,
Raw hides and skin 54.31
(other than fur skins)
and leather
3
Articles of apparel, 365.96
accessories, not knit
or crochet
Footwear gaiters and 13.86
the like, parts thereof
4
Articles of iron or steel 307.34
Ores, slag and ash
5
Vehicles other than 233.01
railway tramway
Coffee, tea, mate and 6.34
spices
6
Articles of
accessories,
crochet
Lac,
gums,
resins, 3.41
vegetables saps and
extracts
7
Railway,
tramway 221.23
locomotives,
rolling
stock, equipment
Cotton
8
Iron and Steel
Plastic
thereof
9
Aluminium and articles 79.92
thereof
Articles of iron or steel
10
Rubber
thereof
Live
trees,
plants, 0.24
bulbs,
roots,
cut
flowers etc.
Electrical,
Equipment
and
apparel, 227.48
knit or
91.64
articles 58.45
6.60
3.00
and
articles 1.95
0.67
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
It was the third-largest recipient of the total Chinese aid flows to Africa during 20002012. In 2015, China exported goods worth US$1.41 billion and imported the goods for
US$2.66 billion, registering a trade deficit of US$1.5 billion in 2015 (Figure 10).
Figure 10
China’s trade in goods with the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2000-2015
5000
4000
3000
In million US $
2000
1000
Trade Balance
Imports
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
-1000
2000
0
Exports
-2000
-3000
-4000
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
Unlike other countries, like Ghana and Ethiopia, the DRC exported more than it
imported from China. At a more disaggregated level, major items among China’s total
exports to the DRC included value-added products like electrical equipment, nuclear
reactors, iron and steel, vehicles and railways, and other manufactured goods. While
China imported Copper, mineral fuels, ores, woods and articles of wood, rubber and
articles, nickel and articles, pearls and precious stones, coffee, tea, mate and spices.
Table 3
China’s Top-Traded Items with the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015
S. No.
Export Item
Value
million US$
253.44
in Import Item
Value
in
million US$
Copper and articles 1315.46
thereof
1
Electrical,
Electronic
Equipment
2
Nuclear Reactors, 169.91
boilers, machinery,
etc.
Other base metals, 746.35
cermet’s,
articles
thereof
3
Vehicles other than 82.99
railway tramway
Ores, slag and ash
4
Bird skin, feathers, 79.83
artificial flowers,
human hair
Mineral fuels, Oils, 57.25
distillation products,
etc.
496.66
5
Footwear, gaiters 75.90
and the like, parts
thereof
Wood and articles of 44.11
wood, wood charcoal
6
Articles of iron or 72.39
steel
Inorganic chemicals, 4.47
precious
metal
compound, isotope
7
Furniture, lighting, 52.54
signs, prefabricated
buildings
Pearls,
stones,
coins, etc.
8
Plastics and articles 51.06
thereof
Live animals
9
Iron and Steel
43.20
Raw hides and skins 0.04
(other than fur skins)
and leather
10
Pharmaceutical
products
36.51
Products of animal 0.03
origin, n.e.s.
precious 0.21
metals,
0.08
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
The DRC received 9.21 per cent (US$7.80 billion) of aggregate Chinese aid flows to
Africa during 2000-2012. China is involved in around 38 projects. Major sectors included
government and civil society, health, industry, mining and construction, agriculture,
forestry and fishing, education, communications, energy generation and supply.
Sudan
Sudan stood fourth among African countries in terms of receiving Chinese aid during
2000-2012. In 2015 Sudan exported goods worth US$3.05 billion and imported around
US$2.55 billion, running a trade surplus of US$0.40 billion i.e., a trade deficit for China
(Figure 11). China’s top export items under major categories were nuclear reactors,
boilers, machinery, electronic equipment, articles of iron or steel, footwear, vehicles
other than railways, rubber and articles thereof among others to Sudan (Table 4). It
imported mineral fuels, oils, ores, slag, cotton, animal fodder, copper and live animals
among others from Sudan. Here again China imported raw materials from its African
counterpart and exported value-added manufactured goods.
Sudan received a total of 6.53 per cent (US$5.53 billion) of the total Chinese aid flows to
Africa during 2000-2012. China is involved in around 85 projects. Major sectors include
government and civil society, health, agriculture, forestry and fishing, education,
energy generation and supply, and transport and storage.
Figure 11
China’s trade with Sudan, 2000-2015
15000
5000
Trade Balance
Imports
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
2000
In million US $
10000
Exports
-5000
-10000
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
Table 4: China’s top traded items with Sudan, 2015
S. No.
Export Item
Value
in Import Item
million US $
1
Nuclear
boilers,
etc.
2
Electrical, Electronic 215.00
Equipment
Oil
seed,
oleagic 101.91
fruits, grain, seed,
fruit, etc.
3
Articles of iron or 158.31
steel
Ores, slag and ash
24.52
4
Footwear, gaiters and 151.10
the
like,
parts
thereof
Cotton
17.29
5
Vehicles other than 121.89
railway tramway
Residues, wastes of 16.01
food industry, animal
fodder
6
Rubber and articles 98.18
thereof
Plastics and articles 5.30
thereof
7
Iron and Steel
Raw hides and skins 3.39
(other than furskins)
Reactors, 263.60
machinery,
90.17
Value
in
million US $
Mineral fuels, Oils, 1349.81
distillation products,
etc.
and leather
8
Articles of apparel, 75.29
accessories, knit or
crochet
Lac, gums, resins, 1.43
vegetable saps and
extracts nes
9
Plastics and articles 71.88
thereof
Copper and articles 0.99
thereof
10
Other made textile 63.22
articles, sets, worn
clothing etc.
Live animals
0.20
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2017)
Angola
Angola exported goods worth US$15.99 billion and imported goods worth US$3.72 billion
in 2015. It also enjoyed a trade surplus over China of US$12.27 billion in 2015 and
US$25.13 billion during 2014 (Figure 12).
Figure 12
China’s trade with Angola, 2000-2015
50000
40000
20000
10000
Trade Balance
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
-10000
2001
0
2000
In million US $
30000
Imports
Exports
-20000
-30000
-40000
Source: UN Comtrade Database 2017
Table 5
China’s Top Traded Items with Angola, 2015
S. No.
Export Item
1
Electrical,
Equipment
Value in Import Item
Value
in
million
million US$
US$
Electronic 555.13
Mineral fuels, Oils, 15955.37
distillation products,
etc.
2
Furniture,
Lighting, 373.39
signs,
prefebriated
buildings
Pearls,
precious 18.09
stones, metals, coins,
etc.
3
Nuclear
Reactors, 362.18
boilers, mahinery, etc.
Wood and articles of 12.46
wood, wood charcoal
4
Articles of iron or steel
253.08
Salt, sulphur, earth, 11.05
stone, plaster, lime
and cement
5
Iron and Steel
216.63
Plastics and articles 0.14
thereof
6
Vehicles other
railway tramway
7
Ceramic Products
8
Plastics
thereof
than 199.21
Products of
origin, nes
animal 0.05
187.79
Electrical, electronic 0.04
equipment
articles 184.41
Beverages, spirits and 0.03
vinegar
9
Footwear, gaiters and 166.70
the like, parts thereof
Optical,
photo, 0.01
technical,
medical,
etc. apparatus
10
Articles of
accessories,
crochet
Printed
books, 0.00
newspapers, pictures
etc.
and
apparel, 111.94
knit or
Source: UN Comtrade Database (2015)
China’s exports to Angola mainly included manufactured goods like vehicles other than
railways, furniture, electrical equipment, nuclear reactors, iron and steel among others
(see Table 5). Angola’s top exports to China included mineral fuels, oils, pearls, salt and
wood and articles of wood among others (Table 5).
Angola received 5.48 per cent (US$4.64 billion) of the total Chinese aid to Africa during
2000-2012. Major sectors included health, agriculture, forestry and fishing,
communications, education, government and civil Society, water supply and sanitation,
trade and tourism.
This analysis, based on time series data of aid and trade, makes a strong case about the
nature of economic relationship of Africa and China. It resembles a typical colonial
relationship i.e., importing raw materials and exporting value added manufactured
items. Aid flows reveal that China’s aid is not uniform across the whole of Africa. A
small subset of Africa receives a significant pie of the total aid. Similarly, a few
countries have a major share in bilateral trade. Further, trade decomposition gives a
vivid account of what China sells and what it buys after giving aid i.e., after building
critical infrastructure like roads and railways, it has confined to buying raw materials
and selling back manufactured items.
Policy Implications
Aid for Trade: China’s aid disbursal to Africa is positively correlated to bilateral trade.
One per cent of increase in aid is associated with 0.60 per cent increase in bilateral
trade.
No doubt China has provided help in building schools, sending medical teams, training
thousands of people from African countries and has provided humanitarian help many
times. This has helped the Chinese in building a good image among African countries,
and in getting an upper hand in securing contracts for mining ventures i.e., entering
Africa.
Trade decomposition: China mainly imported raw materials like mineral oils, agricultural
products, wood articles among others and major exports fall under major categories of
value-added manufactured items like electrical equipment, nuclear reactors, vehicles,
plastic items, footwear apparel and other accessories. This trade relationship resembles
a typical colonial interaction similar to the British importing raw materials from its
colonies and selling back manufactured items.
Aid composition: Officially, China has not disclosed the total amount of aid disbursed to
each country. It remains unknown how China distributes its aid sector–wise in African
countries. However, based on AidData estimates, it can be estimated that China’s
significant aid accrue to the economic infrastructure sector. A small portion is devoted
to building human capital and genuine development assistance. A total of 88 projects of
military finance have also come to light. Exact details of these projects remain
unknown. Scholars are divided whether China has misused its aid program to enter
African markets and fulfil its own energy needs. A large group of Western scholars allege
that China’s main intention to provide aid is to get access to African markets and mines
(Evans et al. 2006; Zafar 2007). However, Deborah Brautigam (2009), who has closely
watched these aid projects on the ground, dispels these arguments and appreciates
China’s development assistance to Africa.
Impact on African economies: There have been tremendous job losses reported across
Africa, especially in the textile sector, due to liberalisation of trade policies (Mutume
2006). Generally, it is believed that investments by foreign companies create ample job
opportunities in host countries but Chinese SOEs also bring Chinese labour with them.
This may be for two reasons:
a) Chinese SOEs do not get skilled workforce in host countries and therefore,
they have to bring their own workforce. Also top managers of ongoing projects
speak only Chinese, so it may be difficult for them to communicate quickly
and effectively with an African workforce.
b) China has deliberately taken its unemployed workforce to foreign destinations.
Existing industrial towns in China are unable to create adequate job
opportunities, thereby compelling many unemployed to seek overseas
opportunities.
If a foreign country’s investments do not lead to job creation in African countries,
already ridden with massive unemployment, then such investments are of limited use.
How much revenue would be generated if these African countries developed their own
capacity remains to be studied.
Impact on domestic producers: Reports indicate that China’s cheap items have
significantly harmed domestic producers in African countries. Labour intensive sectors
like clothing and textiles have seen a reduction in sales on account of cheap Chinese
substitutes. Mutume (2006) notes that the phasing out of the old system has already cost
Africa more than 250,000 jobs over the last few years, reports the International Textile,
Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF), leaving more than a million family
members without stable incomes. Most jobs have been lost in Lesotho, South Africa,
Swaziland, Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritius, Zambia, Madagascar, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia
and Kenya. African countries must create safeguard mechanisms so that the interests of
domestic producers are protected.
Conclusion
China’s flourishing bilateral trade with African countries has significantly benefitted
from its aid programme to these same countries. It is providing enormous capital in the
form of concessional loans to capital-starved and labour-surplus African countries.
However, the usage of this capital is restricted to selective sectors that directly supplies
natural resources to China.
Repayment patterns show that aid recipient countries pay the donor country i.e., China
in the form of minerals. China’s bilateral trade shows a relative increase for those
countries that also saw an increase in aid allocation. Trade flows show that China’s
multilateral trade with African countries has increased significantly; however, Africa’s
top export items include mostly raw materials while import items include mostly valueadded manufactured items. In fact, Africa has become a source of natural resources and
a consumer of Chinese finished goods, to feed its own strong economic growth
establishing the fact that ‘aid for trade’ hypothesis holds true. Thus, it can be said that
China has used aid as a tool to enter African countries. At the same time, China’s role as
a development partner cannot be nullified completely.
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No. 17 Oct 2017
China’s Growth Transitions: Implications and Outlook
Anoop Singh
No. 16 Nov 2017
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Implications,
Prospects & Consequences: Impact on India & its China
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Kishan S Rana
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Acquisition of Syngenta by ChemChina: Implications and
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Alagu Perumal
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China’s Global Internet Ambitions: Finding Roots in
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Dev Lewis
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Exploring Trade and Investment Patterns of ASEAN in
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Veda Vaidyanathan
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