Dwelling

Provided for non-commercial research and educational use only. Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use. This article was originally published in International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who you know, and providing a copy to your institution’s administrator. All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution’s website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier’s permissions site at: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissionusematerial Jones O. 2009. Dwelling. In Kitchin R, Thrift N (eds) International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, Volume 3, pp. 266–272. Oxford: Elsevier. ISBN: 978-0-08-044911-1 © Copyright 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Author's personal copy Dwelling O. Jones, CCRI, Cheltenham, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Glossary Affect The vital systems of life beyond or pre rational, reflexive thought and language use. Agency The capacity to act creatively. Becoming A view of life as always in creation and thus always in motion and only possessing immanent and emergent form rather than static, predetermined form. Embodiment An approach which takes bodies seriously as against the mind–body dualism. Hybridity The understanding that much of life is only possible through routine interconnections of differing types of things and the idea that bodies themselves are not singular and pure but multifaceted in form, origin, function, and identity. Taskscape Landscapes and places made by the repeating actions of organisms over time. Introduction Dwelling approaches life as a process of being-in-theworld which is open to the world. Human and nonhuman life is read as an immediate, yet also enduring, relational process of bodies-in-environment (space and place) which are (with variation) mobile, sensing, engaging, responding, exchanging, making, using, remembering, and knowing. This process-based, vitalist view of life is closely linked to phenomenology, and stands in opposition to dualized, rational Cartesian-based approaches. As Tim Ingold suggests when setting out Heidegger’s foundational work on this concept, dwelling encompasses the whole manner in which one lives one’s life on the Earth; thus ‘‘I dwell, you dwell’’ is identical to ‘‘I am, you are.’’ For Heidegger, to be a human means to be on the Earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. This offers an alternative to Descartes’ cogito – ‘I think, therefore I am’ – the foundation of rationalism which helped set up/ reinforce a series of persistent, related dualisms including those of mind–body, subject–object, society–nature, and human–nonhuman. These, some argue, are impediments to understanding the relational nature of life, not least in terms of important questions of humans in nature/environment/place, and environmental sustainability. Dwelling is thus offered as an alternative ground from which human and nonhuman life can be rethought. Given its focus on the body, which is inevitably in place and at the center of its own space, it has been an important theme within geography for those thinking about 266 space, place, and landscape, and within related disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, archaeology, and landscape studies, which also address questions of society, nature, and environment. In recent times, there has been an upturn of interest in dwelling as various disciplines seek to develop richer, relational, process-based notions of life in terms of ecological relations, hybridity, affect, posthumanism, performativity, and nonrepresentation. Dwelling differs from social construction approaches to life/nature through its stressing of the physical, the relational, the senses, the orchestration of body and space/environment. It has more affinity with other relational process views such as actor network theory (ANT). It differs in that it retains a topographical interest in space as place and the space that moves with and around bodies, whereas ANT takes a more technogrammatic, topological approach to unfolding life. Dwelling takes an ecological view of how humans and other animals make and inhabit ‘life-worlds’ through registers of specific bodily practice. It can be used to consider places and landscapes as temporal extensions and entanglements where all manner of beings, things, and processes come into specific relations and settle out into the varied patterning that marks the world. Foundations The genesis of the concept, as discussed here, can be precisely located in Heidegger’s (Figure 1) essay Building Figure 1 Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Author's personal copy Dwelling Dwelling Thinking. This was one of the seven essays in the work Poetry, Language, Thought, but the notion of dwelling captures much of the ambitions in Heidegger’s later work. It was thus part of the so-called ‘turn’ (Krhre) in Heidegger’s thought through which he moved away from some aspects of the position of Dasein set out in his earlier work. Dasein, as is dwelling, is essentially a conception of being-in-the world and being inseparable from the world. It attempts to create a new ontology of being which more or less reverses and reconnects the way in which the self engages with the world as presented by Cartesian ontology. In the later work the lived, temporal, mortal nature of being continues to be a central theme but the focus is more strongly on how being, and its spaces as places, are always ‘emergent, relational processes’ and thus continuous orchestrations of body, environment, culture, and time. The turn to the ‘dwelling perspective’ is often explained in comparison to the ‘building perspective’. The latter stands accused of seeing human thought and action as somehow isolated from the world and thus in a position to impose on the world, to, in some cases, literally build upon it ideally generated blueprints. The dwelling perspective points out that any form of life emerges from the world and there is never a gap, or break, in which thought and practice can completely free itself. Any building, including rational thought and knowledge, emerges from dwelt life. The subject–object dualism is scrambled and objective ‘views from nowhere’ impossible. The continuities of dwelt life can be seen in Heidegger’s most famous illustration of the concept. This describes a 200-year-old peasant farmhouse in the German Black Forest. It is built on the lee of a hill, facing South, near meadows and a spring which supply sustenance. The form of the roof (pitch and overhanging eves) is shaped to shelter the house from winter snow and storms. The interior, with its rooms, artefacts, beds, tables, cots, and shrines, is expressive of the lived lives. Dwelt life is articulated and practiced though continuities of elements, bodies, processes, materials, artifacts, and actions. Nigel Thrift suggests that turn to dwelling can be understood as a turn from thinking about space as an abstract, a priori ground to be filled by life, to thinking about place, in which relational transactions bring spaces, always specifically articulated, into being. These alternative views of space as spacing are of obvious interest to geography and reflect divisions that have, and still do exist within it. Things are critical to dwelling, and in a sense have their own being. They ‘gather or unite’. To illustrate this, Heidegger uses another oft-cited example of a bridge, which, he suggests, does more than simply connect two banks of a river. Rather it creates a place, and rearticulates the spaces and places, and the lives therein, around it. This quite literal example should not obscure 267 the idea that all things are connectors and assemblers, Heidegger reminds us that the old German word for ‘thing’ meant as such. The plethora of things which fill the world are tools by which selves create dwelt lives. Other key elements are the decentering of the modern human subject and a concern for nature and the environment as an active field. Heidegger states that the Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal and should be ‘spared’. This sparing of the Earth, or of the things of the Earth, is letting something be the way it is in itself. Such a letting-be is sharply contrasted to the modern domination of things/nature. Not by controlling or ruling, but by respectful sparing, can we be open to the Earth appearing in its gifts. Here, we see a proto-version of radical ecology, and indeed, some environmental philosophy does make specific connection to Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s notion of dwelling has poetic and spiritual dimensions, seeing continuities of dwelt life as preserving ‘the foursome’ – the unity of Earth, sky, gods, and mortals. Heidegger’s desired authentic life requires these mystical elements which are best expressed and judged by poetic and spiritual vision. Dwelling is to be on the Earth as a mortal, cultivating, constructing, and cherishing, but this needs to be framed, judged, and given meaning by and within the vastnesses of time, Earth, sky, and gods. Heidegger considered that modernity, in the form of industrialized capitalism, consumerism, and the spectacular society, forcibly detached the self from of the world and thus stifled true dwelling. He was highly critical of the technological age and its conception of, and use of, things. Think of the contrast between craft, say a carpenter – working with well-honed tools and skills to make things out of an intimately known material, in a process where skilled movement, material quality, and technology are harmoniously orchestrated and expressed in the process and the outcome – with industrial mass production where workers might do repetitive, possibly unskilled, isolated (from the wider process/outcome) tasks. The poetry, soul, and (harmoniously) dwelt life is missing from the latter. As we will see, later adaptations of his ideas rejected this split between authentic (dwelt) life and inauthentic (detached) life yet retained the central idea of being-in-the-world. Post-Heideggerian Dwelling. Temporalities, Landscapes, Taskscapes, and Politics Heidegger’s ideas have been hugely important in (re)shaping ontologies of life and in understandings of how life is lived in space, place, and landscapes as they have been carried forward in various disciplines. Significant Author's personal copy 268 Dwelling developments in anthropology, archaeology, and sociology have been underpinned by the work of Tim Ingold, Barbra Bender, and others. Ingold’s influential work on dwelling is set out in two main articles ‘The temporality of the landscape’ and ‘Building, dwelling, and living’, and four other related articles, all now collected together under the heading ‘Dwelling’ in a collection of his published works. Ingold takes Heidegger’s notion of dwelling and combines it with the related phenomenology of MerleauPonty, elements of ecological physiology, and Bordieu’s theory of practice. For Ingold, dwelling is a perspective that treats ‘‘the immersion of the organism-person in an environment or life-world as an inescapable condition of existence.’’ The world continually comes into being with and around the inhabitant, and its constituents take on significance through their incorporation into a regular pattern of life activity. There is an overt continuation of Heidegger’s dwelling, but there is also an important difference. In Heidegger, dwelt life was considered to be eroded to the point of extinction by modernity. For Ingold, ‘‘dwelling is the inevitable form of life. All living things dwell, thus it becomes universally applicable to human and nonhuman life.’’ The qualities of each dwelt life might be markedly different, but it is not a case of dwelt or undwelt life. All of life and its skills and practices stem from an ecology of action which is emergent, relational, and extended through ‘hybrid’ articulations of bodies/materials/practices. Life and its spacings are always unfolding. We grow up in the world and inevitably it enters us. Ingold describes how human children, like the young of many other species, grow up in environments furnished by the Figure 2 The Harvesters; Pieter Bruegel the Elder. work of previous generations, and as they do so they come to carry the forms of their dwellings in their bodies – in specific skills, sensibilities, and dispositions. Ingold’s primary concern has been to move understandings in archaeology and sociocultural anthropology from the ‘building perspective’ to the ‘dwelling perspective’. To do this, Ingold considers the buildings/ architecture of humans and nonhumans as extensions of Von Uexku+ll’s life-worlds, which suggest that each life form dwells in a distinctive way and from this, practices and forms (of whatever kind) stem. In doing so, the gulf between human and nonhuman life, for example in terms of architectures, is erased. Both emerge out of lived life and are ongoing processes (albeit articulated in solid material form). As it is centered on ongoing emergence and its residues, dwelling inevitably brings temporality and process to the center of considerations of places and landscapes which are most obviously understood as spatial formations. Only by engaging with the temporal dimension of practice can one begin to understand the natures of current landscapes and how they are immanent to their emergence rather than expressions of some fixed preformation. Specifically situated practice is all there, and there is no generality apart from that. Ingold illustrates his arguments with an analysis of Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s painting The Harvesters (Figure 2). In the foreground of the painting is a pear tree. Around it some people are harvesting a field of grain, while others eat and rest in its shade, or are moving to and fro along a path. A church stands half-concealed in the background. A vista of landscape stretches away from Author's personal copy Dwelling the high-on-a-hill vantage point. Other distant churches (markers of villages), fields, and woods can be seen. Ingold considers the painting from the perspectives of time, actions (repeated), and the specificity and the relational agency of the actors (human and nonhuman) depicted. In effect, Ingold treats the landscape in the same way that Heidegger considers the peasant house in the Black Forest, thinking about how (dwelt) life flows in and through the elements in the scene. Agency is distributed between the humans and nonhumans depicted. There is an ongoing interplay of relations between elements, bodies, and time. The people make the landscape through their bodies, treading the path by repeated walking. The landscape marks them and their practices, such as their walk being shaped by the pull or push of the hill as they move to and fro, or the actions of swinging a scythe. The shape of one moment of the social that the painting depicts – the seated group eating – is defined by the pool of shade made by the relationship of the earth, the tree, and the sun. Although life is emergent, a becoming in the ever ongoing moment of the present, this takes place within the (material, emotional, cultural) accretions of past moments thickened and made enduring in various ways. The emergent life of the tree is mapped in the precise configuration of its branches. Like the churches in the background, the tree not only embodies and marks the temporal depth of the landscapes, it makes or gathers the place/space around it. Dwelt life is thus both in the now and in deep(er) time where past and present are blurred together, not least through materiality, memory, and (habitual) embodied practice. Heidegger’s example of a peasant house and then Ingold’s use of this picture has seemingly rendered dwelling as an expression of authentic rustic (past) life. This has obscured its relevance to other forms of life which, on the face of it, seem markedly different (e.g., contemporary urban life which is addressed later in this article). To capture the relational, emergent, creation of landscape, Ingold coins the term ‘taskscape’, where the spatiotemporal patterns of the environment take settled physical form. But this is to make the point that all landscapes (and places) are taskscapes (both human and nonhuman) – the distinction between them (landscape and taskscape) is ultimately dissolved. Cities, countrysides, wildernesses, etc., are all ‘hybrid’ taskscapes where human and nonhuman are bound into specific relational, dwelt, spatiotemporal patterns. Recent eminent sociological approaches to nature and landscape have made this post-Heideggerian form of dwelling the theoretical hub of understanding of nature– society relations as articulated in contested landscapes; Macnaghten and Urry suggest that dwelling helps overcome the conflicts between ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ approaches to nature and environment. They emphasize 269 that it is specific, dwelt, social practices which produce and transform different natures and different values. These are spatially and temporally distributed tasks; the past is continually redefined in terms of the present and landscapes are never completed but are always subject to contestation and renegotiation. This highlights the important point that although Heidegger and Ingold illustrate ideas of dwelling in apparently harmonious, authentic, rural settings, this does not mean that power, contestation, economy are necessarily excluded. A political-economy analysis is also possible of the Bruegel painting, and obvious questions of power, ownership, unjust labor conditions might well arise, but these do not negate the relationships that Ingold highlights; however, these questions might make them more complex, multiple, and contested. Ingold has recently acknowledged that his development of dwelling lacked overt political analysis and seeks to address this in more recent articles. Drawing upon Macnaghten and Urry’s work, Adrian Franklin places dwelling at the heart of a new anthropology of nature which breaks through obstacles in structuralist approaches to nature which ignored practice, practical knowledge, things, technologies, and embodied sensual experience. Franklin seeks to push dwelling toward a more animated, turbulent vision of the world unfolding in a burgeoning, far-reaching (in time and space) interfolding of processes. He stresses the material and the technological as woven into ‘social’ fabrics and concludes that the world looks different this way and to see it and sense it requires a more active study of engagement with the world. The basic building blocks of this new anthropology are unmediated perceptual knowledge, practical experience and knowledge of the world, the technologies that link humans and nonhumans, the aesthetic and sensual composition of experience, and the cultural choices that are made in reference to these. These kinds of interpretations and uses of dwelling link into current interests in geography in affect, performativity, and nonrepresentation which are considered below. So, through the deployment of dwelling, nature and the social (understood in an embodied, affective sense) are refolded into relational co-constituting patternings where the emergent territorializations become places which are physically manifest topographical patterns, but which remain open to the surrounding world and to culture, politics, and economy. As we have seen, ideas of Heideggerian and postHeideggerian dwelling have often been discussed and illustrated through and in relation to ideas of rural landscapes, home, nature, localness, and rootedness. This sits uneasily with the apparently mobile, speededup, stretched-out urbanized nature of much of contemporary life. But in such life, embodied emersion in an Author's personal copy 270 Dwelling environment, and time/space-deepened experience remains inevitable. New forms of repeated practices and encounters still abound, such as commuting to work, which may be seen as urban taskscapes. Examples of life without place(s) (home, work, cities), rhythm, and repetition are rare or non-existent in large part because of the very nature of our nature. Ideas of human and nonhuman dwelling which center on the life-worlds made by bodyin-environment seem to be applicable to contemporary urban life as anywhere else. Dwelling and Geography Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian dwelling has influenced various strands of human geography over the last half-century or so. The former has been deployed in ongoing streams of phenomenological and humanist geographies; both in more recent geographies seeking to develop posthuman geographies informed by poststructuralism, ANT, relationality, nonrepresentation emotion, and affect. Both these streams are seeking to establish alternative ontologies and epistemologies of being on which geographical understandings of life are based. In addition to this, and more specifically, Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian dwelling have offered very different approaches to landscape to those within mid–late twentieth-century geography, but now, in conjunction with the above, these are coming together in exciting new accounts of landscape as described below. Humanistic Geography and Phenomenology From the 1970s onwards, humanistic geography sought to develop understandings of social life embedded in subjectivity, space, place, and everyday life. In part, this was to counter the prevailing geometric paradigm with its concerns for abstract spatial relations which largely ignored subjective human experience and the emergent nature of knowledge/practice. Some geographers, for example John Pickles, turned to phenomenology to underpin the approach, drawing particularly on the work of Husserl, while others turned to Merleau-Ponty and elements of existentialism. This shared much with Heidegger’s approach centered on being-in-the-world and focused very much upon how the world makes itself known, and how it can be made known through study. There are differences between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions and some geographers sought to base their phenomenological approaches more directly on Heidegger, suspicious of the desire to reveal a universal and a priori nature of the life-world, in the former. Place became a central focus of some key expressions of phenomenological and humanist geographies. Seamon and Mugerauer’s Dwelling, place and environment published in 1989, refers back to Heidegger, Bachelard, the phenomenologist architecture of Christian NorbergSchulz, and pioneering geographers in this field – Yi-Fu Tuan, Anne Buttimer, and Edward Relph for whom nature, place, and architecture were key experiential milieu of human life. Within these broad aims, various foci were to be found: Seamon sought to understand the experiential and contingent character of place through movement (anticipating the movement in Ingold’s account of taskscape); Relph deployed Heidegger’s dwelling to escape from crude notions of place as location; Tuan’s highly influential work explored distinctions between space and place and notions of ‘topophilia’ – the affective bond between people and place which shared much with Heidegger’s idea of dwelt life. These, and other, approaches of place have been usefully summarized by Tim Creswell. Geography and Landscape Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian dwelling shares some traits with the Sauerian approaches to landscape which were prominent in mid-twentieth-century geography in that both are interested in interrelations between humans and the environment. However, whereas Sauer developed an approach aimed at scientific mapping of the transformation of natural landscapes into cultural landscapes, dwelling sees the production of landscape as more thoroughly relational, and not on some unidirectional trajectory of nature to culture. This is a dualism in which dwelling does not even acknowledge. Later cultural geographies of landscape, which ‘read’ landscapes as constructed texts and expressions of power (colonial, gender, economic, ideological), differ from dwelling in that they do not focus on the emergent coming-into-beingness of landscape in which the properties, vitalities, agencies, trajectories, and velocities of humans and nonhumans (rocks, weather patterns, plants, animals, people, technologies) combine to produce a unique chemistry out of which particular patterns of landscape, place, and life form. In recent works, new geographical approaches to landscape and place have merged with wider ontological and epistemological questions which have adopted dwelling as part of their theoretical armory. This is because the latter are interested in bodies in place/space and bodies in ongoing relational action ‘as central elements of being’ and thus have often been discussed in the context of rethinking landscape and place. Ecologies of Places and Landscapes Dwelling is being deployed within poststructuralist and posthumanist geographies to counter, or develop, cultural approaches which were deemed too constructionist and too centered on the narrowly defined social. In some cases, these deployments of dwelling have harked directly back to the work of Heidegger, but they have also drawn Author's personal copy Dwelling upon post-Heideggerian dwelling, notably that of Ingold. There has been a good deal of exchange between geography, sociology, and landscape studies as these new configurations have developed. Nigel Thrift and others frequently return to dwelling to remind us of the basic principle of life being an embodied, embedded, relational unfolding process. This manoeuvre is included in recent attempts to rejuvenate ideas of place in geography in which a move from the building perspective to the dwelling perspective is central. Thrift discusses ecologies of place, where places are performed inter-being/material processes which coalesce into known/knowable spatial forms but remain fully wired into the flux of the wider world. Dwelling also brings the past, memory, ‘hauntings’, and the contingencies of shared life into understandings of everyday life/space, which more topological approaches, such as ANT, find hard to pick up. For David Harvey the importance of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling is that it reminds us of how places are constructed in our memories and affections through repeated encounters and complex associations, and how place experiences are necessarily time-deepened and memory-qualified. These new directions are important because the very idea of place has come under critical scrutiny in some poststructuralist/ ANT-based geographical thinking and under pressure from ideas of globalized flows, and yet, they remain a critical aspect of everyday life, not least because of the way in which life is dwelt life. Geographies based upon Heideggerian dwelling (e.g., David Seamon and Robert Mugerauer) tried to show that dwelling can deal with interconnection and flows in and out of ‘place’ as well as connections within place, and the newer deployments of dwelling continue in this vein. In work on places and landscapes where trees are present, Cloke and Jones address a number of questions within the dwelling perspective. First, they problematize the dwelt/ authentic–undwelt inauthentic life dualism which is present in Heidegger and, to some extent, subsequent accounts of dwelling, by showing that the taskscape of an orchard is a highly complex, hybrid assemblage of old and new practices/technologies, material, and imaginative presences. Second, they problematize the dualism between bounded space and network, by showing how the orchard is simultaneously articulated in both senses and could only be understood as such. Third, they challenge the idea of landscape as a fixed/framed view by placing the embodied (moving) witness within the ever-changing landscape of movement, sound, light, and smell. Dwelling implies being-in-the-landscape and once that is allowed, then there is all the business of the moment to consider; for example, the dynamics of weather and light, as well as the inevitable momentum of the past, and this goes for all who experience the landscape – visitors, workers, owners, and researchers. 271 Performativity and Nonrepresentation Dwelling has much affinity with artistic, poetic, and literary mappings of being-in-place/landscape, as the writer Jonathan Bate shows, and thus will be of interest in relation to the increasingly evident intersections of geographical and artistic interests. Recently some geographers have developed a more performative account of dwelling. David Crouch, referring to Ingold’s practical ontology in the world, feels that understandings of the production of nature (in the form of gardening) need to focus more strongly on the performative practice of doing. More emphasis is placed on the moment of emergence rather than on the field of emergence. John Wylie suggests that Ingold’s approach offers a potentially fruitful means of reconfiguring cultural geographies of landscape within the ambit of embodied practice and performativity but that it needs adjusting in three ways. First, the temporal aspects of dwelling need to take more account of fleeting and mobile experiences, as well as stressing known, habitual landscapes. He suggests that dwelling as a form of phenomenological ontology should be the milieu for material cultures and ways of being that are productive of multiple spatialities and temporalities, longstanding and momentary, rural and urban, fixed and mobile, coherent and imaginary. In particular, it must enable the register of the transient and the fleeting as well as the enduring. Second, attempts to move away from the visual as the way of engaging with/reading the landscape need to be tempered with the idea that the visual – the gaze – is itself an embodied practice. Third, geography needs to develop methods appropriate to a scripting and interrogation of embodied experiences. These developments, along with Harrison’s recent exploration of Levinas’s view of dwelling with a concern for its ethical resonances, mean that ideas of dwelling within geography have again a renewed momentum. Nonhuman Dwelling One very interesting and important development in notions of dwelling is the use of the concept to consider the lives of nonhumans. These often draw upon Von Uexku+ll’s idea of life-world to stress the ‘intelligences’ of dwelt animal life, how they are markedly various, and how they intersect; all this with the view of understanding human dwelling. Sarah Whatmore and Steve Hinchcliffe in their work on cities which are ‘habitable’ (for humans and nonhumans alike) consider animals and their urban dwellings as more-than-human agents exercising unbidden, improvised, and sometimes, disruptive energies. A recognition of dwelt animal life-worlds has significant implications for understanding the being of animals. Author's personal copy 272 Dwelling As the philosopher Raimond Gaita points out, an animal’s intelligence is entirely active, its understanding entirely practical. In other words, animals practice embodied, practical, enacted knowledges – as self, being, and ‘voice’. This challenges anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. We all dwell, and there are commonalities which can be considered. It also links directly to questions of animal welfare. It is of note that organizations such as Compassion in World Farming see the Cartesian architecture of modern knowledge as culpable for denying animal rights. The appeal for domesticated, zoo, and companion animals to be able to express their natural behavior as much as possible is, in effect, an appeal to let them dwell in their environment, and thus create their life-worlds and practice their enacted being. Such arguments have been developed by Jones as a way of countering ANT ideas of symmetry and purely relational identity in which the dwelt becomings of animals might get lost. Final Points It is the recognition in dwelling of the rich, intimate, creative ongoing togetherness of beings and things, the recognition of agency other than human, the recognition of time-deepened processes, embodied experience, the experience of rootedness, the richness of things together over time, and the recognition of specificity, which makes it such a potent approach in posthumanist geography. Dwelling is one conceptualization amongst others at work in human geography that together are trying to build a fuller account of the complex processes of life, which does not divide off and privilege the ‘social’ in narrow terms, and see the social just in reflexive, rational, language-based terms. Doreen Massey is critical of Heidegger’s notion of place as being too rooted but, she adds that in principle his reformulation of space as place seems to point in the right direction. See also: Actor-Network Theory/Network Geographies; Affect; Becoming; Ecology; Emotional Geographies; Humanism/Humanistic Geography; Hybridity; Landscape; Non-Representational Theory/Non-Representational Geographies; Performativity; Phenomenology/ Phenomenological Geography; Place; Posthumanism/ Posthumanistic Geographies. Further Reading Bate, J. (2001). The Song of the Earth. London: Picador. Buttimer, A. (1976). Grasping the dynamism of the life-worlds. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66, 277--292. Casey, E. S. (1998). The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cloke, P. and Jones, O. (2001). Dwelling, place, and landscape: An orchard in Somerset. Environment and Planning A 33, 649--666. Creswell, T. (2004). Place: A Short Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Franklin, A. (2002). Social Nature. London: Sage. Gaita, R. (2003). The Philosopher’s Dog. London: Routledge. Harrison, P. (2007). The space between us. Opening remarks on the concept of dwelling. Environment and Planning D 25, 625--647. Harrison, S., Pile, S. and Thrift, N. (2004). Patterned Ground: Entanglements of nature and culture. London: Reaktion Books. Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. Heidegger, M. (2001). Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Perennial Classics. Hofstadter, A. (2001). Introduction. In Heidegger, M. (ed.) Poetry, language, thought, pp x--xxv. New York: Perennial Classics. Ingold, T. (1993). The temporality of landscape. World Archaeology 25, 152--174. Ingold, T. (1995). Building, dwelling, living: How people and animals make themselves at home in the world. In Strathern, M. (ed.) Shifting contexts: Transformations in anthropological knowledge, pp 57--80. London: Routledge. Ingold, T. (2000). The Perception of the Environment. Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London: Routledge. Ingold, T. (2005). Epilogue: Towards a politics of dwelling. Conservation and Society 3(2), 501--508. Jones, O. (2003). The restraint of beasts: Rurality, animality, actor network theory and dwelling. In Cloke, P. (ed.) Country visions, pp 450--487. London: Pearson Education. Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. (1998). Contested Natures. London: Sage Publications. Massey, D. (2005). For Space. London: Sage. Massey, D. and Thrift, N. (2003). The passion of place. In Johnston, R. & Williams, M. (eds.) A century of British geography, pp 275--299. Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy. Pickles, J. (1985). Phenomenology, Science and Geography: Spatiality and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Relph, E. (1976). Place and Placelessness. London: Pion. Seamon, D. (1980). Body-subject, time-space routines, and placeballets. In Buttimer, A. & Seamon, D. (eds.) The human experience of space and place, pp 148--165. London: Croom Helm. Seamon, D. and Mugerauer, D. (1989). Dwelling, Place and Environment: Towards a Phenomenology of Person and World. Haven: Yale University Press. Thrift, N. (1996). Spatial Formations. London: Sage. Thrift, N. (1999). Steps to an ecology of place. In Massey, D., Sarre, P. & Allen, J. (eds.) Human geography today, pp 295--352. Oxford: Polity. Thrift, N. (2005). From born to made: Technology, biology and space. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, 463--476. Tuan, Y.-F. (1971). Geography, phenomenology, and the study of human nature. Canadian Geographer 15, 181--192. Tuan, Y.-F. (1974). Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Villela-Petit, M. (1996). Heidegger’s conception of space. In Macann, C. (ed.) Critical Heiddegger, pp 134--158. London: Routledge. Vycinas, V. (1969). Earth and Gods: An Introduction the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Wylie, J. (2003). Landscape, performance and dwelling: A Glastonbury case study. In Cloke, P. (ed.) Country visions, pp 136--157. Harlow: Pearson. Relevant Website http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu Place and Space in Geography, Environment, Environmental Ethics, Ecology, Research on Place and Space; Pegasus, University of Central Florida.