Chapter 1 – The reasons and results of international intervention in Somalia
Before delving into the effects of international intervention on Somali state-building today, it is
necessary to acquire a historical perspective. This will show, inter alia, that building a Somali state has
always been an externally-imposed idea, and one of the central justifications of intervention. Stateuildi g i te e tio has ee a iousl oti ated o e ti e, f o
ati e ad i ist atio of olo ies to
post-WW2 development, Cold War strategic alignment, humanitarian needs, and fighting global
terrorism. However, it has always led to increased conflict among Somalis trying to capture the ample
financial and political resources associated with state-building.
Hereafter, we will draw the background against which the rest of this dissertation will evolve. Precolonial history, Somali forms of governance, and historical developments not immediately related to
international intervention will only feature insofar as they serve to explain the reasons and results of
intervention.
The area now known as Somalia is situated on international trade routes connecting the Mediterranean
and Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, and the East African Coast with the Arab world and India. Besides this
central geopolitical location, the northern coast of Somalia is also one of the few places in the world
where the highly prized commodity frankincense grows. Since ancient Egyptian times, the Horn of Africa
has been integrated into global trade flows1 and has experienced the resulting mixing of populations and
cultures. For example, Arab, Persian, Indian and Bantu communities have been present in Somalia for
more than five centuries, dissolving into the Somali coastal and riverine population mix.
Efforts to incorporate parts of the Somali region into larger empires were undertaken by African
kingdoms such as Shungwaya, as well as by the Ottomans, the Sultanate of Muscat and later that of
Zanzibar. Although such partial annexations left their imprint on Somali history and culture, the history
of international interventions described here will start with the arrival of the European colonial powers
in the 19th century. The British and Italian interventions kickstarted the history of modern Somalia, and
most Somali specialists agree that the effect of these interventions is still discernible today.
1.1 British protectorate in Somaliland (1884 to 1960) – Cinderella of the British Empire
The shift from coastal navigation to the trans-Indian Ocean routes, which came with improved
navigation and seafaring techniques of European ships on their way to the riches of the East,
te po a il de eased the st ategi i po ta e of “o alia s oast. This e plai s h the olo ial
scramble in the Horn of Africa started comparatively late. But the opening of the Suez Canal in 1876
restored “o alia s geopoliti al significance. The British asserted their naval dominance in the Gulf of
Aden to protect their shipping lanes against Egyptian, French, and Italian contenders. The
coaling/transhipment port of Aden, occupied by Great Britain in 1821, soon became one of the busiest
1
The waters separating the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa had historically been called the Gulf (or
Sea) of Berbera before the British renamed it. This indicates the importance of this town, already mentioned as
Malao by Greek navigators circumnavigating Africa in the 1st century AD. See Anonymous, The Periplus of the
E th aea “ea , translated by Wilfred Schof.
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ports in the British Empire. Controlling the Somali coast on the other side of the Gulf of Aden, with its
treacherous coastline and history of piracy and looting of stranded ships2, became a tactical necessity.
Several British explorers, most famously Richard Burton in 18553, visited the Somali coast and some
parts of the hinterland. Their accounts of the lack of resources of the Somali interior and common clan
conflicts dissuaded British officials to set up anything more than a skeleton presence in what they
a ed “o alila d . At that time the coast was still under nominal Ottoman, de facto Egyptian control,
as it had been since the 16th century. When the British annexed Egypt in 1880, they first ruled the Somali
coast by proxy; but in 1884 the Egyptian troops abandoned the region to fight against the Mahdi revolt
in Sudan, and Britain hastily established a protectorate, modelled on those they had set up in Southern
Yemen.
British aims in Somaliland were to protect naval interests, secure a regular meat supply for their colony
in Aden and preserve peace among the tribes. The latter objective would help secure the first two and
prevent their expulsion in favour of another colonial power. British gunboat diplomacy relied on
superior firepower and principles of peacekeeping they had honed among Arab tribes on the Arabian
Peninsula, selecting local allies and keeping them in power by coercion, stipends and interfering in
succession quarrels. Besides the livestock exported from the Somali coast to Yemen they had no
commercial or extractive interests.
Not inclined to invest in Somaliland, the British were by contrast eager colonial explorers and
geographers, and accounts by British travellers and colonial agents have dominated, arguably until
today, the perception of Somalis by Westerners. This is a contentious point for many Somalis (and
postcolonial theorists), but there are few other written sources available, and many of these travellers
tried to present a balanced and well-informed view of Somalis and their affairs.4
The Dervish rebellion by Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, which started in 1900 and lasted until 1920, aimed
at kicking the English infidels out of Somaliland. But most of the fighting occurred between Somali clans
and in any case there were not many British interests or servicemembers to put at risk. After several
expensive and inconclusive military campaigns, and later when England was engrossed in World War 1,
the p ote to ate s autho ities aited out the rebellion, which provided more amusing anecdotes to the
2
3
4
There are many accounts of shipwrecks off the Somali coast. See, e.g., Durrill, W.K, Atrocious Misery: the
African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, in The American Historical Review Vol. 92, No. 2, Apr.
. By
1800 the Majerteen confidently expected two or three European ships to be wrecked on their shores every
season as uoted o p. 289. He also provides a map with explanations on the treacherous currents that in July
and August would carry ships to the rocky coast between Ras Xafuun and Caluula.
Burton, R., First Footsteps in East Africa or An Exploration of Harar, 1856. Other British travellers preceded
Burton, and many were to follow him, but his detailed account of the Somalis remains one of the most
complete descriptions from the 19th century, and he was (one of) the first travellers to go far inland, all the way
to Harar.
In this caricature by F. Elliot of the “o ali a , “o alis ight ell e og ize the sel es: In appearance the
Somali is an Arab, and sometimes a handsome Arab. Treat him with confidence and consideration, he is
cheerful, intelligent, willing to learn and true to his code of honesty. Treat him harshly or unjustly, he becomes
sulky, obstinate, mutinous and dangerous. He is an excellent scout, a wonderful marcher, and very proud if
confidence is shown in him. It would be fatal to the peace of the country if the Somali should be treated with
that contempt which is often shown to the black races by Europeans. In Jubaland and its Inhabitants, The
Geographical Journal, Vol. 41, No. 6, June 1913, p. 561. Other portraits were less flattering, but most visitors
readily agreed that the Somalis were not a people to be subjugated easily and thus urged caution in
approaching Somalis.
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E glish p ess a out the Mad Mullah tha dile
as fo olo ial ad i ist ato s. They saw their
minimalist approach vindicated by the unfolding events, although the chaos that ensued when British
troops retreated entirely from the interior between 1910 and 1913, leading to increased clan fighting,
proved that some presence beyond the coast was required. In 1919 and 1920, Great Britain ended the
rebellion with an ae ial o i g of the De ish leade s head ua te s i Talee .
I
Douglas Ja di e poi ted out that the la k of de elop e t of hat he alled the Ci de ella of
the British Empire5 as osti g the B itish t easu , as the ou t s e e ues e e o l a meagre
£80,000, while the British presence there cost the treasury £150,000 per year. He did not consider the
transfer of government to Somalis an option6. Jardine thought that education, despite the mistrust it
might provoke among the conservative, religious Somalis – the Dervish rebellion had started when
Sayyid Hassan found out that young Somalis were being taught lessons in Christianity in an English
school – and the development of Somaliland as a hunting and sporting paradise could be avenues for
develop e t, as there can only be one criterion of success, namely the increased happiness of the
people, and of that there is ample evidence in Somaliland7 . Supposedly the Somalis were grateful for
the British presence.
After the second world war, England started investing a bit more in Somaliland, because of ethical
pressure on the colonial apparatus as well as in response to the nascent Cold War. The administration
headquarters were moved from Berbera to Hargeisa in 1946, signalling a shift in intent from controlling
only the coastline to controlling the interior. A treaty was signed with Ethiopia in 1954 to fix the border,
angering Somali nationalists and Isaaq pastoralists, who thereby potentially lost the right to access the
pastures on the other side of the border (in fact Ethiopia has never barred access to pastoralists).
Efforts to groom Somalis to take on more administrative and security responsibilities, were given a
boost by institutes of secondary education in Sheikh and Borama, and by modest police and military
t ai i g. The i pa t of these s hools as o side a le, as a of “o alia s futu e elites, also from the
South, attended them as there were no secondary schools in Italian Somalia (see hereafter). Airfields
were opened in Berbera and Hargeisa, and the protectorate was connected to the rest of the Empire by
radio and postal service.
On the eve of independence, a British observer noted that The Somalis have done well enough, and
there is no reason why they should not govern their country without chaos ensuing, provided they are
subsidized 8. He warned that The Somalis of the Protectorate are better educated than the Somalis of
Somalia. It will be very unfortunate if they are dragged along behind an independent Somalia, always
looking to Somalia for leadership . Ho e e , i late
the e as still o s hedule fo “o alila d s
independence, or any preparation, such as planned elections or a gradual transfer of administrative
responsibilities.
5
6
7
8
Jardine, D., Somaliland: The Cinderella of the British Empire, Journal of the Royal African Society Vol. 24, No. 94,
Jan. 1925. Jardine also wrote the most comprehensive and rather sympathetic account of the Dervish wars, The
Mad Mullah of Somaliland, in 1923.
Jardine mentions that there is no doubt that the British officer, both as a soldier and an administrator, has won
the respect and admiration of the Somali in a er high degree. But this … does ot arr ith it a desire [of
the Somali] to imitate the European or his standards of life and action .
Jardine 1925, p. 108.
Waterfield, G., address to the Royal Africa Society and the Royal Empire Society, Oct. 3, 1957, The Horn of
Africa, African Affairs, Vol. 57 No. 227 (Jan. 1958).
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Reflections on the British colonial presence in Somalia
* G eat B itai s effo ts to t a sfo “o ali so iet i the a ea the o t olled as i i al.
Anticipating on the next section, the same may be said of Ital s effo ts i Puntland. Both regions were
integrated into the regional livestock market, increasing the power of urban commercial elites (often
Arab or Indian); but the predominant pastoral economy and its social relations remained undisturbed.
From a postcolonial perspective, this light-handed approach could explain the capacity of local
societies to self-organize into autonomous states after 1991.
* In an effort to preserve peace with minimal expenses, the British engaged the clan system, acting as
arbiters but also exacting collective vengeance when the context required it; they established
themselves as primus inter pares among the Somaliland clans. This strategy, interestingly, had
considerably more success than the heavy-handed approaches tried later.
* By their extensive travels in the region, ethnographic studies and efforts to understand Somali
language and culture – within the imperial context of the 19th and early 20th centuries – the British
defined the international image of the Somali as follows: a tough, ferociously egalitarian nomad who
can best be left to his own devices. The riverine agricultural communities of the South and the more
sophisticated inhabitants of coastal settlements never seemed quite as Somali as the Northern
pastoralists9. This image, tainted by the media coverage of civil war savagery and Al Shabaab
extremism, still predominates international thinking about Somalia, and preconfigures tentative
solutions for Somalia.
1.2 Italian colonial development (1890s to 1941) – Grand dreams of Fascist Modernization
Compared to the sparsely inhabited and resource-poor north of Somalia, South Somalia had more to
offer. Behind the old port cities of Mogadishu, Merka, Baraawe and Kismayo lay a fertile agricultural
hinterland, largely unexploited, save for the presence of small farming communities.
When in the late 19th century Italy embarked on its own colonial adventure, there were few areas left in
the world to colonize, besides the Horn of Africa. South Somalia was at that time loosely controlled by
the Sultanate of Zanzibar, which had an alliance with the Somali Sultanate of Geledi, based in what is
now Afgooye (25 km from Mogadishu on the banks of the Shabelle river).
Robecchi-Bricchetti describes Mogadishu in 189110 in terms that are so similar to those that could be
used now, that one wonders how much impact colonialism reall has had…:
-
9
10
Strife in the city between settlements of Xamar Weyne (Somali population) and Shingani (Arabs,
mixed, cosmopolitan) occurs on an almost daily basis. This situation of daily strife was also
recorded by previous Western visitors Revoil (late 1882) and Roskoschny (1889); the latter even
oted that Mogadishu s epithet as kul yowm daua fitna: everyday a struggle. This internal
struggle had led the city to the brink of destruction. Revoil estimated that the 6000 people living
This critique has mostly touched I.M. Lewis, the doyen of Somali studies. See for example the argument
between Catherine Besteman and I.M. Lewis in the late 1990s, sparked by Besteman s publication Representing
Viole e a d Otheri g So alia, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb. 1996), pp. 120-133. This had
repercussions with articles being published in other journals in defence of either author over the coming years.
Puzo, M., Mogadishu, Somalia: Geographic Aspects of its Evolution, Population, Functions and Morphology,
1972.
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-
-
5
in the city were only a third of the original population, basing himself on the number of ruins
and the lack of any new houses11.
The governor of Mogadishu had little control over the city. He disposed over 200 highly irregular
and apparently ineffective soldiers, but tried not to use them, preferring to settle the numerous
disputes by negotiation. They would have been of little use if the hostile surrounding Abgaal
tribe decided to attack the city. Roskoschny suggested that the reason the Abgaal did not attack
was because trade was more beneficial to them than occupation would have been.
Bricchetti noted many irregularities in the collection of taxes; almost the only revenue came
from duties levied in the port. The rich and powerful paid no taxes.
Hostility towards foreigners was high in both sections of the city, and Bricchetti was attacked by
the inhabitants of Xamar Weyne because they felt they had received less gifts than the
inhabitants of Shungani , leading to several deaths.
Despite the chaos in Mogadishu, commerce was bustling. In 1891 cotton, cereals and sesame oil
were the main export items, but many products from the interior, including ivory, were also
t aded th ough Mogadishu s ha ou . I po ts e e ai l te tiles12.
In fact, the Banadir—the coastal strip between Warsheikh in the North and Baraawe in the South—was
not the first part of the Somali coast to fall under Italian control. In 1889 the local potentate Yusuf
Kenadid, to protect himself from his enemy the Majerteen Sultan Osman Mohamud, placed himself and
Hobyo (spelt Obbia by Italians) under Italian protection. That same year, Sultan Osman Mohamud
entered into a similar protectorate agreement with Italy, as he also wanted to benefit from Italian
firearms and stipends in exchange for formal Italian control. But until the mid-1920s Italy did not seek to
exercise any real authority in this zone, which covered present-day Puntland and Galmudug13.
Italy lobbied hard with the Sultan of Zanzibar to obtain a concession on the Banadiri coast, which had
more to offer than the sparsely inhabited, dry northeast. After an initial rejection, the Imperial British
East Af i a Co pa lo ied o Ital s ehalf, a d by 1892 Italy controlled the entire Somali coast from
Bender Qassim (Bosaso) to the Juba river14.
Ital s p i e i terest in Somalia was not agricultural, at first, but commercial and above all strategic15.
Italy hoped to control the fertile regions of the Ethiopian highlands, and Eritrea and Somalia both
provided access. Hence explorations up the Juba river (towards Ethiopia) were a priority. In 1892
Bricchetti noted that Somalia is not California, neither could one find there the rich pastures of
Lombardy a d that this ou tr … ould e er offer resour es to our peasa t e igra ts , but that,
on the other hand, this land is good for commercial ventures 16.
11
12
13
14
15
16
Puzo, 1972, pp 51-58.
Guadagni, M.G., Colonial Origins of the Public Domain in Southern Somalia, 1892-1912, Journal of African Law,
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 1978) pp 1-29; p. 2.
Hess, R.L., Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966.
Galbraith, J.S., Italy, the British East Africa Company and the Benadir Coast, 1888-1893, Journal of Modern
History, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec 1970), explains how the occupation of the Somali and African Red Sea coast was
shaped by European politics: the British suspicion of France led it to cooperate with Germany and Italy,
granting the latter access to the Banadir coast through intervention with the sultan of Zanzibar. Great Britain
saw little benefit in occupying the East African coast itself.
Guadagni, 1978, p. 1.
Idem
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In the 19th century, the Banadir coast had long been in decline. It seems that the economy was
somewhat revived under the Sultanate of Zanzibar in the second half of the 19th century, by Indian
merchant capital and the slave trade: Bantu slaves were imported to Mogadishu, often traded for ivory.
They worked the farms, did domestic labour, and worked as artisans17. In 1882, George Revoil noted
that two thirds of the population of Mogadishu consisted of slaves. It must be noted that Somalis never
exported slaves, they only bought them. Slaves allowed a boom in cereal exports from Banadir to South
Arabia, as documented by several chroniclers at that time.
The Filonardi company (1893-96) and the Banadir company (1896-1904), both of which received
concessions from the Italian government to manage and develop the Banadir coast, simply continued
taxing caravans and trade as the Sultan of Zanzibar had done. They refused to engage in agricultural and
commercial development as other European concession companies did, and when confronted with a
public-relations scandal in Italy because of slavery in 1903, the concession was handed back to the
government.
Ital s effort to build an empire was thwarted by its defeat against Ethiopian troops at the battle of
Adwa in 1896, a resounding defeat of a European colonial power by indigenous African troops. This led
them to reluctantly pay more attention to Somalia. The reluctance was due to perceived unprofitability
of colonial enterprises in Somalia. A scheme was implemented to encourage Italian agricultural
entrepreneurs to start businesses in Somalia, but in 1910 the new governor Di Martino reported that, of
11 farming concessions created, 7 had been abandoned18.
Capital and labour requirements could not be met, making any development slow and difficult. In
Mogadishu there was hardly any effort to produce housing or other facilities for Italian colonists, who
lived in the old houses of Shingani until the 1930s19, when an urban masterplan for Mogadishu was
partially implemented.
The Somali colony languished until the advent of fascism in Italy; from 1923 onwards, more resources
and energy were poured into the development of La Somalia Italiana . The protectorates of Northern
Somalia (Magiurtina), which had only been nominally under Italian control and refused to comply, were
subjected manu militari between 1924 and 1926. The British ceded Trans-Juba to Italy in 1926, adding a
large swath of partially fertile territory. Henceforth Italy directly ruled Somalia, although in practice local
freedoms and the system of tribal hierarchy and customary law were not affected.
Modern institutions and some industrial processing plants were established, large farms and irrigation
schemes planned, a railway was built from Mogadishu to Jowhar, roads were paved in Mogadishu, and
poor Italians were shipped to Somalia with the promise of a better life. The Duke of Abruzzi established
a large agricultural investment company (SAIS), which developed over 20,000 hectares of land around
Jowhar20. Although it became profitable, this was at the expense of large state investments in transport
and processing facilities, so altogether it was not profitable to Italy21.
17
18
19
20
21
Alpers, E.A., Muqdisho in the Nineteenth Century: A Regional Perspective, Journal of African History, Vol. 24,
No. 4, 1983, p. 448.
Hess, 1966, p. 112; see also Guadagni, 1978, p. 3.
Puzo, 1972, p. 72.
For a description of the plantation, including photographs, see Istituto Coloniale Fascista: Somalia, published
around 1930.
Hess, 1966, p. 164.
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When Mussolini decided to reconquer Ethiopia, Somalia was one of the launching pads of the invasion.
Many Somali troops fought alongside the Italians against their historic foes22. With the conquest of
Ethiopia in 1935, “o alia e a e o e of si p o i es of Af i a O ie tale Italia a ; the “o ali p o i e
included the Ogaden, inhabited by Somali tribes. The fascist objective was to control a large area that
would contribute to the greatness of the Italian empire, absorb the population surplus that had been
fleeing Italy to the New World throughout the second half of the 19th century, enrich Italian agriculture
and commerce with tropical products, and become a destination for its industrial products.
From the outset of Italian colonialism, dreams competed with interests almost making the authorities
lose a sense of proportion 23. Italy either did not have, or did not employ, the means to make its dreams
come true. The Ethiopian adventure lasted six years before its demise and, in economic and social costs,
could be termed a disaster. In 1941, without a shot being fired, Somalia surrendered to the British.
Italy did unify Somali territories, from Puntland to Jubaland and, for a few years, the Ogaden24, under a
single state structure, initiated some agricultural, infrastructure and light industrial development, and
involved Somalis in these efforts, thus creating the nucleus of a modern urban class in Somalia.
Arguably, Italy also instilled this class with the dream of a strong, modern state; it established some
infrastructure for such a state, both physically and institutionally, but there was one area in which the
Italian development record was dismal: education. By 1935, only 1250 Somalis were enrolled in primary
schools, and when the Italians left there was still not a single secondary school in Somalia25.
The legacy of the Italian presence is still present in manifold ways in Somali culture, from a popular
predilection for pasta, pizza and a hiato , to the elite enjoyment of theatre and literature. That
Mogadishu was known, from the 1960s to the 198 s, as the pea l of the I dia O ea a also e
largely attributed to Italian urbanization and architectural contributions.
Hess concludes his imposing study of Italian colonialism in Somalia with a reflection on racism, noting
that Italians in Somalia did not impose racial segregation and do not even seem to have had racist views.
The e as also o e thusias to sp ead Ch istia it . Perhaps for this reason, individual Italians are
liked and respected in Somalia, as in Ethiopia, although colonialism as a whole is condemned in both
countries26.
‘eflectio s o
La So alia Italia a
* As in British Somaliland, Italians used rather than tried to transform traditional Somali self-governance.
However, the Italians built much more infrastructure and tried to develop agriculture and commerce,
as well as law and order; they obviously had their own interests in mind, but Somalis participated in
the nascent state structures that accompanied these efforts. We know that states have historically
existed in Somalia, f o the la d of Pu t ith its uee Ati (2250 BC) through the Ajuran Empire of
the 13th and 14th centuries, to the Geledi sultanate of the 18th and 19th centuries. Did any of these
22
23
24
25
26
“o ali )aptié t oops pa ti ipated in the invasion. Hess, 1966, p. 174.
Novati, G.C., Italy in the Triangle of the Horn: Too Many Corners for a Half-Power, Journal of African Studies,
Vol. 32, 3, 1994, pp 369-385.
For a brief period (August 1940 to March 1941) Italy even occupied British Somaliland, bringing all Somalis,
except a few thousand Issas in Djibouti, under one administration.
Hess, 1966, p. 187.
Hess, 1966, p. 189.
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previous experiences of statehood affect Somali experiences of the modern state that Italy
introduced? Was there any historical continuity?
* By involving Somalis in their efforts to conquer the Ethiopian highlands, the Italians spurred on dreams
of the g eate “o ali atio . It ould sta d to easo that fas ist odes of thi ki g a out politics
would have influenced this Somali project. This might explain the impractical irredentism with which
independent Somalia later pursued this objective.
* The cultural influence of Italy on Somalia was considerable and persists today. Might this be due to
what Hess describes as the lack of racism, and the effort to befriend Somalis (and even intermarry with
them)? This goes counter the predominant narrative today, which sees colonialism as an imposition
and contemporary intervention as a collaborative effort; however, as we will see later on, the evidence
rather points to a contrary conclusion, that colonialism sought more local acceptance than statebuilding efforts do today.
1.3 British and Italian trusteeships: preparing Somali independence (1941-1960)
When the British defeated the Italians in East Africa in 1941, they established a British Military
Administration (BMA) in Somalia and Eritrea, returning Ethiopia (without the Ogaden and Haud that
remained administered by Mogadishu until 1948) to Emperor Haile Selassie. They remained in control of
Somalia until 1950, when the UN-mandated Italian trusteeship started, aimed at preparing Somalia for
independence in 10 years: the Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia, AFIS.
The BMA stripped what had been Africa Orientale Italiana of its assets, dismantling ports, railroads,
industries and installations and shipping it all to their colonies (or selling it to allies). Great Britain was
still at war and they considered all assets brought by the Italians to Africa as war booty, deeming the
Somalis (and Ethiopians and Eritreans) had no use for them27.
The BMA as a i i alisti
a age e t of aptu ed te ito ies a d did ot seek to de elop the .
However, officers in charge were sympathetic to the young urban modernist class, which came together
in the Somali Youth Club (established 1943) and a relation developed between them28. When, in 1946,
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested that British Somaliland, the Haud, Ogaden, Italian Somaliland
and the No th Easte p o i e of Ke a e joi ed togethe to fo a G eate “o alia this sti ed up a
lot of e ite e t a o g this g oup of ou g “o alis, a d the idea of “o ali e , as Greater Somalia
is known in Somali, became firmly implanted in the Somali political imaginary.
27
28
Wrong, M., I Did t Do It For You, 2005. K.C. Gander Dower, in The First to be Freed: British Military
Administration in Eritrea and Somalia UK Mi ist of I fo atio ,
, states: E it ea a d “o alia a e …
two over-capitalised, bankrupt semi-dese ts thus justif i g the st ippi g of assets. ‘i ha d Pa khu st, i
Michela Wrong, op. cit., p. 14 , sa s The [the BMA] felt the e as too u h i dust he e. This as a ati e
state a d it did t eed this i f ast u tu e. It ould e used o e effe ti el else he e, a d, oi ide tall ,
else he e ea t else he e i B itish-administered territories. W o g poi ts out that Haile “elassie as so
angered by this asset stripping that he maintained cool relationships with Britain throughout the rest of his
rule, despite having been in exile in Bath and the British liberation of his country.
Barnes, C., The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea, c.1946-48, Journal of
Eastern African Studies, 1:2, 2007, pp 277-291. He points out that the British were motivated both by the idea
of retaining an imperial foothold in the region, and by the idealistic notion of an African nation-state.
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By 1948, however, it was clear that Britain would not press this issue (opposed by France, the USA and
the USSR who considered it a threatening British imperial project29) and it disengaged from Somalia.
Great Britain was facing the independence of its Indian colony, post-war reconstruction and many other
pressing issues. The Four Powers (USA, USSR, France, England), mandated to decide on the future of the
Italian colonies, could not agree on what to do with them. Their representatives visited Mogadishu to
conduct hearings among Somalis in January 1948; the suggestion that Italy return to administer the
territories caused riots instigated by the Somali Youth League (SYL, as the Club had renamed itself in
1947), who wished to self-administer a Greater Somalia instead, and 52 Italians died in Mogadishu and
Kismayo30. The Four Powers referred the matter to the UN General Assembly. Upon the suggestion of
Iraq, the SYL and a pro-Italian Somali political coalition were invited to New York to participate in
discussions on the future of their country31.
The decision of the UNGA (Resolution 289, Nov. 21, 1949) to establish a trusteeship under Italian
administration in Somalia was unique in several ways. While trusteeships were quite common at that
time, they were usually awarded to the power in control of the territory, formally and minimally
arranged by the UN Trusteeship Council and open-ended. The return to administration by a defeated
power (Italy was at that point not even a member of the UN), with a stringent mandate to prepare the
territory for independence according to a plan prepared by the UN Trusteeship council, together with
Italy and other UN members (the Philippines, India, Iraq and the Dominican Republic), and the ten-year
deadline were all novelties. They inferred a greater responsibility for the UN, which had to adopt a more
ha ds-o app oa h, and indeed the UN Trusteeship Council made several visits to critically appraise
progress in the 1950s32.
Neither Ethiopia nor the Somalis were happy with the return of the Italians, but Italy rapidly assuaged
both, cultivating ties with the SYL over the years until it practically delivered Somalia to the party in
1960.
The mandate to prepare Somalia for independence both politically and economically presented Italy
with problems similar to those it had faced as a colonial overlord. Somali society, with the exception of
the budding urban professional class, had expressed no interest in statehood; the levels of education
and professionalization were desperately low33, forming barriers for both an efficient civil administration
and a diversified modern economy; the country was resource-poor and had developed a habit of
dependency in the colonial period, financing the trappings of the state and essential imports with
29
30
31
32
33
Marcus, H.G., Somalia and the Decline of US interest in Ethiopia, 1963-69, Proceedings of the Second
International Congress in Somali Studies, University of Hamburg, August 1983, edited by Thomas Labahn,
Vol. II: A haeolog a d Histo . The White House strategists … opposed Greater So alia e ause the
resultant state would be weak and embryonic, easily manipulated by the USSR and Egypt, then under radical
leadership. Since Somalia was already suspicious of close US ties with Addis Ababa, the State Department was
dire ted to e ourage Ital to o ti ue its ajor role i the ai te a e of So alia s sta ilit a d free orld
orie tatio . pp 280-81.
Tripodi, P., Back to the Horn: Italian Admi istratio a d So alia s Trou led I depe de e, in The International
Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 32 No. 2/3, 1999, pp 359-380.
Finkelstein, L.S., Somaliland under Italian Administration. A Case Study in United Nations Trusteeship, 1955,
p. 10.
Finkelstein, 1955, p. 6.
In 1954 there were 3000 Somalis with a primary education degree (Tripodi, 1999, p. 373, quoting AFIS
Go e o Ma ti o s add ess to UN T usteeship Cou il, NY
.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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external support; moreover Somali culture, with its contempt for manual labour of any kind, was not
propitious, in a Weberian sense, to the development of a modern state.
Italy was, moreover, itself poor and in reconstruction, and did not have many resources to spend on
Somalia. The governors of AFIS and their administration had to be creative. The carabinieri contingent
was drastically reduced in the first years of AFIS (from 6000 to less than 700) to save money and a policy
of “o alizatio of the ad i ist atio as apidl i ple e ted. For some Somali critics, including the
SYL leadership, this transfer of power did not go fast enough. They complained about Italian colonial
attitudes. Since Italy was mostly sending personnel with previous experience in Africa, such attitudes
were likely to occur34.
AFIS focused most successfully on two areas: education and ad i ist ati e efo . At the moment of
the transfer of authority, there was in the territory no [formal] organ of self-government, much less of
representative government, at any level; no Somali who had experience of governing or of administering
in any superior post; no system of education beyond the primary level, and even the elementary
education which existed was scanty35.
By 1960 there were a few secondary schools in Somalia, as well as a University (established in 1954), a
“ hool fo Politi al a d Ad i ist ati e P epa atio est.
a d a I stitute of “o ial “ ie es, La
a d E o o i s est.
. Mo e tha a hu d ed “o alis were studying abroad, mainly in Italy and
Egypt. However, a Somali script had still not been decided upon, despite this being one of the priorities
for AFIS. There was strong opposition between traditional and religious leaders, who desired the Arabic
script to be used, and modernists, who advocated Latin characters or a modified version thereof,
Osmania 36. It as t u til
, he “iad Ba e i posed a odified Lati s ipt, that this p o le
as
resolved.
As regards administrative reform, on the eve of independence there was an elected legislature with the
powers of a constitutional assembly, this assembly had selected a cabinet (1956), there were 48 elected
municipal councils with powers of taxation, a court system had been established (although AFIS left
customary law – xeer – undisturbed), and Somali civil servants were in control of 15 of the 19
government departments37.
Despite the apid “o alizatio of the ad i ist atio , politi al p og ess as slo a d di isi e. The
Trusteeship Council established by Italy in 1950 to advise AFIS consisted of tribal chiefs who opposed
virtually everything that smacked of modernization, including changes in traditional institutions 38. In
contrast, I.M. Lewis noted in 1958 that the modern class of leaders in South and Central Somalia
considered clan identity to be a thing of the past and refused to even reveal their own clan background.
In their attitude towards clanship and heer [xeer = customary law] politicians in Somalia show a striking
difference to those in the British Protectorate. Whereas in the latter territories the stranglehold of these
traditional political principles is a burning question widely discussed, in Somalia their continued influence
is discounted and even denied. In Somalia a deliberate effort is made to give the impression that the
force of agnation is a thing of the past. The end desired is Westernization and the fiction is maintained
34
35
36
37
38
Tripodi, 1999, p. 364
Finkelstein, 1955, p. 11
The ai oppositio to the de elop e t of the “o ali la guage o es f o the “o alis the sel es
Finkelstein, 1955, p. 18.
Ware, G., Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960, Phylon, Vol. 26 No. 2, 1965.
Ware, 1965, p. 179.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
ote
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11
that the goal has already been reached and that clanship is now so unimportant that it has no relevance
in the new political field.39
Under pressure of the UN, Italy reconciled with the SYL, and gradually substituted the traditional
leadership with this new class of politicians. As a result, clan balance could not be openly discussed.
Since colonial times, the Italians had mostly relied on the Hawiye, who were most numerous in the
administration at the beginning of the trusteeship period. The SYL however was mainly Darood: in 1956,
this clan group constituted 50% of the SYL membership, while 30% was Hawiye. As a result of their
electoral victory in the 1956 Somalia Assembly elections – winning 54% of the votes cast and securing 43
seats of 70 – the Darood thus became politically ascendant, which they remained until 1991.
In line with its stated clan-aversion, the SYL was careful to present a cabinet after the 1956 elections
where clan affiliation did not seem to count. The President, Aden Abdullah (nicknamed Aden Adde – he
later became the first president of independent Somalia) was Hawiye, as was the Prime Minister,
Abdullahi Isse. The PM presided over a ministerial council of two Hawiye, two Darood and one Dir
minister40.
Table 1: clan composition of AFIS government in 1956. Source: Lewis 1958/2
Clan group
Government workers
Population
Darood
35%
22%
Hawiye
28%
36%
Rahanweyn
15%
25%
The Banadiri minorities (Reer Xamar and Reer Baraawe) were also well represented in government,
capturing another 10% of civil service positions. Lewis noted, however, that the overrepresentation of
Darood and Hawiye was also due to the propensity of pastoralists to seek employment far away,
including in government, while the Rahanweyn cultivators were not so inclined41.
The Rahanweyn (or Digil-Mirifle) had also traditionally been pro-Italian. Pastoralists had always looked
down on the Rahanweyn as cultivators of supposedly less pure Somali stock, so the Italian presence was
experienced as emancipatory. In the 1956 elections, the Hiz ia Digil Mi ifle HDM, later HDMS) won
26% of the vote, indicating that this clan group was not only highly mobilized, but also massively voted
for the party representing its clan interests. The ideology of the HDM was very conservative and even
against independence, preferring continued Italian administration42.
The HDM went asunder because of internal rifts, caused in part because their political programme did
ot st oke ith the UN T usteeship s o je ti es a d spi it . To a oid la -based voting, in the 1959
general elections each party had to present a nationwide list of candidates for each of the 26 electoral
districts. As a result, in the 19 districts where the SYL list was not contested the party won 61 seats; in
39
40
41
42
Lewis, I.M, Modern Political Movements in Somaliland part 2, Africa: Journal of the International African
Institute Vol. 28 No. 4, Oct. 1958, pp 344-363 – hereafter cited as Lewis, 1958/2. Quote from pp 353-354.
Lewis, 1958/2, p. 352.
Lewis, 1958/2, p. 355.
Ware, 1965, p. 175 and Lewis, 1958/2, p. 355.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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the other 7 districts the SYL won 22 of the seats, the HDM five and a youth party two43. This gave the
Somali Youth League 83 of the 9 seats i the asse l , a o fo ta le ajo it to sail i to the postindependence era.
Municipal elections were held in 1954 and 1958. A major problem for the elections was the lack of a
population count. The vast majority of Somalis, then as now, voted along clan lines, and when AFIS
attempted to conduct a census among pastoralist tribes in 1957-58, clan elders presented grossly
inflated numbers44. The AFIS had estimated the total number of voters in 1956 to be 300,000, but more
than 600,000 ballots were cast in 1958. This skewed the electoral results in favour of the pastoralist
tribes. The fraud that riddled the elections in the second half of the 1950s increased throughout the
1960s, until the Somali electorate erupted in anger after the March 1969 elections, paving the way for
Ba e s ilita oup.
While the trappings of a modern state were established in Mogadishu and the major cities, most of
(rural) Somalia still lived under traditional rule, with clan elders deciding on collective matters, including
justice. AFIS rapidly set up elected local councils in the main towns, but most decisions were taken
outside them through the traditional governance mechanisms. The UN Trusteeship Council noted, after
trips made to Somalia in 1951 and 1954, that local/municipal councils were not functioning as expected,
and suggested as a solution to increase their responsibilities, for example raising revenues through local
taxation, to make them more relevant45. But AFIS had neither the resources nor the political will to thus
formalize informal local governance, and continued to rule as in the colonial period, through
government representatives that largely left local communities to their own devices.
In the economic field AFIS did not fare well. Besides the lack of professional skills, Somalis generally
seemed to have no interest in import-substitution industrialization. There was also a dearth of
investment capital: local capital did not exist, Italy had insufficient resources, and foreign investors were
worried about what may happen after independence. Besides Italy, only the US provided very modest
amounts of development funding.
Experts agreed in any case that capital-based development would be unsustainable if Somalia did not
increase her foreign revenue46. In fact, Italy subsidized her own industry (AGIP, Italcable, etc.) with
contracts to develop Somalia while shielding Italian investors in Somalia from international
competition47. Grand agricultural development plans suggested by AFIS found no investors.
Internal revenue to cover recurrent costs was collected in very small amounts48. Besides the small tax
base, Somalis resisted taxation and Italian settlers argued that they need ot pa ta es if “o alis did t.
Like the Sultans of Zanzibar and the federal government today, AFIS found it easiest to rely on taxing
imports and exports and cover recurrent costs with external assistance.
43
44
45
46
47
48
Ware, 1965, p. 179.
Some of the chiefs presented numbers that exceeded the total population of Somalia , Ware, 1965, p. 178.
Finkelstein, 1955, p. 12-13.
Finkelstein, 1955, p. 3.
Tripodi, 1999, p. 377.
Finkelstein gives the following figures for fiscal year 1955 in Somalia (1 USD = 7 Somalos)
- hut and income tax = 2.5 million So in 1952-53; customs tax = 29.3 million So; Total revenue = 31.8 million So
- running costs of government = 57.6 million So; incl. development and military = 88.2 million So
- Italia go e
e t ust o e defi it ith .
illio “o alos, i.e. .
illio U“D…
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Foreign revenue generated through export was equally hard to come by. The production of livestock,
“o alia s t aditio al e po t, as o strained by environmental factors; agricultural production was not
competitive (the market for the small and fragile Somali bananas in Italy was subsidized and protected)
and Somalia had no known natural or mineral resources to export49. As in most developing nations, the
cost of imports exceeded export revenues, leading to a shortage in foreign reserves50. It was clear that
Italy could not have done much more, and that Somalia would remain dependent on foreign assistance
after its independence51.
Maybe the most problematic aspect of the coming independence was the lack of coordination between
the Italians and the British52; both parts of what is now Somalia became independent with different
systems of administration, governance and law; they did not even have a shared written language.
There were few organs of self-government in British Somaliland. By 1960 there were four elected
municipal councils (in Hargeisa, Berbera, Burco and Gabiley). A Protectorate Advisory Council, whose
members were selected by the clans under supervision of the British district commissioner, existed since
1955. In 1957 a Legislative Council was set up with 15 members, who were partially elected and partially
appointed by the British governor; but both councils wielded little power, and in the same year only 30
of the 200 officers in British Somaliland were Somalis53. In February 1960, elections were held for a
national legislative council54, but the British were under no UN-mandated obligation to prepare their
protectorate for independence, and they did not. When Somaliland became independent on 26 June
1960, it had much less institutional autonomy than the rest of Somalia, which it joined five days later, on
July 1st.
Reflections on the Preparations for Somali Independence
* Lyons & Samatar argued that The process of decolonization created an independent state that
remained aloof from society 55. The state indeed appeared as a set of institutions that had little
relation to the informal institutions of Somali society. For example, the relation between the formal
justice system and customary law (xeer) was never defined; they just coexisted. One could argue that
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Repeated Italian efforts to revive salt production in Xafuun, Puntland, floundered for a variety of reasons,
including lack of infrastructure and local ownership. Interestingly, already in the 1940s Somali leaders had set
thei hopes o oil, hi h as o e of the easo s the e e eti e t to a a do the Ogade , he e ese es
were suspected. This hope still animates politicians in Somalia, Somaliland and the Ogaden today. See Barnes,
2007, p. 287, and Lewis, 1958/2, p. 356.
For example, in 1953, imports amounted to So 78.6 million and exports to So 34.7 million, Italy covering the
deficit.
Ware, 1965, The [1954 UN Trusteeship Council] mission found a wide expectation that the United Nations
must and will assume to carry the post-1960 budgetary deficit.
Issa Salwe, Abdisalam M., The Collapse of The Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy, 1996, pp 66-67
Lewis, 1958/2, p. 349
The results of the elections may have increased communal tensions in the protectorate: Despite receiving 31%
of the vote, the National United Front and Somali Youth League coalition only obtained one seat, while the
coalition between the Somali National League and the United Somali Party secured 32 seats with 69% of the
ote. This as the o se ue e of a fi st past the post s ste a d the ele to al i u s iptio o de s.
Touval, Saadia, Somali Nationalism. International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa, 1963,
p. 106.
Lyons, T. and Samatar, A.I., Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political
Reconstruction, 1995
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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the weak state-society nexus, namely the rural/urban divide and the split between conservative
majority and modernizing minority, was the cause of later state collapse.
* There seems to have been no discussion about what kind of state structures would be most
appropriate for Somali society. The Italians came with a model that was adapted to the Somali context
and their own lack of resources. That it did t fit as ost appa e t ith the ea l T usteeship Cou il,
composed of clan elders, who opposed most reforms and institutions suggested by AFIS. The UN put
pressure on Italy to seek more modern-oriented Somali partners, specifically the SYL. Although the
matter would need more thorough investigation, it seems that within the SYL there was also little
discussion about state structures, as the party soon became engrossed by its rapid expansion and the
Greater Somalia agenda.
* Rather than what the state should look like, from the beginning the question seems to have been who
should take control in independent Somalia and how power would be shared. In democracies, this is
the function of elections. In this regard, the Somali experience of doctoring elections from the mid1950s onwards is interesting. First, the question of population figures (essential for that of
representation) came up and could not be resolved, leading to over-representation of pastoralists
whose numbers could not be estimated as easily as those of settled communities. Then, AFIS (again
under UN pressure) re-engineered the system to favour political parties instead of clans, which
ensured the SYL would be the undisputed master of independent Somalia.
* Thus, the “YL s de ial of clan identity was a precondition for it to capture state power. Given that the
state was not supported by society, which remained clan-based, but by the international community,
there was no incentive for the SYL to represent the population. Instead, there was a strong incentive to
modernize society (with external resources) to create a larger constituency for itself.
* A modern state, with its permanently staffed institutions and enlarged responsibilities for the welfare
and development of its people, needs incomparably more resources than traditional governance
systems, which are basically free. It was clear from the beginning that Somalia did not have sufficient
resources to pay for its state, and that it would have to rely on external funding to maintain the state.
This ei fo ed the aloof ess of the state is-à-vis society.
1.4 Cold War Interventions in Independent Somalia (1960-1990)
In 1960 Somalia became politically independent, but, as we have seen above, in economic terms it was
dependent upon continued assistance. This placed Somalis in a patron-client relationship to external
powers, hi h i the Cold Wa o te t e e the t o lo s . It spe t a out a de ade o -aligned, then a
decade with the Soviets, and finally a decade with the so-called f ee o ld .
Somali Foreign Relations
“o ali fo eig poli
as d i e
ostl
the G eate “o alia age da u til the defeat i the Ogade
War (1978)56. This was disast ous fo the ou t s egio al a d i te atio al status. To eigh ou i g
56
Although it was only in 1986, by signing a treaty between Somalia and Ethiopia that ended support to mutually
destabilizing groups, that this policy was definitively abandoned by the Somali state. In a long private interview
in 1985, General Barre was still preoccupied with how he could muster US support for his effort to retrieve the
Ogaden, Laitin, D., The American-Somali Alliance: Whose Agenda?, TransAfrica Forum, summer 1985, pp 21-43.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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states, Somalia was a constant threat, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with its fixation on
ot ope i g the Pa do a s Bo of olo ial o de s, st o gl opposed the Greater Somalia agenda. When
Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974 (as the first non-Arab member) the move seemed opportunistic
to many Africans, as an attempt to escape the OAU framework. Indeed, the Gulf states, motivated by
historical suspicion of Ethiopia and their fear of a hostile power on the other side of the Red Sea/Gulf of
Aden corridor, supported the Greater Somalia project as a check on Ethiopia; but not at the expense of
their relations with the USA.
The British rapidly lost their influence i “o alia. Afte “o alila d s i depe de e, the e as a e odus
of British officials and citizens (in contrast, many Italian settlers remained in southern Somalia). In the
second half of the 1940s, Britain had enjoyed popularity among Somali leaders mostly because of their
support for the Greater Somalia idea, and because of their laissez-faire style of colonialism, which suited
Somalis better than the directive and paternalistic Italian style57. But the British were narrowly
associated with the Isaaq clan group58. A punitive disarmament expedition in the late 1940s in the
Ogaden, then still controlled by the BMA, confirmed this in the eyes of many Darood59. As seen above,
the Darood formed about 50% of the SYL cadres60, so the party that steered Somalia through its first
decade of independence was suspicious of British motives. On the other hand, the Isaaq could not
fo gi e the B itish fo ha i g gi e a a the Haud pastu es to Ethiopia by the treaty of 195461 and
considered that the lack of preparations for independence had placed them in a subordinate position in
independent Somalia. The final et a al
B itai a e he Ke a kept the North East Province at its
independence in 1963; many Somalis had e pe ted that, i li e ith Lo d Be i s de la atio , this area
ould e etu ed to “o alia by Great Britain before Kenyan independence, just like Trans-Juba in
1926. This even prompted Somalia to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain entirely62.
The Italians were more successful in maintaining relations with Somalia. They expressly positioned
themselves as a medium power: not threatening but conciliatory, seeking cooperation with all sides;
within the Western bloc they profiled themselves as the only power keeping cordial relations with all
antagonists in the Horn (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia), using their historic knowledge of the area and direct
contact with its protagonists to their advantage. Although this did not strengthen their position within
57
58
59
60
61
62
Tripodi, 1999, p. 364.
Moha ed I gi iis, i his e ie of Lid ie Kapteij s ook Clan Cleansing in Somalia (2013), contests that the
B itish fa ou ed the Isaa la fa il , oti g that a of the B itish olle ti e pu ish e ts e e agai st
Isaaq clans. That is because the area controlled by the British was mainly inhabited by Isaaq. It is clear from the
limited political liberties allotted before independence that the Protectorate administrators sought no balance
between the Isaaq and the other clans inhabiting the territory, the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadabursi and
Issa: the four towns with municipal councils were all in Isaaq areas. See keydmedia.com for the review of
Kapteij s ook.
This campaign was called the Geel Ood – camel enclosure. British troops assisted by Isaaq auxiliaries abducted
herds of camels and kept them hostage until Ogaden clansmen would hand over their weapons – Barnes, 2007,
p. 287. The Ogaden, with the Majerteen and the Marehan, form the major clans of the Darood. Together with
the Dhulbahante, the Ogaden also p o ided ost of the De ish e ellio s t oops.
Lewis, I.M, Modern Political Movements in Somaliland part 1, in Africa: Journal of the International African
Institute, Vol. 28, No. 3, July 1958, p. 258 – Hereafter cited as Lewis, 1958/1.
Issa-Salwe ,1996, p. 48.
Relations were re-established in 1967, but British influence in Somalia stayed minimal until the breakdown of
the Somali state. The important influx of Somalis into Great Britain, together with the British role in the War on
Terror and now in Somali state-building, thanks in part to the academic community of British Somali experts,
have rekindled British-Somali relations.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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the Western bloc (at crucial moments the USA and regional powers ignored Italy and dismissed its
proposed services63) it did ensure good local bilateral relations. The 1969 coup changed little in this
regard: Siad Barre and many of those who took power had been trained in Italy, or by Italians.
Besides its pivotal diplomatic role, Italy maintained trade relations with Somalia, provided aid and made
some investments64. As Chart 1 sho s, the lio s sha e of non-military official development assistance
(ODA) p o ided to “o alia i the late ea s of Ba e s egi e a e f o Ital . One of its focus areas was
higher education. At the Somali National University, lectures were given in Italian and many Somalis
went on to Italy for a doctorate. Thus, Italian remained a language spoken by Somali elites until 1991.
The Italian embassy was the last to be evacuated in Mogadishu in January 199165.
Chart 1: So alia s offi ial de elop e t assista e i USD
do or group, 9
-1990 (source World Bank).
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
600M
580M
560M
540M
520M
500M
480M
460M
440M
420M
400M
380M
360M
340M
320M
300M
280M
260M
240M
220M
200M
180M
160M
140M
120M
100M
80M
60M
40M
20M
0
US bilateral aid
Italy bilateral aid
Other DAC (Western countries) aid
Non-Western ODA
Note: DAC countries include the USA, Canada, all Western Europe, Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand
63
64
65
This happened during the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, the 1977-78 Ogaden war, and again with the collapse of
the Somali state in 1990-91. Novati, 1999, pp 380-381.
Novati, 1999, p.
: Ital as o fide t that the “YL go e
e t ould e doo ed to el o fi a ial
assistance from Italy be ause of “o alia s a k a d ess a d a i g fo o e goods, ash a d k o -ho …
the “o ali epu li as the ai if ot sole e efi ia of Italia e te al aid du i g the
s a d s.
Ahmed Samatar also points out that Italy was the main source of imports to Somalia, even in the socialist
1970s. From 1973 to 78, 29% on average of officially registered imports to Somalia came from Italy (Samatar,
1988, p. 120).
The fi al-days–of-the- egi e a ou ts Italia diplo ats a e a o g the ost ha o i g witness accounts
of the outbreak of civil war. See Sica, M., Operazio e So alia: la dittatura, l oppozitio e, la guerra i ile ella
testi o ia za dell ulti o a as iatore d Italia a Mogadis io, 1994, and Pacifico, C., So alia: ‘i ordi d u
al
d Afri a italiano, 1996.
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The two former colonial powers were displaced in Somali foreign relations by the superpowers, who
established clientelist relations with allies in the Horn of Africa as elsewhere in the developing world.
Many Somali commentators overstate the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa66, taking their cue
from Cold Warriors, who in turn assumed geostrategic importance because of superpower rivalry in the
Horn. Documents from both the Kremlin and the White House indicate that the region was not
considered of vital interest for either67, but Cold War dynamics turned the Horn into a zone of
contestation, as each superpower tried to contain the other – without risking direct confrontation.
Proximity to the Arab world and oil-shipping lanes is not a unique position, and Somalia clearly lacked
the capacity or will to disrupt either. The historic antagonism between Muslim Somalis seeking access to
rich highland pastures and Christian Ethiopians seeking access to the sea was only of regional
importance, with scant global strategic impact. The Horn also lacks unique resources that could whet
the appetite of an external power. From 1967 onward, the Soviets had a good foothold in the region in
Southern Yemen; that same year, the Americans replaced the base in Kagnew, Eritrea, with a much
bigger one in Diego Garcia. Neither superpower sorely needed facilities in Somalia or Ethiopia.
Somalia managed the financial aspects of the patron-client relationship offered by the superpowers
well. From 1960 to 1969 Somalia received 2.38 times the average ODA per capita allotted to SubSaharan Africa; in the decade of the 1970s that proportion grew to 2.82 and in the 1980s to 2.85 (Chart
2). However, the dependency of Somalia on development assistance also grew continuously (Chart 3).
Chart 2: Percentage of Sub-Saharan African ODA allotted to Somalia (source World Bank)
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
0%
Somalia % ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa
66
67
Somalia % population of Sub-Saharan Africa
E.g. Ingiriis, M., 2016.
Brind, 1983, p. 76, It is eas to o e esti ate the st ategi i po ta e of the Ho a d of the fa ilities it a
p o ide to the supe po e s. … The “o iet U io as ot g eatl i o e ie ed he “o alia expelled its
ilita pe so el i
. “i ila l , o e a fi d u h e ide e that “o alia a d the Ho
as of o spe ifi
geostrategic interest for the USA. See for example Habte Selassie, Bereket, United States Policy towards the
Horn of Africa, The Balance of External and Regional Interests, in Labahn, ed. 1983, Vol. 2 pp 311-368.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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Chart 3: Relation between Somali GDP and external assistance (source World Bank)
$1,200,000,000
90%
80%
$1,000,000,000
70%
$800,000,000
60%
50%
$600,000,000
40%
$400,000,000
30%
20%
$200,000,000
10%
$-
Official Development Assistance
0%
Gross Domestic Product
ODA % of GDP
Shifting alliances in the Cold War
Upon independence Somalia declared itself non-aligned, and it participated in the Yugoslav conference
esta lishi g the No -Alig ed Mo e e t the follo i g ea . I
, Somalia rejected an offer by
Western nations ($10-18 million according to the sources) to support development, in favour of a Soviet
assistance package that amounted to $63 million. The reason Somalia chose for the USSR, besides the
more generous package, was Soviet eadi ess to uild up “o alia s a
, hi h it eeded to pu sue its
prime foreign-policy objective, Greater Somalia. Since the countries this policy would adversely affect –
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti – were all solidly in the Western bloc, one can understand Western
reticence in providing military assistance.
Somalia thus naturally drifted into the Eastern bloc. After the 1969 military coup, with its socialist
rhetoric, the alliance became much stronger, culminating in the 1974 Soviet-Somali friendship treaty. On
the other hand, in June 1970 the USA and West Germany cut off their aid programmes while other
Western bloc countries, including Italy, reduced theirs68. Besides Soviet-bloc assistance, the country was
also the beneficiary of Chinese and Cuban aid; the Chinese offered non-military development assistance
(the North-South paved road, from Bosaso to Kismayo, advantageous terms of trade and generous lines
of credit), while the Cubans mostly came as military advisors. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and
70s, Somalia also received Western support, mostly in the field of development (see Chart 1), but in
small amounts; the yearly average of development assistance provided by Western nations jumped from
38 million US$ in the 1970s to 250 million US$ in the 1980s.
68
Issa-Salwe, 1978. The US had earlier suspended its aid programme in 1966, angered by the provision of goods
to North Vietnam by ships sailing under Somali flag, but the diplomatic efforts of PM Cigaal had resulted in the
resumption of aid.
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Estimates vary, but by 1977 the USSR had poured about 600 million dollars plus a lot of military
hardware and manhours – thousands of experts – into Somalia69. It was joined in this effort by a
contingent of Cuban military advisors. The USSR supported fish-processing plants in Berbera and Bosaso,
and a meat-packing factory in Kismayo, as well as a dam project on the Juba river (all of these projects
came to nothing). The Soviet Union had also granted Somali products preferential access to its market.
What the Soviet Union gained in exchange, besides an unreliable political ally, was access to facilities it
had built in Berbera po t: oil sto age, t a ship e t, Af i a s lo gest u a and a secret missilehandling area. The Soviet fleet also had access to Kismayo port.
Ba e s de isio to invade the Ogaden in 1977 inverted the Cold War alliances in the Horn. Although the
details of how the decision was made were never elucidated, it seems most likely that Barre seized what
he sensed was a final opportunity. In 1974, a radical left-leaning military committee, the De g , had
deposed the pro-Western Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. In 1975, Barre started propping up the Western
Somali Liberation Front for guerrilla warfare. It was widely rumoured that there were Somali Armed
Forces covertly operating in the Ogaden. The Somali leadership hoped Ethiopia would fall apart under
pressure of the armed opposition to the Derg (in Tigray, the Bale mountains of Oromia and other areas)
and would relinquish the Ogaden and Haud to Somalia.
What probably tipped the balance for Barre, who by then was taking most decisions alone, including
that of going to war, was the gradual rapprochement between the Soviet bloc and the Derg. In August
1976, Mengistu visited Moscow and received assurances of support; Castro had visited in February and
conveyed his favourable impression of the revolution to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Carter administration,
o e ed the De g s adi al politi s a d hu a -rights abuses, was backing out of its alliance with
Ethiopia70. It seems Barre gambled that the Soviet Union would either support its ally (the treaty of
friendship was three years old), or remain neutral in an armed conflict between its erstwhile and new
allies71. Somalia, with one of the strongest armies in Africa, thought it could wrestle control over the
Ogaden from the enfeebled Ethiopian regime.
There was a last-ditch attempt by Cuba to avoid a confrontation between the two neighbours. In
February 1977, Fidel Castro met all parties concerned in Aden, proposing an anti-imperialist federation
of Ethiopia, “o alia a d the People s De o ati ‘epu li of Ye e , ith a auto o ous status fo
Eritrea and the Ogaden, but this suggestion was turned down by the Somalis72.
In July 1977 the Somali army crossed the Ethiopian border in full strength; over the course of the next
months they advanced on Harar, briefly took Dire Dawa and occupied Jigjiga as well as most of the
Ogaden. They stayed put until early 1978. The Soviet Union sided with mainstream international and
69
70
71
72
Laitin, D., The War i the Ogade : I pli atio s for Si aad s ‘ôle i So ali Histor , The Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol. 17 No. 1, March 1979. He gives the following breakdown of “o iet ilita assista e: By
mid-1974, about 1,
So ali soldiers had ee to the So iet U io for trai i g, a d the ar s i e tor
[included] an estimated 150 T-35 and 100 T-54 tanks, mostly fitted with 105-mm guns. Also, over 300 armed
personnel carriers, 200 coastal batteries, 50 MIG fighters, a squadron of II-28 bombers, and an SA-2 ground-toair missile complex now belonged to the Somalis. Up to 3,600 Soviet advisers supported this effort , p. 99.
President Carter announced in Feb. 1977 that he was cutting military aid to Ethiopia by $100 million because of
the De g s poo hu a -rights record. Wright, G.V. Jr, P eside t Ca te s ‘espo se to the Ho of Af i a
Co fli t: The “elli g of Cold Wa II , p. 373-374, in Labahn, ed., 1988.
Laitin, 1979, p. 100,
Brind, 1983, p. . “ee Cast o s a ou t of his ediatio atte pts to DD‘ ha ello E i h Ho e ke o Ap il
1977. The transcript was retrieved on 21 May 2018 from the digital archive of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
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African opinion by condemning the invasion of July 1977, and, with a massive donation of Soviet military
materiel and 20,000 Cuban troops from Angola, turned the course of the war that initially seemed
favourable for Somalia. Barre then broke with the USSR and Cuba, expelling them from Somalia in
November 1977. The public celebrations in Somalia that followed this announcement clearly indicated
that the Russians had not endeared themselves to the Somali public.
Barre turned to the USA instead, in a volte-face that stunned the entire international community by its
hypocrisy73. But the USA did not risk a confrontation with the USSR, even in a proxy war. Barre seems to
have been delusional about how important Somalia was to the USA74. Somalia lost the war, and by mid1978 had withdrawn all its troops from the Ogaden.
Over the following years a lukewarm relation developed between the Barre regime and the USA. If it
were not for the Iranian revolution and the Soviet participation in the Afghan civil war, US President
Carter might not have been moved away from his détente-minded approach of Cold War politics; but
given the regional context, he followed the containment policy advocated by his national security
advisor Brzezinski and started investing i the U“A s elatio ship ith “o alia.
To become more acceptable to the West, Barre, who had lost a lot of popularity in the war, in 1979
quickly instituted some reforms, such as a new constitution spelling out civil rights and general elections.
However, the constitution was suspended by a state of emergency declared in 1980, and only one party
was allowed to contest the elections. Barre had already garnered some European support, especially the
promise of security assistance, not only by expelling the Soviet bloc but also by allowing a West German
squad to liberate a Lufthansa plane hijacked by Palestinians in Mogadishu in October 1977. (This
betrayal of the Palestinian cause, incidentally, de ted Ba e s sta di g a o g A a pu li opi io ).
In 1980, the US signed a deal with Somalia delivering military aid in exchange for use of the Soviet-built
facilities in Berbera. It was to be home to a Rapid Deployment Force unit set up to deal with Cold War
emergencies, and to be used as an emergency landing strip for the Space Shuttle. In the decade of the
1980s, Somalia received ell a o e $100 million per year from the USA, most of it military assistance,
the rest humanitarian relief (feeding the Ogaden refugees) and development assistance75.
This was less than Barre had hoped for. As Chart 1 shows, US official development assistance remained
relatively modest throughout the 1980s. However, US political support to Barre did not waver. A
declassified Pentagon do u e t f o
su s up the U“ positio : Since Preside t Siad s rise to
po er i O to er 9 9, So alia s pro le s ha e e o e so e te si e that his positio ould easil
eake , aki g So alia a e e
ore fragile a d trou led all for the US … if he ere o erthro , it
probably would result in the surfacing of leaders who would request substantially more outside military
a d e o o i aid. I Siad s a se e, the U ited States ould fa e diffi ult poli hoi es as the struggle
73
74
75
B the Ba e s i te atio al sta di g as al ead e lo , a o g Af i a s, A a s a d the West. He lost the
last vestiges of support when he replaced the internationally respected Foreign Minister Umar Arteh (19691977) by his close relative Jamaa Barre (1977-1991), who had no international experience.
Barre may have been swayed by informal declarations of support to Somalia by the Carter administration,
made between April and July 1977. Laitin (1979, p. 106) mentions, inter alia, a press statement by the State
Depa t e t spokes a i Jul
We do think it is desirable that Somalia knows it does not have to depend
on the Soviet Union but can obtain arms from other sources. “ee also the a ou t then US ambassador
Raymond L. Thurston, The United States, Somalia and the Crisis in the Horn, Horn of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 2
(April/June 1978), pp 11–20. But by 1979 the cash-strapped Barre regime was so upset at the lack of substantial
Western assistance that he unsuccessfully approached the USSR again, with the suggestion for a new entente.
This estimate comes from Laitin, 1985.
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to consolidate power evolved and rapprochement with the Soviets became a possibility, particularly if US
aid were not forthcoming. 76
Western financial intervention
“o alia s e o o had ee egati el affe ted i the
s by Siad Ba e s command-economy
policies of collectivization, nationalization, state monopolies and price controls. Agricultural output had
not kept up with the population growth77. I dust ializatio , e e of the ost ele e ta light ki d, had
never taken off. GDP per capita dropped by a third from 1960 to 1990 (see Chart 4). Moreover, some
700,000 refugees from the Ogaden had stranded in refugee camps in Somalia as a result of the war78.
They were entirely dependent on external assistance as Somalia could provide them with nothing.
In the 1980s, the Somali economy was therefore in shambles79. In 1987, the journalist and writer
G aha Ha o k o se ed that almost every international aid agency is represented in one form or
another in Mogadishu 80. Another observer noted that the economy survives on the remittances of
Somali migrants to the Arab Gulf and the commissions that go to Somali officials and merchants who can
act as middlemen for foreign aid contracts 81.
Chart 4: Evolution of GDP per capita in constant US$, Somalia 1960-90 (source World Bank).
19000
18000
17000
16000
15000
14000
13000
12000
11000
10000
It was therefore unavoidable that Somalia accept structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the
World Bank, a precondition to further loans not only from these institutions but from most Western
76
77
78
79
80
81
US Department of Defense, Defense Estimative Brief: Somali Democratic Republic, 3 June 83.
“ee fo e a ple AI “a ata s study on the banana sector, showing production fell by 65% from 1973 to 1981,
mostly as a result of command-economy related policies. Samatar, 1993.
Figure given by AI Samatar, 1988, p. 139. Other sources, in particular Western aid agencies, often mention the
figure of 1 million.
For example, in 1987 export earnings were $135M, debt service $216M and aid in cash and kind $400M
(Hancock, 1991, pp 23 ff).
Hancock, 1991
Laitin, 1985
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donors. In 1981, a structural adjustment program was signed with the IMF, followed by a structural
adjustment loan from the World Bank. These required privatization of public assets (notably real estate,
collective farming facilities, industries – all that had been nationalized in the early 1970s), a shrinking of
the public sector, a currency devaluation, and export-oriented growth.
Although all observers agree that the Somali economy needed profound reform, the standard recipe of
the International Financial Institutions was not adapted to the Somali context. The economic reforms
did thus not produce the expected results. The privatization mostly benefited Siad Ba e s fa il , la
and loyalists82. Shrinking the public sector gave Barre a chance to purge the ranks of all potentially
hostile clans. The loan was used to pay interests on debt and finance imports, mostly consumed by the
wealthy class83. By 1985, the Somali government was so deeply lacking in foreign exchange that the IMF,
the World Bank and other experts virtually ran the Ministry of Finance84.
The fiscal policies imposed by international financial institutions and Western lenders on Somalia
arguably had more of an impact on the evolution of state and society than the Cold War, although few
scholars focus on it when examining the causes of collapse of Ba e s egi e. One of the consequences
was that Mogadishu came to look like a o eted p ize, a fo eig
ide, the Pea l of the I dia O ea as
the town was known because of its languid beauty. A semblance of Western modern life could be
upheld in the capital, further divorcing the regime and its foreign supporters from the rest of Somali
society85. The disparity between life in the capital and the war, drought and general hardship outside of
it may explain the large-scale looting that took place in Mogadishu in the early 1990s – in fact, much of
the initial fighting seems to have been motivated by booty as much as clan animosity86.
I deed, the Sulta ist 87 type of regime that emerged under Barre was financed largely from external
sources, as national resources dwindled (see Chart 4). Besides grants and loans from the international
financial institutions, the military assistance provided by Western powers was routinely skimmed by
Ba e s o ies, ho also aptu ed a sha e of hu a ita ia aid a d de elop e t assistance. For
example, despite announcing that Ethiopian Somali refugees had the same citizen rights as other
“o alis, Ba e s egi e kept the li i g i efugee a ps to e su e the o ti ued flo of i te atio al
assistance88.
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
Samatar, 1993, Although o l a ha dful of the se io e e s of the go e
e t i ludi g the P eside t s
wife and daughter) became plantation owners, most took advantage of their offices to lead the charge toward
the p i atizatio of pu li esou es .
World Bank structural adjustment loans in the 1980s posited many conditions before receiving the loan
(political, economic, fiscal reform), but very few conditionalities on spending.
Laitin, 1985, p. 33
see the description of luxurious expat life in 1987 by Hancock, 1991, pp 23-31.
Ingiriis, M.H., The Suicidal State: The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre regime, 1969-1991, 2016, p. 226 notes that
Weste e assies e a e sites of oot . The sa e happe ed to the UN o pou d, the Natio al
University, and residences of foreigners, Kapteijns, L., Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991,
2013, p. 125.
“ulta is te ds to a ise he e e t aditio al do i atio de elops a ad i ist atio a d a ilita fo e that
are purely instruments of the master... Where domination... operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will
be called Sultanism... The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but
consists only in the extreme development of the ruler's discretion. It is this which distinguishes it from every
form of ratio al autho it , i Ma We e , E o o & “o iet Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), 1922.
The a te ede ts fo late a lo d a use of hu a ita ia aid, up to toda s gatekeepe s of IDP a ps, lea l
lay in this era.
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Therefore, the international community was not a neutral bystander, but complicit in the regime and its
exactions on Somali society89. Of course, not all foreigners were enjoying pool parties in the Lido
beachfront area of the capital. But even those foreign NGOs toiling away in rural districts to implement
development projects or provide humanitarian assistance, e e, i a a , e a li g Ba e s egi e
taking over state functions without engaging in oppositional politics and grudgingly allowing the regime
to take its cut.
Over the course of the 1980s, “iad Ba e s suppo t ase i “o alia d i dled; he atta ked the Maje tee
(Puntland) from 1982, the Isaaq of North West Somalia from 1986, but other clans were also being
purged from the government. As the corrupt, unpopular and illegitimate atu e of Ba e s egi e
became ever clearer, Western political support decreased. This generally did not affect financial
support—as Chart 1 shows, some donors, in particular Italy, kept up high levels of aid—although the UN
started scaling down its operations in 1987 (Chart 5). However, the West avoided confronting the
dictator or alienating him entirely. A new US ambassador who arrived in September 1990, while the
Ba e egi e as i its fi al th oes, o ti ued the poli ies of p o oti g the “iad Ba re regime as part
of old a politi s 90. However, there was no love lost on both sides. The US embassy was mainly
looted Ba e s ‘ed Be ets i Ja ua
a d Weste e assies a d diplo ati pe so el i
general had at least as much to fear from uniformed personnel as from clan militias and armed criminals
in the early phases of the civil war91.
Chart 5: UN agencies net flows to Somalia in current US$ (source World Bank).
120M
100M
80M
60M
40M
20M
UNHCR
89
90
91
WFP
Other UN agencies
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
0
The sudden and massive
increase of UN aid in
1980 is related to the
influx of refugees from
the Ogaden, as well as
Somalia joining the
Western bloc. In 1987
there was drought in the
central rangelands
(Mudug and Galgaduud),
which explains the
important WFP
contribution that year.
Total UN
Compagnon, D., Political Decay in Somalia: from Personal Rule to Warlordism, Refuge, Vol. 12, No 5, 1992.
Ingiriis, 2016, p. 226.
On the other hand, expat personnel in general felt little sympathy for Somalis. Writing about the events of July
, A a “i o s ites: Fo e pat iates, the expectation was that if there was more unrest, they would be
finally forced to leave the country that none of them particularly cared for and that many of them had
assumed, from their first day, would sink into chaos. Indeed, on my second full day in Somalia eight months
previous [i.e. 1988], a USIS bureaucrat told me that I should not bother to begin any research; she kept one bag
al a s pa ked, ead fo flight; “o alia as goi g to lo . “i o s, A., The Begi i g of the E d , in
Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival, Nordstrom & Robben, ed., 1995).
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Desperate to find new allies, Barre even approached South Africa for support. In the late 1980s the
South African regime had been ostracized by almost the entire international community, but given its
military industry and comparative wealth, Barre hoped to gain some advantage from improving bilateral
relations. This further cooled already frosty relations between Somalia and the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa. Barre used the international stage to project an image of strength and control on domestic
audiences92, but in the international arena his regime was markedly unsuccessful, a fact not lost on the
Somali elites93.
Most foreign scholars of Somalia do pla the ole of the supe po e s st ategi o je ti es i the fall of
the Barre regime, pointing to internal factors instead94. But P eside t Fa aajo put fo a d a
perspective that many common “o alis see to sha e: When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991,
so too did the polarization of the world. The United States no longer had any real need for Somalia. It
as o o e ie t to ithdra the support that had lo g e a led Barre s rule a d the illegalities that
characterized it. When the United States suspended all financial aid to the Barre regime, his security
apparatus swiftly collapsed 95. Although, as we have seen, it was true that the US was propping up the
Ba e egi e, la i g it fo the ollapse of Ba e s go e
e t a e fa tuall i o e t – even if the
Soviet Union, the Cold War and US support to Barre would have survived, it is difficult to imagine how
Ba e s egi e itself could have survived. But this perspective is evidence of the prevalent sentiment
among Somalis, from the 1980s to now, that the USA is an untrustworthy ally. The US is reticent to
commit and whatever support it gives is ofte too little, too late a o di g to its allies, and misguided
or purposefully undermining, according to its detractors.
Reflections on the Cold War period in Somalia
* The international community and the USA in particular were not a neutral actor but were clearly
responsible for propping up the Barre state as it degenerated into a predatory organ, killing and
looting its own population. The principal means by which Barre and his cronies enriched themselves
was the IMF-imposed privatization and the absence of accountability on the use of the resultant loans.
Here again we see the principle at work: external support decreases incentive to build internal
support.
* The humanitarian sector was already very present in the 1980s, and it was identified as part of the
international alliance supporting the Barre regime. The predatory skimming or looting aid and
aptu i g ul e a le populatio s i a ps to fa ilitate these p a ti es, hi h e a e su h a ellknown feature of the humanitarian disaster in the 1990s and again in the late 2000s, were already an
assumed part of aid delivery before the collapse of the Somali state.
* Although Somalia had a relatively strong state in terms of its international power projection, it had
isolated itself completely by 1990, through a behaviour that was seen as aggressive, arrogant and
u oope ati e. It ui ed its eputatio
its i siste e o edee i g the lost “o ali te ito ies a d
92
93
94
95
Simons, 1989, p. 53.
See note 73. Laitin, 1979, e plai s i detail ho Ba e s la k of diplo ati p o ess sou ed elatio s ith all
parties, one by one: the Soviet Union, the Arab world, the African states, Western Europe and the USA.
E.g. Ingiriis,
The catastrophe that confronted with Somalia had its roots in the psychological effect of the
legacy left behind not by colonialism, but considerably by the ideology of the Siad Barre regime p. 272.
Mohamed, M.A., U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia: From Cold War Era to War on Terror. Master s thesis,
Buffalo State University, June 2009. Excerpt from p. 13.
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invading a fellow African state. It was arrogant towards the rest of African nations, pretending it was
Arab, but it never invested much in developing friendly ties with other Arab nations. The opportunistic
switching from non-aligned to Soviet bloc to the West, made it lose any semblance of integrity, and it
was by all counts an embarrassing ally to have. In contemporary parlance, Somalia was a rogue state.
Diplomats may have seen the collapse of the Somali state with a sigh of relief. It is puzzling that
atte pts to e o st u t the “o ali state do t see to take these facts into account.
* Siad Barre is still admired today by some Somalis for his sheer longevity in power. He seems to have
single-handedly changed the Somali regime from (corrupt) parliamentary democracy to socialist
development96, to pe so al ule Sulta is . This is blatant proof of the weakness of the Somali state
institutions; at the same time, the Somali state remained strong enough until 1990 to keep all
competitors at bay, for example rival generals or clan elders. This contradiction remains to be resolved.
1.5 UN intervention after the collapse of the Somali State (1991-95)
Note: The following four sections apply to Somalia as defined by the international community, but do not
cover Somaliland. That is a different story, as we will see later.
By the time the Siad Barre government fell in January 1991, its authority was restricted to parts of
Mogadishu and some Marehan lineages. The Northwest had been taken by the Somali National
Movement, who would shortly thereafter declare the full independence of Somaliland; Puntland and the
est of “o alia e e o t olled
a ious ilitia g oups, i ludi g the e a ts of “iad Ba e s
personal forces who retreated to Gedo after being expelled from Mogadishu. Mogadishu fell to several
Hawiye clan factions, the best-known being Moha ed Fa ah Aideed s fa tio of the U ited “o ali
Congress, USC.
It is surprising how effectively Siad Barre s regime manipulated the clan element, despite it having been
officially proscribed from Somali politics. Maybe the denial favoured the eruption of clan identity as a
force of political destruction, leading to what some scholars have termed clan cleansing of genocidal
proportions97. As a result, the popular uprising did not target Barre s regime as much as his clan and clan
family. Hawiye ministers and advisors of Siad Barre and other non-Darood regime figures as well as
businessmen had little to fear. They could use their erstwhile government and security connections to
hunt down and kill Darood clansmen, even if the latter had been in the opposition to Barre.
The Darood were expelled from Mogadishu and other locations in South-Central Somalia and their
properties looted or confiscated by Hawiye clansmen. The next rounds of fighting, which were at least as
deadly, pitted Hawiye groups against each other for control of Mogadishu, mainly Abgal vs. Habar Gidir,
but later also sub-clans against other sub-clans over control of a neighbourhood. Outside Mogadishu,
many clan groups fought over territorial control. Sedentary groups in the towns and farmlands
(minorities, Rahanweyn, Bantus) almost systematically lost confrontations against the better-armed
pastoralist clans.
96
97
Admittedly, Siad Barre was not alone behind the regime change in 1969; but he was, from the beginning, the
primus inter pares in the new revolutionary government and by 1975 his hold on power was unshakable.
The heated debates provoked by Lidwien Kapteijns book Clan Cleansing in Somalia (2013), seem to be
motivated by Somalis (and some postcolonial writers) protesting against Western scholars reducing Somali
politics to clan. However, most Somalis would not deny the fact that clan cleansing did take place, but object to
her supposedly partial treatment of the Darood clan as the main victim.
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Tens of thousands of civilians died in the clan killing in Mogadishu, Baraawe, Kismayo and elsewhere,
throughout Southern Somalia. Rape, mutilation and all kinds of other cruelties were committed by the
oo aa , the u dis ipli ed ou g la fighte s that o posed the ulk of ost ilitias. Up to a
hundred thousand Somalis fled over the border, to Kenya, Ethiopia or Yemen, often walking all the way
from their home areas. The disruption of most trade networks, the repeated looting by armed militias of
food supplies on farms, the extorsion taking place at roadblocks erected all throughout Southern
Somalia, and the fact that many farmers and pastoralists were fighting or fleeing, instead of working, led
to famine in 1992.
The UN-led intervention in Somalia
Surprisingly, the year 1991, which was the most intense period of the Somali civil war, elicited almost no
international reaction. The first UN Security Council resolution on Somalia in the post-Barre period was
taken in January 1992. 1991 was a busy year, internationally: the first half of the year was dominated by
the Gulf War, and the second by the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and the starting of the Balkan
War. The diplomatic lassitude caused by “o alia s ogue eha iou , oted a o e, a also ha e pla ed
a part in the initial lack of reaction of the international community.
By January 1992 it was clear that a massive famine was in the making98. The international community
decreed an arms embargo—that has lasted at least until 2018—a d ag eed to sta t a la ge-scale
hu a ita ia ope atio . Afte a offi ial ease-fire between the warring parties in Mogadishu in March
199299, this led to the establishment of UNOSOM in April 1992 (UNSCR 751), whose main purpose was
to deliver humanitarian aid. The mission was unarmed100 and by UN charter had to espe t “o alia s
sovereignty101, so it needed guarantees from the militias controlling the capital, posing the problem of
fictitious sovereignty: what should the UN do in such a case?
The intervention started hesitantly and by July 1992 the UN Security Council, angry at the lack of
progress, in UN“C‘
used th eate i g la guage to fo e “o alis to fa ilitate aid: In the absence of
such cooperation [by all parties, movements and factions to assist in general stabilization] the Security
Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia .
These measures were the militarization of UN aid delivery by means of US Army support provided under
the u
ella of a U ited Natio s I te atio al Task Fo e UNITAF . U de Ope atio P o ide ‘elief
(Aug.-Dec. 1992) aid was being delivered directly by US cargo planes from Mombasa airport to the areas
of operations. This was still not sufficient. Faced with massive looting of aid and deliberate attacks on
organizations and people delivering it, the UN ratcheted up the intervention, despite Somali hostility.
98
99
100
101
January 23rd , 1992: UNSCR 733 proclaims an arms embargo, urges all parties to agree to a cease-fire and find a
political solution, and instructs the UN to start a large-scale humanitarian operation.
March 3rd, 1992, faction leaders signed a cease-fire in Mogadishu to allow humanitarian assistance; like all
subsequent cease-fires intended to lure international aid, it was soon broken by all parties.
It started with the arrival in July of 50 unarmed military observers.
Nevertheless, with UNSCR 751 (April 24th, 1992) the UN decided to establish a mission in Somalia (UNOSOM),
and it was agreed the UN would send 50 (unarmed) observers to monitor cease-fire agreements. A 90-day plan
of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance was agreed on too.
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UNSCR 794 of 3 December 1992, fo the fi st ti e i the UN s histo appealed to Chapte VII of the UN
Charter102 to mandate the application of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The fiction of Somali sovereignty and the integrity of the state was finally abandoned after resolutions
733, 746, 751, 767 and 775 had failed to deliver the expected results. The third phase of the
intervention (Dec. 1992 to Oct.
as alled Ope atio ‘esto e Hope . Outgoi g P eside t Bush
(senior) pledged 30,000 US troops to support this operation103.
That seemed like a large amount in a country like Somalia. On 8 December 1992, the first US troops
landed by amphibian invasion in and around Mogadishu. With the US troops came media coverage, and
with that coverage – du ed the CNN effe t 104 – came additional funding for humanitarian operations.
NGOs started flooding into the country; many of those that had left in 1990/91 came back in 1992 for
the relief effort. In one account, there were 40 international NGOs operating in South Central Somalia by
1994105.
Emboldened by the apparent success of UNITAF, the Secretary General, when writing to the Security
Council to request their endorsement of UNOSOM II106, envisioned a vast scope of responsibilities for
the revamped UN mission. Besides a force under UN command of 28,000 international troops, it went
far in its state-building ambitions: disarmament, setting up a Somali police force to eventually take over
security provision, settling IDP issues, and continuing aid delivery, restoring a civil administration
throughout the country and economic revival.
What UN“C‘
did t oa h as the future of the Somali state. The SC meeting happened before the
Addis Ababa meeting between Somali factions107 was finished, and the UN likely wanted to avoid predetermining the political outcome. In its rapidly succeeding Security Council resolutions of 1992 and
1993, the UN repeatedly alled fo a essatio of hostilities to e follo ed
a politi al settle e t ,
ased o
atio al e o iliatio , although the o di g ha ged slightl f o esolutio to esolution.
The e as o spe ifi atio of hat su h a politi al p o ess should lead to e.g. ele tio s o a oadased go e
e t a d ofte the state-building objective was secondary to that of delivering aid. The
102
103
104
105
106
107
Article 41 of the UN ha te : The “e u it Cou il a de ide hat easu es ot involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.
Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Natio s.
At full deployment, UNITAF consisted of 37,000 soldiers: 25,000 US, the others provided by 27 countries.
The CNN effe t efe s to the i flue e that the edia have over the policy agenda. Once networks start
providing saturation coverage to a specific crisis, it becomes impossible for politicians not to address them. The
term started being used in the early 1990s, and the Somali crisis – together with the Gulf and Balkan Wars –
was one of the first instances of its use. See Livingston, S., Clarifying the CNN effect. An examination of media
according to type of military intervention, Joan Shorenstein Center, John F Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, June 1997.
Bradbury, M., 2010, p. 4.
Lette “UN “e eta Ge e al Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council, dated 3 March 1993.
In March 1993, a conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was held in Addis Ababa under the auspices
of the UNECA; the agreement signed between 15 factions on 27/03 had little effect on the ground.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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parties in conflict had to cease fighting and start talking to allow the UN to deliver assistance, while a
more permanent political settlement had to be reached by local forces.
O e of the easo s the Addis A a a ag ee e t did t hold as the oppositio
General Aideed, who,
among the faction leaders, was gradually becoming the main enemy of the international community108.
Aideed had repeatedly spoken out against the presence of international forces in Somalia, even warning
the Security Council. He desired to be recognized as the president of Somalia, contesting the legitimacy
of Ali Mahdi, who had been proclaimed President by a USC congress in January 1991. Ali Mahdi was
internationally seen as a more acceptable representative of Somalia than Aideed.
The killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers of UNOSOM II109 on 5 June 1993 as they were inspecting one of
Aideed s eapo depots as a tu i g poi t; the follo i g da , the “e u it Cou il issued esolutio
837, calling for a UN-led investigation into the killing, calling to account those factional leaders
responsible, and increasing the striking and deterrent capacity of UNOSOM II. The UN and the USA
together declared war o Aideed s fa tio 110.
This led to the i fa ous Bla k Ha k Do
i ide t o O to e
, i hi h U“ se i e e
111
were killed (as well as 800-1000 Somalis . The tele ised i ages of the U“ soldie s odies ei g
dragged through the street Aideed s la
ilitia struck a raw nerve in American public opinion. The
CNN effe t did the est: a fe da s late P eside t Cli to a ou ed the withdrawal of the US
o ti ge t, hi h as the a k o e of UNO“OM II s e fo e e t a .
UNOSOM dragged on until March 1995, when it was officially ended. A year before that, not only the
US, but also other Western nations112 had withdrawn their armed forces, leaving the operation very
diminished113. Up to the end, the UN forces were involved in conflict throughout the country and could
not tip the scales in favour of a peaceful resolution114.
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
General Aideed was frequently singled out for criticism in reports by the UN Secretary General on the situation
in Somalia; see for example S24992 (of 19 Dec. 1992), S25168 (26 Jan. 1993) and S26317 (Aug. 1993).
3-4 May 1993: UNO“OM
Co ti ue Hope takes o e f o UNITAF. It ill ope ate u til Ma h
.
Aggressive operations by UNOSOM forces also caused civilian victims. For example, a group of elders meeting
in a house on 12 July 1993 was killed in a US strike. This led to a popular uprising against the intervention. Four
foreign journalists investigating the 12/7 incident were killed by an angry mob. Emboldened by their success,
the ilitias took o e o e a eas of Mogadishu. UNO“OM s t oop o t i uti g ou t ies de eloped tensions
among themselves, with Italy taking the lead in criticizing the US approach.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle of Mogadishu (1993).
Besides the US, Italy, Belgium, France and Sweden also withdrew their contingents in March 1994.
Nov. 1994: UNSCR 954 extends the mandate of UNOSOM II until March 1995. By now, UNOSOM has scaled
down and only operates in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa; it focuses its attention on reaching a political
settlement.
See SG report S/1994/1068 of September 1994, paragraphs 25 to 27, for a sample of incidents faced by
UNO“OM: O “epte e a UNO“OM logisti s o o of t u ks as a ushed ea Wa la e . O l
one vehi le ea hed Baledogle … O
Jul , i Belet We e, t oops of the )i a ea o ti ge t e e
completely overrun by a strong militia force. One UNOSOM soldier was killed and the UNOSOM troops had to
a a do all thei e uip e t to the ilitia … O
August, an Indian unit escorting a supply convoy was
ambushed by armed militia near Burlego, on the Baledogle-Baidoa road. Seven Indian soldiers were killed
during this incident. On 31 August, three Indian doctors were killed in Baidoa when a rifle grenade exploded as
the e e lea i g the offi e s ess … Du i g a e e o [i Balad o “epte e ] to ha d o e so e
United Nations equipment to the local authorities, the latter demanded that all United Nations equipment be
handed over to them. In the afternoon of the same day, approximately 100 militia, supported by "technicals",
attacked a UNOSOM position protected by troops of the Zimbabwean contingent, with a view to seizing all the
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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Despite its unprecedented scale, UNOSOM failed to create a safe operating environment for
humanitarian aid delivery, or to reach a political settlement. With crises in Rwanda and the Balkans
claiming the attention of the international community, and with Somalia being perceived as of no
strategic interest, political engageme t di i ished. With o a ute e e ge
a d o pea ekeepi g
forces, foreign aid declined, from a budget of US$1.5 billion for UNOSOM II in 1993, to $20-25 million in
the second half of the 1990s (Chart 6). Overall, Western aid fell to below pre-war levels by 1997
(Chart 2). Many international agencies closed their operations or contracted them out to local Somali
NGOs.
Reflections on the UN intervention in Somalia, 1992-1995
* The net result of UNOSOM II was:
•
•
•
•
•
•
“o alia he efo th as see as a asket ase , a d the i te atio al o
u it dise gaged.
Somali trust in UN impartiality was broken, as the UN often became a party to the conflict.
Somali faction leaders came to see themselves, and to be seen by foreigners, as the heirs to
“o alia s so e eig t .
The UN s eputatio as ta ished globally as it did not achieve the objectives it had set itself.
U“ pu li opi io tu ed agai st the UN, as it as elie ed that ou soldie s ha e fought
a el a d that the e e the i ti of a politi al uag i e aused by fuzzy UN planning.
The US and the international community came to fear military intervention in civil conflicts, like
in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia.
All observers and experts agree that UNOSOM was a resounding failure, from beginning to end. The
mission left in 1995 without having achieved any of its objectives. What are the lessons that can be
learned from this experience?
* The i itial espo se as too little, too late . B Ja ua
, the famine that claimed around 300,000
lives, and the conflict which had claimed tens of thousands of lives115 and sent hundreds of thousands
seeking refuge outside the country, were far too advanced to stem. The principal reason for this late
reaction was the UN principle of non-interference and respect of sovereignty. The intervention that
resulted from UNSC resolutions 733 and 751 still sought to base itself on these principles; it was only in
December 1992 that Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked for another type of response.
* The muscular approach advocated by the UN and the USA in a second phase backfired spectacularly
he it as applied to eli i ate spoile s , i this ase General Aideed. Although the UN claimed it was
retaliation against an attack on its peacekeepers, the long-standing enmity between Aideed and
international forces made it seem, to Somalis in any case, that the UN was attacking the Habar-Gidir
clan of the Hawiye. This allowed Aideed to mobilize a number of Somalis that the UN could impossibly
defeat, even with 28,000 troops.
115
equipment before the troops withdrew. UNOSOM troops reacted immediately in self-defence. Four militia
members were killed and 39 captured during this incident. No casualties were incurred by the UNOSOM troops.
The Zimbabwean contingent finally left Balad with all equipment and stores intact. Immediately upon their
departure, so e
e , o e a d hild e ushed i to the a p to pi k up lefto e s.
Bradbury, M., 1994, p. 16, estimates that 400,000 Somalis died in the first three years of the civil war from
famine, epidemic outbreaks and from war violence.
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* The reason this clash came about was the disarmament effort by the UN against clan militias. In March
, i a lassi al ase of issio
eep 116, the UN secretary general, bolstered by favourable
impressions of the new muscular approach, decided to go to the root of the Somali problem and to
vastly expand the UN mission and help Somalis rebuild a functioning polity. This overstretch fatally
affected UNOSOM II.
1.6 The International Community withdraws to the side lines (1995 – 2005)
After the failures of the UN led mission, international leadership in Somalia passed to donor
governments, coordinated through the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and chaired by the
Eu opea Co
issio EC . As the la gest do o to “o alia, the EC e e ted o side a le i flue e o
the direction of aid policy in the mid-1990s. In the absence of famine or large-s ale o fli t, the ou t
as judged to e o i g to a ds e o e a d “o alia s p o le s e e edefi ed i de elop e tal
te s. The fo us of i te atio al aid s it hed f o
elief to de elop e t a d lo al solutio s 117.
Chart 6: Net flows of the EU/DAC and UN to Somalia in current US$ (source: The World Bank)
250M
200M
150M
100M
50M
0
EU/DAC aid to Somalia
UN aid to Somalia
Total EU/DAC plus UN
Note: DAC stands for Development Assistance Committee of the OECD; it regroups all main developed donor
nations plus the EU institutions118
116
117
118
This is the term used to indicate shifting and generally expanding goals of a mission that was originally much
o e su i t. Fo e a ple, p ote ti g hu a ita ia aid deli e ies e o es disa i g all ilitias a d
i ludi g the i a politi al e o iliatio p o ess .
Bradbury, M., 2010.
Figures from the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) give as total assistance to Somalia in fiscal year 2002
$174.4 million, and for 2003 $271 million. It is not clear to this author what the base for this discrepancy is.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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Humanitarian Assistance
Chart 6, above, clearly indicates how the UN role as major donor to Somalia in the early 1990s was
gradually eclipsed by the EU and bilateral donors. From 1996 to 2004, absolute funding levels were very
low, compared with the 1980s (see Chart 2) and the post-2005 period. From 2005 onwards, the UN
contribution again increased – from an average of $20 million/year in the decade from 1995 to 2004, to
$34 million/year in the following decade (2005-2014). In the same period, the net flows from DAC
countries increased from a yearly average of $29 million to $138 million.
Chart 6 does not include security assistance, for example the payment of AMISOM troops, the cost of
anti-piracy operations, and bilateral security assistance and related costs. The international community
did not incur any such costs from 1995 to 2007; AMISOM started in 2007-2008 and anti-piracy
operations were set up in 2008 (EU-NAVFOR) and 2009 (UN-mandated CTFa d NATO s Ope atio
Ocean Shield), while capacity-building of the Somali Security Forces accelerated in the second decade of
the 21st century.
The focus of intervention in Somalia in the 1990s was almost strictly humanitarian. Somalia scored near
the bottom (161 of 163) in The Human Development Report of 1998, for which, for the first time, a
separate publication was made covering Somalia119. Although there was relative peace in most of the
country, socio-economic indicators were still terrible120. Donors worked through NGOs to continue to
provide humanitarian relief where needed, but also start development work where possible.
In the UN 1996/97 consolidated appeal for funding, the country was divided into three zones: of crisis
(most of South Central Somalia), of transition (Central Somalia and parts of South Central) and of
recovery (Puntland and Somaliland) 121. Besides, donors supported the IDP camps in Kenya, Ethiopia and
Yemen. But funding for Somalia was hard to get by, as Kofi Annan noted in a report to the Security
Council in December 2000, e tio i g la k of edia o e age a d do o fatigue as pa t of the
problem122.
Given the lack of security for aid workers in Somalia, nearly all international NGOs and even some
Somali ones relocated to Nairobi following the withdrawal of UNOSOM; the UN agencies and embassies,
and most donors covering Somalia were already based there. Their programmes in Somalia were all
remotely managed, with field staff or local partners implementing much of the actual work. This had
several consequences123 that continue until today:
•
119
120
121
122
123
124
Most of the aid overhead is spent in Nairobi; the peripheral benefits of expatriates renting
houses, buying cars, doing their shopping and accessing local services accrue to Kenya, not
Somalia. In fact, the percentage of funding earmarked for Somalia and actually spent there
might dwindle to about 20-30%124.
Bradbury, Menkhaus & Marchal for UNDP – Human Development Report Somalia 2001.
In particular the mother and infant mortality rate. UNDP HDR Somalia 2001.
Le Sage & Majid, 2002, The Livelihoods Gap: Responding to the Economic Dynamics of Vulnerability in Somalia,
Disasters 2002, 26:1, pp 10-27
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia S/2000/1211, Paragraphs 52 and 56.
Partially based on Menkhaus, K., 2003a, Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment; commissioned by
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Information Section (DIP), 2003; and partially on
my own observations working for a NGO covering Somalia but based in Nairobi.
Menkhaus, K., 2003, p. 56
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•
•
32
Decisions made in Nairobi, among staff that rarely visits the field and has no intimate knowledge
of Somali sociocultural realities, may have limited or adverse effects in the field.
Field staff in Somalia, trying to bridge the gap between the reality they operate in and the
decisions made remotely in Nairobi, may have strong incentives to hide certain failures or
adverse effects of the programmes they run. This disconnect may also allow field staff to skim
the budgets and steer programmes in ways that benefit themselves (for example, recruiting
friends and family or providing aid to their own community).
To remedy adverse effects of remote management, programme directors in Nairobi and their
do o s a put i pla e ostl thi d-pa t o ito i g e ha is s, fu the edu i g the
amount of funding actually spent on the programmes; while for the monitors, who can also not
access field operations, the incentive to report positively is strong, so actual problems go
unreported.
The net effect was that Somalis, already suspicious about the true motives of the aid community, grew
even more disenchanted with the whole international aid sector and NGOs in particular.
The Political Process
The fragmentation that characterized Somalia was reversed, according to expert observers, in the late
1990s125. With the formation of Puntland (1998), a state in Bay and Bakool126 (1999) and the Transitional
National Government (TNG), centrifugal forces were checked. This was mirrored in the growth of cities
such as Hargeisa, Garowe, Bosaso and Baidoa.
While the UN and the international community had all but disengaged from the local political front127,
they did back regional initiatives taken by Kenya (1996), Ethiopia (1997), Egypt (1997) and Djibouti
(2000) to reach a political settlement in Somalia; generally, however, the country was relatively peaceful
in the second half of the 1990s and external powers were not strongly inclined to intervene until the
onset of the Global War on Terror, which kicked off in Somalia with the Ethiopian invasion in 2006.
The regional and international efforts to rebuild a Somali state seemed a logical response to the analysis
that ost of “o alia s p o le s ste
ed f o state ollapse. But in fact, such international
conferences provoked conflict rather than peace. For potential participants the stakes were high: peace
talks were a way to access international funding (starting with a visa, a plane ticket and a room in a
luxury hotel) and gai politi al as e da e ithi o e s o
u it . Menkhaus, for example, notices
that, ith ea h su essi e atio al e o iliatio o fe e e, new military factions would appear that
claimed to represent a population group, but often had no such mandate128.
125
126
127
128
Marchal, Bradbury & Menkhaus in the UNDP Human Development Report Somalia 2001.
The rich agricultural lands inhabited by the Rahanweyn had been wrecked by continuous strife until the
Rahanweyn Resistance Army, with Ethiopian backing, established its authority over Bay and Bakool in 1999.
This allowed the return of humanitarian workers, until Al Shabaab expelled most of them in 2009.
Although the UN was not involved in the Arta Conference, the SG did request the Security Council to
implement a trust fund for Somalia and to consider a new UN assistance mission in the country, and he
requested the World Bank and IMF to re-engage with Somalia. He also suggested that the UN agencies relocate
from Nairobi to Mogadishu, if and when a single authority had been established in that city and the harbour
and airport would re-open. S/2000/1211, final paragraphs
Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, Review of African Political Economy 97, 2003, p. 409
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The announcement of a new round of peace talks typically prompted factional or regional leaders to
fight for supremacy over a clan or region. The Arta peace talks of 2000, and later the Eldoret talks of
2002, thus clearly led to conflict in the Jubas, Bay and Bakool, and Puntland129. The outcomes of these
peace talks led to even more conflict.
The Arta conference in Djibouti brokered by Omar Guelleh, the President of Djibouti (himself a
Somali/Issa) attempted a novel approach, inviting clan elders and civil society groups for consultations
to avoid relying on faction leaders (warlords). A new formula was invented for clan representation in
politi s, a el the . fo ula . This gi es o e e ual pa t of ep ese tatio to each of the four major
clan families: Hawiye, Darood, Rahanweyn and Dir/Isaaq, and half a part for the minorities (Bantu,
coastal communities and professional minorities). This formula is still used in 2018; for example in the
275-member federal parliament there are 61 seats each for the major clan groups and 31 for the
minorities.
The TNG de ided o i A ta i
, led Moha ed Hassa “alad , most strongly represented the
interests of the Mogadishu business class and their Hawiye protectors. It was immediately opposed by
many regional strongmen, who had not participated in Arta or dropped out before the end. As the TNG
included (business-friendly) Islamist elements and was from the onset supported by Gulf states, Ethiopia
also opposed it and convened the dissidents in a new organization, the Somali Reconciliation and
Restoration Council (SRRC). The dominant figure in this alliance became Abdullahi Yusuf, the President
of Puntland since 1998130.
The TNG established itself in Mogadishu in December 2000; it set up the trappings of a government and
appealed for foreign funding. It had already secured international legitimacy, and Somalia was for the
first time since 1991 again represented by a state. However, do o s adopted a ait-and-see app oa h,
and only Saudi Arabia and Libya provided some funding. Since the TNG had few warlords and thus no
armed forces, and most of the territory – including much of the capital – was controlled by its
opponents, it soon became clear that it would not be able to govern. It also did not try to reach out to
the SRRC or other opponents, or to improve the situation in Mogadishu, for example by reopening the
harbour and airport. Instead, its members immediately engaged in conflict over the spoils of
government131.
Therefore, the international community pushed for a new round of peace talks that were held in Kenya
(in Eldoret, 2002-2003, and Mbagathi, 2003-2004) to reconcile the parties in conflict. After nearly two
years of expensive conferences, a new parliament was elected along the . fo ula, reflecting the
growing consensus among the international community that real political power in Somalia had reverted
to clan elders and local politics. The 275 MPs then elected Abdullahi Yusuf as President of a new
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004. This surprise election result – the sitting
president Salad Hassan was another main contender – was reportedly obtained Ethiopia s otebuying among MPs132. Ethiopia (with tacit Western backing) thus ensured that a pro-Ethiopian, antiIslamist warlord would lead a new government based on clan balance.
129
130
131
132
Menkhaus, K., 2003, p. 410
These included “hatigaduud ‘‘A fa tio , Mo ga Majerteen in Bakool), Hussein Aideed (HabarGidir/Sacad), Abgal/Warsangeli and Biimaal clan militias
Menkhaus, K., 2003b, p. 418
Menkhaus, K., 2007, p.
. The goi g ate of a MP s ote as $
-5000.
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Yusuf, instead of reaching out to his opponents from the ex-TNG, pressed his advantage by appointing a
PM close to Ethiopia, who presented an 82-member cabinet. The European Union agreed to pay for the
ministers and the MPs, most of whom remained in Nairobi claiming they would be unsafe in Somalia
(and Nairobi was where the international donors were), but the TNG faction returned to Mogadishu.
Te sio s soo ose et ee oth g oups, a d Yusuf did t a age to reach Mogadishu until 2007;
instead he settled first in Jowhar, and then in Baidoa. He attempted to convince Ethiopia to send
peacekeepers, to allow him to recapture the capital and most of the rest of South and Central Somalia
from his rivals, but the international community was hesitant to fund this venture.
Yusuf s go e
e t ade o atte pt to a tuall go e , e e i the to of Baidoa, a d the TFG ould
have joined the long list of failed attempts to rebuild a Somali government (let alone state), were it not
for a factor that played in its advantage: the Global War on Terror.
Reflections on the period of minimal international involvement
* Although the o se sus i
as that afte UN“OM s ithd a al the ou t
ould slip a k i to
chaos and war, the reverse happened. Various forms of local governance emerged, involving clan
elders, faction leaders, businessmen, Islamists, Sharia courts, professionals and intellectuals. Fighting
continued in some areas, but at a low level with, for example, very little displacement. When the
international community again became involved, mainly through neighbouring countries, local
conflicts increased, though remaining still modest compared to the violence levels after 2006.
* Successful local governance and peace i itiati es led o se e s to ad o ate fo a uildi g- lo k
approach instead of a top-down effort to rebuild a national state. This could account for the greater
autonomy of Somaliland and Puntland, but also allow for Rahanweyn and other aspirations in a future
structure. This is why the current federal model came to be seen as the most appropriate.
* The 4.5 formula was adopted in 2000 to give traditional leaders a larger share of power, hoping that
this would render the government more stable. Until then, self-proclaimed political leaders, heading
the la gest fa tio s, had ee elu ta tl see as the eposito of “o alia s so e eig t . The MPs
selected by the clans in the 4.5 system were, however, often not clan elders or their representatives,
but political entrepreneurs, so the parliaments elected in 2000 and 2004 were not representative of
Somali society.
* The assumption of international actors that Somalis invited to peace talks would represent their
constituency proved erroneous. In successive rounds, different selection criteria were used to ensure
better representativity. But, what if the principle of political representation was not shared between
Somalis and foreigners? If a participant to a negotiation has not been vested with a mandate, however
symbolically, by the people he/she is supposed to represent, how can he/she speak in their name?
What is the tradition of political representation among Somalis? Does it exist outside the clan context?
* In the second half of the 1990s, donors and humanitarian agencies led the intervention in Somalia.
Despite plans to support development in areas that were recovering and to spread the aid more
intelligently, aid seems to have had little impact in these years. Remote management from Nairobi was
part of the reason. Somalis in general show little respect for the aid sector.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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1.7 Somalia in the Global War on Terror (2005 – now)
Immediately after 11 September 2001 /
, Somalia was identified as a possible hotbed for Islamic
terrorism. The only known Islamist fa tio i “o alia, Al Itihaad Al Isla i a Isla i U io a d its
leader Hassan Dahir Aweys were put on the list of designated terrorist organizations by the US on
September 23rd because of presumed links with Al Qaeda and the 1998 bombings of US embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. Of more immediate consequence for Somalis, however, the main financial
remittances (hawala) company, Al Barakaat, was shut down by US fiscal authorities, and its $8.5 million
reserves impounded. This killed many small Somali businesses and complicated the transfers that kept
many Somali families afloat and allowed small investments133, the more so because all Somali
remittances companies could be closed on the same grounds (that terrorists supposedly used them to
transfer funds).
The de isio to put “o alia o the te o at h list as ased o assu ptio , ot fa t. While failed
states had hithe to ee o side ed a hu a ita ia dilemma, post 9/11 it became a global security
threat. With the reasoning that Afghanistan had provided Al Qaeda with an operational base because it
was a failed state, Somalia automatically also became suspect, as a failed Muslim state with a known
Islamic political faction134. But there was no hard evidence that terrorists were hiding in Somalia or that
Somalis abetted international terrorism. As Le Sage oted at the ti e, to many Somalis and
international observers, the spotlight that has shined on Somalia as part of the war on terrorism has
come as a surprise. 135
The US administration had little direct knowledge of Somalia. Since the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident,
it had disengaged almost entirely from Somalia. When media (falsely) reported, in October 2001, that Al
Qaeda was transferring its arsenal and leadership from Afghanistan to Somalia, US intelligence and
military officers scrambled to the region to establish operations. They did not heed expert opinion that
there was no sign of AQ implantation in Somalia, and that it was highly unlikely to happen136.
As in Afghanistan137, the US was often misled by local partners, particularly its Ethiopian ally. Ethiopia
considered that any (possibly) anti-Ethiopian group, including the Transitional National Government, Al
Itihaad, the Sharia courts and local warlords, were terrorists138, and provided US officials with hit lists of
133
134
135
136
137
138
Besides Al Barakaat, Al Haramain charitable organization was also closed down under Executive Order 13224,
to lo k the assets of i di iduals a d e tities that p o ide suppo t, se i es, o assista e to, o othe ise
asso iate ith, te o ists a d te o ist o ga izatio s…. . Late i estigatio s showed that both groups could
not be held responsible for the charges against them, see fo e a ple Asso iated P ess, Italian prosecutor says
no basis for terrorism charges in probe of alleged Somali financial link to al-Qaida 07 Jan. 2004), but the fear it
struck in all other hawala operations led many of them to discontinue their operations in Somalia and other
risky countries.
For a typical exposé of Somalia as a terrorist threat, see Phillips, J., 2002, Somalia and Al Qaeda: Implications
for the War on Terrorism, in The Heritage Foundation #1526, April 2002.
Le Sage, 2004, p. 5.
Ken Menkhaus, in a 2002 testimony to the US Congress Foreign Relations Committee, stressed that Al Itihaad
(AIAI) was not related to Al Qaeda, that the TNG was not a front for AIAI, that AIAI had no military training
ases ithi “o alia, a d that “o alia as a u likel safe ha e fo Osa a Be Lade , a d i fa t fo a
foreigner. Other experts (i.e. Hoehne, Bryden, Elliot & Holzer) wrote policy papers that argued against a US
anti-terror campaign in Somalia, but their influence seems to have been scant.
See, e.g., Anand Gopal on the extent to which US forces were misled by local partners.
Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar, 2002, describe the four-pronged strategy by Ethiopia to unseat the
TNG, including diplomatic efforts to withdraw recognition from the TNG, organizing an opposition front (the
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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targets (Le Sage, 2004, Ch. 1) including terrorist training camps. However, when the US surveyed these
targets from an air base hastily established at Gode in Eastern Ethiopia, they found nothing to bomb.
The main target, Al Itihaad, proved particularly elusive. US commandoes searched in vain for its training
camps. Although AQ had established links with small Islamist groups including Al Itihaad in the early
1990s, it had left Somalia in 1995139, leaving local Islamist groups to their own devices. Al Itihaad had
established a local administration in Luuq and other towns of Gedo, and maintained a small military
presence at Ras Kamboni in Lower Juba, Ceel Waaq in Gedo and Laas Qoray in Puntland. The areas it
controlled were among the better-governed of South Central Somalia and NGOs generally appreciated
their presence.
The Itihaad branch in the Ogaden conducted several impressive attacks against Ethiopian targets, even
in Addis Ababa, and in 1998 and 99 Ethiopia invaded Gedo, routing Al Itihaad from all its positions and
setting up a buffer zone it still controls in 2018. Al Itihaad then gave up warfare as a strategy140. Instead,
it focused on delivering social services in areas where it had influence and used its good connections to
the business community and the Sharia courts to play an increasing role in security and politics in
Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region.
In 2002, the USA established a Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) at Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti, whose focus was on monitoring and eliminating the terrorist threat in the Horn of
Africa, mostly using covert action141. It built security capacities among the governments of Djibouti,
Ethiopia and Kenya with joint military Counter-Terrorism exercises, security training, improved control
at the airports and seaports, and torture142 techniques. Finally, the US also sought to directly engage
potential Somali allies in the War on Terror, including the very willing anti-TNG coalition of Ethiopiansupported warlords regrouped i the “o ali ‘eha ilitatio a d ‘e o st u tio Cou il , hi h—as we
have seen above—were the beneficiaries of the 2002-2004 talks to establish a Transitional Federal
Government. The US plan may have been modelled on Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance
reconquered power in 2001 with the help of US airpower and commando teams.
143
A o di g to the U“ Natio al “e u it Cou il s st ateg of
, The principal objective of our
collective response will be the rebuilding of a state that can look after its own people – their welfare,
139
140
141
142
143
“‘‘C , ilita supplies to “‘‘C a lo ds a d a tio a le i tellige e p o ided to the U“ a d i te atio al
allies on supposed links between the TNG and international terrorism.
In those years, Al Qaeda was itself a very minor player and Somali Islamists might not even remember having
met them at the time.
In 2001, Al Itihaad had split into three groups: the militant Ethiopian/Ogaden wing, which had committed most
of the terrorist attacks, had become autonomous; those that sought to establish an Islamic state in Somaliland
a d Pu tla d ithout iole e fo ed a o e e t a ed Al I tisa ; hile the i g led A e s o ti ued
to rely on its projection of force to play a role in Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle.
Le Sage (2004) gives a few examples of such US covert actions, including raiding internet cafés in Mogadishu,
installing underwater surveillance cameras near Ras Kamboni, and targeted killings of senior Islamist political,
judicial and intellectual leaders.
I a tuall
ote enhanced interrogation ut Mi osoft Wo d p o pted e to a oid usi g euphe is s a d
suggested the o d to tu e i stead. The US Embassy person in Kenya in charge of the security cooperation
programme with the Kenyan government once privately admitted to me that tea hi g e ha ed i te ogatio
was one of the ways the US helped Kenya fight terrorism, noting that existing Kenyan practices (inherited from
the British during the Mau Mau rebellion) were rougher.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003.
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health, prosperity, and freedom – and control its borders (this point will be further pursued in
Chapter 3). But in fact the US did not engage in Somali state-building during this period.
The decisive, yet ill-informed, US action to counter a non-existent global terrorist threat in Somalia144 by
bolstering the traditional opponents of the Islamists had adverse results. The coalition of anti-TNG
warlords regrouped in the SRRC that captured the power of the new TFG in 2004, was thoroughly
u popula i “o alia. The TFG s pro-Ethiopian and anti-Islamist discourse may have helped it gain
acceptance in the international community, but it made anti-Ethiopian and pro-Islamist sentiment seem
nationalistic among the Somali population145.
Preside t Yusuf A dullahi s i siste t e uest fo Ethiopia t oops to help hi e aptu e Mogadishu f o
the Mogadishu g oup that had split from his government, angered many Somalis. Throughout Somalia,
the official transfer of power from local to national institutions brought confusion; as we have seen,
national political processes often revived local tensions about representation, which easily degenerated
into armed clashes. Into this political void stepped the Sharia courts.
The rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union
Sharia courts were an innovation in Somalia, where religious law was traditionally part of customary law
(xeer) and dispensed by clan elders. The first court appeared in Mogadishu in 1994, supported by
businessmen and other local strongmen. It resolved family, property, contract, criminal and other cases
based on Sharia, and its decisions were enforced with the help of militias paid for by local businessmen.
Although the Sharia courts could only resolve issues within their communities – not among communities
– and they were thus by necessity constricted to the clans and sub-clans living in their area146, they
expressly avoided clan politics and were perceived as a neutral, effective justice-dispensing force.
The fortunes of the Sharia courts waxed and waned over the years. Local warlords would try to
dismantle them, and in 2000 the TNG tried to integrate them into its own justice sector, which existed
on paper only, effectively disintegrating them. Finally, the US accusation that the Sharia courts were
radical organizations harbouring terrorist elements made them undesirable allies to the TNG. But, given
the la k of TNG s eal po e , so e of the p i ipal Sharia courts simply continued functioning, and they
remained popular. These were the departing points for the swift comeback of Sharia courts from 2004
to 2006.
Besides lawlessness and lack of governance caused by the TNG – TFG fiasco, criminality in Mogadishu
was maybe at its worst in 2004-2005, when, according to Marchal (2009), kidnapping was the best
business in town 147. Between 2004 and 2006 Sharia courts were established in many localities in
144
145
146
147
In an extensive analysis in his doctoral dissertation, Le Sage concludes that, although AQ may have had some
presence in Somalia, it amounted to very little, most of their operatives and activities being in Kenya. Other
experts agree; more distant observers (in US security think-tanks and the global media), however, painted a
very different picture, where Somalia was deeply penetrated by Al Qaeda.
This is also the assessment of current President Farmaajo in his 2009 Master s thesis: Washington committed
another foreign policy blunder. As allies, it solicited none other than the Somali warlords who had effectively
feudalized and starved the country. Thus, against its policy and ideals, the United States effectively legitimized
thei eig of te o . p. 20)
Given the location in which they appeared, the original courts were mostly Hawiye – an argument used by the
predominantly Darood SRRC to oppose them.
Marchal, 2009, p. 387.
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Mogadishu and throughout South-Central Somalia, on the initiative of Islamist activists, businessmen
and clan elders. These courts then came together in a loose st u tu e a ed the Cou il of Isla i
Cou ts , o CIC the o e e t e a e k o late
the a o
ICU, o Isla i Cou ts U io , led
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Aden, who would become president of a new Transitional Federal Government in
2009. Although the ou ts p i a fu tio e ai ed the e fo e e t of the ule of la , the also
came to take on some political functions, similar to local governing bodies.
The Sharia courts had long been seen by both the USA and Ethiopia as harbouring radical Islamist
elements. The influence of Al Itihaad and its leader Hassan Dahir Aweys within the ICU was real, which
for the US as suffi ie t to defi e the ICU as suppo ti g te o ists . The e pa sio of the ou ts
influence gravely concerned the US, who saw them as akin to the Taliban. Besides targeted killings of
court officials and associated politicians148, the US encouraged the formation of a coalition of Hawiye
warlords which they hoped could boot ICU out of Mogadishu.
Thus, in February 2006 the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) was
formed, including warlords such as Yalahow, Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere, Musa Sudi, Qeybdiid and
Bashir Raage. They received $150,000 each per month149. The US may not have realized that most
members of the ARPCT were Abgaal and Murusade, while their opponents were mostly Habar-Gidir,
thus t a sfo i g this see i gl ideologi al ou te -te o is fight i to o e o e hapte i the
struggle between Hawiye clans for supremacy in the capital150. Fighting started immediately as a
business dispute over the makeshift port of El Maan. Over the next four months the ICU, and notably its
military wing Al Shabaab, defeated all the warlords and for the first time since 1990 Mogadishu was
under one single authority.
What contributed to the ICU victory was the perception that the warlords of the ARPCT were foreign
stooges151, a general civil-society exasperation about insecurity and lack of governance152, and the
fighting prowess of Al Shabaab. In all areas controlled by the ICU, their security forces implemented
draconian security and Sharia-based law and order. Although i so e ases o e s eil, p ohi itio
to watch the 2006 World Cup) this went too far for most residents, all welcomed the improved security
and governance. The ICU removed roadblocks, cleared the streets of rubble and rubbish, and reopened
Mogadishu s harbour and airport. For the first time since 1991, citizens could move freely and securely
within Mogadishu and beyond.
Later, the months from June to De e e
ould e see as a golde age 153, also by foreign aid
age ies ho ould fo the fi st ti e ope ate ith i i al p edatio
a lo d ad i ist atio s a d
the insecurity caused by the mooryaan154. Concerns about enforced Islamic radicalization of Somali
society subsisted among humanitarians, Somali intellectuals and human rights activists, but it appears
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
Obviously, these assassinations were never claimed by the US, but it was clear to most Somali observers at the
time that anti-ICU target designation by Ethiopians and associated warlords, together with US technology, were
responsible for these killings. See Menkhaus, 2007, and Le Sage, 2004.
ICG authored article in Foreign Affairs: Blowing the Horn, March 1st, 2007.
ICG report, 2006.
At the time there were rumours that US forces were fighting on the side of ARPCT; see ICG 2006, pp 12-13.
Which had manifested itself in the March-June 2005 uprising, or kadoon. See Chapter 6 hereafter for more.
The expression is taken from Barnes & Hassan, 2007, p. 6.
Personal discussions (2016-2018) with several international NGO staff members who were present at that time.
The oo aa a e, as e plai ed else he e, ou g “o alis ith gu s, eithe o ki g fo a faction or for
themselves.
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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that actual radical implementation of, for example, corporal punishment or wearing the veil was not
systematic; overall it was even infrequent. The ICU remained a broad-based coalition of Islamists of
different persuasions, business interests and clan elders, united only in wanting an end to the civil war
and efficacious governance based on Islam.
Within the ICU, the radical Islamist elements were gradually strengthened by US/Ethiopian and TFG
efforts to neutralize them. In response to the targeted assassinations, Al Shabaab had started its own
programme of assassinations of those they identified as traitors in the service of Ethiopia or the US. The
battle to liberate Mogadishu from the ARPCT drew many young fighters to Al Shabaab. AS established a
school targeting youth without—or far from their—family with a strong emphasis on doctrinal
o ie tatio and combat training. In those years the jihad was being fought in Iraq, Palestine and
Afghanistan. The leader of Al Shabaab, Ayro, had himself fought in Afghanistan.155
The ICU, with Al Shabaab forces in the vanguard, quickly swept through the rest of South Central
Somalia; by the autumn of 2006 the TFG only controlled an area around Baidoa (protected by Ethiopian
troops) and Puntland. The international community continued backing its creation, the TFG, despite that
go e
e t s e ide t la k of apa it , e e to go e Baidoa.
In early December 2006, the UN, in Security Council Resolution 1725, authorized an international
intervention in Somalia, IGASOM156, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD)157. In a flagrant violation of the spirit of UNSCR 1725, which specified (Article 4)
that troops from countries neighbouring Somalia would not be deployed158, the Ethiopian army
captured Mogadishu in December 2006. The US denied backing the Ethiopian invasion, but a later
Wikileaks document has provided evidence for what many at the time suspected, that the US did give
Ethiopia the green light159 a d e p o a l p o ided logisti al suppo t. To e e od s su p ise, the
ICU did not oppose any resistance and disbanded instead, but Al Shabaab elements as well as former
warlords remained in the cities and countryside to fight the Ethiopians and the TFG.
The pe iod that follo ed as des i ed,
a o se e s, as the loodiest episode i Mogadishu s
history since the 1991-92 civil war. The Ethiopian army shelled neighbourhoods that were considered
hot eds of esista e , ea i g the ta geted ost of the it . A esti ated - % of Mogadishu s
155
156
157
158
159
Marchal, L., 2009.
E e pts f o A ti le , detaili g the a date of IGA“OM : To monitor progress by the Transitional Federal
Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue / To train the
Tra sitio al Federal I stitutio s se urit for es to e a le the to pro ide their o se urit a d to help
facilitate the re-establishment of national security forces of Somalia. However it is article 1 that is almost
comically far off the mark: [The SC] Reiterates that the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions offer the
only route to achieving peace and stability in Somalia, emphasizes the need for continued credible dialogue
between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, and affirms therefore that the
following provisions of the present resolution, based on the decisions of IGAD and the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union, aim solely at supporting peace and stability in Somalia through an inclusive
political process and creating the conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Somalia while at the
same time deploying foreign forces.
IGAD is an intergovernmental agency dealing with issues in the Horn of Africa. It is composed of the following
countries: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. It has been strongly
involved in Somalia over the past years.
In a report by the UN SG of 22 December 2006, mention is not even made of the presence of Ethiopian troops
in Somalia; instead, it makes it appear only the TFG and the ICU are fighting together: UN doc S/PRST/2006/59.
See wikileaks.org .
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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one million residents fled the city and thousands died160. The TFG s t oops that came with the Ethiopians
were mostly Puntland Darood, and they took e e ge fo the Da ood s e pulsio f o Mogadishu i
1991 by looting and harassing the local population. Meanwhile, the TFG made no attempt to govern the
city or re-establish security161. The Ethiopian forces decided to withdraw in December 2008, but
Mogadishu remained at war until mid-2011, when Al Shabaab withdrew its troops.
Renewed War in Somalia
After the Ethiopian invasion, the United States carried out several airstrikes against presumed Al Qaeda
operatives in Somalia and Al Shabaab leaders, deemed guilty by association162. The UN was an impotent
side-player, incessantly calling for dialogue. The European Union, which had footed most of the bill for
the Transitional Federal institutions, also had little influence on the ground in Somalia. The IGASOM
intervention force requested in UNSCR 1725 started as a small contingent of Ugandan soldiers, renamed
AMISOM in Mogadishu in March 2007; they initially had negligible impact as they were supposed to
keep a pea e that did ot e ist.
Throughout Somalia ,the Ethiopian presence fostered a nationalist reaction with Islamic overtones. The
Eritrean government, in its proxy war with Ethiopia, tried to capture this momentum by convening the
ICU leadership, clan leaders and the heads of factions opposed to the TFG to Asmara in September 2007,
to fo the Allia e fo the ‘e-li e atio of “o alia , o A‘“. Al “ha aa refused to participate in this
political alliance and continued the fight on the ground, which gave it a clear resistance identity.
Between 2007 and 2009 Al Shabaab asserted its control over most of South Central Somalia. It received
eapo s deli e ies f o E it ea i iolatio of the a s e a go a d o the la k a ket. It is the
view of the Monitoring Group that the sheer quantities, numbers and diversity of arms, especially in
central and southern Somalia, are greater than at any time since the early 1990s. wrote the UN
rapporteurs on the arms embargo in July 1997163, noting that the Ethiopian army had ferried in and
distributed to its allies weapons and ammunition without seeking an exemption from the UN Security
Council. Ethiopia maintained thousands of troops in Somalia (in April 2008 a bracket of 5,000 to 20,000
troops was given164), a presence that by itself was already a violation of the UN Arms Embargo. In the
second half of 2008, the ENDF started withdrawing its troops and materiel, under a plan to hand over
authority to the TFG. But the state was incapable of assuming that function. Ethiopia estimated that of
the 17,000 Somali security forces it had trained by the end of 2008, 14,000 had deserted with their
weapons and uniform165.
Fighting broke out in many areas that had previously been peaceful. Some regional strongmen made
alliances of convenience with Al Shabaab and others joined the movement. By late 2008, the Monitoring
160
161
162
163
164
165
Menkhaus, K., 2007, p.
. Ma hal
lai s that
,
of Mogadishu s eside ts had fled No .
2007.
Marchal, 2009, p.
states: Many inhabitants could have endorsed the TFG and the Ethiopian military
presence in January and February 2007, had those two worked to normalize the situation, get economic
activities on a new footing and secure the city. But, as mentioned above, that was not the plan of TFG officials
who wanted to settle their own scores and enjoy the attributes of power without any concern for the people.
See for example this article in the NYT from Feb. 2007, with examples of the US raids and their targets.
Report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia S/2007/436, published on 18 July 2007.
Report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia S/2008/274, published on 24 April 2008 (2008/1).
Report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia S/2008/769, published on 10 Dec 2008 (2008/2) §22,
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018
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Group estimated that 90% of the territory south of Puntland was controlled or influenced by armed
opposition groups. Besides Al Shabaab, these included local forces under nominal ICU/ARS command
and JABISO, the military wing of Al I tisa , a militant group that had branched off from Al Itihaad in
2008.
By the end of 2008, the Transitional Federal Government had also lost Baidoa to Al Shabaab, and it now
only controlled parts of Mogadishu166. It was kept alive by international injections of funding and
security assistance, and by Ethiopian and AMISOM troops. Its own security forces (military, intelligence,
police, presidential guard) were managed along clan lines, many of them Darood, making the TFG
appear as an enemy organization by the Hawiye inhabiting Mogadishu and most of South Central
Somalia. TFG Security forces often clashed internally, caused insecurity and crime167 in the areas they
influenced, and after training and rearming by a variety of foreign actors, they often deserted back to
their clan.
The election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as new president of the TFG in March 2009 returned peace
to much of South Central Somalia. The followers of the ICU and other groups under the umbrella of ARS
were now once again aligned with the government, leaving only Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in the
armed opposition. Both168, undertook an offensive in Mogadishu in May 2009 to boot out the new TFG,
but they were stopped by a recently reinforced AMISOM backed by US weapons deliveries. Al Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam remained in control of part of the capital city, and the urban war raged on. Mid-2009,
the militant groups clashed, and by the end of 2009 Hizbul Islam had effectively disappeared, leaving Al
Shabaab in control of the resistance. Ayro, killed by a US Tomahawk missile in 2008, was succeeded by
Godane.
Aid delivery between state building and counter-terrorism
In 2008, one third of all casualties among aid workers in the world fell in Somalia. Despite the initial lack
of security, aid agencies flocked to Somalia, encouraged by donors who made available considerable
funding. But, despite a large-scale effort by NGOs, donors and the UN, a famine could not be averted in
2011-12, costing the lives of an estimated 250,000 civilians, a casualty tally similar to that of 1992-93.
During that previous famine, aid agencies had learnt to compose with forces on the ground, from the
delivery point of aid to its distribution. Local NGO officials usually dealt directly with controlling clan
factions to try and minimize taxation and confiscation, while maintaining the security of the NGOs and
all involved in the humanitarian operation. It was no secret that NGOs, as well as UN agencies or the
contractors they employed, had to pay some form of humanitarian tax to local authorities, also when
they were affiliated to Al Shabaab, Al Itihaad or Hizbul Islam. Up to an extent, su h suppo t to lo al
autho ities can be justified; for example, when the cash-stripped local authority is required to provide
security to NGOs or their contractors, or needs a computer or fuel or funds for its own development
projects, which serve NGOs. But it was well-k o that a ta es disappea ed i to p i ate po kets o
were pilfered at checkpoints by freelance militia. This is a reality aid agencies had to put up with.
166
167
168
UN Monitoring group 2008/2 §57.
There were reports of AMISOM and TFG commanders selling weapons and ammunition on the Mogadishu
arms markets in several UN Monitoring Group reports published during this period.
Hiz ul Isla
as eated i Fe ua
se e al ilita g oups u de A e s leade ship. I Ap il
, he
returned from his exile in Asmara, and the offensive together with AS started in May. By the end of the year the
two groups had fallen out; some of Hizbul Islam joined Al Shabaab, the rest (including Aweys) disbanded.
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In 2007, when the TFG had returned to Mogadishu with the Ethiopian army, the UN and donors decided
to full a k it, hopi g that this suppo t ould ake the TFG o k 169. They lavished support on federal
institutions, notably a police force, and channelled funds through the nascent state institutions; the idea
as that NGOs should o t i ute to sta ilizatio i a eas the TFG o t olled o o ue ed with the
help of AMISOM; hu a ita ia aid thus e a e a ki d of pea e di ide d . Ho e e , do o s e ui ed
NGOs to work through, or with, the federal government, to increase its capacity and legitimacy.
The problem was that those running the TFG had no desire to help either the aid community, or many of
the people threatened by drought170. Transitional authorities deeply mistrusted the humanitarian
community, seeing them as spies in cahoots with the enemy171; indeed, many NGOs did not hide they
preferred past arrangements with the ICU administration or any local authority that could ensure
stability, security and low levels of corruption to working with the TFG. Predatory behaviour by
government forces was worse than that by Al Shabaab172. The TFG thus seized the opportunity to
impose strict and expensive licensing regimes on NGOs, and blocked aid deliveries that, it believed, were
going to populations opposing it173.
In the conflict between the TFG and the NGOs, the UN ofte hose the side of its p otégé a d told
NGOs to follow government directives. The UN even downplayed the threat of famine – in 2009 half of
the population of South-Central Somalia, i.e. 3.5 million people, were threatened by famine according to
aid agencies174 – as a famine would reflect badly on the TFG and, by extension, on those who supported
it. This situation contributed to the inadequate humanitarian response to the drought.
The other conundrum aid agencies in Somalia had to deal with, was counter-terrorism financing. The UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ould Abdallah, noted that the payments that NGOs
were making to local authorities sho ed that those who claim neutrality can also be complicit , i
othe o ds, that i pa tialit a d eut alit , o e alues fo the hole NGO se to , e e al ead
compromised, suggesting they stood on the side of the terrorists175. For a few years, CT financing rules
were not applied to humanitarian operators in Somalia, but that changed in 2009.
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
Menkhaus, K., Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali case, in Disasters 34, 2010.
Menkhaus, K., 2010, op. cit., p.
, The state-building, stabilisation agenda only held up if a key assumption—
namely, that the government was at least willing, if not yet able, to assist in the delivery of emergency relief to
its own citizens—was true. That assumption was utterly untenable in 2007–08 .
Menkhaus, K., 2010, op. cit., p. 333
Bradbury, M., State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia, Briefing Paper for
the Feinstein Center, September 2010.
Menkhaus, K., 2010, op. cit., p.
, While it possessed almost no administrative capacity at all, the TFG
i sisted o e er isi g its so ereig right to o trol the flo a d dire tio of i ter atio al hu a itaria aid. This
was mainly driven by the desire to block aid delivery to populations that the TFG deemed sympathetic to the
insurgency— namely, most of the Mogadishu population. In the midst of the massive exodus of Mogadishu
residents from the war-torn capital in spring 2007, the TFG blocked convoys of food aid to internally displaced
persons (IDPs), claiming some of the food might be old and that it had to inspect each truck to protect Somalis
from the threat of expired grain. In reality, the TFG had no inspection capacity at all and merely sought to stop
the aid shipments.
My personal observation in 2016-18, including discussions with local Somali observers, is that the UN can
grossly overstate the number of potential victims of humanitarian crises. For example, one could read in Le
Monde that % of “o alila d s populatio as i
isis o e e ge
situatio i Fe ua
.M
estimation would be that instead of 800,000, maybe about 8,000 Somalilanders needed humanitarian aid – 1%
of the stated total.
Ould Abdallah, A., Why the world should not let Somalia go to the dogs in Kenyan Daily Nation 25 June 2009.
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That year, over US$50 million of US humanitarian assistance programmed for Somalia through USAID
and the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance was suspended on the orders of the US Treasury
Depa t e t s Offi e of Fo eig Assets Co t ol, out of o e that it as at isk of e efiti g Al
Shabab.176 This problem soon affected all humanitarian organizations working in South Central Somalia.
How could they prove that none of the donor money was going toward Al Shabaab, especially when
they knew the contrary was true?
Most of the estimated 250,000 fatalities of the 2011-2012 drought in South Central Somalia lived in
areas controlled by Al Shabaab. Although part of the blame lies with Al Shabaab for worsening the crisis
with inappropriate responses to the unfolding famine and contradictory policies toward aid agencies, all
experts who wrote about this drama agree that counter-terrorism funding rules considerably hampered
aid delivery177.
The War on Terror as new matrix for intervention
Although Al Shabaab only pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012, the US considered it a terrorist
organization from 2008 onwards. A report on Al Shabaab by the American Enterprise Institute from
Fe ua
is t pi al: The U ited States appears to e high o al Sha aa s list of i ter atio al
targets. The group began issuing threats against the United States in 2008, and it now professes an
ideolog rese li g al Qaeda s. It has pledged allegia e to i Lade a d ie s itself as fighti g the
global Jihad led by al Qaeda.178 The epo t goes o to suggest A“ as pla i g to atta k the U“
presidential inauguration in 2009 and repeatedly warns its intended audience of US policy-makers to
take the AS threat on US homeland security very seriously. These are either imagined threats or based
on very flimsy evidence. In fact, until the time of writing Al Shabaab has never committed any attack, or
planned one insofar as is known, outside East Africa.
As ‘ola d Ma hal puts it: The security approach structures the international response to the Somali
crisis to the extent that there is little perceived need for an analysis of the situation on the ground, of its
numerous grey areas and the contradictions habitually indulged in by all Somali actors. In this superficial
understanding, Somali politics, once characterized by factionalism, ambitious politico-military
entrepreneurs and shifting alliances, has become an arena where good guys endorsed by the
international community fight against bad guys supported by Eritrea and al-Qaeda.
The War on Terror since 2006 has drawn the international community to become more militarily
involved in Somalia. From 2007 onwards, an African Union Mission (AMISOM) funded entirely by the EU
has been growing; its mandate changed from purely defensive/training to offensive action in 2010.
AMISOM helped the government secure Mogadishu (in 2011) and major towns (between 2012 and
2014), but since then the military confrontation has developed into a stalemate. An exit strategy is
planned for AMISOM, contingent on the training of the Somali National Army. This task has been taken
on by a host of actors, from private South African companies paid for by the UAE, to US and UK military
contractors and a small EU training force; but the largest group of trainers comes from Turkey.
176
177
178
Bradbury, M., 2010, p. 12.
See for example Maxwell & Majid, 2016, Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 20112012.
Harnisch, C., The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab. A report by the Critical
Threats project of the American Enterprise Institute, February 12th, 2010.
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International military involvement in Somalia was further prompted by the rise of piracy in the mid2000s. Three international naval missions, under NATO, EU and US command, were dispatched to the
region:
• EUNAVFOR was set up in December 2008.
• The UN-mandated CTF-151 under US command was established in January 2009.
• NATO s Ope atio O ea “hield, u de e ol i g ommand, was founded in March 2009.
Besides patrolling the seas, these naval missions have been involved in building prisons in Garowe and
Hargeisa, and other capacity-building work with local or national authorities. By 2018 the three naval
operations patrolling the coast had come to an end.
In general, civil-military cooperation has become a key component of international involvement, and the
security presence of the international community is larger than ever. Besides the multitude of military
trainers, the US, the UK, Kenyans and Ethiopians all have their own military bases in Somalia, from
where they pursue their counter-terrorism mandates. Foreign intelligence services are also very present,
and bands of dodgy-looking foreign military contractors can be frequently found driving in cars with
government plates. Unsurprisingly, the War on Terror matrix has produced a militarized form of
intervention, where the security of intervening states is the paramount objective. A secondary objective
remains building the security capacity of the host state for delegating tasks, such as surveillance and
operations.
Political support for the Somali Government has been recalibrated, away from human security towards
security based on national interests. Initial support to Sheikh Sharif s go e
e t was tepid. After the
failed e pe ie e of t i g to set up A dullahi Yusuf s TFG, the i te atio al o
u it was
discouraged. The Islamic nature of the new government – in 2009 Sheikh Sharif announced that Somali
law would be based on Sharia – scared some donors away, as ell as “heikh “ha if s past as leade of the
Islamic Courts Union. The virulence of the insurgency, which controlled almost the entire South and
much of Central Somalia, bode ill for future prospects of this government and donors hesitated to get
involved.
But Sheikh Sharif succeeded where his predecessors had failed. He achieved clan balance in his
government, resulting in more stability throughout South Central Somalia. Although his government was
riddled with political infighting and corruption like the previous and following ones, it also gained some
legitimacy by initiating some public services. Fo e a ple, u e t P eside t Fa ajo s p i e
ministership, from 2010 to 2011, inspired hope among the Somali public that good government was a
possibility179. So did the surprise election in 2012 of President Hassan Sheikh, a person with a
technocratic, NGO, background and not a warlord.
By 2012 the international community was satisfied that the Somali state-building project was on the
right track, and direct bilateral support to the Somali Federal Government increased. The role of the UN
has again increased dramatically, to the point that many Somalis see the federal structure of the current
Somali state as a UN creation. The World Bank and other international institutions have cautiously
returned to advise Somali authorities. Multilateral and bilateral donors, especially from Northern
Europe, fund large-scale relief and development programmes that are implemented by international
and local NGOs. Financially, the Somali government is almost entirely dependent on foreign aid, through
direct budget support (as its own revenue-generating capacity is still very low) and indirectly, by foreign
179
He notably introduced compulsory registration for soldiers, paid their salaries and instituted a few other civilian
reforms.
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funding of essential social services like health and education. Somalia still tops the list of failed states by
many counts.
Reflections about the War on Terror intervention
* “o alia as ide tified as a glo al te o ist th eat o the asis of a failed state assu ptio , p o a l
laced ith a lash-of-civilizatio s logi of Islam vs. West . The evidence was anecdotal at best:
Somalia simply had to harbour terrorists with evil intentions toward the West. But, although Western
special forces and drones only could find occasional targets from 2001 to 2007, their presence may
have contributed to the rise of Al Shabaab, exactly that what they had come to fight in the first place.
* Counter Terrorism Financing measures have harmed the Somali economy: by restrictions on the
hawala remittance system and by cutting off aid to areas controlled by Al Shabaab. Simultaneously,
through the presence of World Bank advisers and international auditors, donor flows are directed
more carefully. In the latest phase of international intervention, finance has become a more precisely
used tool.
* In 2005-2006, grass-roots mobilization of all Somalis in Mogadishu and the war-racked South-Central
region brought to power a government of sorts that immediately improved security and governance in
all areas under its control. This was also the opinion of international aid workers then present in the
country. This government was violently evicted from power by a Western-backed Ethiopian invasion.
The international community then sought to impose the government it had created in exile as the only
legitimate one. This resulted in constant conflict and the gradual implantation of Al Shabaab in
Somalia.
* There was already tension between the humanitarian agenda of aid agencies and the state-building
agenda of the UN and donors180. Now a third form of intervention has complicated the landscape:
military intervention. Security forces are not a priori interested by either government capacity building
or the humanitarian situation in a country, and their actions can harm both. How does this dynamic
play out in the field? Are Somalis aware of these three competing objectives? Besides working at crosspurposes, do these forms of intervention also work together to produce a common outcome?
* To answer the question above, we may wonder what the purpose is of humanitarian assistance in
Somalia today. As was apparent in 2007-08 and 2011-2012, the aid sector cannot respond adequately
to a humanitarian crisis. This is partially due to contradictory objectives of interveners, but also
because the entire international community is narrowly associated with one of the parties in conflict:
the state. Failing to meaningfully improve human security, the aid sector enacts, in Somali eyes, the
enforced modernization agenda imposed by the West. Gender-based violence and female-genital
mutilation, individual human rights and the rule of law – common themes of donor-driven
de elop e t p og a s – justify this view. The modern Somali state that interveners are seeking to
build is also part of the modernization agenda. Can the humanitarian intervention still be distinguished
from the political one?
180
O e ha d of the i te atio al o
u it
as st e gthe i g the apa it of the TFG se u it fo es hile the
other was trying to alleviate the hu a ita ia disaste those e fo es helped to pe pet ate : Menkhaus, K.,
2010, p. 334.
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1.8 Patterns of international involvement
The historic survey of international interventions in Somalia provides us with some interesting insights:
1. The Somali state has been a wholly international creation, from the 1950s onwards. As the state was
not a local project, Somali politicians did not even try to achieve independence from external
support. This would not make sense because, for them, the state has always been the primary
instrument to access external wealth, which in turn confers local power. In any case, the Somali
state has always been dependent upon external support.
2. For Somali politicians, the state is thus a resource that can be captured. Barre had captured and
then exhausted this resource as he fought against his rivals. The vestiges of the state—its property
of land and buildings, weapons, personnel, reserves, monopoly position regarding taxation, etc.—
were either destroyed or divided among many Somali factions in the civil war. Without a state to
fight about, Somali society stabilized into forms of local governance in the 1990s.
3. The state being an instrument to acquire wealth and power, it has been used in predatory fashion.
This was true internationally, where by 1990 Somalia was a rogue state with no allies. But also
do esti all . “o ali e pe ie es of the state ha e ee o e all egati e, f o “i ad Ba e s ti e to
today, when a checkpoint manned by government forces is more likely to result in extorsion, rape or
intimidation, than one manned by Al Shabaab or clan militia. This negative Somali perception of the
state is not addressed in international state building plans.
4. There is a clear correlation between levels of external financial support and civil strife in Somalia:
The more aid, the more war. This makes sense in the light of the first two points above, as both
hu a ita ia a d state- uildi g assista e is see as a resource to be captured.
5. The one time that a home-grown system of governance was established in most of Somalia, the
Islamic Courts Union, it was rapidly destroyed by external intervention. The international
acquiescence of the Ethiopian invasion was manifest. This may have given Somalis the impression
that the international community is not interested in peace and stability per se, but only on its own
terms, through a state it controls; and that control is thus the international objective.
6. The international community has sustained a constant effort to make Somalis accept the federal
government it backs, first created in Nairobi in 2004. Many Somalis still contest the UN-backed
federal state, but it appears that acceptance levels are gradually rising, as the Somali state, while
still quite powerless, is becoming increasingly stable. The insistence may be paying off, but Somalia
remains a failed state by all definitions.
7. The international community has always been coy about its involvement in conceiving, building and
sustaining the Somali state, making it seem like either a developmental necessity (in the 1950s), or
as a request by Somalis themselves (since 1992). Given the systematic dependence on external
support, the donors of the Somali state could claim ownership over it, but instead they maintain the
fiction of sovereignty and independence, which confuses many Somalis.
8. There is little historical evidence that the colonial period was a traumatic one in Somalia, and it
ould e ha d to a gue that the oots of “o alia s t ou les lie i the olo ial pe iod. I fa t, colonial
administrators made more efforts to understand and work within the Somali context than
interveners do today. British, Italian and other European colonials often offered positive
assess e ts of the “o ali a d his futu e p ospe ts, warned about imposing values, and seemed to
be the result of genuine efforts to understand Somalis. (This is contrary to the harsh racist
perspective of colonial domination generally assumed by public opinion worldwide, which
postcolonial literature also appears to take as standard). The colonial period was disruptive because
it as the fi st o ta t et ee “o alis a d the ode ized o ld, ut ot e ause of olo ial
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10.
11.
12.
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policies, which usually built on the local balance of power. Italians did not involve Somalis in their
half-hearted effort to create a fascist colonial state.
Until the 1990s, there was a degree of frankness within and among international organizations when
discussing the situation in Somalia; since the 2000s, international discourse about presence and
objectives in Somalia has become increasingly out of touch with reality. This is evident, for example,
when comparing UN documents about Somalia of the 1940s, 1990s and 2010s. Today, international
age ies assess e ts of the o te t a d the a tio s to e take the ei are often in contradiction
with those made by independent experts.
The disconnect between international intervention and the Somali ground truth has notably
increased with the Global War on Terror. Somalia was no threat to the international community, but
it has been treated as such since 2001. It can be argued that the War on Terror has spawned radical
Islam and extremism in Somalia, rather than preventing it. Despite – or because of – more than a
decade of warfare, Al Shabaab has become an intractable problem, in terms of security and political
control.
Intervention in Somalia has been justified mostly in humanitarian terms, both in policy documents
and towards domestic public opinion. However, humanitarian action has been increasingly
constrained and diverted for external state-building and counter-terrorism purposes. This has led
not only to failure of international assistance when Somalia faced major crises (1991-1993, 20072008 and 2011-2012), but also to the loss of impartiality and autonomy, as the aid sector is now
amalgamated to the overall Western agenda of forced modernization, and is incapable of accessing
populations in opposition-held areas.
Somalia has been a test case where many of the assumptions underlying international community
intervention have been broken. Both superpowers failed to make Somalia an ally despite
considerable investments. The UN intervention failed spectacularly to bring peace and allow
humanitarian aid delivery, despite its unique invocation of Chapter VII of the UN charter and the
massive means deployed. The powerful US was routed militarily in 1993. The NGO sector lost its
independence. Coordinated donor policies failed to make an impact on the ground. Despite being
one of the theatres of the War on Terror, 40% of the country is controlled by Al Shabaab, which has
progressively radicalized. And almost all state-building efforts by the international community have
gone to waste.
The refusal to take stock of the situation is astounding. From the points given above, it should be clear
that the less intervention in Somalia, the better. It seems Somalis can work out their own systems of
governance. Why is the international community still supporting an externally defined state-building
effort despite its consistent failure?
Robert Kluijver / International Intervention and State-Building in Somalia / Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po 2016-2018