Military Cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council

"Wschodnioznawstwo 2014", 2014

In the past few decades the Middle East has been one of the most militarized regions in the world. The reasons of this high level of militarization varied depending on the time period and particular country. During the Cold War many of the region’s countries played a role of the client states of the United States or the Soviet Union and took part in the proxy wars waged by the two sides of this conflict1. This has made them a major recipients of the American and Soviet military assistance as well as significant buyers of their weapons2. The Middle Eastern arms race was an offshoot of the great Cold War arms race between the East and the West, but it had also its own conditions and specificity. The states of the region strengthen their military potential and capabilities not only to get a stronger position in the Cold War rivalry, but also to realize their own regional goals and ambitions, to settle some old grudges with their neighbours or to solve some internal problems.

Military and security cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is of continuing importance for the United States, given the region's pivotal location in the Middle East and proximity to Iran. But recent developments in the defense posture of the United States, together with the U.S. responses to the Arab Spring, and the lingering after-effects of the Iraq conflict, have caused local leaders to question the nature and durability of this cooperation. This monograph examines recent developments in the political and economic dynamics in GCC countries and their neighbors, and the potential implications for U.S. security interests in the region.

AGSIW Issue Paper, 2020

The Gulf region has long been considered a “Western lake” – formally British with the colonial presence of the United Kingdom until the early 1970s, and less formally American given the continued military footprint of the United States, starting with the Naval Support Activity Bahrain. But lately the international relations of the Gulf countries increasingly have been characterized by a diversification of partnerships, including in a field that has historically been deemed the preserve of the United States and European allies: arms trade, and defense and security cooperation. What is the impetus for these new trends; what currents do they point to inside and outside the region; and are these dynamics likely to lead to a deep reshaping of Gulf security, with its center of gravity shifting away from traditional friends and guardians? Giving an overview of evolving military cooperation and arms transfers between three Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and emerging outside powers, this paper evaluates the relative weight of these new partnerships. Additionally, it argues that the dynamics of these new partnerships point to changing underlying power strategies of the Gulf states. Traditional powers involved in the region should take this multipolarization of Gulf security into account to build new cooperation schemes.

Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether the Arab League’s Defence Pact or the Middle East Command, ideas for collective security in the region all failed to move beyond the state of declarations. Most of the time, Arab states were either at open war or in cold peace. Since the Arab Spring has toppled not only regimes but also brought insecurity, new momentum has come into regional security. From joint exercises to the announcement of first an Arab and more recently an Islamic military alliance, states begin to move further into cooperation. As this Letort Paper shows, several obstacles will have to be overcome before collective security in the Middle East and North Africa can become a reality.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is an active organization in the Arabian Peninsula also in the Persian Gulf which seeks cooperation with the member states. The two examples of Bahrain and Yemen are evaluated in the framework which was suggested by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, " Regional Security Complex Theory ". In this theory, the regional complexes are seen in the lens of securitization which can be an explanation in order to understand what happens in the Persian Gulf, what is the GCC's and Iran's motivations in these cases and what was the importance of these cases as the GCC states intervened both of these two examples which are to be evaluated. The article first explains the framework that will be dealt with and explain the GCC's aims to achieve. Then the examples of Bahrain and Yemen would be explained in order to understand the theory and also the developments that happen in Persian Gulf.

Energy security and safe international shipping are of paramount importance to survival of the global economy. This paper shows that the GCC states, as well as their Western allies, are capable of taking significant measures to alleviate the perceived threat from Iran to their security and economic welfare. Iran does possess significant asymmetric warfare capabilities, against which GCC states can and should take effective measures by bringing their diplomacies closer, increasing regional economic and social cooperation, and creating real capabilities for extended deterrence. In this regard, relations with oil-consuming Western countries also play a vital role for strengthening joint defence capabilities, thus making the GCC region a safer and economically more viable place for investment.