Same-Sex Marriage
and the “No” Campaign
»
LOUISE R ICHARDSON-SELF
In September 2017, a non-compulsory postal
(above)
Skies over Sydney
on 17 September
2017, during the
postal survey period.
IMAGE: GILLIAN
COSGROVE
(below)
Fig. 1. Australian
Marriage Law
Postal Survey
IMAGE: GILLIAN
VANN, ID 719706406,
SHUTTERSTOCK.COM
survey seeking Australians’ opinion on marriage
equality was launched — a compromise after
the Government’s plan to hold a compulsory
plebiscite on the issue was voted down by the
Senate. There was only one question: Should
the law be changed to allow same-sex couples
to marry? (fig. 1). Same-sex marriage was first
explicitly prohibited under Australian law with
the Howard Government’s amendments to the
Marriage Act 1961 (cth) in 2004, and campaigners
have been working tirelessly to bolster public
support for reform ever since. Back then, reports
held that as few as 38% of Australians supported
same-sex marriage; by 2007, the number had
risen to 57%.1 By 2016, the number rose again
32 Humanities Australia
to 62%.2 Overall, 79.5% of the population
voluntarily voted in the postal survey, and 61.6%
of respondents voted “Yes”.
It is clear that public opinion on the
legitimacy of same-sex relationships and
marriage equality has shifted dramatically
over the last thirteen years. This is no small
feat. Bringing about genuine shifts in public
opinion requires more than intellectual adoption
of a particular point of view. To be lasting, it also
requires emotional and affective shifts. In short,
how we feel about an issue needs to change, not
only what we think about an issue. I call this
broader task an exercise in effecting changes
within the ‘dominant social imaginary.’ This
trend has been the focus of my research over the
past eight years. My book — Justifying SameSex Marriage: A Philosophical Investigation —
analyses and critiques a variety of justifications
offered in support of same-sex marriage (fig. 2).3
In many ways, changes within Australia’s
dominant social imaginary toward acceptance of
same-sex marriage has been a conservative shift.
Marriage equality advocates have long-traded
on the “sameness” of different-sex and samesex relationships in familial, intimate relations.
Longevity, commitment, monogamy, and
above all “love” have been the central themes in
representations of same-sex relationships. Whilst
conservative and largely apolitical in its message,
the tactic has a high degree of resonance for
the heterosexual community, who often value
deeply the ‘normative ideal of marriage.’ 4
However, what this postal survey revealed is
that while same-sex relationship recognition has
become normalised within the dominant social
imaginary, endorsement of same-sex marriage is
still precarious.5
What is interesting about the resounding
success of grass-roots activism to shape and
shift dominant public perceptions of samesex relationships, and increasingly same-sex
marriage, is the effect this has had on the
subsequent strategy undertaken by antiequality campaigners. In this context the survey
presented me with an opportunity to analyse
the arguments against same-sex marriage as
they crystallised in the “No” campaign. For
example, the Coalition for Marriage,6 perhaps
the most visible body behind the “No” campaign,
adopted three argumentative strategies: the
first, an argument regarding changes to sexeducation and parents’ rights; the second, a free
speech argument; and the third, an argument
concerning freedom of religion.7 Some antiequality activists do still make arguments
particular to marriage itself — for instance, they
argue that marriage is about recognising a union
which is procreative8 — but these arguments
are no longer the predominant arguments in
the debate. Activists also rarely tend to argue
for the “wrongness” of homosexuality itself.
Recently, “No” campaigners actively distanced
themselves from comments made by David
van Gend, a spokesman for the Coalition
for Marriage and president of the associated
Australian Marriage Forum, after he aired
his view that homosexuality is a ‘disordered
form of behaviour.’ 9 That the “No” campaign
hardly focused its arguments on the union of
marriage, and instead focused on the (alleged)
direct causal consequences of legal change,
marks a new trajectory in anti-queer advocacy.
Whilst the slippery-slope tactic has been a
staple of fear-mongering for some time, what
sets these arguments apart is that the feared-for
consequences do not relate to marriage itself.10
This article provides an analysis of this new
tactic. I will illustrate the ways in which the “No”
campaign tapped into six factors for change in
an attempt to hinder social equality and reverse
shifts in the dominant social imaginary. To some
extent these tactics were successful, as reflected
(left)
Fig. 2. Cover of
Louise RichardsonSelf, Justifying
Same-Sex Marriage:
A Philosophical
Investigation,
(London & New
York: Rowman
& Littlefield
International, 2015).
IMAGE: WITH
PERMISSION FROM
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD
INTERNATIONAL.
by a dip in support for same-sex marriage
during the campaign period.11 This matters
because arguments such as those produced by
the Coalition for Marriage nonetheless inhibit
the equal regard that the queer community are
owed, even if these arguments convince only a
minority of people.
CHANGING THE DOMINANT
SOCIAL IMAGINARY
As noted above, bringing about genuine
shifts in public opinion requires more than
intellectual adoption of a particular point of
view. To be lasting, it also requires emotional
and affective shifts. That is, one must effect
changes within the dominant social imaginary.
In previous research, I identified ‘five factors
for change;’ 12 I now believe that there are six.
First, encounters with resistant imaginaries —
i.e. with alternative ways of understanding the
worlds that we inhabit and the possibilities for
collectives of people within it — is required to
generate ‘epistemic friction.’ 13 This is the factor
of contradiction. Second, there must be desire
for change. Mere contradiction is not enough
to spark cultural revolution, since humans are
often surprisingly tolerant of inconsistencies
Humanities Australia 33
in belief sets and worldviews.14 The third factor
is time. As I have pointed out elsewhere, no
change is immediate, it is always gradual. But
we should also consider the likelihood of change
in relation to our “moment in time” — i.e. our
historical context, as well as our imagined
believed, we are hurtling toward a society of
‘gender-bending’ fluidity and confusion, as well
as sexual experimentation, thanks to the ‘secrecy’
of such programs, which increasingly operate
without recourse to parents’ wishes and without
their consent.
BRINGING ABOU T GENUINE SHIF TS IN PUBLIC OPINION REQUIRES MORE THAN
INTELLECT UAL ADOP TION OF A PARTICUL AR POINT OF VIEW. TO BE L A STING IT AL SO
REQUIRES E MOTIONAL AND AFFECTIVE SHIF TS.
future. The extent to which we can expect new
meanings to percolate into the dominant social
imaginary also depends on some resonance
between new meanings and the old, since new
meaning-generating stories and normative
practices must latch onto something that is
already endorsed in order to make it sensible.
Thus, resonance is the fourth factor. Fifth, there
must be an element of critique, for without
critique, there would be no challenge to the
dominant social imaginary. To this, we can add
“power” as the sixth factor. Some actors are
more capable of bringing about shifts in the
dominant social imaginary because they are
perceived as being particularly credible, and
hence have more social identity power than
others.15 With this, we can analyse the strategy
of the Coalition for Marriage in their campaign
against marriage equality.
‘SAYING “YES” TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE MEANS SAYING “NO” TO
PARENTS’ RIGHTS’
The first key argument that the Coalition for
Marriage put forward during the “No” campaign
is that marriage equality consequently means
that ‘radical’ sex education and gender theory
will be taught in schools, and that parents will
lose their right to decide what their children will
be taught. In a series of television advertisements
and pamphlets, and throughout their official
website, the Coalition for Marriage targeted
the Safe Schools and related programs, warning
of a slippery slope to a society where none of
the usual ‘safeguards’ for children apply, and
where parents are rendered powerless by the
Government and judiciary to stop the queer
‘agenda.’ If the Coalition for Marriage is to be
34 Humanities Australia
Key to making these arguments stick, has
been making “concerned parents,” and in
particular, concerned mothers, the face of the
argument. This has been achieved primarily
through airing televised advertisements. In one
advertisement, a mother states, ‘School told
my son he could wear a dress next year if he
felt like it,’ 16 while another claims, ‘Kids in Year
Seven are being asked to role play being in a
same-sex relationship.’ 17 Interspersed by blocks
of text, the audience is told that ‘In countries
with gay marriage, parents have lost their rights
to choose’ and that ‘We have a choice. You can
say no.’ 18 In a second advertisement, the same
women assert that ‘School programs have no
place teaching my son radical gender ideas; that
he might not be who he was born as,’ and ask,
‘How am I supposed to protect my kids in the
future from this stuff?’ 19 The on-screen text then
urges viewers to ‘Say no to these radical sex and
gender programs.’ 20 Whilst these advertisements
contained questionable claims (for instance,
schools denied claims that male students were
told that they could choose to wear a dress,
or that same-sex relationship “role play” was
occurring), I find it instructive to analyse how
these advertisements function when they are
taken to be factual, for it is the interplay between
(presumed) fact and affect that interests me here.
The purpose of these advertisements is to
imply that support for same-sex marriage is
incompatible with retaining parental rights.
They also aim to show that marriage equality
undermines the binary certainty of sex and
gender. This is the factor of contradiction at
work: if marriage equality is permitted, then
the natural gender order will be undermined
and parents will be powerless to stop it. The
implicit critique draws on a latent transphobia,
trading on the affective responses of fear,
anxiety, outrage, and (likely) disgust, to elicit a
risk-aversive response to the issue of marriage
equality — that is, to make uncertain voters
desire the comfort and certainty of retaining the
legal status quo. These advertisements are thus
able to resonate with members of the Australian
public by presenting the issue of marriage
equality as inextricably linked to sex education
and parents’ rights, issues with which many folk
are keenly concerned, triggering ‘people’s natural
sense of caution and suspicion.’ 21 The power
of these advertisements to elicit a change of
opinion seems to stem directly from the choice
to place young mothers at the centre of the
argument. Women are rarely seen to have much
cultural authority except in their role as mothers.
Simultaneously, the Coalition for Marriage are
trying to push back against the assumption that
all “No” voters are ‘angry and narrow-minded
bigots’ 22 — a mantle usually placed upon men.
The effect is that the concerns raised here
appear to be legitimate, although they are in fact
predicated on transphobia (i.e. fear, anxiety, or
even disgust toward the separating of “gender”
from “sex”) and a tenuous causal connection
between marriage equality and stable gender
identity. When it was presented prominently
within a narrow time frame, the subsequent
dip in support for marriage equality indicates
the strength of this tactic, and illustrates that the
perception of same-sex marriage as legitimate
within the dominant Australian social imaginary
is precarious at best.
‘SAYING “YES” TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
MEANS SAYING “NO” TO FREEDOM
OF SPEECH’
The second key argument that the Coalition for
Marriage put forward during the “No” campaign
is that marriage equality consequently means
less protection for free speech. This argument
comes hot on the heels of a Parliamentary
Inquiry into Freedom of Speech in Australia and
heated debate as to whether the restrictions
in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (cth) on
speech which offends, insults, humiliates or
intimidates a person on the basis of their race
should be valued above people’s ‘right to be
a bigot.’ 23 On the local level, the Tasmanian
Government has proposed changes to the AntiDiscrimination Act 1998 (Tas), which would see
religious groups exempt from s17(1). This section
provides that a person must not engage in any
conduct which offends, humiliates, intimidates,
insults or ridicules another person on the basis of
certain attributes, including sexual orientation.
The move for reform was instigated following a
complaint by transgender rights activist Martine
Delaney to the Anti-Discrimination Commission
over the distribution of a pastoral letter titled
Don’t Mess with Marriage (though this complaint
was eventually withdrawn after conciliation
failed). This case and testimony from others who
feel they are being forced to support same-sex
marriage by their employers have prompted
the assertion that the most far-reaching threat
of marriage equality ‘is to the freedom of
individuals to voice their opinion in this debate,
and to associate with others who do the same.’ 24
Once again, slippery-slope reasoning is
employed to instil an affective response and
shift people’s position on same-sex marriage.
Both fear and indignation play a role here. As
Damian Wyld — CEO of the Marriage Alliance,
whose handbook was listed as a resource on the
Coalition for Marriage website — points out,
Australians only have an implied right to free
political speech, and he warned:
While the debate about the redefinition
of marriage is occurring in Australia,
the ability of a person to voice an opinion
on the push to change the Marriage
Act 1961 should fall within “political
communication” and thus be protected
by law. But it is arguable that this
protection would disappear if the law
was changed because the debate — and
thus the “political communication” —
would cease.25
Thus, the Coalition for Marriage argued,
‘If gender is removed from the marriage
law, it will weaponise federal and state antidiscrimination laws.’ 26 They warned that this
has already happened overseas, arguing that
‘People have been kicked out of university
courses, fired, denied business or employment,
or forced to resign for saying what they really
think.’ 27 Ultimately, “Yes” campaigners were
positioned as ‘bullies’ who ‘intimidate people
Humanities Australia 35
into silence,’ who want to override the rights of
“No” campaigners to express their right to free
speech, while demanding that those who oppose
same-sex marriage should be forced to offer their
business services to those who do, or participate
in pride events.
This is a shrewd argument to advance within
Australia’s current political climate. Again, this
argument aims to elicit a desire to maintain the
status quo on marriage, but in an interesting
way. Many Australians are dissatisfied with the
scope of what constitutes racist hate speech
under federal law. By highlighting the Delaney
case, brought in a state with similar laws applying
to homophobic speech, the “No” campaign can
capitalise on current dissatisfaction with the law
and standards of political correctness. Because
freedom of speech debates have played such
a prominent role in recent public discourse,
there is a high degree of resonance, and hence
higher likelihood of changing public opinion if
people can see a direct link between marriage
equality and freedom of speech. The campaign
was able to piggy-back off the critiques which
have already been levelled at the Australian
Government for failing to adequately protect
freedom of speech. This allowed campaigners
to assert that they bear no ill-will towards the
queer community, and assert that they were
campaigning merely because they ‘don’t trust
what a “Yes” vote will mean’ for the future.28
More strongly, they may assert that ‘If we change
marriage, we change what we are free to say.’ 29
What the “No” campaign is trying to capitalise
on, is the idea that a society which permits
same-sex marriage cannot co-exist with a society
that protects free speech (the contradiction
component). Time also plays a role here, not only
in the sense of duration — since appeals to some
uncertain, risky future are employed as a scaretactic — but in the sense of timeliness. Ten years
ago, the free speech argument against samesex marriage simply would not have as much
political resonance as it does today. Finally, the
role of power in this argument is also interesting:
“No” campaigners position themselves as
underdogs who need to fight back against the
‘elite’ — the powerful triad of parliamentarians,
media conglomerates, and corporations. This
allows campaigners to feel as though they are
fighting for their own empowerment and against
36 Humanities Australia
a Government that ignores their “rights”, whilst
simultaneously having access to many cultural
resources to pursue this aim.
‘SAYING “YES” TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE MEANS SAYING “NO” TO
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM’
Of all the arguments put forward by the
Coalition for Marriage, the argument for
religious freedom most clearly betrays a veiled
fear — that parishes, schools, businesses, and
individuals will be reproached if they steadfastly
retain and express their belief that queers
ought not to be seen as equivalent to straights.
However, opposing marriage equality on grounds
of religious freedom does not, to their mind,
mean “No” voters are ‘bad people,’ ‘haters,’ or
‘bigots.’ 30 The issue is accordingly recast as a fight
to prevent an intolerable future, one in which
their rights and freedoms are trampled, which
certainly cannot be permitted. Apparently,
The concerns about the freedom of
religion extend far beyond whether an
individual minister of religion or celebrant
is required to solemnise a same-sex
wedding. It has to do with what faith
leaders will be able to preach, what schools
and parents will be able to teach, and
how every day Australians will be able to
conduct their businesses in accordance
with their beliefs.31
The Coalition for Marriage were also concerned
as to whether faith-based charities will retain
their tax-exempt status, and whether religious
organisations will be permitted to hire people
who support their ethos, as they have done in
the past.
Again, in this argument, the Coalition for
Marriage tries to present religious observers as
the threatened underdogs. They suggest that
the Government ‘has not made it clear what
protections for freedom of religion, if any,
will be included in any legislation to change
the Marriage Act,’ 32 whilst warning that any
protections that are received may prove to be
ultimately futile. They point to Opposition
Leader Bill Shorten’s commitment to ‘repealing
protections for religious freedom if they were
contained in legislation to change the Marriage
MARRIAGE EQUALITY:
(far left)
BECOMING ‘NORMAL’
Act’ 33 as evidence to support The Australian
Editor-at-Large Paul Kelly’s comment that
‘there would eventually be no “halfway house”
permitted when it comes to acceptance of
same-sex marriage.’ 34 The freedom of religion
argument is presented as a zero-sum game:
either we protect religious groups, or we permit
same-sex marriage and ‘give a free pass to
the government to make legislation without
important protections.’ 35 The implicit critique
is that we can have one or the other, but we
cannot have both (contradiction), and we should
privilege freedom of religion. The aim is to
achieve resonance with “soft” religious voters
who are intending to vote “Yes.” If the value
of freedom of religion resonates with them,
and they see this value as more desirable and
simultaneously contradictory with marriage
equality, they should be driven to vote “No,”
instead. The intention with this argument is to
capitalise on people’s conservative tendencies,
assuring them that it really is okay to say “No,”
all while instilling fear that they will lose certain
forms of control (or power) over their own lives
if “anti-discrimination” is to trump “freedom
of religion”.
Fig. 3. Australian
and Rainbow flags
The Coalition for Marriage utilised some
shrewd tactics to garner support for their
cause. They provided new meaning-generating
stories, charged with affect, that attach to the
issue of marriage equality. The affective charge
was strengthened by the fact that changes to
the norms of one institution (marriage) do
seem — indirectly, at least — to pave the way
for further normative shifts around gender, sex,
and sexuality which some may not be ready for.
By presenting threats to children and parents’
rights, free speech, and religious freedom as
direct causal consequences of same-sex marriage,
voters were led to believe that changes to the
status quo would bring about an intolerable
dystopian future. This elicits fear and resistance
to change — and it is by playing up to these fears
that the Coalition for Marriage managed some
success in their campaign.
The Coalition for Marriage were keenly
aware that ‘people need motivation more
than information to vote;’ consequently,
neighbourhood campaign training material
encourages ‘Brief dialogue and not a lengthy
debate.’ 36 Minimising their arguments against
same-sex marriage down to a few anxietyinducing sound bites, engaging ‘people’s
natural sense of caution and suspicion,’ is a
clever strategy to elicit their preferred response
in voters.37 By appealing to contemporary
political concerns in Australia, campaigners were
able to tap into voters’ sense of fear, disgust, and
even indignation.
IMAGE: NITO,
ID 756241684,
SHUTTERSTOCK.COM
(left)
Fig. 4. Louise
Richardson-Self
accepts the 2016
Max Crawford
Medal at the
Fellows’ Dinner,
Melbourne
IMAGE: MICHELLE
McFARLANE
Humanities Australia 37
But, of course, the success of this tactic
ultimately rested with how plausible the causal
connections drawn by the “No” campaign were
perceived to be — and we know that the majority
of Australians were not convinced. This strategy
also required voters to share implicit reservation
about the content of sex education, ideals
about unfettered speech, and that they privilege
religious freedom over tolerance, which many
Australians did not. Insofar as there was low
resonance for many voters, the power of this
critique was largely minimised, and the Coalition
for Marriage only achieved a modicum of success
in minimising the “Yes” vote. Nonetheless, even
this modicum of success goes to show that for
many Australians their support of marriage
equality is not unconditional, and their belief
in the equal status of LGBTI Australians is not
unreserved. ¶
LOUISE RICHARDSON-SELF is an
early-career researcher and
lecturer in Philosophy and Gender
Studies at the University of
Tasmania. She was the 2016
recipient of the Max Crawford
Medal (awarded jointly by the
Australian Academy of the
Humanities with Dr David McInnis), and in 2017, she
was a Residential Fellow of the Humility and
Conviction in Public Life project, hosted by the
University of Connecticut’s Humanities Institute.
Her book — Justifying Same-Sex Marriage: A
Philosophical Investigation — was published with
Rowman & Littlefield International in 2015. While
she retains a strong interest in studies of sexuality,
she has since turned her attention to another
prominent political issue: hate speech. Her recent
publications in Hypatia (2018) and Feminist
Philosophy Quarterly (forthcoming 2018) analyse
who can be a victim of hate speech, how hate
speech against women takes a distinctive shape, and
how analysis of dominant and resistant social
imaginings in Australia can highlight or obscure the
harms of hate speech.
38 Humanities Australia
1. Misha Schubert, ‘Public backs gay unions,
equality’, The Age, 21 June 2007 <http://www.
theage.com.au/news/national/public-backs-gayunions-equality/2007/06/20/1182019204491.
html> [Accessed 30 October 2017].
2. SBS Wires, ‘Same-Sex Marriage Support Drops:
Poll’, SBS, 25 September 2017 <http://www.
sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/09/25/samesex-marriage-support-drops-poll> [Accessed
4 November 2017].
3. Louise Richardson-Self, Justifying Same-Sex
Marriage: A Philosophical Investigation, (London
& New York: Rowman & Littlefield International,
2015), pp. 128–34.
4. Cheshire Calhoun, Feminism, the Family,
and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay
Displacement (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 130.
5. Richardson-Self, Justifying Same-Sex Marriage,
p. 13.
6. The Coalition for Marriage describes itself
as ‘a grassroots movement of individuals and
organisations supporting a common cause:
the preservation of the definition of marriage
and through it, the protection of the individual
rights and freedoms of all Australians’, and
as ‘a voice for the silent majority.’ Damian
Wyld, ‘Consequences: Changing the Law
on Marriage Affects Everyone’, Coalition
for Marriage & Marriage Alliance, 2017, p. 73
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
coalitionformarriage/pages/361/attachments/
original/1505297007/Handbook.pdf> [Accessed
30 October 2017].
7. Lyle Shelton, ‘3 Ways Gay Marriage Will
Impact Your Family’, Coalition for Marriage,
2017 <https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
coalitionformarriage/pages/405/attachments/
original/1505533020/> [Accessed 31 October
2017].
8. John Ozolins, ‘Why the Argument for SameSex Marriage is Not Sound’, ABC Religion and
Ethics, 4 September 2017 <http://www.abc.
net.au/religion/articles/2017/09/04/4728711.
htm> [Accessed 27 October 2017]; Wyld,
‘Consequences’, 8–11.
9. Michael Koziol, ‘Leading “no” campaign
spokesman says homosexuality “a disordered
form of behaviour”’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
26 October 2017 <http://www.smh.com.au/
federal-politics/political-news/leading-nocampaign-spokesman-says-homosexuality-adisordered-form-of-behaviour-20171026-gz8oxs.
html> [Accessed 30 October 2017].
10. Comparatively, consider the arguments put
forward in Bill Muehlenberg, ‘No’, Why vs
Why: Gay Marriage (Seaforth, N.S.W.: Pantera
Press, 2010), pp. 1–48 — each relates directly
to marriage or the wrongness of the queer
lifestyles.
11. David Crowe, ‘Newspoll: “Yes” vote losing
ground’, The Australian, 25 September 2017
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/samesex-yes-vote-losing-ground-innewspoll/news-story/1d21b1dbe415c8a678f39a311
f9d6d9c> [Accessed 30 October 2017].
12. Richardson-Self, Justifying Same-Sex Marriage,
pp. 130–33.
13. José Medina, ‘The Relevance of Credibility
Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic
Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and
the Social Imaginary’, Social Epistemology, 25
(2011), 15–35 (pp. 28–32).
14. Moira Gatens, ‘Paradoxes of Liberal Politics:
Contracts, Rights, and Consent,’ in Illusion of
Consent: Engaging with Carole Pateman, ed. by
D. O’Neill, M. Shanley and I. Young (University
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2008), pp. 31–48 (p. 43).
15. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and
the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), pp. 14–17.
16. S. York, ‘You Can Say No’, YouTube, 28
September 2017 <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=RrCOMTpQGw4> [Accessed
1 November 2017].
coalitionformarriage/pages/361/attachments/
original/1505535929/C4M_Field_-_NVC_
Training_Script.pdf?1505535929> [Accessed
31 October 2017].
22. Shelton, ‘Neighbourhood Visitation Campaign,’
p. 5.
23. George Brandis, in Emma Griffiths, ‘George
Brandis defends “right to be a bigot”
amid Government plan to amend Racial
Discrimination Act’, ABC News, 24 March 2014
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-24/
brandis-defends-right-to-be-a-bigot/5341552>
[Accessed 2 November 2017].
24. Wyld, ‘Consequences’, p. 31.
25. Wyld, ‘Consequences’, p. 26.
26. Shelton, ‘Marriage Will Impact Your Family’,
emphasis added.
27. Lyle Shelton, ‘Frequently Asked Questions,’
Coalition for Marriage, 2017, p. 2 <https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
coalitionformarriage/pages/361/attachments/
original/1505535836/C4M_Field_-_NVC_
Training_FAQs.pdf?1505535836> [Accessed
31 October 2017].
28. Shelton, ‘Neighbourhood Visitation Campaign’,
p. 4.
29. Shelton, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, p. 1.
30. Wyld, ‘Consequences’, p. 5.
17. York, ‘You Can Say No’.
31. Lyle Shelton, ‘Freedom of Religion’,
Coalition for Marriage, 2017 <https://www.
coalitionformarriage.com.au/freedom_of_
religion> [Accessed 31 October 2017].
18. York, ‘You Can Say No’.
32. Shelton, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, p. 3.
19. Lyle Shelton, ‘Our Ad — The Gender Fairy’,
Coalition for Marriage, 2017 <https://www.
coalitionformarriage.com.au/our_ad_gender_
fairy> [Accessed 31 October 2017].
33. Shelton, ‘Freedom of Religion’.
34. Wyld, ‘Consequences’, p. 23.
35. Shelton, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, p. 3.
20. Shelton, ‘The Gender Fairy’.
36. Shelton, ‘Neighbourhood Visitation Campaign’,
p. 3, original emphasis.
21. Lyle Shelton, ‘Neighbourhood Visitation
Campaign,’ Coalition for Marriage, 2017, p. 3
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
37. Shelton, ‘Neighbourhood Visitation Campaign,’
p. 3.
Humanities Australia 39