Transformation of Turkey's Regional Policies: The Case of The KRG Referendum Debacle

The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs ISSN: 0393-2729 (Print) 1751-9721 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspe20 Transformation of Turkey’s Regional Policies: The Case of The KRG Referendum Debacle Şaban Kardaş To cite this article: Şaban Kardaş (2018): Transformation of Turkey’s Regional Policies: The Case of The KRG Referendum Debacle, The International Spectator, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2018.1528004 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1528004 Published online: 05 Nov 2018. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rspe20 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1528004 Transformation of Turkey’s Regional Policies: The Case of The KRG Referendum Debacle Şaban Kardaş TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Turkey’s response to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s independence referendum took most observers by surprise. The prevailing assumption was that, despite its vocal objections, Turkey would eventually just accommodate the results of the referendum because years of engagement and a KRG-centred Iraq policy had created multi-faceted interdependencies, which would be hard to overturn. However, rhetoric dictated policy. In a counter-intuitive move, Turkey realigned its partnerships to chart a new policy which involved greater coordination with the central government of Iraq. This reaction is best understood through a study of contextual variables at regional, domestic and leadership levels which have led to major changes in Turkey’s regional policies. Turkey’s Middle East policy; KRG; Iraq; Turkmen; PKK The controversial independence referendum of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) has been a clear game changer in regional affairs. In retrospect, the course of events proved the critics right, as the referendum has unleashed forces that are quite contrary to KRG President Masoud Barzani’s promises and have put its gains of more than two decades in jeopardy. Although Barzani continues to defend his decision,1 it will be hard to recover the losses he has suffered since then. The calculations behind the highly risky referendum decision seem to have rested on some faulty premises regarding the dynamics of Iraq, the region, and international actors. Other miscalculations aside, Barzani failed in his assumptions regarding Turkey’s reaction. Taking the KRG’s indispensability for Ankara’s regional policies for granted, Barzani must have reckoned that, once he managed to create facts on the ground, his Turkish counterparts would accept the new reality as it would be hard for an already over-stretched Turkey to chart a new course in this troubled region. However, after Barzani lost the support of his crucial ally Turkey, whose policy of empowerment had in many ways paved the way for the independence referendum in the first place, the results were overturned in a short while. The dire situation in which Barzani has cornered the KRG owes a great deal to his failure to comprehend the changes at the regional, domestic and leadership levels that Turkey has been going through. CONTACT Şaban Kardaş sabankardas@gmail.com @sabankardas 1 “I Don’t Regret the Vote of 3 Million People”, Basnews, 27 January 2018. http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/ interviews/410277. © 2018 Istituto Affari Internazionali 2 Ş. KARDAŞ Why study Turkey’s reaction to the KRG referendum? Turkey’s policy towards the KRG’s referendum offers an interesting case with which to revisit some of the widely accepted arguments in the extant literature on the drivers of recent Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. By studying this case, I engage with the previous scholarship on three interrelated accounts. First, this case throws into question the prevailing line of argument about the durability of the Turkey-KRG relationship, which was forged over a decade through the creation of multiple interdependencies. Like Barzani himself, most analysts had assumed the relationship would endure for decades. In the words of one close observer of Kurdish affairs, It is difficult to envision a scenario that is both likely and able to derail the ties that have developed between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. There simply exist too many imperatives pushing them together: economics, realpolitik and geography. All the hallmarks are present for an enduring relationship, at least for the next 20 years.2 Other scholars claimed the relationship was due to last because Ankara could not afford to lose the only partnership it possessed, i.e., the one with the KRG, at a time in which it was increasingly isolated regionally and sensitive to energy security concerns. They also underscored the bonding effects generated by the inter-elite exchanges.3 Second, the reasons for Turkey’s drastic policy reversal are more complex than suggested by other treatments of Turkey’s policy towards the independence referendum. One seasoned observer of regional politics and Kurdish affairs reduces Turkey’s policy to “Erdogan’s knee-jerk, anti-KRG reaction”. He argues that “Erdogan largely took his imprudent actions for narrow political goals involving Turkish nationalist politics in the run-up to the next Turkish elections, scheduled in 2019”.4 Third, in terms of its broader implications, the recent scholarship on Turkey’s Middle East policies has been highly critical, suggesting Ankara has entered a major deadlock. Turkey is increasingly defined as an isolated actor which has separated from its Western allies and regional neighbours.5 As it is drawn into a “precious loneliness”, Turkey is arguably losing ground and the room for manoeuvre needed to react to the challenges of this new strategic setting.6 While some aspects of the foregoing three points may be accurate, they oversimplify the complex nature of Turkey’s reaction to the independence referendum and, more importantly, the recent trends in its regional policies. On the first point, I argue that Turkey’s reaction to the referendum ran indeed against a widely shared opinion among scholars and practitioners, who expected it to accommodate the facts on the ground. The change can hardly be seen as a surprise, however, given that the normalisation of Turkey’s ties with the KRG was very much bound to a specific strategic context, which had been drastically altered by the time of the referendum. On the second point, in order to explain the watershed in more depth, I am in favour of a multi-level analysis, as opposed to focusing on single factors, such as leadership or 2 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey”, 100. Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”, 151. Gunter, “Erdogan’s Backsliding”, 101. 5 Park, “Turkey’s Isolated Stance”. 6 Sazak and Kurc, From Zero Problems. 3 4 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 3 the domestic Kurdish issue. I thus explain the cumulative impact of the changes at the regional, domestic and leadership levels on Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour. On the third, I argue that Turkey’s response to the KRG referendum demonstrates the extent to which the prevailing arguments on Turkey’s Middle East policies have underplayed Turkey’s ability to adjust to the changing security environment, even by paying a heavy price or incurring major opportunity costs, if necessary. The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The following section studies Ankara’s empowerment policy which transformed the nature of the Turkey-KRG relationship and moved it in a more cooperative direction. Then, some recent developments that tested the relationship in the run up to the independence referendum are looked at, which emboldened the expectations about its durability. The subsequent sector analyses the main factors shaping Turkey’s reaction to the referendum at the structural, domestic and leadership levels, with a special emphasis on the latter. The final section seeks to assess the implications of structural, domestic and leadership variables for Turkish foreign policy in the region. At any rate, the effects of the new forces are hardly confined to the KRG’s independence referendum, for they reflect structural transformations in Ankara’s regional policies and are likely to shape its approach to similar crises in the future. Therefore, studying Turkey’s reaction to the KRG referendum will have implications beyond that particular case, especially considering the new pro-activism and military posturing asserted by Ankara in Iraq, Syria and beyond. Transformation of Turkey-KRG relations: main drivers of empowerment policy The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the KRG, starting in 2007-08, was one of the hallmark cases of the broader changes in its highly praised proactive Middle East policy. After a self-governing Kurdish entity started to take shape in Northern Iraq following the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey’s reaction was hostile for two decades in an effort to thwart it. By the time of the independence referendum, however, a policy of empowerment was solidly in place, in which Turkey-KRG relations emerged as one of the backbones of Ankara’s policies in the region. This unexpected sea change in Turkey’s KRG policy was a product of various forces at the regional, domestic and leadership levels, which deserve closer scrutiny. Regional and domestic drivers: transformation of the strategic culture At the regional level, Turkish foreign policy underwent substantive transformation. Turkey’s activism, which many analysts claim started during the second term of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), was a product of new principles underpinning regional policies. On the one hand, Turkey’s turn toward the Middle East was based on a liberal security culture, which prioritised a neo-functionalist integration paradigm. Turkey in effect was pursuing a region-building project, which was blended with notions of civilisational solidarity, in which it would ideally play a leadership role. As Ankara approached neighbourhood issues within the paradigm of collective security, desecuritisation of foreign relations became a critical component of its external conduct. Summarised in the once popular ‘zero problems with neighbours’ principle, 4 Ş. KARDAŞ Turkey sought to resolve problems with historic enemies so that it could reconnect with its hinterland. Likewise, Turkey relegated hard power to a secondary status in its dealing with the regional disputes, relying increasingly on soft power assets.7 On the other hand, the evolution of Turkey’s regional policy toward a benign orientation was undergirded by economic liberalism. As the Turkish economy underwent a structural transformation thanks to the post-1980 neoliberal reforms, the country adopted a new outward orientation. Turkey’s economic statecraft in the form of a search for markets, resources and capital started to produce decisive input for the making of foreign policy. The pacifying effect of economic rationalism was felt when it – remarkably – approached regional problems from a more pragmatic perspective. In terms of domestic context, a major sea-change took place during the AKP’s initial terms; this eventually had a revolutionary impact on Turkish foreign policy. On the one hand, since the ruling party’s power base was a broad coalition, bringing together its conservative base, liberals and Kurdish constituencies, it had a reformist agenda which, among others things, prioritised European integration.8 On the other hand, as part of the broader democratisation process, the government sought to address the Kurdish issue through political means. Complementing specific legal reforms aimed at expanding the rights of Kurdish-speaking citizens and resolving their identity-related demands, the government also undertook other initiatives, involving interactions with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) leadership to find a durable settlement to this problem.9 While democratisation enabled desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue at home, in return it also had an inside-out impact: the resulting desecuritisation in foreign policy gave way to a fresh approach to Kurdish geopolitics regionally. The trajectory of Turkey’s relationship with the KRG, as a result of the cumulative effect of these regional and domestic factors, was remarkable. In the immediate postCold War era, the instability throughout the region negatively affected Turkey’s national security. The PKK benefited from this regional insecurity and, through its exploitation of inter-state rivalries and state weakness, posed a formidable threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. As Ankara also approached the Kurdish actors’ struggle in Iraq through the same prism as the PKK’s terror campaign against Turkey, it opposed the formation, under international protection, of a quasi-state in northern Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. When this process was bolstered through the introduction of a federal system following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey’s fears of Kurdish separatism at home were aggravated as well. As part of the new regional policy, however, Turkey managed to transform its policy vis-à-vis the KRG fundamentally, forging multi-dimensional ties with it by the onset of the Arab Spring.10 Indeed, Turkey-Iraq relations in general and Turkey’s deepening economic engagement with the KRG evolved in line with the liberal paradigm which emphasizes the pacifying effect of economic interdependence on political disputes. Iraq emerged as a major trading partner following the US invasion, in some years occupying second place behind Germany. After Turkey’s normalisation with the regional government, a large share of Turkey’s economic ties with Iraq started to be 7 Aras and Karakaya-Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East”. Yavuz, Emergence of a New Turkey. 9 Yavuz and Özcan, “Turkish Democracy”. 10 Öğür et al, Kuzey Irak-Türkiye İlişkileri [Northern Iraq-Turkey Relations]. All traslations from Turkish by the author. 8 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 5 accounted for by the trade with the KRG. While Turkish capital and consumer goods were flooding into the region, Turkish construction firms undersigned numerous lucrative projects.11 Turkey also fostered a special energy partnership with the KRG which, though always controversial, eventually allowed the latter to export its oil through Turkey, independent of the central government’s control.12 In line with the logic of desecuritisation and policy of engagement, Turkey, more importantly, turned the KRG from an enemy into a friend. Turkey’s historical concern that deeper state-building in the KRG would arouse separatist nationalism among Turkey’s own Kurdish-speaking citizens, laying the foundations for territorial dismemberment, lost ground. To the extent that the KRG’s institutionalisation was consolidated under Turkish stewardship, it was expected to emerge as a security partner. More specifically, through normalisation, Turkey was hoping to gain an effective instrument to counter the PKK threat. Moreover, as Turkey later encountered rifts in its relations with the central government in Baghdad and other regional actors, caused by the deepening regional turmoil, the KRG was then framed as a readily-available regional ally. When the Arab Spring pitted Turkey against the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus axis, Turkey further consolidated the engagement with Erbil as a counterbalancing instrument. Inasmuch as its Iraq policy came to be centred on the KRG, Turkey also relied on it to address yet another ‘Kurdish challenge’ instigated by the Syrian crisis. When its policy of convincing Syrian Kurds to work with the mainstream opposition failed, Turkey capitalised on the collegial ties with Barzani, hoping that he would exert influence on his Syrian brethren. Thus, to counterbalance the monopolisation of Syrian Kurdish dynamics by the PKK’s extension, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), Turkey supported Barzani-affiliated Kurdish actors, who formed the Kurdish National Council of Syria (Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê, ENKS).13 Leadership level drivers: personal bonding The leaders and their agendas on both sides were another major driver of the normalisation. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as prime minister and then as president, and Masoud Barzani as the KRG president personally oversaw the relationship. So far, it has been emphasized how the interests of the ruling AKP transformed Turkey’s national security culture to pave the way for a new era with the Iraqi Kurds. Relations with the KRG, and particularly Barzani, were instrumentalised by Turkish leaders for their domestic political agendas. As they embarked on the ambitious project of solving the Kurdish issue, the Turkish leadership brought Barzani onto the Turkish political scene at critical junctures, especially electoral cycles, to mobilise the Kurdishspeaking electorate behind the AKP ticket.14 An interesting encounter took place between the leaders on both sides, which fostered a mutual dependence, as well as a certain degree of trust. While the AKP was the main agent of the normalisation agenda, on the KRG side, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê, KDP) played a similar leading role. 11 Bache-Fidan, “Turkish Business”. Morelli and Pischedda, “The Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership”. 13 Halhallı, “Kurdish Political Parties”. 14 Park, “Turkey, the US and KRG”. 12 6 Ş. KARDAŞ Just as the Turkish side instrumentalised ties with the KRG for its initiatives towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue or for electoral purposes, so the KDP leadership capitalised on this evolving partnership for their own domestic calculations. In the intricate internal politics of the KRG, the KDP, facing pressure from other Kurdish parties favouring the Tehran-Baghdad axis, chose to forge a close alliance with Ankara, which fit well with Turkey’s new vision. More importantly, the KDP confronted the PKK, as the two were engaged in an ideological, political and, eventually, military competition to lead the Kurdish cause regionally. To the extent that Turkey’s empowerment policy contributed to the KRG’s prosperity, it also consolidated the KDP, in general, and the Barzani family, in particular. Through the clientelistic relationship it entered into with Turkey, which facilitated its control over the distribution of rents locally, the KDP extracted enormous political resources vis-à-vis its rivals.15 The handling of the relationship at the leadership level had both positive and negative consequences for Turkey-KRG ties. On the positive side, the interpersonal bonding was a major factor in normalisation and the subsequent deepening of a highly securitised relationship. Since the leading actors on both sides were heavily invested in each other’s tenure, while bolstering bilateral relations, they were in fact investing in their own political survival. Barzani’s readiness to act in line with the AK Party’s domestic agenda exemplified this dynamic very well, as other Iraqi Kurdish parties favoured a different configuration of Turkish domestic politics. Especially after the resolution process started to experience difficulties and the Kurdish issue again started to dominate the political agenda before and after the highly contested 2015 parliamentary elections, the KDP’s rivals supported the People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), and openly expressed sympathy for the PKK. This interplay between individual and systemic levels helped the relationship withstand the challenges in difficult times. On the negative side, however, the mutual dependence at the individual level constituted a major liability. Since both parties went through various domestic crises, the challenges to their tenure or self-centred domestic calculations risked upsetting the entire relationship.16 As will be discussed below, the leadership-level dynamics took such a negative turn in the case of the independence referendum. Facing the challenges Deepening Turkey-KRG relations Turkey’s relations with the KRG did not follow a linear pattern, but the steady improvement in the multi-dimensional partnership eventually led many observers to expect Turkey to back Barzani’s independence referendum. Overall, Ankara had pursued a policy of empowerment of the KRG, whereby Erbil increasingly grew emboldened and self-confident vis-à-vis Baghdad. Relations with the KRG were a major item on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda in the last decade. Turkey’s alignment with the KRG was not particularly well received regionally and internationally. While Turkey had previously been urged to normalise its relations with the Iraqi Kurds, many regional and international players now raised concerns about the 15 16 Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”. The pros and cons of the personalised nature of Turkey-KRG relationship is addressed in Özpek, “Paradigm Shift”. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 7 speed, content and motivations of Ankara’s new KRG-centred Iraq policy. Turkey’s empowerment policy towards the KRG received heavy criticism, which coincided with a new phase in which its Middle East policies were questioned by both regional actors and Western powers, due to its stance on Syria, Iraq, Egypt and beyond.17 To better contextualise this line of criticism, it is worth recalling that Turkey had pursued a transformative, pro-democratisation agenda during the first phase of the Arab Spring, which partly reflected the liberal undertones of its regional policy. Now, Turkey’s engagement with non-state actors throughout the region reflected, deliberately or not, a sort of revisionist posture, which strengthened centrifugal forces in nation-states that were already fragile and facing a colossal threat. Turkey’s support for the popular uprising in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria were regarded as reflections of this new foreign policy approach. The new line of international thinking in light of the Arab Spring’s destabilising impacts presented the territorial integrity of Iraq as a more valuable objective than Kurdish aspirations, and led to charges that Ankara was “midwifing” the KRG’s independence to further its narrow interests.18 Interestingly, it was very common to hear those criticisms in both Washington and Tehran. It was not until the rise of the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June 2014 that Western opinion on the Kurdish aspirations became more favourable once again, creating new dynamics for the Turkey-KRG relationship as well, which eventually triggered a process that culminated in the independence referendum. Ill-fated Turkish-Iraqi relations The deepening of Ankara-Erbil ties was to some extent a by-product of the manner in which Turkey-Iraq relations unfolded. When the US-imposed power-sharing arrangement based on Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian markers started to crumble, a multitude of crises erupted between the central government and the KRG, on the one hand, and the Shiite and Sunni Arabs on the other. At the same time, Ankara encountered problems in its relations with Baghdad, especially after the second term of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, since the central government’s sectarian policies undermined national unity and put territorial integrity at risk. Despite numerous attempts to mend the rift, the parties failed to halt the deterioration in relations, which continued even after the formation of a new government led by Haider al-Abadi in the summer of 2014.19 Given the chronic problems between Baghdad and Ankara, Erbil emerged as a natural partner for Turkey. This new understanding, which started to take shape during the last years of the American occupation, continued well after the departure of American forces from Iraq. As the rest of the country was undergoing enormous instability, the KRG differentiated itself with its level of development and stability, thanks to a great extent to Ankara’s KRG-centred Iraq policy. Turkey served as the gateway for the KRG’s integration into global networks, while Turkish economic activism in the regional government’s area of jurisdiction contributed to the latter’s 17 Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy. Arango and Krauss, “Kurds’ Oil Deal”. 19 Duman, “Türkiye’nin Irak Politikası” [Turkey’s Policy towards Iraq]. 18 8 Ş. KARDAŞ development and accumulation of wealth. Practically, in many ways, the KRG was functioning as a de facto independent state, for it controlled the borders to Turkey, operated airports, and had a separate visa regime. Particularly, the Turkish decision to sign a bilateral agreement with Erbil that would allow for the export of oil produced in the KRG fields through its territory was a game changer in the Baghdad-Erbil balance. It was not until 2014 that this project became feasible with the completion of an additional pipeline to connect KRG oil to the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. Yet, the very prospect of earning revenues outside the central government’s control further emboldened Erbil vis-à-vis Baghdad, augmenting Barzani’s pro-independence aspirations. Following the completion of the pipeline project, which also coincided with the rise of ISIS in Iraq, Barzani’s rhetoric on independence unsurprisingly took an upward turn. He often referred to the ‘dysfunctional Iraqi political system’ to justify his drive, which was expected to resonate well with Turkish ideas of governance in Iraq. To the extent that chronic disputes became a norm defining Ankara–Baghdad relations, Barzani must have assumed that he would enjoy Turkey’s backing if Erbil were to break with Baghdad. The fight against ISIS The rapid spread of ISIS’ control over a large swathe of Iraqi territory after 2014 opened a new chapter for the region, Iraq, and the Kurds. Some major trends were put in motion in this new phase. First, the ISIS offensive reignited some of Iraq’s structural problems, which had been put on hold, including the long-delayed issues between Baghdad and Erbil. Second, the United States had to return to Iraq militarily as part of the global anti-ISIS coalition, which eventually affected regional power relations. Third, capitalising on the anti-ISIS momentum, Iran stepped in to fill the geopolitical void and expand its influence in Iraq and other Arab countries. Lastly, in the new cycle of violence, Kurdish geopolitics also found a permissive environment to assert Kurdish claims to a more receptive international audience. Against this background, the anti-ISIS fight had an overall positive impact on the Turkey-KRG relationship, providing new impetus for Ankara’s KRG-centred Iraq policy. Initially, the Kurdish leadership sought to exploit this new phase, with Barzani calling for an independence referendum immediately after the fall of Mosul in June 2014, followed by the rapid advance of ISIS towards Baghdad. When ISIS changed course by August, however, developments took a new turn as the KRG was engulfed in a fight for its own survival. The KRG official narrative and public opinion were laced with bitterness, as they complained that Turkey’s aid arrived rather late, when the fall of Erbil appeared imminent. However, this negative rhetoric was soon overtaken by political reality and pragmatism. Turkey later extended its military assistance to the KRG unilaterally and as part of the newly forming global anti-ISIS coalition, and the KRG leadership was soon seeking to work with Turkey again.20 A number of factors reflecting the mutually interdependent nature of the relationship induced cooperation between Ankara and Erbil in this new phase. For Erbil, dependence on Turkey for resources and protection played the key role. The newly opened pipeline allowing KRG oil sales to pass through Turkey turned into a major 20 Author’s interview with Fouad Hussein, Chief of Staff to the KRG Presidency, Ankara, June 2015. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 9 source of revenue, as the KRG continued to experience budget disputes with the central government at a time when financial troubles were mounting due to the huge costs incurred by fighting ISIS and hosting the internally displaced persons. Having captured the oilfields around Kirkuk during the withdrawal of the central government forces, the Kurds were able to tap into even larger reserves, hence larger potential revenues. However, the monetisation of this potential only became possible after Turkey allowed the exports to pass through the recently operationalised pipeline, in spite of Baghdad’s objections to the Ankara-Erbil deal on the grounds of political and legal uncertainties. Likewise, the outflow of international investors fearing the instability caused by ISIS bred enormous economic difficulties for the regional government, which were alleviated to a large extent by the persistence of Turkish investments and credit lines opened by Turkey. Especially, direct Turkish money transfers were said to have helped the cashstrapped KRG alleviate some of the social tensions created by its inability to pay salaries, until it reached a budget deal with Baghdad in 2015. At the same time, the provision of military assistance in the form of arms deliveries and training was another key asset that Ankara offered Erbil. For its part, Turkey sustained its KRG-centred policy as it failed to resolve its disputes with the central government. While reaching out to Baghdad, Ankara had concerns regarding the way Baghdad handled the anti-ISIS fight.21 Chiefly, Turkey objected to the growing involvement of Iran in Iraq’s security scene, both directly and through the predominantly Shiite militia groups it spearheaded, known as Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU - Hashd al Shaabi). Since PMUs, along with the Iraqi army, took part in the liberation of predominantly Sunni provinces, in some cases allegedly getting involved in atrocities against civilians, Turkey’s conventional sensitivities pertaining to the Sunni question came to the fore. At the same time, Turkey was seeking to counterbalance Iran, as there was a growing belief that Tehran was working to create a land corridor22 through the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq, and parts of the KRG controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), all the way to its proxies in Syria.23 In many ways, working through the KRG helped Ankara frame its objections to Baghdad and Tehran in more neutral terms, defying accusations of sectarianism. Considering that many Sunnis were also harboured in the KRG, Turkey appeared, in practical terms as well, to be advocating the interests of a loosely-defined Sunni-Kurd and Turkmen bloc. To the extent that the Turkish military presence in Iraq turned into a sensitive political issue, most spectacularly in the case of the Bashiqa base where training of predominantly Sunni forces was undertaken, Ankara used its coordination with Erbil as a justification. For instance, when the central government questioned the status of the Turkish military contingent in the region, Turkey referred to the KRG’s invitation to legitimise its presence. Again, in the run up to the decisive Mosul battle, Ankara managed to channel its military role through the KRG linkage.24 Overall, the new era in regional geopolitics brought about by the fight against ISIS bolstered the partnership between Turkey and the KRG. 21 Kardaş, Turkey Navigates Iraq. Ghaddar, Iran May be Using. “Davutoğlu’ndan ‘Irak’ta Mezhep Savaşı’ Uyarısı” [Davutoğlu Warns against ‘Sectarian War in Iraq’], BBC Turkish, 6 March 2015. 24 “Türkiye, ‘Musul Operasyonu’na Peşmerge ile Katılacak’” [Turkey will Take Part in Mosul Operation together with Peshmerga], Habertürk, 5 October 2016. 22 23 10 Ş. KARDAŞ The Turkmen question The turmoil emerging in the wake of ISIS’s swift advance turned the spotlight on the Turkmens, who have traditionally been one of the main elements of Turkey’s Iraq policy. Ankara endeavoured to protect the rights of its ethno-linguistic kin in the mayhem created first by the Gulf War and then deepened by the US invasion in 2003. Though recognised in the constitution, the Turkmens were not treated as an individual entity in the power-sharing arrangements, nor were they allocated a separate province or territorial designation. They were spread throughout the provinces administered by the central government and the KRG. Most disputed territories, whose status was to be decided through a referendum process, included historic Turkmen settlements, notably in the province of Kirkuk. The aggressive and expansionist policies of the Kurdish parties after the Gulf War, which accelerated after the 2003 war, created a negative-sum game between the Kurds and Turkmens. Moreover, differences among the Turkmens along sectarian lines prevented them from pursuing a unified agenda. While they have an overarching ethno-linguistic awareness, the Shiite Turkmens, aligned with Iraqi Shiite parties, were less willing than their Sunni brethren to act according to Turkey’s preferences. In any case, Turkey advocated a civic agenda, urging the Turkmens to seek their rights within a unified, pluralistic Iraq, and avoided pursuing a militarised approach, such as the formation of a separate militia.25 Having thwarted ISIS’ advance on the Kurds, in the later phases of the conflict, the KRG managed to expand its control over the disputed territories and this gave birth to a host of other problems. One was definitely the re-ignition of the Turkmen issue.26 Having suffered gravely from ISIS’ violent march across their settlements, the Turkmens were already questioning the merits of having foregone a robust military approach to defend their rights. The KRG’s apparent attempt to create a fait accompli over the disputed areas at the expense of the Turkmens strengthened the search for a military option. In response, the Shiite Turkmens rallied around the Hashd units to join the fight against ISIS. Towards the end of the anti-ISIS campaign, in addition to ArabKurdish tensions, militarised Kurdish-Turkmen tensions also came to the fore, as was later demonstrated in places like Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk. Although heightened tensions complicated Turkey’s balancing act between the Turkmens and the Kurds, Ankara managed to uphold its unique relations with the KRG. Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, a major reason for Ankara’s reaction to US plans was the question of the fate of the Turkmens, as American planning prioritised the Kurds. When Turkey later initiated normalisation with the KRG, it sustained the special relationship with Turkmens, while also curbing the Kurds’ ambitions to settle the problem of disputed areas on terms favourable to them. Indeed, Ankara prevented the referendum process as per article 140, by insisting that it could not be implemented with the demographics of Kirkuk altered by the Kurds. Even after the spread of ISIS in Iraq, Turkey endeavoured to find some accommodation in its dealing with the parties. Although the plight of the Turkmens started to rouse greater public interest in Turkish domestic politics and the new phase of militarised tensions put additional strains on the balancing act, in the final analysis, Ankara maintained its special ties with the KRG. 25 26 Nakip, “Powder Keg Iraq”. Duman, The Situation of Turkmens. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 11 Explaining Turkey’s opposition to the referendum The foregoing developments created an environment conducive to the expectation that Turkey would support the KRG’s independence bid. On his part, against this background of a relationship consolidated through many difficult tests,27 Masoud Barzani must have assumed that, despite its objections, when push came to shove, Turkey would stand behind his risky referendum decision. To some degree, his judgement appeared to be well founded. For one, had it not been for Turkey’s policy of empowerment, Barzani would hardly have been in a position even to attempt an independence referendum. Moreover, considering the multi-faceted interdependencies at regional, domestic and leadership levels, it was reasonable to expect that Turkey would find it difficult to forego all the sunk costs of a KRGcentred policy and undermine Barzani. For instance, given the volume and depth of Turkish investments in the KRG and the revenues generated by the oil trade, it was fair to speculate that Turkey would not risk instability, which could take a heavy toll economically, by letting Barzani lose this decisive battle. Finally, if Barzani failed, it would open the region up to further Iranian expansion at Turkey’s expense.28 Furthermore, one can also argue that initial reactions from Turkey after Barzani announced the timeline for the referendum in early 2017 were vague, bolstering his sense of indispensability.29 In February 2017, for instance, Barzani was received by Turkish leaders with a state ceremony, although it stirred a major reaction from nationalist circles. Statements by Turkish leaders categorically objecting to Barzani’s claims were uttered rather late in the crisis, only after President Erdoğan stepped in decisively a few weeks before the referendum.30 However, Turkish officials soon started issuing strongly worded statements and threats underscoring Turkey’s objections to the referendum and the determination not to recognise its outcome. Yet, since a gap between rhetoric and actual conduct had hardly been unusual throughout the whole Turkey-KRG relationship, many observers interpreted such criticism more as domestic posturing than articulation of actual policy. Even after Turkey initiated military exercises and threatened sanctions against the KRG, one Western diplomat speaking to the Financial Times argued, “I think there are reasons Turkey may support it [the referendum], even if, in public, Mr Erdogan has to cater to his base.”31 Barzani, like the Financial Times reporters, must have concluded that, once he managed to create facts on the ground, Erdoğan, with “limited room for manoeuvre”, would accept the new reality. Recalling to what extent Turkey, which had declared any Kurdish gains as red lines in 2003, eventually acquiesced in a federal Iraq in which Kurds enjoy a quasi-independent statehood, Barzani must have felt selfassured. 27 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey”, 99-100. Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”, 151. 29 Similarly, when Barzani announced his desire for an independence referendum for the first time in 2014, one Turkish official had a positive reaction: “Turkey Ready to Accept Kurdish State in Historic Shift”, Financial Times, 27 June 2014. 30 One analyst argues that Turkey’s “active diplomacy” came too late in the crisis to make any meaningful impact. The earlier indecisiveness was arguably because of President Erdoğan’s preference for behind the scenes contacts to dissuade Barzani (Dalay, Evolution of Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan’s Relations, 4). It must be noted, though, that when the KRG press sought to portray such initiatives as Turkey’s green light to the referendum “under certain conditions”, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stepped in to issue a rebuke (“MFA Spokesperson’s answer”, 29 July 2017, http://www.mfa. gov.tr/sc_-40_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusunun-ikby-basininda-yeralan-haberler-hk-sc.tr.mfa). 31 “Iraqi Kurdistan Referendum Poses Challenge for Turkey”, Financial Times, 21 September 2017. 28 12 Ş. KARDAŞ This time, however, rhetoric dictated policy. In a surprising move, Ankara not only took concrete steps to thwart the referendum and its repercussions, but did so in ways that heralded major shifts away from its KRG-centred Iraq policy. Increasingly Turkey abandoned the policy of empowerment, swinging the pendulum back to the central government in the Baghdad-Erbil equilibrium. Ironically, the dialogue established between Ankara and Baghdad in the context of the referendum provided the much needed context to repair bilateral ties. The mutual exchange of high level visits gained new momentum, with the parties taking steps towards deepening cooperation in energy, economics and security. Even the formation of joint mechanisms to fight the PKK’s presence inside Iraqi territory is now (2018) on the agenda. Turkey has expressed its willingness to play a larger role in the post-conflict reconstruction of the Iraqi state so as to strengthen the central government. Obviously, not all KRG actors were as overly optimistic as Masoud Barzani. For one, his nephew and prime minister of KRG, Nechirvan Barzani, advocated a more cautious course of action. This therefore begs the question whether the conditions outlined above did indeed justify Masoud Barzani’s, as well as many observers’, predictions about Turkey’s behaviour. One line of argument is that since the Turkish state would not accept Iraqi-Kurdish independence before resolving the Kurdish question at home, it was all too obvious to predict Turkey’s hostile reaction to the KRG referendum.32 Despite the merits of this argument, explaining Turkey’s behaviour with reference to the domestic Kurdish question alone runs the risk of essentialism. Had Turkey’s KRG policy been conditioned only by this dynamic, major policy reversals observed as part of the normalisation process would never have been undertaken. Although I argue that its policy reversal was hardly unexpected, explaining Turkey’s counter-intuitive reaction to the KRG requires us to look into the broader context in which regional, domestic and leadership level factors had transformed significantly, roughly after 2015. Just as the normalisation of Turkey’s ties with the KRG was very much bound to a specific strategic context, it was the drastically altered nature of that context that accounted for Ankara’s particular reaction to the referendum. Regional dynamics: deepening cycle of insecurity The substantially altered security environment brought about by the Arab uprisings forced Turkey to redesign its regional policies. Just as the normalisation of relations with the KRG was enabled by the broader shifts in its Middle East policies, the new regional geopolitics also shaped Ankara’s policy toward the referendum. The neighbourhood in the second phase of the Arab Spring has been characterised by a host of security issues, including the rise of non-state actors, militarisation of ethnic and sectarian identities, proliferation of weapons, cross-border movement of refugees, deepening of civil wars, greater use of proxy wars and confrontation among regional powers. While the permissive conditions a decade earlier had enabled a more liberal outlook and normalisation of relations with different neighbours, Turkey increasingly found itself engulfed in regional crises, resulting in a resecuritisation of its Middle East 32 I appreciate an anonymous reviewer’s comments to that effect. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 13 policy. Faced with the security externalities emanating from the conflicts on its borders, Turkey approached the Middle East in realist terms, so that threats to its territorial integrity brought national survival considerations back to the surface.33 The radically altered regional environment, in turn, forced a reconsideration of Turkey’s conduct with the KRG. Firstly, in the highly competitive security environment, a greater degree of strategic flexibility became a major component of statecraft. The urgency of responding to fast-moving situations and immediate threats in the strategic environment lessened the utility of durable alliances, necessitating ad hoc alignments. One critical development in this process was Turkey’s new understandings with Russia, Iran and Iraq, due to the problems it encountered with Western partners. Particularly, as Ankara found common ground with Tehran to stave off the immediate pressures in Iraq and Syria, the strategic value of the KRG as leverage in regional affairs was weakened. Secondly, as the deepening instability produced multiple security threats – partly a product of self-inflicted dynamics – Ankara started to see the issue of political transition in a fresh light. Over time, a more status quo-oriented approach overshadowed the pro-democratisation transformative agenda, whereby it increasingly focused on the nation state-based system. In the case of Iraq, Ankara has moved towards the normalisation and deepening of relations with the Abadi-led government in Baghdad. The new thinking led Turkey to tilt the balance away from Erbil toward Baghdad. This return to realism reflected a growing understanding that working with a stronger central government could cater to Turkey’s interests more than a dysfunctional KRG. On the one hand, partnership with Baghdad offered more potential economic benefits, given the central government’s hold on the country’s major sources of revenue. On the other hand, in terms of security, a new narrative in Ankara suggested that, despite a decade of engagement, the KRG had proven unable to uproot the PKK’s military bases there,34 allowing it to expand its presence into the areas cleared of ISIS, most notably Kirkuk. Likewise, there was a new understanding that an independent Kurdish state would be too weak to survive, creating an even deeper governance vacuum for the PKK to exploit. There was support for restoring the central government’s authority over the disputed territories and even the KRG territory as a strong deterrent against the threat posed by the PKK to Turkey and the Turkmens.35 Thirdly, as the ascendant Kurdish geopolitics took a revisionist turn in both Iraq and Syria, it sowed the seeds for further frictions in the region. While the steps taken by PKKPYD in Syria aggravated Turkey’s security concerns in terms of territorial dismemberment, Turkey also started to view the KRG’s gains in rather negative-sum terms.36 Hence, the (re)securitisation of Kurdish geopolitics in Turkey’s new regional outlook. More critically, with the military return of the United States to the region bolstering the Kurdish geopolitical agenda, Turkey’s sensitivity was heightened. In the post-Cold War era, supporters of different variants of Turkish nationalism converged on the 33 Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy”. Interestingly, the Turkish side shared such concerns with their American counterparts even during the initial phases of the Turkey-KRG rapprochement, facilitated by the Americans, as per a cable from the US Embassy in Ankara, dated 22 February 2010, published by wikileaks: https://ia801000.us.archive.org/23/items/243148-10ankara282/24314810ankara282.pdf 35 Özcan, The KRG’s Referendum. 36 Dalay, Evolution of Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan’s Relations, 5. 34 14 Ş. KARDAŞ assumption that the United States had plans to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. Such speculation had a powerful impact at critical moments when Turkey’s Iraq or Syria policies were in question, such as the 2003 Iraq war.37 During the AKP’s initial terms in power, when desecuritisation was underway, those narratives were put on the backburner. In the context of the unfolding US policy in Syria under the pretext of fighting ISIS, those narratives resurfaced such that the KRG model was being replicated by the West in Syria and, eventually, in Turkey.38 Although the United States officially objected to the KRG referendum, the cumulative impact of such narratives hardened Turkey’s already negative attitude toward the referendum. Domestic dynamics: resecuritisation at home At the domestic level, the new trends in Turkish politics had a decisive impact on Turkey’s regional policies, affecting its reaction to the KRG referendum. First, the unfolding cycle of insecurity in the external environment led to the resecuritisation of Turkey’s domestic context. With the country under direct terror attacks from both ISIS and PKK, Turkish society and politics became sensitive to national security issues. While new security measures were initiated, public concerns about national survival and territorial integrity started to dominate the political agenda, drastically transforming the way the Kurdish issue is handled domestically.39 Second, in a related development, a new power configuration and governing alliance emerged domestically. The resecuritisation of domestic politics was an important driver of the emerging power bloc between the AKP and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), which increasingly prioritised a nationalist platform formed around ethno-cultural definitions of Turkish identity.40 In many ways, 2015 was the decisive turning point. After its failure to secure a majority in the June 2015 elections, the AKP called for repeat elections in November, in which it regained a parliamentary majority. However, the political turmoil bred a contentious political atmosphere in which the peace process collapsed and the PKK reignited its terror campaign. As a result, the AKP started searching for new political allies in order to ensure its domestic survival. The failed coup attempt of July 2016 and the subsequent developments further cemented this electoral alliance, which eventually advocated a proactive stance in Iraq and Syria to defend national interests. The Turkish government’s critical attitude toward the independence referendum was inevitably affected by this resecuritisation at home and the evolution of the new governing bloc. As will be seen later, Barzani pressed ahead with the referendum decision without reaching a consensus with the Turkmens. Additionally, this development came against a background of other crises instigated by Barzani, such as raising the KRG flag in Kirkuk41 and including the disputed areas in the referendum, which had agitated core constituencies supporting the AKP-MHP bloc, and unleashed an ethno-nationalist 37 Kardaş, “Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis”. Zaman, “ABD Suriye’de” [US in Syria]. 39 Weiss, “From Constructive Engagement”. 40 The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli justified his support for the AKP with reference to “the acute survival problem with which the nation is confronted”. “Bahçeli: Türkiye Ağır Bir Beka Sorunu Yaşamaktadır” [Bahçeli: Turkey Goes through a Grave Survival Problem], Ulusal Kanal, 11 February 2018. 41 Saadoun, “Kurdish Flag Fans Controversy”. 38 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 15 mobilisation that has come to play a larger role in the making of Turkish foreign policy.42 Eventually, such domestic drivers also exerted enormous pressure on the decision-makers to thwart Barzani’s ambitious project. Leadership dynamics: personal bond broken Since the Turkey-KRG relationship evolved in a highly personalised manner, it has been sensitive to dynamics on both sides at the leadership level. Previously, normalisation with the KRG as part of the desecuritisation of domestic and foreign policies served the interests of the ruling AKP, as it sought to consolidate its power at home and embolden Turkey abroad. Facing enormous challenges to his authority, Masoud Barzani also had personal stakes in converging with the Turkish leadership’s agenda. As Iraq and the region faced difficult times, Barzani’s personal trajectory also underwent major changes. After his presidency came to an end in the summer of 2015, a KRG presidential crisis ensued.43 Skilfully thwarting the internal opposition’s moves to unseat him by holding new elections and changing the laws, Barzani continued to occupy his position. He partly capitalised on the coalition against ISIS to justify his de facto rule, yet, as the fight was coming to an end, fundamental internal tensions were waiting to surface. When Barzani pushed for the referendum at such a critical juncture, Turkish leaders were running on an altogether different political calendar, which increasingly desynchronized the respective policies. As much as Barzani was rushing to deliver independence through his unilateral approach, Turkish leaders had a stake in the continuation of the status quo or favoured a consensual process that would take other stakeholders’ views into account.44 The bond at the leadership level was broken for at least two inter-related reasons. First, there was a growing belief that Barzani was insisting on the referendum agenda for his own personal reasons which were at odds with the political realities of the region.45 The set of concentric crises starting with the Kirkuk flag dispute were viewed by many as his attempt to distract attention from the KRG’s acute problems, and perpetuate his tenure. In that respect, for instance, his framing of the referendum in terms of his childhood dreams only added to the fury of the Turkish leaders,46 who had started to view his ambitions as too costly to tolerate. Interestingly, the KRG presidency row after 2015 had already reminded the Turks that Barzani’s departure from power would pose major threats to the sustainability of ties.47 Other Kurdish parties, highly critical of Turkey because of their belief that Ankara failed to support them in the anti-ISIS fight, grew extremely anxious about the KDP’s close ties with the Turkish leadership. Furthermore, they accused Turkey of perpetuating the corrupt governance model set up by the Barzanis, and were advocating greater orientation of the KRG toward Tehran and accommodation with Baghdad. 42 There has been a flourishing coverage of the new nationalism in Turkish society, which is also supported by polling. See, for instance, Hoffman et al. 43 Ala’Aldeen, State-Building in a Fragmented Kurdistan. 44 Üstün and Dudden, Turkey-KRG Relationship. 45 Yeşiltaş, “Stratejik Körlük” [Strategic Blindness]. 46 Both President Erdoğan and MHP leader Bahçeli took issue with Barzani’s statements: “Erdoğan’dan Barzani’ye Son Uyarı!” [Last Warning from Erdoğan to Barzani!], A Haber, 17 September 2017. 47 Dalay, “Regional Implications”. 16 Ş. KARDAŞ Aware of these risks, Ankara endeavoured to diversify its partners in the KRG. It tried to reach out to the PUK and Gorran movement, from which the criticism was mainly coming. Turkey activated a consular mission in Sulaimani, which is the stronghold of the PUK and Gorran, and accelerated dialogue with Islamist groups. More significantly, as divisions within the Barzani family started to resurface, Turkish leaders increasingly favoured Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, who advocated a different approach to the issue of the KRG’s independence. Second, as the Turkish leadership was confronting challenges domestically and overseeing the rise of a new domestic power constellation, Barzani’s rather selfcentric insistence on his personal agenda undermined the trust he enjoyed with his Turkish counterparts. After the resumption of the PKK’s terror campaign in 2015, Turkish politics were framed in terms of national security considerations. In the wake of the failed coup attempt of July 2016, survival concerns were further amplified. In addition to various military responses to the security challenges, the Turkish leadership increasingly focused on overhauling the political system. Complementing the expansion of the nationalist platform of the ruling coalition, attention shifted towards reconfiguring the Turkish political system from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. Having received the popular mandate for the necessary constitutional changes in the April 2017 referendum, the next major hurdle for the ruling AKP was to win the first presidential election slated for 2019. As they devised a strategy for an electoral cycle (which would include municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections),48 pursuit of a nationalistic agenda became integral to the AKP's platform. Thus, the independence referendum was completely out of sync with the Turkish leadership’s priorities, and to the extent that he insisted on it, Barzani undermined his rapport with Erdoğan. Erdoğan’s loss of trust was a major reason for Turkey’s opposition, even though the country risked losing the gains of a decade-long engagement with the KRG. Erdoğan is known for adopting counter-intuitive and at times risky positions and taking dramatic turns.49 In the referendum case, Erdoğan’s personal beliefs helped solidify Ankara’s opposition to the referendum. At a time when the complexities of the electoral process of which the alliance with the MHP was the key component required delicate handling, President Erdoğan developed an aversion to Barzani’s self-centred referendum project, which threatened to undermine his own calculations. He made this discomfort with Barzani public50 and eventually delivered on his words to undo the results of the referendum project. Conclusion Turkey’s objection to the KRG’s referendum bid had a decisive impact on the unfolding of events. Although Masoud Barzani managed to hold the referendum despite opposition from regional and international actors, the results were stillborn. The intergovernmental 48 Though originally slated for 2019, early presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2018. Özdamar, “Leadership Analysis”. 50 He said: “Honestly, we did not expect Barzani to commit such a mistake. It seems we were mistaken. At a time when our relations were at their best historically, this decision, which was undertaken without prior consultation and meeting with us, is a betrayal to our country.” “Erdoğan: Açıkçası Son Ana Kadar Barzani’nin Böyle Yanlışa Düşeceğine İhtimal Vermiyorduk, Yanılmışız” [Erdoğan: Honestly, We did not Expect Barzani to make such a Mistake, We were Mistaken], Milli Gazete, 26 September 2017. 49 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 17 mechanism established by Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran unleashed initiatives that forced Barzani to revoke the referendum’s outcome.51 Having alienated his main regional ally in Ankara, he could not withstand the countermoves of the Iraqi central government, which drastically erased the facts he was hoping to create on the ground. Not only did the KRG lose its de facto control over the disputed territories with the advance of the Iraqi army into Kirkuk, but the Kurdish gains accrued over two decades were rapidly eroded. As the Iraqi central government reasserted its authority over budgetary issues, state employees, borders and airports under KRG jurisdiction, Ankara acquiesced in Baghdad’s initiatives. In addition to its drastic impact on Iraq’s internal dynamics, this development is likely to affect regional affairs and alignment patterns. In particular, the referendum has altered the parameters of Kurdish geopolitics in the Middle East. With the windows of opportunity created by the global coalition against ISIS, the Kurds appeared to have ridden the wave of the future. Exploiting that momentum regionally and internationally, the KRG leadership further consolidated their gains, which had been accruing since at least 1991. While the referendum decision was meant to crown this process with independence, it had the opposite effect. Today, the Iraqi Kurds are rapidly losing ground vis-à-vis Baghdad, as well as regionally and internationally. As a result of the cumulative impact of the changes at the regional, domestic and leadership levels, Turkey’s reaction to the referendum ran against conventional wisdom, which expected it to accommodate the facts on the ground. Turkey made hard tradeoffs and even risked losing a major ally, opening the way for Iran’s further penetration of the region and jeopardising years of economic investments. Nevertheless, with hindsight, Turkey’s risky move appears to have paid off. The most important strategic dividend from this high-risk counter-intuitive action is Turkey’s belief that it has built yet another defence line to thwart revisionism in the region. To the extent that the gains of the PKK/PYD in northern Syria and Iraq resecuritised Kurdish separatism in Ankara’s regional security outlook, it also marred the way Turkey approached the KRG’s standing regionally. Despite a decade of investment in a KRG-centred policy, Turkey is now less concerned about Erbil losing ground vis-à-vis Baghdad because upholding the state order is a higher priority. As such, this case offers important indications about Turkey’s future in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, the strategic factors behind Turkey’s reaction to the independence referendum represent the new normal in its Middle East policies and are likely to shape its reactions to other regional crises. After toying with the idealist project of regional transformation, Turkey has reverted to a realist reading of its strategic environment, and is gravely concerned about how the fragmentation of the regional order has threatened nation states. It has now refocused on the re-empowerment of the nationstate model and prioritizes political order over centrifugal forces. At the same time, as the prevailing concerns for national survival and fear of territorial dismemberment have risen to be the main markers in the Turkish domestic context, there is broad concern for the pursuit of a proactive foreign policy. The new security doctrine increasingly claims a right to preventive use of coercive assets, forward deployment if necessary and the use of force beyond borders. Turkish assertiveness in 51 For a brief evaluation of the referendum process, its broader context, and its aftermath, by members of an international group of observers, see Park et al., “On the Independence Referendum”. 18 Ş. KARDAŞ the last two years, moreover, relies on rebalancing its partnerships to stabilise the region and check revisionist actors. Turkey believes its traditional transatlantic partners have fallen short in extending their support, for they have not viewed the regional setting through the same prism as Turkey. As it saw the unfolding of separatist Kurdish geopolitics as an existential threat that needed to be thwarted at any cost, Turkey has perforce reached a new accommodation with its arch rivals Russia and Iran. Even though these realignments have been driven by ad hoc issues, they increasingly seem to have become durable feature of Turkey’s regional policies, while its treaty-bound allies have proven to be of limited help. Lastly, in terms of leadership level dynamics, this case reveals how Turkish leaders are flexible enough to reshuffle the cards by taking high-risk decisions when a previous policy is thought likely to create challenges to their own agenda. In this case, the Turkish leadership exhibited a capacity for strategic initiative to devise policy responses to the regional crises, and were able to impact the strategic environment in a favourable direction. 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