Dori

Organon F 31(3), 2024

In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view. For ex-ample, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, Strawson’s physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge’s idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel’s remarks on dual-aspect theory. I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyze how these positions address the mind-body problem. Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mind-body problem itself remains neutral toward these positions. Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, atten-tion should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem.

FBIM Transactions, 2014

Blangko SURAT KETERANGAN AHLI WARIS

One Scripture or Many

2024

Sergio Lubello, «Il dovere costituzionale di farsi capire»: scuola, lingua, cittadinanza lezione per il polo di Salerno I Lincei per la scuola: Polo di Salerno Giornata interdisciplinare L'Etica nella ricerca e nella didattica Mercoledì 24 gennaio 2024 – ore 15:30 - 19:30