Vittori

Contemporary Italian Politics ISSN: 2324-8823 (Print) 2324-8831 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rita20 Podemos and the Five-star Movement: populist, nationalist or what? Davide Vittori To cite this article: Davide Vittori (2017): Podemos and the Five-star Movement: populist, nationalist or what?, Contemporary Italian Politics, DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2017.1339935 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1339935 Published online: 20 Jun 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rita20 Download by: [The UC San Diego Library] Date: 25 June 2017, At: 07:05 CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1339935 ARTICLE Podemos and the Five-star Movement: populist, nationalist or what? Davide Vittori “Politics: History, Theory, Science” programme, LUISS University, Rome, Italy ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The resounding electoral successes of the Italian Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5S) and the Spanish Podemos (We can) in recent years, have attracted the attention of many political scientists. The two parties can be considered a new kind of anti-establishment party with values incompatible with those of the radical-right parties. From a normative standpoint, two main allegations have been made against the two parties: both have been considered ‘populist’ and, in some ways, ‘nationalist’. Still, the academic literature so far lacks a detailed analysis of the nature of their alleged populism and nationalism. In this article, I argue that both parties share a populist stance, while the label ‘sovereigntists’ rather than ‘nationalists’ is more appropriate in both cases. Populism; nationalism; Fivestar Movement; Podemos; party politics; comparative studies Introduction Despite the attention received by European radical-right parties in recent decades, the electoral breakthrough of the Italian Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5S) and the Spanish Podemos (We can) in recent years has shifted the focus of European public opinion(s) onto a different kind of anti-establishment party. The growing literature on these movements is based on single-case studies (Pucciarelli and Russo Spena 2014; Torreblanca 2015; Tronconi 2015), their ideologies (Biorcio and Natale 2013; de Quirós 2015; Ramón Rallo 2015; Santoro 2012), their electorate (Biorcio 2015; Fernández-Albertos 2015; Politikon 2014) and their leadership (Gil 2015; Greblo 2011). Single-case studies represent a useful tool for analysing the various aspects of their institutionalisation, especially as they are genuinely new parties; however, a comparative perspective – focused on two relevant thin ideologies, populism and nationalism – is helpful in order properly to categorise them. The aim of this article is twofold: on the one hand, it provides a qualitative operationalisation of two well-known concepts, populism and nationalism; on the other hand, it inquires into the nature of the populism and nationalism of Podemos and the M5S. I argue that both movements share a populist stance, while the label ‘sovereigntist’ rather than ‘nationalist’ is more appropriate in the two cases. The article proceeds as follows: the first two parts are devoted to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of populism and nationalism. The third part focuses on the methodology CONTACT Davide Vittori dvittori@luiss.it © 2017 The Founding Editors, Contemporary Italian Politics 2 D. VITTORI and the case-selection, while the forth part comprises the comparative qualitative analysis of the two parties. Concept analysis and minimal definitions: populism and nationalism Conceptualisation of nationalism and populism Concept analysis as described by Giovanni Sartori (2009) is the methodological tool used for this article. The methodology, thus, is inextricably linked with Sartori's basic scheme on the relation between terms and referents. According to Sartori, attributing to a term its referent requires a concept re-construction, since the meaning is the intermediation between the ‘world outside’. Thus, before operationalising populism and nationalism (the world outside), it is crucial to identify a suitable definition (the referent) for both concepts. The aim of a minimal definition is not merely to describe what a concept should be, but also to set the boundaries between the extensional properties and the non-observable or the least observable properties, which should be left aside when dealing with a minimal definition. Populism: a minimal definition Populism's theoretical conceptualisation is all but straightforward in the academic literature. Scholars with different backgrounds have tried to find a suitable definition for this ‘chameleonic’ (Taggart 2000) political phenomenon. Yet, the absence of agreement on a minimal definition complicates the analysis. In brief, five main schools of thought may be identified: populism as democratic illiberalism (Pappas 2016); populism as a political mobilisation tool (Di Tella 1965); populism as a leader-led movement (Roberts 2006; Weyland 2001); populism as a communicative/discursive tool (De la Torre 2010; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Laclau 2005; Canovan 1981), and populism as an ideology (among others, Mudde 2004; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). As argued elsewhere (Vittori 2013), the latter interpretation fits better the various manifestations of populism, which will here be considered to be: a thin-centred ideology whose core is represented by (a) anti-elite(s) and (b) anti-(political) status quo attitudes and (c) mobilisation of the community/people through instruments of direct participation in political decision-making. The definition comprises three necessary criteria that a party has to comply with in order to be labelled as ‘populist’: (a) anti-elitism, (b) the fight against the political status quo and (c) the direct participation of the ‘people’ in decision-making. Firstly, (a) populism comprises a fierce criticism of national and supranational elites: political, economic and also cultural elites are the targets of populist parties, in whose eyes the elites disregard the power of the few as compared to the powerlessness of ordinary people. Moreover, (b) the political discourse of a populist party has to hold out the prospect of a non-gradual transformation of the politique politicienne. Political corruption and political professionalism are two side of the same coin, i.e. the power acquired by political parties and their bureaucracies against ‘the people’. Thus, the political class as a whole has to be radically changed and de-professionalised. Finally, (c) populists CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 3 advocate an unmediated relationship between those who represent and those who are represented. This feature implies superseding the Burkean concept of representation, and, consequently, using the tools of direct democracy, such as national-level, popular referenda; internal referenda within the party, and widespread use of primary elections for the selection of candidates. Nationalism: minimal definition The notion of nationalism is as controversial as populism. According to Smith (1986, 1991) ethnosymbolism is the predecessor of nationalism: nationalism, thus, has to be traced back to the formation of collective cultural identities a long time before the creation of nations as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). Gellner (1983) focuses on the relationship between the modernisation processes that took place in Europe after the first industrial revolution, and the growth of nationalism. In a similar fashion Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) argue that nationalism created a new loyalty, inextricably linked with the sovereignty of states, through the invention of peculiar traditions. Although Gellner looks at states’ formation from a top-down perspective (from the elite to the people), while Hobsbawm stresses the necessity to focus also on the bottom-up perspective, both authors consider nationalism ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983, 1). As Finlayson (1998, 103) points out, ‘nationalism must be understood as an ideological legitimation strategy revolving around the tension of universal and particular’, since the political discourse that surrounds nationalism is actively involved in constructing a ‘pre-existing or projected national community’ (Finlayson 1998, 105). According to Freeden (1998, 750), the peculiarity of nationalism lies in its ‘thin-centred morphology, with a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ and in its ‘structural inability to offer complex range of argument’. For the purposes of this article, nationalism has to be analysed through the narrative (s) adopted by political actors. In doing so, the minimal definition must refer to the kind of nationalism displayed by contemporary parties, otherwise both the conceptualisation and the operationalisation will prove useless for the analysis. From Hobsbawm's perspective (1992), the ideology of nationalism presupposes an overlap between national units and the State. This minimal definition is much more telling when it refers to the formation of nation states and the construction of those ‘invented traditions’, which fostered the process of political unification of previously divided political units. While nationalism can be defined as a thin-centred ideology for which political and national units must coincide, other core features are also crucial to setting the boundaries of the concept: (1) the positive valorisation of the members of the community, (2) the homogeneity of a group – conceived politically and culturally as a nation – and (3) monopolisation of the right-to-decide by the people within the nation (thorough elected representatives or through direct forms of decision-making). This third feature is labelled here ‘sovereigntism’. 4 D. VITTORI Operationalisation of populism and nationalism Populism Populism comprises three core features: anti-elitism; anti-status quo attitudes, and mobilisation of the community through tools of direct participation. Anti-elitism might be considered a synonym of anti-establishment attitudes. Nonetheless, antielitism has a broader meaning than anti-establishment attitudes. Albeit populists would never consider themselves as part of the political establishment, when (and if) they overcome the process of institutionalisation, they become part of the (political) establishment. If populists have to possess by definition an anti-establishment ideology, then the logical consequence would be that once institutionalised, populist parties ceased to be populist. Anti-elitism refers specifically to arguments against ‘vested interests’ i.e. (1) the few (2) political, (3) economic and (4) cultural oligarchies that run the country against the will of ‘the people’. Regardless of their institutionalisation, from an ideological standpoint these parties can consistently criticize the ‘few’, who allegedly act against the ‘the people’, even when they gain momentum in government. The second feature refers to a criticism of the political status quo: this attitude is associated with the promise of radical change, broadly conceived, in terms of political representation and public policies. The former is related to (5) the need to change the system of representation, since all political parties (and the political class as a whole) are considered distant from the people. Secondly, this feature also implies a radical differentiation from other ‘forces of the status-quo’. The Manichean division (6) that the populist parties trace is between the other parties and themselves: in a populist ideology, the left-right scheme is considered outdated. Neither the old left-wing parties nor the old right-wing parties can claim to represent the people; only the non-mainstream party can. Finally, since all political parties are focussed on the search for power and not on the interests of the people, populists advocate (7) less professionalism in politics and the reduction of public and private funding of political parties. The third feature is connected to the participation of the ‘people’ in decision-making. With regard to the party organisation, this means involving the activists, members and supporters in decision-making through (8) ‘internal’ referenda on crucial issues and (9) open, semi-closed or closed primaries for the selection of candidates; in the public sphere, the aim of those parties is (10) to promote national-level referenda, and to promote or reform constitutional/legal provisions for popular-initiative laws. Nationalism The operationalisation of nationalism is based on a framework built from the three abovementioned features derived from the literature on this topic: the positive valorisation of the Nation; the homogeneity of a group, and the monopolisation of the right-todecide. The first feature is inextricably related with (A) the recognition of an ‘imagined’ glorious tradition. In this case, nationalists tend to encourage a redefinition of sensitive subjects (such as history) in line with a positive evaluation of the national past. Secondly, (B) symbols related to the grandeur of the nation are sacralised by nationalists. Thirdly, (C) the perception of socio-cultural threats coming from outside as CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 5 inimical or dangerous ‘Others’ (the National enemies) is crucial in the nationalist narrative. Transnational ideologies, albeit compatible in principle with nationalism, are frequently considered by nationalists as a source of de-legitimation and instability for the Nation. Equally dangerous for nationalists are the separatist forces, which are believed to threaten the integrity of the State. The second feature refers to the positive valorisation of (D) shared rituals, which are considered part of ‘who we are’. Conversely, multiculturalism and other forms of hybridisation of the culture are rejected. In order to preserve cultural sameness, nationalists encourage (E) the securitisation of borders, preserving the Nation from the ‘threat’ coming from political refugees and economic immigrants. Nationalists are inclined to prefer ius sanguinis citizenship law. Moreover, (F) nationalism rejects universalistic policy provisions: this means the prioritisation in all public policy fields of the (national) in-group with respect to the (non-national) out-group. Prioritising an in-group vis-à-vis an out-group may or may not have racial connotations (xenophobia): preference for the in-group may be derived, for example, from the intrinsic conviction that those who belong to a group need special treatment, regardless of any negative racial implications for those who are excluded. The third dimension refers to the close relationship between the national community and the right of this community to decide on its destiny, i.e. domestic sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers ‘to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority’ (Krasner 1999, 9). Rather than going into detail in describing what sovereignty means in the classical works (among other Locke, Hobbes and Bodin), we here analyse domestic sovereignty as the control that the national authority (should) exert within its borders. Since economic globalisation has constrained the exercise of State sovereignty in several ways (Sassen 1996), arguments against (G) the influence of international institutions (the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation) in affecting national policy-making are to be expected. Furthermore, (H) economic liberalism will be depicted negatively, due to the alleged unaccountability of multinationals and transnational corporations and the role of globalisation in expropriating the will of the people. Thirdly, mistrust of the influence of (I) military powers in the national political system is to be expected. Conversely, positive references are to be expected with regard to (J) the sovereignty of the people in the national arena and of the State in international fora. Referenda in this sense will be promoted by nationalists in order to restore the sovereignty of the nation and the people. Methodology and selection of the sources The method used in this article is qualitative content analysis (QCA). Hsieh and Shannon (2005, 1278) define content analysis as ‘a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding’. In particular, the article will be focused on what the two authors call a directed approach to content analysis, which is aimed at extending the theoretical framework on which the article is based. As Marying (2014, 39) argues, content analysis is not ‘a standardized instrument that always remains the same; it must be fitted to suit the 6 D. VITTORI particular object or material in question and constructed especially for the issue at hand’. The choice of sources and the coding procedure(s) are deliberately non-standardised, since qualitative content analysis must ‘place relations with the individual object above all else’ (Marying 2014, 41). Following Bryman (2004, 542), this approach ‘emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis [. . .] on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item is being analyzed’. The cases are selected following exploratory and descriptive criteria: the deductive criteria are linked with the theoretically-derived aspects of analysis (Mayring 2000). Both parties have been labelled as populist and sometimes as nationalist: if and in what ways these labels fit the parties’ ideologies, however, is often taken for granted. Thus, the two are supposed to be positive cases for both concepts. The QCA methodology is the most suitable for clarifying these issues. The unit of analysis for the coding is the period; being focused on a qualitative analysis we need a full sentence, which allows the reconstruction of the text's meaning. Following Titscher et al. (2000), every unit of analysis is coded and allocated to one of the ten categories, plus the ‘none’ category, in which all periods with no references to the two concepts are inserted. The ‘none’ criterion is left aside in Tables 1 and 2, since it is irrelevant for the results of the analysis. As the leadership – or the spokesman/woman of the movement – is crucial for conveying the political ideologies in any political party, the party leaders’ speeches (Pablo Iglesias and Beppe Grillo) given at the movements‘ most representative meetings are selected (see Appendix). These speeches – which are compared in order to look at the consistency of the thin ideologies – are usually aimed at re-affirming the ideologies of the movements before audiences of party members and/or sympathisers. In the Spanish case, Iglesias’ speech was held during one of Podemos’ first rallies, in Puerta de Sol in January 2015 (Speech A). In the Italian case, Grillo's speech dated back to the second V-Day in 2008 (Speech 1). The second set of sources consists of speeches with a different audience and different rules of conduct: both were speeches – one by Pablo Iglesias (Speech B) and one by Federico D'Incà, former M5S spokesman in the Chamber of Deputies – given during the confidence-vote sessions for two centre-left governments (Speech 2). The first was given during the unsuccessful attempt (on 2 March 2016) by the socialist leader Pedro Sánchez to form a coalition government with Ciudadanos (C's), the second during the first confidence-vote session for Renzi's government (22 February 2014). The third set of speeches were given by Iglesias (Speech C) and Grillo (Speech 3) after the electoral breakthroughs of their parties. In the first case, the meeting was organised, in Portugal in 2014, by the United Left group in the European Parliament; in the Italian case, Grillo gave his speech in 2013, during the last V-Day in Genova. Comparing the three pairs allows an in-depth analysis of the thin ideologies of the movements, since the audience, the political contexts and the formal rules vary significantly: evidence of nationalism or populism in different cases should strengthen the consistency of the findings. Secondly, three long interviews were selected for each leader. The reason for this choice is, again, that the audiences were different with respect to the audiences for the previous speeches. In the case of the interviews, the audiences are larger and more heterogeneous and the leaders may try to hide some ideological features, Table 1. Populism: operationalisation and results for Podemos and the Five-star Movement. Populism Feature Anti-Elitism Area Ideas Criteria 1 Negative references to: The oligarchy and vested interests Negative references to: The political class Negative references to: The economic elite Negative references to: The cultural elite References to: The changing the system of representation References to: Distance from the mainstream – neither left nor right References to: Less professionalism, less power of the lobbies and the reduction of public funding for political parties. Structuring decision-making by means of: Internal referenda on the main issues Structuring decision-making by means of: Primaries (open, semi-closed, closed) for the selection of candidates and leading officials within the movement/parties, Structuring decision-making by means of: Referenda and popular-initiative legislation in the national and supranational legislative arenas. 2 3 4 Anti-Status quo Ideas 5 6 7 Political Mobilisation Organisation/Decision-making 8 9 10 Podemos Five-star Movement Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Partially Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS n. 7 8 D. VITTORI Table 2. Nationalism: operationalisation and results for Podemos and the Five-star Movement. Nationalism Feature Positive valorisation of the Nation Area Ideas n. Criteria Podemos A Positive references to: Glorious past traditions (even in the redefinition of the imagined traditions) Positive references to: Symbols of the Nation (rituals). Negative references to: perceived enemies (ideological or physical; external or internal) of the Nation. References to: Shared national identity with its rituals and symbols (cultural sameness) and to the threats of hybridisation of the National culture (multiculturalism) Decision-making related to: Discouraging immigration/securitisation of borders/(re) introduction of ius sanguinis for citizenship, Decision-making related to: Welfare chauvinism. Negative references to: Supranational institutions as unelected or technocratic bodies, distant from the people's will. Negative references to: Supranational economic integration and globalisation. Negative references to: Military influence of global powers on national soil. Positive references to: Sovereignty of the people in the national arena and of the State with respect to the supranational fora. Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Partially Incorporated Not Incorporated Not Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Not Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated Incorporated B C Homogeneity of the Group Ideas/Decision-Making D E F National monopoly of decision-making (Domestic Sovereigntism) Ideas G H I J Five Stars Movement CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 9 emphasising those that are considered less divisive and more accommodating to the audiences’ tastes. The length of the interviews selected (more than 40 minutes each) is crucial in order to enable the interviewers to explore as many issues as possible: elaborate answers tend (in general) to be less prone to simplistic views, such as those a populist is typically obliged to express in the mainstream media (Mazzoleni 2003). Thirdly, the statutes, and the programmatic manifestos for the last legislative elections (2013 in Italy and 2015 in Spain) and the last European elections (2014), will be analysed. Statutes and manifestos are crucial channels for the parties not only because they highlight the parties’ organisations and programmes, but above all because they reveal the rationalisation of the political principles articulated by leaders and officials in their communications with the media. Due to the paucity of the M5S programme for the European Elections (it consisted of only 7 points) (Movimento 5 Stelle 2014), the analysis is extended to a book entitled Vinciamo noi (We will win) (Di Cori Modigliani 2014), aimed at explaining the programme in greater detail and published with a preface by Grillo and Gianroberto Casaleggio, the other leader of the M5S. A criterion is considered incorporated if more than two sources refer to it or when the ideas, the organisational structure or the decision-making procedures are put into practice by the movements; it is partially incorporated if there is only one mention in the sources; it is not incorporated if there are no mentions. Each feature is incorporated if at least two out of three or three out of four criteria are incorporated. If none of the criteria is met, the feature is considered not incorporated. If one out of three or two out of four criteria are met, the feature is considered partially incorporated. Podemos and M5S in comparative perspective Podemos’ populism The analysis reveals that the first macro-feature, i.e. anti-elitist attitudes, is crucial in Podemos’ ideology. The contraposition between the political/economic elite and the people is clear-cut both in Iglesias’ speeches (A, B and C) and in all his interviews (I, II and III); in the GUE/NGL meeting (2014a), Iglesias stated that ‘politics starts to be politics when it ceases to be a problem of one hundred people and becomes a problem of a thousand, ten thousand, one hundred thousand people’ (Speech C); the oligarchies Iglesias refers to are mainly (2) political and (3) economic, while the negative reference to (4) cultural elites emerged only once and it is related to the collusion of the media-system. As for the political elite, in the Puerta de Sol speech Iglasias stated that this situation of pauperisation and humiliation has come about not only because bad people governed, not only because they are negligent – they are. The problem is a model which pits the State against the society, a minority that fattened their accounts, while the majority saw their [accounts] slimmed down [. . .] (Speech A). Podemos itself is described as an instrument to enable the people to be truly represented in the institutions: ‘[t]he people are tired; if Podemos can be an instrument to transform the rage of the people . . . into a willingness to open doors and windows, then 10 D. VITTORI we will be useful’ (Interview I). As for (1) vested interests and oligarchies, Iglesias (2014, 129–134), speaks about the Wall Street Party, which is considered a conglomerate of people from the political and economic spheres. In Europe, the Wall Street party is exemplified by Angela Merkel ‘who controls the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF’, while in Spain some of the officials within the PP, PSOE and CiU shift easily from the Council of Ministers to boards of Directors Iglesias Turrión (2014). In this regard, the issue of revolving doors (puertas giratorias) is considered the main instrument used by the political caste to serve the vested interest of the powerful (Interview III and Speech B). (Economic) vested interests – the so-called ‘Ibex 35 government’ – are ‘uncountable to the citizens’ (Speech B), according to Iglesias. The second macro-feature, anti-status quo attitudes, can be exemplified by this Iglesias statement (Speech B) on (5) political representation: ‘as long as the political game table is like this, the same [political actors] will always win [. . .]. The game table is adulterated. It is false that some belong to the centre-left and others to the centre-right; they are a caste [. . .], they defend the same interests’. A similar approach can be discerned in interviews II and III. The new anti-status quo cleavage that Podemos is trying to popularise is (6) between los de arriba (those who are on the top) and los de abajo (those who are at the bottom): the spatial coordinates move from a horizontal left-right division to a vertical perspective, in which the top is represented by the tip of the social pyramid (see Speeches A and C). With regard to the necessity to give power back to the people, Podemos introduced the consulta ciudadana (see below) as the main instrument of direct democracy. The statue of the party (art.14 and Appendix, letter A and B) has strict and formalised rules to be followed to call for both a consulta ciudadana and a consulta revocatoria, which can be equated to an internal recall system. Evidence of the incorporation of the third attitude (7), i.e. the de-professionalisation of politics, can be found in the organisational principles and in two of Iglesias’ interviews (Interview B and C). Moreover, in the 2014 manifesto for the European elections, Podemos committed itself to reducing ‘the professionalisation of politics’ through a salary for MEPs equal to the median wage in each State, a limit of two legislatures for elected public officials, the introduction of recall for Parliamentarians, a ban on public officials carrying out other paid activities during their terms of office, and stringent auditing of the expenses of public officials (Podemos 2014b, 33). Along the same lines, the programmes for the regional elections (Podemos 2015a, 63–70) and for the legislative election (Podemos 2015b, 157–166) indicate a desire to de-professionalise politics and achieve greater ‘control by the citizens’ over politicians. Finally, political mobilisation is a distinctive feature of Podemos’ organisation: on the one hand, (8) the consulta ciudadana (an internal referendum open to party members) is aimed at giving the highest organ of the movement – the Citizens‘ Assembly, where all members are represented – “full sovereignty over the issues most relevant for the whole organisation” (Podemos 2014a). According to information provided by the movement's website, there were eight popular consultations (last updated July 2016) – three at the regional level, three at the municipal level and two at the State level. Two independent firms – Agora Voting and OpenKratio – supervised the on-line electoral consultations and attested to their regularity. The most relevant (9) primaries among the members of Podemos were held from 17 to 22 July 2015 for the selection of CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 11 candidates for the lower and upper chambers as well as for the premiership during the 2015 legislative elections. As indicated in the organisational principles, primaries are extended not only to the State level, but also to the local level, where the Citizens’ Territorial Assemblies have responsibility for organising the competitions (Podemos 2014a, art.33). As for the promotion of direct democracy, the 2015 manifesto for the legislative elections makes five main proposals (point 226): (10) reform of the Popular Legislative Initiative; introduction of the Popular Deliberative Process Initiative; introduction of the Popular Veto and the Popular Consultation and, finally, introduction of the recall mechanism. Podemos also campaigned for a referendum on the independence of Cataluña. Podemos's nationalism One of the most high-profile criticisms Podemos’ leaders make of conventional interpretations of recent history refers to the so-called transición (transition) – the postFrancoist years – and its political consequences, i.e. the neutralisation of political conflict in Spanish society and the so-called Pacto del Olvido (Pact of Forgetting). Rather than looking nostalgically at the non-democratic traditions of the past, Podemos in its programme for the legislative elections (2015b, point 261) advocates the removal of Francoist symbols and ‘the promotion of more pluralist representations of the past’. Moreover, Podemos demands nullification of the judicial sentences passed under Franco. There are no signs (A and B), in the different sources, of nostalgia for the Spanish empire or the pre-eminence of a nation among the others recognised by the Spanish constitution as historic nationalities. On the contrary, albeit rejecting a radically separatist stance, Podemos recognises the value of plurinationalism in Spain, as explained in the 2015 programme (2015a, prologue and points 54, 227 and 334). Although there is one mention in Iglesias’ speeches of pride in being Spanish (Speech C), there are no positive evaluations of the symbols or rituals of the nation. Nonetheless, negative mentions of (C) the alleged ‘enemies’ of the country's sovereignty are recurrent. The party of Wall Street; the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel; financial totalitarianism; the top 1% of the world's the wealthiest people: there are all considered as potential threats (Speeches A, B, and C, Interview I). However, these threats are framed as a threats to democracy (Podemos 2014b, 31), rather than threats to national purity. No signs have been found of positive evaluations of the homogeneity of the group against multiculturalism (D). No proposals in this regard are advocated by Podemos; contrary to criteria E and F, respect for the plurinational nature of Spain and calls for the better treatment of refugees and immigrants can be found in the programmatic manifestos for the legislative and European elections (Podemos 2014b, 2015a, 2015b). In all the sources relating to Podemos and Pablo Iglesias, the concept of the sovereignty of the people – presented in different ways – is highlighted. While recognising that (G) sovereignty has shifted from the State to supranational institutions (Speech B and Interview III), Iglesias also acknowledges that (H) ‘globalisation mocks popular sovereignty every day’ (Speech B and C). 12 D. VITTORI The military influence of the United States (I) is viewed with suspicion by Podemos. Although, during the European Election, the withdrawal of Spain from NATO was advocated by Podemos’ prominent figures, the party's official position was somewhat nuanced: remaining within the NATO defence framework, while (2014b, 2015a) asking for greater autonomy. At the same time, Podemos made a clear-cut statement (2015b, point 326) on reform of the Spain-United States bilateral treaty on the US military bases: ‘the existence of United States bases in Spain, and participation in anti-ballistic missile systems, threaten our sovereignty [and] our national security’. Finally, popular sovereignty (J) is conceived as the re-establishment of food sovereignty (Podemos 2015b, point 29 and 336); implementation of the ‘women working sovereignty’ (Podemos 2015a, point 133), and the achievement of energy sovereignty (Iglesias, Interviews II and III). As previously indicated, this popular sovereignty is antithetical to financial totalitarianism and globalisation; in Podemos vision, the party of Wall Street as well as other supranational institutions are among the unelected and undemocratic technocratic bodies which confiscate the people's rights. One example of this conception is found in the criticism of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is considered ‘a threat to our sovereignty, our democracy, our economy and our Welfare State’ (Podemos 2015, point 322). The five-star movement's populism Almost all works on the M5S agree that the movement can be defined as populist: for example, Corbetta and Gualmini (2013) use the term web-populism; other authors (Tarchi 2015; Biorcio 2013) prefer to categorise M5S as one of the many variants of populism that Italy has experienced in recent decades. The M5S possesses all the criteria linked to the anti-elitist macro-feature. During the first confidence vote for the newly appointed Renzi government, the M5S spokesperson in the lower chamber talked explicitly about (1) vested interests linked with the owner of the newspaper, la Repubblica. In his words, the replacement of former Prime Minister, Enrico Letta, with Matteo Renzi revealed ‘the working of vested interests, such as the one represented by Eng. Carlo De Benedetti’ (Speech E). Grillo himself highlighted the presence of those vested interests behind the media system in the Speech D. As for the political and economic elites (2 and 3), they are targets of Grillo's criticism both in the Speeches (D, E and F) and in the Interviews (IV, V and VI). Although the Movement's manifestos are very succinct, they contain similar criticisms: ‘Parliament no longer represents the citizens [. . .]. The parties have put themselves in place of the popular will and they have escaped its control and its judgment’ (Movimento 5 Stelle 2013, 2). The economic elite – frequently associated with vested and unaccountable interests (Grillo 2014) – is equally criticised in almost all the sources under investigation (in particular Interview IV). In the book Vinciamo Noi (Di Cori Modigliani 2014) technocrats are defined as ‘suffering from an illness: economism’; and they are counter-posed to the ‘thinking world’. CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 13 The references to the cultural elite (4) concern mainly the mass media, which are accused by Grillo of being biased and responsible for the decay of the country (Interview IV and Speech F). The anti-status quo macro-feature too is a cornerstone of the Movement's ideology. As for the change in the system of representation (5), the Movement's statute – called ‘the Non-Statute’ – explicitly recognises that M5S is not a party nor wants to become similar to such organisations (article 4). The main mechanism for giving voice to the citizens is on-line participation in the activities of the Movement. Internet, however, is considered not merely a tool for fostering the direct participation of members, as in the case of Podemos; on the contrary, it conveys the particular values that the M5S wants to incorporate in its DNA: the absence of leaders – although some authors argue (Mosca, Vaccari, and Valeriani 2015) that the movement has a strict top-down organisation, based on the pre-eminence of the leadership (Beppe Grillo, Gianroberto and Davide Casaleggio) – and, secondly, the absence of any intermediaries between the people and the movement (article 4). Finally, Grillo does not hesitate to characterise the outcome of the 2013 legislative election as a revolution for Parliament (Interview IV, V and Speech F). In all speeches (D, E and F) the end of the left/right dualism is highlighted (6). The battle for (7) the de-professionalisation of politics is at the centre of Beppe Grillo's first campaign. In 2005 – for the so-called ‘Clean up Parliament’ campaign – he launched an appeal in the International Herald Tribune asking the 23 parliamentarians ‘already convicted of crimes by the Italian judicial system’ to allow themselves to be suspended, ‘so as to give a real signal that our country is changing’ (Grillo 2005). In 2007 during the first V-Day, Grillo launched a popular initiative aimed at (a) banning candidates convicted of crimes; (b) limiting elected representatives’ terms of office to two only (this threshold is a formal rule for elected M5S members), and (c) introducing the preference vote in the electoral law. The same issues were included in the 2013 electoral programme. On its website, the M5S gives a high profile to its decision to forgo €42 million of the money allocated to the public funding of political parties. M5S imposes a deduction of 50% on official salaries of its members of Parliament. As for the third macro-feature, (8) internal referenda on a variety of issues is the main tool of direct democracy the M5S uses. Casaleggio Associati's servers host the online vote, thus raising suspicions concerning the full transparency of the voting process. No formal rules for the holding of a referendum are indicated in the ‘Non-Statute’ (Movimento 5 Stelle 2009), leaving to the leadership greater room for manoeuvre than in Podemos’ case to use the internal referendum as a form of plebiscite on decisions already agreed by the party leadership. The most debated referendum in this regard concerned abolition of the crime of illegal immigration, introduced by the fourth Berlusconi government in 2009. Grillo at first wanted to avoid a referendum on the issue (Corriere della Sera 2013) and when he was forced to call one (Castigliani 2014 he favoured the maintenance of this crime. M5S activists (63.5%) reversed Grillo's position. Other referenda concerned the constitution of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group within the European Parliament with Nigel Farage's UKIP; Grillo's participation in a meeting with Matteo Renzi; an M5S electoral-law proposal, and the expulsion of a handful of M5S senators. According to Vignati (2015), these internal referenda are anything but democratic because of the authoritative role of Grillo (and Casaleggio). 14 D. VITTORI Although the ‘Non-Statute’ (Movimento 5 Stelle 2009) is ambiguous with regard to the procedures to be adopted for the selection of candidates for elections at the national, regional and local levels, the mechanism of closed-primaries (9) is frequently adopted by the M5S: it was used in 2013 for the selection of parliamentary candidates – the socalled Parlamentarie; in 2014 for the selection of European Parliament (EP) candidates, and more recently, for selecting mayoral candidates in the largest cities in Italy (among others Rome, Milan and Turin). Grillo also made clear (Interview IV) that the M5S wants to introduce a mechanism of recall in order to make politicians more accountable. The code of behaviour for M5S members of the EP envisages this procedure. Thirdly, the cornerstone of the M5S programme for the European elections was (10) the call for a referendum on Italy's membership of the Euro-zone. Despite the absence of legal bases (the Italian Constitution forbids the holding of referenda on international treaties), Grillo in Interviews IV, V, and VI claimed that a non-legally binding referendum should be held in any case. Moreover, the 2013 programme for the legislative elections, indicates among the Movement's priorities the reform of the law on referenda, since M5S advocates abolition of the participation threshold for non-constitutional referenda and the introduction of both confirmatory and abrogative referenda (see also Speech F). The Italian constitution only provides for the latter. The five-star movement's nationalism As in the case of Podemos, there are no positive references in the sources under analysis to glorious past traditions or to the symbolism of nation (A and B). Rather, the M5S has used the symbolic power of national holidays to promote meetings of the Movement. For example, the second V-Day (V2-Day) took place on Liberation Day (25 April): according to Grillo, the V2-Day was the continuation of a process of liberation from the forces of Nazism and Fascism. The M5S national rally in Mira (Venice) was held, in 2013, on 2 June – the day on which the founding of the Republic is commemorated: in this case, the rally was framed as the ‘celebration of Our Republic’ (Corriere del Veneto 2013). Nonetheless, negative references to (C) external enemies can be found in Interviews IV and V and in Speech E: the references were related to the role of the strong economies as well as the multinationals in influencing politics in Italy. References to the homogeneity of the group are scarce; still the M5S stance on this issue is ambiguous. Grillo's position on illegal immigration was rejected by the on-line vote of the membership (E). Still, sporadic criticism of economic migrants can be found in other sources (i.e. Grillo 2007, 2015), where he advocates the tighter control of immigration. Grillo also condemned the proposal to introduce the principle of ius soli to Italy. Nonetheless, no positive references to (D) the cultural sameness of the homeland or to (F) welfare chauvinism are present: the motto used by Grillo (2013 and Speech F), ‘no one has to be left behind’, indicates the absence of any inclination towards nationalism. As for sovereigntism, Grillo has criticised (G) the European Union for dealing with the crisis without involving the people. In this connection, he said (in Interview IV), ‘either the European Union becomes, as imagined by the founding fathers, a community, or I am not interested in participating in a banking union, a financial union, a CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 15 monetary union, which represents only a few strong economies’. In the manifesto for the European elections, the M5S called for a non-legally binding referendum on Italian membership of the Euro-zone, and it campaigned for abolition of the Fiscal Compact (see also Grillo, Interview 1 and Speech 3). Although no references are found with regard to criterion H, threats from globalisation and supranational economic integration are part of the M5S narrative (in Grillo and Casaleggio 2011, 72): ‘the G8 nations represent 65% of the world economy. It can be easily stated that they bear the largest share of responsibility for the world famine; for the income inequalities; for an unspecified number of conventional and guerrilla wars, and for interference in other States’ affairs through financial leverage, diplomatic pressure and the media’. Grillo's blog was sceptical about Italy's relations with global powers (I), in particular the US, especially with regard to nuclear weapons on Italian soil (beppegrillo.it, 2010, 2016) and with regard to Italian participation in military interventions. In 2005, Grillo launched a mailing campaign against the Iraq invasion: he asked his blog's followers to send an email to the President of the Republic demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq soil. In 2008 (Speech D) he defined Italy as a ‘NATO aircraft carrier’. In 2013, the M5S presented, in the Chamber of Deputies, a proposal to withdraw Italian troops from Afghanistan, while more recently it voted against the refinancing of Italian missions abroad, despite being in favour of selected missions, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon. Finally, Grillo participated in the demonstrations against enlargement of the US military base ‘Dal Molin’, launching an on-line referendum in order to stop the enlargement. Positive references to the self-determination (J) of the people are abundant: in Speech F, Grillo claims that ‘we have lost monetary sovereignty, we have lost economic sovereignty, we have lost food sovereignty, we have lost sovereignty over everything, including sovereignty over our sons who leave home’; in interview V, he states that he ‘want[s] a sovereign State; I do not want to delegate my sovereignty. We have delegated everything; we are not a nation anymore [. . .]. There is no more State in Italy [. . .]’. In Speech E, on the other hand, he defined as illegitimate the 2008 legislative elections, because ‘the sacred constitutional principle according to which the people are sovereign’ was violated. The proposal for a referendum on membership of the Euro-zone testifies to the importance, for the M5S, of restoring the sovereignty of the people over the supranational fora. In the preface to the book containing the programme for the European Elections (2014), Grillo and Casaleggio state that ‘the country can make a great leap away from partitocracy and embrace direct democracy where the citizen is sovereign’. Conclusion In recent years, Podemos in Spain and the M5S Italy have had astonishing electoral success, thus attracting the attention of several scholars. These movements are frequently defined as populist and, sometimes, nationalist parties. Rather than focusing on the unidimensional left-right schema (among others, Dalton and McAllister 2014; Jahn 2010; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Mair 2014) and the choices of the two parties concerning alliances with other parties (Vittori 2016), in this article I have tried to evaluate whether the parties have incorporated a populist 16 D. VITTORI and/or a nationalist thin-ideology. I started by outlining the minimal definitions and, then I moved to the operationalisation, using ten indicators for each concept. As Table 1 shows, nine out of ten criteria used in order to define populism are incorporated by Podemos and ten out of ten by the M5S. Only the negative reference to the cultural elite – a criterion that for example is typical of parties such as the Italian Forza Italia or the Northern League – is incorporated by Podemos less than fully. Despite certain differences vis-à-vis the transparency of internal referenda, both parties rely on mechanisms of direct democracy to foster participation of the ‘people’ in decision-making. In light of this, it is correct to define the two parties as populist. Conversely, Table 2 shows a different picture since only the third macro-feature, which I defined as domestic sovereigntism, is incorporated by the two parties. In that case, the focus of Podemos and the M5S is more on the right of people to decide, than on positive evaluations of the Nation. While the analysis reveals the focus of both parties on a ‘perceived’ enemy outside the country – namely the supranational institutions as well as the forces behind the globalisation process – no references have been found to the other two macro-features related to nationalism, i.e. positive evaluations of the Nation and the homogeneity of the group. This conclusion should not be overstated: despite sharing certain basic features, the two parties are different in respect of several policy positions and in terms of organisation. Further research should compare, on the one hand, other aspects of the two parties not analysed here and, on the other hand, other relevant cases, focusing in particular on niche parties, which are often considered a priori as populists and/or nationalists. 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Podemos o la política después de la crisis. Barcelona: Debate. Tronconi, F., ed. 2015. Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement. Farnham: Ashgate. Vignati, R. 2015. “The Organization of the Movimento 5 Stelle: A Contradictory Party Model.” In Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, edited by F. Tronconi, 29–52. Farnham: Ashgate. Vittori, D. 2013. “How to “measure” populism in Western party systems. A preliminary study and the Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà case.” Politikja, no. 2. Vittori, D. 2016. “Podemos and Five Stars Movements: So Similar, Yet so Different.” Paper presented at ECPR Graduate Student Conference, Tartu 10–13 July. Weyland, K. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics 34 (1): 1–22. doi:10.2307/422412. Appendix Podemos Speech A: Iglesias Turrión, P. (2014), Pablo Iglesias full speech for the meeting ‘Unidos Contra a Austeridade’, 21th November 2014. 20 D. VITTORI Speech B: Iglesias Turrión, P. (2015), Pablo Iglesias full speech in Puerta del Sol, Madrid, 31th May 2015. Speech C: Iglesias Turrión, P. (2016), Pablo Iglesias full speech for its first intervention in the Spanish Congress, 2nd March 2016. Interview I: RTVE.es, (2014), Entrevista a Pablo Iglesias, secretario general de Podemos, in ‘La Noche en 24h’, 6th December 2014. Interview II: Podemos, (2015), #HablaConPablo: Entrevista de Trabajo, 2nd December2015. Interview III: La Sexta TV, (2015), Pablo Iglesias responde a la calle, in ‘laSexta Noche’, 30th April 2016. Five-star Movement Speech D: D'Inca, F. (2014), Federico D'Inca full speech during the confidence vote to the Renzi government, 25th Febrauary 2014. Speech E: Grillo, B. (2013), Beppe Grillo full speech for the Third V-Day, Genova, 1st December 2013 Speech F: Grillo, B. (2008), Beppe Grillo full speech for the Second V-Day, Turin, 25th April 2008. Interview IV: La7, (2014), Full interview to Beppe Grillo, in ‘Bersaglio Mobile’, 21th May 2014. Interview V: Rai Uno, (2014), Full interview to Beppe Grillo in Porta a Porta, in ‘Porta a Porta’, 19th May 2014. Interview VI: Sky, (2014), Exclusive interview to Beppe Grillo in SkyTg23, in ‘SkyTg 24’, 4th May 2014.