Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies 45.1
March 2019: 17-41
DOI: 10.6240/concentric.lit.201903_45(1).0002
Divergent Convergent:
Ricoeur, Derrida, and Metaphor
Kim-Su Rasmussen
Department of Philosophy
Chonnam National University, South Korea
Abstract
This paper analyzes the exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida concerning
metaphor. I argue that the exchange is not a “missed encounter,” as Pirovolakis
has suggested, but exemplifies a hermeneutic situation in which theoretical
divergence is supplemented by a practical convergence. Rather than a mere
exegesis of the exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida, I emphasize the practical
implications for the interpretation of poetic metaphors. To be more specific, I
emphasize the case of Celan’s poem “Blume” and the semantic density of the
central metaphor. Although Ricoeur and Derrida diverge in strictly theoretical
terms, their theoretical positions—when translated into practical terms—
establish different but convergent paradigms for the interpretation of poetic
metaphors.
Keywords
Ricoeur, Derrida, Celan, metaphor, hermeneutics, deconstruction
18 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
Introduction
The exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida around metaphor, also known as
“la querelle de la métaphore,” constitutes a fascinating chapter in modern intellectual
history. The substance of the exchange is the encounter, on a precise set of issues, of
two major philosophers who represent different theoretical paradigms in the
contemporary humanities: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. We might understand
the exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida as an episode in a larger confrontation, a
wider set of exchanges, which includes the debate between Gadamer and Derrida,
among others.
In a narrow sense, the quarrel is played out in a series of three texts. The thesis,
as it were, is established in Derrida’s essay “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text
of Philosophy” (Margins of Philosophy 207-71). In this essay, Derrida conceives of
metaphor in a manner that challenges the status of philosophical concepts. Derrida
suggests that the metaphorical expression contains an excess of meaning, which
cannot be properly grasped by the concept of metaphor, and that our most basic
philosophical concepts such as truth are, in reality, dead or worn-out metaphors that
have lost or erased their metaphorical qualities. The antithesis comes in the form of
Ricoeur’s book-length study “The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in
Language,” particularly chapter eight (The Rule of Metaphor 303-71). One of the
main points in Ricoeur’s study is that a philosophical concept might be articulated in
terms of an old or worn metaphor, but the concept itself, so to speak, contains a
dimension that is a genuine creation of new meaning. Thus, even if the concept is
invariably articulated in terms of a dead metaphor, it cannot be reduced to metaphor.
The quarrel was brought to a conclusion of sorts in Derrida’s essay “The Retrait of
Metaphor” (Psyche 48-80), where Derrida suggests that he by and large agrees with
Ricoeur, and the few points of disagreement are due to misconstructions of his
position.
This exchange between Derrida and Ricoeur is interesting for several reasons.
First, it illuminates their positions vis-à-vis metaphor and the interpretation of
metaphor. Although the theory of metaphor is extraordinarily complex, one of the
virtues of this debate is that the emphasis on metaphor is much more precise than,
say, language, symbol, sign, text, or discourse. Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that the exchange is initiated by Ricoeur in a manner that is, frankly, uncharacteristic.
However, it is worth noting here that the debate around metaphor had a prehistory,
not only in their personal relationship insofar as Derrida was at one point Ricoeur’s
assistant at the Sorbonne, but also insofar as Ricoeur and Derrida shared much of the
Kim-Su Rasmussen 19
same philosophical background (Michel 31-32). And at a later stage, Derrida and
Ricoeur enjoyed a second major debate, first privately then publicly, around the
concept of forgiveness (“The Word” 167-75).
In the study Reading Derrida and Ricoeur, which is the most exhaustive study
of the relation between the two thinkers to date, Eftichis Pirovolakis emphasizes that
the exchange around metaphor can be considered a missed encounter:
Nor is a series of publications that appeared in the seventies on metaphor
a debate, as in none of the three texts of this exchange do they fully
engage with each other’s arguments. The first one, Derrida’s “White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy” (1971), is a
“deconstructive” interpretation of the vicissitudes of metaphor in
philosophical discourse and does not contain any reference to Ricoeur.
It is the latter who instigates the polemic by providing, in the eighth
study of The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language
(1975), a critical reading of Derrida’s essay. In no way does that reading
amount to a detailed response to Derrida. Ricoeur chooses to focus on
two very specific aspects of “White Mythology,” whose argument,
moreover, he hastily assimilates to Heidegger’s conviction that the
metaphorical exists only within the limits of metaphysics, and to which
he devotes just a few pages. Finally, “The Retrait of Metaphor” (1978)
was supposed to be Derrida’s rejoinder to Ricoeur’s polemical
comments. Yet, the explicit references to Ricoeur are limited to a few
observations to the effect that he mistakenly attributed to Derrida
assertions that “White Mythology” was specifically intended to put into
question. Derrida goes on to devote the largest part of his essay to a
meticulous examination of certain Heideggerian motifs. As a result,
their debate on metaphor could also be portrayed as a failed attempt to
engage in constructive dialogue. (2)
To a large extent, I agree with Pirovolakis, and this exchange, to be sure, took place
at a certain distance, with a certain restraint, and was conducted with a great measure
of mutual respect. As Benoît Peeters remarks, Ricoeur came to regret the critique of
Derrida: “In a late letter to his former assistant, he [Ricoeur] admitted that he ‘still
regretted the unfortunate critique’ of Derrida’s work in The Rule of Metaphor, before
adding: ‘You deftly picked it out and brilliantly lifted it up’” (527). Their differences,
in retrospect, might appear secondary in view of their similarities.
20 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
Nevertheless, this paper argues that the “querelle” between Ricoeur and Derrida
is not simply a missed encounter, where the two thinkers fail to engage with each
other, but that it is restricted in the sense that it remains on a merely theoretical or
speculative level. If this speculative debate is translated into practical terms, i.e. a
practical interpretation of metaphors, then it becomes evident that the divergent
theoretical positions support practices of interpretation that are not identical, for sure,
but nevertheless convergent. The “querelle” is not an example of a missed encounter
but an example of a hermeneutic conflict in which a speculative divergence is
grounded in and supplemented by a practical convergence.
I
As mentioned earlier, the exchange around metaphor was not the first encounter
between Ricoeur and Derrida. Here, a brief reflection on Ricoeur’s and Derrida’s
positions in relation to Freud might serve as a context and an entry into the quarrel
about metaphor (see also Pirovolakis; Bernstein). The Rule of Metaphor, according
to Ricoeur, was a return to the problem of symbolism after a long detour through the
problem of Freudian interpretation:
Freud and Philosophy in a certain sense got away from me, since it was
supposed to be a response to The Symbolism of Evil but instead became
a book on Freud. The Rule of Metaphor is, finally, in a critical relation
to The Symbolism of Evil and to Eliade in the sense that in it I was asking
myself if there was not a structure of language that had been studied
more thoroughly, that was better known than the symbol—itself a vague
notion used in so many different ways, from the symbols in chemistry
to the symbol of the monarchy. By contrast, thanks to the long rhetorical
tradition, we understand better how metaphor operates. I asked myself
then whether I could not pour back into a kind of rhetorical receptacle
all of the diffuse problematic of the symbol, providing it with a strong
semantic framework. In fact, what I produced there was a semantic
theory of symbols. (81-82)
The question then arises whether there is a return to symbolism in The Rule of
Metaphor, a more precise rethinking of symbolism, and to what extent the return to
symbolism is formed by the detour through the problem of interpretation. Ricoeur’s
Freud and Philosophy presents an original interpretation of Freud’s texts, a
Kim-Su Rasmussen 21
philosophical interpretation, emphasizing an inner tension in Freud’s texts between
“energetics” and “hermeneutics.” From the beginning, we may notice that the French
title De l’Interprétation suggests that Ricoeur sought to foreground the problem of
interpretation, the problem of a hermeneutic developed in relation to dreams and
other manifestations of the unconscious, rather than a reading of Freud as the founder
of psychoanalysis as therapeutic theory and practice (Iser 70-71). It is more about
interpretation than it is about psychoanalysis.
Ricoeur’s book is organized in three main sections: problematic, analytic, and
dialectic. The first and the third sections, the problematic and the dialectic, establish
a general interpretive framework. The main part of the book is the second section,
called “Analytic,” in which Ricoeur reconstructs the chronological development of
Freud’s theory of the psyche from the early “Project” (1895) until the late Civilization
and its Discontents (1930). The Freudian theory of the psyche, according to Ricoeur,
is characterized by a tension between a positivist pole and a non-positivist pole: on
one hand, we have Freud’s ambition to conceptualize the psyche in strictly
naturalistic terms as a quantitative neurological apparatus (energetics), and on the
other his characteristic manner of decoding neurotic symptoms, dreams, and cultural
artifacts (hermeneutics).
The Freudian discovery of the unconscious, according to Ricoeur, is articulated
in a mixed discourse that vacillates between a positivist and a non-positivist pole,
between “energetics” and “hermeneutics.” The tension in Freud’s texts between the
two poles is articulated in several stages: from the early “Project” to the first
topography, from the first to the second topography, and the late revision of the model
through the introduction of the death drive. This tension between energetics and
hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, is a constant feature throughout Freud’s work; it
is a tension that is never entirely resolved. The unconscious, according to Ricoeur, is
precisely located at the intersection of the two trajectories (“Lectio magistralis” 77).
One of the important concepts in Ricoeur’s study is the notion of symbol. It is
carried over from his previous study on The Symbolism of Evil. Initially, Ricoeur
defines the symbol as “double or multiple-meaning expressions” that call for
interpretation (Freud and Philosophy 13). At a later stage, Ricoeur describes the
symbol as a dialectical synthesis of an archeological and a teleological vector, a
“concrete” moment of a dialectical movement that indicates the “fullness or peak of
mediation” (495). The symbol, in other words, enables Ricoeur to work through the
Freudian lesson, to mediate between energetics and hermeneutics, and to assimilate
this tension within a higher synthesis that casts new light on the problem of the self.
22 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
Derrida’s essay “Freud and the scene of writing,” which is part of Writing and
Difference, navigates a similar territory. His point of departure is similar, if not
identical, with the one outlined by Ricoeur: the Freudian theory of the psyche is split
between two poles, a positivist-energetic and a non-positivist-hermeneutic pole. Or,
in other words, it is a tension between force and significance, as indicated by the title
of the opening essay in Writing and Difference. Derrida emphasizes on one hand “a
neurological fable whose framework and intention, in certain respects, he [Freud]
will never abandon,” and on the other a non-positivist mode of decoding signs, an
interpretive procedure, a hermeneutic style (251). Derrida’s reading of Freud, up to
this point, is very similar to the one we find in Ricoeur.
Once this framework has been established, however, Derrida abandons the
simple bipolarity by emphasizing the “folds” or “loops” that complicate the dividing
line. In other words, if the starting point is similar to Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud,
i.e. the tension between positivist energetics and anti-positivist hermeneutics, then
Derrida’s essay goes in the exact opposite direction. Instead of seeking to mediate
between the two poles, Derrida seeks to dig even deeper into the difference between
the two. He seeks to emphasize a fourth “layer” in Freud’s texts, not the dialectical
integration of the opposites within a symbolic discourse, as Ricoeur suggested, but
an “arche-writing,” a “grammatological unconscious,” which precedes and
conditions the very differentiation between energetics and hermeneutics: “Writing
supplements perception before perception even appears to itself [is conscious of
itself]” (Derrida, Writing and Difference 282). It is a primary supplement, a mise en
abyme, a difference that resists all integration, all synthesis, all dialectical mediation.
In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur distinguishes between two “hermeneutic
styles”: one emphasizing the role of consciousness in the restoration of meaning
through multiple detours, the other considering consciousness to be non-transparent,
tainted by illusion, and a stranger in its own house (27). In this context, it is clear that
Ricoeur, a distinguished representative of the former, considers Freud to be among
the eminent representatives of the latter. In a gesture that is far too rare, the book
delineates a trajectory that does not remain safely on one side of the dividing line;
instead, the author crosses over to and seeks to learn from the other side, with the aim
of mediating between the two in a higher dialectical synthesis. In certain respects,
Derrida responds to Ricoeur’s project by theorizing an anti-symbolism, which resists,
subverts, and delays all integration.
On this account, the difference between the two could not be clearer. Ricoeur
reads Freud’s entire oeuvre as a chronological development of a theory of the psyche,
a theory which is characterized by an inner tension between positivism and non-
Kim-Su Rasmussen 23
positivism, between energetics and hermeneutics. Ricoeur, on his part, seeks to
mediate between the two poles and overcome the tension in Freud’s theory of the
psyche, which results in a theory on three levels: first, Freud’s positivist scientific
theory of the psyche that emphasizes the psyche as an apparatus that receives and
processes psychic energy (energetics); second, Freud’s non-positivist theory of the
psyche, which emphasizes interpretive procedures of decoding dreams, symptoms,
and cultural phenomena (hermeneutics); third, Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud’s
theory of the psyche, which seeks to mediate between the two poles and reinstate the
autonomy of the self-conscious self. Derrida accepts the first two levels of Ricoeur’s
interpretation of Freud; however, instead of Ricoeur’s mediation and recuperation of
consciousness in terms of the symbol, he goes in the exact opposite direction,
emphasizing a grammatological unconscious that conditions the very differentiation
between positivist energetics and anti-positivist hermeneutics. Thus, while Ricoeur
seeks to reinstate the rational ego as the master of its own house, Derrida seeks to
outline an unconscious to the second degree, a dream within a dream, which resists
all forms of recuperation or reinstatement.
Both Ricoeur and Derrida consider the Freudian theory of the psyche to be of
utmost importance. Ricoeur identifies an inner tension in the Freudian theory of the
psyche, which he seeks to overcome in the form of a theory of symbolism as the
cornerstone of a recuperative hermeneutics. Derrida, in the exact opposite direction,
seeks to undermine the self-transparent self, the autonomous subject, in a manner that
radicalizes mainstream Freudian positions. If Ricoeur seeks to reinstate the
autonomous subject, Derrida outlines a Freudianism to the second degree in the form
of a grammatological unconscious.
However, in spite of these differences in their reading of Freud, it is worth
noting that Ricoeur and Derrida share a common heritage from phenomenology. In
particular, they both understand language and the generation of meaning as inherently
temporal. Does the temporality of language, as Ricoeur suggests, imply a detour that
leads back to a hermeneutic of the subject? Or does the temporality of language, as
Derrida suggests, imply an infinite deferral of such a recuperation, which threatens
to undermine all conceptual stability? And what are the broader implications of these
different hermeneutic styles? These are some of the questions that are raised in the
“querelle de la métaphore.”
24 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
II
In order to ground the discussion between Derrida and Ricoeur, I choose to
discuss the theoretical positions in relation to a concrete example, or a set of examples.
Here, I emphasize the poem “Blume” by Paul Celan, which is part of the third cycle
of the collection Sprachgitter (1959).
BLUME
Der Stein.
Der Stein in der Luft, dem ich folgte.
Dein Aug, so blind wie der Stein.
Wir waren
Hände,
wir schöpften die Finsternis leer, wir fanden
das Wort, das den Sommer heraufkam:
Blume.
Blume—ein Blindenwort.
Dein Aug und mein Aug:
sie sorgen
für Wasser.
Wachstum.
Herzwand um Herzwand
blättert hinzu.
Ein Wort noch, wie dies, und die Hämmer
schwingen im Freien. (1-17)
In Michael Hamburger’s elegant translation, the poem reads as follows: “FLOWER
// The stone. / The stone in the air, which I followed. / Your eye, as blind as the stone.
// We were / hands, / we baled the darkness empty, we found / the word that ascended
summer: / flower. // Flower—a blind man’s word./ Your eye and mine: / they see / to
water. // Growth. / Heart wall upon heart wall / adds petals to it. // One more word
like this, and the hammers / will swing over open ground” (115).
Kim-Su Rasmussen 25
Initially, we might interpret Celan’s poem as a text, which is organized around
the presentation and unfolding of a flower metaphor. The poem, on a thematic level,
indicates a movement from stone to flower, from darkness to summer, and the crucial
turning point is the “finding” of the word: flower. Subsequently, the flower grows,
drawing on the water from eyes, indicating a movement towards greater freedom. As
we know, the poem is partly based on biographical circumstances, insofar as Celan’s
son pronounced as his first word “Blume” (or “fleur”). However, the poem is not
merely a recounting of a biographical circumstance; it suggests that the entry into
language, into the symbolic order, is a step toward potential emancipation. In other
words, the flower, the “Blume,” is a metaphor that raises questions about language
and meaning; the poem is a complex metapoetical text, which is organized around
the central flower metaphor.
Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor proposes to examine metaphor on three
different levels: the level of the word, the level of the sentence, and the level of the
text (or discourse). The theory of metaphor, according to these different levels of
analysis, develops within the domains of rhetoric, semantics, and hermeneutics. One
of the oldest conceptions of metaphor, as Ricoeur demonstrates in The Rule of
Metaphor, considers it to be grounded on a principle of substitution, an operation of
substituting one expression for another (Simms 62-77). A variant of this view
considers the metaphor to be a comparison or a condensed simile: A is (like) B. The
substitution is grounded on a similarity or a resemblance of the two expressions. Such
an understanding of metaphor is conditioned by a distinction between the proper and
the improper, between the literal and the figural sense:
Between the figurative sense of the borrowed word and the proper
meaning of the absent word, there exists a relationship that can be called
the “reason” (in the sense of rationale or basis) for the transposition.
This reason constitutes a paradigm for the substitution of terms. In the
case of metaphor, the paradigmatic structure is that of resemblance. This
is the postulate of “the paradigmatic character of the trope.” (The Rule
of Metaphor 52)
Furthermore, the difference between literal and figural sense, which defines the
classical understanding of metaphor as substitution, is simultaneously the principle
that guides the interpretation of metaphors:
26 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
To explain (or understand) a trope is to be guided by the trope’s “reason,”
that is, the paradigm of substitution, in finding the absent proper word;
thus, it is to restore the proper term for which an improper term had been
substituted. In principle the restitutive paraphrase is exhaustive, so the
algebraic sum of substitution and subsequent restitution is zero. Here
we have the postulate of “exhaustive paraphrase.” (52)
This conception of metaphor, which is part of the heritage from Aristotle, has
received a number of theoretical reformulations. In particular, Ricoeur subscribes to
Max Black’s conception of metaphor in terms of interaction. The point here is that
the semantics of metaphor is not exhausted by reference to a principle of substitution
between one and another sign, between literal and figural sense, but must be
expanded in terms of interaction between the linguistic expression and the contextual
determination and counter-determination within the sentence. Thus, the metaphor
signals its appearance as a breach in the semantic expectations of a specific context.
The substitution-metaphor operates on the level of signs: the metaphor is conceived
as a substitution of one sign for another. By contrast, the interaction-metaphor
operates on a sentence-level, where the metaphor is a break with the contextual
expectations: the metaphor is conceived as an interaction with a context.
Some of the implications of Ricoeur’s theoretical distinction between
substitution-metaphor and interaction-metaphor become clearer when we consider
the poetic metaphor “flower” (Blume). According to the classical substitution-theory,
the “flower” metaphor might be read as a figural expression that represents a sense
of hope. The growing flower, accordingly, stands for a growing or rekindled hope for
the future. According to the interaction-theory, the “flower” metaphor does not
merely represent a sense of psychological hope, but it also metapoetically represents
a sense of linguistic meaning, which had previously been absent. These
metalinguistic dimensions are indicated by expressions such as “wir fanden/ das
Wort,” “Blindenwort,” and “Ein Wort noch.” Thus, the “flower” is a metaphor that
indicates a sense of linguistic meaning. Both of these senses of the metaphor—the
flower as hope and the flower as meaning—receive yet another layer when we
consider the “flower” metaphor as a nexus of intertextual associations. As several
commentators have pointed out, Celan’s poem alludes to a famous line in Hölderlin’s
poem “Brod und Wein” (1884):
. . . nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes,
Nun, nun müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn. (stanza 5, 17-18)
Kim-Su Rasmussen 27
Initially, the verse lines seem to present an analogy between words and flowers,
between language and non-linguistic reality. Paul de Man’s discussion of Hölderlin’s
verse turns on an asymmetrical parallelism between language and nature:
The word “entstehn” establishes another fundamental distinction. The
two terms of the simile are not said to be identical with one another (the
word = the flower), nor analogous in their general mode of being (the
word is like the flower), but specifically in the way they originate (the
word originates like the flower). The similarity between the two terms
does not reside in their essence (identity), or in their appearance
(analogy), but in the manner in which both originate. . . . It would follow
then, since the intent of the poetic word is to originate like the flower,
that it strives to banish all metaphor, to become entirely literal. (3-4)
In a note, de Man emphasizes: “The line is ambiguous, depending on whether one
gives the verb ‘entstehn’ a single or a double subject. It can mean: words will
originate that are like flowers (‘Worte, die wie Blumen sind, müssen dafür entstehn’).
But the meaning is much richer if one reads it: words will have to originate in the
same way that flowers originate (‘Worte müssen dafür entstehn wie Blumen
entstehn’). Syntax and punctuation allow for both readings” (291n1).
The natural flower, according to de Man, emerges as an epiphany, as a
disclosure of its own idea, its principle. The poetic expression seeks to emerge in a
similar manner, but it is ultimately doomed in its endeavor to emerge like the flower.
While the flower emerges from the same, from its own idea, the word emerges from
something different, from something other than itself. “This type of imagery is
grounded in the intrinsic ontological primacy of the natural object. Poetic language
seems to originate in the desire to draw closer and closer to the ontological status of
the object” (de Man 3-4). Thus, like Sartre in L'Être et le néant, de Man falls back
into an ontological dualism between in-itself (nature) and for-itself (unhappy
consciousness in Sartre, the romantic image in de Man), with the latter longing for a
return to the in-itself. The relation between natural flower and poetic word, according
to de Man, is determined by an asymmetric parallelism (Andersen 165-72).
Gottfried Benn maintains in his famous speech “Probleme der Lyrik” that the
expression “like” (wie) is a breach of the poetic vision and a weakness of the creative
transformation (513). The visionary power of poetry is weakened by the simile which
emphasizes analogical or identical aspects at the cost of differences. Heidegger
28 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
objects that, although it may be accurate in certain instances, such an interpretation
is inappropriate in the case of Hölderlin’s verse:
Wir blieben in der Metaphysik hängen, wollten wir dieses Nennen
Hölderlins in der Wendung »Worte, wie Blumen« für eine Metapher
halten. (Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache 207)
Initially, we might paraphrase Heidegger’s statement along the following lines: if we
interpret Hölderlin’s line “Worte, wie Blumen” as a metaphor, or in terms of
metaphor, then we remain stuck in metaphysics. Here, to begin, it is perhaps
worthwhile to abstain from translating the passage, at least for two reasons.
Heidegger’s idiosyncratic language is near-impossible to translate without an
extensive number of footnotes unpacking some of the semantic nuances. Second, the
movement of translation is, if not identical, then at least closely affiliated with the
movement of the metaphor. In this context, although it is unclear what exactly
Heidegger understands by metaphor and by metaphysics, it is fairly clear that he seeks
to associate metaphor and metaphysics in some manner. Perhaps we might
understand the association of the two terms in the following loose or approximate
sense: if we understand Hölderlin’s poetic line concerning words and flowers in terms
of metaphor, i.e. as a process of substitution between literal and figural sense, then
we remain within the horizon of metaphysics as a set of presuppositions concerning
physical and non-physical being as well as the difference between the two domains.
In the book Der Satz vom Grund, in which one of the issues is to hear the
difference in tonality between “Nichts ist ohne Grund” and “Nichts ist ohne Grund,”
Heidegger discusses a listening and visual mode of thinking of the relation (Einklang)
between “ist” and “Grund.” He writes:
Fassen wir das Denken als eine Art Hören und Sehen, dann wird das
sinnliche Hören und Sehen übernommen und hinübergenommen in den
Bereich des nicht-sinnlichen Vernehmens, d.h. des Denkens. Solches
Hinübertragen heisst griechisch metaphérein. Die Gelehrtensprache
nennt eine solche Übertragung Metapher. (Heidegger, Der Satz vom
Grund 86-87)
Heidegger maintains that hearing is never simply a mere sensuous activity. The ear
is a necessary condition for the realization of hearing; yet, it is not the ear, but a
Kim-Su Rasmussen 29
subject, an I, that listens and hears. Thus, a “listening thinking,” according to
Heidegger, does not amount to a figural or metaphorical listening:
Die Vorstellung von »übertragen« und von der Metapher beruht auf der
Unterscheidung, wenn nicht gar Trennung des Sinnlichen und
Nichtsinnlichen als zweier für sich bestehender Bereiche. (88-89)
Here, in this quasi-definition of metaphor, Heidegger establishes a fairly
straightforward equivalence between the metaphor and the distinction between
sensible and non-sensible. The metaphor “beruht auf”—relies upon or is conditioned
by—the distinction between sensible and non-sensible. The expression “beruht auf”
indicates a relation in which something is conditioned by something else, in which
something finds its ground in something else. Thus, the distinction between sensible
and non-sensible is the ground, the foundation, the condition of the metaphor.
However, as we recall, it is precisely such a “grounding” rationality that Heidegger
questions in Der Satz vom Grund. If Heidegger maintains that the metaphor is
grounded in and by the distinction between sensible and non-sensible, then it seems
inevitable that his quasi-definition of metaphor is the precise location of a strange
and paradoxical aporia.
However, this aporia is seemingly glossed over in his famous dictum: “Das
Metaphorische gibt es nur innerhalb der Metaphysik” (89). The “innerhalb,” which
employs a spatial metaphor, describes the relation between “the metaphorical” (das
Metaphorische) and “metaphysics” (der Metaphysik). Here, again, by employing a
spatial metaphor to describe the relation between metaphor and metaphysics,
Heidegger seems to run into an aporia, perhaps an unavoidable aporia, in which the
writing contradicts the statement. Thus, in Heidegger’s ruminations on metaphor and
metaphysics, he describes the relation partly in terms of grounding/grounded (beruht
auf) and partly in terms of inside/outside (innerhalb).
Throughout the exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida, there is an explicit, as
well as implicit, taking position vis-à-vis Heidegger’s statement from Der Satz vom
Grund that the metaphorical only exists, only is given, or only appears within
metaphysics. Previously, Ricoeur and Derrida had disagreed on the interpretation of
Freud: Ricoeur had established a paradigm of interpretation, which Derrida had
challenged directly. Now, in the debate about metaphor, the roles have been reversed:
Ricoeur directly challenges Heidegger’s position, which he claims is also, implicitly
if not explicitly, the position of Derrida. In opposition to Heidegger’s association of
metaphor and metaphysics, Ricoeur maintains that Heidegger’s quasi-definition of
30 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
metaphor in terms of the distinction between sensible and non-sensible does not
account in a satisfactory manner for the wide range of semantic nuances of metaphor.
Heidegger’s famous statement concerning metaphor and metaphysics,
according to Ricoeur,
suggests that the trans-gression of meta-phor and that of meta-physics
are but one and the same transfer. Several things are implied here: first,
that the ontology implicit in the entire rhetorical tradition is that of
Western “metaphysics” of the Platonic or neo-Platonic type, where the
soul is transported from the visible world to the invisible world; second,
that meta-phorical means transfer from the proper sense to the figurative
sense; finally, that both transfers constitute one and the same Übertragung. (The Rule of Metaphor 331)
In this passage, Ricoeur explicates the meaning of the “beruht auf” and the “innerhalb”
as an identification of two distinct processes. Heidegger’s position maintains an
“equivalence of the two transfers,” which, according to Ricoeur, is the “metaphysical
transfer of the sensible to the non-sensible, metaphorical transfer of the literal to the
figurative” (The Rule of Metaphor 332). Thus, Ricoeur suggests that Heidegger’s
association of metaphor and metaphysics in terms of a strict equivalence is
problematic for several reasons: first, it is questionable whether these two processes
have anything but superficial resemblance in common, and, second, even if the case
could be made for a deep or substantial association of the two processes, it would
strictly speaking only be applicable to a definition of metaphor as a word-for-word
substitution. Thus, Ricoeur emphasizes that Heidegger’s statement concerning
metaphor is restricted to the metaphor-substitution, but it does not account for the
metaphor-interaction.
Ricoeur unpacks Heidegger’s statement as follows: Heidegger states that the
substitution-metaphor is given or appears within metaphysics (understood in NeoPlatonic terms), but he says nothing about the interaction-metaphor or metaphor as
semantic interaction between expression and context. Thus, by sharply distinguishing
substitution-metaphor and interaction-metaphor, Ricoeur effectively circumscribes
Heidegger’s claim that there is some deep association between metaphor and
metaphysics.
One might assume that Ricoeur’s position is further strengthened by the earlier
observation that Heidegger’s determination of metaphor in terms of its “grounding”
in the distinction between sensible and non-sensible, or the spatial relation of
Kim-Su Rasmussen 31
metaphor “within” metaphysics, reveals an inner aporia, or set of aporias, whereby
the text contradicts its statement. In this disputation between Heidegger and Ricoeur,
it is Ricoeur, no doubt, who comes out as the most convincing.
Ricoeur’s interpretation of Heidegger is animated by a further claim: Derrida
takes over and extends Heidegger’s association of metaphor and metaphysics. Thus,
to challenge Heidegger’s position is simultaneously to challenge Derrida’s position.
However, it is noteworthy that Derrida, in his discussion of Heidegger’s association
of metaphor and metaphysics, maintains a certain distance, even reservation,
concerning the precise manner of association between the two terms:
This explains the distrust that the concept of metaphor inspires in
Heidegger. In Der Satz vom Grund he insists above all on the opposition
sensory/nonsensory, an important, but neither the only, nor the first, nor
the most determining characteristic of the value of metaphor. (Derrida,
Margins of Philosophy 226n29)
These reservations, these qualifications, indicate that Derrida is well aware of the
restrictions, the limitations, and the weaknesses in Heidegger’s correlation—the
“beruht auf” and the “innerhalb”—of metaphor and metaphysics. Nevertheless, while
Derrida remains skeptical of the letter, he maintains the spirit of the correlation
between metaphor and metaphysics. In other words, Derrida seeks to provide a better
conception of metaphor, one that draws on Nietzsche’s famous description of the
worn out metaphor, which is able to account for such a correlation between metaphor
and metaphysics.
III
From this point onwards, when Celan’s poem “Blume” alludes to Hölderlin’s
famous verse lines in “Brod und Wein,” it is not merely a recuperation of the simile
between words and flowers, but also, and more importantly, a grammatical quotation:
“Ein Wort noch, wie dies, und. . . .” The demonstrative pronoun “dies” does not
simply refer to another word, to “Blume,” but indicates a grammatical location, which
remains open for a word to come. In other words, Celan’s poetic flower indicates a
sense of psychological hope, a sense of renewed meaning, and a grammatical
anticipation of a word to come, which, arguably, and with a number of restrictions,
might point beyond metaphysics as a form of utopia (Lyon 69). Celan’s poem, at this
stage of our interpretation, adds a utopian dimension to the psychological sense of
32 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
rekindled hope and the metalinguistic sense of renewal of meaning. But,
unsurprisingly, it does not stop here.
If the semantic density of the poem’s flower metaphor was already manifest in
the intertextual allusions to Hölderlin’s famous verse lines in “Brod und Wein,” it
becomes even clearer in the allusions to a famous passage in Mallarmé’s “Crise de
vers.”
A quoi bon la merveille de transposer un fait de nature en sa presque
disparition vibratoire selon le jeu de la parole, cependant; si ce n’est
pour qu’en émane, sans la gêne d’un proche ou concret rappel, la notion
pure.
Je dis: une fleur! et hors de l’oubli où ma voix relègue aucun contour,
en tant que quelque chose d’autre que les calices sus, musicalement se
lève, idée même et suave, l’absente de tous bousquets. (279)
Several Celan scholars have pointed to the intertextual relations between Celan’s and
Mallarmé’s texts (Meinecke 245; Bogumil 29-30; Fioretos 172). Initially, we might
discern four main elements in this passage: the bouquet of flowers (un fait de nature),
the linguistic articulation (le jeu de la parole), the recall (hors de l’oubli), and the
mild or pure idea (la notion pure). We might interpret this passage as an interaction
between nature and language, between presence and absence, allocating a certain
priority to the natural phenomenon, which the linguistic articulation, “le jeu de la
parole,” negates, thereby preparing the appearance, or more precisely the recall, of a
synthesis, the “notion pure,” which mediates, overcomes, and sublates the difference
between nature and language. This model of interpretation has been widely influential:
modernism in general, and Symbolism in particular, rejects the mimetic-referential
paradigm of realism, promoting instead a vision of poetic language as a creation of
an autonomous symbolic dimension that anticipates—or recalls—something new.
Here, attempting to displace Mallarmé from mainstream modernism, one might
object that such an interpretation does not sufficiently take into account the precise
formulation “en sa presque disparition vibratoire,” which indicates an unfinished
process of disappearance. The natural phenomenon is marked in language as a trace,
a musical effect, an echo, which is neither presence (as natural phenomenon) or
absence (as linguistic meaning), but remains in a state of indeterminacy, in a state of
becoming, suspended between nature and language, between presence and absence.
The difference between nature and language is the precise location of an “arche-
Kim-Su Rasmussen 33
writing” or a “grammatological unconscious” that conditions the differentiation
between the two domains in the first place. In other words, if the modernist reading
of Mallarmé operates with three dimensions—a natural flower, a linguistic flower,
and a symbolic flower that synthesizes the natural and linguistic flowers—then a
deconstructive reading adds another layer, an “arche-flower,” which is located
somewhere in the grey area between natural and linguistic flower.
This layer of meaning is radically unstable and polysemous. Perhaps this
becomes clearer when we contemplate a certain ambiguity in the expression “Je dis:
une fleur!” Initially, we might read the colon as a continuous movement, which
unfolds or explicates that which is said: the speaking subject pronounces the words
“une fleur.” However, this colon is unstable, polysemous, and we might read it in an
entirely different sense, in a different direction, whereby a much broader layer of
meaning becomes apparent: it is “je dis,” which is a flower. Here, in a dizzying
reversal, it is the notion of an autonomous subject, appearing transparent to itself in
the act of speaking, which becomes problematic insofar as it is a metaphor, or
embedded in a metaphorical textuality, which it can neither avoid nor master. This
metaphorical textuality, of course, is not to be confused with the restricted metaphor,
which the speaking subject is able to articulate, precisely because it is the speaking
subject itself, the “je dis,” which is revealed as a metaphor that has effaced its own
metaphorical characteristics. We might describe this as Mallarmé’s poetic anti-cogito.
It is this layer of meaning, this dizzying perspective, which becomes evident at
the end of Derrida’s essay “White Mythology”:
Such a flower always bears its double within itself. . . . And it can always
become a dried flower in a book. There is always, absent from every
garden, a dried flower in a book. (Margins of Philosophy 271)
A book, not to be confused with a text, is already marked by a metaphor, neither
present nor absent, but latent, inscribed as a still vibrating trace, which has effaced
its own metaphorical textuality. The reversal in Mallarmé’s text, the reversal from
the subject saying “a flower” to the “I say” as a flower, might be read as an indication
of a broader reversal between concept and metaphor: rhetorical-philosophical
concepts of metaphor are already inscribed in the distinctions between literal and
figural meaning, which they seek to grasp:
Each time that a rhetoric defines metaphor, not only is a philosophy
implied, but also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself has
34 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
been constituted. Moreover each thread in this network forms a turn, or
one might say a metaphor, if that notion were not too derivative here.
What is defined, therefore, is implied in the defining of the definition.
(230; emphasis in original)
Thus, while Derrida rejects the letter, he maintains and improves the spirit of
Heidegger’s propositions concerning the relation between metaphor and metaphysics.
The innovation, on Derrida’s part, consists in extending the famous text by Nietzsche
on “Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” where truth is considered to be a moveable
army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms, where truth and other
metaphysical concepts are metaphors that have become worn out and have lost their
sensuous force (Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind) (Vol
I, 880-81). In another text, less famous but equally radical, Nietzsche claims that time,
space, and causality are mere epistemic metaphors (Erkenntnis metaphern) that we
employ to reflexively interpret things (mit denen wir die Dinge uns deuten) (Vol 7,
484). Thus, drawing on Nietzsche, Derrida can maintain that Heidegger, on this
particular point, was too pious: it is not merely the case that metaphors only exist,
only appear, within metaphysics; rather, metaphysical concepts such as truth, time,
space, and causality are metaphors that have erased their own metaphoricity.
Here, there is no question of limiting the dialectical relation between concept
and metaphor, whereby the concept via negativa is able to delimit and incorporate
the metaphor in its domain, but rather of pushing the relation beyond its boundaries
and towards a point of reversal, where the relation itself is turned upside down and
the concept inscribed in a general metaphorical textuality. The metaphorical
textuality, the reservoir of dead metaphors, is the domain of a grammatological
unconscious, which manifests itself behind our backs and against our intentions; it is
a realm of unrestricted polyvalence, and philosophical or metaphysical concepts,
according to Derrida, are constituted through a necessary limitation and repression of
this unrestricted polyvalence. Metaphysics, according to Derrida, is constituted
through an original repression of metaphor.
It is this position that provokes Ricoeur to no end, and this is the real target of
the book The Rule of Metaphor. In his discussion of Derrida’s essay “White
Mythology,” Ricoeur maintains:
Two assertions can be discerned in the tight fabric of Derrida’s
demonstration. The first has to do with the efficacy of worn-out
metaphor in philosophical discourse, and the second with the deep-
Kim-Su Rasmussen 35
seated unity of metaphorical and analogical transfer of visible being to
intelligible being. (336)
The second assertion concerning a unity between the metaphorical transfer of literal
and figural meaning and the metaphysical transfer of sensible and intelligible being,
according to Ricoeur, is shared by Derrida and Heidegger (Gasché 301-318; Cazeaux
175-198). However, Ricoeur recognizes that the first assertion concerning the effects
of dead metaphor in philosophical discourse is far more important: “We must
understand that here it is not a question of the genesis of empirical concepts but of
the primary philosophemes, those that define the field of metaphysics: theoria, eidos,
logos, etc. The thesis can be stated as follows: wherever metaphor fades, there the
metaphysical concept rises up” (The Rule of Metaphor 338). The issue, for Ricoeur,
is that the “primary philosophemes” such as “truth” are seemingly reduced to
resurrections of dead metaphors.
Ricoeur maintains a sharp distinction between two analytical levels, between
the sign and the sentence, thereby enabling a sharp distinction between the
phenomenon of wear and tear as simple catachresis and the phenomenon of proper
conceptualization. Even if metaphorical transfer and dialectical conceptualization are
both operational in the worn or dead metaphor, they are nevertheless distinct
operations: “If these two operations were not distinct, we could not even speak of the
concept of wearing away, nor of the concept of metaphor; in truth, there could be no
philosophical terms. That there are philosophical terms is due to the fact that a
concept can be active as thought in a metaphor which is itself dead” (346). In spite
of the wear on metaphor, the concept is able to renew itself through the revival of the
dead metaphor: “Applying these remarks on the formation of the concept in its
schema to the concept of metaphor is enough to dispel the paradox of the
metaphoricity of all definitions of metaphor. Speaking metaphorically of metaphor is
not at all circular, since the act of positing the concept proceeds dialectically from
metaphor itself” (346). Hereby Ricoeur maintains that the meaning of the
metaphysical concept is distinct from and independent of the material signifier.
One of the dividing points between Ricoeur and Derrida is whether the meaning
of a concept is independent of or dependent on the materiality of language. According
to Ricoeur, the distinction between different levels, between the substitutionmetaphor and the interaction-metaphor, allows us to conceive of a concept as a
creation or renewal of meaning taking place in a dead metaphor. The concept, in other
words, is bound to but distinct from the materiality of language. By contrast, Derrida
maintains, at least in this text, that concepts are embedded in textual situations, which
36 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
the concept can neither exhaust nor transcend. In other words, the issue is whether
the meaning of a concept is autonomous vis-à-vis the materiality of language: Ricoeur
maintains that the concept is able to establish autonomy of meaning through dead
metaphors, while Derrida maintains that concepts, on principle, are unable to
transcend the materiality of language.
IV
In a restricted sense, the issue at stake is a theory of poetic metaphors and the
implications for the interpretation of such poetic metaphors. However, both parties
to the debate understand the issue to be much more than that. Taking the lead from
Nietzsche, the debate is whether truth, time, space, and causality are mere metaphors
that we employ in our interpretations of things. In Ricoeur’s terms, the issue in The
Rule of Metaphor is to rethink the semantics of symbols, but with metaphor as a more
restricted and precise framework. In Derrida’s terms, the issue is whether
philosophical concepts are able to transcend the materiality of language and establish
a domain of rationality that is universally valid. The “querelle de la métaphore,” it
seems, has less to do with metaphors in a strictly poetological sense than with the
possibility of metaphysical concepts to establish autonomous meaning. Ricoeur
defends an “idealistic” position that seeks to establish universally valid norms of
rationality. Derrida, by contrast, promotes an “anti-idealistic” position that maintains
how concepts are veiled metaphors, how norms are veiled expressions of particular
interests.
The question that I would like to emphasize, while bracketing the wider
philosophical implications of this debate, is whether and to what extent the
speculative or theoretical differences have implications for practical interpretations
of poetic metaphors. In order to frame the debate within a context of practical
exegesis, I propose the hermeneutic circle as a useful guideline through this debate.
The hermeneutic circle, as is well known, is one of the oldest principles of
interpretation which proposes to interpret the meaning of specific parts in terms of
the whole and the whole in terms of the parts. The concept of the hermeneutic circle,
of course, is itself an example of a concept that operates within a dead or worn
metaphor.
The concept of the hermeneutic circle might be extended in at least four
directions, which concern the specific content of the whole in question. First, we
might interpret the work as an expressive part of an oeuvre that spans the entire
productive life of the author. Second, the work might be seen as a formal whole, an
Kim-Su Rasmussen 37
autonomous aesthetic entity, which establishes the framework for the interpretation
of specific parts. Third, we might consider the work as a part that reflects, directly or
indirectly, in one way or another, the broader historical context. And, fourth, we
might consider the work to be part of an unruly intertextual network, which subverts
“genealogical trees” in favor of “rhizomes,” to borrow a term from Deleuze and
Guattari.
These four directions of the hermeneutic circle establish a first “horizontal”
plane of interpretation. A second “vertical” plane might be said to intersect with the
first. On the vertical plane, the first position is established by discourses that
emphasize the literal or non-figurative sense as unambiguous referentiality to
nonlinguistic experience. The second position is associated with the “hermeneutics
of suspicion” whereby an apparent or surface level of meaning is supplemented by a
latent or hidden level of meaning. The Freudian interpretation of dreams, in many
ways, establishes a paradigmatic model for such an interpretation of a hidden depth.
Derrida, in many ways, belongs to the hermeneutics of suspicion, which
considers the conscious ego to be a stranger in its own house. However, it is more
accurate to characterize his position as a “suspicion of suspicion,” a hermeneutics of
suspicion to the second degree. Thus, it is not merely the patient, but also, and more
importantly, the analyst, who is caught in the web of the unconscious. Derrida’s
innovation is what we might describe as a grammatological unconscious, which
concerns a form of writing or tracing or intertextuality as a domain of unbounded
signification that subsists underneath the surface of the text in a traditional sense.
Who speaks in and through this form of textuality? The answer, according to Derrida,
is a “neutral voice” that belongs to nobody in particular.
By contrast, Ricoeur seeks to recuperate the subject from the various modalities
of the unconscious. Ricoeur considers both the immediate experiences of selfconsciousness (the literal sense as reference to nonlinguistic experience) as well as
the experiences of the alienated consciousness (the Freudian interpretation of dreams,
the Derridean interpretation of textuality) to be particular stages of a development;
they are manifestations of a process, an extended detour, which passes from
immediate subject through alienated subject to reflected subject of language, action,
and responsibility. Hermeneutics, in this sense, is an extended detour to oneself.
In short, we might describe the hermeneutic circle as an interpretive principle
that extends horizontally in the form of expressive, formal, contextual, and
intertextual modes of interpretation; however, this horizontal extension is
supplemented by a vertical extension, where immediate consciousness (literal
38 Concentric 45.1 March 2019
referentiality) and suspicious consciousness (Freud) is further intensified in terms of
hyper-suspicious consciousness (Derrida) and symbolic consciousness (Ricoeur).
One might say that Celan’s poem “Blume” complicates a simple or
straightforward conception of referentiality as a correspondence between linguistic
and nonlinguistic reality, between language and experience. This complication is
manifest in the density of the poem’s central metaphor, which implies at least four
dimensions: a natural flower, a linguistic flower, a symbolic flower that synthesizes
the natural and the linguistic flower, and, finally, a grammatological or intertextual
flower that implies a radical semantic multivocity. We might interpret these different
layers of metaphor as indicating a sense of hope, a sense of renewal of language and
meaning, a sense of utopia, and a sense of intertextuality whereby the speaking
subject is merely a point of intersection in a strictly unbounded domain of impersonal
discourse.
The density of the central metaphor does not mean that referentiality is
suspended; nor does it mean that all linguistic referentiality is folded back into itself
in solipsistic autoreferential statements; rather, it means that poetic referentiality is
given a temporal inflection. If we think of the poem’s referential structure as an
appointment with nonlinguistic referentiality, as an encounter, an event, then in a
sense, the poetic language is both “too early,” “too late,” and “on time,” which
combines a prefigurative, a refigurative, and a configurative relation to nonlinguistic
referents.
When considering the semantic density that characterizes the central metaphor
in Celan’s poem “Blume,” it seems fruitful to draw on Derrida’s notion of
metaphoricity as a grammatological unconscious, as an unbounded realm of
multivocity, which disperses and multiplies meaning in all directions. Celan’s flower
associates to Hölderlin’s words-like-flowers, Mallarmé’s poetic anti-cogito, as well
as many others. His flower is blooming in many directions. However, following
Ricoeur’s interpretive strategy, it seems equally fruitful to attempt to reunite the
multiple fragments of meaning into some sort of coherent interpretation. These two
interpretive strategies, while theoretically divergent, are practically convergent.
Conclusion
The exchange between Ricoeur and Derrida around metaphor is an
extraordinary chapter in modern intellectual history. Both thinkers establish positions
that go beyond the paradigm of Freudian psychoanalysis, where the discourse of the
analysand is governed by unconscious forces, while the analyst is able to decode the
Kim-Su Rasmussen 39
hidden or latent meaning of the manifest discourse. For Derrida, the goal is to expose
the second-degree illusions of the analyst, who claims to be positioned outside of that
which is analyzed. For Ricoeur, the goal is to work through and overcome the
difference between analysand and analyst, reinstating the subject as a reflected agent
of interpretation and action.
Derrida’s emphasis on metaphors that subvert the domain of concepts is an
extraordinary line of thought that opens new avenues for the interpretation of poetry
and other complex symbolic entities. The object of interpretation contains an excess,
which the interpreter is unable to exhaust in a conceptual discourse. The strength of
his position is the practice of reading, which is characterized by an emphasis on
“hypersignificant parts” that have escaped the attention of more traditional strategies
of reading. However, a weakness is that his position rarely accommodates the demand,
or the desire, whether justified or unjustified, for integration of the semantic parts
into a semantic whole. Ricoeur, by contrast, emphasizes the whole, and the ongoing
integration of new semantic parts into the semantic whole. This extends not merely
to specific metaphors, but characterizes his philosophical project in general. As
Johann Michel writes: “Ricoeur’s hermeneutics seeks to provide a mediation between
tradition, modernity, and post-modernity” (66). In this sense, his philosophical
position and his reading strategy is less subversive, more accommodating.
The theoretical differences between Ricoeur and Derrida when it comes to
metaphor ought to be viewed, at least partly, from a practical perspective, i.e., the
practical interpretation of metaphors, where their divergence is much less dramatic
than it might first appear. The strength of Derrida’s position, on this particular point,
is an emphasis on the hypersignificant parts that escape our concepts. The strength of
Ricoeur’s position is the labor of the concept that seeks to mediate between
oppositions and integrate the various semantic parts into a new whole. In other words,
they emphasize different aspects of the hermeneutic circle. The central question in
this debate between Derrida and Ricoeur is not their theoretical or speculative
differences, but the discovery of a “deeper” agreement in terms of the demand for
interpretation that follows from these speculations. When we seek to translate
Derrida’s and Ricoeur’s conceptions into practical interpretations of specific
metaphors, their speculative divergence appears less important than their practical
convergence.
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About the Author
Kim-Su Rasmussen, PhD, is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Chonnam
National University, South Korea. His research focuses on Post-Hermeneutics broadly
conceived. His publications have appeared in Theory, Culture & Society, Seminar: A Journal
of Germanic Studies, Orbis Litterarum, and other journals.
[Received 30 July 2018; accepted 7 December 2018]