The Challenges of Federalism system in Somalia

THE CHALLENGES OF FEDERALISM SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA A CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA SUBMITTED BY ABDIRASHID ISMAIL NOR A RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF AN AWARD FOR A DEGREE IN MASTER IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS KAMPALA UNIVERSITY JUNE, 2014 1 DECLARATION AND COPYRIGHT I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the Author, University of Kampala and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree. I give consent to this copy of my thesis when deposited in the University Library, being made available for loan and photocopying, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Oct 2014. The author acknowledges that copyright of published works contained within this thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of those works. I also give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University’s digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University and Author to restrict access for a period of time. Further information: Mobile phone: +2526-15961655 Email: wardheere10@gmail.com Signature:________________________ Date:______/______/_______ 2 3 APPROVAL This research report has been done under my supervision as a university supervisor and submitted with my approval. Signature:_______________________ Date :________/_______/__________ Monica A. Ssengendo (Mrs.) 4 Dedication To my parents who taught me discipline and patience, my Allah reward and forgive, my wife and my children who share with me the hard time and gave me support while I was preparing this dissertation and all hardworking and dedicated Somali federalism analyst who play a crucial role in Federalism challenges and sustainable good governance, stability and peace prosperity in long-term. 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENT In the name of ALLAH, most beneficent, most merciful. May the blessing and mercy peace upon him our prophet Mohamed. S. A. W. My thanks to ALLAH the first and last. This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people. i would like to acknowledge the inspirational instruction and guidance my supervisor Monica A. Ssengendo (Mrs). She has given me a deep appreciation and detail for this subject. Monica was read my numerous revisions and helped make some sense of the confusion.. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Prof. Najib Sheikh, president of the Hope University and coordinator of graduate studies at Kampala university for their concern and assistance. My sincere appreciation to the team supported me for Data collection from Mogadishu, Garowe, Bosaso, Kismayo and Baidao. Thanks Raqiya and Mi'raj Mogadishu team leaders, Mr. Shure for Baidao team leader, Kenadid Abdiaziz for Garowe and Bosaso team leader and friends from other areas who contributed me to the data collection process and procedure. I would also like to thanks the support and assistance given me by the Dr. Ulusow, Somali political analysts and writer and Prof. Hassan Mahadallah, professor of southern university, department of political science and others who have been very generous support of my academic pursuit and my theses. Also my co-worker has contributed ideas, feedback and advice. Zakaria Ismail, in particular assisted this research and design as well as his research experience. Finally, I would very like to thanks to my wife Malyun H. Hussein for her love patience, thoughtful, support and encouragement. I couldn't have completed my dissertation with her assistance, tolerance and enthusiasm and numerous friends who endured this long process with me, always offering support and love. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE………………………………………………………….. 1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY……………………………………… 1 PROBLEM STATEMENT……………………………………………….. 4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY………………………………………………… 5 CONTENT SCOPE…………………………………………………………….. 5 GEOGRAPHICAL 5 SCOPE………………………………………………………. TIME SCOPE………………………………………………………………... 5 DEFINITION OF TERMS……………………………………………….. 6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY…………………………………………….. 6 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY………………………………………….. 6 GENERAL 6 OBJECTIVES……………………………………………………….. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES……………………………………………………….. 7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS………………………………………………. 7 CHAPTER TWO…………………………………………………………. 9 LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………… 9 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 9 VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF FEDERALISM………………………….. 10 THEORIES OF FEDERALISM………………………………………….. 12 THE HISTORY OF FEDERALISM IN SOMALIA…………………….. 14 WHAT DOES FEDERALISM MEAN IN SOMALIA?............................ 16 CHALLENGES OF FEDERAL ISM SYSTEM…………………………. 17 CONTRIBUTION OF FEDERALISM SYSTEM TO THE PEACE…….. 28 FEDERALISM ADVANTAGES………………………………………… 32 FEDERALISM’S DISADVANTAGES………………………………….. 34 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY……………………………………………. 34 CHAPTER THREE……………………………………………………. 35 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY…………………………………………. 35 7 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 35 RESEARCH DESIGN……………………………………………………. 35 STUDY AREA AND POLLUTION……………………………………... 35 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE………………………………………………. 36 SAMPLE SIZE……………………………………………………………. 36 SOURCES OF THE DATA………………………………………………. 38 PRIMARY DATA………………………………………………………………. 38 SECONDARY 38 DATA……………………………………………………………. DATA COLLECTION METHODS……………………………………… 38 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE…………………………………… 38 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION…………………………. 39 CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………… 41 DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS……. 41 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 41 FINDINGS………………………………………………………………… 41 ANTICIPATED CONSTRAINTS………………………………………... 39 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY………………………………………… 39 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION…………………………………………… 39 CHAPTER FIVE……………………………………………………….. 59 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS………. 59 RECOMMENDATION………………………………………………………….. 67 REFFERENCES…………………………………………………………… 72 APPENDICES……………………………………………………………... 74 APPENDIX I: WORK 74 PLAN…………………………………………………….. APPENDIX II: RESEARCH BUDGET…………………………………... 75 APPENDIX III: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION………………………… 76 APPENDIX IV QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW 78 ….………………………….. 8 9 ABSTRACT Much has been written about the putative virtues and vices of federal and unitary systems of government, but little empirical testing of the impact of such systems on the quality of governance has been conducted. The research takes up a series of theoretical debates put forth by advocates of federalism, including competition among sub national governments, fiscal federalism, veto points, accountability, and the size of government. In each case, there is room for doubt about the practical impact of federalism system on governance. The main objective of this study to investigate the challenges of federalism system of Governance on domestic politics in Somalia, undertake the understanding of the federalism regarding Somalia community and insure the kind of government structure which Somali people prefer. The study focused on the challenges of federalism system in Somalia, a case study of Somali Federal Government between 2009 and 2013; this time scope provides adequate information to the problem under investigation. The target populations of this study focus on the most effective Ministries, parliament Ministry of civil services, ministry of finance and planning, ministry of defense, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Ministry of natural resources. Also, constitution affairs committees and interior and federal committee and the most effective Somali civil society and scholars. The researcher used closed-ended and a few open-ended questionnaires. The researcher will directly distribute questionnaires to the respondents. Personally for the analysis of the data obtained. In this case questionnaires will be self-administered to allow further probing and clarification of unclear issues. After the collection of the converted into numbers to enable analyzing and describe the data systematically to reach logical conclusions on the effect of the study variables. Editing of data was used to check for errors and slips to ensure accuracy and reliability of data. Data was analyzed and processed electronically using statistical package for social scientists (SPSS). 10 Findings show that the Current federalism system of governance of Somalia is based on clan rather than by Population. The majority of the people agreed that current federal is based on by clan, 78% out of 92 reported that current federal based on clan while few of the respondents believe that it's based on regions. The study recommended that Federalism shall accomplish the task of preserving national unity through the distribution of powers and sovereignty between the central state and the autonomous territorial entities operating within it. It shall ensure the peaceful coexistence of peoples, while recognizing their diversity. Also Place much greater emphasis on reconciliation, both with armed factions and on a national level between clans. Provide support to local peace and reconciliation conferences that can feed into larger regional conferences only after most local disputes have been resolved. These conferences should be completed before implementing the federal and elections. Furthermore, The federal government must cultivate the trust of the Somali people. Through participation and awareness that everything happening in the country belongs to them and represents their best interest and reducing the public hesitation that foreigners are using tool to exploit the resources of the nation by divide and rule. The main challenges to the federal experiment emanate from three inter-related categories of problem: the absence of functional institutions, the problems of security and continuing and conflicting different clan interests. All these impinge strongly on the federal experiment. 11 12 LIST OF TABLES Table1: Gender of Respondents Table2: Marital status of the respondents. Table 3: Respondents Age. Table4: The Level of Education of the respondents. Table 5: Occupation of Respondents. Table 7: The federalism system of government is appropriate to Somalia. Table 8: Federal system will perform in Somalia simply and shortly. Table 10: Establishment of the federal states in the country is based on fair and community participation. Table 11: The implementation of the regional states took part in all the communities living in the regions, Table12: The current federal states in Somalia based on by clan not by region. Table 13: The federalism system will causes some conflicts between communities reside in the regions. Table 14: The federal system is a thought from Somali community. Table 15: Federalism system will take part to build up trust and cooperation between regions, governments and among community. Table 16: Federalism is a something that will divide the country and people. Table 17: Federalism as a system of government has positive impact to the community and the country. Table 18: Federalism system will contribute Somali peace process. Table 19: Federalism system is not suitable such community have same religious, language and culture but, appropriate people with different religious, language and culture. 13 Table 20: Before the accord of federalism was not conduct study and assessment from the community about their wish and keen 14 ACRONYMS AOS ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ASEAN OUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS ASWJ AHLU SUNNA WAL JAMA'AH AU AFRICAN UNION EU EUROPEAN UNION EUTM EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION FGS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA FMS THE FORMATION OF FEDERAL MEMBER STATES GIS GEO-INFORMATION SYSTEM HIPS HERITAGE INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDY IC ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ICU ISLAMIC COURT UNION IGAD INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT IT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY JIA JUBA INTERIM ADMINISTRATION LAS LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION NSDI NATIONAL SPATIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE SDI SPATIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE SPSS STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS TFG TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TFP TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL PARLIAMENT 15 U.S UNITED STATE UN UNITED NATIONS UNO UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION UNPOS UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA UNSOA UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT OFFICE FOR AMISOM UNSOM UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR SOMALIA USA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 16 CHAPTER ONE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY According to the international political and legal theories and practice, co-federal, federal, convocational and unitary systems of government, as noted above, are the four main forms (also called structures of government) which are used by various countries around the world. As we will see in the coming paragraphs, each system is a product of particular historical, geographical, racial, cultural, linguistic and religious circumstances and peculiarities of nations. No nation has adopted a system of government out of the blue or for a love it. But due to these determinant factors some nations have chosen a co-federal, federal, convocational, or unitary system. Here are some brief introductions and historical perspectives how and where these systems developed, applied and transformed with the passage time and development of nations. By Omar Salad Elmi –Bsc Hons, 2008 A confederation is a governmental structure where by two or more independent states enter a treaty for reasons of mutual trade, defense, political rapprochement and/or geographical necessity. They set up common commissions or secretariat to work out their mutual interests while each state in the confederation has its sovereignty and government - head of state, legislature, army, money, flag and passport. (Somalitalk.com Dec 22, 2008) If we look back into history most confederations emerged in Europe and America. The united Provinces of the Netherlands (a confederation) existed from 1579to 1795; the Swiss Confederation Switzerland from 1789 to 1848; the German Bund (a confederation) from 1815 to 1866; the American Confederation from 1781 to 1789(1) Eventually over time and with the progress of societies such confederations had 17 developed into either a federal state (e.g. USA, Germany), consociation federal state (e.g. Switzerland) – a loose system where the central government is weak and constituent provinces (called cantons) with ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity retain their sovereignty; or to a decentralized unitary state (e.g. The Netherlands). In Africa a confederation called Senegambia emerged between Senegal and Gambia and it aborted in the1980s. (Omar Salad Elmi –Bsc Hons, 27-29 November 2008, Nairobi, Kenya). The confederations sprang within one country’s borders but today there are no modern confederations at national level but global, continental, regional and subregional levels like the United Nations organization (UNO), Islamic Conference (IC), Organization of American States (AOS), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), League of Arab States (LAS), and the InterGovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) in East Africa for the purpose of cooperating and coordinating economic, social, security, and technological matters between member states. Dr. I. M. Lewis et al, A Study of decentralized political structures for Somalia – (A Menu of Options -1995). A Federal state is a highly decentralized form of government in which two or more independent states or provinces agree to form and share a central federal government and institutions while retaining some of their powers. The federal state is mostly premised on ‘geographical devolution with guarantees for the autonomy of the units.’ The federal constitution defines and distributes these powers and functions between the central state and the constituent states or provinces with the necessary guarantees. Normally, the federal government powers and functions include national defense and security, monetary and economic regulation, nationality and immigration, national symbols (e.g. flag and emblem) and foreign relations while the constituent units have powers to run trade and economy, education, health and policing. The latter also have the say to question the federation and dissociate from it if they wish so. (Somalitalk.com Dec 22, 2008) Now there are fifteen federal states in the world. One in Australia, four in the Americas - Canada, Brazil, Mexico and the United States; five in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Switzerland (the last two have consociation system where the central powers are either rotated or divided between 18 ethnic groups). In Africa three federations were formed in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda and only the Nigerian one has survived. In Ethiopia an ethnic based federal system of government was adopted in 1994. So the Ethiopian and Nigerian federations which are fragile and yet to be consolidated are the only ones existing Africa. In Asia two federations that emerged in India and Malaysia still survive with underlying tensions. In the Middle East a federation called the Arab Republic was formed between Egypt and Syria in 1958 and it fell apart in 1961, and again in 1971 Egypt, Libya and Syria announced Federation of Arab Republics that finally broke up in 1973. In the Middle East there is one monarchic federation, i.e., the Federation of Arab Emirates. But some countries with ethno-cultural and religious diversity use the unitary system rather than federal one (e.g. Britain, Kenya). To recap, there are altogether there 15 federal states - three in the Americas, five in Europe, two in Asia, two in Africa and one in the Middle East which means only 29% out of the 195 countries in the world. Murray Forsyth, Union of States, 1981. . (Omar Salad, 27-29 November 2008, Nairobi, Kenya). The consociation system is a loose federal government for ethno-culturally, linguistically and religiously fragmented societies. The purpose of the use of this form of federalism is to insulate and keep at bay sharp differences and competition between these communities from consociation federal government run by mature elite politicians elected and delegated by the respective communities. For example, Switzerland has such various ethno-cultural and religious population groups (German, French, Italian, etc.) where the Swiss Federation is run by a federal assembly and executive collegiate council elected and delegated by the ethnic provinces known as cantons with the members of the former two rotating the post of president on ethnic basis every year. (Omar Salad, 27-29 November 2008, Nairobi, Kenya). The unitary system of government has been the first, basic and is the most dominant one currently used in the world. There are at least four types or variations of the unitary system: a) a highly centralized type in which the central government or head of state has all the powers and controls the country, that can be an absolute kingdom, dictatorial military or civilian one party regime (e.g. Somalia in 1969-1991); b) a centralized type which usually practices partial liberal democracy and avails most of the powers for itself but delegates some petty powers and functions to municipalities 19 (e.g. Somalia in the 1960-1969); c) a decentralized type that often practices liberal democracy and devolves adequate autonomous decision-making roles and powers to regions and districts to plan and carry out their social and economic affairs (e.g. UK, Netherlands); and d) a fourth type that either espouses to partial democracy or democracy and is premised on confessional (religious) consociation in which the high posts of central government are apportioned between communities divided on the basis of different religious, for example, Lebanon where the president belongs to Maronite Christians, prime minister to Sunni Muslims, and speaker of the parliament to Shi’a Muslims, etc. (Federalism and decentralization-options, Omar Salad, 2008) PROBLEM STATEMENT Aynte of HIPS recommends the creation of a body responsible for national civic education on federalism. Most people are not aware how diverse federalism is or the options available for decentralization. There also needs to be national dialogue on the role of national and local authorities in controlling revenues from natural resources, he believes. “One area where there is real potential for revenue, the exploitation of natural resources, has been postponed to an unspecified time due to the controversy it has already raised between Puntland and the TFG [Transitional Federal Government - the former name for the SFG],” said Issa Mohamud Farah, director general of the Puntland Petroleum Minerals Agency. “In a country where agriculture is marginal, manufacturing is non-existent and the service sector is limited, the potential importance of revenue from petroleum and mineral resources is not to be underestimated.”This is likely to be an area of conflict between the federal states and central government, which would want greater control of oil revenues, Farah believes. Somalia President Mohamud also acknowledged that this is a major difficulty. “We don’t have resource-sharing, we don’t have revenue-sharing, we don’t have many, many more things to share,” he said at an event at London’s Chatham House in February 2013. “If we do not put those tools and instruments in place then federalism will create more problems.” The former Puntland Presidents Mr. Farole acknowledged that the type of federalism would like to see for Somalia is a system where power and resources is divided 20 between the states and the federal level. Gone are the days when power and resources was unfairly concentrated in a single city-state. Expectedly, when Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991, the nation-state collapsed with the fall of Mogadishu – a city-state under successive administrations since independence. This historic disaster should never be repeated and the Somali federation should provide space for political stability and economic development at the local and state levels, to ensure sustainable stability even if the center is threatened or falls. This is how government is managed – at the local level where people play the most important role and can solve and manage their own affairs. Abdirahman Farole 2010. Also, Dr. Mohamud M Uluso Somali political analysts argue that the formation of federal Member States (FMS) without legal and political consensus sparks fresh political and social turmoil in all regions of Somalia. It is unequivocally clear that the federal system based on clan ownership of territory has become major obstacle to national reconciliation, peace building, and state building in Somalia. It polluted the notion of state, citizenship, and Islamic values and intensified clan rivalry and vanity within the Somali society everywhere. He added that all processes used to form the Federal States have undermined the sovereignty and political independence of the federal government, usurped the responsibilities of the federal parliament, and legitimized political dishonesty and disregard of the rule of law. They abolished the right of the Somali citizens to challenge the unconstitutionality and harmful consequences of the clan based States. Therefore, this research set out to examine the challenges of federal system in Somalia. SCOPE OF THE STUDY CONTENT SCOPE The study is to investigate the challenges of Federalism system of governance in Somalia a case study Federal Government of Somalia. 21 GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE The study will be conducted in Mogadishu Somalia the base of Somali Federal Parliaments. TIME SCOPE The study focused on the challenges of federalism system in Somalia a case study of Somali Federal Government between 2009 and 2013; this time scope provides adequate information to the problem under investigation. DEFINITION OF TERMS FEDERALISM is an ambiguous notion, involving relationships between central and peripheral power structures that vary widely from country to country. THREE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS System Description Concentrates all power in the hands of the national Unitary government; state governments (if they exist at all) merely follow the orders of the national government Regional and national governments both have real power, Federal but the national government is usually supreme over the regional governments Examples Japan, France, Sweden, Saudi Arabia United States, Canada, Australia, Nigeria, India, Germany Diffuses nearly all the power to the state governments; the The Confederate States of Co-federal national government merely keeps the states loosely bound America, the United Nations, the together European Union PURPOSE OF THE STUDY The purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges of federalism system of Governance in Somalia on domestic politics in Somalia a case federal government of Somalia. 22 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY General Objectives The main objective of this study to investigate the challenges of federalism system of Governance on domestic politics in Somalia a case study Federal Government of Somalia. Specific objectives1. To investigate the challenges of federalism system on domestic politics in Somalia. 2. To find out the advantages and disadvantages associated with federalism 3. To assess the contributions of the federal system to Somalia’s peace process 4. To find out solutions to the challenges of the federal governance system in Somalia RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. What are the challenges of Federal system in Somalia on domestic politics?2. What is the Advantages and disadvantages of federalism system? 3. How does federalism system contribute to Somali peace process? 4. What are the solutions to the challenges of the federal governance system in Somalia? Fig. 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK Independent Variable Dependent Variable -Somali Government Federalism -Peace making - Peace Building - Community policing - Peace keeping Outcomes - Peace - Unity - Human development - Attitude change -Increased security - Poverty reduction - Violence mitigation -Economic stability - Culture - Political will - International community 23 Intervening -Government policy -Favorable Factors political environment -Community support -Availability of Sub federal states Fig.1: Source: Researcher Independent variable: Federalism System Dependent variable: Peace In the conceptual framework depicted in figure 1.1 is about the role of federal states on promoting peace in Somalia by the side of implementing the federal, attitude change, better peace stability and conflict reducing. However, Good government policy, community support and availability of effective federal may develop and modify this relation. 24 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW INTRODUCTION In this chapter will discuss the literature related the challenges of Federalism system of Governance on domestic politics in Somalia. The review is conceptualized under the objectives of the study and focuses mainly on Federalism system on domestic politics, and their challenges on them. CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM Federalism is a political concept in which a group of members are bound together by covenant (Latin: foedus, covenant) with a governing representative head. The term "federalism" is also used to describe a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constituent political units (such as states or provinces). Federalism is a system based upon democratic rules and institutions in which the power to govern is shared between national and provincial/state governments, creating what is often called a federation. Under the concept of dual federalism, certain delegated powers are specifically mentioned as belonging to the national government. The Tenth Amendment lays down all other powers that are reserved for the states. This Concept allots separate functions to the national and state governments, which are therefore supreme, in their own spheres. The term layer-cake federalism may also be used to describe this concept of federalism. The proper distribution of powers between the central and local governments is an important issue in a federal union. According to the American Constitution certain powers were specifically delegated to the national government. Further, the Tenth Amendment of 1791, stated: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people." However, over the years, economic and social changes, have altered the balance of powers between the central government and the states. 25 VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF FEDERALISM Federalism by Ron Watts Federalism provides a technique of constitutional organization that permits action by a shared government for certain common purposes, together with autonomous action by constituent units of government for purposes that relate to maintaining their distinctiveness, with each level directly responsible to its own electorate. Indeed, taking account of such examples as Canada, the United States and Mexico in North America, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina in South America, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Spain in Europe, Russia in Europe and Asia, Australia, India, Pakistan and Malaysia in Asia, and Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa in Africa, some 40 percent of the world's population today live in countries that can be considered or claim to be federal, and many of these federations are clearly multicultural or even multinational in their composition. - Ron Watts, former Principal of Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario and Fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, from Federalism Today, the background paper written for the International Conference on Federalism 2002, Saint Gallen, Switzerland, August 2002. Federalism by John Kincaid Federalism is essentially a system of voluntary self-rule and shared rule. This is implied in the derivation of the word 'federal', which comes from the Latin foedus, meaning covenant. A covenant signifies a binding partnership among co-equals in which the parties to the covenant retain their individual identity and integrity while creating a new entity, such as a family or a body politic, that has its own identity and integrity as well. A covenant also signifies a morally binding commitment in which the partners behave toward each other in accord with the spirit of the law rather than merely the letter of the law. -John Kincaid, Professor at Lafayette College in Pennsylvania and director of the College's Meyner Center for the Study of State and Local Government, from John Kincaid, Handbook of Federal Countries: 2002, Introduction, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002. 26 Multi-level Governance by Michael Stein Multi-level Governance is a concept developed by academics and policy-makers in the late 1980s and early 1990s in conjunction with the emergence of a more economically and politically integrated European Union. It was initially intended to describe a broadening of the concept of federalism in a vertical and territorial sense to include the intergovernmental policy-making structures of more than two levels of government, but no more than five: international, regional supra-national, national, regional sub-national and local. In recent years, however, the concept has also been extended horizontally and functionally to encompass non-governmental and nonstatist entities such as private sector interest groups and non-profit organizations and charitable organizations whose role in the international policy-making process is increasing with economic globalization. These multi-level governance structures tend to be more ephemeral and flexible in nature, and more numerous and fragmented than other intergovernmental policy-making structures (Hooghe and Marks 2003). In contrast to that in traditional Anglo-American federalism, the pattern of intergovernmental relations in the European Union reflects the features of an overlapping, interlocking, and cooperative type of federalism that is generally identified with a distinct continental European tradition of federalism. But many proponents of multi-level governance argue that there are good grounds today for applying this concept analytically to intergovernmental policy-making structures outside the European Union, particularly to the increasingly important supranational and local governance structures in politically decentralized countries. There is currently no one generally accepted definition of multi-level governance. Among common strands, however, are the following: first, the tendency over time towards increased participation of non-state actors in governance functions; second, the proliferation of overlapping decision-making networks; third, a change in the role of the state from command and control to steering, coordination and networking, and fourth, the challenges faced by multi-level governance structures in terms of democratic accountability (Bache and Flinders 2004). Among the major criticisms of the concept are: 1) it is too descriptive and cannot explain or predict governance policy outcomes; 2) its proponents exaggerate the importance of sub-national policy actors and underestimate the role of national governments at the implementation and outcome stages of public policy-making; 3) its adherents exaggerate the hierarchical 27 nature of the intergovernmental relationship prior to the emergence of multi-level governance patterns, and overemphasize the extra-constitutional and non-institutional nature of its networking processes; 4) the concept only applies to particular policy sectors and levels, rather than being a general feature of these processes (Jordan 2001). THEORIES OF FEDERALISM Dual federalism: This theory holds that federal government and the state government is co-equal each with sovereignty. In this theory the constitutions are interpreted very narrowly, such as the Ten Commandments, the supremacy clause, the necessary and proper clause and commence clause. Here in this narrow interpretation, the federal government has jurisdiction only if the constitution clearly grant such. In this case, there is a very large power entrusted to the state government. This theory holds that the federal government is limited to only those powers explicitly listed in the constitution. (Jordan 2001). Rigid Theory: this theory was advocated by A.H irch he argues that federalism is not a function of the constitution but of societies. Therefore it should have a rigid constitution. He says that federal essence lies not in the constitution or institutional structure but the society itself. In some of this theory, W.S Livingstone warned that state needs to adopt a written constitution, which implies that they should use rigid constitution to back it, so that the constitution will not be easy to change. Nigeria and United State of America are typical example of countries that used this Theory. (Jordan 2001). COMPARISON OF FEDERAL, UNITARY AND CONFEDERATE STATES There are in general three types of states: federal, unitary, and confederate states. A unitary state is where only one government has sovereign power. That central government can create other bodies to exercise its power, but the central government can also eliminate them. The typical example of a unitary state is France, which has a central government located in Paris. A federal state is where sovereignty is shared between relatively sovereign state governments, and an "umbrella" government of very limited, clearly defined power. Neither state nor federal governments have the power to interfere with the other's 28 powers. The United States of America had been an excellent example of a federal state, with a federal government located in Washington, D.C. - which was a non-state, neutral and federal territory. Some consider "The War Between the States," which eliminated the right of secession, the end of the federal era. But elements of federal government lingered until at least 1913, when the states' voice in federal government, a state-appointed senate, was lost under the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A confederate state is where sovereignty is given mostly to the regional governments, with minimal power given to the central government. Two good examples of this form of government include the original United States government under the Articles of Confederation, as well as the Confederate States of America, which believed in states' rights. In current times the best example of co-federal government is the European Union. HOW SOMALIA PRACTICE FEDERALISM? At the first tier, the federal government, the president who is the head of the state government is the commander in Chief of the Armed forces he wields the highest power. The president of the federation performs these functions: defense of the country, external affairs, Aviation, Award of natural little of honor, decorations and other dignities, Census, Currency, coinage and legal tender, Customs and excise duties, Nuclear energy program, Mines and Minerals including oil fields, Regulation of political parties, Traffic on the federal trunk roads, Implementation of treaties relating to Somali affairs and He is chief of all Armed forces in the federation. The federal government also performs some functions in concurrently list which are: Health, Education, Road, Communication and Etc. At the second tier, the state government performs the functions in the concurrent and residual lists. The governor who is the chief executive of the state, He provides Road, Education, Health and Communication. He sees that there is peace and progress in the state. He also performs residual list functions, in this list all the functions are performed by the state Governor alone; they include those work that are not in the exclusive list and concurrent list, like Chieftaincy affair settlement of dispute between villages in the state etc. 29 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESS: 1991 First Attempts at Reconciliation Following the ouster of Siyad Barre in 1991, the first two international reconciliation meetings aimed at re-establishing a Somali government took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. Six organizations participated. An agreement endorsing Ali Mahdi as president was immediately rejected by General Muhammad Farah Aidid, and a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the south ensued. (published by AMISOM, 2009) 1993 Conference on National Reconciliation In March 1993, fifteen parties to the Somali Civil War signed two agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament: an agreement to hold an Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation, followed by the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement made at the Conference on National Reconciliation. Fighting continued, however, and the agreement later fell apart . (published by AMISOM, 2009) 1997 National Salvation Council From November 1996 to January 1997, a conference on national reconciliation was held in Sodere, Ethiopia. It created a 41-member National Salvation Council (NSC) charged with the responsibility of organising a transitional government. The conference was, however, boycotted by Hussein Farah Aidid, (now leader of his father’s faction following Gen. Aidid’s death) and by the government of Somaliland. A similar conference in Sana’a, Yemen, did not include all the parties of the conflict, and was rejected by those not attending. (published by AMISOM, 2009) 1997 Cairo Peace Conference / Cairo Declaration A fourth reconciliation meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in December 1997 saw 28 signatories to the ensuing agreement, including both Ali Mahdi and Hussein Farah Aidid. The “Cairo Declaration” provided for a 13-person Council of Presidents, a prime minister, 30 and a national assembly but left the country without a national leader. . (published by AMISOM, 2009) 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference Officially dubbed the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC), and sometimes called the Djibouti conference, this was a series of meetings held in Arta, Djibouti, from 20 April – 5 May 2000. In contrast to previous reconciliation meetings, the Arta conference included extensive participation by unarmed civic leaders – intellectuals, clan and religious leaders and members of the business community. . (published by AMISOM, 2009) It culminated with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), the first Somali government since 1991 to secure a measure of international recognition, enabling Somalia to reoccupy its seat at the UN and in regional bodies. The TNG was opposed by a rival pan-Somali governmental movement, known as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), made up of warlords from different regions of the country. . (published by AMISOM, 2009) 2002 Somali Reconciliation Conference In an effort to reconcile the TNG with its SRRC adversaries, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa launched a fresh national reconciliation process before the TNG mandate had ended. This process eventually developed into a sixth major Somali reconciliation meeting, the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, held in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002. It produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary structure established at Arta. (published by AMISOM, 2009) 31 2003 National Reconciliation Conference The 15th Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2003. The Initiative to convene the conference was endorsed by the IGAD summit of 2003 and supported by the AU, the Arab League and the UN. At the conference, the TNG and the SRRC were reconciled, and a new united movement subsequently developed, dubbed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Conference was successfully concluded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional Charter. (published by AMISOM, 2009) 2004 Nairobi Conference From 9 to 29 January 2004 a conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya, at which the Transitional Federal Government developed further. A document was signed by the major factions, titled Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings from 9-29 January 2004. The agreement called for the establishment of Transitional Federal Institutions as well as elections. This was followed by the inauguration of a Transitional Federal Parliament in August 2004, election of a President in 2004, and finally the granting of the vote of confidence to a prime minister and the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in early 2005. (published by AMISOM, 2009) 2007 National Reconciliation Conference Following the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union, more than 3,000 people from all of Somalia’s regions and clans as well as the Somali Diaspora participated in a National Reconciliation Conference convened by the TFG in Mogadishu from 15 July – 30 August 2007. Offshoots of the ICU and opposition leaders, however, held a separate meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, where they joined forces to fight the TFG under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). . (published by AMISOM, 2009). 32 The birth of the Federalism and Constitution The birth of Federalism in Somalia approaches after The Meeting was addressed by H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Hon. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), H.E Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Prime Minister of the TFG, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud, President of the Puntland State of Somalia, Mohamed Ahmed Alin, President of the Galmudug State of Somalia, and Hon. Wafula Wamunyinyi, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The Meeting was facilitated by Augustine P. Mahiga, Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General. Delegates included members of the TFIs, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug State of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a. Approximately three dozen stakeholders from the international community also participated in the proceedings, including: regional organizations, namely: European Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States and Organization of the Islamic Conference and A special session on the humanitarian crisis and ongoing drought was held, during which the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Mark Bowden briefed participants. The Meeting considered four priority tasks for ending the Transition before 20 August 2012, namely: Security, Constitution, Reconciliation and Good Governance and adopted the Roadmap outlined in Annex 1 and, agreed to the following principles for its implementation: A. Somali Ownership: The TFG shall lead the process of the implementation of the Roadmap, working with TFP, regional entities, and all sectors of society, including women, business community, religious leaders, elders and youth. B. Inclusivity and Participation: The implementation of the priority tasks in the Roadmap shall be inclusive with participation of the TFG, TFP, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug, ASWJ and Civil Society. C. Resources: The TFIs and the international community undertake to provide timely support for the implementation of the Roadmap in line with a Resource Mobilization Plan with milestones which shall be agreed within 21 days. Financial support by the 33 international community shall be on a results basis and contingent upon the implementation of the priority tasks in the Roadmap. D. In view of the limited time and resources, the TFIs and international community should, to the extent possible, hold meetings inside Somalia to allow the TFIs to devote more time to the implementation of the Roadmap. E. Monitoring and Compliance: The implementation of the Roadmap shall be monitored on a continuous basis and appropriate measures taken to ensure compliance with the benchmarks and timelines in accordance with the Kampala Accord. F. Within 14 days a Technical Committee composed of the TFIs, regional entities, ASWJ, and regional organizations including: (IGAD, EAC, AU, AMISOM, League of Arab States, EU and UN shall be formed to facilitate cooperation and collaboration among the Somali parties and with its international partners to implement the Roadmap. The Committee shall work from Mogadishu. G. Finally, the Meeting expressed gratitude to AMISOM and troop contributing countries namely, Uganda and Burundi, and Somali forces for the sacrifices they continue to make to advance the cause to peace and stability in Somalia. Statement on adoption of the roadmap, Mogadishu, 6 September 2011). The Birth of Federalism and draft Constitution The birth of Federalism in Somalia approaches after The Meeting was addressed by H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Hon. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), H.E Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Prime Minister of the TFG, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud, President of the Puntland State of Somalia, Mohamed Ahmed Alin, President of the Galmudug State of Somalia, and Hon. Wafula Wamunyinyi, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The Meeting was facilitated by Augustine P. Mahiga, Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General. Delegates included members of the TFIs, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug State of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a. Approximately three dozen stakeholders from the international community also participated in the proceedings, including: regional organizations, namely: European Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on 34 Development, League of Arab States and Organisation of the Islamic Conference and A special session on the humanitarian crisis and ongoing drought was held, during which the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Mark Bowden briefed participants. The Meeting considered four priority tasks for ending the Transition before 20 August 2012, namely: Security, Constitution, Reconciliation and Good Governance and adopted the Roadmap outlined in Annex 1 and, agreed to the following principles for its implementation: A. Somali Ownership: The TFG shall lead the process of the implementation of the Roadmap, working with TFP, regional entities, and all sectors of society, including women, business community, religious leaders, elders and youth. B. Inclusivity and Participation: The implementation of the priority tasks in the Roadmap shall be inclusive with participation of the TFG, TFP, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug, ASWJ and Civil Society. C. Resources: The TFIs and the international community undertake to provide timely support for the implementation of the Roadmap in line with a Resource Mobilization Plan with milestones which shall be agreed within 21 days. Financial support by the international community shall be on a results basis and contingent upon the implementation of the priority tasks in the Roadmap. D. In view of the limited time and resources, the TFIs and international community should, to the extent possible, hold meetings inside Somalia to allow the TFIs to devote more time to the implementation of the Roadmap. E. Monitoring and Compliance: The implementation of the Roadmap shall be monitored on a continuous basis and appropriate measures taken to ensure compliance with the benchmarks and timelines in accordance with the Kampala Accord. F. Within 14 days a Technical Committee composed of the TFIs, regional entities, ASWJ, and regional organisations including: (IGAD, EAC, 35 AU, AMISOM, League of Arab States, EU and UN shall be formed to facilitate cooperation and collaboration among the Somali parties and with its international partners to implement the Roadmap. The Committee shall work from Mogadishu. G. Finally, the Meeting expressed gratitude to AMISOM and troop contributing countries namely, Uganda and Burundi, and Somali forces for the sacrifices they continue to make to advance the cause to peace and stability in Somalia. statement on adoption of the roadmap, Mogadishu, 6 September 2011). MAIN CONCERN OF FEDERALISM SYSTEM:  National Security. Federalism will speed up the on-going national disintegration. By legitimizing the existing clan fiefdoms, it will encourage the creation of new ones. Due to the absence of national authority, together with international policy, such as America’s Dual Track Policy, Somalia currently boasts eleven declared clanbased autonomous states. Draft Constitution (2010),  Political Risk. By supplanting the 1960 constitution, which has been the legal basis of the Somali Republic, as constituted in 1960 from the union of the British Somaliland and Italian Somali, the Draft Constitution renders the Act of Union null and void. Composed without the participation of the people of Somaliland, and devoid of any reference to the 1960 union, this document is bound to legitimize the secession of the region, even without a national referendum. (Draft Constitution 2010).  Social Justification. Federalism lacks social justification in Somalia where society shares common language, religion, culture, habitat, and occupation. Furthermore, federalism will incite a new social conflict as neighboring states are bound to fight over political boundaries and economic resources. (Draft Constitution 2010).  Economic Burden. 36 By expanding government, federalism will squander the meager resources of the nation. (Draft Constitution 2010). WHAT DOES FEDERALISM MEAN IN SOMALIA? Federalism is an ambiguous notion, involving relationships between central and peripheral power structures that vary widely from country to country. In Somalia, the constitution outlines the connections between the central government and future “federal member states,” but the precise roles and responsibilities of each level of government are not specified. Article 54 states: “The allocation of powers and resources shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States” pending their creation, except in the areas of foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy, which are all under the purview of the central government, based in the capital, Mogadishu. The federal member states will be represented in parliament through the Federal State’s upper. CHALLENGES OF FEDERALISMSYSTEM A. The Current Challenges However, the experiment, and it is an experiment for Somalia, faces a host of challenges, not least the fact that the 2016 deadline for the revision of the federal constitution and the creation of regional states and elections is fast approaching. The fact that the Parliament has yet to legalize the specific details of state formation and no single federal state has yet been formally recognized by the FGS makes it easy to take a bleak view of the situation in Somalia. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Somalia’s problems as a whole have proved intractable for so long, it is worth taking a careful study of what is happening in the country, analyzing the real changes and taking a balanced view of the current processes and the results achieved so far. This article aims to offer a brief sketch of the challenges that continue to entangle the federal experiment; it also evaluates the evidence of the steady progress that has been made over the last two years. (Samuel Addis, 2014) 37 The main challenges to the federal experiment emanate from three inter-related categories of problem: the absence of functional institutions, the problems of security and continuing and conflicting different clan interests. All these impinge strongly on the federal experiment. (Samuel Addis, 2014) 1. The Absence of functional Institutions: The ambiguity in the provisional constitution on how regions can come together to form a state is a central problem. Confusion has been further underlined by the failure of the Federal Government of Somalia to establish the Federal Commission, supposed to be established after the formation of the current government and the Upper House of the Parliament, and given the power to approve the formation of states. This vacuum has left Federal Government hamstrung over regional state formation. The absence of the relevant federal institutions has not only created confusion about the role of the Federal Government, it has also encouraged a view among some regional actors that the formation of federal states was not the business of the FGS itself. (Samuel Addis, 2014) 2. Problems of security and continuing The fact that the Federal Government is still unable to make its writ run all across the country has reinforced a view that it should not have a role in federal state-making. The fact that large areas of land remain in the hands of Al-Shabaab certainly poses a challenge. Despite the liberation of the major port of Kismayo in 2012 and of a number of towns in central and southern areas recently, Al-Shabaab’s continued rural control has made formation of local governance structures difficult. Targeted killings of local administrators coupled with Al-Shabaab’s tactic of taking advantage of clan alliances and counter-alliances have all worked against federalism taking root in Somalia. Some government critics, despite all evidence to the contrary, have argued that federalism is a model imposed by neighbors of Somalia with the deliberate intent to weaken the state. (Samuel Addis, 2014) 3. Clan interests 38 Remains the major force challenging the spread of federalism. The draft constitution states that two and more regions can form a federal state, but this makes no allowance for clan interests. These have manifested themselves in the form of disputes and conflicts between clans that see themselves as indigenous to certain regions and others who are considered newcomers, either due to massive displacement from the conflicts of the last two decades or as a result of deliberate policies practiced under the dictatorship of Siad Barre in the 1980s. These have strongly influenced clan efforts to influence attempts to merge regions into a proposed federal state. The availability of actual or potential resources has also played a role in hampering the creation of federal states. This also relates to the desire of regions to ward off federal hands from the granting of profitable oil or other mineral concessions. (Samuel Addis, 2014) 4. Relationship between Federal and State governments In other words, although there may be considerable agreement over the concept of federalism, there are still wide divergences on the practicalities of the relationship between Federal and State governments and limited creation and application of the necessary structures for the process. Equally, there are still uncertainties over which regions could or should come together to form states. In addition, controversies between high-level officials of the FGS also had a role in delaying the regional formation. Mostly driven by a desire to advance clan interests, such controversies stalled progress on numerous occasions, undermining the institutional integrity of the government. (Samuel Addis, 2014). At the same time, despite these challenges, a closer look provides some encouraging signs. The rapprochement between the Federal Government and the Puntland administration is notable in this regard. Puntland, the oldest self-governing entity in Somalia (excluding Somaliland, which declared its own unrecognized independence in 1991), is not yet recognized as a federal state in the absence of an agreed constitution, but it is seen as a model to emulate in other parts of Somalia. The creation of the Juba Interim Administration (JIA) formation also demonstrates a significant development. Last year’s August 27 Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the Juba delegates led by Ahmed Madobe and the Federal Government was a milestone. It was followed by an agreement that endorsed the Addis Ababa Agreement by five other power contenders including Aden Shire in February 2014. 39 The specifics of the Juba Interim Administration were finally agreed upon subsequently after two reconciliation conferences in Mogadishu and Kismayo as well as visits of officials of the FGS and JIA to Kismayo and Mogadishu. (Samuel Addis, 2014). The JIA’s formation has three major positives as far as regional state formation is concerned. The first is that the regional initiative that was spearheaded by IGAD and Ethiopia’s mediation role was effective in helping the two parties reach a deal. It is a useful reminder that regional mechanisms can play a great role in pacifying Somalia. Secondly, as Kismayo is a city home to more than 19 clans and sub-clans, the success in forming JIA is proof of the possibility of producing compromises for the interests of the more powerful clans. The agreement was able to solve the dispute between the federal government and Juba political actors, providing an interim mechanism wherein administration of the Kismayo port would be under the federal government whereas the revenue would be used by and large to the development of the region. By promising inclusive representation of all clans, it has also substantially defused political tension in the region. For instance some of the attempts to create state formation are being held hostage due to rivalry over the levels of representation among two or three clans. The formation of the JIA provides a real example of the way to settle the different and competing interests of a number of clans. It is also important that the FGS showed flexibility in accommodating the interests of local parties and politicians in regional state formation in line with its bottom–up approach to federal state-making (Samuel Addis, 2014). Third, It might be added that the fact that the agreements reduced the tensions arising in Kismayo from rival presidential claimants and brought semblance of order was particularly commendable. (Samuel Addis, 2014) The recent agreement to form a Southwest Interim Administration comprising Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shebelle is also a significant step. Two groups advocated this. One, referred to as the Southwest 6 group, supported the formation of a single state encompassing Bay, Bakool, Lower Shebelle, Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba. A second group, the Southwest 3 group, supported a state composed of only three regions, Lower Shebelle, Bay and Bakool. The basis of the dispute lay in disagreements between the two main elements of the Merifle/Rahenweyne clans, and 40 the agreements reached will have much wider repercussions on regional state formations. The attempt to include Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba in a Southwest state threatened the existence of the JIA and disruption of the whole Juba process. The Federal Government played an important mediating role, emphasizing that it was listening to the grass roots and also underlining that it was encouraging that a Somaliled process had gained the trust of all parties, and hopefully settled the dispute. (Samuel Addis, 2014) These developments point to steady progress being made despite the challenges and difficulties. Optimism, of course, still needs to be treated with caution. Further progress is dependent upon political will and by acceptance of the rules of the draft constitution. The constitutional review itself must also address the loopholes and difficulties visible in the provisions for federal state-making, in the administration of natural resources and other inter-governmental areas. The newly emerging federal states need to be inclusive and ensure they provide acceptable representation for the different clans in their region. Integration of militias into the national army and the Federal Government’s authority over external relations are also key matters that need to be addressed. Security and the need to keep a close eye on “spoilers” also remain issues that cannot be neglected. (Testimony by EJ Hogendoor, International Crisis Group, 8 Oct 2013) 5. Regional Politics The region has significant security interests in Somalia, and immediate neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda all have sizable forces in the country. Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somali is very much linked into the Middle East, and Egypt, Qatar and Turkey are very active in the country. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Despite its size, Djibouti plays a significant role, in large part because much of its population is Somali and many Somali businessmen either do business in, or have strong ties with businessmen from the country. Djibouti has also hosted several multiyear Somali peace processes and its elite have strong ties to Somali leaders. Its forces are now based in relatively quiet central Somalia. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) 41 Ethiopia has been Somalia’s historic regional rival: disputes over control of the Ogaden region, which Somali nationalists consider to be part of “Greater Somalia” continue, and led to a brief war (1977-78) and much longer proxy conflict. Calls for the annexation of the Ogaden, as well as other parts of greater Somalia, remain popular with Somali nationalists, and pandering to this sentiment by the Islamic Court Union (ICU) was part of the reason Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006. Addis Ababa quickly expelled the ICU from major cities, and then remained to prop up the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This led to the rise of Al-Shabaab, which presented itself as the most effective force fighting Ethiopian “occupation”. It was during this period that the group received its most significant diaspora support— not because they shared its ideology, but because they saw Al-Shabaab as part of a liberation struggle. The intervention cost Ethiopia dearly, and three years later, Addis quietly relented to the selection of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former chairman of the ICU as the new TFG president. Ethiopia quickly withdrew, with AMISOM only slowly replacing it as the force protecting the embattled government. Since then Ethiopia has focused largely on supporting groups that can effectively act as a buffer along its borders, many of whom are resistant to the new central government. This includes Somaliland and Puntland State. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Ethiopia, promoting its own system of “ethnic federalism” is a strong proponent of federalism in Somalia, and has long supported a seemingly logical “bottom up” approach of state building. Many Somalis, however, see this as a ploy to keep their country weak and divided, and this very much plays into the hostility of many towards international pressure for the SFG to truly devolve power. While overstated, Ethiopia is wary of a strong Somali central state, particularly if it is close to countries perceived as hostile by Addis Ababa. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Kenya is a relatively new entrant in Somalia. Nairobi forcefully intervened in 2011 to create its own buffer state and facilitate the return of more than 0.5 million Somali refugees currently living in the country. Kenya subsequently joined AMISOM, but often follows its own interests. In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its support behind Ahmed Madobe, its most effective proxy force leader. Publicly Kenya is looking for an exit, but Somalis view this claim with great scepticism. According to the UN Monitoring Group, Kenyan-Somali politicians and Kenyan military officers are allegedly earning large amounts of money from trade, including illegal charcoal, 42 passing through Kismayo, and more importantly most believe Kenya wants to control southern Somalia because it has large oil and natural gas deposits. Al-Shabaab is aggressively trying to turn the local population against the Kenyan.“Christian” forces occupiers, and the Westgate Mall attack was an attempt to trigger a crackdown to that end. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Uganda is most removed, but remains the dominant actor in Mogadishu (despite the presence of a large Burundian continent) because of the size of its contingent and the forceful personality of President Museveni. It contingent is also accused by Somalis of profiteering from the war. Previously very active, Museveni lately has been distracted by political turmoil in Kampala and has taken a less force role, ceding some influence to Ethiopia and Kenya. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013). Beyond the regional states, a number of Muslim countries have taken an active interest in Somalia. Turkey is perhaps the most prominent country, and to its credit played a major role in responding to the latest famine in 2011, and then subsequently has arrogated a substantial role for itself, and its companies, in the reconstruction efforts. Qatar has also played a major role, particularly in its support for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his supporters from Damul Jadiid (New Blood), a faction of Al-Islaah, the Somali wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood has also increased the interest of Egypt, which before Tharir Square had been in major competition with Ethiopia over influence in Somalia. The greater regional interest allows the SFG to play different states off each other, particularly Muslim states against Ethiopia. The influence of Damul Jadiid has led Somalia to re-orient somewhat away from IGAD and AU towards Middle East. This has complicated Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia and Kenya, and to a degree with the UN. (Testimony by EJ Hogendoor, International Crisis Group, 8 Oct 2013) 6. The International Community Not only is international involvement complicated by numerous bilateral countries with individual agendas, but there are also a number of international organizations, including the UN, AU, and IGAD (not to forget, occasionally, the League of Arab States, the World Bank, and NATO) active in Somalia with no clear division of responsibilities or lead actor. (This sometimes was a problem within the UN and AMISOM as well, where agencies did not cooperate or contingents did not follow the 43 chain of command). They are also joined by a number of special envoys with unclear roles vis a vis the international organisations, the missions in Somalia or ambassadors accredited to Mogadishu. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the overlapping mandates of the AU and the UN. The AU has the military peace enforcement responsibility, but by virtue of having been in Mogadishu for the last four years and fielding a force of over 17,000 troops is a major political actor in Somalia, while the UN has a political mandate, but by virtue of security being a huge part of re-establishing stability in the country (as well as supply a great deal of support to AMISOM, through UNSOA, and the government) was very much involved in security policy and security sector reform. Both missions are also headed by special representatives with no clear instructions on how to share responsibilities. This was a particular problem for AMISOM and UNPOS, particularly because UNPOS was based in Kenya and its senior staff rarely spent much time in Mogadishu. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) It is too early to tell if new United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM), established on 3 June 2012 can succeed where so many others have failed. Its mandate includes the provision of policy advice to the SFG and AMISOM on peace building and state building in the areas of: governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination of international donor support. It is also tasked to help build the SFG’s capacity to promote respect for human rights and women’s empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions. To strengthen intra-UN coordination, a major problem since UNPOS was created in 1995, a post of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator will be established on 1 January 2014 and “structurally integrated into UNSOM”. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Importantly, UNSOM is based in Mogadishu and will be deployed across Somalia, as requested by the Federal Government and as conditions permitted—so far it is only present in the capital, Garowe, Baidoa and Kismayo (it has not received permission to establish an office in Hargeisa). The Security Council emphasized the need for coordination, and UNSOM and AMISOM will work “on parameters for practical 44 partnership on the ground”. To date UNSOM is just starting to deploy with approximately 50 staff in Mogadishu, whose mobility is severely subscribed because of insecurity (the UN compound was attacked on 19 June and 1 permanent staff, 3 contractors and 4 guards were killed, along with at least 6 Somali bystanders). It will not be up to full strength until early 2014, depending on the security situation. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) The major role for UNSOM will be coordinating security sector reform and international support. As was noted by the UN technical assessment team, “A common and closely coordinated strategy for international security support, which sets our clearly the respective responsibilities for the Africa Union, the United Nations, other allies, and Somali forces, with clear timelines and appropriate resources is a priority”. Security training is now being conducted by Somali forces, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), Turkey, Ethiopia and Bancroft Global Development, a private company, this is ostensibly coordinated through a UNSOM facilitated and Somali-led steering group. Much work remains to be done. According to the last UN report, Somali forces continue to face significant logistical challenges and “indiscipline continued to present a challenge, and there were reports of clashes within Somali security forces in Baidoa and Buurhakaba, and an increasing number of desertions in Bay and Bakool. Furthermore, police continue to face serious capacity gaps and “international support, including stipends and training continues, but lack of coherence undermines its effectiveness”. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013) Donor coordination will be equally challenging. Encouragingly the SFG has developed the Somali Compact that strives to provide an overarching strategic framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts over the next three years. It will remain to be seen if the donor community, in its New Deal pledges, will adhere to that framework, especially as counter-terrorism priorities again rise to the fore with the recent Westgate Mall attack. (Testimony by EJ Hogendoor, International Crisis Group, 8 Oct 2013). B. FUTURE CHALLENGES There are many of such challenges that can be associated with a country with a federal state system of governance and few of them are identified and discussed 45 below. These few were chosen from a critical perspective of governance structure and SDI implementation strategies. 1) Structure versus Scaling One of the main socio-technical challenges is the issue of system structure and information abstraction across the level of government. This structure is the simplest modeling describing the scenario of institutional framework of GI organization cutting across the levels of governance in the country. ( Rajab ifard 2000). In such complicated environment, data collected locally are fused and integrated representing the reality as close as possible. But as the information is filtered up in the system it start getting trim down and also split into various sections. This issue of information scaling and splitting is important to service provision and decision making. There is dilemma of filtering quality of details needed in the process of scaling against transfer of too much details to the top where is not needed. Also this information flow pattern is contrary to the Hierarchical reasoning of splitting down structures in to smaller units approach to information infrastructure as given by Rajab ifard 2000). Moreover, information becomes duplicated as the middle tiers and top tier fights on ownership and usage of the information. At the extremes, redundancy of both data and process is created within on stream of service provision and decision making. (Rajab ifard 2000). There seems to be clear delineation between the local levels but when it gets to the state, the complexity of information management and operation control becomes fuzzy and complicated. Implementing SDI in such environment need clear definition of responsibility and boundaries. (Rajab ifard, 2000). There is also the issue of dual top level in multi-level organization, where most middle level organization has two or more top level to be responsible to. This is common in public organization in most developing countries’ federal system. There are possibilities of information flowing across the system in irregular manner Each 46 section becoming independent of the other level, thereby communicating with all other levels irrationally. (Rajab ifard, 2000). 2) GI Policy versus Decentralization Policy Most decentralization policies of developing countries are either very old or based on old concepts of governance. They are detailed in terms of political rights and responsibilities, governance and power devolution, financial and resources stratification. But most of them did not include organization management, service provision and most especially data management both spatial and non spatial. This is a setback in the policy as issues surrounding collection; usage and ownership of data are not spelt out in detail. Most organizations established under the policy are either silent on such issues or use the political standards. (Aderinoye, R., 2002) 3) Polycentricism (Autonomy versus Common Interest) Closely related to the above challenges is the issue of autonomy within the Federal states in Somalia. State government within the country is autonomous in resource management and development processes. They define policies relating to service deliveries within their boundaries amongst other regulations. This has brought about polycentricism of the middle tier of the governance in Somalia. There have been movements of complete resource control and policy re-definition in advantage of state governments. The most recent movement in the country is the local government trying to claim autonomy from the state and federal government. (Rajab ifard, 2000). SDI Project scale and Resources Availability (Imbalance Resources) Local Governments in Somalia are mostly supported by state governments so they have limited resources to be autonomous, but some of them still propose autonomy of local level. Moreover, there is great imbalance within State governments that are supporting these local governments. While some are very rich in resources and revenue, others are highly dependent on allocations from the federal government. Implementing SDI in each level of governance requires lots of resources and capacity which may be too much for federal government to solely sponsor. How these projects can be founded is a strong challenge against a successful implementation of SDI in the county. (Agbaje, G.I. and Akinyede, J.O., 2005) 47 Some local governments have resources to conveniently establish SDI and some cannot even maintain the existing manual data handling system. The same imbalance applies to the State governments and also political regions. While some can afford the most expensive and most recent technology, some have to rely on cheap and open source tools and application if they were to implement SDI. (Rajab ifard, 2000). 4) Public Private Partnership Deficiencies Somalia as an example of developing country still has weak public and private partnership. This can be attributed to many factors of socio-economy within the country. They include Long age of disparity between public and private capital, resources and capacity, and also due to difference in targeted values of the two parties. While public offices are targeted at public service delivery (pure public good system), privates are going for profit oriented service provision. (Agbaje, G.I. and Akinyede, J.O., 2005). 5) Political Interference There is imbalance of priorities by difference government and political administration. While one state government realized the necessity of establishing SDI within the its state, the bounding states may have some other projects in mind. Some governors believe in solving immediate problems than making a development plan that will last longer than their tenure in office. Variance of priority affect issues like purpose of the SDI, some may target Health service with GIS and the other thinks of LIS for the purpose of land revenue and taxes. Also the effect is on budget allocation for SDI implementation and availability of alternative technology at cheaper cost to save money. (Georgiadou, Y., 2007). Personal interests, Political rivalry and Corruption of power are main plague in African developing countries that are affecting implementation of development projects. SDI is not exception as most brilliantly packaged SDI projects are either not implemented or result to failure due to poor funding and sabotage. Federal organizations are facing multiple IT challenges in four primary areas: cyber security and sophisticated attacks, information explosion, consumerization of IT, and complex and changing infrastructure. (Ekwueme, A.I., 2003). 48 These four trends are having a profound effect on the ability of government agencies to protect and manage an explosion of information. Moving applications to the cloud, consolidating data centers, managing mobile devices, and authenticating users are approaches that government agencies are leveraging to become more secure and efficient. To prevent these trends from delaying their mission-critical operations, government agencies must have a clear strategy for identifying and adopting IT solutions that secure, manage, and protect their information. CONTRIBUTION OF FEDERALISM SYSTEM TO THE PEACE  federalism and peace-making One of the most important developments contributing to the shift in the world political paradigm from statism to federalism has been the demonstrated utility of federal arrangements in peace-making. In a world well advanced in its movement toward federalism as the new paradigm for interstate and intergroup relations, it must expect it also to offer considerable promise for peace-making. While it is wise not to exaggerate that promise and look upon federalism as some kind of videmecum, as Somali selected federalism with their institutions should work hard to find ever better ways to utilize and apply federalism to the cause of peace. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011) there are three levels or, if one prefers, dimensions of federalism, involved in the use of federalism for peace-making. The most proximate is the use of federal arrangements, whether by that name or some other. The use of arrangements that are able to combine self-rule and shared rule and to constitutionalism the combination is federalism even if it is called functionalism or autonomy or something else. There is an old American saying: "If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, and looks like a duck, it is a duck, no matter what you call it." That is why the European Union of today, although founded as the European Community with a deliberately neutral name and description as a set of functional communities, developed into a federal system of the co-federal species after passing through periods of growth and crisis over the past 40 years. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011) The earlier effort to establish the openly federal "United States of Europe" failed because it reached too far and was too explicit in doing so, awakening the hesitations 49 and reservations of too many of those involved in the decision-making at whatever level in the years immediately following World War II. Hence it was only when the leading European federalists retreated, as it were, from federalism and adopted functionalism that it was possible to start building a federal union in Western Europe. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011). So, too, with so many of the failed Third World federations attempted at the time of decolonization. In some cases the formal application of federalism led to total disengagement of the member states. In the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the conflict between the white minority and the black majority which gave the federation the appearance, probably correct, of trying to preserve white minority rule, collapsed entirely and each colony became an independent state. Federal efforts in Ghana, where the racial problem did not exist but the problem of dictatorship and democracy did, it was dictatorship that overwhelmed federalism. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011) In the case of Pakistan and other similar examples, it was lack of the requisite attitudinal dimensions of trust, will to federate, and federal political culture that turned federation partly into secession and partly into a dead letter for many years. On the other hand, while the West Indies Federation collapsed because it reached for too much, the Caribbean Community, a co-federal arrangement, emerged out of its wreckage based on an unavoidable necessity for cooperation and sharing, even among islands by definition insular. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011) On the other hand, in Belgium after trying several other arrangements and terminologies, it became apparent to the parties involved that explicitly reinventing Belgium as a federation would be more helpful and so federation was successfully embraced in place of the earlier regional autonomy which had in turn replaced an earlier de facto provincial decentralization. Similarly, in Spain, use of the word "federal" in the constitutional reinvention of the country in the wake of Franco would have scared the right to death or perhaps to revolution and equally frightened the separatist movements in the country's very strong peripheral regions. Adopting a different terminology, then, was vital to the initial success of the effort. With the passage of time, however, it has become increasingly easier for all involved to 50 describe what they invented in Spain as "federal" and to take a certain pride in the regularization of their regime in that way. (Daniel J. Elazar, 2011)  Federalism and Peace Mediation In order to reach a peace agreement, it may be necessary to develop a vision of state organization in the future. In many conflicts, especially conflicts with an ethnopolitical component, a lack of power-sharing is amongst the root causes of conflict. Thus, future power-sharing arrangements, including federalism, can become a part of the agenda for peace. This “Peace Mediation Essential,” which was written by State Concepts, in collaboration with the Mediation Support Project and in consultation with the UN Mediation Support Unit, gives an introduction to federalism. Mediators will have to consult additional resources for further details. (The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) In order to reach a peace agreement, it may be necessary to develop a vision of the future state organization. In many conflicts, especially conflicts with an ethnopolitical component, a lack of power-sharing is among the root causes of conflict. Thus, future power-sharing arrangements, including federalism, can become a part of the agenda for peace. (The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) Federalism can change the power balance and can create new vulnerable groups. If any group can permanently dominate or block the political process at any government level, this is an indicator of a flaw in the federal design. Implementation issues should be considered early in the process, as implementation will be a major factor for the sustainability of the peace process. (The Union of Serbia and Montenegro 2003). Federalism is a flexible form of state organization which needs to be adapted to specific circumstances. There are as many variations of federal state design as there are federal countries. The form of federal state organization adopted is as significant as whether federalism is introduced. (Anderson george,1987)  Federalism and Conflict Resolution Federalism can be a useful means of conflict resolution in that it can provide a viable power balance between majority and non-majorities, groups and individual citizens 51 Based on the self-rule principle, policy areas which are important for the identity of an ethnic group (or minority) and which are potentially divisive (e.g. culture, police, religion) can be left to lower levels of government. This can promote selfdetermination and can indirectly help avoid conflicts at higher levels of government and Shared rule promotes decision-making which respects the interests of the federal units. Furthermore, the federal units legitimate the state through their participation in the political process (upper chamber of parliament). Additionally, the bicameral parliament assures that the interests of citizens as such (through the lower house) are also taken into account. (amoretti ugo m. & Bermeo nancy,2004) Most nationalities of the world today find themselves in territories characterized by plurality of nationalities and cultures, which when politicized, can give rise to contradictory claims on the centre. One of the tested tools used increasingly Negotiating Peace through Federalism by nations such as Ethiopia and Canada to neutralize and confront demands for autonomy from such culturally plural groups is federalism. (Bermeo nancy,2004). Federalism dilutes many of the perceived threats to the existence of a group or perceived constraints to their developmental aspirations. By conceding to their demands, we wish to suggest, such groups are made to embrace, accept and increase Their sense of loyalty to the center. In a nutshell, it is a win - win situation. (Feeley, Malcolm, and Edward Rubin.(2008).  Federalism and stability The most economically developed and politically relatively stable countries in the world are federal states. They include the USA, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Austria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria (the most diverse and populous sub Saharan country in Africa which re-gained political stability after the Biafran war when it consolidated its federalism status). Their relative stability, we would like to suggest, has something to do with the way in which they have been able to allay, curb and address regional fears through federalism. (Hakim, E. A., Mikaya, M., Beny, L., Bakheit, C. S. & Blackings, M. 2014). THE ADVANTAGES OF FEDERALISM 52 the federal system of government has the following advantages:  Federalism promotes various forms of liberty: many arguments for federalism has traditionally been put in terms of promoting various form of liberty in the form of non-domination immunity or enhancement opportunity.  Federal Arrangement may promote individual's right Federal arrangement always protect against political authorities by concentrating state sovereignty, placing some power with the center by entrusting the central with the authority to interference only in sub-unit.  Federal Fosters Peace: in the sense of preventing war and fears of the war, state can join federal to be jointly powerful to discuss external aggressive and to prevent aggressiveness or for prevention of wars among themselves.  Federalism Promotes Political order: federalism is referred as the appropriate form of organization; for instance in organic conception of the political and social order. The federation may promote co-operation justice or other value among and within sub-units as among and with their constituent units. For instance by monitoring legislating, enforcing or funding agreements, human rights, immunity, from interference of development starting with family. Each larger unit is reasonable for facilitating the floor of sub-unit and securing common goods beyond the reach of sub-units without a common authority. it caters for religious differences, as in Somalia it allows for fair distribution of power on a territorial basic by adequate constitutional provision. the system makes administration easy because it operates in a very larger area and also for population which could been very difficult to Governor the federal system is suitable for a country with significant sectional differences a companied by strong particular feeling. under circumstances, federalism produces a favorable psychological guarantee against over confederation Somalia is also beneficiary of these advantages.  Fosters state loyalties: Many Somali feel close ties to their home state, and federalism maintains that connection by giving power to the states. 53  Practices pragmatism: Running a country the size of the United States, with such a diverse population, is much easier to do if power is given to local officials. Likewise, state and local officials are closer to the problems of their areas, so it makes sense for them to choose policies to solve those problems.  Creates laboratories of democracy: State governments can experiment with policies, and other states (and the federal government) can learn from their successes and failures. Example: California has frequently led the nation in environmental regulations: Many measures adopted by California are subsequently adopted by other states. And during the 1990s, Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson experimented with welfare policy, and those experiments influenced federal welfare reform.  Leads to political stability: By removing the national government from some contentious issue areas, federalism allowed the early U.S. government to achieve and maintain stability.  Encourages pluralism: Federal systems expand government on national, state, and local levels, giving people more access to leaders and opportunities to get involved in their government.  Ensures the separation of powers and prevents tyranny: Even if one person or group took control of all three branches of the federal government, federalism ensures that state governments would still function independently. Federalism, therefore, fulfills the framers’ vision of a governmental structure that ensures liberty. FEDERALISM’S DISADVANTAGES Critics argue that federalism falls short in two ways:  Prevents the creation of a national policy: 54 The Federal States does not have a single policy on issues; instead, it has Different policies according to the federal regions, which often leads to confusion.  Leads to a lack of accountability: The overlap of the boundaries among national and state governments makes it tricky to assign blame for failed policies.  Citizen Ignorance Citizen Ignorance and argue that federalism cannot function well due to ignorance. Most Americans know little about their state and local governments, and turnout in state and local elections is often less than 25 percent. Citizens consequently often ignore state and local governments, even though these governments have a lot of power to affect people’s lives.  It can lead to inequality between states and lead to unhealthy competition between them SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY The results from this study on the challenges of federalism system of governance in Somalia will be important and reference to all political leaders and also future prevent to the challenges of the Federalism system in the country both publically and privately to the domestic politics also, this research will assist by policy makers like the government mainly the ministry of constituency to ensure and trace the follow up of new ideas on challenges of federalism system in Somalia on domestic politics. CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY INTRODUCTION This chapter presents a detailed description of the research methodology. The methodology refers to the detailed procedure to be followed to realize the objectives. Methodology includes a description of research design, study area and population, sampling techniques, data collection method, Data entry, clearing, data analysis and 55 interpretation. It comprises several sub section which are usually presented in the order given below: RESEARCH DESIGN This study will be conducted through quantitative survey research design. A survey is data collection tool used to gather information about individuals. Since the study is aimed to investigate the challenges of Federal system on domestic politics in Somalia. The researchers have seen that survey research design was enable them together the necessary data. STUDY AREA AND POPULATION Study population The target population of this study will consist of 120. So, 15 of them are federal states in the regions, 20 are members of parliament, 10 are cultural leaders, 8 are ministries, 12 are village chiefs, 10 are District commissioners, youth leaders are 15, 15 are women leaders and 12 will be civil society leaders. So, 90 of the respondent will come from Mogadishu the base of Somalia Federal parliaments and the other 30 from member of federal states it its sub regions. The target population of this study focuses on the most effective Ministries, parliament committees, civil society, federal states, Cultural leaders, District Commissioners, village chiefs, Youth leaders, Women Leaders and Civil Society leaders. the targeted groups including, the mastery of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Federalism, ministry of civil services, ministry of finance and planning, ministry of defense, ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and ministry of natural resources. Also, constitution affairs committees and interior and federal committee and the most effective Somali civil society and scholars. SAMPLING TECHNIQUE SAMPLE SIZE The sample will consist of 92 participants selected from the accessible population will be got from these sample categories. Table 1 shows the respondents of the study with 56 the following categories: The Slovene's formula is used to determine the minimum sample size. n N 1  N (0.05) 2 n – Sample size N – Total population 0.05 – Margin of Error 𝐧= 𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝟏+𝟏𝟐𝟎(𝟎.𝟎𝟓)𝟐 = 𝟏𝟐𝟎 = 92 𝟏.𝟑 Member of parliaments sample= federal states sample = cultural leaders = 𝟏𝟎 𝟏𝟐𝟎 Ministries sample = 𝟏𝟓 𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝟐𝟎 𝟏𝟐𝟎 ×92 = ≈15 ×92 = 12 ×92 = ≈8 𝟖 𝟏𝟐𝟎 ×92 = ≈6 Village leaders sample = 𝟏𝟓 𝟏𝟐𝟎 ×92 = ≈11 District commissioners sample = Youth leaders sample = 𝟏𝟓 𝟏𝟐𝟎 Women Leaders sample = Civil Society leaders = 𝟏𝟐 𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝟏𝟎 𝟏𝟐𝟎 ×92= 8 ×92= ≈11 𝟏𝟓 𝟏𝟐𝟎 ×92 = ≈11 ×92 = ≈9 57 Category of employees Total Sample Size Percentage Population Sampling Method Member of parliaments 20 15 15 Stratified Federal States 15 12 12 Purposive Cultural leaders 10 8 8 Stratified District Commissioners 10 8 9 Stratified village chiefs 15 12 12 Ministries 8 6 7 Purposive Youth leaders 15 11 15 Stratified Women Leaders 15 11 12 Purposive Civil Society leaders 12 9 10 Total 120 92 100 SOURCES OF THE DATA Primary data: The required primary data will directly from the respondents (Politicians, Parliaments, Ministries and writers all courses, community leaders). This will do through administering a structured questionnaire. 58 Secondary data: Secondary data will be obtained from existing literature in previous research paper findings, journals, reports, research magazines internet libraries and resources from the federal state offices. DATA COLLECTION METHODS Questionnaire: A structured questionnaire will use as an instrument of data collection from the Politicians and community elders. The researcher used closed-ended and a few open-ended questionnaires. The researcher will directly distribute questionnaires to the respondents. personally for the analysis of the data obtained. In this case questionnaires will be self-administered to allow further probing and clarification of unclear issues. Data is collected using various instruments and techniques, but, this study was conducted through questionnaire as the main tool for collecting data. Questionnaire is a collection of items to which a respondent is expected to react in written (Oso & Onen, 2008). The selections of these tools have been guided by the nature of data to be collected the time available as well as the objectives of the study. Interview guides will also be used to get responses from Member of Parliaments, Ministers, and Political Analyst; this will enable the researcher to prove the respondents in order to generate more information on the challenges of federalism system of governments in Somalia. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE Researcher was get an authority letter from the Hope University partnership with Kampala University, to make the authorization of carrying out a research about the challenge of federal system in Somalia. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION After data was understandably studied, edited and summarized qualitatively and quantitatively, showing the mean, mode and standard deviation. The data was thereafter be presented in tables and counted. The total was converted into numbers to enable analyzing and describe the data systematically to reach logical conclusions on 59 the effect of the study variables. Editing of data was used to check for errors and slips to ensure accuracy and reliability of data. Data was analyzed and processed electronically using statistical package for social scientists (SPSS) to analyze the challenges of federalism system of governance of in Somalia. ANTICIPATED CONSTRAINTS The main limitation of the study is that, there is on research relating to the challenges of Federalism system of governance, as there are not enough relevant references of books. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY To establish the reliability of questionnaire, the researcher will use method of expertise judgment as best method of reliability after construction of the questionnaire. The researcher approached supervisor and other experts that have great knowledge about the topic of this study to ensure the reliability and validity of the researcher instruments. The sample technique and procedures or mechanisms put in place made the study possible to ensure the validity and reliability as they kicked off the biasness in the research and the advice of experts: which clearly made the research relevant, specific and logical. In addition, a pilot test will conducted in order to test and prove on the on the reliability of the questionnaire. To prove the validity of the data collection instruments scale was used the validity relevance questions and the total number of questions. ETHICAL CONSIDERATION The data which the researchers collected from the respondents will keep confidential and will use for the purpose of fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of International relations. The respondents will inform the content of the research and its aims because the researchers whose subjects are people must consider the conduct of their study and give attention to the ethical issues associated with carrying out the research. Some of the key ethical issues that be given due to attention in this will privacy of participants, voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdrawn partially or completely from the process consent and possible deception of participants 60 maintenance of the conditionality of the data by individuals or identifiable participants and their anonymity. 61 CHAPTER FOUR: 4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 4.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the data analysis and Discussions of the study findings and it will mainly focus on the Demographic data of the respondents in terms of Gender, Age, marital status, education and occupation under the general questions. The presentation, interpretation and analysis of the data collected were in accordance with the main purpose of the study the "Challenges of federalism system of governance in Somalia”. The presentation and analysis of data will be based on research objectives and questions. The study design was cross sectional and both qualitative and quantitative data was collected through questionnaires and interview guide. After collection data was analyzed by using SPSS program and the results was presented as text and tables. 4.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA This study was conducted in South-Central Somalia particularly in Mogadishu as the base of Somali Federal Government, Baydhabo of Bay region and the base of South west state, Kismayo of Lower Jubba region and the base of Jubba-land state and Puntland state of Somalia particularly, Bosaso of Beri region, Garowe of Nugal region and the capital and the base of Putland state. the data was collected from 92 respondents from Four different regions with different administrations such states and Federal government of Somali. This section will present the demographic information of the respondents by beginning with the gender of the respondents, Ages of the respondents, marital status and level of education and their Occupations. 4.3 FINDINGS: Following shows at the main findings of the research data drop from the main three data analyzing table of the research: 62 Table1: The Gender Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Male 58 63.0 63.0 63.0 Female 34 37.0 37.0 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The above table (1), the respondents were included "Male" and "Female" which total of 92 respondents. 63% of the respondents were "male" while the remaining 37% were the "Female". The respondents were 92 people from the community participated the survey from different regions and administration. so, the findings were that 63% of 58 respondents from the total participants were "male" and the remaining 37% were "female". Table2: Marital status of the respondents Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Single 20 21.7 21.7 21.7 Married 61 66.3 66.3 88.0 Divorced 11 12.0 12.0 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The above table (2), the respondents including different rank regarding their Marital status of the respondents, the highest number of the respondents of 66% were Married which was 61 respondents of 61, the second number was 22% were Single which equal 20 respondents and the remaining 12% were Divorced of 11 respondents. The findings of this survey were that 66% (61) of respondents from the population participated in the survey which was conducted in different locations of Somali country such Puntland state, South west state, Jubba-land state and Somali Federal Government. also, 22% of the respondents were single and the other were 12% of 11 respondents from the population took part the survey. 63 Table 3: Respondents Age. Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 20-30 29 31.5 31.5 31.5 30-40 20 21.7 21.7 53.3 40-50 27 29.3 29.3 82.6 50-60 13 14.1 14.1 96.7 Above 60 3 3.3 3.3 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The above table (3), the respondents participated the survey and questionnaire of this study were included different category and different age. the Findings mentioned that the uppermost of the respondents of 29 the population were between 20-30 years old which is equal of 31.5%, while those between 40-50 were 29.3% of 27 respondents from the survey conductors, those between 30-40 were 20 participants which equal 21.7% of the survey participants, the remaining were between 50-60 of 13 persons which is 14% and above 60 reported 3.3% of 3 persons which mean that was the smallest one. Table4: The Level of Education of the respondents Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent High school 9 9.8 9.8 9.8 Some collage 10 10.9 10.9 20.7 Collage graduate 4 year 15 16.3 16.3 37.0 Vocational/technical 9 9.8 9.8 46.7 Bachelor Degree 17 18.5 18.5 65.2 Master's degree (Ms) 25 27.2 27.2 92.4 PHD Degree 5 5.4 5.4 97.8 Professional degree 2 2.2 2.2 100.0 school (2 year) (Md, JD, Etc) 64 Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent High school 9 9.8 9.8 9.8 Some collage 10 10.9 10.9 20.7 Collage graduate 4 year 15 16.3 16.3 37.0 Vocational/technical 9 9.8 9.8 46.7 Bachelor Degree 17 18.5 18.5 65.2 Master's degree (Ms) 25 27.2 27.2 92.4 PHD Degree 5 5.4 5.4 97.8 Professional degree 2 2.2 2.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 school (2 year) (Md, JD, Etc) Total 92 Source: Primary data The above table (4), the respondents have different degree regarding their level of education, the highest number of the respondents of 27.2% have a master degree which was 25 respondents, the second group of them 18.5% have a Bachelor Degree which were 17 from the respondents. also, 15 persons of 16.3% from the survey conductors graduated College for 4 years. the remaining groups graduated different institutions and have different degree with different educational and study level in terms of their educational background, 9.8% of respondents from High school, 9.8% from vocational training, 5.4% of PHD holders and 2.2% of Professional degree (Md, JD, Etc). The findings of this survey were that 27.2% of the 25 respondents from the population also, 18.5% of the 17 respondents have earned bachelor degree all others respondents remained have different level of education. The highest degrees earned the survey participants were Bachelor and Master degrees. 65 Table 5: Occupation of Respondents Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Minister 6 6.5 6.5 6.5 Member of Parliament 14 15.2 15.2 21.7 Politician 19 20.7 20.7 42.4 Social activist 22 23.9 23.9 66.3 Community leader 6 6.5 6.5 72.8 organizational 8 8.7 8.7 81.5 organizational 12 13.0 13.0 94.6 100.0 Women leader Youth leader Others... specify 5 5.4 5.4 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The above table (5), the community has different Occupational according to the survey participants. the participants are contained many sides involved by this study such as Ministries, Member of parliaments, Politician, Social activists, Community leaders and different groups from civil societies. 6 ministries participated the survey which makes 6.5 of the study become a ministries, 14 member of parliaments are involved and filled the questionnaire during the study which mean that 15.5% were member of parliaments both federal government and states, 19 politicians are participated which indicate 20.7% of the population participated the study became a political analysts and writers. also, 23.9% of 22 persons were social activist. community leaders 6.5% of 6 members, women organizations 8.5 of 8 participants, youth organizations 13% of 12 youth persons participated the study and others participants were 5.4% which totaled 5 persons which are not including the category designed the for the questionnaire. The findings of this table and the whole survey is that the highest participant were Social activist which 23.9% of them, 20.7% of the population and the sample were politicians are the second , 15.5% of the participants became a member of parliaments and 13% of youth organizations and 8.5 from member of parliaments. 66 Table 6: Originally from the participants Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Urban 67 72.8 72.8 72.8 Sub urban 11 12.0 12.0 84.8 Rural 14 15.2 15.2 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The above table (6), the highest number of the survey participant are Urban community which is 72.% of the participants are resides as Urban, during the study more than 67 people mentioned that they were from the cities, also, 15% of 14 contributors were from Rural societies and the lowest people contributed were sub rural which through 12% of 11 participants. Table 7: the federalism system of government is appropriate to Somalia Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 21 22.8 22.8 22.8 Agree (A) 21 22.8 22.8 45.7 Disagree(D) 39 42.4 42.4 88.0 Strongly disagree (SD) 11 12 12 100.0 Total 92 100 100 Source: Primary data The above table (7), the most participants disagreed that the Federalism system of governance is appropriate to Somalia which means that 42.4% of the conductors have opposite the federalism idea. while 12% of them were strongly disagree that federal system is the most appropriate government system in Somalia but, decentralization is the most appropriate one recommended the population according to the interview conducted during the survey. 67 Findings of this survey were that 54.4% of the participants argue that federal is not appropriate Somali community, while 44.6 agreed that federal system is suitable in the country and recommended to implement it but, the most declined the federalism system. On the other hand, The prominent writers argued that Somali people yearn for individual liberty, responsibility, and solidarity. Somalia’s future lies in hierarchically decentralized unitary system of governance that upholds Somali identity and unity, and ensures rule of law, democratic political process, and respect of human rights, justice, fairness, and shared prosperity (Dr. Ulusow, 2014). Writing for Hiil-Qaran Political Party recently, Abdirizak Haji Hussein, form erprime minister of Somalia (1964 to 1967), wrote that "a decentralized unitary system, with guarantees of regional or local autonomy, would be more, much more, appropriate for the Third Somali Republic. The unitary decentralized system provides not only regional/local capacitating but it’s also more pragmatic and cost-effective. Though regional/local autonomy should be constitutionally guaranteed, its implementation should be contingent on each region’s demonstrable administrative ability to undertake such duties and responsibilities. Once such capability is verified a transfer of such a mandate should be constitutionally delineated and put into action" (Hussein, 2011). Table 8: Federal system will perform in Somalia simply and shortly Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 4 4.3 4.3 4.3 Agree (A) 30 32.6 32.6 36.9 Disagree(D) 38 41.3 41.3 78.2 Strongly disagree (SD) 20 21.7 21.7 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data On table 8 shows that only 4 people out of 92 believes that the federal system will performs simply and shortly in Somalia, while 30 out of 92 agrees that this system can work simply but the majority of the respondents 38 out of 92 respondents believes that the federal system won’t perform simply and shortly in Somalia. 68 This findings accepts with the real facts in Somalia while the government established based on clan, what they call 4.5 sharing power and this implies the federal system will also work share the power based on clan which will be hard to apply in Somalia, the findings is also in line with the arguments of Somali politician analyst Dr Mohamoud M Ulusow who argues that “the formation of federal system based on clan ownership of territory has become major obstacle to national reconciliation, peace building, and state building in Somalia. It polluted the notion of state, citizenship, and Islamic values and intensified clan rivalry and vanity within the Somali society everywhere". Table 9: Federal system can actually contribute to resolve the conflicts Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 15 16.3 16.3 16.3 Agree (A) 21 22.8 22.8 39.1 Disagree(D) 31 33.6 33.6 72.7 Strongly disagree (SD) 25 27.2 27.2 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data In table 9, presented that 15 out of 92 of the respondents are strongly agree that the federal system will actually contribute to resolve the Somali conflicts, while 21 out of 92 agrees that the system will contribute the conflicts, but the majority of the respondents 31 out of the total respondents of 92 disagrees that this system can contribute to resolve the conflicts existing in Somalia. The findings of this research shows that the federalism will not contribute to the resolve the Somali government, instead of that it will increase the conflict as it argue a member of parliament (MPs) who believes that “the main challenges to the federal experiment emanate from three inter-related categories of problem: the absence of functional institutions, the problems of security and continuing and conflicting different clan interests”, Rationally, this perception must have triggered the imperative to halt the implementation of federation process until common consensus is forged. 69 Table 10: establishment of the federal states in the country is based on fair and community participation Category Frequency Strongly agree (SA) Percent 7 Valid Percent 7.6 Cumulative Percent 7.6 7.6 Agree (A) 29 31.5 31.5 39.1 Disagree(D) 35 38.0 38.0 77.2 Strongly disagree (SD) 21 22.8 22.8 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data According to the table 10, a total of 92 respondents were participated the responses, only 7 of them are strongly agree that the federal states of Somalia was based on fairly, while 21 of the respondents were totally strongly disagree to the fairness of the federal states. The majority of the respondents 35 out of those 92 respondents were disagree and believes that those states wasn’t based on fairness and communities didn’t participate them. So, the overall findings of this table shows there are some people 31.5% who had a confidence that the federal states had been built on fairness and with the participation of the belonged people while much percentage of that 38% believes reverse. Table 11: The implementation of the regional states took part in all the communities living in the regions Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 5 5.4 5.4 5.4 Agree (A) 21 22.8 22.8 28.3 Disagree(D) 56 60.9 60.9 89.1 Strongly disagree (SD) 10 10.9 10.9 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data According to the table 11, a total of 92 respondents were participated the responses, only 26 of them are agree that the Somali community participated the implementation 70 of regional states as well as the federal government, while 10 of the respondents were totally strongly disagree to the lack of community participation of the regional states. The majority of the respondents 56 out of those 92 respondents were disagree and believes that those states wasn’t based on community participation. So, the overall findings of this table shows some people believe that regional states participated the community 26% who had a confidence that the federal states had been built on fairness and with the participation of the belonged people while much percentage of that 66% believes that community weren't involved and participated the establishment of the federal states and its accomplishment. Table12: The current federal states in Somalia based on by clan not by region Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 51 55.4 55.4 55.4 Agree (A) 27 29.3 29.3 84.8 Disagree(D) 5 5.4 5.4 90.2 Strongly disagree (SD) 9 9.8 9.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 92 Source: Primary data The above table (12) shows that Current federalism system of Somalia based on by clan rather than by region as agreed when was established. the majority of the people agreed that current federal is based on by clan, 78% out of 92 reported that current federal based on clan while few of the respondents believe that it's based on regions. According to the current political conflicts of the regions based on clan rather than regions, for example Puntland state established by a sub clan, Galmudug as well as based on clan, Somaliland which was claimed to be free from Somalia based on solely clan, Jubbaland is clearly one clan while many Somali clans resides, South west which caused a lot of confusion is well based on Digil and Mirifle clan. All Somalia federal states were founded by a clan which claimed to be majority clan while ignored all the minority and sub clans resides those regions, not only the federal states even Federal government discriminated by the minority groups . 71 furthermore, the most intractable issue is the question of federalism. Despite five years of work, the committee drafting Somalia’s new constitution was unable to reconcile different positions on the devolution of power and left many provisions on federalism vague or unaddressed in the provisional constitution that forms the basic law of the SFG. Put simplistically, serious disagreements remain between those who would like to see Somalia become a strong unitary state—one that can stand up to neighbors, such as Ethiopia, that have long meddled in its affairs—and those that fear a centralized government would be dominated by a single clan, or group of clans—as it was during the Siad Barre era—and would then deny them their fair share of resources. This divide also tends to follow clan lines with many Hawiye clans, who dominate central and south Somalia and particularly greater Mogadishu, supporting a unitary state, while many Darod clans, who dominate Puntland and Jubaland, are strong proponents of federalism. Table 13: The federalism system will causes some conflicts between community reside in the regions Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 22 23.9 23.9 23.9 Agree (A) 45 38.0 38.0 62.0 Disagree(D) 12 23.9 23.9 85.9 Strongly disagree (SD) 13 14.1 14.1 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data On table 13 shows that only 25 people out of 92 believes that the federal system will in Somalia will not cause any conflict in the community, while 22 out of 92 agrees that federalism may cause some conflicts and community misunderstanding based on clan and boundaries of the regions and state governments, but the majority of the respondents 45 out of 92 respondents believes that the federal system will causes conflicts between state governments and Federal government, state governments themselves, residence of regions as well as the community resides in the regions and districts because of priority and superiority of the clans. 72 This findings accepts with the real facts in Somalia while the government established based on clan, what they call 4.5 sharing power and this implies the federal system will also work share the power based on clan which will be hard to apply in Somalia. Well-known writer and Somalia political analyst specially Federalism of Somalia argue that "a creating a formidable obstacle to recovery of the lost nation, the separation of clans on key issues threatens to divide Somalis who share a common culture, territory, and religion. African federalism has shown to fail due to a lack of commitment to democratic values and obstruction of the central government authority. The signs of many problems associated with clan federalism like violent minority dissent against a dominant clan and intensifying political struggle are now visible in territories such as Jubbaland, southwest and Puntland Rather than solving the problems of bad governance, clan federalism expands the state’s flaws, frustrates national reconciliation, and annuls citizenship rights and obligations". Table 14: The federal system is a thought from Somali community Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 12 13.0 13.0 13.0 Agree (A) 25 27.2 27.2 40.2 Disagree(D) 23 25.0 25.0 65.2 Strongly disagree (SD) 32 34.8 34.8 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data On table 14 shows that 37 people out of 92 argue that the federalism system was a thought from Somali community, while 55 out of 92 realized that federalism may not attention from Somali community and it is not Somali culture as they believe . Although The idea of Federalism in Somalia was first put forward by the Pro-Italian Hisbiya Digil & Mirifle political party in the 1950s. This view is not politics for their culture, ethnicity and history as well as not concept from the Somali community, but this ideology from western countries specially an idea, sourced from anthropologist and historians who observed Somalis for the last 100 years. It is mainly accused the emergence of the concept to the Somali context an author and great anthropologist, 73 the British writer of Somali affairs I'M Lewis. He contributed the idea on conference held at Mombasa. Table 15: Federalism system will take part to build up trust and cooperation between regions, governments and among community Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 10 21.7 21.7 21.7 Agree (A) 11 32.6 32.6 54.3 Disagree(D) 36 28.3 28.3 82.6 Strongly disagree (SD) 25 17.4 17.4 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data When the respondents (92) were asked if federalism will build up trust and cooperation between regions, governments and community their responses noted as 10% strongly agree, agree 11%, disagree 36% and strongly disagree 25%. The ever all findings of this table shown us that people weren't believe if the Federalism system will take part to build up trust and cooperation between community resides together as well as region states and the federal government of Somalia, 61% out of 92 respondent totally declined that the federalism will build up trust and cooperation between community. This revealed that significant number people still doubt the reliability of Federalism in Somalia and the future relations between the government and federal units. History witness that Puntland, a federal unit which has formed before the Federal Government had a tough relation with the Federal Government, which sometimes caused a media war, cutting bonds and denial of the Federal Government. 74 Table 16: Federalism is a something that will divide the country and people. Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 32 22.8 22.8 22.8 Agree (A) 38 30.4 30.4 53.3 Disagree(D) 10 30.4 30.4 83.7 Strongly disagree (SD) 12 16.3 16.3 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data When the question of federalism is something that will divide the country was addressed to the respondents (92). Their responses were translated as strongly agree (32%), agree (38%), disagree (10%) and strongly disagree (12%). This table shows that significant number of Somalis (70%) perceive that federalism is a tool used to divide the nation which can intensify the little difference between the people, the sub-tribes they belong to. this came after the civil war broke-out and the whole family disintegrated in small fractions in which all are against one another and all are fighting for not interest or not anything that contribute to their lives physically but prestigious fight with full of superiority complex. the overall findings of this table shown as that significant number of Somalis (70%) perceive that federalism is a tool used to divide the nation and the people regards the sub boarders of the country, superiority of the people lived in the regions, discrimination of the minority and the sources of the country, all those can caused a conflict between community and another civil war because the current federal based on clan not region. “Federalism is a destructive force for Somalia, and it will continue to remain one whose woes will haunt Somalia,” Abdulkadir Sheikh Ismail, former chairman of the parliamentary committee on constitutional affairs, told IRIN. If “regional state interests take prominence over the national interest, the common interest is lost as a result, and that could set a dangerous precedent,” he added. 75 “The establishment of a federalism of the clan, rather than a regional one” is a serious risk, according to Marco Zoppi, a freelance political analyst. “The current distribution of the clan already lends itself to a phenomenon of this kind.” Table 17: Federalism as a system of government has positive impact to the community and the country Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 21 22.8 22.8 22.8 Agree (A) 33 35.9 35.9 58.7 Disagree(D) 25 26.1 26.1 84.8 Strongly disagree (SD) 13 14.1 14.1 98.9 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data The question about whether federalism as system of government will have a positive impact on the community and the country at large the respondents responses were as follows strongly agree(22.8%), agree(35.9), disagree(26.1%) and strongly disagree (14.1%). This information exposes that still noteworthy number f respondents has a hope that if the option is chosen as a system of government to Somalia, it may have some substantial impacts on the good way of the state. Apart from disintegration, it can help communities choose accountable officials and respond t their immediate needs like schools, hospitals, tapped water, environmental protection, roads, airports, and other infrastructure. Table 18: Federalism system will contribute Somali peace process Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 26 28.3 28.3 28.3 Agree (A) 25 27.2 27.2 55.4 Disagree(D) 28 30.4 30.4 85.9 Strongly disagree (SD) 13 14.1 14.1 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 92 76 Source: Primary data When respondents were enquired if the Federalism system will contribute Somali Peace Process, 51 out of 92 respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the system will contribute the peace process f the nation. Another 41 respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the notion that federalism will contribute peace process of the Somali people. 28.3% f the respondents strongly agreed, 27.2% agreed, 30.4% disagreed while 14.1% f the total respondents strongly disagreed. Considering the responses given by the respondents, it shows there existence of frustration and little knowledge, the total impact of the system and the total life of the Somali people. There is no much difference between the agreed/strongly agreed and disagreed/strongly disagreed. It seems that people didn’t understand federalism, its designs and how it works. Table 19: Federalism system is not suitable such community have same religious, language and culture but, appropriate people with different religious, language and culture. Cumulative Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent Strongly agree (SA) 33 35.9 35.9 35.9 Agree (A) 25 27.2 27.2 63.0 Disagree(D) 22 23.9 23.9 87.0 Strongly disagree (SD) 12 13.0 13.0 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data When they were addressed with the question federalism system is not suitable with such community who has same religion, language, and culture, but appropriate to people with different religion, language and culture, some 36% f them strongly agreed while 27% f them agreed and 24% f them agreed while 13% f them strongly disagreed. This will strengthen the argument made by some Somalis that concept of federal is not home grown but imposed idea by westerners to stabilize the country or to 77 establish small cantons with little power that can be dealt with one by one. However, traditional leaders, politicians and some other significant members of the community exposed little knowledge n the concept. Furthermore, Somalia is not a multicultural country with critical cultural and religious antagonisms and is not home to mutually exclusive ethnic or racial groups that earnestly desire to be separate from each other and would, therefore, require constitutional guarantees for their continued existence in separation in a secure multicultural political environment… There is hardly any part of this country that can stand by itself as a viable federal unit. Most likely, the only thing that will result from the plan to make Somalia federal is the break up the country into several clan based, exclusive [sic] and economically non-viable units, and the creation of these clan enclaves will in all likelihood only exacerbate the clan hostilities that the civil war has generated. With the creation of these clan cantonments the trend towards national integration will be reversed and clan identities will begin to cast a menacing shadow over Somali ethnic identity, which under the circumstances is bound soon be gone with the wind. Federalism, therefore, is not the right choice for Somalia (Ali A. Hersi, 2004). 20. Before the accord of federalism was not conduct study and assessment from the community about their wish and keen Category Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly agree (SA) 46 50.0 50.0 50.0 Agree (A) 24 26.1 26.1 76.1 Disagree(D) 9 9.8 9.8 85.9 Strongly disagree (SD) 13 14.1 14.1 100.0 Total 92 100.0 100.0 Source: Primary data When respondents were answering the question before the accord of federalism, proper study and assessment of the community concerning their wish and keen was not conducted, 50% of them strongly agreed, 26.% of them agreed, 10% of them disagreed and 14% of them strongly agreed. 78 This makes forte to the previous argument made by some people that federalism was not an option of the people but imposed. Federalism was not the rightful solution as the majority of the people don’t see it the suitable way of their life. As long as the system and its process is not community driven and supported by all socio-economic groups, it is hardly established. This accord of federalism were made after The Meeting was addressed by H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Hon. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), H.E Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Prime Minister of the TFG, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud, President of the Puntland State of Somalia, Mohamed Ahmed Alin, President of the Galmudug State of Somalia, and Hon. Wafula Wamunyinyi, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The Meeting was facilitated by Augustine P. Mahiga, Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General. Delegates included members of the TFIs, Puntland State of Somalia, Galmudug State of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a. Approximately three dozen stakeholders from the international community also participated in the proceedings, including: regional organizations, namely: European Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States and Organization of the Islamic Conference. This Accord made by few Somalia politicians and stakeholders from the TFG, TFP, Puntland State, Galmudug State, of Somalia, and Hon. Wafula Wamunyinyi, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The Meeting was facilitated by Augustine P. Mahiga, Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General. Thus, the accord demonstrated that Somali community was not contribute any opinion and guidance to the current federalism system based on clan as well as there was not reconcile by the Somali scholars, intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders, community leaders, civil society and wholly Somali community in order to contribute their desire and wish of their country and government. only they were guests and silences because few people and international community were preferred. 79 CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS: 1- Lack of community understanding about the federalism. Considering the responses given by the respondents, it shows there existence of frustration and little knowledge, the total impact of the system and the total life of the Somali people. There is no much difference between the agreed/strongly agreed and disagreed/strongly disagreed. It seems that people didn’t understand federalism, its designs and how it works. Furthermore, the federalism accord demonstrated that Somali community was not contribute any opinion and guidance to the current federalism system based on clan as well as there was not reconcile by the Somali scholars, intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders, community leaders, civil society and wholly Somali community in order to contribute their desire and wish of their country and government. only they were guests and silences because few people and international community were preferred. Mohamed Hassan Haad, a well-known traditional elder, is also skeptical. “Somalis do not understand what federalism is. It does not serve the interest of Somali people and will remain an intractable problem in the long run. It is going to set one clan against the other,” he told IRIN. “Somalis have been fighting over clan and religious issues for two decades, and federalism is nothing but a new source or cycle of conflict over land and ownership.” 2-The structure of Current Somalia Federalism based on Clan rather than Regions: The above table (12) shows that Current federalism system of Somalia based on by clan rather than by region as agreed when was established. the majority of the people agreed that current federal is based on by clan, 78% out of 92 reported that current federal based on clan while few of the respondents believe that it's based on regions. According to the current political conflicts of the regions based on clan rather than regions, for example Puntland state established by a sub clan, Galmudug as well as 80 based on clan, Somaliland which was claimed to be free from Somalia based on solely clan, Jubbaland is clearly one clan while many Somali clans resides, South west which caused a lot of confusion is well based on Digil and Mirifle clan. All Somalia federal states were founded by a clan which claimed to be majority clan while ignored all the minority and sub clans resides those regions, not only the federal states even Federal government discriminated by the minority groups . furthermore, the most intractable issue is the question of federalism. Despite five years of work, the committee drafting Somalia’s new constitution was unable to reconcile different positions on the devolution of power and left many provisions on federalism vague or unaddressed in the provisional constitution that forms the basic law of the SFG. Put simplistically, serious disagreements remain between those who would like to see Somalia become a strong unitary state—one that can stand up to neighbors, such as Ethiopia, that have long meddled in its affairs—and those that fear a centralized government would be dominated by a single clan, or group of clans—as it was during the Siad Barre era—and would then deny them their fair share of resources. This divide also tends to follow clan lines with many Hawiye clans, who dominate central and south Somalia and particularly greater Mogadishu, supporting a unitary state, while many Darod clans, who dominate Puntland and Jubaland, are strong proponents of federalism. Agreement on the powers of the federal government need to be thrashed out quickly, otherwise Somalia risks embarking on a “piece-meal” approach in the establishment of local administrations and federal states “The establishment of a federalism of the clan, rather than a regional one” is a serious risk, according to Marco Zoppi, a freelance political analyst. “The current distribution of the clan already lends itself to a phenomenon of this kind.” 3- federalism of Somalia will causes some conflict between community resides in the regions On table 13 shows that only 25 people out of 92 believes that the federal system will in Somalia will not cause any conflict in the community, while 22 out of 92 agrees that federalism may cause some conflicts and community misunderstanding based on clan and boundaries of the regions and state governments, but the majority of the 81 respondents 45 out of 92 respondents believes that the federal system will causes conflicts between state governments and Federal government, state governments themselves, residence of regions as well as the community resides in the regions and districts because of priority and superiority of the clans. This findings accepts with the real facts in Somalia while the government established based on clan, what they call 4.5 sharing power and this implies the federal system will also work share the power based on clan which will be hard to apply in Somalia. Well-known writer and Somalia political analyst specially Federalism of Somalia argue that "a creating a formidable obstacle to recovery of the lost nation, the separation of clans on key issues threatens to divide Somalis who share a common culture, territory, and religion. African federalism has shown to fail due to a lack of commitment to democratic values and obstruction of the central government authority. The signs of many problems associated with clan federalism like violent minority dissent against a dominant clan and intensifying political struggle are now visible in territories such as Jubbaland, southwest and Puntland Rather than solving the problems of bad governance, clan federalism expands the state’s flaws, frustrates national reconciliation, and annuls citizenship rights and obligations". “Federalism is a destructive force for Somalia, and it will continue to remain one whose woes will haunt Somalia,” Abdulkadir Sheikh Ismail, former chairman of the parliamentary committee on constitutional affairs, told IRIN. If “regional state interests take prominence over the national interest, the common interest is lost as a result, and that could set a dangerous precedent,” he added. In contrast, many Scholars have identified and documented complex problems and conflicts associated with clan based federalism. These problems include (a) the impossibility of making clan and administrative boundaries congruent, (b) tension between majorities and minorities clans in districts, (c) exacerbation of the plight of minorities, (d) solidification of clan cleavages on political, institutional and territorial basis, and reproducible permanent clan identity for creating differences in society (e) Revenge for the abuse of a kin by others, (f) impossibility to develop countrywide civic citizenship, (g) clan mobilization for secession after successful formation of group identity and cohesion, leadership, government, parliament, and armed forces, and external support, (h) difficulty of countrywide mobility of citizens, (i) turning 82 constitutional conflicts into clan conflicts. These problems and others like contest between big and small states, handling of foreign affairs, regulation of domestic and foreign trade, are good indicators for the failure of clan federalism. (Dr Ulusow,2014). 4. Federalism system is not thought from Somali community Many countries have experienced civil wars since the end of the Cold War in 1990. Most ended either through a military victory for one group (e.g. Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia) or through a negotiated settlement (e.g. South Africa and Mozambique). Regardless of the way civil wars ended, leaders have faced the difficult tasks of designing suitable institutions that would regulate political, economic, and cultural conflicts within their societies. Somalia is no exception. The team led by Ioan Lewis and James Mayall published A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options in 1995. The study briefly explained the four mechanisms that political scientists often propose when designing governance institutions for divided societies: Co-federalism, federalism, consocialism, and decentralized unitary. In the following section, the report briefly revisits the main features of these four models and presents the arguments of Somali and non-Somali scholars prescribing them. Co-federalism Co-federalism is loosely defined as a 'union of states'. Independent States 'confederate' to establish common and complimentary policies (Elazar, 1991; Lister, 1996; Golove, 2003). The European Union is often provided as an example of a confederation. Constituent states retain sovereignty—thus making it a weaker union than that of a federation—but are obliged, by terms of the confederation, to adhere to particular polices on, for example, trade, fiscal policy, immigration, defense, and justice. Member states are also able to veto or 'opt-out' of policies that are considered harmful to their interests (Golove, 2003). Hussein Adam, writing in 1994 in the edited volume Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and it's Alternatives, identifies confederalism as a possible path to maintaining ties between Somaliland and Somalia. "It is likely," Adam writes, "that internal and international circumstances may oblige the Republic of Somaliland, in 83 time, to reconsider full independence and opt for some link with Mogadishu in a cofederal state" (1994). Lewis and Mayall also considered the confederation system to be a potentially viable model explaining: European experience here may have potential relevance for Somalis: one of the motives inspiring European union was to prevent a repetition of the two European wars that also engulfed the world in conflict earlier this century. At some point in the future, and in conformity with traditional political values, it would be possible for the different Somali regions or states to create common institutions and policies. Somalis could then work together in central agencies, with representation from each state or region protected by the sovereign status of each region and by the right to veto, or opt-out of unwelcome proposals (Lewis and Mayall, 1995). Richard Dowden, in an article written for the African Arguments blog, agrees with Lewis and Mayall. Using the Swiss confederation as a model for Somalia, he argues that there are potential benefits of the opt-out clause: The way people live and are governed [in Switzerland] is decided locally. The Swiss confederation means that cantons [sub-divisions of the country] have joined the state willingly and can leave if they want to… Allow the government in Mogadishu to run the city and port, perhaps the Benadir region, but no further. Negotiations should then take place region by region about the relationship between them and the capital, leaving power in local—not national—hands (Dowden, 2011). Federalism Ronald L. Watts, in Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, defined federalism as the "combination of shared-rule and regional self-rule within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to another." (Watts, 1996). In a federal arrangement, sovereignty is divided between national and sub national governments along territorial lines (Wheare,1964; Watts, 1996). PeterH. Schuk identifies four distinct paths to federalism: 1) pre-existing regions or colonies unite to form one federal states (e.g. the United States); 2) a colonialist or imperial force imposes a federal arrangement on a given nation-state (e.g. the United Kingdom imposing federalism on Australia): 3) a federal state is created through military conquest (e.g. Germany following World War II); and 4) an existing nation84 state decides to establish a federal system to accommodate different groups within that state (e.g. South Africa and Belgium) (Schuk, 2006). In Somalia, as Mohamed H. Mukhtar noted, the Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil al-Somalia (HDMS) political party, representing the historically marginalized Digil and Mirifle clan families, was the first party to propose a federal structure for Somalia prior to independence in 1960 (Mukhtar, 1989). The proposal did not gain traction at the time with most of the political elite favoring the unitary model. Globally, of 202 recognized independent states in the world, just 25 have adopted federalism, though, according to the Forum of Federations, these states account for more than 40 per cent of the world's population (Forum of Federations, n. d.). Federal states often feature large populations. Each of the three existing federal states on the African continent—Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa—are among the five most populous countries on the continent. Somalia’s total population—approximately 10 million—is smaller than the population of some federal members states inNigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Lewis and Mayall suggest that federalism may provide an effective compromise between groups seeking a centralized system of governance and those seeking a decentralized system of governance (Lewis and Mayall, 1995). In such a system, a central, federal government of Somalia will continue to exist alongside regional governments. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), they claim, may provide a useful model for Somalia. Veteran Somalia observer Mohamed Abshir Waldo, likewise, sees federalism as a viable solution to the political crisis in Somalia. While explaining the creation of Puntland, he states: The verdict of the federalism choice was based on three considerations: 1) that this system of zonal self-governing was the best approach that Somali communities could, under the circumstances, heal and overcome the fear, hatred and distrust of the bloody civil war; 2) that it offered a middle solution between an autocratic, centralized system of governance and outright secession; and 3) that decentralization empowered district and regional communities and offered more balanced and more productive socio-economic development opportunities (Waldo, 2010). 85 According to the previous Transitional Charter and the current Provisional Constitution, Somalia has officially been a federal state since 2004. Transitional governments prior to the current Federal Government of Somalia, involving two presidents (Abdullahi Yusuf, Ahmed and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and five prime ministers (Ali Mohamed Gedi, Nur Hassan Hussein, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, and Abdiweli Mohamed Ali-Gas), Sa'id Shirdon and current prime minister Abdiweli Sh. Ahmed Mohamed have, however, all failed to implement it. Con-socialism The term 'con-socialism' was popularized by Arend Lijphart. It is commonly understood to refer to non-majoritarian or consensus democracy. Group representation along ethnic, religious, lingual or, in the case of Somalia, clan lines, is guaranteed. Majority domination is averted through power-sharing agreements and the formation of coalitions representing all groups in society are encouraged (Lijphart, 1977; Andeweg, 2000). Governments adhering to con-socialist principles often provide minority groups with considerable autonomy. con-socialism departs from other forms of decentralization by ensuring representation along non-territory specific lines. Minority groups are guaranteed representation in government regardless of territorial cohesion. Somalia has practiced consociation list politics. The 4.5 (four-point-five) clan-based power-sharing formula resulted from a meeting among factions under the umbrella of the National Salvation Council, also known as the Sodere Group. The formula provides equal political representation to the four clan families in Somalia - the Darood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir and Hawiye - with a number of smaller clans receiving, cumulatively, half representation. The 4.5 system is demonstrated in the House of the People of the Federal Parliament of Somalia in which, of 275 seats, the four major clans are each guaranteed 61 seats, with the remaining 32 seats allocated to ‘minority’ clans. 86 Critics of con-socialism and the 4.5 system alike have argued that it reinforces existing divisions in society by institutionalizing them (Eno & Eno, 2009; Samatar, 2007). Further, they argue that representation without cohesion or effective leadership among groups is meaningless. con-socialism assumes the groups represented have a common agenda with strong leaders able to articulate that agenda. Some rights are thereby awarded to communities rather than individuals. This view is not politics for their culture, ethnicity and history as well as not concept from the Somali community, but this ideology from western countries specially an idea, sourced from anthropologist and historians who observed Somalis for the last 100 years. It is mainly accused the emergence of the concept to the Somali context an author and great anthropologist, the British writer of Somali affairs I'M Lewis. He contributed the idea on conference held at Mombasa. 5. Federalism is not the option for Somalia Few disagree that decentralization of authority is necessary for Somalia to rebuild a government system that is trusted by all Somalis. Consensus on the type of such decentralization remains elusive. Officially, based on the draft constitution, Somalia is a ‘federal state’. This does not, however, mean the debate on this issue is over. There is no system of governance that can provide a panacea to the overwhelming governance challenges Somalia has faced since the collapse of the state in 1991. Lessons can be learned from other countries emerging from conflict to rebuild government but the Somali context is unique and, ultimately, sustainable solutions to its problems will also be unique. A major challenge is how to balance the contradictory trends within Somali society. Both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are strongly present in Somalia. This study has presented the domestic and external drivers of decentralization. It has also provided a brief overview of four different models of decentralization, each offering varying degrees of autonomy and sovereignty to decentralized units. It has, furthermore, attempted to provide a summary of the advantages and disadvantages associated with each system of governance. A genuine national dialogue on the domestic drivers explained above, with a view to designing a unique system of decentralization for Somalia, is long overdue. 87 Ali A. Hersi argues that the unitary system in Somalia is often wrongly conflated with military dictatorship. Rejection of over-centralization of the state, he contends, does not necessitate federalism. "[M]any Somalis, who apparently do not have an adequate grasp of what a federal system entails, are using this political concept rather loosely, to simply mean a form of administrative decentralization only" (Hersi, 2004). Recommendations 1. Federalism shall accomplish the task of preserving national unity through the distribution of powers and sovereignty between the central state and the autonomous territorial entities operating within it. It shall ensure the peaceful coexistence of peoples, while recognizing their diversity. 2. The FGS shall leave specific issue such as population census and political participation to local parliaments to the concerned federal state's discernment, reducing considerably accuses of acting to benefit one group over the other. 3. Support and prioritize nation-wide negotiations on the type federalism the FGS will implement. Insist that the formation of new states adheres to a rulebased process. 4. Advance inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the federal government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities. 5. Ethiopia, the United Nations, and European Union have shaped the federal member states in South Central Somalia, while the Federal Parliamentary Committee and the Independent five members Commission on Constitutional Review are yet to start their tasks. An interview with VOA, Chairman of the Parliamentary committee Hon. Mariam Arif Qassim has appealed to the Somali people to effectively take ownership of the constitutional review process. But, the Federal Parliament and the Attorney General have yet to publish for public engagement the official final version of the Provisional Constitution after the postponement or amendment of certain articles. The Chairman suggested that at least six issues need public debate and decision: 1. Definition of federalism; 2. The roles of the president and prime minister; 3. Taxation Power and National Resource Sharing; 4. Right to Citizenship; 5. Power allocation between federal government and federal 88 member states; 6. The status of Mogadishu, the capital under federal system based on clan hegemony. The above undefined issues challenge the legitimacy of existing federal government and shaped regional states. 6. Continue to support local and regional administrations’ capacity building, particularly through the Local Stability Fund proposed by the UK at the London Conference in 2012, but this must be linked to reconciliation and measures to ensure minority clans are adequately represented in those governments. 7. Place much greater emphasis on reconciliation, both with armed factions and on a national level between clans. Provide support to local peace and reconciliation conferences that can feed into larger regional conferences only after most local disputes have been resolved. These conferences should be completed before implementing the federal and elections. 8. Decentralization of authority is necessary for Somalia to rebuild a government system that is trusted by all Somalis. Consensus on the type of 7 such decentralization remains elusive. Officially, based on the draft constitution, Somalia is a ‘federal state’. This does not, however, mean the debate on this issue is over. 9. The federal government must cultivate the trust of the Somali people. Through participation and awareness that everything happening in the country belongs to them and represents their best interest and reducing the public hesitation that foreigners are using tool to exploit the resources of the nation by divide and rule. 10. Borders between the federal units will create great deal of problems unless dealt with carefulness and conscious understanding on tribal difference, rural water and pasture resources and inter clan conflicts. The only way that federal government can reduce these tensions is to use the former regional and district boundaries and re-assess the desires of the communities on which side to join. 11. Revenues should be clearly defined and the share of each level of government should be stated clearly. The collection of taxes need to be addressed, if the Federal customs are assigned to collect all taxes, then the process that regional and local administrations can draw from the bank should be simplified. 89 Recommendations for future studies Basing on the findings, the study recommended that a similar study should be done on other regions similar line in order to access whether the same results will be attained A. Assess the best approach can work with the state governments and federal government of Somalia. After establishment of many federal states based on clan wee the relationship between federal member and federal government of Somalia and their relations is not good and based on trust between them. also, there are still wide divergences on the practicalities of the relationship between Federal and State governments and limited creation and application of the necessary structures for the process. Equally, there are still uncertainties over which regions could or should come together to form states. In addition, controversies between high-level officials of the FGS also had a role in delaying the regional formation. Mostly driven by a desire to advance clan interests, such controversies stalled progress on numerous occasions, undermining the institutional integrity of the government. So, the gap is the poor relationship between the states and federal government because there is lack of nation-wide negotiations and community participation about the federal states while declined the small clans and minorities according to the rule and political participations. also, the draft constitutions were not acknowledge the definition of federalism shall accomplish in Somalia, what kind of federalism and how it looks like. Some of the community palming to the government and complaining the way of implementation about the federalism while there so no community participation and not reconcile the educators, scholars, civil society and minorities. B. The Foreign involvement on Somali Federalism system of Governance in Somalia 90 Ethiopia, the United Nations, and European Union have shaped the federal member states in South Central Somalia, while the Federal Parliamentary Committee and the Independent five members Commission on Constitutional Review are yet to start their tasks. An interview with VOA, Chairman of the Parliamentary committee Hon. Mariam Arif Qassim has appealed to the Somali people to effectively take ownership of the constitutional review process. But, the Federal Parliament and the Attorney General have yet to publish for public engagement the official final version of the Provisional Constitution after the postponement or amendment of certain articles. The Chairman suggested that at least six issues need public debate and decision: 1. Definition of federalism; 2. The roles of the president and prime minister; 3. Taxation Power and National Resource Sharing; 4. Right to Citizenship; 5. Power allocation between federal government and federal member states; 6. The status of Mogadishu, the capital under federal system based on clan hegemony. The above undefined issues challenge the legitimacy of existing federal government and shaped regional states. The region has significant security interests in Somalia, and immediate neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda all have sizable forces in the country. Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somali is very much linked into the Middle East, and Egypt, Qatar and Turkey are very active in the country. (EJ Hogendoorn,2013). all these countries have influence on Somali federalism system while Kenya and Ethiopia are the most one because of the Natural resources and border security related issue. Also, Ethiopia and Kenya scheming some Somali territory for long time since the independence when British colony transferred Northern Front Somalia (NFD) to Kenya and Ogaden region to Ethiopia, Somali scholars and economist believe that two regions are the most rich natural resources in Somalia available that regions including Oil, Mineral, Gold and many other resource. 91 CONCLUSION Federalism is a system of government which devolves power from the federal government to state levels and lower. It has been used by world states for centuries. Somalia has chosen Federalism during 2004 Embegatti Reconciliation Conference for Somalis hosted by the Kenyan government. Ten years from now, the nation did take no step towards implementing federalism on the ground. The SFG remains an extremely weak and fragile state, its security dependent on external sources, its sovereignty threatened and its stability far from certain. Yet it is at an inflection point where the hope of achieving sustainable progress is becoming real if, and only if, the international community work together to that goal and Somalis honestly confront the governance challenges facing their country. This study has discussed the current and existing challenges of federalism system of governance and opportunities of the federal political structure for Somalia. A great deal of work has been done in drafting the constitution, electing a new president and appointing a new government, but there is more work ahead for Somalia’s political leaders. It has to continue discussing the Federal Constitution, its deficiencies and opportunities to correct it, The success or failure of this current government will be judged by how the Federal Government approaches and discharges the Federal Constitution, its support for establishing the remaining new Federal Member States, adequately and fairly dealing with constitution such us Puntland and Somaliland, sharing revenue and ensuring international security support together and developing better relations for all sides for the progress of Somalia. Working together on security, economic development, re-establishing federal forces and social structure without mistrust between states and federal government. 92 REFERENCES Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, Alex Nowrasteh. (n.d.). Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement? Civins, B. (2008). ETHIOPIA’S INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA,. (New York: Human Rights Watch).Fearon, J. D. (1998). DOMESTIC POLITICS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Copyright © 1998 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved. Gent, S. E. (2003). Instability, Intervention, and Inter-Power Politics. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester.group, I. c. (15 February 2012). THE KENYAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA. Africa Report N°184.loubser, h. m. (december 2012). the international response state failture: the case of Somalia. university of pretoria.Samater, A. I. (july 1, 1995). somali affiars. White, J. P. (2006). CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SOMALIA. washington DC: central for stratege and international affairs. Bakvis, Herman and William M. Chandler. 1987. Federalism and the Role of the State. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Amoretti, Ugo M. and Nancy Bermeo (eds). 2004. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2000. “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels.”American Economic Review 90:2 (May) 135-9. Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2000. “New Tools andNew Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” Policy Research Working Paper 2283. Washington: World Bank, Development Research Group. Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater: A comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon. International Organization 55(2):487-95. Beer, Samuel H. 1993. To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 93 Bermann, George A. 1994. “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States.” Columbia Law Review 94, 339-43. Bickers, Kenneth N. and Robert M. Stein. 1996. “The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel.” American Journal of Political Science 40:4 (November) 130026. Bird, Richard and Francois Vaillancourt (eds). 1998. Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Bollen, Kenneth A. 1993. “Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures.”American Journal of Political Science 37, 1207-30. Cairns, Alain C. 1988. Constitution, Government, and Society in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Chandler, William. 1987. “Federalism and Political Parties.” In Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler(eds), Federalism and the Role of the State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 149-70. Crisp, Brian F. 2000. Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezualan Politicians and InterestGroups. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Crook, Richard C. and James Manor. 1998. Democracy and Decentralization: Local Government in South Asia andWest Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 94 APPENDICES APPENDIX II: RESEARCH BUDGET FUNDING CATEGORY TOTAL NEED IN EACH CATEGORY Research preparation $120 Transportation $120 Questionnaire preparation $150 Office equipment $120 Thesis book $300 Others $250 Total amount needed $$1060.00 Total amount requested $1000 95 APPENDIX III: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION Kampala University Master’s Program Department of Social Sciences Mogadishu, Somalia. Dear Respondents, REF: The Challenges of Federalism System in Somali I am a post graduate student at Kampala University Master’s degree program pursuing master’s degree in International relations and diplomacy; I am undertaking a research study “To investigating the challenges of federalism system of governance in Somalia". Your institution has been selected to participate in the research study. I will be grateful if you could fill in the questionnaire attached. Your particulars and that of the institution do not need to appear anywhere on the questionnaire. Confidentiality will be strictly adhered to. Yours Faithfully, ABDIRASHID ISMAIL NOR Thank you for your cooperation. 96 APPENDIX IV: Questionnaire for the challenges of federalism system of governance in Somalia. Kampala University Master’s Program Department of Social Sciences Mogadishu, Somalia. REF: The Challenges of Federalism System in Somali Dear Respondents, I am a post graduate student at Kampala University Master’s degree program pursuing master’s degree in International relations and diplomacy; I am undertaking a research study “To investigating the challenges of federalism system of governance in Somalia". You are invited to participate in this dissertation survey. In this survey, approximately 90 people will be asked to complete a questionnaire that asks questions about the challenges of Federalism system of government in Somalia. Completion of this survey will take approximately 15-20 minutes. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There are no foreseeable risks associated with this survey. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw from the survey at any point. It is very important for us to learn your opinions. Your survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will be reported only in the aggregate. Your information will be coded and will remain confidential. If you have questions at any time about the survey or the procedures, you may contact. Yours Faithfully, Abdirashid Ismail Nor 97 SUCTION A: Please provide the demographic details below. 1. What is your Age? (A). 20-30 (B). 30-40 (C). 40-50 (D). 50-60 (E). Above 60 2. What is your Gender? (A). Male (B). Female 3. What is your Marital status? A. Single B. Married C. Divorced 4. Please indicate the highest level of education completed A). High School or equivalent B). Some College C). College Graduate (4 year) D). Vocational/Technical School (2 year) E). Some Graduate F). Master's Degree (MS) G). Doctoral Degree (PhD) 98 H). Professional Degree (MD, JD, etc.) 5. What is your Occupation? A). Member of Parliament B). Minister C). Politician D). Social Activist E). Community Leader F). Others (identify )………………………….. 6. Which of the following best describes the area you live in? (A) Urban (B) Sub Urban (C) Rural 99 SUCTION B: Please Tick ( ) the column that best expressed your opinion on the items provided: Key: (SA) = Strong agree (A) = Agree (D) = Disagree (SD) = strong disagree S/N ITEMS 7 the federalism system of government appropriate to SA A D SD Somalia. 8 Federal system will perform in Somalia simply and shortly 9 Federal system can actually contribute to resolve the conflict. 10 The establishment of the federal states in the country are based on fire and community participation 11 the implementation of the regional states took part in all the communities living in the regions 12 The current federal states in Somalia based on by clan not by regions 13 the federalism system will cause some conflicts between community reside in the regions 14 the federalism system is a thought from Somali community 15 Federalism system take part to build up trust and cooperation between regions, government and among community. 16 federalism is a something will divide the country and the people 17 federalism system of government has positive impact to the community and the country 18 federalism system will contribute Somali peace process? 19 Federalism system is not suitable such community have same religion, language and culture but appropriate people with different religious, language and culture? 20 Before the accord of federalism was not conduct a study and assessment from community about their wish and keen. 100 SECTION C: INTERVIEW 1. What is federalism system in Somali? 2. What are the challenges of Federal system in Somalia on domestic politics? 3. How federal system will perform in Somalia? 4. What is the positive and negative impact of federalism system of government in Somalia? 5. What is the Advantages and disadvantages of federalism system? 6. How federalism system contribute Somali peace process? 7. How to find out solutions to the challenges of the federal governance system in Somalia? 8. Please share any additional comments of concerns on this subject. Thank you for your cooperation. 101