"Blockchain and democracy" by Jörn Erbguth

Literature Review on Blockchain and democracy Supported by the University of Zurich, Digital Society Initiative Jörn Erbguth University of Geneva joern@erbguth.net 1. Panorama on the topic Democratic states are entities where issues are decided by a large group – the people. There is a democratic process that builds upon elections, a legislative procedure, judicial review and separation of powers by checks and balances. Blockchains rely on decentralization, meaning they rely on a large group of participants as well. Blockchains are therefore confronted with similar problems. Even further, blockchains try to avoid central coordinating authorities. Consensus methods ensure that the systems align with the majority of their participants. Above the layer of the consensus method, blockchain governance coordinates decisions about software updates, bugfixes and possibly other interventions. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this blockchain governance? Should we use blockchain to secure e-voting? Blockchain governance has two central aspects. First, it is decentralized governance based on a large group of people, which resembles democratic decision-making. Second, it is algorithmic decision-making and limits unwanted human intervention. 2. Cornerstones Blockchain and democracy can be split into three areas: First, the use of democratic principles in order to make blockchain work. This ranges from the basic concensus algorithm to the (self-)governance of a blockchain. Second, blockchain is seen as providing a reliable tool for democracy. This ranges from the use of blockchain for electronic voting to the use in administration. Third, to study possible impacts of blockchain technology on a democratic society. This focusses on regulatory and legal aspects as well as ethical aspects. 3. Democratic Principles Used in Blockchain (Public) blockchains do not have central control. Still there is a constant need to find consensus for the next block, the protocol, and which software version to use and eventually fix bugs. This is similar to a democracy, where a consensus about laws and other government activities has to be reached. 3.1. Consensus Algorithms The lowest level of decision-making within blockchains is the consensus method used. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO introduced the Bitcoin Proof-of-Work (POW) algorithm (Nakamoto, 2008). Although academia is lagging behind the industry here, consensus algorithms is now a well-researched area. MILLER and SERGEY created formal models for it (Miller & LaViola, 2014; Sergey, 2018). Game theory is frequently applied to Bitcoin (Beccuti & Jaag, 2017; Houy, 2016; Zhen, Yue, Zhong-yu, Chang-bing, & Xin, 2017). Å et al. apply it towards a miner joining a mining pool (Liu, Wang, Niyato, Zhao, & Wang, 2017). Due to the inherent waste of energy of Bitcoin mining, the slow confirmation times and the limited scalability, industry and academia are looking for alternatives to POW. POW does not need any permission to work and allows everybody to participate. A range of improvements and alternative non-permissioned consensus algorithms are proposed: BIRYUKOV, KHOVRATOVICH and W. LI propose to replace the wasteful Bitcoin POW by a POW that solves real world NP-complete problems (Biryukov & Khovratovich, 2017; W. Li, 2018). Bitcoin’s POW favors by a small margin large mining pools compared to individual miners. This increases the risks of miner concentration which renders a 51% attack more likely. BASTIAAN proposes a two-phase mining (Bastiaan, 2015). MILLER, KOSBA, KATZ, SHI introduce non-outsourceable POW (Miller, Kosba, Katz, & Shi, 2015). Kiayias, Miller, Zindros submit a non-interactive POW (Kiayias, Miller, & Zindros, 2017). SHI advocates for adding a miner selection mechanism to POW (Shi, 2016). An alternative to POW could also be proof of storage (Biryukov & Khovratovich, 2017). However, the scalability of POW is deemed limited. A possible alternative to POW is Proof-of-Stake (POS). Although POS is not permissionless, POS does not need a third party to grant permissions. Instead the permissions are based on the number of tokens a participant has, which is directly available through the blockchain. SALEH provides a formal model for POS (Saleh, 2017). Since not every token holder will be ready to participate in the mining process, many blockchains like EOS (“Block.one’s Proposal for EOS Constitution v2.0,” 2018; EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2, 2017/2018; Sprey, 2019), TEZOS (Goodman, 2014) or Crux (P. Li, Peng, Yang, Zheng, & Pan, 2018) are using a delegated proof of stake (dPOS). Other consensus mechanisms like proof of luck, proof of mining or proof of elapsed time rely on specific secure hardware (Ahmed & Kostiainen, 2018; Lao, 2014; Milutinovic, He, Wu, & Kanwal, 2016). In permissioned settings where the participation is controlled, byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) can be used. Many papers address the use of BFT in blockchains (Crain, Gramoli, Larrea, & Raynal, 2017; Gramoli, 2017; Ren & Erkin, 2018; Team Rocket, 2018; Zhang, 2016). Combining POW and POS is also proposed (Abraham, Malkhi, Nayak, Ren, & Spiegelman, 2017; Stone, 2018). A range of authors provide overviews over possible and implemented consensus mechanisms (Andoni et al., 2019; Cachin & Vukolic, 2017; Chu & Wang, 2018; Pass & Shi, 2017; Rauchs et al., 2018; Vukolić, 2015; Yeow, Gani, Ahmad, Rodrigues, & Ko, 2018; Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, & Wang, 2017) 3.2. Blockchain Self-Governance How does the governance of blockchains above the consensus model work? JOHN and PAM discuss the governance challenges that every decentralized system is exposed to (John & Pam, 2018). How can we prevent top-nodes going rogue, hold them accountable and at the same time prevent it from seeming that noone is in charge? The authors map the discussion between on-chain and off-chain governance, analyze the properties of stigmergic governance and design a “Blockchain Governance Kernel”. HSIEH, VERGNE and WANG analyze the self-governance of blockchains concluding that decentralization on the organizational level has a negative effect (Hsieh, Vergne, & Wang, 2017). DE FILIPPI and LOVELUCK research the analyze pitfalls of Bitcoin-governance and conclude there needs to be institutional governance (De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016). The case of the decentralized autonomous organization “The DAO” is a prominent case of failed algorithmic governance (DuPont, 2018; Hütten, 2018; Mark, Zamfir, & Sirer, 2016; Reijers et al., 2018; Wit, 2017). Better self-governance of Bitcoin should provide for better predictability (Trump, Wells, Trump, & Linkov, 2018). BRACAMONTE and OKADA take a look at off-chain governance rules of Ethereum as a consequence of the DAO (Bracamonte & Okada, 2017). Even in the blockchain community, there is resistance to on-chain algorithmic governance (Stake, 2018; Vitalik Buterin, 2017; Zamfir, 2017). 4. Use of Blockchain in Democratic Governance Corruption is a major problem in many countries. Immutable trust of blockchains is seen as a tool to help remedy this. 4.1. Blockchain Based E-Voting Voting is central to democracy. The use of blockchain to secure e-voting is frequently discussed. Many authors discuss the use of Bitcoin for e-voting. Solutions are submitted that use different cryptographic methods to provide for anonymity: This ranges from using the anonymous Kerberos authenticationprotocol (Bistarelli, Mantilacci, Santancini, & Santini, 2017), zero knowledge proofs (Zhao & Chan, 2015), blind signatures (Jason & Yuichi, 2017) to ring signatures (Wu, 2017). AYED, WEI and WEN propose a solution based on a proprietary blockchain that relies on external voter identification and secure hardware (Ayed, 2017; Wei & Wen, 2018). HSIAO, TSO, CHEN and WU propose a smart contract-based solution where a secret sharing scheme and homomorphic encryption are used (Hsiao, Tso, Chen, & Wu, 2017). MARELLA et al. implement a prototype called Broncovote on Ethereum (Marella, Mohler, Milojkovic, & others, 2017). Voter anonymity is provided by homomorphic encryption. Since Ethereum’s smart contract language solidity does not support this, homomorphic encryption is implemented on a trusted server. In their conclusion, they propose using the Paillier encryption system instead since it can be used through solidity. K. KHAN, ARSHAD and M. KHAN discuss a solution based on Multichain (Khan, Arshad, & Khan, 2018). KOVIC emphasizes that a blockchain used for e-voting needs to also distribute nodes to other stakeholders like civil society in order to offer improved trust compared to non-blockchain-based e-voting solutions (Kovic, 2017). WU evaluates the proposed voting system against an extended set of requirements like fairness which is violated by the immediate visibility of intermediate results or receipt-freeness which is violated when a voter can prove who he or she has voted for (Wu, 2017). 4.2. Government Applications Governments provide a set of different registers for property, companies and people. Trust in these registers is important. Blockchain is seen by many authors to replace this trust. CARTER and UBACHT as well as OJO and ADEBAYO provide a review of papers and projects that use blockchain for e-government (Carter & Ubacht, 2018; Ojo & Adebayo, 2017). KIM, LASKOWSKI and NAN ask for ontologies that are better suited for governance than current generalpurpose smart contracts and that their standardization would also enable blockchain portability (Kim, Laskowski, & Nan, 2018). Some rather general papers quite naively see blockchain as some kind of general-purpose database or service layer that will miraculously and simultaneously enforce decentralization, security, confidentiality and transparency. Among these papers is one by GÖKALP et al. which discusses the use of blockchain in healthcare (Gökalp, Gökalp, Çoban, & Eren, 2018). OJO and ADEBAYO see blockchain as a next generation government information infrastructure that should enable “do-it-yourself” governance (Ojo & Adebayo, 2017). CASINO, DASAKLIS and PARSAKIS offer a comprehensive overview of blockchain-based applications (Casino, Dasaklis, & Patsakis, 2019). Rozas provides an overview of papers (Rozas, 2018) that analyze the possibility of using blockchain as an approach to solve the tragedy of commons (Ostrom, 1990). Some papers analyze the use of blockchain for a self-organizing share-economy (Kurka & Pitt, 2017; Pazaitis, Filippi, & Kostakis, 2017). MISCIONE et al. compare governance through blockchain is with tribal governance (Miscione, Ziolkowski, Zavolokina, & Schwabe, 2018). The economics of this governance discusses (Davidson, De Filippi, & Potts, 2016). NORTA introduces a formal life cycle model for governance (Norta, 2015; Norta, Othman, & Taveter, 2015). ATZORI shows that blockchain can replace government functions and might even be used to overthrow governments (Atzori, 2015). 5. Impact of Blockchain on Democratic Societies 5.1. Legal and Regulatory Cryptocurrencies and also blockchains in general are also seen as a regulatory challenge for governments. Since blockchains are not limited to national borders, governments have to navigate in a multi-stakeholder environment. TAPSCOTT advocates for a bitcoin governance network (Tapscott, 2014). Weber concludes that Bitcoin lacks governance and that Bitcoin will either include governance or will face pressure to be shut down (Weber, 2016). A new lex cryptographia (Wright & De Filippi, 2015), also called peer-to-peer-law (Abramaowicz, 2016), is predicted where authoritative decisions will be created without having authoritative decision makers. The question of replacing law by code is also subject to discussion mostly in the legal domain (Dwyer, 2017; Filippi & Hassan, 2016; Filippi & Wright, 2018; Lessig, 2000; Yeung, 2019). 5.2. General, Ethical and Philosophical View A range of papers take a more philosophical approach. They see blockchain as a blueprint for a new thinking of humankind that will eventually replace centralized structures. (Shackelford & Myers, 2017) conclude that blockchain can be a recipe for cyber peace. (Huckle & White, 2016) challenge the view that blockchain has to be libertarian and show that it is also suited to support socialist societies. (Reijers & Coeckelbergh, 2016) analyze the effect on society when we shift trust from first-order institutions to quasi-entities. DIERKSMEIER and SEELE analyze the ethical chances and challenges of cryptocurrencies and call for ethical clarifications of moral ambiguities to level business opportunities and to promote good using cryptocurrencies (Dierksmeier & Seele, 2016). However, expectations are described as being exaggerated. SWARTZ questions the dream of blockchains, their autonomy and automation and concludes that blockchain technology might be just boring (Swartz, 2017). CAMPBELL-VERDUYN and GOGUEN conclude that blockchain does not remove the necessity of trust but rather shifts trust (Campbell‐Verduyn & Goguen, 2018). 6. Research Gaps and Questions • • • • • Consensus mechanisms are viewed in the light of game theory rather than in the light of democratic principles. Is it possible to design a democratic consensus mechanism? On the other hand, can democracy learn from the analysis of and experience with blockchain consensus mechanisms? How should blockchain governance be shaped? Who should be allowed to participate in blockchain governance? Should participants in blockchain governance be liable to other blockchain participants or to outsiders? Should participation in blockchain governance be anonymous? How should votes in blockchain governance be weighted? Do we need separation of powers and checks and balances for blockchain governance? Jurisdiction is the limit to judicial review in a democracy. What limitation should there be for blockchain governance? Should blockchain governance be able to reverse transactions? Do we need international blockchain law? What should it include? How can it be realized? How can autonomous systems and governments work together on an international basis? Will governments be ready to act as certification providers for self-sovereign IDs? Will governments agree to use international blockchains? What kind of international governance mechanism is needed to create and maintain common blockchain regulation? For e-voting, fairness and receipt-freeness are requirements that should be addressed in more depth. Another focus should be put on the interfaces used for voting. In the context of blockchain, most manipulations are not done on the blockchain itself but in the area of key generation, key storage and interfaces. 7. References Abraham, I., Malkhi, D., Nayak, K., Ren, L., & Spiegelman, A. (2017). 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Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shaoan_Xie/publication/318131748_An_Overview_of_Blockchain_ Technology_Architecture_Consensus_and_Future_Trends/links/595b87c4aca272f3c08872e8/AnOverview-of-Blockchain-Technology-Architecture-Consensus-and-Future-Trends.pdf About the author This literature review has been supported by the University of Zurich Digital Society Initiative and carried out by Jörn Erbguth, PhD-candidate at the University of Geneva. He holds a degree in law and computer science, has worked as a CTO at the leading Swiss legal online information system, lectures at the University of Geneva and the Geneva School of Diplomacy and is a consultant on blockchain, smart contracts and GDPR.