04.07.2019
A way out for Russia and Turkey from Idlib's spiral of violence | Middle East Institute
A way out for Russia and Turkey from
Idlib's spiral of violence
July 1, 2019
Ömer Özkizilcik
Since May, the Idlib region in northwestern Syria has seen a
spike in armed conflict and a spiral of violence as Russia
has tried to pressure Turkey to implement the 2018 Sochi
deal, under which both sides agreed to set up a
demilitarized zone in the area. Turkey has not backed down,
however, and has responded harshly to Russia’s actions,
reminding Moscow of the potential costs of a major military
operation. While the violence threatens the 3.5 million
civilians in Idlib, the instability also represents an opportunity for both countries to revive the Sochi deal,
which was previously torpedoed by both the Assad regime and the Salafist-jihadist group Hayat Tahrir alSham (HTS). Since the start of the regime’s military campaign last month, the National Army, a group of
Free Syrian Army factions that fought alongside Turkish soldiers, has gradually entered the region. This
development may balance the HTS presence and ultimately help to force the group out of the
demilitarized zone, ensuring a continued Turkish-Russian consensus on Idlib.
Over the past six months, the internal dynamics within Idlib have changed dramatically. As part of a twostep campaign launched at the beginning of the new year, HTS has consolidated its control over the area,
targeting Turkish-backed factions and eliminating or containing its rivals. As Murat Ye
şiltaş and I have
argued, this development will likely prompt Turkey to wait for a new window of opportunity to implement
the Sochi deal, instead of taking military action itself, rebranding HTS, or accepting a devastating regime
military campaign.
The Assad regime has bombed Idlib in a bid to prevent a real ceasefire and gradually escalated to
recapture the region with the aim of taking back every inch of Syrian territory. On May 6, the regime,
backed by Russian airpower, launched a ground assault toward the Ghab Plains, violating the Idlib deescalation zone and carrying out airstrikes on civilian targets — including UN demarcated hospitals. This
operation made Russia’s role in the escalation clear, as it has been carried out exclusively by Russianbacked units like the Tiger Forces, the 5th Corps, and the al-Quds Forces. Perhaps contrary to Russian
expectations, however, Turkey has not yielded and has made clear the cost of working against its
interests in Syria. It has supplied opposition groups with anti-tank and Grad missiles, facilitated their use
against regime assaults, and encouraged counter-attacks, ultimately leading to the capture of an area of
around 38 square kilometers.
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A way out for Russia and Turkey from Idlib's spiral of violence | Middle East Institute
New arrivals
Since the beginning of May, reinforcements have bolstered Idlib’s defense. Factions of the Turkish-trained
National Army in Afrin and the Euphrates Shield areas, namely Jabhat al-Shamiya, Firka Hamza, 9th
Division, Jaysh al-Islam, Authenticity and Development Front, Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah, Jaysh al-Sharqiyyah,
Ahrar al-Sham, 20th Brigade, Liwa al-Samarkand, Hasakah Shield, and Liwa 112, have joined the fight in
rural Hama, adding more than 1,000 fighters. This was the first time these factions had entered Idlib
since HTS’ rise to dominance. Indeed, Jabhat al-Shamiya was evicted by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, HTS’
predecessor. The fighters of Ahrar al-Sham from the Ghab Plains were similarly forced out by HTS to
Afrin and have now returned and regained control over the region. Even the Firka Hamza militia —
formed and equipped by the Pentagon to fight ISIS — has entered Idlib, marking a major blow to HTS’
ambitions of “cleansing” it of potential rivals. This represents yet another significant change in dynamics
within the region and could have important longer-term consequences.
Beyond simply testing the waters with troop movements, anti-HTS groups also brought their religious
scholars like Jabhat al-Shamiya’s Shari Mohammed Khatib, known for his close ties with Sufis. The
arrival of such figures offers an alternative to HTS’ Salafi teachings and may help to change the
ideological balance of power. As the National Army units continue to fight on the frontlines against the
regime, they have boosted their credibility in the eyes of both locals and the Turkish-backed National
Front for Liberation (NLF).
These developments have undermined HTS both militarily and rhetorically. Tactically, to repel the regime,
the group has had to allow its rivals to enter Idlib, breaking its dominance and eroding its hegemony. This
has also undercut HTS’ arguments about the National Army — that they are border guards for Turkey,
deserters from the Syrian revolution, or even apostates to some. This could represent a real opportunity.
The current escalation has changed the power dynamics in Idlib, challenged HTS’ propaganda, and
underlined the importance of Turkey. HTS has long claimed to be capable of defending Idlib by force, but
it is now clear that is not the case, and only assertive Turkish action can prevent the regime’s advance.
A potential reordering
The first attempt to implement the Sochi agreement failed, but this should not preclude a second try,
especially with Turkey signaling its resolve. Factions of the National Army, together with the Turkishbacked NLF, can balance HTS in Idlib and force the extremists out of the demilitarized zone. In the past,
only parts of the NLF confronted HTS, and ultimately lost. But today, with the active support of the
National Army, the factions of the NLF have the capacity to win in a fight against HTS, as they have proved
before. Critically, HTS may also be reluctant to attack the National Army, fearing a direct confrontation
with Turkey.
Improved coordination between the two armed opposition structures and a Moscow-Ankara settlement
on de-escalation will have an impact on Idlib’s internal dynamics. When fighting against the regime
subsides, the potential for infighting among extremists and other opposition groups increases. HTS has
always found a pretext to attack the Syrian opposition when it felt threatened or saw an opportunity to
expand its control. To enforce the demilitarization zone, the opposition presence must grow gradually or a
confrontation with extremists will be inevitable. A good starting point would be a Russian concession of
areas recently captured by the regime to factions of the National Army.
Moving forward
The latest developments represent a very real opportunity, but only if Russia is serious about the Astana
process and the Sochi deal. However, if Moscow is only using HTS as a pretext to pursue a military
solution in Syria, rather than a political one based on the Geneva and Astana processes, then Ankara has
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A way out for Russia and Turkey from Idlib's spiral of violence | Middle East Institute
made it abundantly clear that Idlib will become a very costly battle for Russia and it will do whatever is
needed to force the pro-regime bloc to the table once more. For the sake of both parties, it’s worth trying
again.
Ömer Özkizilcik is an analyst and writer in the Security Department of the SETA Foundation. The views
expressed in this article are his own.
Photo by Gokhan Balci/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
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