Poli

G.R. No. 180308 19 June 2012 PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al FACTS: Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are nominees of the government to the board of directors of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and Andal are also directors and corporate officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By virtue of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has also substantial interest in PHC. The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses because of its huge operating expenses. In view of the losses and to protect the government’s interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee), which conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons. The Senate Committee found an overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government’s interest in the said corporations. Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. Locsin and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the hasty approval of the Senate of the Committee Report No. 312. ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312. HELD: The Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless. G.R. No. 150605 Dec. 10, 2002 EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker, et. al. FACTS: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House of Representative to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative. HELD: The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.  G.R. No. 189466/ G.R. No. 189506 February 11, 2010 CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), et.al. FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, woelecmen, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. ISSUE: Whether or not HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations. HELD: HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent." It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.  G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD) vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA. HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party- either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.  G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998 JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House HELD: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.  G.R. No. 165691 June 22, 2005 ROBERT Z. BARBERS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR SENATORS AND PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES, and RODOLFO G. BIAZON Facts: FACTS: Robert Z. Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators promulgated a resolution proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs. On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming Biazon as “the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections. Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator claiming that the latter’s proclamation was void, illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections. On the other hand, Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1st Division has no jurisdiction to review, reverse or modify the actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as National Board of Canvassers for Senators and that because he already took his oath, it should not entertain Barbers’ petition. It also argued that considering his lead over Barbers, the remaining votes in the uncanvassed COCs would not substantially affect the results as to the 12th senator. On the other hand, Barbers countered by saying that there could be no valid proclamation based on an incomplete canvass. COMELEC denied Barbers’ petition. It ruled that Barbers’ petition cannot be categorized as a pre-proclamation controversy since the issues cited are not proper for such nor it can be categorized as an election protest since the ground cited also does not make it as such. Besides, the COMELEC also found out that considering Biazon’s lead over that of Barbers, even if those unincluded votes would be counted in favor of Barbers still it would not affect the results. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition. HELD: No. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this kind of petition in light of Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Senate Electoral Tribunal as well as the ruling in Pangilinan v. COMELEC. In Javier v. COMELEC, it was held that the phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.  G.R. No. 178413 March 13, 2008 AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et. al. FACTS: Two months after the May 14, 2007 national elections, 11 candidates for senatorial posts were proclaimed and had taken their oaths except to the 12th and last post where Pimentel and Zubiri were the contenders. A new board of canvassers (Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao) was created because Pimentel thru his counsel questioned some irregularities as to the authenticity and due execution of Cert. of Canvass. During the proceedings, they were not allowed to ask questions and present evidence to prove their claim. Instead, their questions were noted in the minutes. Hence, Pimentel a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the court to issue tro as to enjoin comelec from canvassing; to annul such proceedings because it is unconstitutional and illegal proceedings and; to allow them to raise their objections and present evidence to prove their claims. All petitions were denied. Eventually, Zubiri were proclaimed, had taken oath and assumed office. Pimentel protested. Zubiri filed a motion to dismiss contending that Pimentel should have filed with Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) for the annulment of his proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in cases of Senators. HELD: No. The SC did not recognize the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel, which could have prospered if he met the requirement of law, because SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it. In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies.  G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS FACTS: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives, which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.  G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal FACTS: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters to Senate President Ople and Justice Melo, requesting them to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their petitions, contending that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. ISSUE: Whether or not the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. HELD: No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, et. al. FACTS: History of “Pork Barrel” (Pre – Martial Law Era – present) While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Controversy of Pork Barrel: Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law, which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, valid and constitutional. HELD: No. When individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine, they are made able to legislate as individuals, not as Congress as a whole. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to individually legislate, which the Constitution does not allow.  G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008 ROLEX SUPLICO vs. NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, et. al. FACTS: Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said petitions, among others, sought the annulment of the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with the said deal. On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao of China that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor General made a manifestation and motion stating that in an Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been informed that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient basis that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the petition has become moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and the bar. Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised, the Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness. The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo? HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official act of the President. Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence. Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials of informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance. G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et. al. vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA FACTS: A case was filed against Kokoy Romualdez in the SB and herein petitioners were impleaded. It concerned among other things the sale of the equity of Kokoy in 36 or 39 corps and eventual sale to Lopa (brother- in-law of Marcos) for Php5 million. In a privilege speech in the Senate, JPE urged the Sente to look into these transactions for a possible violation of RA 3019. The matter was referred to the SBRC for investigation. The latter subpoenaed petitioners to testify and produce documents. The petitioners here allege that the investigation will prejudice their rights in the case before the SB. SC ruled that upon examination of the speech of JPE, there can be discerned no legislative purpose. The inquiry must be done “in aid of legislation” and all that the called for is an investigation to check for violation of RA 3019. That is more for the jurisdiction of the courts. It further ruled that Sec. 21, Art. VI must respect the Bill of Rights, among those are the rights to due process and against self-incrimination. Under the latter, the accused in a criminal case is absolutely free from compulsion from testifying at all. This same rule can apply to an administrative proceeding which bears the earmarks of a criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are required to testify in this inquiry in aid of legislation according to Sec. 21, Art. VI. HELD: No. It provides that the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self. Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. The inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. Another important note is that the inquiry right of Congress is subject to respect for the Bill of Rights. The Court differentiated in Romeo Chavez v. CA the right of an accused against self- incrimination with the right of a witness against self-incrimination: Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.” Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009 REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et. al. vs. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order(TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543,Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to attend a public hearing at the Senate on August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042,The Migrant Workers Act. Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations were sent to the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc. requesting them to attend the September 4,2006 Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice. HELD: No. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no more obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding. As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true-recourse must be had to others who possess it. The court further held that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution).  G.R. No. 167173 December 27 2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), et. al. vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, et. al. FACTS: It is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by Edgardo Angara. Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said. Respondent is is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166. Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry. On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved. Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB- Philippines of unregistered foreign securities. ISSUE: Whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts. HELD: Contention is untenable. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.” Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.  G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995 COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS FACTS: The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee of the EIIB, was sent to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from the savings of unfulfilled plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and abuse of power. As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner Perez also denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM only allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for overt and covert personnel had been cleared by COA. Jose F. Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office found their responses unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division, ordering him to bring “all documents relating to Personal Service Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.” Petitioners then moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted by the Ombudsman since no affidavit was filed against petitioners) and the subpoena duces tecum, which was denied, since it was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Petitioners filed for a motion of reconsideration, which was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter complained is an “appropriate case” within the concept of the Constitution. HELD: The petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in the decision. True, the court recognizes the privilege based on state secrets. However, in the case at bar, there have been no claims that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor is there a law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. On the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293 states that “The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of rewards.” And even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, the decision would only justify ordering the inspection in camera, and not their nonproduction. Further, documents in question are public documents and as petitioner claims, the disbursements by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by COA, then there should be no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by the respondent Ombudsman. As to the issue whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter is an “appropriate case”, it is expressly provided for in the Constitution that “the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the actions taken and the result thereof.  G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: On November 20, 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain areas of Manila Bay. On February 4, 1977, then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 1084 which created the Public Estates Authority (PEA). On January 19, 1988, then Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, which granted land reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) to PEA. PEA then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI) to develop the Freedom Islands, which are located along the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, on April 25, 1995. Following then Senate Pres. Ernesto Maceda’s speech criticizing the JVA, the Senate conducted an investigation which resulted in Senate Committee Report No. 560, dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of the report are that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are inalienable, and that the JVA itself is illegal. However, a Legal Task Force commissioned by then Pres. Fidel Ramos upheld the JVA’s legality. On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today reported that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI. On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Despite this, on March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA, which then Pres. Joseph Estrada approved on May 28 that same year. ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. HELD: Yes. Sec. 7, Art. III and Sec. 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution respectively define the right to information and the State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest. PEA cites Chavez v. PCGG to argue that, in ongoing negotiations, the right to information is limited to definite government propositions. AMARI also holds that the said right cannot be invoked before the transaction is completed. Contrary to AMARI’s argument, the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information covers negotiations leading to a transaction’s completion. This right affects three types of information: a) official records; b) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and c) government research. Matters recognized as privileged information are not covered by the right. However, PEA does not claim that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information.  G.R. No. 170516               July 16, 2008 AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), et. al. vs. THOMAS G. AQUINO, et. al. FACTS: Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making. Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA – that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.  G.R. No. 169777             April 20, 2006 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, et. al. FACTS: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress. HELD: No. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.  G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004 LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. It owns a piece of land, in the middle of which is a hospital stands. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties for canteen and small stores and to medical and to professional practitioners. A big portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise. In 1993, bith land and the hospital building were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of about 4.5 million pesos. The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Article VI, Section 28(3) if the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income to be used for operational expenses. ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is tax exempt under the 1987 constitution. HELD: Only the hospital is exempted from property tax. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit. Or private advantage. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. However, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160, in order to be entitled to the exemption the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Accordingly, only those portions of the hospital used for patients whether paying or non-paying are exempt from real property taxes. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  G.R. No. 168056 October 18, 2005 G.R. No. 168056 (ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita FACTS: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution. HELD: (1) No, since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes. (2) No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.  G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006 In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO vs. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. HELD: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.” Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.  G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008 ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,  (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,  and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege. HELD: Yes. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege.  It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.  G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012 LUISK. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to CIBAC’s Manifestation of Intent to participate in the party- list election. Respondents, President and chairman Villanueva submitted the certified Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. Pia Derla submitted a 2nd Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, Jr (petitioner) as party-list nominees as she affixed her signature as “acting secretary-general” of CIBAC. The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized Respondents filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification,” seeking to nullify the certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contented that Derla had misrepresented herself as “acting secretary-general”, and not even a member of CIBAC. Resolution filed by the COMELEC First division granted the petition and ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunge from the records, and declared respondents’ group as the true nominees of CIBAC. COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division’s findings as the commission reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her authority to file a certificate, whereas respondents presented evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to CIBAC’s Constitution and bylaws. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr. (petitioner) to file Petition for Certiorari for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the said Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized as the legitimate nominees and representative of CIBAC party-list. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. HELD: No. There’s no error because it is indicated clearly in the law that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with COMELEC.  G.R. No. 189506               February 11, 2010 CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), et. al. FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents filed with HRET petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan. According to the respondents, Palparan was not eligible to sit as a party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Palparan's contention: HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected. He was just a nominee and any question involving his eligibility was an internal concern of Bantay. HRET dismissed petition against Bantay on the ground that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act but HRET upheld its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition for special civil action of certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. HELD: Yes. Petitioner Palparan pointed out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party- list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.