Anthropocentrism and Post-humanism

Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm ❦ Callan wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 9:50 P.M. Page 1 Anthropocentrism and Post-humanism HELEN KOPNINA The Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands Defining Terms: Anthropocentrism, Humanism, Post-humanism ❦ ́ Etymologically derived from the Greek words ανθϱωπoς (anthropos, or human being) ́ and κ εντϱoν (kentron, or center), the term “anthropocentrism” is a worldview that privileges the aim of improving human welfare over other aspirations. The commonly held meaning of anthropocentrism is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “regarding humankind as the central or most important element of existence.” While anthropocentrism literally means human-centeredness, the term is used in different ways. According to the environmental philosopher Baird Callicott (2006, 119), anthropocentrism presupposes that “only humans are worthy of ethical considerations” and “other things are mere means to human ends.” The terms “human chauvinism” and “speciesism” are closely related to anthropocentrism. Humanism, the cultural movement that gained prominence in the Renaissance, refers to the perceived duty to promote human welfare above other objectives. The humanistic orientation is particularly concerned with the personal, ethical, and political choices facing humans. Humanism includes social altruism and social justice. Social justice in relation to the environment is typically associated with “environmental justice” or concern with the unequal exposure of different human groups to environmental risks and benefits. Environmental justice is associated with shallow ecology, concerned with the fair distribution of natural resources in order to address intergenerational justice (justice between the present and future generations of humans), and the eradication of poverty (Naess 1973). Following from this, humanism and anthropocentrism can be seen as close associates. Humanism has long been a tenet of sociocultural anthropology and has underwritten aims to expose social inequalities, colonialism, racism, sexism, and the like (Sodikoff 2011). In anthropology, the idea of humanism is promoted, among others, by the Society for Humanistic Anthropology within the American Anthropological Association. The roots of humanistic anthropology go back to the earlier anthropologists, such as Bronisław Malinowski, who advocated a role for anthropologists as policy advisers to African colonial administrators. Humanist anthropology explicitly focuses on criticism of colonization, racism, and sexism, combining community-level interactions through participant observation with involvement with or on behalf of marginalized or poor people in the developing world (Lewis 2005). Post-humanism or posthumanism (literally meaning “after humanism” or “beyond humanism”) refers to any worldview, belief, or ideology that is critical of traditional The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Edited by Hilary Callan. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ❦ ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm 2 ❦ A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M Callan A ND wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 9:50 P.M. P OST- HU MA NI SM humanism and associated theories about the superiority of humanity. Post-humanism has its roots and draws its inspiration in the ecocentric (ecology- or naturecentered) environmental ethics (e.g., Katz 2011), deep ecology (e.g., Naess 1973), and animal-rights literature (e.g., Borràs 2016). The philosopher Francesca Ferrando (2012) discussed post-humanism as a type of “mediation philosophy” which addresses nonhuman species as well as technology and ecology. Post-humanism in anthropology is often associated with the notions of social change, responsibility, and multispecies coexistence (Haraway 2008). Post-humanist anthropology has also addressed the hierarchical relationship between humans and nonhumans. In their book Posthumanism: Anthropological Insights (2017), Alan and Josephine Smart revive “traditional” ethnographies where cattle, pigs, yams, and sorcerers were central to the anthropological narratives, but they also extend their discussion to more contemporary topics such as microbiomes that inhabit human bodies and nano-machines. The focus in a study of the “more than human,” including animals, plants, bacteria, and other organisms, is on the interrelatedness of the human and nonhuman domains (Abram et al. 2016). More ecocentric scholars in environmental anthropology have embraced post-humanism that recognizes deep ecology (Naess 1973), and/or animal rights/welfare (Peters 2016; Singer 1977), and/or ecological justice (Baxter 2005) perspectives. More recent ethnographies have started emphasizing the value of nonhuman life (e.g., Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2016). From the point of view of post-humanism, there is no reason to a priori limit certain rights to some communities, indigenous or not, and no part of humanity should be “exempt” from responsibility to nonhumans. Post-humanism may recognize that a degree of human activism is a necessary part of environmental protection precisely because humanity possesses the consciousness to recognize the morality of rights. In a more radical interpretation, post-humanism questions the central tenets of humanism, condemning speciesism, human chauvinism, and human supremacy. Different Types of Anthropocentrism The anthropologist David Kidner (2014) has argued that it is not anthropocentrism but rather “industrocentrism,” or a focus on industrial neoliberalism, that subordinates both people and nature to the economic system. Kidner argues that the use of the term “anthropocentrism” is far from culturally universal as this perspective may well be unique to industrial societies. As part of the definition of anthropocentrism is “legitimate” care for humanity, the term blinds us to the systemic character of industrialism’s colonization of the world. While industrocentrism supports the assumption that human interests have to be “balanced” against those of the natural order, it actively camouflages colonization of the planet and people as mere “resources” or “capital” under the pretense that it is of benefit to humanity. Tim Hayward (1997) interpreted anthropocentrism as meaning two things: first, anthropocentrism as the love of one’s own species, and, second, anthropocentrism as discrimination against other species. This position is similar to the distinction between “strong” (a belief that nonhumans have value only if they are valuable for humans) and “weak” anthropocentrism (a belief that is seen as inevitable and even benevolent as it ❦ Page 2 ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M ❦ A ND Callan wbiea2387 P OST- HU MA NI SM wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 Page 3 3 underscores the self-interested motivation to preserve the environment) developed by Bryan Norton (1984). In the first case, a legitimate concern for human welfare can be seen as “natural” and even noble, as care for one’s own species acknowledges that a balanced, healthy, and naturally plentiful environment is necessary for humans to prosper. Indeed, all species are selfish to the extent that they need to sustain and nourish themselves and reproduce, and thus by evolutionary default, are concerned about own welfare (Kopnina et al. 2018a). It is also assumed that, while anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric differ, all people will strive to preserve the environment on which they (or the subjects of their concern) are dependent. This convergence theory, or environmental pragmatism, assumes that, in the case of environmental protection, anthropocentric and ecocentric motivations achieve the same ends in practice (e.g., Grey 1993; Norton 1984). Thus, pragmatic environmentalists such as Norton (1984, 1992) and Weston (1985) typically reject the intrinsic value of the environment in favor of instrumental values. Norton (1984, 131) argued that weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing unsustainable practices, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental protection without what he found to be the “questionable ontological commitments made by non-anthropocentrists in attributing intrinsic value to nature.” In the second case, anthropocentrism is a “concern with human interests to the exclusion, or at the expense, of interests of other species” (Hayward 1997, 52). This strong anthropocentrism has been implicated in a number of environmental problems, from the destruction of wild habitats to abuse of animals used for consumption and medical research (Norton 1984). In his book The Arrogance of Humanism (1978), the American biologist David Ehrenfeld describes the consequences of this exclusion. Critique of Anthropocentrism The rejection of intrinsic value is often justified by the arguments that humans cannot know what the needs of other species are as we can perceive the world and morality only with our own senses (Grey 1993; Norton 1984). Yet, according to the concept of anthropocentric fallacy, while we can perceive the environment and its elements only by our human senses, this does not mean that we cannot grant nature intrinsic value (Eckersley 1992; Washington 2015). By way of comparison, white men are capable of developing a consciousness that recognizes the rights of women or other ethnic groups (Kopnina et al. 2018a). They do not have to be sexist or racist just because they are white males. Consequently, ecocentrism is not antihumanist but rather is directed “against an uncaring, economic, narrow-minded humanism rather than against humanism itself” (Barry 1999, 31). Critics have argued that, since it embraces instrumental valuation of resources, anthropocentrism does not protect nonhuman beings without economic value (Crist 2015; Katz 2011; Kopnina 2018b; Piccolo et al. 2018; Washington et al. 2018), nor does it safeguard animal welfare (Regan 1986; Singer 1977). Anthropocentric motivation was shown to be inadequate for biodiversity protection outside of instances when both people and environment are negatively affected, basically abandoning species that are not instrumental to human welfare (Cafaro and Primack 2014; Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2016). ❦ 9:50 P.M. ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm 4 A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M Callan A ND wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 9:50 P.M. Page 4 P OST- HU MA NI SM Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethics ❦ While some cultures worship trees and “sacred” natural places (Knudtson and Suzuki 1992; Kopnina 2015; Sponsel 2014), other communities can be indifferent to environmental concerns or cruel to animals (Taylor 2010). While anthropocentrically motivated anthropology morally privileges indigenous rights and traditions, it simultaneously disregards ecological justice and animal rights. For example, the anthropologist Veronica Strang (2017) asks whether the Aboriginals of Australia have the “right” to continue hunting wallabies to the point that the once plentiful population has dwindled to critical levels. The complexities of the moral dilemma associated with rights have surfaced at a meeting between Aboriginal elders and representatives of the Queensland National Parks and Wildlife Service, which promoted legislation to prevent the hunting of vulnerable or threatened species in national parks. One of the Aboriginal elders, Colin Lawrence, referred to the local history of colonial settlement. In the early 1900s a European settler had shot a number of Aboriginal people until he was speared by one of their leaders, who is now regarded as a local hero. The settler, according to Lawrence, had shot Aboriginal people “like dogs,” “and now you want to tell us we can’t even shoot a wallaby!” (field notes, 1991, in Strang 2017, 275). This case begs a few ethical questions. Do the Aboriginals have a right to mistreat animals in the same way as they were themselves mistreated by colonial rulers? Who gives this right to the people and simultaneously takes it away from wallabies? Is respect for nonhumans something that colonial power holders brought with them (as part of Western postmaterial values) or has it been part of the indigenous societies (as part of traditional ecocentrism)? While there is robust ethnographic evidence that many indigenous societies used to live relatively sustainably and could have been considered ecocentric or at least zoocentric (e.g., Sponsel 2014), this example illustrates that anthropocentrism may be taking over indigenous worldviews. One might hypothesize that indigenous anthropocentrism could have emerged under the influence of colonial oppression, substituting for traditional post-humanist values. However, while the (arguably also Western) concept of human rights seems to be readily adapted in the rhetoric opposing national park authorities, post-humanism seems to have a long way to go. The assumption that nonhuman species should be treated “like dogs” (not in the sense of pampered pets) seems morally defensible because their moral significance is simply left out of consideration (e.g., Cafaro and Primack 2014; Doak et al. 2015; Kopnina 2016). Connecting the Dots: Post-humanism in Theory and Its Practical Implications Post-humanists do not deny the destructive reach of the rich and the immorality of colonialism. Yet, while the rich consume more, the influence of the poor on the environment is more localized, involving for example overhunting, which leads to the “empty forest syndrome” (Crist and Cafaro 2012). Without a strategy to voluntarily reduce human ❦ ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M A ND Callan wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 P OST- HU MA NI SM 9:50 P.M. Page 5 5 population, and to redistribute resources away from the rich to the poor without bloody revolution, the total economic pie will be still consumed either way. In fact, it appears that, while meat consumption in rich countries is declining, it is increasing in poor ones (Economist 2018). In this sense, anthropocentrism is not just about overconsuming elites, but also supports an ideology of global human entitlement to natural resources (Crist 2012). Yet, as generations of cultural change have shown, ideology is not fixed. Respect for nonhuman rights has been recently enshrined in some governments’ legal systems (Sykes 2016). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has served to inspire initiatives such as the Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth (https://therightsofnature.org/universal-declaration), initiated by the Bolivian government; the Wildlands Project Land Conservation (Noss 1992); the rights of rivers in New Zealand, Australia, and India (O’Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018) and of Lake Erie in the United States. Also recently, more Western consumers have turned to veganism (Economist 2018). Still, the practical manifestation of post-humanism exposes ethical dilemmas. In one of the interpretations of post-humanism, legitimate humanist grievances, ranging from colonialism to racism and sexism are translated into human relationships with other species. However, in anthropology, this translation tends to be allegorical rather than political and legal. For example, drawing on the tradition of multispecies ethnography, Salazar Parreñas’ (2015, 1) describes a captured orangutan: ❦ The orangutan herself was subjected to constraints of space rooted in colonial and postcolonial histories of making territories. And those constraints were, for her, gendered insofar that her sex affected her relationship to space. For instance, whenever managers thought she should get pregnant, she would be forced into captivity with a male orangutan for the purpose of procreation. Thus focus on the human groups’ suffering from colonialism and gender overwrite the simple fact that the orangutan was caged and forced to mate. Typically, such multispecies investigations fall short of recognizing animal rights or even animal welfare. Another example of this is a reflection by Donna Haraway, a well-known supporter of post-humanism, on her friend’s inquiry about animal experimentation: So if you were going to abandon humanism, in favour of the post-humanism, ahumanism, non-humanism of the process philosophers, of the phenomenologists, of Derrida and Whitehead, I still want to know how specifically laboratory experimental practices get done and get justified … I want to know what you would say when someone buttonholes you and says: I challenge you to defend the slaughter of lab animals in biomedical experiments. (Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, cited in Haraway 2008, 86–87) Haraway responded: Yes, I will defend animal killing for reasons and in detailed material–semiotic conditions that I judge tolerable because of a greater good calculation. And no, that is never enough. I refuse the choice of “inviolable animal rights” versus “human good is more important.” Both of those proceeds as if calculation solved the dilemma, and all I or we have to do is choose. I have never regarded that as enough in abortion politics either. Because we did not learn how to shape the public discourse well enough, in legal and popular battles ❦ ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm 6 A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M Callan A ND wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 9:50 P.M. Page 6 P OST- HU MA NI SM feminists have had little choice but to use the language of rationalist choice as if that settled our prolife politics, but it does not and we know it … We feminists who protect access to abortion, we who kill that way, need to learn to revoice life and death in our terms and not accept the rationalist dichotomy that rules most ethical dispute. (Haraway 2008, 87) From this fragment (discussed in more detail in Kopnina 2017) it is unclear how the “material–semiotic conditions” apply to the case of abortion. A human embryo is not “killed” for the “greater good.” Abortion is normally a mother’s choice, which cannot be said of laboratory animals who are intentionally exposed to diseases, subjected to experimental treatments, and then killed, whether they are pregnant or not. Even our beloved pets have their lives and reproductive choices fully determined by their owners (euthanasia, sterilization, and castration are common practice). Thus, though Haraway promoted multispecies ethnography, post-humanism is accepted only as a discursive practice. The implications of post-humanism in practice can be profound. Recognition of the post-humanist ethics may necessitate the need to designate large nature areas as protected reserves in accordance with the species’ various needs (Mathews 2016). Mass-scale use of nonhumans for consumption and medical experimentation may become unthinkable (Bisgould 2008). The emerging fields of animal law (Borràs 2016), ecological justice (Baxter 2005), earth jurisprudence (Burdon 2011), and earth justice (Higgins 2010) offer bolder ways of thinking about—and more importantly, acting upon—post-humanism. ❦ wbiea1733 wbiea2313 wbiea1978 wbiea2151 wbiea2159 wbiea1997 wbiea1556 wbiea1491 SEE ALSO: Nature, Concepts of; Environmental Sustainability; Nature/Culture Distinc- tion; Environmental Justice; Philosophical Anthropology; Human–Animal Relations; Rights; Multispecies Ethnography REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING Abram, Simone, Greg Acciaioli, Amita Baviskar, Helen Kopnina, Donald Nonini, and Veronica Strang. 2016. “Involving Anthropology: Debating Anthropology’s Assumptions, Relevance, and Future.” Anthropological Forum 26 (1): 74–95. Barry, John. 1999. Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue, and Progress. London: SAGE. Baxter, Brian. 2005. 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Sunderland, MA: Sinauer. ❦ ❦ ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm A N T H R O P O CE N T R I S M ❦ A ND Callan wbiea2387 P OST- HU MA NI SM wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 Page 7 7 Crist, Eileen. 2012. “Abundant Earth and Population.” In Life on the Brink: Environmentalists Confront Overpopulation, edited by P. Cafaro and E. Crist, 141–53. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Crist, Eileen. 2015. “I Walk in the World to Love It.” In Protecting the Wild: Parks and Wilderness: The Foundation for Conservation, edited by George Wuerthner, Eileen Crist, and Tom Butler, 82–95. Washington, DC: Island Press. Crist, Eileen, and Philip Cafaro. 2012. “Human Population Growth as If the Rest of Life Mattered.” In Life on the Brink: Environmentalists Confront Overpopulation, edited by Philip Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 3–15. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Doak, Daniel F., Victoria J. Bakker, Bruce E. 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London: Routledge. Washington, Haydn, Jack Piccolo, Guillaume Chapron, Joe Gray, Helen Kopnina, and Peter Curry. 2018. “Foregrounding Ecojustice in Conservation.” Biological Conservation 228: 367–74. Weston, Anthony. 1985. “Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Ethics 7: 321–39. ❦ Page 8 ❦ Trim Size: 170mm x 244mm ❦ Callan wbiea2387 wbiea2387.tex V1 - 10/14/2019 9:50 P.M. Page 9 The abstract and keywords will not be included in the PDF or any printed version of your article, but are necessary for publication on Wiley’s online publishing platform to increase the discoverability of your article. If the abstract and keywords are not present below, please take this opportunity to add them now. The abstract should be a short paragraph up to 200 words in length and keywords between 5 to 10 words. ABSTRACT ❦ Anthropocentrism is the belief that value is focused on human beings and that all other beings are means to human ends. Related to anthropocentrism, humanism privileges the aim of improving human welfare. Humanism has underwritten efforts to expose social injustices and to improve the welfare of all human beings. In relation to the environment, post-humanism can be defined by a number of characteristics. First, post-humanism exposes anthropocentrism as an attempt to ignore behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the expanse of all other species. Second, post-humanism critiques exclusive moral focus on human inequalities in relation to environmental protection, emphasizing that inequality between species should remain within the scope of ethical consideration. Third, post-humanism exposes anthropocentrism as an inadequate basis for environmental action as it criticizes anthropocentrism as ethically wrong as well as pragmatically ineffective. KEYWORDS anthropocentrism; anthropology; biodiversity; biodiversity loss; ecology; environmental ethics; human chauvinism; humanism; speciesism ❦ ❦