(ISSN: 2141-1468) NIGER DELTA RESEARCH DIGEST (NDRD) Journal of the Centre for Niger Delta Studies (Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State Nigeria) __________________________________________________ Volume 8, Number 2, December 2014 ETF/NDU/BAYE/ARJ/09/10/02 i NIGER DELTA RESEARCH DIGESTS (ISSN: 21411468) Vol. 8 (2) December 2014 Editor-in-Chief: Ibaba Samuel Ibaba Associate Editors: C.M. Sorgwe, Christine Odi Editorial Assistants: Sunday Abraye, Odingiowei Kwokwo, Peace Jack Akhigbe Editorial Advisory Board: Chris Ikporukpo ( University of Ibadan, Nigeria); Michael Watts (University of California, Berkeley, USA); Okechukwu Ukaga (University of Minnesota, USA); Cyril Obi ( Social Science Research Council, USA); Augustine Ikelegbe ( University of Benin, Nigeria) Jennifer Giroux (Center for Security Studies, Switzerland) and Ambily Etekpe ( Niger Delta University, Nigeria) ii NIGER DELTA RESEARCH DIGEST (ISSN: 2141-1468) The Niger Delta Research Digest (NDRD) is the CNDS official journal, published biannually to disseminate multi and inter-disciplinary research on the Niger Delta. The journal is a print journal and the views expressed are those of the author (s) and not the NDRD, its editors or the CNDS. Authours are entitled to one complimentary copy of any issue where their article, essay or book review appears. The journal does not pay honorarium to contributors. Similarly contributors are not required to any any fee for publication. Editorial policy and submission guidelines. The Niger Delta Research Digest (NDRD) publishes feature articles/papers, essays and book reviews on issues in development, peace and conflict resolution, environment and sustainable development, agriculture, language, culture and history. The focus of the journal is on the Niger Delta and it is published twice a year. Articles, essays and book reviews that are submitted for consideration may not have been published previously and may not currently be under review for possible publication elsewhere. Manuscripts undergo a peer review process to ensure that they are appropriate for publication and of outstanding quality. Authors are informed whether submissions have been accepted for publication, require revision prior to possible publication, or are rejected. Copyright of contributions appearing in the journal is vested iii in the Centre for Niger Delta Studies, Niger Delta University, Nigeria. Contribution should be sent in electronic format in MS Word. Complete details of the author(s), including title, preferred name and surname, designation, organisation, postal and electronic mail address are also required. Unsolicited papers can be submitted any time of the year. Contribution length and presentation Different kinds of articles appear in NDRD, including feature articles, research essays, and book reviews. (a) A feature article is written by an expert on a certain topic. The full length of paper should be a minimum of 5,000 and maximum of 8,000 words, including the bibliography. It should include an abstract of about 150 words (b) An essay is an analytic, interpretive, or critical composition, usually dealing with its subject from a limited and often personal point of view. The full length of paper should be a minimum of 5,000 and maximum of 8,000 words. An abstract of about 150 words should be included. (c) Book reviews should be a minimum of 800 and maximum of 1,200 words. A book review must be accompanied by the following: a cover scan, title of the book, author(s), publishers, place of publication, publishing date, ISBN, number of pages, and binding (paperback or hard cover). Book reviews are limited to books published within one year. (d) Feature articles and essays should have five key words Reference style iv Latest edition of APA reference style CONTENTS Editorial---------------------------------------------------------------Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of the Amnesty and Post Amnesty Challenges Augustine Ikelegbe Climate Change and the threat of weather-related disasters in the Niger Delta Okoli Al Chukwuma Intimate Partner Violence against men in the Niger Delta: A Study of Benin City” Uzono Endurance and Akhuetie Ruth Drama and the Niger Delta Struggle: A Study of select Nigerian plays Christine Odi Cultural Identity: A Dialectics of Cosmology among select groups in the Niger Delta Tam Gordon Azorbo and Ifure Ufford-Azorbo v EDITORIAL This issue of NDRD is made of five papers which focuses on different subjects in the Niger Delta. The first paper, written by Augustine Ikelegbe is a reflection on the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. Entitled “Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of the Amnesty and Post Amnesty Challenges”, the paperinterrogates the Amnesty Programme and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ( DDR) in the light of lessons and insights drawn from the literature and experiences elsewhere. The paper concluded that the Amnesty Programme has faltered on the altar of poor planning and organization, weak and non-inclusive implementation structure and institutionalization, poor implementation and poor results. The paper notes that historically and contemporarily, there exists no cases of insurgency that borders on contests of the state project and the national question that have been successfully repressed and suppressed militarily, as there is always a resurgence. The current Amnesty Programme realises this truth. It has further indicated that the grievances and ensuing armed insurgent dimension of the conflict requires a political resolution. It was obvious that the military and repressive approach failed to douse, suppress and defeat the agitation and insurgency. The more effective strategy for comprehensively addressing the grievances and resistance is massive development efforts and increased revenues and vi resource benefits woven around regional autonomy and reforms of governance and the current federal practice. The second paper, “Climate Change and the threat of weather-related disasters in the Niger Delta”, written by Okoli Al Chukwuma examines the correlation between climate change and weather-related disasters in the Niger Delta. Writing from the standpoint of threat analysis and relying on secondary sources of data, the paper posits that the Niger Delta is highly susceptible to climate-change-induced weather disasters in view of its proximity to the continental waters which makes it vulnerable to ocean surge, coastal erosion and flooding. The paper makes a case for a contingency approach to disaster remediation as the way forward. This is followed by the piece by Uzono Endurance and Akhuetie Ruth which investigates the incidence of intimate partner violence (physical, sexual and emotional) against men in Benin City. Entitled “Intimate Partner Violence against men in the Niger Delta: A Study of Benin City”, the authors, relying on empirical study, concludes that among the three types of violence investigated, men experience more of emotional violence. This is followed by physical and sexual violence. The study concluded by making recommendations, including the creation of a platform for abused men to seek solace and legislations to curb violence against men. The fourth paper by Christine Odi examines from a literary perspective, the dramatic enactment of the origin and progression of the rise of militancy in the Niger Delta region. Entitled “Drama and the Niger Delta Struggle: A Study of select Nigerian plays”, the paper reflects on issues relating to the struggle for resource control, self- determination and vii liberation of the people from perceived oppression. With reference to the plays reviewed, the author remarks that the fundamentals of the Niger Delta Conflict have not been addressed, noting that this would most likely lead to the recurrence of violence. The final paper written by Tam Gordon Azorbo and Ifure Ufford-Azorbo is entitled “ Cultural Identity: A Dialectics of Cosmology among select groups in the Niger Delta”, itinterrogates the metal and bronze casting traditions of the Benin people, the feminine perception of God by the Ijaw and the marriage customs and traditions of the Akwa Ibom people . This is with a view to highlighting the impacts of such pristine cultural practices on the people‟s world-view and identity. The paper reveals that cultural identity is an important contributor to the peoples‟ well-being. It also shows that the perceived identity provides social cohesion, a sense of belonging and acceptance, and communal stability. viii ix RESOLVING THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT: A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AMNESTY AND POST AMNESTY CHALLENGES1 AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE2 Abstract This paper sought to critically examine the amnesty programme and DDR in the light of lessons and insights drawn from the literature and experiences elsewhere. The analysis concluded that the amnesty programme has faltered on the altar of poor planning and organization, weak and non-inclusive implementation structure and institutionalization, poor implementation and poor results. Key Words: DDR; Amnesty; Conflict Transformation; Niger Delta; Non- state armed actors Introduction 1 This paper was first presented at the International conference on Natural Resources, Security and Development in the Niger Delta, Organised by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, March 8-11, 2010, Yenagaoa, Bayelsa State. 2 Professor Ikelegbe is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Benin. His email contact is austineikelegbe@gmail.com NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The Niger Delta is the economic jewel of Nigeria, as it hosts almost all of Nigeria‟s oil and gas that accounts for over 80% of government revenue, 95% of export receipts and 90% of foreign exchange earnings (World Bank 2002:1; Imobighe 2004: 101). Yet, it receives only little of these resources, and the prosperity generated has not touched the lives of the ordinary citizens in the region. The region is reputed to be one of the least developed and poorest in the country. The contradiction between being the bread basket on the one hand and underdevelopment, deepening poverty and misery on the other has produced mass discontent, resentment, alienation and hostility and a generation of angry citizens. In consequence, the region has been immersed in protests and struggles against perceived injustice, inequality, disinheritance, marginalization and neglect. In 1966 and since 1998, these protests became so broad and intense that they slipped into periodic insurrection and insurgency. The Nigerian state‟s perception and management of the struggles has largely militarized the region, turned it into a huge garrisoned command, and made it the most large scale and prolonged military operation since the Nigerian civil war. Intense conflicts between the Nigerian state and the communities, civil groups, militant movements, that between the trans-national companies, communities and militant movements, as well as the conflicts within and between communities, ethnic groups, socio-cultural/economic groups and militant movements, cults, and armed bands have turned the region into a huge melting pot of pervasive violence, crimes, local wars and insecurity. Nigeria‟s economic survival, its statehood and nation project are being consistently threatened just as the security of the citizens of the region. In 2009, the federal government quite unusually and contrary to its securitization of the conflict embarked on an 2 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 amnesty programme. The amnesty path, process, management and implementation as it relates to demilitarization, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR) have generated quite some interests. The paper seeks to critically examine the amnesty programme and DDR in the light of lessons and insights drawn from the literature and experiences elsewhere. The paper begins with an introduction and conceptual clarifications. Thereafter a background is provided by examining the grievances, agitation and insurgency in the region. The government‟s security framework of conflict management is then examined just as some examination of the balance of power in the conflict. Furthermore, the paper concentrates on the amnesty and post amnesty conditions and challenges as well as the challenges of conflict and post conflict transitions. Then the paper makes some recommendations and concludes. The Niger Delta Conflict: Context, Grievances, Struggles and Militancy. When oil exploration began in the Niger Delta area in the late 1950s, the people expected that it would make a huge difference to their lives. The massive machines and technology that they saw indicated that their lives would change positively. However, after ten, then thirty and then fifty years, they realized that oil had brought misfortune and misery. Their natural resource had become a curse. Their land was taken for exploration, exploitation, pipelines and platforms. The much that was left were polluted and degraded by numerous oil spillages. The rivers were polluted. The land was no longer arable and the rivers had been deserted by fish colonies. The air was polluted by gas flares and acid rain was tormenting their house roofs just as the people had become plagued by numerous diseases. The people had become under-employed and unemployed. 3 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 While immersed in the negative externalities of oil, there were no benefits or if there were, too few and trickle. The oil companies completely ignored and disregarded the communities and their people. They had to protest to be heard or for anything to be done. When they protested, massive repression and abuses were visited on them. At the level of the government, derivation based fund share of the Federation Account which was 50% by the early 1960s plummeted to 1.5% by the 1980s. Even within the oil producing states, the oil producing communities (OPCs) were neglected and marginalized. The OPCs became angry, disenchanted and frustrated. Protests became militant and disruptive. The initial demand in the region was for developmental attention, because of seeming neglect and difficult terrain. The demand has persisted because of persisting underdevelopment in spite of trickle, poorly funded, centralized and poorly performing interventions such as the NNDB, OMPADEC and NNDC. As the state directed development demands failed, the communities turned to the TNOCs. This has become a major source of community-TNOC conflicts since the 1970s. The content of demands also became volatile and political and shifted from mere development to issues of selfdetermination, resource control, federal restructuring to guarantee regional autonomy and self-development, environmental remediation and corporate responsibility. A critical analysis of the demands reveal a shift from accommodation to direct challenge of the Nigerian state project and confrontations with the state. It was within the preceding context that the struggle for resource control began and gathered momentum. The people who had been disinherited from resources in their own land, began to seek more benefits and even control of their own resources. The struggle was at diverse levels. Now 4 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 spearheaded by the youth, the people sought to compel benefits from the oil companies. Second, the people sought greater benefits from their oil from the federal government. The demands ranged from 50% to 100% ownership and control. Third, a reformed and re-structured federal state to guarantee regional autonomy and resource control was sought. Fourth, there was a struggle by communities to directly benefit from the increased derivation funds. This yielded results in the form of development commissions in Ondo and Delta States. There have been four dimensions of the Niger Delta Struggles. These are: political agitation, communal and ethnic agitation, civil agitation and militant agitation. The struggle started as a political agitation, then it became a civil agitation conducted by community, women, the youth, and cultural and civil society groupings. The political agitation has emerged again since 1999. Militant insurgency first occurred in 1966 and has dominated the struggles since 1998. The militant agitation was a forceful attempt to compel oil based benefits, redress grievances and seek resource control and self-determination. It was essentially a rebellion against state and corporate mis-governance and a determined effort for reforms. Furthermore, apart from the 1966 Adaka Boro incidence, the militant agitation was a forceful response to militarization, repression and state violence in the region. At the general level, the militant agitation was directed at compelling the Nigerian State and TNOCs to dialogue or negotiate on the critical issues in the struggle. More specifically, it objectives were to cut or destabilize oil production; to draw international attention to the plight of the region, and to compel the withdrawal of the TNOCs, to restrain, checkmate and demoralize the military and militarization through attacks, or counter or reprisal attacks on 5 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 security agencies, and compel concessions and benefits from the Nigerian state and TNCs. The militancy and insurrection in the region is a classic case of the primacy of grievances in conflict causality. A prominent leader of the region put this succinctly in an interview recently; the boys are fighting for their survival. They are fighting unemployment, criminal negligence of their area, the dehumanization of our own people (Newswatch 2008:08:04; 16-26). Conceptual and Analytical Issues 1. Conflict Resolution: Analysis and Issues There are critical aspects of conflict management and resolution such as Conflict Settlement, Post Conflict Recovery/ Transition and the conflict actors. The conflict settlement stage refers to the challenges of securing negotiations, agreements and credible commitment of actors in conflict to a settlement. This is a critical stage in determining post conflict stability. There are many issues such as who negotiated the settlement? Were they the critical actors and protagonists of violence? Does the settlement have the support of critical actors? Is the settlement rational in the post conflict period? It is possible that a settlement that was rational during the conflict becomes irrational once the violence stops (Collier & Sambanis 2002:5). Post Conflict Transition or Recovery. Once a settlement occurs, the process of post conflict transition begins. This is a very sensitive process that determines the sustenance of the settlement and peace or whether there would be a relapse into hostilities. The transition requires even more commitment and statesmanship. Transitions involve change and in this case 6 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 comprehensive changes in terms of structures and orientations. Structural changes relate to the institutional forms that have to be put in place to manage and sustain the provisions of settlement and the requirements of conflict resolution. Altitudinal changes pertain to perceptions and orientations that need to be altered so as to promote peace and co-existence. Malan (2008:141) raises the need for transitional conception and thinking to be long term, futuristic and to place in perspective certain issues such as the causes of the tensions and conflicts, the purpose of the conflicts, required changes in the conflict causing situation and the goals of the changes envisaged. There are certain things to note here. First, it is only when the causes of the conflict have been reversed and the goals or purposes of the conflict have been realized that conflict resolution can be said to have taken place and serious post conflict transition can be said to be on course. Second, the level of satisfaction of parties in the post conflict period will depend on the extent of realization of their goals. Third, whether parties are satisfied or dissatisfied with the outcomes of conflict settlement determines the success or otherwise of conflict resolution and post conflict transitions. Conflict actors are important not only for conflict settlements but for roles of creating or generating and sustaining through cooperation „future socio-economic transformation and political stability‟ (Malan 2008:133). Often times, conflict actors are seen as the visible, noise making, activists and protagonists of violence. But conflict actors include the ordinary people/communities and their groupings, the elite and the state officials. State militaries for example are major actors in conflict regions with diverse interests and pressures; some opportunistic, some retaliatory and oppressive and yet some compromising even with the enemy. In Sierra Leone, the 7 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 military were government soldiers in the day but dressed up as rebels in the night, to attack and plunder from civilians, mine diamonds and even sell arms to rebels. They became known as sobbels. In Algeria, the military tended sometimes to cooperate with Islamic extremists because such consolidated their positions (Keen 2006:3). Thus, militaries and rebels sometimes share some interests such as the preservation of the systems of exploitation and opportunities that flourish in situations of conflict. Therefore, conflict actors have to be analyzed to determine their strength, support, resources, interests and goals. These have to be taken into account in the design of settlements and post conflict transitions. Peace is a relative state of being, tranquility, wholeness and harmony. It denotes the absence of threats, fear, intimidation, brutality and harm. It further denotes the absence of conflicts, violence, war and the conditions that warrant, induce and sustain them such as poverty, injustice, oppression, repression, exclusion, deprivation and discrimination. The issue of peace raises numerous questions such as what kind of peace?, whose peace?, in whose interests? And at what terms? There is negative peace and the peace of the graveyard. There is peace that is merely an interregnum and that is not sustainable? Peace Building is the process of facilitating and strengthening enduring peace. There are some components such as: (i)Preventing the recurrence of violence (ii) Addressing the social conditions that underpin and cause the conflicts (iii)Building institutions resolution and peace that enable sustained 8 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 (iv)Instituting a system of human security. 2. The Justice and Peace Nexus Justice is vitally linked and inextricably tied to peace. Most conflicts emanate from unjust systems of governance and resource management. In conflict situations, infringements of rights, abuses and atrocities are recurring decimals. There are perpetrators of abuses and victims of injustice and abuses. There cannot be peace without the address of these issues and some elements of punishment, pardon and compensation. Justice enables the easing of pains, grief and abuses of victims, the enthronement of new just, fair and equitable order and the building of a better basis for social harmony and coexistence. Justice can be retributive or restorative. In retributive justice, perpetrators of crime and abuses are investigated, tried and punished such as being banned from public office even if granted amnesty, while victims of abuses and injustice are compensated or paid reparations. The peace that retributive justice achieves is what Malan 92006:146) describes as negative peace. It has been observed that where retributive justice is sought from rebels, militants and state militaries, the fear of justice sustains continued belligerence and violence. Restorative justice is based on a system of amnesty, pardon or sometimes punishment through an open Truth and Reconciliation Commission Process. But the ultimate goal is reconciliation, social harmony, the restoration of the dignity and identity of victims, their reintegration to society and the satisfaction of their needs. 2. Demilitarization, Demobilization and Rehabilitation: Conceptual and Comparative Notes 9 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Demilitarization, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (DDR) process is a process of managing conflict and post conflict situations. More specifically, DDR involves demilitarization; a withdrawal, extensive reduction in the size and scale of deployments, restrictions of operations and presence or restrictions to specified locations or barracks of military or non-state militants in a territory; demobilization where rebels/militants surrender arms and are demobilized; disarmament which involves the surrender, collection and sometimes destruction of arms and ammunition of non-state armed actors. Though disarmament is often measured by the number of disarmed persons and the quantity of arms surrendered, its success actually depends on the quantity surrendered as related to estimated stockpiles and arms availability, the further access to arms, the nature of arms inflow and trade, the continued availability of arms and the possibilities and opportunities for re-armament. Rehabilitation involves retraining and re-orientation and a process of reintegration to society through education, technical skills, employment and empowerment. Rehabilitation has to be based on extensive data base such as qualifications, skills, work experiences, career expectations and needs of militants and rebels. Then there is usually an amnesty that involves a pardon or reprieve for criminal and treasonable actions that belligerents may have committed. DDR is usually within a framework of first ceasefire or cessation of hostilities. Second, it is within a larger framework of peace efforts and negotiated resolution of conflict. In fact, it is preceded by negotiations or clear agreements by parties in conflict and quite importantly, the state, militias or rebels and their political movements. Third, DDR is associated with some gestures and guarantees such as release of detained and imprisoned soldiers, militants and those on trial. There is further an administrative structure for the management of 10 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 DDR that is fairly autonomous and inclusive of stakeholders. Oftentimes as in Africa, it is backed up with technical support by international organizations. This provides the needed capacity and experience as well as credibility for the management of the delicate process that DDR is. DDR is a very complex, delicate, sensitive and difficult process that requires extensive planning and preparations (Lawrence & Shie 2003), pragmatism, funds and technical support. It depends vitally on the competence of management, the neutrality and impartiality of the entire process, the level of trust, confidence, integrity and transparency that the process generates and the careful and comprehensive planning that go into the process. The entire process depends on the success of its interrelated component parts such as effective demobilization being dependent on or secured through effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Yet, rehabilitation and reintegration have to be founded on a comprehensive strategy of self and paid employment, economic opportunities and empowerment, human capital development and job creation efforts such that there is not only productive engagements but the incentives for returning to arms , violence and associated economic opportunism declines. Successful DDR requires quite some analyses and the provision of answers and responses to certain questions and issues respectively such as: How can arms be controlled such that militants disarmed are not rearmed? How can militants be rewarded for giving up violence? What is the computation or mapping of the benefits and costs of violence to the different actors and how can this be tilted? Who and what are the interests with incentives to perpetuate the conflict and how can they be managed? How can militants and rebels be permanently demobilized and productively be engaged? 11 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 There have been major problems with DDR elsewhere and even in Nigeria. The Rivers State amnesty programme (20042005) faltered at the disarmament and rehabilitation stages. Even though disarmament involved the surrender of over 3000 arms and compensation payment for them, very little and old arms were actually surrendered and the militants not only recouped but were not short of arms in subsequent hostilities. Even though about 2000 militant youths were to be trained in a camp set up for the purpose, skills acquired and rehabilitation were not followed with employment and economic empowerment. Thus, the militants were not effectively managed, monitored, controlled and integrated into society. Though there was a lull of hostility for a short while, there was full resurgence of militia activities by 2006. A major problem with rehabilitation in some countries such as Somalia and Kosovo is small efforts and funding. Further, it has been found that the „failure to meet expectations of demobilized combatants jeopardized security and contributed to high crime rates’ (Keen 2006:16). In Chechnya, inadequate rehabilitation was a factor in the turning of thousands of unemployed, heavily armed exfighters either to kidnapping, raiding or to Islamist and nationalist extremism (ibid). Persisting violence and difficult security environments usually persists even where DDR has been fairly successful as in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, DDR has at best be tenuous as militants have periodically slipped back into armed combats while armed conflicts has resurged several times. The Nigerian State and the Securitization of the Niger Delta Crisis The state has tended to see the militant activists as rascals, criminals, miscreants, disgruntled elements and terrorists. 12 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 This has underpinned state perception of the conflict as a law and order crisis that is driven by lawlessness. The recent search for military assistance to tackle lawlessness and violence in the region is based on this conception. This is opposed to the conception that sees the conflict as an insurgency driven by popular struggle and resistance in favour of social, environmental and resource rights and justice. The military regimes saw even the peaceful agitations as security threats. The Obasanjo Administration military operation in Odi was in the security threat-military option cast, just as its set up of the Ogomudia chaired Special Security Committee on oil producing areas, whose mandate was to look at ways and means of instituting effective security of oil operations and installations (cited in Ukwo 2008: 1180). The federal government, therefore, views the conflict from a security perspective. The threat to oil production or disruption is regarded as security breaches just as the militant operations in the region. Even peaceful protests are viewed as threats and responded to as such. State policy then has been to suppress and repress protesters and militants. This emerged clearly from the early state engagements of peaceful communal protesters since the 1990s. Apart from Umuechem, Iko, Ikenyan, Ilaje, Choba and others where mobile police and military interventions signposted death and destruction, the first extensive test case of militarization and consequent brutalities was the Ogoni region. The Ogonis were harassed, driven into the forest, tortured, raped and brutalized for years while through divide and rule strategies, her neighbours were armed, assisted and turned on her. Since the 1990s, the entire region has been a huge garrisoned command, with military and police check points, sandbags, searches and harassment. The military has guarded, protected and escorted oil installations, TNC personnel and quarters, and oil vessels and barges since the 1990s. The 13 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 actions against the militant movements in the region have been decisive. Helicopters, gun boats and sophisticated weapons have been used against militias and communities alleged to harbour them. The military has been in the communities and waterways, conducting operations and searching for the militants. This is in spite of the huge military and security infrastructure in the region, consequent upon the security-military threat perspective. The Road to Amnesty: The Military, Militias and the Balance of Power and Impact in the Conflict The federal government has sought to decisively deal with the militias through dislodge and defeat, and detention and trials of militant leaders. Apart from the extensive military deployment and presence in the region, the military through various task forces and operational code names, have engaged and fought the militias, sometimes through large scale naval, ground and air attacks on alleged militant bases and communities allegedly hosting them. But military operations achieved only limited successes. While some communities were overrun and seized and occupied oil installations were retaken, there were also heightened militia attacks and counter attacks and successes against the oil infrastructure. Besides, there were cases of militant seizure or occupation, being retaken by the military, only to be overrun again by militants. Even in 2009 when Gbaramatu Kingdom was attacked from the air, land and waters, and occupied by the military, there was a heavy toll on oil infrastructure which made the victory pyrrhic. There has been little success in the control, mitigation and eradication of militancy and the insurgent militia forces. In relations to the military-militant movement confrontations, Edeogu (2008:77) has noted: 14 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 This on-going tea cup war is already a decade old, yet none of the two parties to the conflict could give a decisive knock- out blow to its opponent. The militants who seem to have the tactical advantage fight classical guerrilla hit and run battle; the security forces who are often on the defensive respond in conventional way using helicopters, gunships and air power… the only self-evident and valid conclusion is that there is no military solution to this crises. Apart from sustained attacks on oil infrastructure, the greatest manifestation of stalemate and failure is the illegal oil trade which has thrived in spite of extensive military operations and presence. The insurgency enabled or provided an environment for a huge oil theft industry. While military operations were failing, frequent but temporal truces were brokered behind the scene, between militants, security personnel and bunkerers, between militants and state government officials, and between militants, ethnic leaders and political and business elites that provided some stability that protected oil production and derivation avenues or safe havens for bunkering. On a balance, the low intensity war was devastating to Nigeria, the federal government, the transnational oil companies and even the region. The hostilities almost grounded upstream operations as installations were frequently attacked and operations were disrupted. The environment of operations was made difficult, costly and unsafe. The cost base of TNOCs substantially escalated. Oil wells had to be 15 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 shut in, pipeline distribution disrupted and production was well below capacity. At some point, onshore operations in parts of the country were suspended. By 2008, about 25-40% of Nigeria‟s oil production was shut in. By early 2009, both Chevron-Texaco and Total had shut some of their capacity while Agip announced a force majeure. From a production of 2.5million bpd in 2005, and a production capacity of 3million bpd, there was decline to between 1.9 and 2.1million bpd in 2008, 900,000 bpd in early 2009 and 1.7million bpd in mid2009. Nigeria‟s position as a leading source of world energy supply in Africa was lost to Angola. It was, therefore, a matter of survival and an action to protect and guarantee oil and gas production, exports and revenues that the government in 2009 embarked on an amnesty programme to break the stalemate in hostilities. The Economy of the Conflict There has been an extensive and large scale theft of crude oil since the late 1990s. The estimate of losses is between 10% and 5% of national oil production. It is also estimated that the nation loses over USD 3.5 billion annually. At the bottom of the oil theft are syndicates, comprised of powerful and highly placed persons such as serving and retired military personnel, top TNOC officials, top government officials and party bigwigs and financiers, and top traditional rulers and opinion leaders. There is also connivance within the security agencies. These syndicates engage in sophisticated bunkering at large scale commercial levels. Besides the large scale bunkerers are small operators, some of which are cult and militia leaders. The nation has not been able to stop bunkering in spite of the huge security infrastructure in the region. Seeming weaknesses have made the agencies less successful in apprehending bunkerers and their shipments. It is alleged that 16 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 bunkerers pay protection fees to security agencies and that some security personnel actually escort bunkerers barges and vessels to the high seas (Vanguard 02:08:2003). This is in addition to corruption. The disappearance of MT Africa pride was underpinned by corruption within the security agencies. The government has lacked the political will to arrest, prosecute and convict the large-scale bunkerers and have rather been brutally handling those at the margins. Bunkering is at the root of several armed gangs, pirates, cults and militias in terms of funding, arming and sponsorship. The bunkerers use the militias and gangs to guard and secure their operations and to cause conflicts that divert the security agencies and enable safer bunkering. The Amnesty Programme: Content, Response and Challenges The Amnesty Programme was a bold, realistic and pragmatic action taken by the federal government. It denoted a frank assessment and acceptance that some militancy was driven by grievances which have been genuine because of the nature of governance and scanty benefits to the region. It further denoted a bold initiative and promise to reverse the status of under-development. But it was built on trust on the President, based on personal promises to militia leaders and government statements of intentions. It was in a sense, a form of surrender without losing the low intensity war. It was a great show of statesmanship by the President, a massive gamble on the path of government and a big risk based on trust by the militants. This in essence is the greatest weakness and vulnerability of the programme. A surrender without defeat and without negotiated agreements and substantial efforts at address and resolution of grievances and problems that root the conflict, is an imposed and fragile peace that is highly susceptible to pushes beyond the precipice. 17 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The amnesty declaration was preceded with a Presidential panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of militants in the Niger Delta. The government was magnanimous to receive major militant leaders who embraced the amnesty at the Presidential Villa and some held meetings with the president as part of efforts to clear doubts, build trust, express demands, make guarantees and clarify intentions. There is also the Presidential Amnesty Implementation Committee on the Niger Delta headed by a chief co-ordinator, Air Vice Marshal N.O Ararume. The federal government set aside about N50billion for the programme. The amnesty is premised on arms surrender and collection, rehabilitation and reintegration of militants into society. At a point, however, the amnesty was associated with threats after its expiry. The JTF threatened to deal with any militant who persisted in militancy. The message was clear. Accept amnesty or be smoked out. In other words, political violence or insurgency was unilaterally declared ended and subsequent insurgency was to be treated as common criminality (Ezumah 2009:A3). The Amnesty Programme was well received outside the Niger Delta region and by the international community. The European Union pledged E190million towards efforts at sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants. An immediate fallout of the amnesty was the surrender of thousands of militants. It is estimated that about 7000 militants accepted amnesty in Rivers State and about 20,000 in the entire region (The Guardian 15: 02/10). There was also a cessation of hostilities. MEND declared a unilateral ceasefire in October 2009. Oil and gas production picked up remarkably. Crude oil production rose up from 1.6m bpd to about 2million bpd. 18 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The Implementation of the Amnesty Programme: Issues, Evaluation and Challenges Most of the militant groups, leaders and members embraced the amnesty and came out of the camps to surrender arms and ammunition at arms collection centres. The militias apart from their leaders are in rehabilitation camps. But the comprehensiveness and integration of the amnesty programme is in doubt. The short and long term goals, specific policy packages, the funding component and exact content of the amnesty programme are not yet clear. Obviously, the amnesty‟s DDR was not founded on adequate preparations and administrative and technical structures. The Amnesty Programme was not backed by a firm and organized administration and a detailed programme of management. The implementation structure is presently hazy in focus, goals and actions. It is obvious that the commitment put into enacting and securing the amnesty deal is not been demonstrated in the rehabilitation phase. First, the amnesty was not within a framework of negotiations and peace agreements that should be the prelude to conflict resolution and peace building. In fact, the Mitee Committee recommended a DDR within the framework of a third party driven negotiations with politically driven militias and civil society and resolutions that address central grievances and that provides a basis for comprehensive and enduring conflict management and peace. Second, the process of DDR and the implementing structure has not been inclusive in terms of involvements of all parties such as the militias, the TNOCs, ethnic and regional leaders, civil society leaders and communities. Thus, the goals, policy, planning, content, implementation and management have sort of been dictated rather than negotiated. There has been a one-sided demilitarization. As it is, the militias announced and executed a ceasefire, ended hostilities 19 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 and withdrew from the camps. But the JTF has remained intact in terms of its size, locations and deployments. The JTF rather than be downsized and redeployed is to be strengthened and repositioned to deal with subsisting militancy. Disarmament has mainly pertained to insurgent militia groups and has excluded criminal bands and cults. Furthermore, disarmament has also left out the arms in the stockpiles of communities, diverse armed bands and cultist groups and individuals. The sources of arms also remain just as the funding for arms. For example, the maritime and coastal waters, ports and jetties are still porous and largely uncontrolled. It is difficult to identify a concrete integrated and sustainable programme of rehabilitation and reintegration of militants. As it exists, the rehabilitation programme has been poorly planned and executed. Most of the rehabilitation centres were hurriedly put together and have been badly located sometimes within state headquarters and major towns. There are challenges of accommodation, facilities and space. The Aluu centre in Port Harcourt could only accommodate about 800 out of an estimated 7000 militants (Ebiri 2010:13). Shortages of bed spaces, beds and other facilities have made only few militants to be accommodated. Some centres have been abandoned or come alive only at month ends when allowances are paid. There have been little control, supervision and rehabilitation programmes and activities in the centres. As a testimony of poor organization and disenchantment, most of the rehabilitation centres are empty. The Aluu centre that could accommodate about 800 persons has only about 110 militants (Ebiri 2010:13). There are presently no proper programme of rehabilitation and reintegration in terms of specific training, skills development and acquisition, human capital development and economic empowerment and employment programmes. 20 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Though certain agencies such as National Directorate of Employment, National Poverty Alleviation Programme and the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development Programme are supposedly the structures for rehabilitation, these have not seemed to put up programmes of sustained work and interests. Besides, the centres have not been equipped adequately for the kinds of training and skills development required (Ebiri 2010:13). The entire amnesty programme has been haphazardly designed and implemented. It has been plagued by inadequacies, delays and inaction. There have been complaints and grievances from militants and the region‟s leaders and groups. The programme has lacked credibility and confidence. The programme has lacked experienced and technically capable personnel to manage it. There is the clear absence of technical advice and support of international organizations which would have grown credibility. There have been allegations of corruption and frittering of funds meant for rehabilitation. There have been allegations too that much of the funds set aside for the programme is taken more by consultants, contractors and administrative fees rather than actual rehabilitation and subsequent empowerment of militants (Ebiri 2010: 13). There have been protests by former militants on the streets of Port Harcourt, Yenagoa and Benin City over the administration of the rehabilitation programme especially in terms of neglect, poor living conditions, poor facilities and accommodation at the rehabilitation centres, unpaid maintenance allowances and failing rehabilitation and integration. Existing organizational deficits have made some militia leaders to believe that they have been cheated, short changed and deceived to surrender arms and to believe the government on rehabilitation and reintegration. 21 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 MEND has described the Amnesty programme as deficient in that it is not based on dialogue, negotiations of the core issues of justice and fairness nor on substantive development efforts. Rather it is based on settlement of few thugs, alms to the youth and divisive strategies as to benefits between communities that bear oil facilities and those that bear oil and its exploration impacts. There are emerging clear signs of failure of the amnesty programme. MEND has called off its unilateral ceasefire since 30th January 2010. Hostilities seem to be on the verge of resurgence. MEND has threatened renewed attacks on TNOCs and oil servicing companies and has warned them to halt operations to safeguard their staff and facilities (Ebiri 2010:13). Since 2010, there have been militia attacks on Chevron Texaco‟s pipeline in Makaraba-Utonana in Delta State and Shell‟s crude oil pipeline at Abonemma in Rivers State. The Post Amnesty Outlook and the Prospects of Resolution of the Conflict: Policy, Issues and Challenges If we take the amnesty as a major milestone in the resolution of the conflict, then the region is in a transition to „political stability and socio-economic transformation (Malan 2008:133). A conflict transition programme is not an ad hoc arrangement, but a well-planned, organized and institutionalized programme. The present Amnesty and Post Amnesty programmes are ad hoc and create imminent fears of failure. Further, an amnesty and consequent DDR is not tantamount to conflict resolution and do not build and sustain the peace. Rather, it denotes an environment of cessation of hostilities and state of readiness to engage further on the path to peace. Thus, it provides an environment to dialogue and reach agreements to commence the redress of grievances and to make, build and sustain peace. 22 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 In the current circumstance, the Amnesty Programme is so deficient in critical elements that it is difficult to be emphatic about a Post Amnesty phase. There are emerging fears that the current phase may only be a temporary phase of conflict suppression. There are reasons for this. The current rehabilitation programme and its content are not adequate in preparations for productive engagements and inducements to disengage from militancy. There is yet no post amnesty programme. Even though the absence of a concrete and on ground post amnesty plan was a major reason why SouthSouth governors threatened to pull out of the Amnesty Programme in July 2009, such a clear programme is not yet in place. There is, furthermore, no sustainable development plan for the region and no clear, specific and integrated documented commitment to the sustainable development of the region, apart of course from the Niger Delta Development Commission‟s Master Plan. There have been growing misgivings about the intensions and commitments of the federal government to the development of the region. Rather than a specific programmatic package of development backed with funds, there have only been the award of contracts for execution of about 44 projects including roads, bridges, hospitals and portable water at a cost of about N200 billion by the Federal Executive Council. Otherwise, the development of the region is still left to the structures and funding of NDDC and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. There is also persisting non accommodation of the region‟s interests in the legislative and policy frameworks and practices in the oil industry. Even the much touted Petroleum Industry Bill does not adequately pay attention to community participation, protection of community welfare and development programmes, environmental hazards and compliance and related interests of the communities. 23 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The Amnesty programme has not addressed critical issues such as the redress of under-development and the address of the agitation for resource control and regional autonomy. The need to change the political and socio-economic formation, comprehensively enough to substantially address the prevailing inequalities, disadvantages, injustices, devastation and human insecurity meted against the people and communities in the region has not been addressed. These are issues of restoration of social and communal order; reorientations of attitudes and behaviour; transitional restorative justice for perpetrators (the military and oil TNOCs) of violence and victims such as in Gbaramatu, Odioma, Odi, Kaiama, Ikenyan, Iko, Umuechem, Choba, and Ogoniland and reparations by the TNOCs for the degradation and devastation of the environment and the scanty compensation paid over the years. Critical Issues in Conflict and Post Conflict Transition Beyond amnesty, there are issues that have to be addressed to facilitate transition to peace. These include the following: 1. Incentives for Violence in Post Conflict Transition The violent segment of conflicts is often conducted by a minority but with some support of the locals and regions citizenry. Sometimes, the nonviolent majority are unable to restrain the stronger protagonists of violence. There is danger that a minority of the militants may still stick out as protagonists of violence in the post amnesty period. It is possible that these few elements benefit from continued violence and receives least harm from it. Therefore, the issue of continuing incentives for continued violence has to be critically examined? What conditions generate new incentives for violence? What are the incentives? 24 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 2. The Risks of Further Violent Conflicts Experience has shown that „the risk of war occurrence is higher in post conflict societies‟ that the risk of conflict onset in countries without histories of violent conflicts (Collier& Sambanis 2002:5). The Amnesty Programme is a landmark achievement. If it fails, it would mean a resumption of hostilities. Already, MEND has declared a renewal of actions. The main problem, however, is that further insurgency would be a less organized, coherent and principled militia resurgence. The disbanded groups would re-converge under new groups which may already be in formation in the rehabilitation camps. A new phase of militia resurgence would be less insurgent and more criminalized. Particularly, there would be balkanized and small groups with disparate tendencies and actions. But this time, we should not expect the militants to go back to the creeks. They would operate from the cities and even outside the region. They would be less oil based and would take the country as a wide constituency for diverse extortion based crimes such as kidnapping. In fact, the failure of the amnesty would mean the generalization of militia activities and the beginning of terror attacks. The recent incidences of kidnapped persons in the Northern parts of Nigeria being found or released in the Niger Delta is an indication. 3. The Management of Crime and Violence A major Post Amnesty challenge is that of managing crime and violence. In several countries such as Guatemala, experience has shown that crime rates tend to rise sharply with the advent of peace. The surplus availability of arms, ammunition, organized criminal syndicates and exmilitants/rebels tend towards an easy explanation. Clean breaks from theft, smuggling, violence and impunity don‟t fall 25 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 through easily in post conflict situations. Curtailing violence and crime is going to be a tall order. Already, the incidence of ex militia in rehabilitation camp criminal excesses indicates the huge challenge. Given the poor equipment, resources and poor intelligence capacity of the security agencies, it would be difficult to place the ex-militias in perspective in the incidences of crime. 4. The Destruction of the Conflict Economy. An entire conflict economy based on extensive smuggling of arms, illegal theft and sale of crude oil and petroleum products, the compelled appropriation of resources from TNOCs, oil servicing companies and contractors to TNOCs, the kidnapping for ransom of oil industry staff and the cornering of compensation benefits exist. This economy which is driven by opportunism and greed runs into billions of dollars and drives outrageous lifestyles and expenditure profiles. But more importantly, it is a major source of conflicts, arms and funds for diverse armed groups and militias. Particularly, bunkering perverted the militants, criminalized them and turned the conflict into a business. This illegal economy is also the motivation for inaction and compromise of security operatives. The continued existence of this lucrative economy is a sine qua non for continued and sustained conflicts. A post conflict transition has to address the conflict economy, identify those behind it and the profit from the conflict, eliminate the underground economy and deal with its protagonists or actors and find alternative productive economic engagements for those willing to desist from it. Decisive actions have to be taken to eliminate this illegal economy and appropriations and divert those engaged in them to productive engagements. 26 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Issues in the Resolution of the Conflict and Achieving the Peace There is danger in the seeming assumption of government that resolving conflict means eliminating violence and the conflict actions. Sustainable peace rather has to do with instituting conditions that transforms the conflict situation and resolve the conflict. In the case of the Niger Delta conflicts, resolving the conflict requires more that an amnesty. Certain other issues have to be addressed. 1. Re-Engineering and Re-Constructing the Amnesty Programme. The current amnesty programme and DDR process is deficient in several respects. There is need for a new management structure that is fairly autonomous and determined by all the conflict actors, comprised of all stakeholders and funded by the federal and state governments, TNOCs and international organizations. Such multi-stakeholder constituted, funded, controlled but autonomous agency is a better guarantee of confidence, respect, integrity, transparency and neutrality. 2. Inclusive Dialogue and Agreements There is need for broad consultations and dialogue with critical actors such as communal and ethnic group leaders, youth leaders, militia group leaders, leaders of active NGOs/CSOs and businesses and civil/environmental rights activists in the region. Such consultation with real leaders should produce agreements that reflect a broad spectrum of the feelings, interests and demands of the region that should 27 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 constitute a basic platform for actions on the accelerated development and peace building. 3. Reconciliations and Relations Re-building Building peace requires more than arms surrender. There has to be a process of reconciliation between communities, factions, militia groups and between traditional leaders, local elite, youth, women as well as the oil TNCs and communities. There have to be peace within and between groups in society that were engaged in conflict. Relations have to be restored and rebuilt. Even the JTF may need to reconcile with some communities. The government may need to facilitate this process by identifying groups that were in conflict and utilizing NGOs/CSOs as links and actors in peace building. 4. Confidence and Trust Building In the Niger Delta as elsewhere, the compact between government and the people has been broken. There have been so much hopes that were dashed, promises that failed and expectations that were not met. Government has been like a circus dance, plenty of talk that were not matched with actions, funds that were supposedly released that produced nothing and plenty of motions and actions that didn‟t improve lives. How can the people trust the federal government to deliver on a post conflict development of the region? Government needs to build trust and confidence by delivering on promises being made now. Government officials need to be sincere, honest, truthful and demonstrate integrity at this stage of post conflict transition. 5. De-Militarization and De-Garrisoning of the Region 28 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Since the early 1990s, the region has been a large garrisoned command with the largest military deployment since the Nigerian civil war. Alongside the huge deployments have been extensive military operations, harassments, human rights abuses, excessive force and brutalities. Some communities have been razed down, properties destroyed, some women have been raped while torture, arrests, detention, extortion and even plundering have been occurring. There are indications that the military have been compromised at least in the underground and illegal oil economies of the region. The regions‟ citizens have lost confidence in the military and have merely been held captive. In fact, a major demand of activists, youth, civil society and the militias has been that the militarization should stop and the military re-deployed. So what is JTF still doing that normal security agencies cannot do? It is time to begin a phased withdrawal and eventual disbandment of the JTF. Right now, at least in a sense, there are no more militias and no tea cup and low intensity wars. 6. Demilitarization of Society The society in the Niger Delta region has been militarized. There is a huge individual, group, communal and ethnic arsenal of sophisticated arms and ammunition. There is a ready resort to violence to resolve even trivial problems. A culture of impunity, nihilism, machismo and might is right is pervasive, indicated by such slangs as „nothing de happen‟ and „no shaking‟ particularly among the youth. Furthermore, there is now the destructive pursuit of personal interests at the expense of anything or anyone, the disregard for authority and social and parental control and a growing lack of affective feelings and absence of guilt. This new militarist order and culture has to change to more civil attitudes that respect 29 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 rights, abhor violence, detests abuse and rejects impunity and lawlessness. 7. Managing the Post Conflict Economy A post conflict transition is also the time to destroy illegal conflict economies and build alternative and genuine businesses and productive activities. Government can utilize and implement the local content policy in the oil industry to build a viable regional economy which can engage the business entrepreneurs and youth of the region. Furthermore, as was suggested in May 2009, the militias can be integrated into normal socio-economic life such as engagement in regulated security roles. They could be incorporated as private security companies to provide security for oil installations and pipelines (International Crisis Group 2009). 8. Building Stakes for Peace A system of stakes has to be constructed for peace to keep armed groups to accept and sustain peace. As Keen (2006:13) notes, an important consideration in the transition to peace is ‘to a considerable extent, in ensuing that some of those benefitting from war are in a position to benefit to a greater extent from peace’. One way of doing this is to ensure that individuals and groups that benefitted from the conflict are in some way made to benefit from the peace time economy. Beyond these, stakeholder-ship have to be constructed for the communities and even ex-militants such that peace becomes more profitable. 9. Managing Conflict Entrepreneurs There is a certain segment of businessmen who capitalized on the agitation and conflict in the region. They constructed violence into a 30 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 commodity for hire, commercialized militancy, and made huge profits by organizing and deploying violence in favour of political, ethnic and business patrons and chieftains and against opponents, opposition and rival claimants. Linked to powerful patrons, these entrepreneurs have been above the law and have built a culture in which violence pays and is used to settle scores and contest leadership positions and contracts. This category of violence entrepreneurs do sometimes parade themselves as militants but are actually armed bandits and criminals. The security agencies should break into these criminal networks and demobilize them. 10. Conflict Transformation As noted earlier, there cannot be peace except the conditions that generated the conflict are re-ordered or transformed. Otherwise, some conflicts may only be prevented and others reduced in intensity. The deep underlying grievances that underlie the agitation and insurgency are clearly well-known. Various technical committees have submitted reports and the Ledun Mitee Technical Committee even studied earlier reports and made submissions. The Federal Government should put in place a clear blueprint to address the demands and objectives of the struggle and begin immediate implementation. 11. Justice and Equity The injustices and inequity that underlined the conflict have to be addressed. The people have been disinherited, deprived, denied, maltreated and abused. There can be no lasting peace without instituting justice for today and redressing past wrongs. The federal government and its security agencies and the oil TNOCs may need to apologize to the region and rebuild destroyed communities and properties. The oil TNCs would have to pay reparations for the devastation of the land and water, the paltry compensation and the exclusion of the region‟s people in the oil industry. 31 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 12. Accelerated development Luring militants into peace without tackling the root causes and underlying grievances of the conflict has proven to be damaging in some countries such as Mozambique (Renamo) and Sierra Leone (RUF). Therefore, a critical issue is how to reverse the process by which diverse groups take up arms, and successfully persuade others to do so (Keen 2006:15). In the Niger Delta, the central problem is huge underdevelopment amidst a huge resource contribution. The best strategy is a marshall plan of massive and extensive development. The other major grievance is scanty resource ploughback and benefits from oil and the oil economy. The region has struggled for substantial increase in derivation funds and resource control. The politics of resource distribution has been such that other regions resist such increase. The impression has been given that such increase requires a constitutional amendment which is not true as the constitution specifies a minimum which means an increase above 13% requires only enacting a law. More recently, the federal government is giving the impression that it is offering a 10% equity to communities. The details are not yet clear and it is not yet backed by a law. Past and existing development interventions such as Niger Delta Development Board (1961), OMPADEC (1992), NDDC (2000) and even state agencies like DESOPADEC, failed or are failing on the alter of top down approach, hijack by elites, corruption, huge operational costs, elephant projects, unsustainable projects, abandoned projects and performance deficits. The big agency development has been a jamboree for political contractors and has been a museum for elephant, whitewashed, uncompleted, abandoned and high cost projects that have had little bearing on the peoples livelihoods. A new 32 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 form of development that is people centred and participative and that is different from the previous failed and failing efforts has to be instituted. The anchor of this development strategy should be the people who through extensive participation would now drive development. The local people affected and concerned should make the decisions and participate actively in programme implementation and monitoring. The local people should address issues that affect them particularly those that affect their livelihoods. They should be allowed to build confidence, capacity and production by their involvements in development programming and efforts. 13. Effective Governance There are gaps and voids in governance that has to be filled. Governance is yet to be grounded in the people and their perceived needs and interests. There are huge voids in assistance and welfare that numerous associations have risen to fill and are hijacking the loyalty and identity that ought to go to the state. Even the militias performed welfare and social service roles such as scholarships, school fees, medical care and grants to local entrepreneurs. Thus there were bonds, reciprocity and solidarity between militias and communities. As Ibaba (2008:201) notes, militant groups are not just organizations for personal aggrandizement but benefactors to some people. The corruption in the region has been awesome. In spite of perceived needs, the regions citizens in office have frittered and wasted so much resources. Loyalty and commitment to the cause has been lacking. There is need for a 33 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 new regime of accountability and transparency if development is to be accelerated. 14. Environmental Remediation, Sustainable Development Restoration and Can there be sustainable development against the backdrop of degraded natural resources that constitute the basis for the primary occupations of the region. The issue of remediation and restoration of degraded land and water can only be a basis for regenerating the local economies of the region. The physical basis for sustainable development has to be restored. The land and water must be replenished and remediated to make farming and fishing worthwhile. The displaced farmers and fishermen have to be rehabilitated with capital and equipment. Whatever development efforts must be made sustainable in terms of maintenance, independent operations, regeneration and replication, capacity building and further production or reproduction. 15. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Several parts of the region have been devastated. Schools and social services have been destroyed, decadent or abandoned. Properties and whole communities have been destroyed. Businesses and livelihoods have been dislocated. There is need, therefore, for reconstruction and rehabilitation of displaced persons, destroyed properties, devastated communities and damaged social services and amenities. The local economies have to be reconstructed and regenerated. 16. Regeneration of the Culture of Work, Production and Earned Incomes 34 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The culture of work and productive activities has eroded. In its place is a culture of laziness, easy funds and lousy expenditures. There is a plethora of groups and particularly youth movements and community youth groups that have become agencies of extortion, compelled extraction, easy acquisition and unearned distribution of funds. Being youth and being part of these groups has become an employment in itself. There are some youth who do not work, but thrive in being youth, hanging out among youth leaders and engaged in diverse forms of compulsive appropriation of others earnings. There is need for a change towards productive activities. Government should ban youth levies, tolls and extortion on land, housing development and commercial activities. All avenues of easy but illegal funds has to be blocked. It is noteworthy that this unproductive culture is linked to violent crime and particularly kidnapping. Conclusion Perhaps, we should note that historically and contemporarily, there exists no cases of insurgency that borders on contests of the state project and the national question that have been successfully repressed and suppressed militarily. There is always a resurgence. The current amnesty does well in realizing this truth. It has further indicated that the grievances and ensuing armed insurgent dimension of the conflict requires a political resolution. It was obvious that the military and repressive approach failed to douse, suppress and defeat the agitation and insurgency. The more effective strategy for comprehensively addressing the grievances and 35 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 resistance is massive development efforts and increased revenues and resource benefits, woven around regional autonomy and reforms of governance and federal practice. The Amnesty Programme of President Yar‟Adua brought hopes of conflict settlement and a post conflict transition stage. However, after initial successes in terms of militia acceptance, surrender, disarming and entering into rehabilitation centres, the programme is currently freezing, in comatose and stalled. There is now huge disenchantment by militants and a huge fear of conflict relapse, with the resurgence of hostilities by MEND that has suspended its unilateral cease fire. The Amnesty Programme has faltered on the altar of poor planning and organization, weak and non-inclusive implementation structure and institutionalization, poor implementation and poor results. Political commitment is now suspect just as actual funding and release of funds. As a result, supposed conflict settlement phase is faltering and the issue of a post conflict transition and conflict resolution are now becoming mere hopes. The paper raises issues and challenges that should have been addressed and should be addressed and draws on insights and lessons of experiences elsewhere to chart a course towards conflict resolution. Selected References Assefa, H (2001). Reconciliation in Peace Building: A Field Guide. In Luc Regcholer & Thama Pattrnholz (eds) Peace Building Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Ayoob, M. (1995). The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System. 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(2003). Disarming for Peace in Aceh: Lessons Learned. Monterey, Carlifornia: Institute of International Peace Studies. Mair, S. (2003). The New World of Privatized Violence International Politics, Gesellshaff 1 (2). Malan, J. (2008). Understanding Transitional Justice in Africa. In J. Francis (ed) Peace and Conflict in Africa. London & New York: Zed Books. Osaghae, E. Ikelegbe, A.O, Olarimoye, B & Okhomina, S. (2007). Youth Militias, Resource Control and Self Determination struggles in the Niger Delta Region. Research Report, Consortium for Development Partnership Module 5. Paes Wolf-Christian (2004). Oil Production and National Security in Sub-Saharan Africa in Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates (eds) Oil Policy in the Civil of Guinea; Security and Conflicts, Economic Growth, Social Development Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Shftung. 41 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Reno, W. (2000) .Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars in M. Berdal & D.M. Malone (eds) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Sunday Vanguard (2007) .our fight against illegal bunkering and unscrupulous Navy officers interview with Ganiyu Adekeye chief of Naval staff. March 25. Trager Frank N. & Simone Frank L., (1973). An Introduction to the Study of National Security in Frank N. Tragger and Phillip S. Kronenbergy (eds) National Security and American Society: Theory, process and Policy. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Turshen, M. (2002). Introduction ACADS Bulletin; It‟s About Oil. Review of African Political Economy. Ukiwo, U. (2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Insurgency in the Niger Delta in the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta. Proceedings of International Conference Organized by Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University and the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, University of Missour. Yenagua; March 11-13th. United Nations Commission on Human Security (UNCHS (2003). Human Security Now, New York. United Nations Development Programme (2000) UNDP Human Development Report, Nigeria 20002001. Millennium Edition. Lagos. Wolfers, A. (1962). Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 42 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 43 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE THREAT OF WEATHER-RELATED DISASTERS IN THE NIGER DELTA OKOLI, AL CHUKWUMA3 Abstract The phenomenon of climate change has been associated with a trend of weather extremity and volatility across the world. This global trend has often occasioned dire climato-ecological dynamics that threaten human security and societal sustainability. This paper seeks to examine the correlation between climate change and weatherrelated disaster in the Niger Delta from the standpoint of threat analysis. Relying on secondary sources of data, the paper posits that the Niger Delta is highly susceptible to climate-change-induced weather disasters in view of its proximity to the continental waters which makes it vulnerable to ocean surge, coastal erosion and flooding. The paper makes a case for a contingency approach to disaster remediation as the way forward. Keywords: Climate change; weather volatility; disaster; weather disaster; Niger Delta; vulnerability; human security. 3 Okoli, Al Chukwuma is a Lecturer with the Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, Lafia, Nigeria. His email contact is: okochu007@yahoo.com 43 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Introduction Climate Change is one of the most critical challenges facing the contemporary world. The palpability of this challenge has been variously affirmed in contemporary development and human security literature. According to Oladipo: There is now clear scientific evidence that climate change is real. It is upon us. Its impacts will affect everyone on earth in some way, but the poor are the most vulnerable. This is because most of the world‟s poor depend for their livelihoods directly upon highly climate sensitive natural resources (2009:2). The vulnerability of nations to the impacts of climate change depends on where they are geographically situated as well as their coping capacities (Abebimpe, 2011). African is highly vulnerable to climate change in view of a number of factors: Because of its position on the globe, Africa already has a warm climate and is exposed to inconsistency in rainfall, prevalence of poor soil, and flood plains. Second, most economies are dependent on sectors that are susceptible to climate variations; and third perhaps most importantly, the lack of good governance, widespread poverty, poor 45 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 economic and social infrastructure, conflicts, and limited human, institutional and financial capacities mean that as a continent, it is least able to cope with the effects of climate change (Bolarinwa, 2009:3). The vulnerability of Nigeria to the vicissitudes of climate change is expectedly most endemic on its coastlines and littoral flanks. The Niger Delta region is amply situated within this „axis of risk‟. In effect, the Niger Delta has been described as sitting on the threshold of a “sinking future” (Agwu, 2009:8). This is in view of its apparent susceptibility to the possible hazards of climate change. Concerning the risk of climate change related disasters in this region, Rowell, Marriot and Stockman (2005:235) curiously alarmed: If we superimpose the predicted sea level rise on the gradual subsiding Niger Delta (subsidence exacerbated by oil and gas extraction), the net effect is that within the next two decades… about 40km wide strip of the Niger Delta and its peoples would be submerged and rendered extinct. In the light of the contemporary dynamics of climate change in Nigeria, it is evident that the Niger Delta is ostensibly at risk of sundry weather-related disasters. It is the need to understand the nature and implications of this threat that has informed this study. Nature, Approach and Structure of the Paper 46 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The paper is an exploratory qualitative discourse on the relationship between climate change and weather related disasters in Nigeria with particular reference to the Niger Delta. In seeking to establish the nexus between the two variables–climate change and weather-related disasters - the paper does not intend to prove empirical causality; it rather seeks to situate a correlation between the variables with a view to underscoring how the former is associated with the latter. To this end, the paper draws discursively from extant literature and perspectives in a bid to make good its purpose. The thrust of the paper is schematically laid out under a number of themes and sub-themes designed to address the concerns of the subject. The remainder of the paper is thus organised under the following parts: frame of reference (conceptual issues), theoretical framework, setting of the study (the Niger Delta), vulnerability of the Niger Delta to weather-related disasters, Niger Delta and coastal erosion, Niger Delta and flooding, implications of weather-related disasters for human security, the way forward (mitigation and adaption), and conclusion. Frame of Reference/Conceptual Issues Three basic concepts constitute the thrust of the subject of the paper. The concepts are climate change, disaster, and weather-related disaster(s). For the purpose of shared contextual understanding, the conception of these concepts within the purview of the present discourse is articulated in turn in the sub-sections that follow. Climate change Climate change “refers to a change in climate, attributable directly or indirectly to human activities that alter the atmospheric composition of the earth” (Igwe, 2009: 2). It is caused by “the inexorable build-up of green-house gases in 47 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 the earth‟s atmosphere” (Bolarinwa, 2009: 3). In addition to its human causation, climate change has also been associated with “natural variability of the universe observed over comparable time” (Omoyemen, 2009: 2) A comprehensive conception of climate change has been provided by Agwu (2009). Corroborating other sources, Agwu (2009:27) elaborately observes: Climate change is a synonym for global warning, which is caused by the emission of greenhouse gases. These emissions cause environmental distortions like the warming of the oceans, the rise in sea level, and the fact that average temperatures in the world today are already higher than they were at any point in human history. So at the heart of the climate change problem is the depletion of the ozone layer as a result of the production and use of fossil fuel, particularly the emission of carbon dioxide from the burning of coal, oil and gas. Technically, climate change results from the depletion of the ozone layer arising from the greenhouse effect (Agwu, 2009). Hence, climate change is engendered by the increase in the atmospheric concentration of green-house gases (GHG) which changes how the atmosphere absorbs and retains energy (Omoyemen, 2009:2). The greenhouse gases include carbon-dioxide (mainly from burning fossil fuel like coal, oil and natural gas), methane and nitrous oxide (due to agricultural practices and changes in land use), ozone (generated mostly by the fumes in car exhausts), etc. (Omoyemen, 2009:2). The essence and mechanics of the green-house effect has been captured thus: The sun powers earth‟s climate, radiating energy at very short wave lengths, predominately in the visible or nearvisible (e.g. ultraviolent) part of the spectrum. About 33% of the solar energy that reaches the top of earth‟s atmosphere is reflected directly back to space (albedo). The remaining 67% 48 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 is absorbed by the surface and, to a lesser extent, by the atmosphere. To balance the absorbed incoming energy, the earth must, on average, radiate the same amount of energy back to space. Because the earth is much colder than the sun, it radiates at much longer wavelengths, primarily in the infrared part of the spectrum. Much of this thermal radiation emitted by the land and ocean is absorbed by the atmosphere, including clouds, and radiated back to earth. This is called the green-house effect (Oladipo, 2009:3). It is evident from the foregoing that climate change is a complex phenomenon. In effect, its nature, origin and dynamics have been shrouded in scientific mystification. It is important to note in passing that even in science, there appears to be no consensus concerning the phenomenology of climate change. What obtains, in effect, is a widely held orthodox claim that climate change is caused by the depletion of the ozone layer as a necessary consequence of the so-called greenhouse effect. There are seven theoretical perspectives that contend to explain the phenomenon of climate change. The first, which is the most widely acknowledged in the scientific literature, is the global warning perspective. This perspective holds that climate change is a consequence of global warming. The global warming derives from increase in the earth‟s temperature as a result of increased amount of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere (Koestler, 2010). The burning of carbonbased fuels by man in the course of his household, industrial, social and economic activities has been the principal culprit in this regard. The rest of the extant perspectives are highlighted in Table 1 showing hereunder. 49 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Table 1: Theoretical perspectives on climate Change This holds that there are biological and Bio-Thermostat chemical processes that offset the perspective increased carbon- dioxide effect; for instance, the increased uptake of carbondioxide by plants. Cloud formation and albedo perspective This postulates that changes in the formation and albedo of clouds create a feedback that cancels and the effects of increased carbon-dioxide. (Albedo is a fancy word denoting the ability of clouds to reflect solar radiation). Human forcing (besides greenhouse gases) perspective This espouses that mankind‟s greatest destructive impact on climate is its transformation of the Earth‟s surface by deforestation, irrigation of deserts, urbanization (building of cities), etc. Ocean current perspective This contends that global temperature variation over the past century has been due to the slowdown of the ocean‟s “thermohalin” circulation. Planetary motion perspective This states that all the warming in the latter part of the twentieth century can be explained by natural gravitational and magnetic oscillations of the solar system induced by the earth‟s movement through space. These oscillations modulate solar variation which then derives climate change. 50 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Solar variability perspective This claims that solar variability accounts for most of all of the recent warming and will dominate in the 21st Century regardless of man-made greenhouse gas emissions. Source: Koestler (2010), as adapted by the author. Scholarly inquiries into the phenomenology of climate change have given rise to three dominant schools of thoughts, namely the apocalyptic school, the scientific school and the denialist school. The apocalyptic school attributes the phenomenon of climate change to some extra-cosmic events that have been prophesied in the books of religions to characterise the “end time” (Awake, August, 2008). This implies that the occurrence of climate change signifies the advent of the last days‟ as predicated in the religious books (see for instance the Bible: the Book of Revelation). The scientific school associates climate change with the dynamics of global warming. This school holds that the rising global temperature is as a result of the increase amount of carbon emission into the atmosphere is responsible for climate change (Koestler, 2010). Scholars who subscribe to the scientific school of thought can be sub-divided into two: the orthodox and the skepticists. The orthodox scholars believe in the tenacity and finality of the global warming–greenhouse effect theory while the skepticists hold the claims with reasoned reservation. The skepticists criticize the orthodox for failing to establish their claims by way of empirical verification and causality. It is to be noted that the orthodox perspective is yet to be conclusively proven (Koestler, 2010). The denialist school posits that the whole idea of global warming and climate change is a matter of scientific permutation and environmentalist propaganda (Awake, 51 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 August 2008). The position of this school seems to be that the universe has always changed on a normal course. So according to them, nothing is unusual about contemporary trends of climate change. Perhaps, what is unusual is that science is getting rather conscious and anxious of these trends. Whether-Related Disasters Weather-related disasters refer to catastrophic events that are precipitated by critical weather variability and volatility ascribed to the dynamics of climate change. The nature and dimensions of this form of disaster has been underscored by Igwe (2009:2) where he notes: Global warming, depending on the region has been associated with increase and decrease in rainfall, thus exacerbating floods, landslides (tsunamis) in wet regions and droughts in dry regions of the world; land ice melting in the cold regions has had similar consequences, as it has given rise to thermal expansion of oceans leading to flooding. All these manifest in natural disasters, such as hurricanes, bush fires, ocean surges, and landslides…. Properly conceived, weather-related disasters are extreme weather incidents that threaten human security and societal sustainability. In Africa, the extreme events have been evident in the rising incidence of droughts and desertification in “areas prone to scarcity of water and flooding in heavy rainfall areas” (Igwe, 2009:3). 52 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Globally, weather-related disasters have been a major cause of mass complex emergencies over the years. This form of catastrophic events have been associated with dire socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences in many parts of the world. Table 2 showing hereunder highlights the incidence of weather-related disasters across the world in 2007 alongside the associated humanitarian impacts. Table 2: Some World’s Weather-related Disasters in 2007 Country/ Incident with Humanitarian Impact Region Britain More than 350,000 people were affected by the worst flooding in over 60 years. England and Wales saw the wettest May to July since recordkeeping began in 1976. West Africa Floods affected 800,000 people in 14 countries. Lesotho High temperatures and drought destroyed crops. Some 553,000 people may require food aid. Sudan Torrential rains left 150,000 people without shelter, at least 500,000 received aid. Madagascar Cyclones and heavy rains lashed the island, displacing 33,000 people and destroying the crops of 260,000. North Korea An estimated 960,000 were severely hit by widespread flooding, landslides, and mud slides. Bangladesh Flooding affected 8.5 million people and killed over 3, 0000 as well as 2.5 million farm animals, 53 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Nearly 1.5 homes were either damaged or destroyed. India Floods affected 30 million people. Pakistan Cyclones rains left 377,000 people displaced and hundreds dead Bolivia More than 350,000 were affected by flooding, and 25,000 were displaced. Mexico Regional flooding left at least 500,000 homeless and affected more than a million. Dominican Rep. Prolonged heavy rainfall caused and landslide displacing 65,000 United State Fires across tinder-dry southern California forced 500,000 residents to flee their homes. Source: Awake (August, 2008:7). Theoretical Framework There apparently exists no theory that offers a cause-effect explication of climate change. This paper proposes the theory of cosmo-anthropogenic dynamics as its analytical anchorage. The theory posits that climate change occurs as a result of the interaction of cosmic and anthropogenic forces, engendering critical climatic dynamics. The climate dynamics produces rapid weather variability and volatility that result in extreme events, often with disastrous consequences (Adebimpe, 2011). Hence, climate change is understood as a consequence of dialectical relations between „nature‟ and „culture‟, bringing about dire impacts and complications on global climate. Thus, weather-related disasters such as rainstorm, flooding, tsunami, 54 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 coastal erosion and the like, can be seen as the necessary outcome of a global climate endangered by natural and anthropogenic impacts. The nature and mechanics of these impacts have been highlighted in the „seven theories‟ of climate change cited in Table 1. The Setting of the Study: The Niger Delta The Niger Delta is located in the Atlantic coast of southern Nigerian where River Niger divided into numerous tributaries to create a network of creeks and basins interspersed by ebullient swamps and forests (Uyigne and Agho, 2007; Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye and Okhonmina, 2007). It is reputed to be the second largest delta in the world and the largest wetland in Africa (Uyigue and Agho, 2007). As currently defined by the Nigerian Government, the Niger Delta encompasses about 70,000km2 and makes up 7.5% of Nigeria‟s land mass (Okoli, 2013: 67). Historically and cartographically, the Niger Delta consisted of the geographical contiguous States of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers (Okoli, 2013). But in its current status, the region embodies, in addition to the aforementioned three States, the littoral States of Ondo (the riverine areas), Cross River and AkwaIbom, (Osaghae et al, 2007). The Niger Delta is home to over forty (40) minority ethic and sub-ethnic groups including the Ijaw, Urhobo Itshekiri, Efik, Ogoni, Ilaje, Kalabari, Ikwere, Isoko, Ndokwa, etc, (Osaghae et al, 2007, Okoli, 2013). The Niger Delta has also often been defined geo-politically as constituting the oil producing states of the South-South and South East zones of Nigeria. In this regard, it would compose of the following States: Abia, Imo, Edo, Ondo, Cross River, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Delta and Bayelsa. The definition of the Niger Delta in this wise has been discredited as being merely political, a-historical and non-cartographical (Okoli, 2013). Compared to the geographical conception, the political 55 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 definition of the Niger Delta is at best artificial and misleading. This is in view of the fact that it is based on extrageographical considerations that are neither tenable nor plausible. Geographically, the Niger Delta has been subdivided into three blocks, namely Western (or Northern) Niger Delta, Central Niger Delta, and Eastern Niger Delta. Table 3 below sheds proper light on these sub divisions. Table 3: Geographical Sub-divisions of the Niger Delta Sub-division Description Central Niger Delta This covers the central section of the coastal South South Nigeria, encompassing Rivers and Bayelsa States. Eastern Niger Delta This consists of east-Atlantic axis of the coastal South-South, including Akwa-Ibom and Cross River States. Western (Northern) Niger Delta This refers to the Western stretch of the coastal SouthSouth embodying Delta, Edo and Ondo (riverine part) States. Source: Adapted from Okoli (2013: 68-69). The Vulnerability of the Niger Delta to Weather-Related Disasters Vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of a population to the impact of disaster as a result of unmitigated exposure to 56 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 hazards. The Niger Delta region is naturally prone to weatherrelated disasters in view of its peculiar vulnerable physical geography (Wapmuk, 2009). The region is a typical wetland comprising about 2,370 square kilometers of rivers and 8,600 square kilometers of stagnant swamp (Uyigue and Agho, 2007). Most of the human population of the Niger Delta lives on the creeks and coasts of the Atlantic basin, interspersed by the numerous tributaries of the River Niger (Uyigue and Agho, 2007). These characteristics have rendered the region highly vulnerable to extreme weather events such as flooding, ocean surge and inundation, and coastal erosion. These incidents often bring about disastrous outcomes. With particular reference to the phenomenon of sea-level rise, Onuoha (2008: 1036) alarmed that “in the event of sudden climate–induced sea-level rise, the risk of the region (Niger Delta) being entirely submerged by devastating coastal flooding is most probable, given its naturally subsidence– prone territory”. More illustratively, Onuoha (2008:1036) opines: While a 0.2 metre rise in sea level would lead to displacement of about 200 villages in the region, a projected sea-level rise of more than 1 metre could flood much of the Niger Delta and force up to 80% of the Delta‟s population to higher ground. The vulnerability of the Niger Delta to climate-induced disasters has been acknowledged by the inter-governmental panel on climate change when it noted that there would be drastic changes in rainfall patterns in warmer climate; and coastal regions like the Niger Delta may experience 5–6 % 57 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 increase of rainfall by 2030, leading to frequent, high and prolonged floods in the region. (Mmom and Aifesehi, 2013: 216). While drastic variability in rainfall patterns appears to be engendering massive flood disasters in Niger Delta, the accelerated pace of Annual Sea Level Rise (ASLR) has been precipitating dramatic ocean surges and coastal inundations that threaten the sustainability of the region. To underscore the severity of this trend, it has been projected that: With ASLR of about 1.0m, about 75% of the Delta could be lost. The number of people at risk, assuming no measure and development, would be 0.9million, 2.10 million and 4.50 million with ASLR of about 0.2m, 0.5m, and 1.0m respectively, resulting in massive environmental refugee (Oladipo, 2009:8). The vulnerability of the Niger Delta to weather-related disasters is, therefore, high and alarming. This situation has been compounded by the untoward activities associated with oil exploration and exploitation (such as gas flaring, oil spills, and petroleum pipeline explosion) whose impacts have been complicating the climatic scenarios in the region (Agwu, 2009; Okoli, 2014b). Niger Delta and the Threat of Coastal Erosion Coastal erosion has been one of the critical impacts and complications of sea level rise in the Niger Delta. This problem has been escalating in keeping with the trend of climate change. According to Uyigue and Agho: 58 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The most important problem facing the Niger Delta is coastal erosion. Although the World Bank has rated coastal erosion as needing moderate attention in the region, it is the most important impact of sea level rise in the region and should be given high priority attention…. Settlements in the coastal region have been lost to the ocean due to erosion. In some places especially in Forcados, some oil wells have been lost to the ocean due to erosion (2007:para. 8). The threat of coastal erosion in the Niger Delta is real and palpable. In a study carried out by Uyigue and Agho (2007), it was observed that there has been a rising incidence of land loss and degradation in the Niger Delta. Based on different scenarios of sea level rise, the study estimated that the region is liable to lose varying measures of land at various scales of coastal erosion and inundations (see Table 4). Table 4: Estimated Land Loss to Coastal Erosion/Inundation Low Estimate High Estimate Sea level 0.2m 0.5m 1.0m 2.0m 0.2m 0.5m 1.0m 2.0m Land loss in km2 2,846 7,453 15,125 18,398 2,865 7,500 15,332 18,80 3 59 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Source: Uyigue and Agho (2007). A study carried out by Adegoke, et al (2010) in the Niger Delta confirmed that the region had recorded massive erosion, particularly on the coastlines. With particular reference to the South-Eastern area of the Niger Delta, the study revealed an appreciable incidence of coastal erosion as reflected in Table 5 showing hereunder. Table 5: Incidence of Coastal Erosion in Selected Parts of the South-Eastern Niger Delta Location Comments Erosion Accretion Total (Km2) (Km2) (Km2) Santa Barbara River to San Bartolomeo River Mouth 2.858 1.272 4.130 Off coast changes of 0.19km2 and 0.124km2 of accretion and erosion respectively observed. Between San Bartolomeo and Sombreiro Rivers 1.265 0.107 1.372 The accretion was observed mainly around Sombreiro River mouth. Erosion observed along 10.9km of coastline from San Bartholomeo River eastwards. Between Sombreiro and New Calabar and 3.197 3.197 This is a massively eroded area of the Niger Delta coastline. 60 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Bonny Rivers Also observed was about 0.435Km2 of accretion off the coast. Between New Calabar and Bonny Rivers 1,577 From Bonny River to Andoni River 0.995 Between Andoni River and Imo River 1.18 1.577 This erosion was observed along a 10.88 km coastline, This portion is the inner portion of the coastline between these rivers. 2.21 3.205 The erosion was observed from the mouth of Bonny River and extending for 6.5km of the coastline. Accretion was observed along the coastline from the point where the erosion ceased. It extends over 17km of coastline up to the mouth of Andoni River. 1.11 2.29 Erosion is prevalent around the coastline nearest the mouth of Andoni river mouth, 61 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 while accretion trend is towards the mouth of the Imo river. Imo River Mouth up to about 3.2 km eastwards 0.567 0.341 0.908 Source: Adegoke et al (2010: 280). The impact of coastal erosion on the affected areas of the Niger Delta has been threatening. The impact includes the following: Loss of farmland; Loss of household abode; Depletion of human settlement on the coastline; Exacerbation of flooding; Population displacement; Loss of material assets (property and infrastructure); Destruction of ecosystem; Land degradation; Ocean encroachment (surge and inundation); and loss of livelihood sources and support. In view of the foregoing, it is evidence that coastal erosion is a veritable threat to human security in the Niger Delta. Over the years, the incidence of coastal erosion has interplayed with shoreline inundations and flooding to exacerbate environmental crisis in the Niger Delta. This scenario poses a serious risk to sustainable human security and development in the region. Niger Delta and the Threat of Flooding Flooding is another critical correlate of the rising sea levels in the Niger Delta (Bariweni, Tawari, and Abowei, 2012). Over the years, the recurring flood in Nigeria and the Niger Delta in particular has posed a serious threat to sustainable development (Adedegi, Odufuwa ad Adebayo, 2012). In the fourth quarter of 2012, Nigeria was affected by a widespread and unprecedented flooding that engulfed a greater part of the 62 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Niger Delta, resulting in massive humanitarian consequences (Eyers and Obowu, 2013). The 2012 flood disaster was so historic in view of its huge destructive impacts and complications. This incident led to massive population displacement in the Niger Delta, sacking many households, village and settlements. Table 6 below shows the relocation destinations of most of the persons displaced in the course of the flood disaster in the Niger Delta. Table 6: Relocation Destinations for Victims of 2007 Flood Disaster in Niger Delta Temporary Percentage of Estimated costs accommodation Victims Hotel Lodging 10% N4.56 Refugee Camps 50% N10b Private homes not affected by flood 20% N180M Migration to safer States 20% N170M Source: Pere (2012:2) Apart from population displacement, the flood disaster equally occasioned multiple socio-economic and social malaises that threatened the survival of the affected communities. In the course of the disaster, roads were rendered impassable and people were trapped in risky locations; transport and food-stuff cost hiked astronomically; public electricity supply was cut off; businesses were shut down; plantations and farmlands were eroded; numerous homes and public buildings were submerged; bridges and 63 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 drainage systems collapsed in numbers; cars and other valuables were washed away; and life was made miserable (Pere, 2012; Eyers and Obowu, 2013). The 2012 incident copiously exposed the vulnerability of the Niger Delta to weather disaster. The expansive scale and spread of the flood underscores the fear that the Niger Delta has “a sinking future” (Agwu, 2009:8). Urgent pragmatic measures are a desideratum to mitigating the region from the eventuality of more catastrophic flooding. Implications of Weather-related Disasters for Human security Weather-related disasters hold negative implications for human security in Nigeria. According to Adebimpe: Nigeria is a disaster prone country. The disasters which often result into environmental emergencies like flooding are worsened by the degradation of the country‟s environment and natural resource. Floods, rainstorms, and droughts affect households each year in Nigeria and contribute to endemic poverty in most parts (2011:97). Weather-related disasters in Nigeria lead to dire impacts and outcomes that jeopardize the foundations of human security in the country. With reference to the Niger Delta region, such disasters have been associated with the following set of adverse outcomes: Population displacement and dislocation of families and settlements; Destruction of household and agricultural assets; Degradation of land in the event of coastal erosion; Contamination of fresh water sources arising from ocean surge.; Death of human beings and 64 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 animals; Loss of livelihood sources and supports; Spread of public health hazards; Despoliation of ecosystems and ecodiversity; Destruction of public infrastructure; and general environmental degradation. The implication of the foregoing is that weather-related disasters touch on the very fabric of human security. By jeopardizing people‟s livelihood sources and assets, weatherrelated disasters plunge the affected population into humanitarian crisis. It also increases the vulnerability of such population to disease, poverty and other forms of socioeconomic insecurity. The 2012 flooding, for instance, created a phenomenal complex emergency scenario that found expression in multiple humanitarian ripples. This was exemplified in massive social dislocations, situational destitution, and internally displaced persons (IDP) crises (Social Action, 2012; NHSA, 2012; Abam, n.d). The severity of this situation necessitated huge inter-governmental and international interventions towards mitigating the devastating impact of the catastrophic flooding. In effect, the 2012 flooding incident in Niger Delta clearly demonstrated how hard extreme weather events can impact human security of a vulnerable population. Controlling Weather Disasters in Niger Delta: Betwixt Mitigation and Adaptation Climate change is a global challenge. Addressing this challenge is a global concern and imperative. This would entail a conscious and conscientious effort at mitigation and adaptation. According to Oladipo: Stopping climate change is up to us. Our actions today will determine the climate of tomorrow. By choosing to take action now, we can limit future damage…. But what can we do? 65 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 In essence, there are two types of responses. The first involves reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to slow or stop the process of climate change. This is known as mitigation. The second, known as adaptation, is learning to cope with the impacts of climate change (2009:2). The reality of weather-related disasters that has engaged the attention of this paper is a corollary of climate change. Dealing with such occurrences requires a pragmatic application of mitigative and adaptive strategies that efficiently reduces human vulnerability (Ologunorisa, 2009). Mitigation deals with the causes while adaptation is largely concerned with the effects (Wapmuk, 2009). Put differently, while mitigation addresses the pre-incident stage of disaster, adaptation deals with the aftermath of disaster. Operationally, the two strategies are functionally related. For instance, “the more successful „Plan A‟ – which is mitigation is, the less „Plan B‟, that is adaptation, is required (Wapmuk, 2009:3). Table 7 details some basic actionable measures that can be taken in addressing the occurrence of climate-induced weather calamities in the Niger-Delta. Table 7: Sundry Strategies for dealing with Weather-related Disasters S/n Mitigation S/n Adaptation 1 Dredging of major water fronts 1 Strategic community alert 2 Reinforcement of coastlines 2 Hazard sensitivity 66 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 3 Conservation of the habitat 3 Community self-help and solidarity 4 Reduction/eradication of gas flaring 4 Efficient dispensation of relief in the event of an incident 5 Stoppage of sand excavation and evacuation on the shorelines 5 Social support for the displaced and other victims 6 Institution of early warning system/mechanism to forewarn eventualities 6 Effective rescue and rehabilitation of affected population 7 Establishment of relief camps on the higher lands 7 Timely intervention of all responders in the event of an incident 8 Establishment of management zone 8 Good community leadership, etc. 9 Sensitization of the locals to risks and hazards and coping tactics Community volunteerism 10 Contingency plan for relief and rescue, etc Community resilience 11 Risk/Hazard awareness for early action Self-defence coastal Source: Author Conclusion 67 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Climate change is a world-wide climato-genetic problematique that has engaged the attention of scientists, humanists, environmentalists, and policy makers over the years. For so long, the origins, causes and mechanics of climate change were shrouded in scientific permutations and mystification. Today, the phenomenology of climate change is universally acknowledged. In this regard, climate change is widely understood as a consequence of mankind‟s violation of nature by way of unsustainable ecological practices. It is a reflection of „nature‟ versus „culture‟ dialectics whose contradictions are mutually detrimental to the sustainability of mankind as well as Mother Nature. Although climate change is global in essence, it affects nations differently depending on how they are situated both geo-politically and socio-economically, as well as their comparative capacities towards mitigating and coping with its impacts. The Niger Delta is highly vulnerable to climate change in view of its location on the core coastal corridor of the country. As we have observed in this paper, this location of the Niger Delta has made it susceptible to weather extremities associated with the dynamics of climate change. This is exemplified in coastal erosion, flooding and ocean surge, all of which have been traceable to the rising sea level on the region‟s Atlantic shores and coastlines. Given its peculiar geographical attributes, therefore, the Niger Delta has been recognized as prone to weather-related disasters. The 2012 massive flood which threatened to submerge the bulk of the Niger Delta habitation adumbrated the fact that the region is sitting on the threshold of a climatic catastrophe. Pragmatic and proactive measures of mitigation and adaption are crucial in arresting the impending doom. References 68 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Abam, T.K.S (n.d). Flood prevention, protection and mitigation in the Niger Delta. 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Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. Awake (August, 2008). Global warming. Is planet earth in peril? Awake magazine, August edition, Average Printing (35,754,000). Beriweni, P.A., Tawani, C.C. and Abowei, J.F.N. (2012). Some environmental effects of flooding in Niger Delta 69 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 region of Nigeria. International Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 1 (1), pp.35 – 46. Bolarinwa, J.O. (2009). Climate change, population challenge and conflict in Africa. Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. Eyers, R. & Obowu, C. (2013). Niger Delta Flooding: Monitoring, forecasting and emergency response support from SPDC (TS 06D – Hydrography in practice – 6659), Environment for sustainability, Abuja, Nigeria). Igwe, I. (2009). Gas flaring and climate change. Nigeria‟s effort towards developing regulatory regime. Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: Impact, Adaptation and vulnerability–Summary for policy-makers. Geneva: Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Secretariat. Koestler, D. (2009). The seven theories of climate change. Heartland Institute. Mmom, P.C. and Aifesehi, P.E. (2013). Impact of the 2012 flood on water quality and rural livelihood in the 70 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Orashi Province of the Niger Delta. Journal of Geography and Geology, 5 (3) pp. 216-226. NHSA (2012). Report of the 2012 Colloquium on flood disasters in Nigeria by Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency (NHSA), held at NICON Luxury Hotel Abuja, on 10th–1th December, 2012. Ogba, C.O. & Utang, P.B. (2010) Geo-spatial evaluation of Niger Delta coastal susceptibility to climate change. FIG Working Week (TS2E-4039), FIG Congress, Sydney, Australia, (April, 11-16, 2010). Okoli, A.C. (2014a). Disaster management and national security in Nigeria: The nexus and the disconnect: International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science, 2 (1), pp.21 -59. Okoli, A.C. (2014b). Petroleum pipeline vandalism and Nigeria‟s national security. Draft Ph.D Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science and Defence Studies, Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna, Nigeria (July). Okoli, A.C. (2013). The dialectics of the Niger-Delta Crisis: A political ecology interpretation. Niger Delta Research Digest, 7 (2), pp. 63-88. Oladipo, E. (2009). The global framework for mitigating climate change. Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. 71 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Ologunorisa F.E. (2009). Strategies for mitigation of flood risk in the Nigeria Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Applied Environmental Management, 13 (2), pp. 17 -22. Olorunlana, F.A. (2013). State of the environment in the Niger Delta area of Ondo State. 1st Annual International Inter-disciplinary Conference, AIIC, April, 24 – 26, 2013 Azores, Portugal (Conference Proceedings: pp. 351357). Omoyemen, O.E. (2009). Climate change and human Security: A gender perspective. Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. Onuoha, F.C. (2008). Oil exploitation, environmental degradation and climate change: Assessing the vulnerability of the Niger Delta environment to natural disaster. Proceedings of the international conference in the Nigerian State, Oil industry and the Niger Delta. A publication of the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University (NDU), Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, p.1036. Osaghae, E. Ikelegbe, A. Olarinmoye, O. & Okhonmina (2007 August). Youth Militias, self determination and resource control struggles in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. Draft research paper, University of Benin. Pere, A. (2012). Accounting experience of the flood disaster in Niger Delta region, Nigeria. Ayapiro Worldwide Services 72 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Research Journal (Ayapiro Worldwide Services,) Yenegoa Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Rowell, A. Marriot, J. & Stockman, L. (2005). The next Gulf:London, Washington and Oil conflict in Nigeria. London: Constable and Robinson Ltd. Social Action (2012). The 2012 floods: Human rights and accountability in the management of emergency relief in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. Social Action Briefing, No. 5 (December). Uyigue, E and Agho, M. (2007). Coping with climate change and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta of Southern Nigeria. Community Research and Development Centre (CREDC). Wapmuk, S. (2009). Mitigating the effects of climate change in Nigeria. The imperative of public education and awareness. Paper presented at the two-day International conference on climate change and human security in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects, November 24 -25, 2009, at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Conference Chamber, Lagos. 73 INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST MEN IN THE NIGER DELTA: A STUDY OF BENIN CITY ENDURANCE UZOBO4 & RUTH E. AKHUETIE5 Abstract This study investigated the incidence of intimate partner violence (physical, sexual and emotional) against men in Benin City, Nigeria. The study adopted the cross-sectional descriptive survey design and had a sample size of 107 men, while the questionnaire served as the primary instrument for data collection. Data collected were subjected to the statistical package for social sciences software where the simple percentage, tables and chi-square tools were used to analyse the data collected. Findings from the study revealed that 4 Mr. Endurance Uzobo is a Lecturer with the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa state, Nigeria. He can be contacted via e-mail at: enduzobo@yahoo.com 5 Miss Ruth E. Akhuetie is a Lecturer with the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. She can be contacted via e-mail at: ruthebby@yahoo.com 118 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 among the three types of violence investigated in the study, men experience more of emotional violence. This is followed by physical and sexual violence. The study concluded by making recommendations, including the creation of a platform for abused men to seek solace and legislations to curb violence against men. Keywords: Intimate partner violence, Physical violence, Sexual violence, Emotional violence, Gender symmetry. Introduction Intimate partner violence (IPV) most known by its other name, domestic violence, is also commonly referred to as domestic abuse, spousal abuse, battering, family violence, etc. It is a pattern of behaviour which involves the abuse by one partner against another in an intimate relationship such as marriage, cohabitation, dating or within the family (Adebayo, 2014). Most people tend to conceive intimate violence as involving just physical abuse of partners, however, it goes beyond that. Writing on the different forms, intimate partners could assume, Siemieniuk et al (2010) stated that: Domestic violence can take many forms including physical aggression or assault (hitting, kicking, biting, shoving, restraining, slapping, throwing objects, battery), or threats thereof; sexual abuse; emotional abuse; controlling or domineering; intimidation; 75 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 stalking; passive/covert abuse and economic deprivation. The Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NHDS) in 2013 defined domestic violence as a confrontation between family or household members that typically involves physical harm, sexual assault, or fear of physical harm”. In a similar vein, Krug et al (2002) citing the World Health Organization defined domestic violence as “ the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm or deprivation”. Based on the foregoing, we can boldly state that domestic violence could assume the following forms physical, sexual, emotional, economic abuse, coercion, threats, intimidation, isolation, jealousy, and blame (NDHS, 2013). Domestic violence against men based on the above definition could be seen as domestic violence experienced by men or boys in an intimate relationship such as marriage, cohabitation, dating or within a family (Wikipedia, 2015). Unlike women, most men tend to hide and not report cases of intimate partner violence against them based on the fact that they will face social stigmatisation regarding their perceived lack of machismo and other denigrations of their masculinity, and again because intimate partner violence against men is less recognized by society than IPV against women (Lupri and Gramdin, 2004). Studies carried out globally have revealed that men are also victims of intimate partner violence. Dekerserdy and 76 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Schwartz (2005) reported that in every 1000 domestic violent situations, approximately 40 cases reportedly involve violence by women against men. In a similar report by Bensley (1998) in the United States, roughly 300,000 to 400,000 men are said to have been treated violently by their wives or girlfriends. A preliminary result from the World Health Organization‟s multi-country study on men‟s health and domestic violence also indicated that in some parts of the world, as many as 20% of men have experienced domestic violence (Claudia et al, 2005). Whereas intimate partner violence is currently gaining attention in the developed countries of the world, the situation still remains almost the same in the developing nations. As a result, only few studies such as Lanre et al (2014) and Adebayo (2014) have examined this situation in Osun and Ekiti States respectively in Nigeria. However, studies addressing this phenomenon have remained unavailable in the Niger Delta despite the reality of its prevalence. It is against this background that this research work seeks to examine the nature, types and extent of intimate partner abuse against men in the Niger Delta, using Benin City as a case study. Theoretical perspectives Several theories have attempted to explain the rate of violence among men and women and the reasons behind this act. However, for the purpose of this study, the gender symmetry and violent resistant perspectives have been adopted. According to the gender symmetry theory, women are just as likely to resort to violence against a partner as men. 77 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Johnson and Ferraro (2000) tagged this as “common couple violence” and suggested that the violence in these types of relationships tend to be less severe, less frequent, and less likely to escalate. They further added that the common couple violence involved situations where couples resort to physical violent behaviour during an argument. Earlier advocates of this theory derived their arguments from Straus and Gelles who developed the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS), a self-report tool designed to measure the frequency of violence between intimate partners (Straus and Gelles, 1986). In terms of specialization in violence, Bouffard et al (2008) stated that this perspective would suggest that since males and females behave in similar ways, male and female intimate partner violence offenders should exhibit similar levels of specialization or versatility in their offending. Thus, there is the expectation that there is no difference in specialization in violence by gender. Despite the wider support that this theory initially received, some recent studies have severely criticized this theory on many grounds. Melton and Belknap (2003) criticism was on the basis that it has the tendency to compound minor acts of violence with more severe acts. Johnson and Ferraro (2000) in criticizing this perspective on methodological ground, added that methodological concerns related to the use of general population samples, and a general failure to take into account the qualitative nature of battering. This has been supported by studies which stated that the frequency of violence use or battering is completely gendered in nature (Henning and Feder, 2004; Melton and Belknap, 2003). For instance, Langhinrichsen-Rohling et al (1995) found out that while the 78 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 majority of couples mandated to domestic violence, treatment were mutually violent, males engage in more severe physical violence compared to females. Finally, this theory was criticized on the ground that the type of violence women resort to within an abusive intimate relationship are typically self-defensive in nature, a pattern referred to as violent resistance. A second theory which is the violent resistance theory arose from the criticism against the gender symmetry theory and provided reasons why a woman might likely engage in intimate partner violence against men. According to Miller (2005), one of the advocates of the violent resistance perspective, women who are often arrested for intimate partner violence often use violence defensively against abusive partners. In other words, women engage in intimate partner violence mainly to defend themselves against partners who might be violent in nature. Similarly, researches form several scholars have confirmed the notion that the primary motivation for the violence that women are reportedly perpetuating are mainly as self-defence (Henning et al, 2006; Swan and Snow, 2006) By implication, according to this theory, women only use violence to defend themselves and women involvement in intimate partner violence is not reflective of a more generally violent or criminal nature. Rather, these women likely specialize in intimate partner violence, meaning they only use violence in specific situations. The violent resistance perspective will, therefore, argue that female perpetrators of intimate partner violence are more likely to demonstrate 79 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 higher levels of specialization than their male counterparts (Bouffard et al, 2008). Methodology This study was conducted in Benin City precisely focusing on the Egor Local Government Area of Benin City. The study made use of the cross sectional descriptive survey to study the married men within Benin City. The sample size was determined using fisher‟s formula for populations greater than 10,000 that is N=Z2 pq/d2 where p=0.075; N=107. The multistage sampling method which involves five stages was used as the sampling technique. First and foremost, the Egor Local Government Area was divided into four wards of the eleven wards within the area of study, of which these four wards were randomly selected from each of these wards; one enumeration area was randomly selected by the balloting system based on the listing of the EAs by the National Population Commission (NPC). From each of the EAs selected, a street was also randomly selected by the ballot system from the list of streets located within the EAs. Using the systematic random sampling technique, alternate houses were selected depending on the random size proportionately allocated to the wards. From each house, one man was purposively selected. This was done to include the men that possess some of the characteristics considered important to the researchers. The instrument used for data collection was mainly the structured questionnaire with four sections. Section one was 80 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 designed to elicit information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Section two was based on the experience of physical violence against men. The third section was based on sexual violence against men, while the fourth was based on emotional violence experienced by men. The study lasted for about a month as each study was conducted for a week in a particular ward. A total of 115 questionnaires were distributed with 8 questionnaires added to the 107 for the purpose of attrition so as to get the required sample for the study. However, the 115 were all retrieved as no case of attrition was recorded. For the analysis of data, the researchers subjected data collected from the field with the assistance of two secondary school leavers to the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) where the frequencies measured were generated on relevant variables, and the chi-square test was also utilized to test for associations between related variables. Level of significance was set at 0.05 and the result was presented with the use of simple frequency tables and cross-tabulated tables for the outcome measures. In taking ethical considerations into account, three specific protections were built into the questionnaire in accordance with the World Health Organization‟s ethical and safety recommendations for research on domestic violence. First, the researchers ensured that only one randomly selected man per household was administered a questionnaire. Second, informed consent for the survey was obtained from the respondents at the beginning before distributing the questionnaire. Respondents were further read an additional statement informing them that the subsequent questions could 81 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 be sensitive and reassuring them of the confidentiality of their responses. Finally, the domestic violence module was implemented only if privacy could be obtained by respondents, if not the research skipped the module, and thanked the respondents at the end of retrieving the questionnaire. For the validity and reliability test, a team of experts from demography and measurement evaluated the content of the questionnaire and their corrections were incorporated into the work. The Cronbach Reliability Test was used to test the reliability level of the study and a figure of 0.77 was obtained which means that the instrument adequately measured what it intended to. Discussion of Findings/Results From our demographic data analysed in table 1.1, the study shows that the modal age of respondents was between 41-50 years (43%) followed by those who were between 31-40 years (41%). Those within 18-22 years and 23-30 constituted 3.7% and 5.6% respectively while those aged 50 years and above were 6.5% of our total respondents. Again, majority of our respondents i.e. 62 (57.9%) were self- employed, 26 of them (24.1%) were unemployed while 19 of them with a percentage of 17.8 happened to be civil servants. Furthermore, with respect to numbers of living children, about 47.7% of the respondents had between 3-4 children, 29.9% of them had 5 children and above, 20.6% of them had between 1-2 children while only about 1.9% had no children. More so, 82 of our respondents with 76.6% claimed to be older than their wives, 19 of them with 17.8% had little 82 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 difference between their ages and those of their wives, 4 of them (3.7%) stated that they were the same in age with their wives, while only 2 of our respondents (1.9%) stated that their wives were older than them. Additionally, from the demographic characteristics of our respondents, it can be observed that in most of the families i.e. 51 (47.7%), the men are mostly the bread winners in their homes. However, a large number of our respondents 44 of them (451.1%) have egalitarian families where both the man and his wife provide for the needs of the family. Still, a significant number of men i.e. 12 (11.2%) acknowledged the fact that their wives currently provided for the needs of the family. Finally, from the educational analysis of our respondents, the study showed that, the highest number of respondents i.e. 41 (38.3%) only had primary education, 33 of them with 30.8% have secondary level of education, 22 of them (20.6%) have no education while, only 11 of them with a percentage of 10.3 have a tertiary education. Table 1.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents Variables Frequencie s % Age Variables Numbers Living Children Frequencie s % of 18–22 4 3.7 <1 2 1.9 23–30 6 5.6 1–2 22 20.6 83 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 31–40 44 41.1 3–4 51 47.7 41–50 46 43.0 5+ 32 29.9 >50 7 6.5 Total 107 100. 0 Total 107 100 Spousal Age Difference Husband older 82 76.6 Educational Attainment No education 22 20.6 Husband same age 4 3.7 Primary education 41 38.3 Wife older 2 1.9 Secondary 33 30.8 No much differences between age 19 17.8 Tertiary 11 10.3 Total 107 100. 0 Total 107 100. 0 Bread Winner of the Family Husband 51 47.7 Occupation Civil servant 19 17.8 Wife 12 11.2 Self–employed 62 57.9 Both 44 41.1 Not–employed 26 24.3 Total 107 100. 1 Total 107 100. 84 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 0 Source: SPSS Output Result 2015. Results for Measuring Domestic Violence against Men Results from other categories to measure the types and trends of intimate violence against men in table 1.2 show that majority of the men with a total number of 72 (67.3%) stated that their wives had not pushed, thrown something at them, or grabbed their shirts or trousers, a significant percentage of them 29% (31 respondents) had experienced this form of physical violence against them by their wives. Only a meagre percentage of them (3.7%) were undecided concerning their response to domestic violence against them. Again, 98 respondents (91.6%) had not witnessed the physical form of domestic violence involving their wives slapping them. Only 5 of our respondents (4.7%) had witnessed slapping as a form of physical violence against them by their wives while 4 of them (3.7%) were undecided. Moreso, whereas majority of our respondents (92 of them) with a percentage of 86.0% had not experienced the physical form of violence where their wives punched, kicked or used weapons on them, 9 of them with 8.4% had experienced this form of violence from their wives. 5 of our respondents constituting 5.6% were, however, undecided. Still, our study revealed that 81 of respondents (75.7%) have had their wives threaten to attack them one way or the other with dangerous weapons while 24 of them with a percentage of 22.4 stated otherwise and 2 of them (1.9%) remained undecided. With regards to sexual violence experienced by men, the study showed that most of the respondents had not 85 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 experienced sexual violence from their wives as 104 of them with a percentage of 97.2 stated that their wives have never forced them to have sex with them, though two of our respondents (1.9%) stated otherwise, while one of them (0.9%) was undecided. All our respondents also stated that their wives had not forced them to perform any sexual act they did not intend to perform. Furthermore, with respect to emotional violence, our study revealed that 53 of our respondents (49.5%) have had their wives say or do things to humiliate them in front of others. 51 of them (47.7%) stated that they had not experienced this form of violence, while 3 of them (2.8%) were undecided. Additionally, the study also revealed that 42 of the respondents (39.3%) had experienced the emotional violence of their wives insulting them and making them feel bad about themselves. 57 of them (53.3%) had not experienced this, while 8 of them (7.5%) were undecided. Finally, 60 of our respondents with a percentage of 56.1 had experienced the emotional violence involving continuous nagging about issues from their wives. 42 of them (39.3%) stated that they had not had the experience of nagging by their wives while 5 of them (4.7%) were undecided. Table 1.2 Intimate Partner Violence Trends against men Variables Wife pushed, threw something, grabbed husband’s shirts Frequency % Variables Frequency Wife forcing husband to perform sexual act he did not intend 86 % NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 or trousers to Yes 31 29.0 Yes 0 0.0 No 72 67.3 No 107 100.0 Undecided 4 3.7 Undecided 0 0.0 Total 107 100.0 Total 107 100.0 Wife husband slapped Wife saying or doing something to humiliate husbands in front of others Yes 5 4.7 Yes 53 49.5 No 98 91.6 No 51 47.7 Undecided 4 3.7 Undecided 3 2.8 Total 107 100.0 Total 107 100.0 Wife punched, kicked or used weapon on husband Wife insulting husbands or making them feel bad about themselves Yes 9 8.4 Yes 42 39.3 No 92 86.0 No 57 53.3 Undecided 6 5.6 Undecided 8 7.5 87 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Total 107 100.0 Total 107 100.0 Husbands experiencing constant nagging from wives Wife threatened to attack husband with dangerous weapons Yes 81 75.7 Yes 60 56.1 No 24 22.4 No 42 39.3 Undecided 2 1.9 Undecided 5 4.7 Total 107 100.0 Total 107 100.0 Yes 2 1.9 No 104 97.2 Undecided 1 0.9 Total 107 100.0 Wife forcing husband to have sex Source: SPSS output result. Hypotheses testing The hypotheses in this study were tested using the chi-square test output result from the SPSS. Three hypotheses were tested in this study. They include; 88 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 1) There is an association between spousal age differences and emotional violence experienced by men. 2) There is a relationship between who acts as the bread winner of the family and emotional violence experienced by men. 3) Educational level has a relationship with emotional violence experienced by men. For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, they will be stated in the null hypotheses form. Hypothesis 1: There is no association between spousal age differences and emotional violence experienced by men. Table 1.3 which tends to reveal the association between spousal age difference and emotional violence showed that our chi-square value is 10.80 at 6 degree of freedom with a pvalue of 0.095. By implication, the study shows that there is no association between the two variables i.e. spousal age differences and emotional violence against men, since our pvalue is more than the expected value of 0.05 which is our level of acceptance. This means that our null hypothesis which states that there is no relationship between spousal age and emotional violence is accepted. Table 1.3: Contingency table of spousal age differences and emotional violence against men Emotional violence against men Spousal age differences Yes No Undecided Total 𝒙𝟐 Df 89 p-value NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Husband older 50 (61.0%) 30 (36.6%) 2 (2.4%) 82 Husband same age 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 Wife older 2 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 No much difference between ages 7 (36.8%) 10 (52.6%) 2 (10.5%) 19 Total 60 (56.1%) 42 (39.3%) 5 (4.7%) 107 10.8 0 6 Source: SPSS chi-square test output result Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between who acts as the breadwinner of the family and emotional violence experienced by men. The chi-square result from the SPSS output in table 1.4 shows that our result for the relationship between who acts as the breadwinner of the family and emotional violence experienced by men has a chi-square of 24.99 at 4 degree of freedom with a p-value of 0.000. This means that our null hypothesis is rejected which states that there is a relationship between the two variables since our p-value is less than the expected value of 0.05 which is our level of acceptance. Table 1.4: Contingency table of the breadwinner of the family and emotional Violence experienced by men Emotional violence against men 90 0.095 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Bread winner of the family Yes No Undecided Total Husband 41 (80.4%) 10 (19.6%) 0(0.0%) 51 Wife 3 (25.0%) 8 (66.7%) 1 (8.3%) 12 Both 16 (36.4%) 24 (54.5%) 4 (9.1%) 44 Total 60 (56.1%) 42 (39.3%) 5 (4.7%) 107 𝒙𝟐 Df p-value 24.99 4 0.000 Source: SPSS chi-square test output result Hypothesis 3: Educational level of men does not have a relationship with emotional violence experienced by men. In determining the relationship that exists between educational level of men and the emotional violence experienced by men, the result of the chi-square computation, as shown in table 1.5 below is 10.27 at 6 degree of freedom with a p-value of 0.114. Based on this output, our null hypothesis which states that there is no relationship between educational level of men and emotional violence experienced by them is accepted since our p-value (0.114) is greater than the expected value of 0.05. By implication, educational level of men does not determine their likelihood of experiencing emotional violence. 91 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Table 1.5: Contingency table showing the relationship between educational level of men and emotional violence against men Emotional violence against men Educational level of men Yes No Undecided Total No education 16 (72.7%) 5 (22.7%) 1 (4.5%) 22 Primary education 25 (61.0%) 16 (39.0%) 0 (0.0%) 41 Secondary education 16 (48.5%) 14 (42.4%) 3 (9.1%) 33 Tertiary education 3 (27.3%) 7 (63.6%) 1 (9.1%) 11 Total 60 (56.1%) 42 (39.3%) 5 (4.7%) 107 𝒙𝟐 Df P-value 10.27 6 0.114 Source: SPSS chi-square test output Conclusion and Recommendations From our study so far, we can make the following conclusions. First, a good number of men in our area of study had witnessed some form of physical intimate partner violence against them by their partners, though this number is incomparable to the number of men who had not witnessed 92 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 such violence. The highest physical form of intimate partner violence men had witnessed from their partners are those of threatened attack from wife to husband. This is followed by wives pushing their husbands, throwing something at their husbands and grabbing husband‟s shirts or trousers. The study also showed that men in the area generally have had minimal experiences of sexual intimate partner violence as more than 95% of men in the study revealed that they had never been sexually forced by their wives to engage in sexual activities they are not ready to participate in. Finally, the greatest form of intimate partner violence against men as revealed by the study is emotional violence as most of the respondents had experienced either their wives saying or doing things to humiliate them in front of others, insulting or making them feel bad about themselves as well as constant nagging of their wives. Based on these key findings, the following recommendations have been made. First, intimate partner violence could lead to depression and subsequently alcoholism amongst men. Therefore, there is a need to create a platform where abused men can seek solace from as it is done for domestically abused women. Again, men should also be encouraged by various non-governmental organizations who seek to foster gender equality to speak out especially when they are being physically abused by the women as most men are likely to feel embarrassed reporting such cases. Additionally, it is necessary for the men to confide in friends, family members, relatives, healthcare providers or counsellors about incidences of abuse as this will help create a 93 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 platform for awareness as well as subsequent campaign against intimate partner violence experienced by men. Also, strong legislations to eradicate any form of intimate partner violence against men should be formulated as is the case for women and greater level of advocacy by government agencies, religious groups and civil rights organizations should be encouraged to help balance the gender discourse on intimate partner violence in order to build better relationships within the family institution in the country. Finally, gender empowerment advocates should ensure that there is a balance of power along gender lines to avoid the concentration of power, rights and gender related policies on the women to prevent them from misusing such powers to oppress the men as it was experienced in Kenya. References Adebayo, A.A. (2014). Domestic violence against men: Balancing the Gender issues in Nigeria. American Journal of Sociological Research. 4(1): 14-19 Bensley, G.M. (1998). Prevalence of Accidental Injuries and Domestic Violence. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 18, 151-158. Bouffard, L.A., Wright, K.A., Muftic, L.R. and Bouffard, J.A. (2008). Gender Differences in specialization in intimate partner violence: Comparing Gender Symmetry and violent resistant perspectives. Justice Quarterly. 25(3): 570-594. 94 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Claudia, G.M., Henrica, A.F.M., Jansen, M.E., Lori, H., and Charlotte, W. (2005). WHO Multicountry Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial results on prevalence, health outcomes and women’s reponses. WHO publication. Dekerserdy, W., and Schwartz, M., (2005). Measuring the Extent of common abuse in intimate heterosexual relationship: A critique of the conflict tactics scale. Available at; www.vaw.net.org/dv/research/vawnetdocs/arctscrit.ph p. Henning, K., and Feder, L. (2004). A comparison of men and women arrested for domestic violence: Who presents the greater threat? Journal of Family Violence. 21: 351-368. Johnson, M.P., and Ferraro, K.J., (2000). Research on domestic violence in the 1990s: Making distinctions. Journal of Marriage and the Family. 62: 948-963. Krug, E.G., Dahlberg, L.L., Mercy, J.A., Zwi, A.B., and Lozano, R. (2002). World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization. Langhinrichsen-Rohling, J., Neidig, P., and Thorn, G. (1995). Violent marriages: Gender differences in levels of current violence and past abuse. Journal of family violence. 10: 159-176. 95 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Lanre, A.O., Olugbenga, O.O., Iyanuoluwa, O.B.A., Olusegun, B.J. and Olalekan, A.W. (2014) “Assessment of Prevalence and Forms of Violence against Married Men in Olorunda Local Government of Osun State, Nigeria”. International Journal of Social and Behavioural Sciences. 2 (1): 001-010. Lupri, E. and Gramdin, E. (2004). “Intimate partner abuse against men”. National clearing house on family violence. Melton, J.C., and Belknap, J. (2003). He hits, she hits: Assessing gender differences and similarities in officially reported intimate partner violence. Criminal Justice and Behavior. 30: 328-348 Miller, S.L. (2005). Victims as offenders: The paradox of women’s violence in relationships. New Jersey: Rutgers University press. Siemieniuk, R.A.C., Krentz, H.B., Grissh, J.A., and Gill, M.J. (2010). “Domestic Violence Screening: Prevalence and outcomes in Canadian HIV population”. AIDS Patient care and STDs 24 (12): 763-770 Straus, M.A., and Gelles, R.J., (1986). Societal Change and change in family violence from 1975 to 1985 as revealed by two national surveys. Journal of Marriage and Family. 48: 465-479. Stuart, G.L., Moore, T.M., Gordon, K.C., Hellmurth, J.C., Ramsey, S.E., and Kahler, C. (2006). Reasons for 96 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 intimate partner violence perpetration among arrested women. Violence against Women, 12: 609-621 Swan, S.C., and Snow, D.L. (2006). The Development of a Theory of Women‟s use of violence in intimate relations. Violence against Women. 12: 1026-1045. The Nigerian Demographic and Health survey (2013). Abuja: National Population Commission Wikipedia- The Free Encyclopedia (2015) Dome-violence. Available at: www.wikipedia.org/domestic violence. 97 DRAMA AND THE NIGER DELTA STRUGGLE: A STUDY OF SELECT NIGERIAN PLAYS CHRISTINE ODI6 Abstract The Niger Delta region has in recent times come under the searchlights of national and international scrutiny on account of the gross under-development, environmental degradation and suffering experienced by the people. The oil exploring and exploiting activities of multinational oil companies, the seeming complicity of the central Authorities in ignoring the yearnings of the people have led to the upsurge of a plethora of youth movements, leading to youths taking up arms to defend their territorial integrity, demand for resource control and self- determination. Militant activities of the youths in the region have severally led to confrontations between the Niger Delta militants and federal military forces. Against this background, this essay from a literary perspective, examines the dramatic enactment of the origin and progression of the rise of militancy in the region, the struggle for resource control, selfdetermination and liberation of the people from oppressive forces. Findings reveal that in a crisis situation, the victim(s) will do all in his (their) power to win in the struggle for survival and development even if it means resorting to violence. The essay concludes that in every crisis, dialogue and other non-violent tools of negotiation 6 Dr. Odi Department of Theatre Arts,Faculty of Arts, Niger Delta University,Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State. She can be contacted via email at: christineodi67@yahoo.com 118 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 yield more lasting results if resolutions taken in the course of the negotiations are honoured. Key Words: Drama, Struggle, Militancy, Patriotism, Niger Delta. Introduction The vision behind any struggle is the expectation that at the end, victory will be assured and until then the struggle will continue. In the evolutionary process, every human society confronts challenges that they struggle to overcome in order to create their ideal society. The ideal society that every human society craves is that society which Ogunbiyi (1999) defines as the one in which: a people create for themselves in order to live fearlessly without experiencing hunger, misery, cruelty, and coercion of any sort A people determined to create the above kind of society for themselves will of necessity, have to continually struggle against forces that seek to undermine or suppress their growth or development (17). The field of drama/theatre is a universal human activity that emanates from studies and draws its materials from the human society. Every dramatic creation consequently is inspired by the people and events that shape the history and culture of their society. The dramatist, in the words of Asigbo „is the conscience of his society because he is the one who faithfully holds up the mirror that reflects his society (2013). 100 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 He is, thus, a vital part of the human society. The dramatists‟ tools for documenting or chronicling the history of a people are his imagination and creativity, made manifest in the plays he creates. Over centuries, dramatists have, through their writings preserved the history and cultures of different societies as they evolve and become more sophisticated. This essay is focused on dramatists‟ representation of the Niger Delta Struggle in their works of art. The Niger Delta struggle, contrary to popular belief did not originate with the discovery of crude oil in Oloibiri - a community in the present day Bayelsa State in 1956. The essay with the use of three dramatic texts, attempts to chronicle the origins of the struggle of a people in their bid to create the ideal society for themselves. Emphasis will, however, be placed more on the peoples struggle in contemporary times. To achieve the goals of the essay, three selected play texts are used to X-ray the development in the contemporary struggle. In pursuit of that aim, the paper locates Irobi‟s Hangmen also Die (1989) as the dramatic take-off point of the contemporary Niger Delta Struggle and Yerima‟s Hard Ground (2005) to represent that period in the struggle where the activities of the fighters are at its peak when neither the agitators nor the opposing forces were willing to shift grounds. Our third play text is Atakpo‟s Watering the Hard Ground (2008) which culminates at the point of the initiation of the Amnesty and Post-Amnesty Programmes of the late President Musa Shehu Yar‟adua‟s Administration in 2008. Brief History of the Niger Delta Struggle Contrary to the 1956-1958 popular take-off point as the origins of the Niger Delta Struggle (Binebai 2010), the Niger Delta people did not, in fact, begin their agitations in the mid twentieth century when crude oil was discovered in the region. The people‟s struggle can be traced as far back as the 101 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when able- bodied young men and women were abducted and cargoed off to European countries as slaves. The people in those early days struggled against the trans-atlantic slave traders until it was abolished in the late nineteenth century. With the abolishment of slave trade, the people faced another kind of challenge. They struggled to control their oil palm resources which the British, during the European industrial revolution, plundered via the instrument of the Royal Niger Company (Binebai 2010). The plundering and looting of the human and natural resources of the region over the years have been variously chronicled through the vehicle of drama by numerous Nigerian dramatists. Writers such as Ola Rotimi, Clark, and Umukoro are only three out of the many dramatists who have dramatically documented the historical travails of the people in their evolutionary processes with such works as Nana Olomu (2001),Trials ofOvonramwen Nogbaisi, Ovonramwen Nogbaisi (1974), Akasa Youmi (2001), and All for Oil (2000).These and other dramatists from their various creative perspectives have immortalized the early struggles of the Niger Delta people in their bids to survive and assert themselves. With the attainment of independence, the discovery and exportation of crude oil from the Niger Delta region, the people‟s challenges magnified. The quality of life of the people degenerated on account of the crude oil exploration and exploitation activities of multinational oil companies in the region. In 1966, ten years after the discovery of crude oil in the region, Isaac Boro and his compatriots took a stand for the continued survival for the people of the region. He staged a twelve day revolution in which he declared an independent Niger Delta Republic. Ambakederemo creatively re-enacted the Twelve Days Revolution of Isaac Boro in his play (1966). 102 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 To forestall further uprisings in the region, the central government promulgated a multitude of laws intent on cordoning the people off from control of the natural resource found in the region and to avert their interference with the operations of the oil companies. Some of the bills passed into law include: the Petroleum Act of 1969, the National Inland Waters Authority Decree 13 of 1977, and the Land Use Act of 1978 (Inokoba and Imbua, 2010; Embu, 2011). With the promulgation of the above laws, and others, there seemed to be an uneasy calm. Those years of seeming silence on the part of the people witnessed a speedy yet preventable deterioration taking place in the region. The oil companies‟ exploring activities impacted negatively on the region and the people on all spheres of their existence - the religious, social, economic, cultural, political, and ecology. In the course of prospecting and exploring crude oil in the region, religious shrines were desecrated, whole communities up-rooted, farmlands and rivers destroyed by oil pollution and spillages. The people lost their homes, communities, sources of livelihood and environment. The region became toxic and dangerous for those living there (Inokoba and Imbua 2010). In the early 1990s, almost three decades after the Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro uprising, Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa and other compatriots took up the struggle from the Ogoni area of the region. His modus operandi was tailored after the nonviolent approach of Mahatma Ghandi. An environmentalist and human rights advocate,.Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots stood up to the oppressive forces demanding better living standards for the people, environmental justice, remediation of damaged flora and fauna and control of the crude oil resources (Binebai 46). The activities of Saro-Wiwa and other activists, have also been dramatically chronicled, an example is Atakpo‟s Ken Saro Wiwa-N- the Niger Delta Trial (2006). 103 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 After the execution of Saro-Wiwa and the eight others in 1995, there was an explosion of youth movements in the region. Youths took to the creeks, acquired lethal weapons of destructionand engaged in militant activities. In 1998 Ijaw youths from across the region converged in Kaiama, a town in the Kolokuma/Opokuma Local Government Area in present day Bayelsa State to hold a convention at the end of which they issued a communiqué tagged the Kaiama Declaration. The declaration demanded resource control, environmental justice, self-determination and true federalism from the federal government that will benefit the Niger Delta (Binebai, 2010). As before, oppressive forces descended on the town of Kaiama, killing and maiming many innocent victims. The action of the federal government under the Abdulsalami Abubakar regime, forced Ijaw youths from all over the region to take to the creeks and wage guerilla warfare against Nigerian military forces and the multinational oil companies. The events that followed the military raid on Kaiama gave birth to years of anarchy, blood-bath and perpetual fear instilled in the people living in that part of the region. Collateral damage was high; there were casualties on the part of the people, the government and the oil companies. The struggle continued for a decade with the activists losing men, families and homes. The government was losing men and revenue accruable from crude oil. The multinational oil companies too were losing profits from oil exploration and production.Pipelines installations across the region were vandalized severally and expatriate workers were continually kidnapped. The scenario in those years was a theatre of death. In 2007, another set of politicians took over the mantle of leadership and by 2008, an olive branch was extended to the fighters in the region under the guise of Amnesty and PostAmnesty Programmes. The condition for granting theNiger Delta militants Amnesty was for them to lay down their arms 104 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 in return for amnesty, training and re-habilitation into society. The programme was lauded and dialogue ensued. Eventually, the Programme was executed. Our discourse here concentrates on the mobilization, organization and activities of militant youths from the late twentieth century into the twenty-first century as dramatically represented by Irobi in Hangmen Also Die, Yerima in Hard Ground and Atakpo in Watering the Hard Ground. Contextualizing the Select Playtexts We do what we do because we know we have no future, because we know, no matter what we do, no matter how much we try, no matter how high we aspire, there is something waiting in the Atmosphere to destroy us” (Hangmen… 38). The above chorus of the seven convicted murderers in irobi‟s Hangmen Also Die dictates the pace for this segment of our discourse. In the lull of activities that was witnessed between the uprisings of Isaac Boro and Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Niger Delta region became home to some of the world‟s poorest people as the region experienced gross neglect, political and economic deprivation, mindless looting of revenue generated from the region, joblessness, biochemical poisoning arising from pollution, brutal military assaults and extreme poverty (Inokoba and Imbua 102). It is in this situation that Irobi futuristically locates his Hangmen Also Die years before youth restiveness and militancy took root in the region. With Hangmen Also Die, deriving from Achebe‟s 105 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 warning below, Irobi prophesied a time when young men will take up arms to hit back at the society in order to survive the harsh realities of their existence. Achebe warned the populace in his Arrow of God (1964): And our fathers have told us that it may even happen to an unfortunate generation that they are pushed beyond the end of things, and their back is broken and hung over fire when this happens they may sacrifice their own blood(quoted in Hangmen Also Die iii). Years after Arrow of God was written, Irobi locates his play in one such setting where seven well educated young men of the fictitious Izon State driven by hunger, anger, poverty and frustration were finally „pushed beyond the end of things‟ by a failed society. For succor, they turn to crime, taking up arms terrorizing innocent citizens, dispossessing them of their valuables, creating an atmosphere of trepidation for the citizenry. The Suicide Squad as the group calls itself is made up of seven frustrated young Nigerian educated elites: Waritimi Tamuno alias Mortuary, holds a First Class Degree in the Management Sciences (Statistics). He has been unemployed for six years after graduation; Atiemie Waribo alias Moshe Dayan has a Masters Degree in political Science; Labomie Allagoa alias Ayatolah Khomeini is a law school graduate without job for of five years; Tekena Iketubosin alias Hydrochloric Acid has a Masters Degree in Microbiology; Konji Amakarama alias Tetanus Tetanus has a Bachelor‟s Degree in Mechanical Engineering; Fubara Igonikon alias Accidental Discharge is an ex-policeman with a Masters Degree in Guidance and Counseling. He was sacked from the 106 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Police Force for over qualification. The leader of the Squad is Tarila Iganima alias R.I.P (Rest in Peace). Tarila Iganima holds a Bachelor‟s Degree in Sociology, a Masters Degree in Anthropology and a Ph.D in Criminology (Hangmen... 3335). The squad as earlier stated is constituted by seven educated frustrated young men who are traumatized by a failing system. Their sole mission is survival via any means. They are all graduates of the University of Port Harcourt (24). They are not disillusioned by what they do. Clear-minded, they claim: We are no Revolutionaries, neither are we Guerillas. We are not even Freedom Fighters fighting for any such stupid thing as our nation‟s independence. We are professional Burglars, Degenerates, and small time thieves graduating into Armed Robbers, Desperadoes … the Wretched of the Earth (24). The fictitious seven young men are traumatized by the gross neglect of the common man in society, the convoluted corruption prevalent in high and low places within the society they find themselves in. Because they have been rejected by their rulers and the world, they have in turn, rejected their humanity. In place of their humanity, the seven young men have put on the skins of predatory beasts ironically preying on the common people on the streets. These seven young men are a macro representation of the psychological state of mind of the average Niger Delta youth in the years after the killing of the Ogoni eight. They were visionless, directionless, bent only 107 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 on one end - survival through anarchy until they were challenged by Tamara (64). Tamara while looking for her son who ran away from home stumbles upon the members of the Suicide Squad in the bush. Not intimidated by them, she challenges the seven young men to give their meaningless lives a purpose by redirecting their rage and frustration into the struggle (64-5). With her counsel, Tamara gives to the hopeless young men, a new hope, a purpose and a cause worthy of fighting for. She gave them the impetus to re-evaluate their meaningless existence and the courage to be part of a worthy cause. A cause for which they will willingly die if need be. Irobi‟s Hangmen Also Die dramatically re-enacts the beginning of coordinated youth involvement in the struggle for the Niger Delta cause. The reawakening of this ethnic consciousness and patriotism was actualized in 1998 when youths of the region converged in Kaiama, a town in Bayelsa State for a Convention that culminated in the birth of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Kaiama Declaration. By 2005 when Yerima wrote Hard Ground, there were multitudes of coordinated splinter militant groups located within the states that make up the region. The region in that period had also become one of the most dangerous places in the world for anyone to be living in. Militant activities of youths involved in the struggle, counter military activities of the federal government and bombardment of communities made the region an uncompromisingly hard ground. The region had become a wasteland of suffering, torture, poverty, starvation and death. According to Nimi: The school you sent me to was made up of wasteland and poverty. Even as a child, you smell it and you quickly learn that nothing is free unless you 108 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 ask for it, and when they refuse to give you, you grab it, and that is what we are doing. Boy‟s first growing up fighting for bean cakes and puff-puff then gradually we were forced to grow to become men overnight asking for our right‟ (Hard Ground, 11). The turn of the twenty-first century for the Niger Delta region was a bleak and dark time. The struggle for selfdetermination, environmental justice, resource control and development was at its peak. The youth dominated the battle front. In a scenario of carnage, Nimi a mere eighteen year old boy in the African context is seen as a leader and followed by many because he had undergone his military apprenticeship and has graduated to master the art of guerilla warfare at an early age. He paints a picture for his family: There are younger boys and girls than me in the struggle. Even when in primary school you live in pain, and it sounds right to join the struggle first as a boy of a group, then as the eye or a spy. By the time you are halfway through primary school, you carry guns for the boys, and by the time you are eleven, in these days of automatic guns, you become an expert. You see people die every day, either of hunger or just death, so it means nothing to you… (12) 109 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Young and the virile men took to the creeks to sustain the struggle that had degenerated to the proportions of genocide of whole communities. Nimi would not have lived to tell the tale if not for the concerted rescue efforts of his uncle, Inyingifaa who had paid money to have him removed from one such genocidal scenes in which he (Nimi) lost eighteen men to the federal military forces (22). Crafted in Senecan style, the gory bloodbath unfolding in the Niger Delta is reported from Nimi‟s parent‟s apartment in Lagos, a location far removed from the Niger Delta region. The reportage, however, does not detract from the horrific picture that was the day to day experiences of the people living in affected parts of the region. Atakpo‟s Watering the Hard Ground (2008) relocates the action back in the region and futuristically shifts the strategy for attaining victory in the struggle away from violence towards dialogue, a strategy which Isaac Boro in Watering the Hard Ground advocates: It was alright in our time to fight. We did so with the barrel of the gun what did we find? That we equally destroyed our own. No, let them not fight, urge them to shed no more blood. We did enough. And we must tell them that violence and killings will take them no further (8). Atakpo‟s characters move beyond the violence, and bloodbath to discuss the future of the children and ecology of the region without violence. They agree that while the children still need to fight on fearlessly, they did not need to do that with the gun (8). Conscious of that fact, when the olive branch is extended, the fighters do not scorn the overture. Series of meetings are held between representatives 110 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 of the central government, the oil companies and the people (38). Agreements are reached, a truce is called and promises of development projects that will be directly initiated and overseen by the members of the communities in the region (57) are made. Shift in Leadership Structure of the Struggle In thepre-colonial and colonial times, people who championed the cause of the struggle were usually monarchs who fought for the survival, well-being and autonomy of their people as exemplified by King Jaja of Opobo, King Koko of Nembe, Nana Olomu of Ebrohimie and Oba Ovonramwen of Benin. A paradigm shift was observed when in post- colonial Nigeria, the ordinary class of people took up the struggle. These groups of people systematically mobilized, organized and took up the struggle in groups. Isaac Boro, his compatriots and followers used brains and brawns in pursuit of their goals. Ken Saro-Wiwa and his group toed the path of non-violence, applying their intellect. Agitators of the twentyfirst century have the advantage of youth, brain, brawn and number to fuel their anger, frustration, deprivation and hopelessness. Consequently contemporary Niger Delta youths in a bid to further the struggle, mobilized, organized and unleashed mayhem. In the three plays studied, the youths are at the forefront of the struggle. That phenomenon is an aberration of the leadership structure of the struggle in earlier times. What was responsible for the shift in leadership structure? Why were the elders and traditional rulers relegated to the sidelines in a cause that their ancestors had championed? A number of reasons have been advanced for this upturning of nature. One of the most common reasons advanced is that the people have lost confidence in the traditional institution. Hitherto, the 111 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 traditional institution is the highest body of authority in any African society. It was a revered and honoured institution reserved for the pristine and honorable men in society. That in contemporary times is no longer the case. The people no longer trust their leaders hence the need for a change in leadership structure. Loss of confidence and trust in the traditional institution is a sub theme that runs through almost all the plays about the Niger Delta region. It is evident in the three plays we are studying as well. In Hangmen… Chief Isokipiri Erekosima, a symbol of traditional authority, reverence, credibility and dignity is given the oil compensation money by the federal government to ameliorate the negative effect of the oil spillage in the community. Rather than protecting the wellbeing of his people from oppressive forces by judiciously sharing the money amongst the citizens of the state, he hijacks the money to the detriment of the entire populace. Yekini, the prison‟s official Hangman attempts to explain to the prison‟s Doctor why he Yekini could not hang the seven young men convicted for murder: You see, sometime ago, the federal government gave the citizens of this state….the sum of three million naira as compensation money for the oil spillage which has ruined their farms, their homes and their lives. But the man they killed, one Chief Isokipri Erekosima, a Commissioner for Local Government and chieftaincy. Affairs connived with his Councilors and Local Government Chairmen to confiscate the three million 112 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 naira. The Councilors took one million….The Local Government Chairmen shared one million. The Commissioner himself, one million. No single citizen no matter how wretched got a single kobo. That was when the young men stepped in‟ (12-3). Inyingifaa in Hard Ground laments also: … the deaths in the camp worried us all, the tribesmen in particular. It was as if the swampy forest could not hold a secret any longer. The chiefs could not be trusted. And too much money was passing from hand to hand… there was no trust anywhere, the air of mistrust was choking…(22). During a meeting in the Presidency, in Watering the Hard Ground, Bekeremo Governor of the Izon state suggests that for there to be any meaningful form of resolution to the crises in the region, the traditional institution has to be brought back into the process of conflict resolution even though he concedes that: „… the people had lost faith in the traditional institutions because the traditional rulers were not truthful with their subjects… hence the people did not believe in them‟ (55). While the Monarchs in earlier times had preserved the cultures and traditions of their kingdoms and seen to the welfare, safety and prosperity of their subjects against opposing forces, it is the general perception that most traditional rulers and elders in contemporary Nigerian 113 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 societies have compromised their authority, reverence, credibility and dignity for money, to the detriment of their subjects‟ safety and well-being. Sacrifices for the Struggle All who consciously decide to fight for a cause, do so with the knowledge that every day that passes might be their last. In the Niger Delta example, most of the people who took up the struggle eventually paid the ultimate price. In ancient Benin Kingdom, it was taboo for an Oba to take a step outside the boundaries of his kingdom. Yet, because Ovonramwen stood up against the oppressive British forces for desecrating the kingdom‟s cultures and values, because he fought to protect his people and the treasures of the kingdom, he was charged to court, tried, found guilty and exiled to Calabar. King Koko of Nembe fought against the capitalist exploitation of British forces in the nineteenth century. He paid dearly for it. King Jaja of Opobo, for daring to stand up to the European slave dealers, was exiled to the West Indies. Because he refused to honour an agreement that would jeopardize the existence of his people, Nana Olomu‟s kingdom was bombarded by British military forces (Binebai 2010) From the time of Isaac Boro to the present, thousands of lives have been sacrificed for the struggle. Boro mobilized and organized a group that rose up against the federal government of Nigeria in 1966 to decry the condition of the region and living standards of the people. He declared independence of the region from Nigeria. He demanded control of the natural resources found in the region. The Boro group held the federal forces at bay for twelve days before he was captured. On the twelfth day of the revolution, Boro was arrested and sentenced to death. Boro‟s revolution in 1966 was a catalyst for the creation of Rivers State in 1967 (Binebai 2010). Ken Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots who rose 114 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 up in the mid-1990s to also decry the deplorable condition of the region, the degradation of Ogoni lands, the devastation of land and peoples‟ lives. Saro-Wiwa and all who stood with him were arrested, tried and executed in 1995. The Niger Delta struggle in the twenty-first century has claimed thousands of patriotic young men and women who gave their lives to the struggle for proper control of the resources in the region, self-emancipation and determination, environmental justice, infrastructural development and better living conditions of the people. Conclusion The closing scenes of Atakpo‟s watering the Hard Ground are optimistic of positive change in the region as dialogue has been embraced. These scenes draw a parallel from the Musa Yar‟adua‟s Amnesty Programme for the Niger Delta militants. A lofty vision but one which five years on, does not seem to be having the desired impact. The militants embraced the project, most of them laid down their arms and were subsequently sent for training locally and abroad. On their return, they were re-assimilated into society. But generally speaking, the open warfare may have been suspended, kidnappings, pipelines vandalism may also be on the decline. But have the real issues been resolved? Do the people now, even marginally have any control over the crude oil resource? Have the decades of degradation in the region been reversed? Have the laws that dispossessed the people been repealed or amended to give the people a fairer deal? Is life for the common man in the streets of the region any better than it was thirty or fifty years ago? There are so many questions begging for answers. Until the right answers are found for the above questions and the right solutions proffered, sheathed swords may not signify an end to the struggle. Therefore, the drama is still unraveling and dramatists will continue to creatively 115 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 document the Niger Delta struggle. And as Usen Usen in Watering the Hard Ground would say: „I siddon look‟ (63). References Ambakederemo, S (1982). The Twelve Day Revolution. Umeh Publishers,Benin City, Nigeria. Asigbo, A. (2013). Fighting from the Trenches: Nigerian Playwrights and the Task of Nation Building. Valid Publishing Co, Awka, Nigeria. Atakpo, U. (2008). Watering the Hard Ground. Press, Uyo, Nigeria Scholars Binebai, B. (2010). When the Oil Runs Dry. Jebokab Limited, Yenagoa, Nigeria. Embu, R (2011). “Drama and the Niger Delta Challenges in Select Nigerian Plays”. Nigerian Theatre Journal. Vol. 11 (1), pp.145-157 Inokoba, P & D Imbua. (2010). “Vexation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: The Way Forward”. J Hum Ecol, 29 (2), pp 101-120. Irobi, E. (1989). Hangmen Also Die. Equipments Ltd, Enugu, Nigeria. ABIC Books & 116 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Ogunbiyi, DO. (1999).Community Development: Principle and Practice. Opeyemi Ltd, Ijebu Ode, Nigeria. Yerima, A. (2005). Hard Ground. Kraft Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria. 117 CULTURAL IDENTITY: A DIALECTICS OF COSMOLOGY AMONG SELECT GROUPS IN THE NIGER DELTA TAM GORDON AZORBO 7 & IFURE UFFORD-AZORBO8 Abstract Culture consists of all objects and ideas within a society. Each group has a distinctive culture with its own characteristic ways of structuring families and promoting standards of rights and wrongs. A society is the largest form of human groupings which consists largely of people sharing a common artistic, social and cultural heritage. A people could preserve their distinctive cultures, literature, art, and many other means of expression that helps in establishing their own identity. Although, modern cultural experts and theorists have investigated cultural identity using cultural signifiers such as location, gender, race, history, nationality, language, sexuality, religious beliefs, ethnicity, aesthetics, food, and 7 Dr Tam Azorbo is a lecturer in the Department of Theatre Arts, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State. His email contact is tammyazorbo@gmail.com 8 Dr Ifure Azorbo is a lecturer with the Department of Theatre Arts, University of Uyo, Uyo. She can be contacted via e-mail at: mayenix88@yahoo.com 118 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 even ways of dressing, little effort has been devoted to the cultural identity of the Niger Delta people. This paper thus interrogates the metal and bronze casting traditions of the Benin people, representing groups in Western Niger Delta, the feminine perception of God by the Ijaw people to represent groups from Central Niger Delta and the marriage customs and traditions of the Akwa Ibom people to represent cultural practices and identity of groups from Eastern Niger Delta. This is with a view to highlighting the impact of such pristine cultural practices on the people‟s world-view and identity. The paper reveals that cultural identity is an important contributor to the peoples‟ well-being. It also shows that the perceived identity provides social cohesion, a sense of belonging and acceptance, and communal stability. Key words: Land and People, Art and Culture, Artistic Identity, Cultural Identity, Niger, Delta. Introduction The identity of a people can be established through the arts and culture. While culture is an organic link between man and his environment which constitutes an integral part of the lives of a people, art on the other hand, is man‟s creation that is intended to serve a particular purpose. The arts and culture are thus developmental imperatives in the socio-political and economic realities of the people. This pre-supposes the action of Umukoro (2002) when he states that the arts and culture are currently engaged in a three-pronged campaign for sociocultural preservation, religious propaganda and educational propagation. These 3ps relating to society/culture, religion and education respectively, constitute the fundamental responsibilities of the arts and culture. The arts and culture are unavoidably rooted in a specific socio-cultural setting. Umukoro (2002) notes further that whether as literature or as performance – caries the distinctive 120 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 badge of a particular society…which by their very nature, are dynamic products of a society in a state of flux. While culture is dynamic and varies from society to society, the arts are a manifestation of culture. While culture refers to the customs, practices, languages, values and world views that define social groups such as those based on nationality, ethnicity, region or common interests, art refers to the visible demonstration of culture. The identity of a people is easily expressed through the arts and culture. The arts and culture are thus important factors in shaping identity.Art and cultural identity is the identity or feeling of belonging to, as part of the self-conception and selfperception to nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, social class, marriage, ways of building houses, ways of preparing food, locality, etc. Through this, the identity so perceived and expressed is characteristic of the individual, members and the whole group sharing the same culture. Identifying with a particular culture helps people feel they belong and gives them a sense of security. An established cultural identity has also been linked with positive outcomes in the areas of wealth, health, education and general well-being. It provides access to social networks which provide support and shared values and aspirations. Social networks can help to break down barriers and build a sense of trust between people, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as social capital. Human beings are, of course, unique among all the animal species. This is unarguably so because humans make use of technologies and other forms of culture as their principal means of adapting to the natural environment. It is along these lines that Webb (1991) in making a relation between culture and environment notes that “the state of nature in which man finds himself, that is, the physical and organic world to which human beings have to adapt in order to survive. This natural environment includes the earth, bodies of water, climatic 121 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 conditions, vegetation, and the various species of animal life which live on the earth with humankind”. The fact that human beings depend on culture for their adaptation to the environment has important consequences for the pattern of human life in every society. It is in these contexts that the art and cultural identity of select groups in the Niger Delta have been interrogated. The Niger Delta The Niger Delta is one of the world‟s largest wetlands, and the largest in Africa as it encompasses over 20,000 square kilometres of water land. The area is composed of four main ecological zones namely the coastal barrier islands, mangrove swamp forests, fresh water swamp forests, and lowland rainforests. The region has a high biodiversity characteristic of extensive swamp and forest areas which supports the abundant flora and fauna, and arable terrain that sustains a variety of crops, economic trees, animals as well as species of salt and fresh water fishes. The high rainfall in the southern part of Nigeria in the rainy season leads to regular overflow of the low, poorly drained terrain of the Niger Delta. It has an ecosystem that is characterized by the ebb and flow of water. However, over the years, the building of dams along the Niger and Benue Rivers and their tributaries has significantly reduced sedimentation and seasonal flooding in the area. The Land The term “Niger Delta” has been defined by different people, groups and organisations in different ways to mean the same thing. These definitions have been attempted historically, cartographically, geographically, ethnographically, linguistically and even politically with each context describing the area from the point of view of 122 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 perception. This arises basically from the problem of classification and interpretation of the issues therein. Ogbogbo (2004) gives a pointer to this: The delineation of the area or region referred to as the Niger Delta has remained polemical, fluid and continued to vacillate, depending on the circumstance and intention of the formulator of the definition. This is because the area has been defined from various perspectives, at different times. Historically and geographically, the Niger Delta is seen as that stretch of land from the River Benin in Western Nigeria to the River Cross in the Eastern part of the Country. And that, of the about 330 miles which make up Nigeria‟s coastline, the Niger Delta covers about 270 miles from the West to the East of the Nigerian coastline that deeps into the Atlantic Ocean (2004). Politically and economically, the Niger Delta has been referred to as comprising nine states namely Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Imo, Abia, Akwa Ibom and Cross River states as contained in the Niger Delta Development Bill which culminated into the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This assertion is taken from an economic point of view because oil production is used as the underlying factor. It is to be recalled that the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) established in 1992 metamorphosed into the NDDC during Obasanjo‟s Administration as President and Commander –in –Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Ekpo (2004) gives credence to this and elucidates that: 123 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The Niger Delta – a geographical area measuring about 70,000 square kilometres – lies in the southern-most part of Nigeria, stretching from the Nigeria – Cameroun boundary in the east to the Ondo – Ogun states boundary in the west. The area is bounded in the north by Enugu, Ebonyi, Anambra, Kogi, and Ekiti states, with the Atlantic Coast forming the general boundary in the south. The Niger Delta comprises about 1,600 communities in nine states namely, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross river, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, with more than 20 million people. He goes further to explain that “the description, which is synonymous to oil production in Nigeria, is a modern perception that has over the years been shaped or sharpened developmental and administrative convenience”. From a geographical point of view is the discussion from a survey carried out by the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) Report (1997) as cited by Tamuno (2000) that “the Niger Delta is that area which, in a triangular form, stretches from Aboh in the present Delta State, in the North to the mouth of the Benin River to the West, the Cross River estuary to the East and to the South, to a point below Akassa and Nun River estuary”. The description of the region following this discussion gives us the picture of an area comprised of Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross River States which shall be used for the purpose of this study. 124 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 The name Niger Delta is derived from the name of the great River Niger. The headwaters of the Niger River rise from Sierra Leone, flow northeastwards to the present day Republic of Mali and then descend southeastwards, cutting through Niger Republic into northern Nigeria and then run further South to merge with the Atlantic Ocean at the southern fringe of Nigeria. Within the Nigerian territory, the River Niger flows south eastwards and runs through the rain forest belt of southern Nigeria. The Niger River cuts across seven states within the Nigerian Federation. Amongst these are Niger, Kogi, Kebbi, Anambra, Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa States. At about 120 miles to the southern fringes of Nigeria, the Niger splinters into several rivers and streams, turning the bulk of the area into a huge evergreen mangrove swamp. It is these crisscrossing of water ways which derive their source from the Niger River that has given that area its deltaic features as well as part of its name (Ogbogbo, 2004). The People In view of the above definitions and makeup of the region as comprised of about six states, it is to be expected that the Niger Delta presents us with a miscellany of peoples. It is estimated that about 30 million people of more than 40 ethnic groups, speaking some 250 dialects live in the Niger Delta. They speak a wide range of languages and dialects. The largest of these groups are the Ijaw, who collectively form Nigeria‟s fourth largest ethnic group but are themselves divided, as a consequence of the territory which they inhabit, and as a result of the fact that they are politically divided into different states of the Federation. Tamuno (2000) notes further that this is a deliberate attempt by the government to continue to marginalize the people as a status-quo of the colonial administration. According to him: 125 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 That the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the British marked the beginning of the balkanization of the hitherto territorially contiguous and culturally homogeneous Ijaw people into political and administrative units, much to our advantage. The trend is continuing in the balkanization of the Ijaws into six states Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers and Akwa Ibom States, mostly as minorities who suffer socio-political, economic, cultural and psychological deprivations. They are estimated to be approximately eight million people and largely living in the riverine areas of Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Ondo States, as well as in Port Harcourt, Warri, Ughelli and other towns on dry land. Their livelihood is primarily based on fishing and farming. Other ethnic groups on dry land in Rivers State include the Ogoni, numbering about 500,000 (themselves divided between four separate dialect groups); several groups speaking languages related to Igbo. These include the Etche, Ndoni, Ikwerre and a number of communities speaking dialects falling into a Central Delta language group; the Andoni, who speak a Lower Cross dialect, and others. In Delta State are found the Itsekiri (whose language is related to Yoruba), the Urhobo, Isoko (in the Edo language group centered in Benin), and others. In the Cross River valley towards the Cameroun border, now Akwa Ibom and Cross River States, live the Efik, on the coast; the Ibibio, Annang, 126 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Oron; and further north, a large number of ethnic groups, some of whose languages are spoken by no more than a few thousands of people. Although, Abasiattai (1987), agrees with Talbot (1967) that the Semi-Bantu, with Ibibio, Boki, Ekoi and Ekuri are the major groups of the Cross River Valley. The Annang, Efik, Oron and Ibeno are accordingly identified as sub-cultures and dialects of the Ibibios. In addition, there are a large number of Igbo immigrants into the Niger Delta area, especially to the British-created towns of Port Harcourt, Warri and Calabar as a result of trade and other commercial activities. Artistic Identity Art is seen as the domain in which man articulates his being. It also articulates concrete spiritual attitude-containing elements of feeling and cognition of a subject towards the objective content that it represented (Hofstadter, 1986). A people‟s arts are a representation of their imaginations, feelings, well-being and existence. Art like culture is dynamic and so changes its form with time and era. Works of arts are to a large extent, representation of reality. They express the feelings of the artist‟s inner state. The artist who is thus the creative medium illustrates things in the external world, or says things about the society in which the art and artist emanate. Art is, therefore, a manifestation of culture. Langer (1953) agrees with the above assertion and confirms that, “a work of art is often a spontaneous expression of feeling, i.e., a symptom of the artist‟s state of mind…Moreover, it may be said to “express,” in another sense, the life of the society from which it stems, namely to indicate customs, dress, behaviour, and to reflect confusion or decorum, violence or peace”. African art in the African world view performs a crucial role in the propagation of African culture. It identifies with other aspects of the African life thus portraying Africanness in 127 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 its form and content. Enwonwu (1977) in analyzing the function of African art says, “The role of art in African society is an important one for all who are concerned with the advancement of African culture, African thought and African personality. The sure way to project the traditional African heritage for unique forms is to carry out studies and transform their internal dynamics, develop transformational modes and models for enhanced traditional practices. The Niger Delta people manifest their existence through the fine, industrial and performing arts in their natural environments. These arts include folktale, music, drama, oral tradition, dance, pottery, carving, sculpturing, fish trap/fishnet making, boat building, et cetera. The Akwa Ibom and Cross River people in spirit and practice of their heritage identify the concepts and elements of the Ekpo masquerade and recreate it for purposes meaningful and suitable to their societal and artistic milieu. Nzewi in projecting the importance of the Ekpo masquerade observes that “the message of a theatre presentation monitors and articulates the collective sensibilities, ethos and aspirations of the audience…generally sensitive to their socio-political environment and tackles topical issues” (1986). The concept of Ekpo is social regeneration through the artistic media of myth and mystical entertainment and satiric chants. That is, the Ekpo theme is performed as a drama of mythical and psychological conflicts. The story in all its ramifications is largely subsumed in cultural and artistic symbols such as music, mime, visual, as well as dance arts. The plot structure is unfolded with the use of dialogue. There is also a participating audience who witness, applaud and approves in the course of the presentation. Ekpo masquerade performance is a commemoration and reaffirmation of rational and communal obligations. In the performance, initiated human aides who serve as acolytes of eka (mother) in 128 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 the spirit realm provide musical directions and accompaniments; spirit characters dance, dramatize and celebrate. Mythology is harnessed for effective social engineering and cleansing of society through the agency of art (Nzewi, 1986). Numerous art forms exist among the people of the Niger Delta. One of such important art forms is the sculpture tradition which is clearly manifest as a historical, artistic and cultural identity of the Benin people in the present day Edo State. The metal and bronze casting art of the Benin people dates back to 1400 A.D. and Oba Ogunta, the sixth king of the empire is credited with having encouraged the art. The art flourished until about 1879 when the British Punitive Expedition raided the ancient kingdom and carted away several hundreds of art works in various media (wood, bronze and metal). Historically, the art of Benin is linked with that of Ile-Ife, the ancestral home of the Yoruba. It is believed that an artist called Igueghae was sent from Ife to Benin to teach the people the art of metal casting (Egharevba, 1968). Casting in Benin at that time was the prerogative of the guild of casters known as Iguneronmwon. It was an art which was closely guarded and endorsed by the monarchy. It was strictly for the glorification and beautification of the kings and royalty. Stylisation, Idealism and Symbolism were major characteristics of the art (Layiwola, 2002). Benin sculptures are historical documentation of weapons, costume, ceremonial, social and ritual paraphernalia. The art is usually categorized in two but closely related forms designated as court and folk. The folk art is executed in wood and does not stand the test of time while the court is carried out in metal, brass, bronze or ivory which are expensive but durable. Art could also be abstractive thus subjecting man‟s intellect to decipher meanings and connotations. Okonofua 129 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 (2001) using the Benin metal and bronze arts adds that these arts were created for obvious social or religious functions yet aesthetic perception was dominant…could be appreciated for the beauty and aesthetic qualities which they represent to our senses. Cultural Identity The people of the Niger Delta are like other Nigerians highly diverse culturally, though there are similarities in historical experiences and cultural affinities. It is in this regard Alagoa 1972; Horton 1962, cited by Okaba (1999) notes that, “there exists in the Niger Delta, a well co-ordinated network of cultural exchanges running south and north though the region”. Historical differences in their political behaviour have been imposed by their peculiar riverine geography in which isolated settlements on the little available dry land, surrounded by mazes of meandering creeks, fostered small ancient city-states and kingdoms like Bonny, Brass, Akassa, Nembe, Oron, Calabar, Bassan, Warri, Okrika, Opobo, Itsekiri and Urhobo. The differences are also as a result of states creation by colonial and federal governments under the guise of political and administrative convenience. Anderson and Peek (1976) in support of this note that: For centuries, peoples with diverse cultural traditions have lived in the Delta side-by-side, sharing an environment dominated by water and subject to floods, tides, and tropical downpour. Because resources vary from one part of the region to another, people have long used the rivers as avenues of commerce; and some later served as middlemen in the 130 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 oversea trade. Most groups maintained their own languages, but the cultural exchanges that accompanied economic transactions often generated comparable customs and art forms. The diversity in the culture of the people is reflected in their music and food, dances, distinct modes of dressing, marriages, festivals, matters of kinship and inheritance, politics, trade and economy, mechanisms of socialization, recreation and general ways of life. And because of the waters that surround many of the communities in the region, a lot of their economic, social and even cultural activities are linked with water. For instance, festivals are usually staged on water in canoes, bigger boats and barges; a feature that is synonymous with the people. They further observe that “Delta residents have responded to their world by incorporating their unique environment in their celebrations, even to the extent of performing in canoes on the water”. The way humans beings express, demonstrate, or symbolize their feelings is usually conditioned by the state of mind, level of consciousness, physical condition, mental alertness, level of morality, geographical and social condition which are all cultural variables. Culture thus influences religious beliefs and convictions. For example, in the Urhobo and Isoko societies within the Niger Delta, the question of destiny or predestination is an individual affair. The individual declares what his destiny in life should be. This is as a result of the egalitarian nature of such societies whereby everybody seems to maintain equal rights and opportunities. In these cultures, man is an individual entity and at the same time part of the collective entity or whole community, so does not subscribe to the notion of a Supreme Being imposing his 131 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 will on mankind. The way a people see religion and concept of the super-sensible world is influenced by the cultural norms within the societal structure. In such societies, the Supreme Being is regarded as just one of the spiritual beings: though believed to be first among equals. Again, in a matrilineal society where the mother has more claim on the child, the Supreme Being is regarded as Mother. Where pottery dominates people‟s occupation, especially when such an occupation is mostly done by women who are also seen as bread-winners. God is given names which reflect “Her” as the Mother who moulded the earth and all creatures therein. In Ijaw societies in the Niger Delta, God is called Teme-arau or Tamuno meaning the woman or mother who created the world; and Owoyengi, meaning the mother who provides all our human needs. The Ijaw is a matrilineal society and women did most of the pottery works and were traditionally Bread- winners in olden times (Nabofa, 1991). In some dialects, the Supreme Being is also called Oyin or Oin, our mother. Another culture that needs elaboration because of its complexities is the marriage ceremonies of Akwa Ibom people of the Niger Delta. Marriage institution is as old as man and among the Ibibio people it is accepted as permanent bond between families. Each family took care to study the other family and know its background. Many questions are raised, including that of good character, wealth, past history on health and public image of members of that family. Arrangements for marriage were under the control of both parents which involves several stages. The first step was for the family of the groom to visit the parents of the bride to propose the marriage. If the proposal was accepted, a date would be fixed for introduction (mbip). The ceremonies for mbip were usually not elaborate as only family members and close friends of both families took part and normally at the 132 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 home of the bride‟s parents. The groom‟s family presented drinks, yams, goat, loin cloth, fish, tobacco, etc. On the other hand, the bride‟s family prepared enough food (pounded yam with different types of soup, sliced yam), and provided drinks. After this comes the fattening/tutelage stage (usin mboppo). In most cases, usin mboppo takes place between mbip and the marriage ceremony (ndo) proper. The practice of usin mboppo was meant to groom the bride to be ready for married life. It was the period of formal and informal education for the young lady. During this period, the girl would be fattened to enhance her health and looks and in some cases (as it was in olden time) be circumcised. On the day the girl would leave the fattening room (usio mboppo), a big ceremony was arranged featuring traditional dances and plays. It was a complete ceremony for the family and the community at large. Both parents would offer sacrifices and thanksgiving to the gods of the land for blessings received. Usio mboppo, therefore, means outing ceremony which led to the main marriage ceremony (ndo). Before the actual day of the marriage ceremony, the husband-to-be would be given a list of items to be bought, which among others, include drinks (assorted), tobacco, goat, yams, dresses for parents and bride, walking stick, etc. These are in addition to monies for the bride price and other things, and entertainment. On the actual day when the groom arrived with his entourage, custom demands that he gave drinks and money that was meant for people who have kept the compound clean. Recently, youths have introduced a gift of football/jerseys in addition to drinks. Women have also introduced gift items and money, at the entrance to the house. On the arrival of the groom and family, the parents of the bride would serve food that included virtually all local 133 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 delicacies indicating that the wife-to-be was capable of preparing all types of food. This is called UdiaIbenge. Once the groom and people had eaten, the marriage ceremony progressed unto a climax which included payment of bride price and other agreed fees; the search for the bride (which again involved some money required for transportation of the bride to the venue); entertainment of guest, friends and visitors; presentation of cooking utensils to the bride by her family as well as presentation of live goat, stock fish and tubers of yam to the bride and groom to take home and entertain their visitors. It was usual for the merriment to go into the night especially if there was plentiful supply of food and drinks (Esema, 2002). The bride‟s family apart from sending forth their daughter with gift items for the kitchen also takes the responsibility of providing for her bedroom (if they are well to do). This is so because it is believed that good food and a comfortable bedroom is the key to a man‟s heart. At the event of death of any of the wife‟s parents, the husband would present a list of items to the family as contained in the marriage list (for the father or mother as the case may be) indicating that he remains their in-law. The people are very ceremonial in their way of life which is evident in their dances, modes of dressing and choice of colours. Nwamuo (2005) while describing the culture of the people of Cross River State (who share the same culture with the people of Akwa Ibom State) throws more light on this. According to him: The immense culture of the Cross River State is reflected. In every sphere of the people‟s lives, be it in their modes of dressing, their highly inflexionary and tonal language, 134 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 their polyrhymic dance, the Ekpe Cult, the Mbopo Festival, The Abang dance, the Ekpiriakata masquerade, the Ekombi dance or initiation ceremonies. Even funeral ceremonies attract so much grace, colour and fanfare that a visitor can easily be amazed at the lavish embroidery and detailed, intricate but carefullywoven and decorated attire of a people blessed with cultural elegance. Conclusion A people‟s cultural heritage encompasses their world of arts, songs, dances, fashion, hairstyles, behaviour of individuals to their neighbours, their communal efforts and humanism. When properly harnessed, it is a reflection of the historical, political and economic heritage. Culture relates to the development of the individual person, the development of the group or class of persons and the development or improvement of the society as a whole. The culture of the individual is dependent upon the culture of a group or class, and that the culture of the group or class is dependent on the culture of the whole society to which the individual and group belongs. Culture provides a rational framework for the solution of social problems which becomes an essential mechanism for management of ethnic or racial conflicts. Culture provides the agenda for identity within social or ethnic groups. Using our case studies, it is evident that the metal and wood casting traditions of the Benin people have greatly identified the people in that order. Within the Niger Delta, any mention of furniture, beads and staff for the royalty 135 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 easily brings to mind, the Benin people. This is same with the Ijaw people. When asked of where they come from, would always mention two places (the father‟s town or local government or state as the case may be, as well as that of the mother‟s). Tracing of descent is matrilineal as the Creator is believed to be a woman who has created the universe and nurtures it. This is also true of the marriages customs and traditions of the Akwa Ibom people whose women are believed to be excellent when it comes to taking care of their husbands References Abasiattai, M.B. (1987), Akwa Ibom and Cross River States: The Land, the People and their Culture. Wusen Press Ltd, Calabar, Nigeria. Egharevba, J. (1968), A Short Story of Benin. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, Nigeria. Ekpo, U. (2004), The Niger Delta and Oil Politics. International Energy Communications Limited, Lagos, Nigeria. Enwonwu, B. (1977), “African View of Art”, Festac 77. African Journal Limited, England. Pp. 41-54. Esema, O. (2002), Culture, Customs and Traditions of Akwa Ibom People of Nigeria. COMP PRINT,Uyo, Nigeria. 136 NDRD 8 (2), DECEMBER 2014 Hofstadter, A. (1966), “Significance and Artistic Meaning”, Art and Philosophy. University Press, New York, U.S.A. Pp. 88-100. 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