Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate

4 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate To understand the background of the Khilafat Movement in India, one needs to understand how and when this political idea was first conceived. The political awakening that followed the end of the First World War was more of a nationalistic nature where homogeneous groups sought identity on the basis of one reason or the other; territory, common language, history, culture, faith or other commonalities that could work as binding factors. This attitude perfectly suited European nations and was exercised by the likes of Germans, Hungarians, Austrians and Italians. This type of nationalism surfaced in Europe and resulted in nation-states as nations tried to re-establish their legitimacy and draw boundaries with other nations. Such nationalism is justified through history. The second type of nationalism is futuristic where legitimacy of a nation is determined at some later point in time. This attitude was typical of groups in territories occupied by colonial powers where various groups united with the urge, in the name of nationalism, to rid themselves of foreign occupation. The famous historian of Pakistan, KK Aziz, defines nationalism as “The common group feeling which inspires the members of a nation”.1 With the wave of political awakening, and the grip of British colonialism loosening on its colonies, India too was in pursuit of a suitable ideology to mobilise its masses for independence. 1 Details: KK Aziz, The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism, Chatto and Windus, London, 1967 60 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters Hindus had “Hindustan”—the ancient Hindu civilisation weaved around Hinduism—and were also in majority in the subcontinent; sufficient basis for a nationalistic sentiment to be evoked in their masses. Indian Muslims, however, struggled to find a definitive basis of nationalistic sentiment; adding fuel to fire were the hard and fast lines of sectarian divide that allowed little room for agreeing on a certain ideology. Islam, alone, did not seem enough but provided some kind of a loose binding force. So, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith put it, the communalism of India provided the first and foremost basis of nationalistic unity to the diverse communities, subjectively though, in British-India.2 There is no doubt that a nationalism of some kind was required by the Muslims to exist in the changing face of India but what is intended here is to analyse one of the many means adopted to attain this goal—the Khilafat Movement. Historians set the marker at various points in time to determine the roots of the Khilafat Movement, but we start the story here from the Rowlatt Act that was annexed to the Defence of India Act 1915 in 1919. The purpose of the Rowlatt Act was to suppress the political uprisings in various parts of India through revolutionary nationalist groups after the end of the First World War. The Act provided for stricter control of the press, arrests without warrant, indefinite detention without trial, and juryless in-camera trials for certain political activity. This potentially meant that political activity in the awakening India could come to a sudden halt which was naturally an unacceptable situation for the native subjects of British-India. This called for several types of reactions from the Indian public, spearheaded by their leaders of course, ranging from the most peaceful to the most violent. We start with the latter. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi called for immediate action through his protest movement—known more commonly as the Satyagarha struggle—that amounted to strikes being called, violent looting, vandalising public facilities like railway tracks and telegraphic communication systems and murders of 2 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Hesperides Press, 2006 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 61 British government officials. Punjab was the worst to be struck by this Civil Disobedience Movement of Gandhi. Martial law had to be imposed by the government in April 1919 to bring the situation under control. Martial law authorities banned all types of crowds and rallying, but the residents of Amritsar retaliated to this ban and gathered at the Jalianwala Bagh; the preamble of the barbaric massacre of hundreds of Indians at the hands of General Dyer who opened fire without sufficient notice. This is where Gandhi appeared on the scene of the political theatre of India, along with his Non-cooperation Movement, and a section of Muslims chose to join hands in the Gandhian ideology of what seemed to be an independence movement. Before moving on to the advice given by the caliph of the Ahmadiyya community, we need to see what Islamic teachings have to say in such a situation. The Holy Quran says, “O those who believe, obey Allah, His messenger and those who rule upon you”.3 The Prophet of Islam promoted peaceful coexistence not only through his word, but more so through his actions—both as a citizen of Mecca and as the head of the state of Medina. The founder of the Ahmadiyya community followed suit and preached and practiced the same—loyalty to the government of the time, obedience to the law of the land and restraint from participating in any act of violence. Khalifatul Masih II’s guidance at this critical point was aligned with all three. He called for all Muslims to abstain from violence and to try to resolve the situation through dialogue among the leaders of communal groups and the government authorities.4 Steps taken by Khalifatul Masih II in these turbulent circumstances, and reported by Al Fazl, are listed below: 1. Cable was immediately sent to presidents of all local chapters of the Ahmadiyya community that it was not permissible for any Ahmadi to partake in any kind of 3 The Quran, An-Nisa: 60 4 Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat, Vol 4, p 220 62 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters agitation 2. As the situation in Lahore and Amritsar deteriorated, Khalifatul Masih II summoned dignitaries of the area—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—and urged them to stay loyal to the government and to prevent any kind of agitation in their respective areas 3. He ordered a tract to be published whereby clarifying the true implications of the Rowlatt Act and to dispel any misunderstandings 4. The tract also condemned the uprising against the government 5. The tract had Quranic teachings about loyalty to the government and the greater cause 6. Sikhs were reminded, through the same tract, of the teaching Raj Bhagti in their faith. This tract was printed in Gurmukhi language for their convenience 7. Letters were written to schools in Punjab urging them to promote loyalty to the government among the pupils 8. 120 missionaries were deployed in areas of Punjab, Bengal, Bombay [now Mumbai] and Malabar to promote peaceful means of expressing opinion rather than showing violent reaction 9. Khalifatul Masih II spoke in his sermons—listened to by the residents of Qadian and relayed in print form through Al Fazl to all parts of India—about the potential damage of such agitations to the collective cause of Indians in the British-India5 This peaceable approach was commended by the Government through its communique and by the nonviolent circles of the Indian society.6 5 Al Fazl, 10 May 1919, p 3 (all points extracted by author from a report) 6 The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 3 May 1919 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 63 The balance that Khalifatul Masih II maintained between obedience of the government and the rights of Muslims is seen exercised during this tumultuous state of affairs in the country. Commenting on the harsh policies by the officials of the martial law, he stated: “The Crawling Order [enforced by Dyer on Indian natives to crawl on a street where a British woman was assaulted] is such a barbaric and inhumane order that no one can tolerate it, and if this results in rage by Indian public, then it should be of no surprise. The brutality demonstrated in the Jalianwala Bagh incident is deeply saddening. General Dyer’s claim that he opened fire to deter any uprising and rebellion in other parts of the country is sufficient to prove him guilty for which no other proof is required. To justify General Dyer’s act as a misjudgment is wrong because a misjudgment occurs where there are reasons to perform an act or not. But to open fire on an unarmed group is unjustified even in the battlefield.”7 Gandhi’s approach, and that of the Muslims forming an alliance with him, remained undeterred and later developed into what Gandhi wishfully called a peaceful retaliation. How peaceful this retaliation had been—bearing results like the Jalianwala Bagh massacre—is not hard to calculate. Gandhi’s Non-cooperation Movement—or Tahrik-i-tark-i-mawalat as it was more commonly known—was primarily aimed at gaining a following from among the Muslims also. Gandhi approached the leading figures of the Khilafat Movement— which was gaining momentum as an anti-Raj force—like Abul Kalam Azad, Ali Brothers, Mahmud ul Hassan, Abdul Bari and Dr Ansari. Gandhi, ironic as it is, was given the lead role in the Khilafat Movement and Mohammad Ali Jauhar is also reported to have said that “after the Prophet, on whom be peace, I consider it my duty to carry out the commands of Gandhi”.8 7 Hazrat Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, Non-cooperation and Islam, Qadian, Mercantile Electric Press, Lahore 8 Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, p100, Penguin Books, India, 2000; M Raisur Rahman, We Can Leave Neither: Mohammad Ali, Islam and Nationalism in Co- 64 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters The future of Turkey had become uncertain in the wake of the post-WWI circumstances. The Muslims of India, like many other Muslim sections around the world, had grievances on how the British had treated Turkey and how they planned to abolish the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, with a longstanding history of being a figurehead of Muslims, was seen by many Muslim circles as the last hope of Muslim solidarity, the fall of which could lead to a complete failure of the Muslim cause in India. The attempt to mobilise Indian-Muslim masses was based on creating a hype about the Ottoman caliph—a symbol that could ignite a nationalistic sentiment. To save the Ottoman caliphate from being abolished at the hands of the British was the main clause of the Khilafat Movement manifesto. The attempts to mobilise Muslim masses through exploiting an emotional attachment to the concept of khilafat, manifested in many ways and forms adopted by the Khilafatists; one being holding conferences in the name of safeguarding the Ottoman caliphate. Khalifatul Masih II was also invited to one of such conferences held in Lucknow on 21 September 1919. He was unable to attend the conference in person but wrote a detailed paper that was read out in the proceedings. The paper, titled Turkey ka mustaqbil aur Musalmanon ka farz (meaning the future of Turkey and the duty of Muslims), was published in book form, translated into English as The Future of Turkey,9 was sent off to concerned government officials and political circles. In this paper, Khalifatul Masih II expounded on the possible lines of action that should be taken by the Muslims, and also those that should not. Quoting the text from the original document should represent the viewpoint sufficiently: “There is no doubt that the whole Islamic world has been looking upon the future of the Turks with doubt and misgivings and there is no doubt that the complete extinction of the empire or any curtailment of its independence will lonial India, in South Asian History & Culture, Routledge, Vol 3 No 2, p 261, Routledge, 2012 9 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, The Future of Turkey, in The Moslem World, Vol 10, p 274, Ed SM Zwemer, Missionary Review Publishing Co, New York, 1920 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate deeply wound the Moslem feeling. “But it is a mistake to say that this is due to the fact that the Sultan is looked upon as the Khalifa of the Mussalmans, because there are many who do not recognise his khalifate but still do feel very real sympathy for him. Apart, however, from this, it appears to me to be politically a mistake as this important juncture, when the material power and honour of Islam are so seriously at stake to present the question before the public in a form which can be accepted only by a section of the community. A considerable section of the Mussalmans of India are of the Shiah persuasion and of them, save only a few extreme bigots, the largest majority of thinking and educated members are fully sympathetic towards Turkey, although they are in no sense prepared to accept the Sultan as the Khalifa of Islam. Similar is the case with the sect of Ahl-iHadis. A certain number of them may be willing to accept the Sultan as the Khalifa, but, consistently with their principles, the sect as a whole cannot accept the Sultan as the Khalifa in the true sense of the word. “My community, known as the Ahmadis, are also by no means prepared to accept such a claim, because according to us, agreeably to the prophecies of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him), the Almighty God has been pleased, in order to demonstrate the truth of the Holy Koran and for the regeneration of the Moslems, to raise in this age the Promised Messiah and Mahdi in the person of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Thus, at present, the person rightly entitled to be Khalifa cannot be any one else than one of his followers. The whole or almost the whole of the Ahmadiyya community has, by swearing the oath of allegiance to this humble writer, given practical demonstration of the fact that they are not prepared to accept the validity of the other Khalifate. Besides the three sections above mentioned, there are also others, who withal their claim to be Moslems, do not recognize the validity of the title of the house of Othman to the Khalifate. Even among the section known by the name 65 66 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters Ahl-us-Sunnat-Wa-aljamat, there is a party, which does not recognize the Othmania Khalifate, or else how could it be possible that while recognising the Sultan to be rightful successor of the Holy Prophet (blessing of God be upon him) they should have taken up arms against him. Under the circumstances it was inadvisable to make the Khalifate of the Sultan the principal plank of the conference, in which it was expected that Mussalmans of all sections should cooperate and give expression to their opinion with regard to the future of the Turkish Empire, seeing that the question was one on which all the factions did not hold one unanimous view. Such a step could not but result in the discovery of their internal differences and weakness.”10 As emotions ran high in the circles of the Central Khilafat Committee (CKC), the advice given in this address by the Ahmadiyya caliph was not seen with great admiration and was rather frowned upon by the activists. However, it proved in the years to follow, that the proposed approach suggested by Khalifatul Masih II was far more pragmatic than the one adopted in the name of Khilafat Movement. What he proposed is hereby quoted: “To my mind, the conference should take its stand upon the position, that the complete extinction or, the curtailment of the sovereign powers of a Moslem State, the head of which is considered by a large section of the Moslems of the world to be their Khalifa, will be an act which cannot but be disliked by all sections of Moslems, to whom even the contemplation of such an eventuality caused the deepest pain. In such a case the motion could be, heartily and universally, supported by all sections of Mussalmans in spite of the fact that many of them did not endorse the claim of the Othmania Khalifate and in spite of the fact that among themselves parties might believe each other to be heretics.”11 In writing this paper, Khalifatul Masih II did not fail to 10 Ahmad, The Future of Turkey 11 Ibid Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 67 maintain the fine balance between his two parallel running loyalties: one to the British Crown (as the ruler of the land) and the other to the cause of Islam. He wrote: “To the Ahmadiyya community of India, their present temporal sovereign is His Majesty George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland and Emperor of India, and their Khalifa is the present rightful successor of the Promised Messiah viz. my humble self. But in spite of that fact, the community, now that there is nothing in such an attitude averse to the interest or honour of Great Britain, do[es] feel the most genuine sympathy for Turkey. This is because though the Turks might differ from them in their beliefs, yet their prosperity was a source of honour to Islam, in which they both have a common interest.”12 The reason that the Khalifatul Masih honoured the British government and always professed loyalty to them, according to Ahmadiyya teachings, was due to the religious freedom that the British had granted to the diverse society of India. But on the other hand, as leadership of a Muslim community, Ahmadiyya caliphate was very bold in criticising the policies of the British government that went against the genuine interests of Muslims. This is quite clear from the advice he offered to the All India Muslim Conference and the activists of the CKC: “The Turks have been defeated on the battlefield and are now a conquered people. Their conquerors consider their territories a legitimate prize, and deem it quite conformable to justice to divide the same among themselves or to make such other changes in their government as they may think proper. They will therefore be hardly prepared to forego their rights at the request of any party or people. To persuade them to leave the former territories of Turkey wholly or nearly in status quo ante bellum is a difficult task; more difficult than to snatch a prey from the jaws of a lion. They may see in this country people fighting one another for the sake of some 12 Ibid 68 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters insignificant rights who will never agree to forego the same. How then can we expect that in the matter of a State, and especially of a State whose existence is looked upon by them as a menace to their civilization, the nations assembled at the Peace Conference will be influenced by any decision of, or any speeches delivered at, our meetings and resign their hard-won prize? The object can be achieved only by persistent effort and industry, and that of a kind apt to turn young heads grey. Actions must be united, every step considered and deliberate and the means carefully selected. No sacrifice of time and money must be grudged.”13 Understanding the hard feelings that the CKC had fostered for the British government, Khalifatul Masih II called for a realistic approach instead of one ridden by bias, prejudice and anti-government sentiments. He thought that any expression of sympathy by the government ought to be utilised if a desired outcome is really to be hoped for. “The first thing which the Mussalmans should do when they actually launch upon this work is to realize fully that among the allied powers who are to decide the fate of Turkey, the only one which feels any sympathy for her and is willing to render any help to her is Great Britain. Her ministers have been most strenuously endeavouring to bring to the notice of the Peace Conference the sentiments which are agitating the minds of the Mussalmans on the subject. It is also the same power which is advocating the cause of the king of Hejaz in the said conference, as has been more than once admitted by ‘The Kibla,’ a semi-official organ of the Hejaz government. All these good services of the British government should always be borne in mind by the Mussalmans whatever the course of action they might now choose to adopt, lest in their precipitancy they should lose the last friend they have, and be guilty of ingratitude. The Britishers are not Mussalmans by religion. Their sympathy for the Turks cannot therefore be due to a community of faith. Nor politically can the overthrow of 13 Ahmad, The Future of Turkey Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 69 the Turks affect the interest of Great Britain. The experience of the last war has shown them how illusory are the dangers apprehended from Pan-Islamism. If Britain has therefore any sympathy for Turkey it is only due to a consideration for the feelings and sentiments of her Moslem subjects. The latter should therefore be grateful for whatever sympathy they might receive from that quarter, and regard her as a valued friend. They should also recognize the fact that while it is the duty of Britain to show a consideration for their sentiments, it is also equally her duty to be considerate of the sentiments of those nations who helped her in the War, whose soldiers fought side by side with the British force in numbers equal to, nay, rather more than, the Mussalmans. The monetary sacrifices made by those nations in order to bring the war to a victorious conclusion were also incomparably larger than those of the Mussalmans. If, therefore, Great Britain, while mindful of the Moslem sentiment, should at the same time show a due regard for the opinions of these nations, the Mussalmans should realize her peculiar position and not overlook the difficulties of her situation.”14 From this paper, it is quite clear that Khalifatul Masih II saw hope of success only if matters were presented in a sophisticated manner and not by putting all eggs in one basket; the sovereignty of Turkey, the caliphate and, the Ottoman suzerainty of the Hijaz. He wrote: “The second point which must be attended to for the achievement of success is that the Mussalmans must leave alone the question of the kingdom of Hejaz. It is a matter of common knowledge how great are the losses suffered by the Arabs under a foreign yoke in their political status and their language. The facts are well known to those who know the history of the country. It is also no secret that the Arabs have made large sacrifices in order to regain their present independence. The national pride of the Arabs has been aroused, and the pulse of freedom is beating strong. Under 14 Ahmad, The Future of Turkey Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters 70 no circumstances can they now be placed under the Turkish rule. After 1300 years, the Arabs have once more become masters of their own house and have already justified their rule by justice and good government. Any new suggestion with regard to them has therefore little chance of success. No such suggestions can be entertained by any reasonable man and the Arabs themselves will be the last to accept them. The independence of the Hejaz is now advantageous to the interests of Islam, and is preferable to its being under the dominion of Turkey.”15 He saw that the only way forward was a reasonable approach to be taken by the Muslims through unanimously agreeing upon the arguments that the Muslims had in the case of Turkey, organising them in a concise and comprehensible form and presenting them through dialogue rather than through force and violence: “The third important point is that after necessary deliberation a standing committee should be appointed to give practical effect to our sympathy for Turkey. Conferences and lectures can avail but little. Collection of funds and the distribution of pamphlets and books will also be to little purpose. Neither will it be profitable to send money to the committee in England. What is wanted is organized activity directed to the end in view, in all the countries of the world. This is an age of reason. Men demand arguments in support of every proposition. What is therefore needed is that evidence should be collected to support our case, and the same should be produced before the statesmen who are to decide this question, so as to win their conviction. It took four years and a half for the sword to decide the last war. The sword is however a peremptory judge. Arguments take longer time to bring conviction. They, therefore, require more persistent effort. There is, however, one difference. The sword can reach only a limited number at a time. But arguments may reach thousands of hearts at 15 Ibid Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 71 once.”16 This paper by Khalifatul Masih II, as his other lectures and booklets, shows the depth of guidance he was rendering to the Muslims of India who were in pursuit of carving some kind of a cause to attach the masses to. The Ottoman sultancaliph, whose trumpet they were blowing, seemed to remain indifferent from the emotional drama being staged in his name. Mehmed VI, in his shrinking territory and capacity, was remaining loyal and cooperative with the British.17 This fact alone is sufficient to prove that the whole concept of the Khilafat Movement was, to a great extent, without strong base and that its activists were unaware of the ground realities that enveloped the international political scenario. It was not hard for the Indian-Muslims to judge the futility of the whole mobilisation that had gained momentum through the Non-cooperation Movement of Gandhi, and of accepting him to lead them in a cause that they saw as purely “Muslim” in nature. A Hindu leader for a Muslim cause was hard to digest by the reasonable circles within the Muslim community,18 the Ahmadiyya caliph being at the forefront. Non-cooperation/CKC activists, on 22 June 1920, had a letter drafted to Chelmsford and circulated for signatures, securing eighty-two Sunni Muslims as signatories from every province of India.19 Gandhi wrote a covering letter for this petition that he said was representative of the largest body of Sunni Muslim opinion in India. The guidance provided by Khalifatul Masih with regard to the situation, shrouded by the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, proved to be the most pragmatic and practicable one through the events that unfolded in the months and years to follow. He had emphasised that there needed to be unity among Muslim circles before submitting their viewpoint to 16 Ibid 17 HC Armstrong , Grey Wolf, Penguin Books, 1938, p 109 18 The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record 1900-1947, Ed Shan Muhammad, Mehankshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1980 19 IOR, Chelmsford Papers, Gandhi to Hignell, 22 June 1920 72 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters the British government. The fragmented and split approach of the Indian-Muslim community is evident from the following instances. The movement based on the ideology of non-cooperation with the British government and of boycotting British manufactured goods was discussed in the All India Khilafat Conference at New Delhi (November 1919), with a conclusion that the boycott was no longer possible. It was seen as jeopardising the commerce of Indian natives more than anything else.20 A conflicting viewpoint was witnessed in the Amritsar session of the All India Muslim League (December 1919) when the following resolution was passed and sent to the King of England: “All India Muslim League tenders its homage to the person and throne of His Majesty the King Emperor and assures him of steadfast and continued loyalty of the Mussalman community of India”.21 But the Khilafat Conference, held also in December 1919 in Amritsar, recorded yet another different approach taken by Mohammad Ali Jauhar where he proposed that the entire Muslim population of India migrate to Afghanistan.22 These varying and unstable positions of Indian-Muslims were self-sufficient in proving their vainness. Jinnah, later to be chosen as the only one leader to sail the Indian-Muslims through their independence movement, held a similar approach to that of Khalifatul Masih II. Stanley Wolpert, the first biographer of MA Jinnah, relates: “Though he [Jinnah] had presided over the Muslim League only three months earlier, Jinnah did not even bother to attend its Nagpur session, rightly gauging the futility of 20 The Northern Whig, 2 August 1921 21 The Indian Muslims: A Documentary Record 1900-1947, pp 113-114 22 Abdul Majid Salik, Sarguzisht, pp 107-108, Al Faisal Nashiran-o-Tajiran-e-Kutub, Lahore, 1993 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 73 his opposition to the Gandhi-Khilafat express. He had no more heart of raucous confrontations that bitter December, no stomach left for the names he had been called. He had warned them openly of the futility of their battle plan, told them honestly of the havoc he correctly anticipated would be unleashed by and against the suddenly politicized masses. Yet every jury, Khilafat Conference, Swaraj Sabha, Congress and Muslim League had rejected his arguments as outmoded, cowardly or invalid.”23 But the Khilafatists decided to cling to their movement, remaining indifferent to the advice of the very able likes of Khalifatul Masih II,24 MA Jinnah, Nawab of Dhaka, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the chiefs of the Punjab and many other Muslim leaders25 including the Aga Khan.26 In complete denial, the Khilafatists decided to travel to London as a delegation, led by Mohammad Ali Jauhar, to present their case before Prime Minister George Lloyd. Having listened to their demands, the prime minister is reported to have remained “unmoved by the delegation’s arguments and refused to concede a single demand”.27 Jauhar, presenting the CKC case before the prime minister, demanded that Jaziratul Arab (the Arabian Peninsula) should be given in custody of the Ottoman caliph who should be responsible for the wardenship of the holy places in Mecca and Medina.28 This was contrary to the clear advice on this matter by Khalifatul Masih II. The result of this, and other demands, however, was exactly as anticipated in his paper The Future of Turkey.29 Khalifatul Masih II had also advised that Muslims should unite on a stance before presenting it to the government and 23 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p 72, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1984 24 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, Muahida-i-Turkiya aur Musalmanon Ka Ainda Rawaiyya, Qadian, 1920 25 IOR, Chelmsford Papers, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 April and 7 May 1920 26 The Yorkshire Post & Leeds Intelligencer, 6 May 1923 27 M Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, Brill, Leiden, 1999 28 IOR L/P&S/18, Minutes of Proceedings at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister 29 Ahmad, The Future of Turkey 74 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters that there should be clarity in the ideology that they were basing their demands on. The emotionally charged CKC failed to attain this clarity before travelling to London to hold talks with the prime minister. Jauhar is recorded to have told the prime minister that the issue of Turkey was a purely religious matter of the Indian Muslims and not a political one.30 The CKC delegation neglected here the advice of the caliph of Qadian where he categorically advised that “you put aside all Muslim scholars and ulema and chose a non-Muslim to be your leader… Mr Gandhi might be a serious and hardworking politician but to have him leading a mission that you declare to be a matter of life and death for Islam and regard it as your most important religious duty is astonishing and a cause of grief.”31 Khalifatul Masih II was to remain firm on his standpoint until the independence movement saw fruition and the British eventually departed from the Sub-continent. Upon his return from London in 1924, he was approached by Gandhi in person at Bombay. He made it clear to Gandhi that unless Congress was made open to all shades of opinion it could not truly be called a national body. Moderates and extremists, cooperators and non-Cooperators must equally have a voice and whichever party happened to predominate must be allowed to formulate and lead the policy of the House so long as it was in power. He expressed his opinion that although the congress was called “national”, but it actually only represented a particular class, and therefore had no real force. “Mr Gandhi expressed concurrence, and urged the Ahmadiyyya chief to join Congress. “The Khalifat-ul-Masih replied that, being a convinced Cooperator and an advocate of constitutional and evolutional progress, he could not join in present circumstances. But would willingly join when he found he could do so without being faithless to religion and conscience.”32 30 Ibid 31 Ibid 32 The Scotsman, 1 December 1924 Khilafat Movement and the Ahmadiyya Caliphate 75 This shows how self-contradictory the ideology of the Khilafat Movement was and also that the viable advice provided by Khalifatul Masih II was not paid heed to. An even interesting aspect of the whole story is that the caliphate of Turkey, that was made the pivot of the whole mobilisation, remained quiet in the situation that was bearing no results and was further pushing the Muslims into more agony. Rallying on the streets, vandalising public property, looting banks and shops, torching buildings, uprisings against a just and moderate government, migrating aimlessly to barren lands and returning unsuccessful, giving up employment and quitting education to partake in the rallying was the only outcome of the story that had a very unhappy, unsuccessful and disgraceful end. The leadership of Gandhi— the most ironic part of the whole story—led the CKC activists and their proponents to blindly dive into the Satyagarha (civil disobedience and non-cooperation movements). These movements—founded on the grounds that it would be the most peaceful protest by the masses against the government— resulted in violence and bloodshed like the one at Jalianwala Bagh and the killing of twenty-two policemen at Chaura Chauri by the activist mobs. Gandhi had to shamefully admit that he had not been able to control the mobs that resorted to violence on any occasion where they could.33 He had to drop the ideology he had so proudly owned and the Muslim circles following him felt abandoned halfway. Gandhi was arrested and a session of the Congress that had been called to assess the feasibility of the Non-Cooperation Movement reached the conclusion that the movement was inviable. The fact, that the Non-Cooperation Movement, or Tark-i-Mawalat, was getting to be seen as unfeasible and destructive to the cause of Indians in British-India, was clearly communicated by Khalifatul Masih II to Gandhi, CKC activists and their blindfolded followers, right at the onset. While all this went on, the caliph of Turkey sat on his 33 The Pall Mall Gazette, 13 February 1922 76 Islamic Caliphate - The Missing Chapters shaking throne promising loyalty and full cooperation to the British government. Those trying to import a dose of nationalism from Turkey to inject into the veins of Indian Muslims, still decided to carry on with their aggressive agenda. But Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), who had paralysed the Ottoman caliphate, signed, in June 1923, the Treaty of Laussane which resulted in the Turkish control being restricted only to the land of Turkey. Turkey withdrew its control from all other territories that fell under the Ottoman Empire including Arabia. This again proved that the advice of Khalifatul Masih II—that Arabia no longer wanted to live under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire—was pragmatic and should have been paid heed to. The advice by Khalifatul Masih II that the Ottoman caliph was not given the status of caliph or khalifa by all Muslims was, yet again, to prove right when the Turkish Grand National Assembly, spearheaded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, permanently deposed the caliph on 3 March 1924. This act, supported by Turk masses, brought the whole structure of the Khilafat Movement to a collapse.34 The caliph was given an amount of two-thousand pounds and sent to Switzerland on the Orient Express from where he travelled to Paris and lived their until his death. As the caliph of Turkey was travelling to Europe to live a life of exile and disassociation to Islam, the caliph of Qadian was occupied with schemes to extend the message of Islam to the same Europe. As the caliph of Turkey settled in Europe in 1924, the caliph of Qadian travelled to London to establish the first ever mosque in London—the mosque that was to be a sanctuary of the propagation of Islam in the Western world. The caliph of Qadian laid the foundation of the mosque in London and travelled back triumphant while the caliph of Turkey continued to live a dormant life in Europe. 34 This dazzling state of the Khilafatists was described very well by The Common Cause, London, later on 25 June 1926