NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO. 10-08
Beyond Compliance:
Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters
Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel
February 2010
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551923
Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law
Really Matters
By Robert Howse 1 and Ruti Teitel 2
We had the opportunity to present versions of this essay at the Universite de
Paris/NYU/Cardozo conference on constitutionalism and globalization, the
International Studies Association annual meeting 2008, the IILJ International
Legal Theory Colloquium and Hauser Scholars Forum at NYU, and Fordham
Law School. Our thanks to participants on those occasions for helpful
comments, and especially to Benedict Kingsbury, JosephWeiler, Tom Lee
and Cathy Powell.
Introduction: General Considerations
1
Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law and Faculty Director, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York
University Law School.
2. Ernst Steifel Professor of Comparative Law and Visiting Professor, London School of Ecnomics, Centre for the Study of Global
Governance. Forthcoming, Journal of Global Policy.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551923
Traditionally, in most fields of legal study, the question of why, how
and to what extent the actors bound by legal rules comply with them has been
a secondary, if not marginal, one for scholarly inquiry by jurists. Law and
economics and legal sociology, as well as realist approaches such as Critical
Legal Studies, have focused greater attention on the actual behavioral effects
of rules. But such approaches have a much broader focus than the specific
question of rule compliance.
International law is a striking exception: the conceptual, and more
recently empirical, study of compliance has become a central preoccupation,
and perhaps the fastest growing sub-field, in international legal scholarship,
engaging some of the best minds in the discipline. 3 Indeed (and perhaps the
most striking or extreme example is Andrew Guzman) there are those who
insist that explaining compliance is a central test or criterion for the adequacy
of any general theory of international law: “…[C]ompliance is one of the
most central questions in international law. Without a theory of compliance,
we cannot examine the role of treaties, customary international law, or other
agreements. Nor can we consider how to improve the functioning of the
international legal system, or develop a workable theory of international legal
and regulatory cooperation.” 4
The objective of this essay is to put in question the focus on
compliance in much recent international law scholarship. In our view, this
focus obfuscates the character of international legal normativity, tending to
3 See William Bradford, “International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography.”
4 California Law Review, p. 2.
2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551923
ignore the centrality of interpretation to the generation of legal meaning, as
well as the horizontal relation between diverse norms and regimes
(“fragmentation”). Looking at the aspirations of international law through the
lens of rule-compliance leads to inadequate scrutiny and understanding of the
diverse complex purposes and projects that multiple actors impose and
transpose on international legality, and especially a tendency to oversimplify
if not distort the relation of international law to politics.
As Benedict Kingsbury has observed, the recent emphasis on compliance
in legal scholarship has been accompanied by little critical thought about the
meaning of the concept of “compliance” this concept and the work it is
supposed to do in any theoretical account of international law. As Kingsbury
shows, a “compliance-based theory of international law” is an impossibility
since conceptions of the meaning and significance of compliance depend on
prior theoretical or conceptual constructs about the nature of international law
and—we ourselves would add—of law generally. 5
In part one of this paper, we attempt to explore the question of what
thinking about compliance studies can contribute to our understanding of
international law in general—and, more importantly, given the central
emphasis on compliance in much contemporary literature, the limits of this
contribution. We conclude that although the importance of compliance to an
overall understanding or theory of international law is less than is often
assumed in the literature, there is nevertheless a strong case for studying the
5 “The Concept of Compliance As a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law,” 19 Michigan Journal of Intl. Law 345 (1998).
3
real world effects of international law, for much the same reasons as in other
fields as well. In the second part, we argue that, nonetheless, the notion of
rule compliance is much too narrow an angle of vision to comprehend
international law’s normative effects. In this part of the paper, we seek to
sketch a broader framework for understanding these effects, which places
considerable emphasis on interpretation and cross-regime impact, elements
that are often lost or given inadequate emphasis in compliance studies. Finally
we consider the significance of the expanded discourse of international law
once there is a shift in terms of the debate over compliance
I Debating the place of compliance in international law
One reason that compliance is often seen as a central problem for
international legal scholarship is the positivist challenge that law is only
really law when accompanied by authoritative interpretation and enforcement
(see Morgenthau).
A focus on compliance, or more adequately perhaps
obedience (see Koh, cf. Henkin) aims to deflect such a claim by asserting that
there is a range of considerations, including reputational effects/long term
self-interest that lead to compliance with international law, regardless of the
absence of authoritative interpretation and enforcement in most instances.
Such a response at once proves too much and too little. There are
many domestic laws that attract widespread non-compliance despite
4
significant sanctions (drug laws and tax laws in many jurisdictions) 6 and
others that attract widespread compliance even though sanctions and
monitoring are relatively lax (seatbelt laws); thus the positivist claim is
already weak, if not incoherent, if the heart of the positivist claim is the
identification of the existence of authoritative interpretation and enforcement
with actual compliance. 7
But the positivist claim may at its root be conceptual: a formal,
definitional property of law ( as opposed other normative systems, religion,
morality, social and familial custom) is that “law” is the binding edict of a
sovereign with coercive force, at least in principle, over the subjects to whom
the legal commands are addressed. If this is so, then even if actual rates of
compliance with international law were superior to those for norms that are
commands of a sovereign with a monopoly of violence over the subjects of
law, demonstrating this would not itself be an answer to the positivist
objection. Indeed, many forms of normativity, including customs and
etiquette within particular sub-political communities, exhibit very high rates
of compliance or obedience, and the positivist has a point in that this does not,
in ordinary language, induce us to call them “laws.”
Perhaps by recognizing that such systems perform some functions
that are interchangeable with those of what is formally or conventionally
understood as “law,” legal scholars are increasingly devoting attention to so-
6 See for a recent inventory of laws that are underenforced and often uncomplied with in the US, Tim Wu, “American lawbreaking,” Slate, October 14, 2007.
7 It would also be at odds with sophisticated social science about why people actually do obey the law; see for example, T. R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006). Tyler found that a sense of legitimacy of the law is a more important factor than fear of punishment in most people’s law-abiding behavior, and that there was a
strong link between procedural justice and legitimacy.
5
called “informal” norms. Indeed, as Kratochwil has argued, distinguishing
“law” from other forms of social ordering is not a simple matter, it is
questionable whether and to what extent the existence of authoritative
interpretation and enforcement can be defended as decisive or even the most
important formal properties of law. 8 Historically, such a view may reflect the
function of law as an agent of rationalization, centralization, and
secularization of authority in the period that could crudely be described as the
rise of the modern nation state (Unger, Law in Modern Society; Max Weber,
Alexis de Tocqueville, “L’ancien regime et la revolution en France”). Why
should international law have to defend itself before the bar of such a
definition of law? Instead, might not the very proliferation of norms labeled
international law in our own, very different era affect how we approach the
meaning of legality? As Dzyenhaus suggests in a recent essay on Lon Fuller,
a focus on the enforcement mechanisms characteristic of domestic law may
distort rather than illuminate our understanding of how legality contributes to
human order: “how law or legality makes it possible for doctrinal issues about
rights and duties in international law to be resolved might actually tell us more
about the nature of law than the same issue in domestic law, since in the latter
domestic mechanisms exist that obscure the question.” 9
As early as the 1940s, the French-Russian philosopher Alexandre
Kojeve discerned the internal tension between the idea of sovereignty and the
positivist conception of law, in a world where many of the transactions and
8 F.V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge University Press, 1989,
pp. 187ff.
9 Dyzenhaus, “The Grudge Informer Case Revisited,” Hart/Fuller at 50 conference, NYU Law School
6
activities that sovereigns seek to regulate cross territorial boundaries.
Granting to positivist or behaviorist approaches that law to be fully law must
possess, in principle, irresistible force to compel its subjects, Kojeve noted
that these subjects and their activities frequently exceed the territorial bounds
of the sovereign; thus, purely domestic law is not fully law, against the
positivist’s own criterion, since its (in principle) irresistible force ends at the
border; only global law can become fully law, since it is capable of
recognition by all sovereigns and thus can become (in principle) irresistible
everywhere that the persons and activities that are its subjects may be
situated. 10 Thus, one ought to understand international law in the perspective
of the limits of the domestic law paradigm with respect to compliance.
A second, and certainly understandable, reason for focusing on
compliance is that there are some international legal norms that have
reciprocity has their fundamental normative and/or functional premise. An
obvious example is that of peace or disarmament treaties. The nightmare
scenario of one party innocently disarming pursuant to the obligations of the
treaty while the other secretly builds up its arsenals, acquiring a decisive
strategic advantage, has often fuelled skepticism about the capacity of
international law to solve the “security dilemma.” International trade treaties
also have significant reciprocity dimensions. Here an analogy may be drawn
to non-simultaneous contractual performance; general compliance studies
may yield some insights into the mechanisms or devices-monitoring,
verification, third party guarantees, self-help/retaliation-that are available to
10 A. Kojeve, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, ed. Frost, tr. Frost and Howse (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007(paperback edition).
7
address the problem.
Yet the current compliance focus in international
legal scholarship is not especially preoccupied with these issues; at least as
much attention if not more is given to multilateral human rights treaties,
which do not pose this kind of challenge or dilemma.
A third, not unrelated, reason why compliance has often been
emphasized in contemporary scholarship may relate to the concern to counter
or refute realist or “skeptical” positions that international law does not really
matter, because the ultimate causes of state behavior are to be found in selfinterest not legal obligation. Here, emphasizing compliance has at least two
drawbacks. The first is that such an emphasis reflects a too quick concession
to the way the realists/skeptics frame the test for whether international law
matters. The second, and obviously closely related, is that if one concedes the
realist/skeptic test, then showing real world normative effects will never be
enough to meet it.
Let us use the position of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner to illustrate
this claim. Goldsmith and Posner argue that most cited examples of
obedience to international law are cases where to do so is in the self-interest,
either short or long term, of the complying state. They suggest that these
cases somehow do not really “count” as a demonstration that international
law is an effective legal system. Goldsmith and Posner do acknowledge that
international law can provide useful communication and coordination
mechanisms where states seek to cooperate on the basis of mutual or
reciprocal self-interest, but that it cannot compel obedience against interests.
8
It is a curious criterion for the validity or even effectiveness of a legal
system that it should routinely command obedience from legal subjects
against their individual interests. Since lawfulness is often an endogenous
preference of individuals and indeed of sovereigns 11 , and since as Goldsmith
and Posner themselves observe, law itself can give rise to “self-interested”
reasons for compliance (e.g. reputational effects), it is unclear how any
empirical study could ever prove that compliance to law is exclusively or
decisively undertaken contrary to perceived self-interest.
Why should it matter to do so? This question is as pertinent for
domestic as for international law. Kant, for one, defined “law” (Recht) in
contradistinction to moral virtue as requiring only external obedience, not a
habit of mind that compels compliance from duty alone, regardless of
heteronomous considerations (Metaphysics of Morals). In some contexts,
law may serve an important function in constraining compulsive, passionate,
or impulsive behavior that will often be contrary to the long-term self-interest
of the legal subjects in question, based upon at least their first order
preferences (see Sunstein, Elster, Holmes). In other contexts, even where the
law has coercive state apparatus at its disposal (police, prisons, etc.) it has
been suggested to often be ineffective in constraining such behavior (e.g.
violence by socially disempowered young men) since deterrence through the
threat of punishment itself supposes some ability to take into account future
consequences.(Hernnstein and Wilson, Crime and Human Nature; but see
11 See the socialization theory of Goodman and Jinks.
9
critical review of some aspects of this work by Howse,
U.Toronto.Fac.L.Rev.).
While compliance cannot solve these kinds of objections to
international law and its relevance, understanding compliance is obviously
important if we care about whether the law realizes its purposes, i.e. on any
non-formalist, instrumentalist view of law, whether law and economics or
critical legal studies or moral and political theories of law of a perfectionist
character.
But here what we are interested in is the impact of the law in all
respects and compliance, unless one stretches the ordinary meaning of the
word to the breaking point, is much too narrow a lens for conceiving the
wide range of effects that can be produced by international law. Why
international law matters cannot be tested simply by examining “compliance”
in any of its common senses (conformity or obedience to rules or even
transformation of state conduct in a manner that conduces to the purposes of
the rules).
The effects of norms, including legal norms, have an inherent
complexity that as, Ruggie explains, defies the positivist aspiration to link
norms causally to discrete behavioral acts: “Norms may “guide” behavior,
they may “inspire” behavior, they may “rationalize” or “justify” behavior,
they may express “mutual expectations” about behavior, or they may be
ignored. But they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the
heart causes death or an uncontrolled surge in the money supply causes
10
inflation ... The impact of norms within international regimes is not a passive
process, which can be ascertained analogously to that of Newtonian laws
governing the collision of two bodies. Precisely, because state behavior
within regimes is interpreted by other states, the rationales and justifications
for behavior that are proffered, together with pleas for understanding or
admissions of guilt, as well as the responsiveness of such reasoning on the
part of other states, all are absolutely critical component parts of any
explanation involving the efficacy of norms. Indeed, such communicative
dynamics may tell us far more about how robust a regime is than overt
behavior alone.” 12
II : Moving beyond compliance
The following are some of the possible effects of international law
that are not captured by the notion of behavioral “compliance” with a “rule”
of law and not tested by studies that look only for rule-compliance, or some
surrogate for it, such as outcomes shifting in the direction supposedly sought
by the rules (some of these effects have been discussed in the compliance
literature, especially by subtle and careful scholars such as Goodman and
Jinks, Simmons, and Levit and we have learned much from their work;
however, the broader consequences have not been addressed, since such
12 John G. Ruggie, “Epistemology, ontology and the study of international regimes, in Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, Routledge, London and New York 1998, pp. 97-98.
Emphasis in original.
11
effects have been considered in the literature from the perspective of their
impact on compliance ).
--international law (norms and/or institutions such as courts and
tribunals) may shift in whole or in part decisionmaking, interpretative and/or
legitimating power from one set of elite actors to another (for example from
diplomats, foreign policy analysts and military planners to legal professionals
such as judges, lawyers and law professors). This effect is autonomous from
that of compliance: in some cases, legal professionalization may lead to more
compliance, and in some cases less. In others, it could even lead to
“ultracompliance” : effects that go beyond what is desired from the
perspective of the objectives of the legal regime, and which may even be
perverse. 13
--adhesion to international legal norms and/or perceived compliance
with them may be used as a basis for admitting states to a “club” with
privileges, as it were; characterizations of certain states as “outlaw,” “rogue”
or “scofflaw” regimes serve to justify the exclusion of such states from more
favorable treatment offered to others, and to legitimate harsher, more forceful
diplomatic, political and military strategies in relation to the “outsider” states.
This is an effect that is considered in relation to compliance by Goodman and
Jinks, for instance. However, it may have significant implications that go
beyond whether the prospect of membership can help induce compliance,
13 With respect to enhanced legalization in the WTO, Joseph Weiler notes: “Whether the shift in legal paradigm has been a victory for the Rule of Law or merely a victory for the rule of
lawyers is a very serious matter on which the jury is still out. There are some very thoughtful actors and observers who are seriously wondering whether the “historical deal” has truly been
beneficial to some of the deeper objectives of the WTO such as establishing stability and “peaceful economic relations”. J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement,” Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/00, p. 4.
12
affecting the capacity of individuals from those states to travel and trade, for
example, or determinations of refugee status, or the perceived political risk of
foreign direct investment. Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge this effect, in
referring to the “standard of civilization” function of human rights treaties;
but curiously they appear to dismiss this function as an indicator that
international human rights law matters, since (contrary to what Goodman and
Jinks speculate) 14 in deploying their reductive perspective it does not as such
lead to “compliance.”
-international law can affect the way that policymakers view
international problems and conflicts (for example in terms of clashes of rights
as opposed to balancing of political or economic interests) and their
perception of the constituencies to whom they are accountable in addressing
such problems and conflicts. In the Balkans, resolving the conflict, and
building post-conflict societies, somehow became identified with the
prosecution of crimes against humanity at the ICTY. The role that
international criminal law could play in achieving these goals was arguably
exaggerated, leading to a relative neglect of other processes, such as local
truth commissions, the building of grassroots democratic institutions and the
reconstruction of civil society. 15 In the case of the 2006 Lebanon war, the
complex security issues raised by Hezbollah’s entrenchment in Lebanon and
the role of Syria were overshadowed in public discourse by claims and
counterclaims concerning the commission of war crimes by either or both
14 Fn Goodman and Jinks
15 Teitel, Bringing the Messiah through the Law, Human Rights in Transition (Post & Hesse, Zone Press).
13
sides during the conflict The broad political and economic considerations
that might be served by integrating Serbia into the European Union have been
almost entirely overshadowed by the concern that Serbia has failed
adequately to cooperate with the ICTY prosecution of war criminals. Indeed,
compliance has become the central issue with respect to Serbian accession to
EU, where “compliance” with international law is viewed as a surrogate for or
symbol of political “cooperation.”
Despite the commitment to positivism, the application of preexisting
law according to criminal justice principles and concepts, the tribunals have
also reflected “teleological goals” (Tadic) including broader, non criminal
justice goals such as peace etc in the region. 16 As the ICTY appellate
chamber held in a sentencing ruling, the law applied “must serve broader
normative purposes in light of its social, political and economic role…”
Consider what compliance might mean in the context of the
International Criminal Court. In this regard, just how important is the fact of
signatories turning defendants over to the ICC as an indicia of “compliance”?
Or, might “compliance” be evaluated through analyzing a complex set of
behaviors in a longer time frame: commitment to the norms themselves via
the act of signing (see Goodman and Jinks on joining human rights treaty
regimes; see also Simmons); incorporating these norms via legislating into
domestic law, the embarking on prosecutions policy in domestic courts, e.g.
UK trials of their soldiers in Iraq; or, cooperating with other countries in their
16 Tadic.
14
prosecutions via a variety of actions including, rendition, extradition.. e.g .
Chile’s extradition of Fujimori back to his home country to face rights
charges. 17 The normative and positive law innovations triggered by the
establishment of and commitment to the ICC might thus lead to prosecutions
of a kind never contemplated by the jurisdiction of the Court itself, such as
for crimes committed in the distant past. This is a clear instance of
ultracompliance. Furthermore, the sense in which there is a layered
normativity can be seen in the importance of the behavior of non-signatories
whose behavior may nevertheless be shaped by the legal regime in question.
Thus, a compliance driven theory does not capture US actions in embarking
upon prosecutions policies in the orbit of the ICC.
- by transforming policies into legal norms, international law may
reinforce those policies in the presence of indeterminacy and controversy
concerning their effects and their substantive rationales (the
“constitutionalization” of elements of the Washington Consensus in WTO
law). Thus instead of changing behavior directly, international legal norms
here may make it more possible or less costly for a state to adhere to an
existing or recently adopted policy course, despite increasing internal
disagreement and dissent concerning the merits of that policy course. Thus
Simmons 18 and Moravcik 19 have pointed out that acceptance of or creation of
international or transnational human rights norms may serve to “lock in” a
transition to democracy and the “rule of law,” increasing the costs of
17 See “Chile returns Fujimori to Peru to face Rights Charges,” Simon Romero, NY Times at A10 (Sept 23 2007)
18 Cite.
19 Cite.
15
resistance or reversion. These observations vindicate Jon Elster’s 20 notion
that precommitment is never about tying one’s own hands but rather someone
else’s, in this case elements within a transitional society who may seek a
return to authoritarianism.
Precommitment can play the expressive function
of reinforcing the beliefs of citizens that there is no turning back and that as
exemplified in international norms the policy choice chosen has a universal
force-or at least that “world history” is on the side of the transition. This
example points to an internal difficulty within the “compliance” perspective.
Goldsmith and Posner, for example, maintain that unlike ratification of
human rights treaties, “democracy, peace and economic development” have
been shown to enhance human rights protection 21 ; however, this contrast
assumes that democracy, peace and economic development occur entirely
exogenous of the effects of international human rights law. If, as just
suggested, international human rights law helps to lock in transitions to
peaceful democratic conditions, then it may ultimate lead to what is usually
conceived of as compliance, but only through a normative effect that is
caught in the first instances by focusing on something other than rulecompliance.
-international law may create benchmarks for a wide range of private
decisionmaking, and this even when in the first instance the rules in question
have not been explicitly addressed at least not traditionally to non-state actors.
Such benchmarks may affect to whom firms lend, with whom they deal as
20 Ulysses Unbound.
21 P.121.
16
suppliers or sub-contractors, design specifications for products such as ships
and aircraft, the terms of such diverse transactions as the adoption of children,
the transportation of hazardous products and the transfer of high technology.
Private actors may simply adopt these benchmarks as common terms of
commerce regardless of the extent to which they have been “implemented” by
states. Thus, here again, the notion of “compliance” does not capture fully
the normative effect.
-conversely, the transnational customs or norms of non-state actors or
institutions that are dominated by non-state actors may become “international
law” through being legalized in a treaty process; the example of the Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement in the WTO, which creates a legal obligation on
states to use international standards (often promulgated by non-state
organizations) for mandatory regulations is a telling one. Here, looking at
state “compliance” tells only a small part of the story of the effects of
strengthening the norm through “legalization” on the actual operation of
markets, consumer choice, etc. (these kinds of effects, that move between as
it were public and private transnational behavior and public and private normsetting and interpretation, have begun to receive attention through the Global
Administrative Law project, led by Kingsbury, Richard Stewart and their
collaborators).
-quite beyond being formally “implemented” in domestic legal rules,
international law may affect the interpretation of domestic law. Viewing such
interpretation simply as part and parcel of “compliance” is inadequate or
17
limiting. The invocation of international law in the interpretative process can
serve a variety of jurisprudential purposes that may have little to do with
“compliance” as such. 22 In using an international legal norm for
interpretative purposes may give a reading or effect to such a norm that is
different from that which the agents of an international regime may have
intended, assuming one could ascertain such an intention. Important
normative effects may occur through cross-regime interpretation. Ignorance
of such effects may lead to serious underestimation of the influence or
particular legal regimes or institutions. For example, international
environmental law, including soft law, has shaped the way in which the WTO
Appellate Body has interpreted norms of international trade law in a number
of cases. 23 Koskenniemi observes: “A legal regime such as the European or
Inter-American human rights convention makes constant reference to general
international law without any act of incorporation. The International Criminal
Tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are all the time applying law
that comes from beyond their constituent instruments. Tribunals having to
deal with State contracts with foreign companies frequently fill gaps and
solve inconsistencies by reference to something like a natural law of the
transnational commercial system. Even when the law appears to step aside so
as to give room for political expediency – as arguably happened in the
Lockerbie case in 1992 where the International Court of Justice affirmed that
Security Council decisions override the rights of States under particular
22 See Teitel, Harvard Law Review essay on comparative constitutionalism.
23 Howse, IILJ Working Paper (2007)
18
treaties - this took place as an inference from Article 103 of the UN
Charter.” 24
While Eric Posner, an international legal scholar heavily focused on
compliance tends to dismiss the influence of the International Court of
Justice, based on the number of judgments it has emitted and their
purportedly distant affects on the controversies decided, 25 the jurisprudential
acquis of the ICJ on such essential questions as state responsibility,
countermeasures, and treaty interpretation has been repeatedly invoked, in for
example, investor-state arbitrations, characterized by compulsory jurisdiction
and a “hard law” remedy, i.e. monetary damages that can be enforced in
domestic court. Along similar lines, sources such as the European
Convention on Human Rights and its interpretation by the European Court of
Human Rights have been used by investor-state tribunals.
Another illustration of the growing area reflecting the influence of
international law is seen in the contemporary controversy over the
importation of international law in interpretations of domestic constitutional
law, eg Roper v Simmons, and Lawrence v Texas where the United States
Supreme Court referred to a number of opinions interpreting analogous
provisions in international covenants for their “confirmatory” value.26
-rather obviously legal agents bargain in the shadow of the law. We
have already mentioned how international law may shape or affect the terms
24 M. Koskenniemi, “Constitutionalism as a Mindset: Reflections on Kantian themes about international law and globalization,” paper presented at Tel Aviv University, December 2005,
p. 8.
25 Posner, “The Decline of the International Court of Justice,” Olin Working Paper, University of Chicago Law School, 204.
26 See Roper at ; Lawrence at ….
19
of bargains or transactions between non-state actors, who are not even
directly bound by the rules in question, typically. States, instead of simply
“complying” with international legal rules may bargain in light of them.
Once again, “compliance-based” theories of international law do not really
have an analytic for understanding such settlements: are they really to be
thought of as non-compliance (since the parties have adopted a solution that
deviates from the given rule in some respects or may be driven to settle out of
uncertainty as to whether even if the legal claim is good the other party will
comply)? While under the influence of the Coase theorem, domestic law and
economics scholars have examined many contexts where, given transaction
costs, background legal rules affect the shape of bargains, the analysis of how
international legal rules affect interstate settlements has largely been
neglected. (One exception is the work of Busch and Reinhardt on why
countries settle disputes within the WTO legal framework). As is illustrated
by the Canada-US softwood lumber dispute uncertainty about compliance can
be a major factor in inducing a settlement (in that case uncertainty concerning
whether the US would comply with further WTO and NAFTA rulings, given
its track record of poor compliance up to that point).
The settlement in
question would be hard to explain if there were no legal rules at all
constraining the ability of the United States to impose trade restrictions on
imports of Canadian lumber (and certainly inexplicable on realist terms since
the US is the far greater power), but equally inexplicable (in its details at
least) if Canada had confidence that its legal claims would result in US
20
compliance. Thus international legal rules can produce distinctive effects,
and shape behavior, on account of uncertainty about compliance.
In a very different context, that of the international legal duty to
punish crimes against humanity, recently reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Bosnia
v. Serbia case, the increasing likelihood of such prosecutions given the
creation of an international criminal court, may well affect peace or regime
transition bargains between parties to a conflict, for instance making it more
difficult or less plausible to use amnesties as a bargaining chip for acceptance
of a peaceful, negotiated transition. 27 On the other hand, with the ICC in the
background now, with its ability to enforce international criminal law during
an ongoing conflict, more cautious or restrained behavior by some of the
participants in the conflict may result, and this could actually make a
transitional bargain easier. In other words, the effects of international
criminal law on transitional or peace settlements in conflicts are likely to be
complex. But these effects do not even come into focus if one centers the
analysis on effects on “compliance” with the duty to prosecute and/or the duty
to cooperate with the ICC for instance.
-as already noted, international law can produce “ultracompliance”, by
which we mean it can have normative effects that are greater or more
powerful or different than what may be desired or consistent with the values
or intentionality that might plausibly be attributed to the “creators” of the
norms. Because of interpretative uncertainty and asymmetries of information,
27 See Snyder for critique , …..
21
governments have been able to invoke international legal rules to justify
policy directions, even where alternative policies could be defended under
reasonable interpretations of those rules. This has especially been the case
with trade liberalization agreements, such as the WTO treaties, where many
of the obligations in question are accompanied by exceptions provisions that
allow a wide range of legitimate policy interventions.
In the case of
intellectual property rights, the United States government and the
pharmaceutical industry convinced many governments and non-governmental
actors that the WTO TRIPs agreement compulsory licensing exception from
patent rights was largely un-useable, eventually giving rise to the need for a
negotiated text to clarify this matter.
Similarly, international human rights and humanitarian law have been
deployed to justify to varying degrees and may have actually spurred forceful
interventions in for instance Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq; in the case of
Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the same time such interventions appear to
have themselves to some extent undermined human rights and humanitarian
values and objectives, especially given the impact on civilian populations.
The concept of “compliance” simply doesn’t capture the extremely significant
complexity and tension in the countervailing normative effects here: a single
act can be seen from the perspective of an attempt to enforce compliance with
a given norm (“humanitarian intervention”) but also, as a violation of it
(where there are disproportionate effects on civilians, for instance). This was
raised regarding NATO intervention in Kosovo, is being raised now re the
ongoing casualties in Afghanistan; and, unquestionably, at stake in the
22
deteriorating sequence of events on the ground in Iraq which has further
delegitimized the humanitiarian/human rights case for intervention.
III. Thinking about the broader meaning(s) in an expanded
international law discourse
Broadening our understanding of the real world effects of
international law beyond the notion of “compliance” is a valuable exercise but
there is at least one sense in which it will not satisfy the realist/skeptics any
more than compliance studies. In the case of Goldsmith and Posner at least,
they ask for further proof that the effects in question result from the character
of the norms as law. For instance, humanitarianism as a political ideology or
morality might have similar effects, even if not packaged as human rights and
humanitarian law. But as Goldsmith and Posner recognize, this would then
cause us to ask why states invest resources in translating these norms into a
legal form. Their answer is that, at least in some contexts, the use of the
language of law communicates a level of “seriousness” to a commitment that
may have consequences for how other actors respond in their own behavior
and the reputational consequences of reneging on these commitments. 28
A different answer, more pertinent in their view to explaining
international human rights “law” is that, states tend to want to justify their
actions in universalist terms, and the language of law is particularly amenable
28
23
to this, given its “formal” character. 29 States need to water down their
rhetoric to appeal to more and more audiences and “law” that does not (in
principle) have such a content tied to particular religious, moral or
civilizational outlook serves well this purpose.
Perhaps Goldsmith and Posner are right that the resort to “law” has
significance in defining what is common, a set of norms that is public and
capable of expression and rationalization in general terms. Beyond these
formal qualities of “law,” however, the legacy of World War II and more
recently of the Cold War has associated the “rule of law” with a set of thicker,
more substantive values: limited government, objective and impartial
treatment of individuals by the state, lack of arbitrariness generally, the
rejection of open-ended struggle and violence, decent and bearable order.
Perhaps it is, in part, because these kinds of associations with “law” and what
gives international law its apparent contemporary appeal, that the language of
constitutionalism or constitutionalization has come increasingly to be applied
to what is perceived as the current trajectory of international law. 30
In many
societies, belief in the capacity of politics and/or economics to guide solutions
to basic global problems has eroded. In these circumstances, “Law” has
enough positive resonance, at least in its constitutionalist versions, to have
become a preferred vocabulary for social order and for legitimating decisions
of governance.
29 Pp. 182-184.
30 Cite Habermas, Koskenniemi, Petersmann, Cass, Howse and Nicolaidis.
24
Unlike Goldsmith and Posner on the one hand, and international law
“utopians” on the other, we worry not so much that international law boils
down to ineffective or largely meaningless (in real world terms) rhetoric but
rather that instead it has, in a range of contexts, been all too effective. In
altering the focus and agenda of states and non-state actors in dealing with
conflict and post-conflict transitions, international law may have raised
expectations too high that where politics and economics, and for that matter
moral idealism, have failed to solve enduring human problems, law will
succeed. We have already given one very vivid example of such arguably
excessive expectations, namely the hopes pinned on international criminal
justice for successful post-conflict transitions and even more so, for bringing
about a world free of dehumanizing conflicts. The messy and contingent
business of brokering political deals between groups and factions, and of
economic reconstruction 31 has become less glamorous than that of trying and
punishing the “villains” (however worthy and justified in itself).
In sum, it may well be true as an abstract matter that it is not only or
exclusively legal normativity that would be capable of producing effects of
the kind we have identified in this paper, and that at other times and places
other forms of normativity might serve similar functions in international order
(religious, moral, political norms, for instance). But such an essentializing,
timeless claim on behalf of law as a distinctive type of normativity is hardly
necessary to defend the proposition that international law matters in all kinds
31 In these particular respects, we see merit to David Kennedy’s concerns about the apolitical or purportedly transpolitical outlook of humanitarian jurists. See Kennedy, The Dark Sides
of Virtue.
25
of ways for us, here and now. 32 Further, as Liam Murphy has eloquently
argued in a recent paper, a careful examination of debates about the “concept”
of law shows the extreme difficulty or perhaps impossibility of drawing stable
unambiguous boundaries between “law” and other kinds of normativity. 33
The extraordinary range of normative effects generated by international law
may well be a product of our distinctive historical situation, just as realist or
national interest-based approaches to the right conduct of international
relations may understandably have been a dominant frame at other times,
such as during the cold war.
Nevertheless, there are those such as Goldsmith and Posner, who assume
that there is a timeless framework for international relations whereby states
always turn to morality and/or law to justify or explain their actions, but it is
self-interest that motivates these actions. In fact this is an even more radical
challenge to the notion that international law matters, or at least matters a lot
(of course, Goldsmith and Posner have to admit that rhetoric performs some
function, otherwise states would not invest in it). On this view, the basic facts
of war and peace, who is powerful and who is not in the international system,
are determined or pre-determined by self-interested behavior, and so whatever
justificatory rhetoric may exist at a given time, it does not alter or transform
those facts. Indeed, the very structure of this argument further indicates why
studies of compliance, however methodologically sound, cannot put to bed, as
it were, skepticism about whether international law matters. Even a very
32 Interestingly, in the Minos, Plato has Socrates define the relevant question that begins the dialogue as “What is law for us?” This evokes the possibility that the very character of “law”
is such that the “what is” question cannot be posed outside the context of actual practices of law, or the givenness of law as a historical practice (and/or, perhaps, divine revelation) is the
phenomenon to which analysis must be addressed.
33 Murphy, “Better to See Law This Way,” Hart/Fuller at Fifty conference, NYU Law School.
26
well designed regression analysis cannot test for the internal motivation that
generates a given behavior. 34 The question of whether and to what extent
particular state behaviors are generated by considerations of justice or
interest, or some mix thereof, has been a matter of moral-philosophical
speculation at least since Thucydides.
Analytically, however, we emphasize a difficulty with the role of selfinterest in the skeptical theory of Goldsmith and Posner, to which we already
alluded earlier: it is incoherent on their rational choice view of domestic
politics to define a state’s self-interest as exogenous of the preferences of its
citizens. Yet, citizens may care for international law for different reasons
than those adduced by Goldsmith and Posner in the case of states, in reality
political leaders of states—namely justificatory rhetoric. Indeed, if citizens
did not care about justice, it would be unclear why states would need to invest
in such rhetoric: who would they hope to persuade? For if states are aware
that other states like themselves act only from self-interest not from the
considerations advanced in their justificatory rhetoric, then they would
certainly not be investing in the rhetoric in the hope of persuading other
states, or more precisely, their political leaders.
Conclusion
34 Thus, in the domestic law context, studies of what motivates people to obey the law need to rely on survey tools. See Tyler, Why People Obey the Law. Since, especially today
international law “compliance” engages in fact a wide range of actors—a fact often, as we observe in this paper, ignored in the literature, which still in large measure focuses on behavior
of “states” as if they were autonomous, unique agents—such studies of motivation in the international law context would need to survey the various actors in question, both within the state
apparatus formally responsible for determining compliance-related decisions on behalf of the state, and others to whom the rules are addressed in part directly (soldiers who may be
personally criminally liable for war crimes, etc.). Some of the best literature, such as Janet Levit (examining rules on concessional trade finance), does, at least anecdotally, attempt to
grasp the complexity with which the motivations of different actors leads to compliances outcomes with respect to international legal norms.
27
Moving beyond “compliance” as a central concept of international legal
theory and inquiry opens up new horizons, or at least suggests new emphases
in international legal scholarship and a recasting of certain of the predominant
debates. First of all, empirical inquiry or theoretical speculation as to how
much “compliance” there is with respect to international law, and how and
why it happens, cannot as such play much of a role in the debate about
whether international law is “law” or what it contributes to global that some
other non-legal discourse—cosmopolitan moralism, for example—would not
contribute. What one needs is much more reflection on those properties of
“law” that it possesses which make international law distinctive as a mode of
discourse in international order, and then to see the effects of international
law through such an understanding. This could give new purchase on some
old puzzles such as the meaning and rationale of “soft law”; it may be that
“soft law” is effective, for example, because it possesses the relevant or
desirable “law” characteristics for the purposes in question (transparency,
generality, connection to common or widely shared norms and practices),
while not itself possessing the “bindingness” characteristic. law.
Furthermore, an implication of going beyond compliance, is a great deal more
attention to interpretation as the manner in which international law creates
effects in the world. Interpretation is pervasively determinative of what
happens to legal rules when they are out in the world; and yet “compliance”
studies begin with the notion that to look at effects, we start with an assumed
stable and agreed meaning to a rule, and whether it is complied with or
obeyed, so understood. Standard search techniques reveal a large and
28
burgeoning literature on “compliance” and (this workshop series
notwithstanding) a general dearth of literature on “interpretation” as central
for international legal inquiry: to understand properly the working of
international law in the world would probably entail reversing that emphasis.
29