539 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.3, 2015| p. 539-584 the situation in YEMEN João Arthur da Silva Reis1 Patrícia Graeff Machry2 Pedro Henrique Prates3 ABSTRACT This study guide aims to embrace the most important issues regarding the present situation in Yemen, in order to provide a basis for understanding and debate over the topic. To do so, this paper is divided into five sections. The Historical Background will explain Yemen’s historical formation, the roots of the North-South divide, its colonial past, as well as the trajectory of both states during the second half of 20th century. This session ends with an overview of the major problems in recently-unified Yemen as well as a description of Arab-Spring-related events in 2011. The Statement of the Issue will concentrate in describing the country’s most influential political factions which are parties of the current conflict. Later, it will provide a description of the events from the fall of Hadi’s government onwards, including the highlights of the civil war and the subsequent intervention led by Saudi Arabia. The Previous International Action session shall list the actions taken and the International and Regional sphere to deal with the situation in Yemen, as well as analyzing UNSC approved resolutions and related documents. The Bloc Positions will concentrate on the UNSC members’ interests and arguments used in debates regarding the situation in Yemen. At the end, the Question to Ponder shall provide five main questions that may guide the debate. 1 João Arthur is a final year student of International Relations at UFRGS and director at UNSC. 2 Patrícia is a 4th year student of International Relations at UFRGS and director at UNSC. 3 Pedro Henrique is a 3rd year student of International Relations at UFRGS and assistant director at UNSC. UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 540 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Examining Yemen’s history is critical to understand its current crisis. Its history has been marked by several foreign invasions that encountered strong resistance, which led the country to be called “Turks’ graveyard” and the “Vietnam” of both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. 1.1 ORIGINS OF YEMEN’S DIVIDE Before the Islamic conquest, many kingdoms and City-States occupied the region. The occupiers lived mainly of the spice trade, especially myrrh and incense, with nearby civilizations. The most notable were the kingdoms of Minean, Sabean, Himyarite, Qataban and Hadhramawt. With the decline of trade after the fourth century, the kingdoms declined and the area became isolated from the world (Etheredge 2011). The birth of Islam in the seventh century and its subsequent expansion quickly reached Yemen, which became a prominent provider of soldiers for the caliphate (Burrowes 1995). Two centuries later, the Zaydis, a Shiite Islamic1 sect that believes that Zayd ibn Ali is the legitimate successor of the Prophet, established themselves in the mountainous region in north Yemen. The sect ruled such area until 1962, putting it under the Imam’s authority, a religious and political leader. Although the Imans rule has ended, the Zayd sect still has a strong influence on politics, representing about forty percent of the population and predominating in the army (Auchterlonie and Smith 1998). In the twelfth century, most of the Southern population, especially Aden, adopted the Sunni Shafii sect. This North-South religious divide is still present in the current Yemeni society, with both sects dividing the country geographically in half (Burrowes 1995). The Southern and coastal regions of Yemen lived a period of great prosperity from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, especially due to the spices and coffee trade and its strategic location. In order to avoid the presence of foreign 1 There are two main sects in Islam: the Shia and the Sunni. This division came from a political dispute in the early days of Islam. Roughly, the former believes that the religious leader must be a descendant of the Prophet, and their laws are based directly on Koran. The latter follows the laws of the Koran and the Sunnah. Zaydis are part of the Shiite sect, but are considered closer to the Sunni practice than to others Shiites. UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 541 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL powers in the region - namely Portugal - the Ottomans invaded Yemen in 1538 (first conquering Aden), taking both North and South. However, the invasion’s high costs caused their withdrawal in 1635 (Auchterlonie and Smith 1998). After the victory over the Ottomans, the Zaidys managed to consolidate their power in both North and South until the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, however, the Southern tribes gradually separated from the North (Burrowes 1995, Kour 2005). Image 1: Yemen’s Ethnic-Religious Composition Source: Izady 2013. In 1839, the British conquered Aden and put it under British India’s jurisdiction until 1937, as they were looking for a midway port on the route to India and to ensure their presence in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (Etheredge 2011). In the decades following the occupation, the British signed a series of treaties with the “Nine Tribes” in the vicinity of Aden, due to the growing threat from foreign powers (especially the Ottomans) and from the tribes in Aden’s hinterland. These agreements ensured the protection by the British UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 542 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations against other powers without interfering in internal tribal affairs, consolidating an informal system called the “Protectorate of Aden¨. This period increased the differentiation between “city” and “tribes”, as the settlers took a series of measures to isolate Aden from the region, ultimately launching the basis for the posterior Southern separatism. The port city gained further prominence with the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), which connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean (Willis 2004). In 1849, the Ottoman Empire invaded Northern Yemen again, and the occupation lasted until its own dissolution at the end of World War I, in 1918. The main reason to occupy Yemen once more was to establish a buffer zone between the British and the important city of Mecca (Farah 2002). After a few disputes in the Ottoman and British ruled territories, both parties negotiated its demarcation in 1902-1905, setting the borders that were maintained until the unification of the two Yemens in 1990 (Willis 2004, Auchterlonie and Smith 1998). After the First World War and the consequent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Imam declared North Yemen’s independence. In 1934, a rising Saudi Arabia won a border war against North Yemen, and took the territories of Asir, Jizan and Najran in the later peace treaty. Fred Halliday (2005) argues that such conquest: laid the basis for a Saudi–Yemen conflict, and much Yemeni resentment, that was to last for decades. Only in June 2000, at a summit between Prince Abdullah and President Al-Abdullah [Saleh], was a comprehensive agreement on this frontier, the longest undelineated one in the world, reached. That very night all Saudi aid to the Yemeni opposition was stopped, and various media activities associated with them, and based in London, abruptly interrupted (Halliday 2005, 178). In the South, Aden became an official British colony in 1937, no longer staying under the Indian colonial government jurisdiction. This administrative change was followed by a larger allocation of British troops and the opening of a British Petroleum refinery, which resulted in an economic boom, turning the port into one of the busiest in the world (Burrowes 1995). In 1959, England, trying to stem the growing Arab nationalism in the region (mostly from Egypt), included the tribes of the Protectorate of Aden into a Federation, to which the city of Aden was added in 1963 (Auchterlonie and Smith 1998). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 543 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1.2 THE “TWO YEMENS” AND THE UNIFICATION PROCESS The 1960s saw both regions experiencing a period of crisis: the North involved in a long and bloody civil war and the South struggled for independence from the British. According to Halliday (1990, 8), four main factors led to the growth of the independence movement: “colonial policy and its changes, socio-economic development, the growth of Arab nationalism, and the 1962 revolution in North Yemen”. After three years of an intense conflict of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the British evacuated from Yemen in 1967. The pro-independence militias, notably the National Liberation Front (NLF), established a new state, the People’s Republic of South Yemen (Brown 1984). Meanwhile, a seven-year-long civil war took place in North Yemen, after a republican coup that followed the Imam’s death in 1962. The conflict opposed monarchists, supported by Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UK, and the republicans, backed by Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union. President Abdullah al-Sallal attempted to establish a republic based on the Egyptian formula, and therefore the war was framed by the struggle for regional influence between Egypt (pan-Arabism and republicanism) and Saudi Arabia (conservative monarchy). Additionally, Yemen’s strategic location was of vital importance for both countries: the first sought an ally at the exit of the Suez Canal, and the Saudis wanted to prevent the emergence of a strong country on the perimeter that could spread republicanism in its sphere of influence (Ferris 2015). Since the beginning, Egyptian military were deployed to the country, and as the conflict escalated, its numbers rose to around 70,000 troops. As the losses amounted to about 10,000 men, the high political and economic costs for the country led to a withdrawal, especially after the defeat in the war with Israel in 1967 (Ferris 2015). Ultimately, Sallal was overthrown from the republican movement’s leadership, and a coalition between Republicans and Monarchists which excluded the Imam - was created after a peace negotiation process. It was the birth of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) (Brown 1984). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 544 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations Image 2: North and South Yemen prior to unification Source: Wikimedia Commons 2011. The two recently born countries then took different paths. In the People’s Republic of South Yemen, an internal coup led NFL’s left wing to assume the government. In 1970, the country changed its name to People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), assuming a policy embracing socialism and aligning to the socialist bloc, particularly to the USSR (Halliday 1990). The Soviets then established a maintenance base for ships near Aden, important due to the vital commercial and logistical sea routes from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The PDRY also played an important political role in the region, by financing guerrillas in neighboring countries (including in the YAR) and harboring foreign revolutionaries (Halliday 1990). Despite some progress after the economy’s nationalization and other socializing reforms, the country remained poor and dependent on foreign aid (mostly from the USSR) and income from migrants. The economy suffered a severe blow on the occasion of the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, amid the Six Days War. Two violent political crises subsequently shook South Yemen. In 1978, a single party model was adopted and the NFL was converted into the Yemen Socialist Party. An intraparty struggle in 1986 led to a self-destruction and virtual decapitation of YSP’s leadership, causing the emergence of Ali Salim al-Beidh as the new leader (Halliday 1990, Burrowes 1995). This chain of events that deeply destabilized the country paved the way for future unification with UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 545 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL the North. The contrasting scenario of relative economic development and political stability in the North further deepened such trend. As the North started opening its economy, an exodus of workforce (mainly to Saudi Arabia) took place, as well as the arrival of many foreign experts to help in the modernization of its economy. After a series of political crisis, in 1974, 1977 and 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh took power and stabilized the country. Formal democracy was introduced in 1982, and oil began to be exported in 1987. The economic development and political stability in the YAR and economic and political crisis in the PDRY facilitated the process of unification in 1990 (Auchterlonie and Smith 1998). The unity was in question since the independence of the South, as both countries oscillated between war and cooperation. In 1972 and 1979, border skirmishes between the two Yemens were followed by the signature of political declarations with intentions to unify the countries. After a short crisis due to petroleum extraction in the border, the leaders of the two Yemens agreed to initiate the process of unification in 1989-1990 (Burrowes 1995). The Republic of Yemen became formally a multiparty democracy with Ali Abdullah Saleh (former Yemen Arab Republic’s President) as the President and with Ali Salem al Beidh (former Leader of Yemen Socialist Party) as the Vice-President. From the beginning, the new country was shaken by a crisis. In 1991, as a response to the Yemeni support to Iraq in the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemenites from its territory, creating a new mass of unemployed and reducing a major source of income of the Yemeni economy. Although the unification achieved some success in democratization, the armies of formers PDRY and YAR were still not unified, and some factions of society, like the Muslim community and the former Southern elite, still opposed the unification (Burrowes 1995). In 1993, although belonging to different political parties, Saleh and Beidh run for President and Vice-president respectively, and they won the general elections, but the former’s party won the majority in legislative elections. In 1994, vice-president Ali Salem al Beidh, claiming an economic and political discrimination of the South, isolated himself in Aden and proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). This led to a short civil war, won by the North, that once again unified Yemen. In 1997, new elections were held, leading to a major victory of the President’s UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 546 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations party, General People’s Congress (60%), and Al-Islah (20%), an Islamic party (Burrowes 1995). By 2005, the economy was not growing enough to keep up with the growing population, exacerbating social problems (Etheredge 2011). According to Visentini (2014), President Saleh ruled his country through buying loyalty from tribes, distributing favors and allying with local oligarchies, as the country faced problems like unemployment, declining oil revenues, water scarcity and population high growth rates. Furthermore, three problems concerned the government even before the Arab Spring: Houthis’ insurgency, Southern separatism and the Al-Qaeda (Visentini 2014)2. The first started as an armed conflict in 2004, when the Zaydi Leader Husayn al-Houthi and his followers chanted anti-US and anti-Israel slogans in pacific protests. The government took violent actions to stop the protests, which were responded with more violence by the Houthis. The group leader was considered a threat and was killed by the government in 2004. From then to 2010, there were several fights between the government and the Houthis. With the increasing violence, more and more tribes from the North started to call themselves “Houthis” (Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells 2010). The second problem was Southern separatism. This movement gained force once again in 2007, although it remained mostly pacific. The people of the South claim that they were put aside in the country’s politics (Visentini 2014). Although only a fifth of Yemen’s population lives in the South, it accounts for more than 80 percent of the oil exports and for most of the country’s sources of revenue, due to the Aden-located refinery and its port (Al-Batati 2014). The question regarding Al-Qaeda gained importance in 2000, after the terrorist attack on USS Cole3, at Aden harbor. Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks led the United States to seek cooperation with President Saleh against the growing terrorism threat inside the country, notably in the Eastern region. The United States provided men and resources, and launched several drone strikes in Yemen since 2002. However, Al-Qaeda from Yemen and Saudi Arabia managed to organize and consolidate itself as the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 2 These three questions are furthered below. For further information, check the Statement of the Issue’s “Local factions, political groups and divisions” subsection. 3 On October, 2000, the USS Cole destroyer was refueling at Aden’s port when suicide terrorists exploded a small boat next to it, killing 17 US citizens and injuring many others (CNN Library 2014). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 547 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL in 2009, quickly becoming the group’s most active branch (Visentini 2014). 1.3 THE ARAB SPRING AND THE COLLAPSE OF SALEH’S GOVERNMENT The wave of protests known as the Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011. Early protests were peaceful and directed against corruption and asking for more democracy, better living conditions, and the resignation of President Saleh, which had been ruling the country for 33 years. The government fiercely repressed the protests, killing 45 protesters in March, which further mobilized the people of Yemen (Naylor 2015). This led to an escalation of violence, with several tribal leaders and army deserters joining the opposition forces. The US and Saudi Arabia, former allies of Saleh, supported the movement to remove him from power, as the costs of maintaining support towards him became too high (Visentini 2014). After many clashes between loyalists and opposition forces, Saleh negotiated his resignation with the Gulf Cooperation Council4. However, Saleh stepped back in three occasions, until the escalation of the conflict led to a direct attack on the presidential palace, seriously injuring the President. The president went to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. In his absence, Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi took power, although he was unable to control the deteriorating situation. The instability in the country also exacerbated previous problems, as the Houthis insurgency, Al-Qaeda (which expanded its area of influence and operation) and internal tribal struggles (Visentini 2014). In September Saleh returned to the country, finally signing resigning his resignation from power two months later. Hadi ascended to power, holding the responsibility to promote new elections. The opposition, mainly the Joint Meeting Parties5, was divided and could not compete with the situation. Elections were held in early 2012 with Hadi as the only candidate, winning the “dispute” and assuming the Presidency of the Republic of Yemen (Visentini 2014). 4 The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 and has Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates as members. It has as its main goal the economic, social and security integration of its members. 5 The Joint Meeting Parties was formed in 2002 in an attempt to challenge the GPC in Yemen politics. It is formed by the alliance of five opposition groups, including the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and Islah, which is the strongest member (Crisis Group 2011). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 548 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations 2 statement of the issue Even though Abed-Rabbo Mansou Hadi was Saleh’s vice-president for 17 years, he was still an unknown figure for most of Yemeni population by the time he was elected in 2012. Not only the people’s trust would he have to gain, but also the armed forces’, which were still suspicious about this new leadership and remained in part loyal to the former President. Acknowledging that it would be hard to control a country so affected by the widespread protests of the Arab Spring and legitimate its government inside the country, Hadi focused on gathering international support and, most importantly, financial assistance. His speeches in the United Nations in late 2012 addressed the importance of the fight against terrorism, represented in Yemen by one of Al Qaeda’s most powerful branches, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Rosen 2015, Zimmerman 2014). In January 2014, the country held the National Dialogue Conference, a forum in which all the existing political groups and factions, some of which were usually marginalized by the political elite, agreed to get together and discuss key systemic issues to the “post-Saleh Yemen”. The result was the conclusion of a large agreement containing more than one thousand recommendations that foresaw the draft of a new constitution and a referendum on that constitution for 2015. Once the constitution was accepted by the referendum, the agreement predicted that new elections were to happen within nine moths (J.H.-R. 2014, Rosen 2015, Zimmerman 2014). However, the result did not please everyone: the final document also stated that Yemen would move toward the adoption of a federalized system. The question of how to divide Yemen in federalized regions raised new discontent, since it has been long an issue of disagreement between Yemeni Southerners and Northerners. President Hadi formed a 22-membered committee – the Regions Defining Committee – to further discuss this issue, and on February 10, the committee voted for a six-region division: four in the North and two in the South. The Southerners rejected the decision, for a division of the Southern territory could hamper their independence ambitions; the Northerners were also not satisfied, since the division left all gas and oil reserves to the Southerners (Mudallali 2015, Zimmerman 2014, Al-Hassani 2014). Therefore, it was not hard to foresee that the rise of a new President would have very little effect on Yemen’s most contentious issues. The impossibility to UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 549 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL reach an agreement between the North and the South fostered tensions and made it easier for extremist groups to gain power in those regions: the Shiite Houthis and the separatists, respectively. The difficulty to gain legitimacy among the armed forces would also prove to be a problem, and the necessity to fight terrorism would definitely not be limited to speech rhetoric, with AQAP gaining more and more power in a country devastated by socioeconomic inequalities and political instability. All of those issues put together exploded in the chaotic situation we see Yemen is facing today. 2.1 LOCAL FACTIONS, POLITICAL GROUPS AND DIVISIONS Grasping the Yemeni crisis directly involves understanding who the groups involved in its current situation are and in what consists their main objectives. The country has to face several diverging interests from distinct political groups and factions, namely the Houthis, the Southern separatists, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the government forces. Parts that can also increase the troubles are the ones that remain loyal to former President AliAbdullah Saleh, especially inside the army. The international press usually calls the Houthis a “Shiite Muslim rebel group” or “Shiite militia” – probably in an attempt to make a direct connection with Shiites in Iran. They are, however, members from the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, which make them a minority not only among Yemen’s mostly Sunni population, but also inside Shia Islam. They hold different beliefs not only from the Sunnis, but also from Shiites in Iran as well, for example: one of the basic premises of the Houthi movement is that people have a religious obligation to rise up against an unjust ruler, a very different vision from other Sunni and Shia schools of thought. These ones would rather prefer to avoid the chaos that can come from insurrection (The Week 2015, Basu 2015, Barrabi 2015, Rayman 2015, Rosen 2015). The Houthi Movement started in the nineties in the Saada governorate in the North of Yemen. They began as a youth-oriented religious group of studies that preached for the revival of traditional Zaydism, making reunions under the name of Al-Shabaab al-Mu’minin, or “The Believing Youth Forum”. There are few official sources about their evolution to become the political group they are today, but some of them allege that this first group has gone through some divergences, and the “Houthi” nomenclature that is uses today is after UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 550 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, their founder. In the 2000s, they started to also use the name “Ansar Allah”, the “Partisans of God”. It is also known that they had support from former-President Saleh during their emergence, for he believed they were a counter-weight group to growing militant Sunni Islamism (Al Batati, Who are the Houthis in Yemen? 2015, Jane 2015, Schmitz 2015). In 2003, however, Hussein al-Houthi organized protests against US invasion on Iraq, also criticizing Saleh’s government for its support to the US War on Terror. After that, the Houthis no longer enjoyed the benefits of President Saleh’s sympathy, and, in 2004, the first war against the government erupted. The reason were the protests in a mosque in Sana’a, an act that Saleh considered a challenge to his authority. He sent his forces to the province, and Hussein was killed. That was the first time the Houthis turned to arms, what they alleged to be on grounds of self-defense. The Houthis continued rebelling against the government with their new leader, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, and since 2004, they fought six wars. In 2010, part of them signed a ceasefire. Ansar Allah gained many followers by exploiting people’s resentments against the regime, which made the movement gather supporters that would not necessarily help the revival of the Zaydism, but who were willing to fight against an autocratic and oppressive ruler (Al Batati, Who are the Houthis in Yemen? 2015, Basu 2015, Jane 2015, Schmitz 2015). Since the first attacks against Saleh’s administration, the Yemeni government has been accusing the Houthis of receiving financial and military aid from Iran. The international press often calls the group as an “Iran-backed” militia, due to the apparent “Shiite affinity”, but both Tehran and Ansar Allah deny the connection. In 2013, a vessel suspected of sending arms illegally to Yemen was intercepted, and officials found Iranian conventional weapons and explosives inside. Yemeni and US authorities believed the ship was meant to reach the Houthis. Even if few proofs exist of this alliance, analysts believe that supporting Ansar Allah would be part of the Iranian strategy of undermining Saudi influence in Yemen. The Yemeni government also accuses the Houthis of being backed by Libya, as well as by Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia – an organization strongly supported by Iran. In November 2014, commanders from Hezbollah arrived in Sana’a alleging that the reason of their presence was to help the Houthi with training for armed clashes in the region of Marib. This connection with the Iranian-backed Lebanese group could be UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 551 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL a proof of the connection between the Houthis and Iran as well (Ellis and Thompson 2015, Balanche 2014, Jane 2015, Zimmerman 2014, Barrabi 2015). However, despite the fact that Iran provides supplies and weapons to the Houthi Movement, there is evidence that Tehran has no control over Houthi behavior, as they are domestic actors, with decades-old interests in the Yemeni balance of power (The Economist 2015 ). As Yemen is one of the countries with most firearms per capita in the world, there is plenty of availability of assault rifles such as AK-47s by legal and non-legal means to groups such as the Houthis. However, they are also equipped with RPGs, mortars, heavy machine guns and a variety of weaponry. It has also historically stolen Army’s military hardware, including T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks, as well as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) (IHS Jane’s 2015). Another root of conflict can be found in the Southern Secessionist Movement. As aforementioned, the Southern population has never been truly satisfied with the 1990 unification. Since then, they fear a government commanded by the North, and the divergences between both parts had already led to civil war, in 1994. The defeating of the South left profound marks and an eternal resentment. They claim to have been historically marginalized politically and economically by the North and excluded by government services and development projects. They have been denied an equal share of the oil revenues, even though 80% of the production in the country take place in the South. Aden’s fisheries, ports and refineries are a center of economic activity, making the South responsible for the majority of Yemen’s wealth. One of their major demands is the redistribution of wealth from Sana’a to the South. The economic and political grievances summed up with national identity issues gave birth to seven parties that share the common desire to build an independent Southern nation. Their coalition is known by the name “al-Hirak”, although that is a loose definition for such a fragile coalition among diverse guerrilla and militant factions (Day 2010, Visentini 2012, IISS 2014, Zimmerman 2014, Al Batati 2014, Mudallali 2015). This separatist movement had an apex in 2007, when former soldiers who had been compulsorily retired from the Southern Army after the civil war started rallying in Aden, demanding equal salaries to the soldiers in the North. President Saleh refused to hold talks and demanded his forces to suppress the protests, killing hundreds of people, which led such groups to engage in UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 552 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations protests during the Arab Spring events that deposed him. When Hadi, himself a Southerner, assumed the presidency, he offered an official apology for the civil war and compensations for civil and military servants who lost their jobs after the unification. He also has encouraged pro-separatism leaderships to join the transitional talks, but with the besieging of Sana’a and his government collapse, such approaching was short-lived, in fact encouraging its claims to overthrow the government and recreate a southern state. However, the Southerners have so far lacked a charismatic centralizing leader and better equipment, as well as the level of centralization of the Houthis: they are ruled by several leaders and divided in many factions due to internal divergences (Al Batati 2014, Reardon 2014). The latest events in Yemen may indicate a possibility to unificate the Southern leaderships in one single and strong voice, as it can be stated by the strong anti-Houthi sentiment in the cities and by some calls for independence made by some of the Southern leaders: Nasser al-Nuba6, for example, affirmed they will no longer take orders from Sana’a (MacDonald 2015). Nonetheless, for now, there have been only sparse military operations, such as RPG attacks against government forces or the Houthis conducted by southern separatists. The Northern Houthis and the Southern Secessionist Movement, as well as the divergences between them, however, are not the only things the Yemeni government has to deal with: the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is also increasing its influence in the territory. AQAP was formed in 2009 by Saudi and Yemeni Sunni militants of the international network of Al Qaeda, being considered its most active and dangerous branch. It already claimed the authority of attacks against several regional and Western targets, notably the attacks to Charlie Hebdo7 in January 2015. The US State Department estimated in 2014 that AQAP had a number close to one thousand members (Guéhenno 2015, Council on Foreign Relations 2015). It is possible that one of their most significant sources of funding comes from donors in Saudi Arabia that also fund other Sunni terrorist groups. According to AQAP’s propaganda, its primary goals are consistent with the principles of militant jihad of purging the Muslim countries of Western 6 Former military general and one of the founders of al-Hirak (MacDonald 2015). 7 On 7th January, two Islamist terrorists self-identified with AQAP and equipped with machine guns promoted an assault on the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo, in Paris, killing 11 and injuring an equal number, and killing six more as the police persecuted them. The attack was reportedly motivated by the frequent publication of Muslim-offensive contempt. UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 553 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL influence and replacing secular regimes with ones that observe the Sharia law to establish an Islamic caliphate. They include overthrowing the Yemeni regime, killing Western nationals and allies – notably members of Saudi royal family – and attacking US homeland (Council on Foreign Relations 2015, Jane 2014). Their presence in Yemen would be probably the first reason to motivate any foreign-led intervention in the country. In the beginning, the Yemeni government suspected that the AQAP and the Houthis held close relations, probably because both groups opposed the regime. These accusations proved to be rumors when AQAP exploded a device targeting a Houthi religious procession. In fact, even though they are still not as strong and influent as the Houthis, the AQAP benefits from the rise of the Houthis to grow, by convincing the groups who oppose them – specially Southerners – that Al Qaeda is the natural ally (Guéhenno 2015, Rayman 2015, Jane 2015). The United States, for example, had total support of President Hadi on conducting air strikes against AQAP targets, which is part of their counterterrorism strategy with target killing campaigns (Mudallali 2015, Council on Foreign Relations 2015). The Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula no longer directly administers areas of the country, but they continue to expand their operations and areas of influence, mainly in Southern and Eastern territories, also operating cells near the capital, Sana’a (Zimmerman 2014). Finally, it is important to understand that the army in Yemen will also be a source of problems in the ongoing crisis. The armed forces are currently divided as some parts have been kept loyal to former-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, mainly the republican guards. This loyalty is dangerous to President Hadi’s administration and Yemen’s stability more generally, since he will no longer be able to count on the full efficiency of his army to shield the cities in case of attacks – that can come from the Houthis, from the Southerners, from AQAP or even from the neighboring countries, as Iran or Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, however, this situation is convenient for Mr. Saleh, who expects regaining influence in the country with the weakness and impotence of Hadi. Saleh is also being accused of allying these loyal military units with the Houthis, in an attempt to weaken even faster the current administration and carve him a secure space in the future of Yemeni politics (Les Echos 2015, Ellis and Thompson 2015, Schmitz 2015) UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 554 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations 2.2 RECENT EVENTS In August 2014, the leader of the Houthis, Abdulmalek al-Houthi, called for protests against the government. The deteriorating socioeconomic and security conditions of the country contributed to erode the credibility of President Hadi’s government, which al-Houthi called corrupt and unable to carry out reforms that could improve people’s lives8. The demonstrations started on the 18th day of the same month, and soon took over the streets of the capital, Sana’a, and many other cities around the country. The armed Houthi rebels soon arrived in Sana’a and started to set up camps surrounding the city and ministry buildings. They guaranteed that they would not use violence except for self-defense, but protests anti-Houthi and pro-Hadi soon took over the streets as well, leading authorities to worry that the situation could easily become violent. The UN Security Council expressed its concern about the security situation after Houthi’s actions and about the effects its deterioration could have in Yemen’s political transition (Guéhenno 2015, Security Council Report 2014). On September 2nd, the President dismissed his cabinet and made a proposal for the Houthis that included their participation on a new government. They refused the proposal, and tensions escalated between them and some armed groups affiliated with the Islamic party Al-Islah9. On the 18th, Houthi rebels besieged a Sunni Islamist university in the suburbs of Sana’a, and the fights between the rebels and the military started to become more violent. However, once the fights spread into the city, military action was refrained, and former President Saleh was suspected to be involved in this decision. The Houthis took over the city in the next days, seizing the state-run television station and government buildings (Security Council Report 2014). Thus, on September 21st, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement was signed. The plan made the parts agree to the appointment of a new government within a month, in order to stop the fighting and to attend Houthi’s 8 Yemen’s socioeconomic indicators place it among the least developed countries in the world: 35% of the population is unemployed – a rate that goes up to 65% among people under 30 years old – and 50% is illiterate – 70% when it comes to women. The revenues from crude oil represent around 70% of the total revenues of the country, and the recent fall off the crude prices worsened the economic collapse of the country (Balanche 2014). 9 Islah is a Northern-based Islamic opposition party. One of its key figures is the President of Iman University, Sheikh Abdul-Magid al-Zindani, who has been long engaged in the Islamic militancy and had in the past connections to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda (Day 2010). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 555 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL grievances. It addressed several issues concerning the country’s critical situation: it predicted, for example, the reduction by 25% of fuel prices and the formation of an economic committee of qualified experts in order to make binding recommendations to the government, whose responsibility was to alleviate “the burden of the people”. Most importantly, the Agreement predicted that the President should appoint political advisers from both Ansar Allah – representing the Houthis – and the Southern Peaceful Movement, as well as a new “neutral” Prime Minister not affiliated to any political party, three days following the agreement’s entry into force. The document, based on the outcomes of the aforementioned National Dialogue Conference, was signed by 12 Yemeni parties and groups, including the Houthi representatives, the Peaceful Southern Movement representatives, and the General People’s Congress party (GPC) – the party of both Saleh and Hadi, still ruled by the former (Jadaliyya Reports 2014, Al-Moshki 2014, Security Council Report 2014). The Houthis, however, refused to sign an annex of the agreement that demanded the restoration of state authority and control over all the territory, which meant a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the camps on the areas they held. It also stipulated the disarmament of all parties involved in the conflicts and the recovery of all stateowned weapons that were robbed during the events. Though many people saw this refusal as a sign that the Houthis were not ready to set off camp of Sana’a, they themselves considered the agreement a success, even without signing the annex (Al-Moshki 2014). Nonetheless, the Houthis did not seem willing to fully respect the agreement and quickly violated it by tightening their grip on the capital with the seizing of the First Armored Division’s headquarters. They moved the expansion of their territorial control10 southwards and westwards – into territories with the country’s biggest Sunni population and the oil-producing region of Marib11 (Security Council Report 2014, Guéhenno 2015). The Houthi’s advance over the country enhanced fear in the Sunni-majority South that envisions federal autonomy and displeased AQAP, that operates intensely in Marib. The tribes in this region who support President Hadi also consider the Houthis “terrorists” and “invaders” and feared that their increased presence might destabilize this important region (Mudallali 2015). In November, the agreement got even 10 11 Sa’da and Hodeida were two other big cities over which they took control (Les Echos 2015). The region produces over 70% of Yemen’s oil and gas (Mudallali 2015). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 556 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations further away from working: the GPC and the Houthi group stated they would not accept the new Prime Minister nominated by Hadi, Khaled Bahah, because they considered that the decision did not fulfill the norms predicted by the Agreement. The GPC considered itself neglected by the President and decided to boycott the new government, calling on all the Party’s nominees to reject any post offered. The Houthis also found the formation of the new government disappointing and stressed that it was necessary to meet the Agreement’s criterions of integrity and efficacy (KUNA 2014). The impossibility to find common ground for truly successful agreements contributed to the escalation of tension among all parts and led to even more troubled events right in the beginning of 2015. On January 17th, the Houthi militia kidnapped Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak, the President’s chief of staff12. He had a long story of disputes with the Houthis: himself a Southerner, Mubarak was the one who proposed the six-region divide that would separate the North from the oil and gas deposits. The Houthis even vetoed his nomination when Hadi chose him for the position (Mudallali 2015). Two days later, the militias attacked the presidential palace, surrounded the Prime Minister’s house and defeated the presidential guard, taking their position. The Southern city of Aden closed all of its air, land and sea access, on a sign of support for President Hadi, who is also a Southerner. The next day, al-Houthi made a speech stating that his revolution knew “no limits” and demanding a national partnership with Southern and revolutionary parties, as well as improved security for people in Marib to fight against Al Qaeda. The later demand was seen by many as an attempt to gather sympathy from the tribes in order to control the oil resources, rather than defending the population from AQAP. The UNSC issued a statement supporting President Hadi and condemning the use of violence (Mudallali 2015). Even so, on January 22th, both the President and the Prime Minister resigned, making an agreement with the Houthis that included the release of Mubarak and the withdrawal of the militias from the presidential palace, the city streets and the government institutions they were surrounding since 2014. In return, Hadi would concede the Houthis the constitutional changes they sought and a wider participation in state institutions (Mudallali 2015, The Economist 2015 ). 12 Which means he is the director of the President’s cabinet (Les Echos 2015). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 557 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL In February, the Houthis consolidated their move by dissolving the parliament and establishing an interim government (Ghobari 2015). By the end of the month, Hadi escaped the house arrest with the help of his security personnel, and moved to Aden (Becker 2015). In a television address, he declared the illegitimacy of the Houthi government takeover, and claimed his own legitimacy as Yemeni President (AlJazeera 2015, Almasmari and Hanna 2015). 2.3 THE ESCALATION OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THE SAUDILED INTERVENTION By the end of March, Houthi rebels, allied with pro-Saleh forces started advancing toward Aden, the last stronghold of Hadi government forces. On March 25th evening, airstrikes against rebel positions in Yemen, conducted by a coalition led by Saudi Arabia, launched a military intervention codenamed Operation Decisive Storm (AlJazeera 2015). The coalition, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, was composed initially by most GCC members (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain) but soon Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Senegal joined the campaign (Reuters 2015). The intervention was held after requests for foreign intervention by the UN Security Council, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) made by President Hadi, who fled to Riyadh when the bombing started (BBCNews 2015, Agence France-Presse 2015). Image 3: Houthi Progression since 2014 Source: The New York Times 2015 UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 558 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations The initial phase of hostilities focused mainly on bombing Houthi and proSaleh strategic positions such as arms depots, military bases, air-defense assets and airports in Sana’a, Taez and elsewhere. A no-fly zone and a naval blockade were established, as the main objective was to achieve air superiority and ultimately a complete control over Yemeni airspace (Mustafa 2015a). According to the coalition force’s spokesman, the next phases would be centered in destroying rebelcontrolled axes of ballistic missiles, supply corridors, ammunition stores, military facilities and logistics assets, as well as preventing the Houthis from entering and controlling Aden (A. H. Cordesman 2015, Al Arabyia 2015). The United States has been providing logistical and intelligence support for the intervention, such as live-feed videos from US surveillance UAVs and aerial refueling for coalition fighter jets (M. Zenko 2015). There is also speculation over the airdropping of weaponry and medical supplies for anti-Houthi militias in Aden, as they were delivered with an advanced system of GPS-guided highaltitude parachutes, a technology available almost exclusively in the US (Stratfor 2015b, 17). The United States has also stopped the freezing of arms sales to Egypt – a prominent member of the coalition, which was in force since October 2013, on the occasion of the military coup that led to Al-Sisi’s government (Bennet 2015). Additionally, as the members of the coalition are US allies, most of the military hardware used in the operation was provided in the last years by the US, such as the F-15 and F-16 fighter jets used in the bombing campaign (Mazzeti and Cooper 2015). From the end of March to the first weeks of April, the war saw a dashing offensive by the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces toward Aden and the Eastern provinces of the country. However, the airstrikes effects and the resistance posed by the coalition-backed pro-Hadi and tribal militias slowly reverted the situation. In the South, the main goal was to establish control over Aden, a port city which consists in a valuable strategic asset, due to its seaport and airfield that could be used as main supplying corridors for the rebel forces. It is also the core pocket of resistance of pro-Hadi troops, and its fall would have a great symbolic value. After a few days in the beginning of April, rebel troops were controlling most of the city’s strategic positions, but its advance reached a stalemate as a fierce resistance by government forces and pro-Hadi militias stopped them, combined with the decisive coalition’s air support. Tribal fighters and other militias have started storming the Aden-fighting rebel’s flank, in an attempt to cut off their supply lines. As they are becoming increasing isolated, without supplies and reinforcements, and as coalition special forces13 started infiltrating through the 13 On May 3rd, between 40-50 special forces soldiers arrived in Aden to bolster the efforts of UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 559 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL port, the situation became increasingly worrying for the rebels (Stratfor 2015b). Image 4: Situation in Yemen by the end of March 2015 Source: Stratfor 2015c. As their units became gridlocked in Aden, the Houthis continued their progression toward East, specially toward the cities of Marib and Ataq, capital of the Shabwa region, where major Yemeni energy facilities are located. However, as the government’s central authority eroded, many tribes started mobilizing their own men to resist the Houthis. In the Eastern Hadramawt region, around 20,000 tribal fighters were raised to fight in coordination with government forces, to repel the Houthi advance. Also, the coalition’s menace of close air support, specifically, has discouraged concentrations of armaments and personnel in ground columns, which has slowed the rhythm of advance of Houthi and pro-Saleh forces. Special Forces units from the coalition also have been reportedly operating across the country, assuming advisory roles and helping to identify targets for the airstrikes (Stratfor 2015b). By mid-April, the situation had stalemated in most of the country: as the air pro-Hadi combatants. A Southern Resistance Movement’s spokesman has confirmed them to be coalition forces’ special units. Despite the Saudi denial of any involvement of ground troops so far, a video footage showing heavily armed soldiers walking in the streets raised suspicion that it could be Saudi special units or UAE soldiers, as their equipment was not available for regular pro-Hadi fighters. UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 560 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations campaign and the tribal resistance had constrained the power projection by rebel troops, it has not been capable of regaining terrain previously conquered by them. The war’s first phase of movements slowed down to become a war of attrition. As practically every faction in the war counts heavily on external support for provision of weaponry, ammunition and even food and medical supplies, there has been an increase in Saudi and Iranian attempts to help their respective allies. In attempts to cut off the logistical support to rebels, Saudi air sorties have destroyed Sana’a International Airport, preventing Iranian aircraft to land. However, despite the blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE, a Iranian convoy was located in the waters close to the Oman-Yemen border, prompting the US to dispatch a cruiser and an aircraft carrier to the location (Stratfor 2015b, 7), which led to sporadic moments of raising tensions (Mcleary 2015a, Mcleary 2015b). On April 21st, the Coalition Forces’ spokesman, Saudi Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri, announced the end of Operation Decisive Storm and the beginning of a next phased, called Operation Restoring Hope. Despite the vagueness of this new operation’s core aims, it was supposed to consist mainly of humanitarian missions, counter-terror operations and focus on reviving political dialogue (Sputnik 2015, SUSRIS 2015). However, the volume of air sorties has remained high since then, which is explained by the broader Saudi strategy of weakening Houthi’s position, in order to force a return to achieve a negotiated solution (Stratfor 2015b, 7). Although the air campaign alone is obviously not decisive to accomplish such aim, it is tied to the decades-long Saudi practice of influencing Yemeni internal actors through political contacts and its patronage system toward tribal leaders and key military and regional leaders (A. H. Cordesman 2015). The coalition’s air campaign is being highly criticized by UN humanitarianrelated organs such as the Secretariat’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for its consequences. Preliminary assessments roughly estimate that airstrikes have directly caused more than 1,000 deaths and more than 3,000 wounded people. The number of internally displaced due to the war rose to 300,000 and around 12 million of the total 26 million Yemeni citizens face food insecurity (OCHA 2015). Additionally, around 2,000 to 3,000 Yemeni refugees flee the country to Djibouti and other neighboring countries every day, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Jakes 2015). The naval blockade added to the airstrikes has produced a major fuel shortage that has brought the water supply, telecommunication services, food production and water distribution to a halt, taking Yemen to the edge of an infrastructure collapse (AlJazeera 2015). By the end of April, there have been frequent Houthi incursions to Saudi UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 561 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Arabia through the Northern Yemeni border, as well as shelling by mortar and Katyusha rocket artillery to the cities of Jizan and Najdan. Saudi Arabia has reportedly been shooting artillery fire toward Marib and Taiz, and has abandoned border posts and evacuated cities in the border (Stratfor 2015b, 4, AlJazeera 2015). Even though such skirmishes in the border have a small dimension, due to the limited capacity of the Houthi to advance into Saudi territory, a coalition’s ground operation to alter the impasse in the civil war has not been ruled out. In fact, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly stated that this is an open possibility, and have assembled its rapid deployment forces. Saudi Arabia has reportedly mobilized 150,000 men in its border with Yemen, and Egypt has extended for three months its mandate for deploying troops abroad in the beginning of May (Reuters 2015). The situation appears to have reached a decisive point, as the coalition will have to decide whether to negotiate a solution keeping the current status quo or to deploy a ground incursion. The current turmoil resulted from the civil war has benefited AQAP, which capitalized on the absence of state authority in most of the country and dramatically expanded its geographical range of operations. The terrorist organization has been deploying a sophisticated military operation since last summer, but as the conflict progressively escalated, it has adapted to the current situation, conducting different kinds of attacks, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) assassinations and diverse guerrilla tactics toward both government and Houthi targets. However, as the later have advanced to the Eastern territories, AQAP shifted its attention to Houthi targets, turning them into its prior enemy (Zelin and Hoover 2015). By mid-April, it has taken control of an airport, a seaport and an oil-exporting terminal in Mukalla, at Yemen’s Southeastern coast, as well as conducting a massive prison break, releasing about three hundred inmates. Although it already possesses strategic positions and assets in other parts of the country, this has been its boldest move so far, as it was the first time it actually assumed the ownership of such critical infrastructure (Laub 2015, Byman and Williams 2015, Stratfor 2015b, 10). 2.4 YEMEN IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC SCENARIO The question of whether the Northern Shiite Houthis will or will not succeed in taking control over the country is part of the longstanding regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has been taking place over the last 30 years. Despite never confronting directly each other, both countries dispute their influence across the region in a species of “regional Cold War”. Middle East’s UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 562 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations destabilization – in course since Iraq’s invasion in 2003 – was deepened by the disruption of many governments’ central authorities during the Arab Spring. This situation offered fertile ground for external powers to meddle into domestic disputes, consolidating Tehran-Riyadh dispute’s modus operandi of supporting internal political factions in order to influence domestic political systems of fragile states such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and now Yemen (Visentini and Roberto 2015). The Syrian Civil War, from 2011 onwards, became the epicenter of this regional dispute, as the US, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries actively supported different groups of rebel forces against the Iran-backed government. The war’s spillover effects reached the surrounding countries and weakened the Iranian arch of alliances – labeled as “Resistance Axis” – composed by Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Palestine’s Hamas and Syria’s Ba’ath government itself (Visentini and Roberto 2015). The rise of the Islamic State (IS), as a result from the effects of the Syrian civil war, led to an implicit cooperation between Iran and the US, due to the shared necessity of containing the IS (Guimarães and Müller 2014). Such trend added to the fact that since 2014, but especially during the first months of 2015, the US-Iranian negotiations over a nuclear deal advanced significantly. As the prospects of a nuclear deal and the establishment of a Washington-Tehran détente arose, traditional US-allies are developing new forms of collective action instead of relying solely on the US. As both the GCC and Arab League are composed mainly by Sunni-majority countries, this rapid deployment force is being interpreted as an alliance directed toward countering Iran (Stavridis 2015, Mustafa 2015a) Additionally, on March 28th-29th, following the beginning of the military intervention in Yemen, during the Arab League summit in Sharm el-Sheik, member countries’ foreign ministers approved the establishment of an Arab Defense Force. Composed of 40,000 men – twice the size of NATO’s Response Force –, it will be based on Egypt and commanded by a Saudi general. It shall be composed of ground, naval, air and special operation units. While the fulcrum of the forces shall be composed by Egyptian, Saudi and maybe Sudanese, countries such as Morocco, Jordan and the UAE will also provide men and niche capabilities, such as intelligence and special operation units (Mustafa 2015). While the troops are supposed to be paid by their respective countries, the permanent command structure will be financed by the GCC. Saudi Arabia took the lead in this new regional configuration by coordinating the collective effort of an expanded version of its traditional main influence area, the Gulf Cooperation Council (Mustafa 2015a). Riyadh also started the bombing campaign simultaneously to the Lausanne P5+1 nuclear negotiations between UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 563 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Washington and Iran. Adding to the regional conditionings, Saudi Arabia has deep-rooted interests in Yemen. It has established, since Yemen’s unification, a system of patronage over internal political factions, managing to balance one against the other. As demonstrated above, the fall of Saleh started dismantling this fragile balance of power, culminating with the Houthi takeover of Sana’a and subsequent advance southwards (Haykel 2011). The dashing Houthi expansion toward Aden triggered a prompt response both from Saudi Arabia and Egypt – the leading military powers in the coalition – due to the city’s strategic character. The seaport gives access to the Bab el-Mandeb strait, situated between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, therefore connecting the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. This strait is not only the entrance for the Red Sea but also its connection to the Indian Ocean (Visentini 2012, Balanche 2014). Through this important chokepoint passes most of the traffic that transits the Suez Canal, as well as through the Egyptian Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED)14 pipeline. As the Suez Canal control is still one of the most important sources of revenue for the Egyptian government, any destabilization directly affects Egypt’s economic security (A. Cordesman 2015b). As most of the Persian Gulf oil exports transit the strait, its daily flow of crude oil and natural gas is an estimated 3.8 million barrels/d in 2013. Such importance is reflected in the prompt rise in oil prices after the coalition’s intervention began by the end of March. The main Saudi goal is preventing the Houthi from taking over Aden. The control of such a pivotal port in the region by what they consider to be an Iranian proxy group would eventually allow Iran to outflank the Gulf and deploying air and naval forces to Yemen, which shares a long and porous border with Saudi Arabia (Stratfor 2015a). 3 previous international action There have been two main multilateral spheres of discussion and action toward Yemen since the events that resulted in the fall of President Saleh: (i) the global sphere, through the United Nations Security Council itself; and (ii) the regional sphere, in which the GCC plays a leading role and the Arab League, a secondary one. The UNSC has adopted six resolutions regarding the Yemeni situation, while the GCC has been the prominent forum for coordinating a direct 14 The Egyptian Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline (SUMED) connects the Ain Sukhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sidi Kerir terminal, in Alexandria. It is the only nearby alternative route to the Suez Canal and therefore is essential for transporting oil northwards when the tankers are too large to go through the Canal (EIA 2013). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 564 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations international approach by overseeing the transition from Saleh’s government to Hadi’s and later leading the military intervention, which soon became an Arab League-promoted force (IFES 2011). As the most recent roots of the current situation in Yemen derive from tensions accumulated mainly from the transition process, a brief explanation of the role played by both the GCC and the UNSC in such developments is necessary. In 2011, the political settlement that followed the ten months of protests and clashes between government forces and rival factions was promoted by the GCC with the support from the UNSC’s five permanent members plus the European Union. As the negotiations succeeded, both the GPC and the opposition, grouped into the Joint Meeting Parties, signed two agreements: the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and the Agreement on the Implementation of the Transitional Process in Yemen in Accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Such agreements delineated the framework for a two-phased transition process: the first would consist of a presidential election to be held on February 21, 2012, and the second consisted in a broader political, electoral, military and constitutional reform, which has not been completed so far (IFES 2011). The UNSC soon demonstrated its support for the transition process through the approval of Resolution 2014 (UNSC 2011). In what became a constant in subsequent resolutions adopted by the Council, it stated the view that the signature and implementation of the provision stipulated by the agreements was the only way to achieving an inclusive, peaceful and orderly process of political transition, urging all parties to abide to its provisions. Later UNSC resolutions’ centered in attaining to such proceedings, and establishing punishment mechanisms for the individuals and parties that deviated from such guidelines. After the successful presidential election that legitimated Hadi’s ascension to power, Resolution 2051 (UNSC 2012) reiterated the next steps to be taken by Yemen, according to the GCC Initiative and its implementation mechanism. Those steps included the convening of the National Dialogue Conference, the restructuring of the Armed Forces and the constitutional and electoral reform, establishing a deadline for it to be completed in 2014. The United Nations Secretary-General has also appointed Jamal Benomar to act as the UN SecretaryGeneral special envoy to Yemen, aiming to mediate negotiations between the conflicting parties and to provide reports directly to the UN Secretary-General and to UNSC (UNSC 2012). As demonstrated above, the National Dialogue Conference was held in January 2014. Resolution 2140 (UNSC 2014) was adopted following its conclusion, endorsing the resulting agreement’s provisions: UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 565 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (a) Obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition, as outlined in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism Agreement; (b) Impeding the implementation of the outcomes of the final report of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference through violence, or attacks on essential infrastructure; or (c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Yemen (UNSC 2014, 6). The Houthi advance from January 2015 onwards was strongly criticized by UNSC members. Resolution 2201 (UNSC 2015a) urged an immediate suspension of hostilities by all parties and demanded that the Houthis retreat from the government buildings in the capital. It also asked for an acceleration of negotiations to form a new government. A presidential statement was approved by the Council on March 22 reiterating such provisions (UNSC 2015c). On March 24, a letter from President Hadi was delivered to the President of the Security Council, stating that he had “requested from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States to immediately provide support, by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression by the Houthis (BBCNews 2015). Two days later, a letter signed by the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE was delivered by the Qatari representative, stating that the signatory countries had decided to answer to the appeal by President Hadi, even through the use of force (UNSC 2015d). On that same day, Operation Decisive Storm began, prompting negotiations over a new UNSC resolution. Three days later, the 26th Arab League Summit resulted in the signing of the Sharm el-Sheik Declaration, expressing support for Operation Decisive Storm as the means of restoring the legitimate Yemeni government against the Houthis (SUSRIS 2015). The position of GCC members has been represented inside the Security Council by Jordan, which urged for a more assertive stance against the Houthis. It has drafted the document that was approved as Resolution 2216, on April 14th, which established an arms embargo against the Houthi and its allied proSaleh forces. It also expanded the sanctions regime designed by Resolution 2140, targeting Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, the son of the former president. Russia has proposed an alternative draft, asking UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 566 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations for an unrestricted arms embargo, against all parties, the calling for immediate ceasefire, and the proposal of humanitarian truces (UNSC 2015e). Although the ceasefire demand and the non-selective arms embargo have been rejected vehemently by Jordan, the asking for humanitarian truces was adopted by the Resolution (Security Council Report 2015). A specific dynamic has developed over discussions regarding Yemen in the UNSC in the last years, which have been drawing a certain amount of criticism. There has been a formidable influence exerted by GCC members, mainly through Jordanian mediation, reaching a point in which the most recent and significant Resolutions, namely 2201 and 2216, were initially drafted by parties in the conflict, as Jordan. Such trend has evolved with the auspices of P5 members: while the UK is the penholder on Yemen, it has only circulated the text among the entire UNSC after previous negotiations between the GCC and the P5. Other non-permanent members, especially Venezuela, have frequently expressed their disapproval of such practices (Security Council Report 2015). As the negative consequences of the military intervention accumulated, with an absence of any advance toward continuing the transition process, Jordanian proposals have been encountering much less support from other UNSC members (What’s In Blue 2015b). One of such proposals was the promotion of the GCCorganized Riyadh Conference, which took place by the end of May. As the Houthis have refused to participate in any dialogue on a non-neutral territory, they have reportedly not having been invited, resulting in an evident failure to reach its aims of providing a roadmap for a peaceful and negotiated transition (What’s In Blue 2015c). A more fruitful attempt to initiate peace talks was conducted on Geneva, from June 15th to 19th. Despite reported statements from both sides expressing the desire for a ceasefire followed by a withdrawal, no agreement was reached (What’s In Blue 2015d). The reason for that in the preconditions for negotiating posed by both sides: while the government-in-exile stresses the need for Houthis to implement the withdrawal stipulated by Resolution 2216 (UNSC 2015e), the Houthis demand the talks to be referenced on the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), signed on September 21, 2014 between Yemen’s major parties following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. Despite the frequent UNSC statements recognizing the PNPA importance, Hadi and its supporters argue that such document was signed under coercion, therefore not being valid (What’s In Blue 2015b). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 567 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 4 bloc positions The United States of America is one of UNSC’s most directly involved countries in Yemen, having considerable interests at stake in the region. With the fall of Hadi’s government, the US lost its most collaborative partner in its counterterrorism strategy in the region, as the governments of both Saleh and Hadi provided intelligence, cooperation and bases to drone strikes (Stohl and Dick 2015, Rosen 2015). Before the Houthi advanced, Obama declared that “[t] his strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years” (Obama 2014). This strategy was based on conducting drone strikes on terrorist targets which reportedly pose threats to US national security and on training and arming Yemeni local forces to degrade AQAP’s activities (Zimmerman 2014). The drone strikes conducted by US caused several civilian casualties and were very unpopular among the local population (Raghavan 2012). After the Houthi takeover, the counterterrorist campaign has faced several problems, due to the chaotic situation and the absence of contact and cooperation between the US military and the Houthi leadership, although both have common enemies in AQAP and ISIS. In addition, Washington withdrew the remaining military personnel from Yemen, which have been moved to US bases in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (Pearson 2015). Although these difficulties, it continues to strike high value targets in Yemen with drones based on military bases in neighboring countries (Rampton 2015), and, by mid-June, killed Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the top AQAP’s leadership which was assigned to succeed Zawahiri as the main Al-Qaeda leader, in what has been described as the largest/most important/greatest blow to Al-Qaeda since Osama bin-Laden’s death (Deutsche Welle 2015). In accordance with President Obama’s speech at West Point15, Washington is actively supporting the GCC-led campaign in Yemen, providing logistical support, weaponry and intelligence, yet with no direct military action. In addition, US military has been supporting the assault by others means, such as search-andrescue missions and aerial refueling (M. Zenko 2015). Furthermore, US blocked several Iranian ships from reaching Yemen and sent an aircraft carrier to enforce the embargo imposed by the Saudi-led coalition (Parry 2015). The reasons to support this intervention are mainly: the security of Bab Al Mandeb strait, to deter what it perceives as an Iranian presence in Yemen through the support to the Houthi 15 In this speech, Obama stated that the United States would no longer act solely on its own to fight terrorism, but would rather cooperate and effectively support regional partners against regional instabilities and terrorism (Traub 2015). UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 568 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations (Khan, Vela and Malek 2015), to defend Saudi Arabia’s border, to protect Yemen’s legitimate government (M. Zenko 2015). Also, NATO has a strategic partnership, known as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), with some GCC members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). This initiative has as main goals to fight terrorism and maintain the stability and security of the Gulf region (NATO 2014). Lastly, some analysts say that the United States support to Saudi Arabia was to comfort its traditional ally after the nuclear negotiations with Iran (Parry 2015). The United Kingdom believes that the security and stability of Yemen is the interest of everyone in the international community. Therefore, UK supports the Council’s response to the crisis through Resolution 2216, which called for a political solution and imposed sanctions on Houthis’ leaders, which, according to the UK government, are the main responsible actors in destabilizing the country. In response to the humanitarian crisis, the United Kingdom increased its aid and urges others countries to do the same (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2015). After the terrorists attacks in the Yemeni capital, UK, alongside with United States, withdrew its special military forces in Yemen, which were training local forces on counterterrorism and protecting embassy personnel (Pearson 2015). Although seeing a political solution as the best for the situation, London supports the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, on the basis that is has been legitimized by President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour’s request (Aguilar 2015). According to the Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom supports the assault on Yemen “in every practical way short of engaging in combat” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2015). This includes support in infrastructure and maintenance of the British-built aircraft utilized in the campaign (Foster, Loveluck and Mojalli 2015). It is important to remember that the UK keeps providing Saudi Arabia with precision guided weapons, however the British government was assured that the weapons will be used according to international law (Press TV 2015). France shows great concern with the deteriorating situation of Yemen, thus, it was a sponsor of Resolution 2216 (2015), which condemned the unilateral actions by the Houthi rebels that destabilized the country and minored the ongoing political transition. Through the Resolution, Paris seeks to achieve an end to the crisis, the resumption of an inclusive political dialogue, an agreement on the formation of a national unity government and a phased reconstruction of the Yemeni transition process. The country also calls for protection of civilians and the unobstructed access to aid by those (France 2015). According to France, the menace posed by the Houthis to unity, integrity, UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 569 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL stability and sovereignty of Yemen only benefits terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh/ISIS (France 2015). These groups were perceived as a threat to national security of France in two episodes. First, the declaration by an AQAP member that France has surpassed the US as the main enemy of Islam. Second, the group also claimed responsibility over the attack on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in January, provoking a massive popular commotion (Russia Today 2015). In addition, a French national was kidnapped by an yet unknown group in Yemeni territory (O’Grady 2015). As United Kingdom, France supports the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. In fact, in May, President Hollande was the first Western leader to take part in a GCC summit. This enhanced the cooperation between France and the GCC members in a new “strategic partnership”, based on five pillars: political coordination to address regional and global issues; military cooperation; security cooperation to combat terrorism; economic and energy cooperation; and cultural engagement (Aluwaisheg 2015). Also, as a member of NATO, France has a partnership with four members of the GCC to fight terrorism and maintain the security and stability of the Gulf region (NATO 2014). Furthermore, France and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to boost Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities, especially regarding the provision of fighter jets by France (Deutsche Welle 2015). The Russian Federation is against the coalition’s military intervention in Yemen, arguing that this action is a direct violation of international law (Barmin 2015). At the same time, Moscow encourages dialogue among the fighting factions in Yemen and supports the official government, to avoid a new failed state and a terrorist heaven in the region (Saunders 2014). Despite recognizing President Hadi as the legitimate government, Russia maintained negotiations with other parties in the conflict, such as the Houthis and the Southern separatist movement, in order to achieve a negotiated solution to the crisis. In spite of that, it has ignored the request for support from the Southern separatist movement, which has asked Russia for support in the attempt to secede from North Yemen, and later refused to grant official recognition to the Houthis as the legitimate Yemeni government, which has been proposed by a Houthi delegation to Moscow, in exchange to economic benefits to Russian companies (Suchkov 2015, Saunders 2014). Russia proposed a draft resolution demanding humanitarian pauses, calling all parties to end hostilities and for a general arms embargos, not just targeting Houthi leaders (What’s In Blue 2015a). It is the UNSC member which has most vehemently condemned the Saudi-led intervention, being the only country to oppose Resolution 2216 (2015) by abstaining to vote it, which was later drafted by Jordan (Voltaire Network 2015). Lastly, the main objective of Russia in the UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 570 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations Yemeni crisis is to contain Sunni extremists groups, such as Al-Qaeda (Saunders 2014) The People’s Republic of China has major economic interests in the region, since Gulf countries are important economic partners, providing half of its oil imports and possessing several Chinese companies’ investments. Also, the “New Silk Road” passes through the Red Sea, which gives a greater strategic dimension to the region (Bhadrakumar 2015). In Yemen, China has several investments, most in oil industries (Chinese companies are responsible for eight percent of the Yemen’s oil production), infrastructure and telecommunications. Furthermore, Beijing has provided millions of dollars to Yemen in humanitarian aid and economic assistance (Rakhmat 2014). Beijing responded to the crisis evacuating almost 600 nationals and 225 foreign nationals from the port of Aden. The evacuation was undertaken by Chinese naval frigates, which were conducting anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia. It was the first time that China helped to evacuate foreign citizens, and only the second time that China has used warships to evacuate its own citizens - the first one was in Libya, in 2011 (BBC 2015). Also, although condemning its unilateral actions, China negotiated with the Houthis, proposing potential economic development plans committing itself to protect Yemen’s national interest (Banco and Masi 2015). Lastly, China believes that the chaos in Yemen represents a threat to the region’s peace and stability, thus calls all parties to end hostilities and to achieve a political, inclusive and peaceful solution to the crisis. The government also takes note on humanitarian issues, expressing concern with the difficulties to deliver humanitarian assistance and to evacuate expatriates (Voltaire Network 2015). Angola believes that Houthis’ unilateral actions jeopardized the political transition that, despite all problems, was maintaining its course in Yemen, based on the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Also, Angola urges all parties to accept the UN mediation and to abide to the Security Council’s Resolutions to put an end to the conflict. Furthermore, Angola seeks a peaceful solution to the crisis and expresses deep concerns with the humanitarian crisis and the rise of terrorist activities in Yemen (Voltaire Network 2015). As others countries, Malaysia is deeply concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, with most of its civilian population lacking basic needs, such as food, medicine and water (Voltaire Network 2015). Malaysia emphasizes the situation of Yemeni youth, as almost a quarter of the killed in the conflict were children. Also, the recruitment and use of children as a military force, mainly by the Houthis, is unacceptable, and Malaysia calls for a severe response for such UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 571 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL international law violations (What’s In Blue 2015a). Malaysia believes that the only legitimate path toward a democratic, stable and inclusive Yemen is the one based on the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, on the National Dialogue Conference and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, those which were jeopardized by Houthis’ attacks (Security Council Meeting Coverage 2015). Furthermore, the country praises the efforts of GCC and UNSC members to reach a peaceful and negotiated end to the crisis (Voltaire Network 2015). In May, a controversy arose when a Saudi newspaper announced that Malaysia was joining the Saudi-led military coalition to intervene in Yemen, with troops already in Riyadh. However, this information was later denied by the government, which said that the troops were there for rescue of its nationals and humanitarian missions (The Malaysian Insider 2015). As Malaysia, Spain is deeply concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The country calls all parties involved in the conflict to promote an inclusive solution, with consensus and dialogue as means to reach a democratic and stable political transition in Yemen. Madrid also stresses the need to avoid any military action in the country to prevent an escalation of the conflict and the suffering of Yemeni population (La Moncloa 2015). As many others, the country shows grave concern with the increasing terrorist activity in the region. Furthermore, Spain points out the importance of transparency during negotiations inside the Council, since discussions about the draft resolutions were limited to a few members, excluding non-permanent ones (Voltaire Network 2015). Finally, as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, Spain is a NATO member, thus integrating the ICI with some Gulf countries (NATO 2014). Chad, a close partner of the US and France in the struggle against terrorism, has a prominent role in the fight against terrorism in Africa and has been watching closely the recent events in Yemen (Schmidt 2013). In 2013, it supported with troops the French intervention in Mali and, in early 2015, it sent a brigade to fight Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon (Allison 2015). Additionally, the headquarters of the French-led regional alliance against terrorism called Operation Barkhane is located at its capital, N’Djamena (Larivé 2014). Chad condemns the unilateral use of force against the legitimate government of Yemen, represented by President Hadi, especially by Houthis. Chad seeks cooperation between the international community and the Gulf Cooperation Council to prevent the collapse of Yemen. Furthermore, the country praises the efforts of the GCC to restore the government and peace in Yemen (Voltaire Network 2015). The country also calls all factions to stop military action and restore the political stability in line with the Gulf Cooperation Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 572 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations National Dialogue Conference outcomes and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (Security Council Meeting Coverage 2015). Lastly, Chad reinforces all parties’ obligations to respect international humanitarian law and to avoid targeting civilians. Chile calls for an immediate cease-fire in the conflict and the release of political leaders under house arrest. The country criticizes the lack of attention given by the international community to the growing levels of deaths among the younger Yemeni population, including the children (Voltaire Network 2015). Also, Chile encourages all parties to avoid unilateral actions and to join talks mediated by the UN (Security Council Meeting Coverage 2015). Finally, joining Spain and others, Chile calls for a more transparent negotiation process in UNSC. Lithuania stresses that the Security Council must call all parties in Yemen to come back to negotiations and to the transition process that was going on before the Houthis’ aggressions, since this could save many innocent lives and avoid the escalation of the humanitarian crisis (Lithuania 2015). Lithuania call all sides of the conflict to observe and to comply with the international humanitarian and human rights law, emphasizing that humanitarian aid must be allowed to reach those in need without obstacles. Lithuania believes that the Council’s message to the crisis should be that a political solution must be found, that violence is not the answer, and that those who continue the aggressions will be punished with sanctions (Voltaire Network 2015). Lastly, Lithuania is a member of NATO, which have a partnership with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the fight against terrorism and to achieve a peaceful and stable situation in the Gulf region (NATO 2014). New Zealand values the Council’s message to end the hostilities, to promote a return to dialogue and to an inclusive political process as agreed previously by the GCC initiative and National Dialogue Conference. New Zealand is deeply concerned with the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and reminds all parties from the obligation to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law (New Zealand 2015). New Zealand condemns the unilateral actions by the Houthis, which conducted a coup d’état against the transition process that had been previously endorsed by the Council. The country also stresses the need to focus also on the long term humanitarian, social and economic consequences of the crisis, which has been disregarded. Finally, New Zealand praises the efforts from Jordan, United Kingdom and the Gulf Cooperation Council members on the search for stability and peace in Yemen (Voltaire Network 2015). The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela sees the Security Council as having the responsibility to encourage a peaceful and negotiated end to the conflict UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 573 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL in Yemen. This mediation by the UN should respect Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial independence (Telesur 2015). Caracas supported the draft resolution proposed by Russia, claiming for humanitarian pauses and for an arms embargo on all parties (What’s In Blue 2015a). Venezuela is apprehensive with rising terrorist activities in the region, especially from Al-Qaeda and ISIS, which are taking advantage from the current conflict. Lastly, the country agrees with Spain and Chile about the lack of transparency of negotiations inside the Council (Voltaire Network 2015). Nigeria is deeply concerned by the deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in Yemen. The country sees dialogue and negotiation as the only paths to peace and stability in Yemen. Nigeria urges all parties to return to the transition process in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, and by the National Dialogue Conference (Voltaire Network 2015). Jordan has been one of the most active countries in the discussions regarding Yemen. As a GCC pending member and a close ally, it was the introducer of Resolution 2216 (2015) that was initiated by GCC, Resolution which has imposed sanctions on Houthi leaders and demanded that they unconditionally end the use of violence (What’s In Blue 2015a). In addition, Jordan joined the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen with F-16 fighter jets, in support of President Hadi’s government , against the Houthis. According to the country, the main reasons to this military engagement were the Arab world’s national security and its territorial integrity that was being perceived as violated by Iran in Yemen and other countries, such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon (Omari 2015). Furthermore, Jordan stresses that a deteriorating political, humanitarian and security situation in Yemen, exacerbated by Houthis’ unilateral actions, are a serious threat to neighboring States (Voltaire Network 2015). Lastly, the government urges all parties to join United Nations-brokered negotiations and to restore the political transition process as a means to promote peace and stability in Yemen (Security Council Meeting Coverage 2015). 5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER 1. Can Yemen’s situation be considered as part of a broader regional dispute or it can be dealt with separately? 2. How can the Security Council avoid an escalation of the war and assure that the transition process can move on? UFRGS Model United Nations I vol. 3 I 2015 574 UFRGSMUN I UFRGS Model United Nations 3. Is it the sanctions regime directed towards Houthi and pro-Saleh leadership an effective manner of containing the escalation of violence and forcing the parties to abide to a peaceful and negotiated political transition? 4. Is the air bombing campaign led by the GCC the best manner to promote the return of a status quo ante and from thereupon, to continue the political transition process? 5. What can the UNSC prevent and/or remediate the negative humanitarian effects of the coalition airstrikes? REFERENCES Agence France-Presse. “Saudi Strikes Yemeni Rebels; Iran Warns.” DefenseNews. 26 de March de 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideastafrica/2015/03/26/saudi-strikes-yemen-rebels-iran-warns-dangerous-step/70494262/ (acesso em 01 de May de 2015). Aguilar, Joey. “No military role in Yemen: UK envoy.” Gulf Times. 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