Local Governance and Government Administration in Belarus

Local Governance and Government Administration in Belarus Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) Introduction The structure and functions of the local government in Belarus are conditioned by the political regime of the country. The first presidential elections of 1994 resulted in the appointment of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the president, who, since then, has maintained the office. After the 1994 presidential elections, Belarus has undergone several constitutional amendments by means of referenda in 1996 and 2004, which institutionalized a powerful role of the president and set the country on an authoritarian trajectory (Burkhardt 2016: 479).1 Lukashenka strengthened his position by consolidating power in the executive branch and creating a centralized governing system known as the presidential ‘power vertical’. The presidential mandate (Article 84 of the Constitution) not only provides control over the executive (Paragraph 6-7) but also allows to govern via presidential decrees and ordinances (Article 85) and to appoint and dismiss the judiciary (Article 84, Paragraph 8-11).2 Article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that Belarus’ local governance is conducted by local Councils of Deputies, comprised of local representatives who are elected for a 4-year term in their respective constituency, and by local Executive Committees. Heads of local executive committees are appointed and dismissed by the president (Article 119). This institutional arrangement includes separation of local governance into local ‘self-governance’, conducted by councils of deputies, and local ‘management’ in hands of executive committees. The existence of two local governing bodies, where one is elected while the other is appointed and 1 Burkhardt, F. (2016). Belarus. In Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems. A. Fruhstorfer and M. Hein (Eds). Wiesbaden, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden: 463-493. 2 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. Available at < http://pravo.by/pravovaya-informatsiya/normativnyedokumenty/konstitutsiya-respubliki-belarus/>. Accessed: October 16, 2018. 1 in control of the president, highlights a weak local governance structure that relies politically on the central government. Local governance structure in Belarus The Belarusian parliament adopted a new law on local governance that came into force in January 2010.3 The ratified law simplified the administrative-territorial organization of local councils and executive committees; however, it has maintained the institutional structure of two local governing bodies. The administrative organization includes three territorial levels: a regional level (6 regions and Minsk city), a district level (118 districts and 10 cities), and a primary level (14 townships, 8 villages and 1152 rural areas).4 Thus, the local governance system has a sub-territorial hierarchical dependency, where the regional governing bodies hold control over district-level councils and executive committees, while the primary level governing bodies report to the district level. Also, it means that the central government maintains decision-power over activities of councils and executive committees; the regional level councils report to the National Assembly (the Belarusian Parliament), while heads of regional executive committees are accountable to the president. The administrative-territorial organization of local government impacts the distribution of functions between local governing bodies. Regional councils are responsible for balancing the budget of all subordinate councils and establishing the limit on debt and borrowing from the central government for the entire region. Local councils are in charge of approving development plans, socio-economic program, local budgets, local taxes and fees as well as decisions on the use of public property. However, their governing role is replicated and constrained by functions of executive committees. If local councils are in charge of 3 Zakon o mestnom upravlenii i samoupravlenii v Respublike Belarus [Law on Local Management and SelfGovernance in the Republic of Belarus]. 4 January 2010, No. 108-3. Available at: <http://pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=h11000108>. Accessed: October 16, 2018. 4 Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus (2018). Informatsiia o vyborah v mestnye Sovety Deputatov [Information on the election of the local Councils of Deputies]. Available at: <http://rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS28-info.pdf>. Accessed: October 17, 2018. 2 approving local budgets and political programs, executive committees are the ones that prepare budgets and develop and implement political and socio-economic programs. In fact, functions of executive committees are more extensive and clearly defined than the ones of local councils (Article 41).5 Also, executive committees have managerial control of public property, infrastructure, organizations and natural resources that belong to respective local governments. Hence, institutionally, the role of representative local councils has been restrained by executive committees. Local elections are called every four years for electing deputies of local councils. Even though local elections are not as politically salient as presidential or parliamentary election campaigns, election results are often guaranteed with the help of election manipulation strategies: the use of early voting, ballot box stuffing, carousel voting. Election commissions do not include oppositional parties or movements (only two exceptions in the 2018 local elections). Some independent candidates have faced the problem of registration in districts where incumbents, loyal to the government, are running. Independent observers and journalists are often removed from polling stations and, as practice shows, are not allowed to closely observe the vote count. 6 For Belarus’s oppositional parties and movements, local elections are not the main priority.7 Due to organizational and budget constraints, oppositional parties and movements do not have local representations outside big regional cities. Nevertheless, the official electoral statistics on the 2018 local elections shows a high number of independent candidates elected into local councils.8 This indicator should not be 5 Zakon o mestnom upravlenii i samoupravlenii v Respublike Belarus [Law on Local Management and SelfGovernance in the Republic of Belarus]. 4 January 2010, No. 108-3. Available at: <http://pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=h11000108>. Accessed: October 16, 2018. 6 OSCE/ODIHR did not observe the 2018 local elections in Belarus. However, some examples of electoral manipulation in Belarus could be found in the 2016 parliamentary election report: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, December 8, 2016. Parliamentary Elections 11 September 2016: Final Report. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/287486?download=true>. Accessed: August 22, 2018. 7 Burakov, A. (November 15, 2017). “Mestnye vybory kak shans dlia oppositsii? Ne v Belarusi [Local elections as an opportunity for opposition? Not in Belarus]. Deutsche Welle. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2JexR4E>. Accessed: October 17, 2018. 8 Central Election Commission of the Republic of Belarus (2018). Vybory v mestnye Sovety deputatov Respubliki Belarus dvadtsat’ vos’mogo sozyva (sbornik elektoral’noi statistiki) [the 28th Local Councils of the 3 misinterpreted. Many candidates are nominated by labor collectives or by collecting signatures from constituents. These candidates do not have party affiliation but they are not independent, since public associations loyal to the government nominate their candidates using these options. The current Belarusian government has relied on public associations, such as Belaia Rus’, the Belarusian Republican Union of Youth, the Belarusian Union of Women, the Federation of Trade Unions, to fill election commissions and create initiative groups for collecting signatures for regime-loyal candidates (Rohava, 2018).9 Political and economic power of local governments (fiscal decentralization) De jure, budgets of local governments at all levels are independent. Local budgets are comprised of transfers, which are subsidies from the central government, and around 60% of revenues are local fees and taxes, where the largest share comes from income tax (more than 30%), then VAT (16% of tax revenues), and then property and profit tax. 60% of local budgets finance social and public services available to local residents, including education, public health, public transport, and cultural activities. 10 In this regard, local budgets are important for sustainable financing of local public services at all levels. However, despite declared legal autonomy in defining local taxes and fees, the central government controls tariffs for public utilities and monitors any adjustments made to local taxes and fees. Since the degree of fiscal decentralization depends on the autonomy of local governments in setting local tariffs and taxes, it can be considered as very low in the case of Belarusian local councils Republic of Belarus (volume of electoral statistics)]. Available at: <http://rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS28-Itogi.pdf>. Accessed: August 22, 2018. 9 Rohava, M. (August 22, 2018). Revisiting Electoral Tactics in Belarus: Local Elections 2018. Baltic Worlds. Available at: <http://balticworlds.com/revisiting-electoral-tactics-in-belarus-local-elections-2018/>. Accessed: October 23, 2018. 10 Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus (2018). Biudzhet Respubliki Belarus dlia grazhdan [Budget of the Republic of Belarus for Citizens]. Available at: <http://www.minfin.gov.by/upload/bp/budjet2018.pdf>. Accessed: October 23, 2018; Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus (January 5, 2018). Zakon Respubliki Belarus o respublikanskom biudzhete na 2018 god [Law of the Republic of Belarus on Republican budget for 2018]. December 31, 2017 No. 86-3. Available at: <http://www.minfin.gov.by/upload/bp/act/zakon_311217_86z.pdf>. Accessed: October 23, 2018. 4 (Mazol, 2015). 11 In addition, the budget, which comes from tax revenues, has designated sectors of public spending and has to follow state program targets that are set by the central government. It limits flexibility and independence of local governments’ budgets. Only at the district and regional levels local governments are able to self-finance their budgets from tax revenues. Primary level governments rely on the central government’s transfers, subsidies that compensate the gap in their revenues. In practice, it means that local councils are not incentivized to cultivate new venues of self-financing. Any additional revenues will result in proportional deductions of state subsidies. Thus, local councils and executive committees remain dependent on the central government in their funding. Local governments and constituencies: accountability and interactions Public participation in the decision-making is restrictive due to the challenging political environment, which significantly impacted public engagement and mobilization. In the recent years, the government has established several mechanisms of informing and engaging citizens in decision-making processes: policy programs are published in local statecontrolled media (newspapers and websites), direct lines and open hours for citizens were created, and local councils hold public consultations events. The practice, however, indicates that interactions with citizens are confined to only certain types of public engagement and communication. While decisions and programs are publicized, the public outreach is very low, and it could be considered as formality. Direct lines and the policy of “one window”, which created a consolidated contact center of the respective local executive committee, has shown some progress. For residents, it simplified the procedure of contacting a needed department of an executive committee. Also, some departments of executive committees have 11 Mazol, A. (June 2015). Local Self-Governance in the Republic of Belarus. BEROC: Free Policy Brief Series. Available at: <http://eng.beroc.by/webroot/delivery/files/Local_self-governance.pdf>. 5 established an electronic contact form. Residents could electronically register complains, and responsible authorities can officially respond to them also using electronic format. The development and growth of social platforms for crowd funding and petitions in Belarus have increased citizens’ awareness. Some civic campaigns and initiatives are able to mobilize local residents to attend public meetings with local deputies and local executives. For example, in 2017 civic mobilization campaign were able to stop a number of construction and demolition plans that were permitted by the Minsk city authorities: the Kurapaty memorial site and a public park in the Katouka district of Minsk were saved. Another win was for residents who stopped the city demolition plans of the historical Asmolauka district in Minsk. In a highly centralized government system with two local governing bodies, local councils are powerless in policy-decision making. Local deputies ally with the position of executive officers if they want to get reelected or get promoted. The whole system is unable to cope with emerging local and regional issues or to provide accountability mechanisms. In January 2018, the construction of the pulp-bleaching factory in the town of Svietlahorsk sparked the protest from local residents, who were concerned that authorities ignored damaging health effects of the plant and did not conduct a proper risk assessment.12 Just a month later, residents of the city Brest also protested against the construction of the battery plant next to the city, collecting more than 25 000 signatures demanding to stop the construction. 13 The addressees of petitions are not local councils’ deputies, executive committees are, and, consequently, the president and the presidential administration. This type of civic engagement and protest works when the cause can mobilize significant support of local residents and generate public and media endorsement. However, it should not be 12 Rudnik A. (January 30, 2018). Belarusian industrial enterprises: authorities invest, citizens protest. BelarusDigest. Available at: <https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-industrial-enterprises-authorities-investcitizens-protest/>. Accessed: October 17, 2018. 13 DW, February 2, 2018, Kto I pochemu vystupaet protiv akkumuliatornogo zavoda vozle Bresta [Who and why opposes the battery plant next to Brest]. Available at: <https://p.dw.com/p/2rtXL?maca>. Accessed: October 17, 2018. 6 recognized as a sustainable and efficient mechanism of public engagement with local governments. V-Dem data assessment: V1-Local government index “Are there elected local governments, and if so to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?” and V2-Local offices relative power “How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?” 14 The V-Dem data illustrates changes in the role of local councils since Belarus declared independence in 1991. Local councils gained a prominent role and political power in the first years of the country’s independence. There were some signs that Belarus would develop a strong system of local governance. However, the presidential election in 1994 followed by national referenda resulted in consolidation of power in the presidential office and institutionalization of the autocratic rule. By 1997, local councils have lost their main functions to executive committees and remained fiscally dependent on the central 14 V-Dem [Belarus-1991/Belarus-2017] Dataset v8 (2018). Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>. Accessed: October 16, 2018. 7 government. The reform of local government in 2010 aimed at ratifying the role of local governments in Belarus’s political system. The law clarified the institutional arrangement and allocation of functions between administrative centers and provided local councils with independent legal status, opening opportunities for international cooperation. However, in practice, local councils have gained only nominal powers of approving political and economic programs and calculating local budgets. 8