Politics of Belarus

Ukraine is an outsider in terms of political values and standards of governance. Transparency, efficiency and accountability, rubber-stamped in official papers and declarations, are superseded by other standards: informal networks, patronage, and a patron-client system are what truly shape the performance of state institutions, making them serve the interests of the elected rather than the electors. The article traces the rise of Viktor Yanukovych to the Presidential office through extensive use of these informal patterns and formation of a vertikal of his own, laying preconditions for his fall.

The Freedom of the Press ranking recently published by Freedom House has found Belarus’ media environment to be Europe’s most restrictive. The ranking placed Belarus as 192nd out of 199 countries and territories within the “worst of the worst” category. These results suggest that media freedom in Belarus has neither been influenced by the country’s recent improvements in its relations with the West nor by the rapid spread of digital technologies. Some of the business community’s representatives have been unsatisfied with the ranking’s results, which call for a deeper reflection on the hidden mechanisms of control that afflict Belarusian media.

As protests continue to galvanize Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is consolidating his grip on power. Volatile domestic dynamics – and Russia’s reactions to them – will shape the discredited regime’s future. This paper outlines four possible scenarios for Belarus up to one year from now. They include options for Russia and the EU, whose strategic objectives differ, but whose short-term interests align: preventing bloodshed, avoiding open geopolitical conflict, and preparing for a post-Lukashenko transition.

The E40 notably may lead to the revitalization of a centuries-old transcontinental transportation/trade corridor, connecting two important European seas and more deeply integrating Ukraine (and Belarus) into the EU’s infrastructural and economic frameworks. Yet, given outstanding financial, geopolitical and ecological obstacles to its completion, the concept of the E40 still requires deeper strategic analysis and higher levels of agreement between all the parties involved.

Ostatniego ćwierćwiecza polskich przemian politycznych dotyka i niniejsza publikacja, która jest zbiorem artykułów przygotowanych przez pracowników naukowych i doktorantów z różnych ośrodków w kraju. Prace dotykają zarówno polityki wewnętrznej, jak i zagranicznej państwa, co oznacza, że odnoszą się do stosunkowo dużego obszaru poznawczego. Zdecydowaną przewagę uzyskały w tej tematyce problemy zewnątrzpaństwowe odnoszące się do Unii Europejskiej, polityki zagranicznej, kilku aspektów bezpieczeństwa europejskiego i międzynarodowego, migracji wewnątrzeuropejskich czy Kościoła katolickiego. Wszystkie te kwestie mieszczą się w ogólnych zarysach „wybranych problemów politycznych” państwa polskiego w latach 1989-2014. Zadaniem niniejszej publikacji stało się przybliżenie Czytelnikom takich problemów politycznych Polski z ostatniego ćwierćwiecza, które wymagają dodatkowego komentarza, pogłębionych analiz podmiotowych i przedmiotowych oraz ciągle aktualnego spojrzenia metodologicznego i merytorycznego.

During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise in the first week from those that do not see protest? Taking the case of nationwide protests in Belarus in August 2020, this study employs an original protest event catalogue to investigate what drives mobilization in early-rising localities. I test hypotheses in the protest literature relating to whether pre-existing social networks, or pre-election campaign rallies, influence subsequent protest mobilization. The innovative use of Telegram data demonstrates the platform's value for social scientists studying protest. My results suggest that pre-existing social networks help drive mobilization in localities by facilitating communication, coordination, and engagement prior to protest onset, priming people to be ready when the moment of protest arrives. This article also highlights the impressive scale of nationwide mobilization in Belarus in 2020, and demonstrates that local networks were engaging in widespread opposition activity even before mass mobilization.

Guest editor of a special issue of the Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 2(1) (2016), ‘Gender, Nationalism, and Citizenship in Anti-Authoritarian Protests in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine’.

https://www.ibidem.eu/en/zeitschriften/journal-of-soviet-and-post-soviet-politics-and-society/journal-of-soviet-and-post-soviet-politics-and-society-15134.html?___from_store=en

Политические убийства, немотивированные аресты, принудительная эмиграция, подавление мирных протестов грубой силой -- все это стало неотъемлемой частью жизни белорусов с приходом Александра Лукашенко к власти, состоявшимся более четверти века назад. Но репрессии далеко не единственный инструмент поддержания легитимности действующего режима, апологеты которого неоднократно подчеркивали, что жесткие меры адресованы только «трудновоспитуемым» членам общества. Какими бы вопиющими ни были нарушения прав человека после президентских выборов 9 августа 2020 года, они далеко не исчерпывают репертуар средств, используемых нынешним белорусским руководством для укрепления созданной им системы.
Политическую практику, в которой политическое лидерство утверждается через пропаганду антифеминизма и/или культа женщины как символа нации, мы называем гендерным популизмом . При этом, что интересно, в белорусском случае гендерный популизм выступает доминирующей дискурсивной практикой не только для режима, но и для его противников. Ниже будет показано, каким образом сосуществование pазнонаправленных форм гендерного популизма сказывалось на участницах антирежимного протеста, превратившись в источник их «выгорания».

A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően a NATO keleti bővítése szinte végig teljes mértékben az USA és nyugati szövetségesei elképzelései szerint alakult. Az identitás-válságban szenvedő, útját kereső, súlyos gazdasági gondokkal küzdő, gyenge Oroszországot a nyugat részéről meg lehetett győzni arról, hogy a német újraegyesítést követően a NATO keleti bővítése nem fog folytatódni. A továbbiakban a NATO keleti bővítése nem ütközött különösebb ellenállásba vagy akadályba, Moszkva tehetetlenül tudomásul vett mindent. Ez egészen az ukrajnai és grúziai háborús konfliktusig folytatódott, amikor Oroszország először tanúsított érdemi és történelmi következményekkel járó ellenállást, elhalasztva Ukrajna és Grúzia felvételét a NATO-ba.
A NATO keleti bővítése elleni orosz ellenállás radikalizálódásának és új minőségi szintre lépésének mérföldköve a 2021 decemberében az USA számára átadott, majd rövidesen nyilvánosságra hozott orosz biztonság- és védelempolitikai kezdeményezés. Ez radikálisan új helyzetet teremt (!). Minden jel arra mutat, hogy Oroszország alaposan átgondolta az egészet és nem blöfföl.  Moszkva a továbbiakban nem tűri el a NATO további keleti bővítését és nyugati együttműködés hiányában saját katonai-technikai (katonai infrastruktúra telepítése) és katonai eszközeivel (katonai beavatkozás) fogja garantálni érdekei érvényesítését. Az orosz álláspont lényege, hogy a nyugat „vagy arrébb megy” a katonai fenyegetéssel, vagy „arrébb lesz téve.”
Szinte teljesen kizárt, hogy az USA és a NATO elfogadja az orosz kezdeményezésben foglalt, leglényegesebb pontokat,    mivel ehhez a nyugat részéről a korábbi elvek és a gyakorlat teljes felülvizsgálatára,  illetve korábbi „alapelvek” jelentős részének feladására lenne szükség.  Marad tehát az orosz érdekérvényesítés katonai dimenziójának megtapasztalása, mint „végső érv”.  Mindez nem jelent NATO-orosz háborút, ugyanakkor a Szövetség keleti bővítésének végét valószínűleg igen, emellett az eddigiekben nem látott mértékű gazdasági adok-kapok játszmát is valószínűleg igen. Emellett várható a nyugat és kelet harcának további éleződése, aminek többek között az orosz-kínai együttműködés minden eddiginél sokkal szorosabbra zárása valószínűleg következménye lesz.  Ez a küzdelem egy negatív végösszegű játszma, ami a nyugat relatív hanyatlását és a kelet további felemelkedését fogja gyorsítani.

В книге предлагается целый спектр определений понятия европе- изации: от «европеизации политики» и «европеизации сверху и снизу» до европеизации социальных практик, знания и повседневной куль- туры. Все эти стратегии помещаются авторами в белорусский контекст с целью исследования условий, возможностей и перспектив их осуществления в Беларуси. В качестве объекта анализа выступают: внешняя и региональная политика Республики Беларусь; властный и оппозиционный дискурсы; ценностное измерение белорусского общества; «историческая политика» и потенциал концепта «Империя Центральной Европы»; материалы по европейской тематике в официальных и неофициальных печатных СМИ; наконец, практики потребления в Беларуси.
Содержание книги имеет междисциплинарный характер. Предна- значена для всех, интересующихся проблемами европеизации и их преломлением в белорусском контексте.

Ukazanie sytuacji na ziemiach białoruskich w czasie II wojny światowej, pomimo bogatej historiografii, wymaga nadal kompleksowej analizy. Jeden z najmniej zbadanych problemów tego okresu dotyczy prasy białoruskiej i jej funkcjonowania w okresie niemieckiej okupacji
Białorusi. Problem ten dotyka innych tematów, jak na przykład sprawa kolaboracji z władzami okupacyjnymi i ruchów nacjonalistycznych (białoruskiego, litewskiego, niemieckiego, polskiego, rosyjskiego i ukraińskiego). W czerwcu-wrześniu 1941 roku po zajęciu ziem białoruskich przez wojska niemieckie Białoruś została wciągnięta w kolejny w XX wieku dramatyczny okres „wojny wszystkich ze wszystkimi” (B. Chiari, M. Karp, E. Mironowicz), który tylko formalnie trwał do lipca 1944 roku.

This publication assesses implications of the post-2020 Belarus for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as well as for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization collectively. Chapters on Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish perceptions are also supplemented by perspectives from Russia and Belarus.

Власть и общество: БССР в 1929-1939 годы в документах Секретного отдела/ Особого сектора ЦК КП(б)Б /Составитель, автор предисловия И.Романова. Вильнюс: Логвінаў, 2019. 1240 с.
К началу 1930-х годов сведения о текущем состоянии в сельском хозяйстве, промышленности, медицине, культуре и т. д. исчезли из открытых источников. Параллельно формировалась закрытая система распространения информации и документооборота, в том числе - в партийных архивах ВКП (б) -КП (б) Б. Практически все такие документы имели гриф «Секретно», «Совершенно секретно», «Лично секретарю ЦК».
Хронологические рамки сборника - 1929-1939 гг. - период, который историки называют «сталинской революцией сверху». Каждый из «переломов» этого периода - наступление на НЭП в 1928-1929 годах, насильственная коллективизация и массовая депортация крестьян в 1930-1931 годах, голод 1932-1933 годов, усиление репрессий и их пик в 1937 году - 1938 г. - вызвали новый массовый поток таких документов.
Перед нами уникальные документы, которые представляют панораму событий на местном уровне. Документы свидетельствуют об информированности руководства страны о ситуации на местах, об отношении к ним и их власти, а также раскрывают многие другие «скрытые» стороны советской жизни, «скрытые» - т.е. не существующие в официальном дискурсе. Корпус этих документов показывает нам не только ЧТО руководители страны видели, но и КАК они это видели.


Power and society: the BSSR in 1929-1939 in the documents of the Secret Department / Special Sector of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus / Compiled, author of the foreword I. Ramanava. Vilnius: Logvinau, 2019.1240 p

By the early 1930s, the information about the current state of agriculture, industry, medicine, culture, etc. had disappeared from open sources. At the same time, a closed system of information dissemination and document circulation was formed. Almost all such documents were labeled “Secret”, “Top secret”, “Personally to the Secretary of the Central Committee”.
The chronological framework of the collection is 1929-1939. - the period that historians call "the Stalinist revolution from above." Each of the "turning points" of this period - the attack on the NEP in 1928-1929, the forcible collectivization and mass deportation of peasants in 1930-1931, the famine of 1932-1933, the intensification of repressions and their peak in 1937 - 1938 - caused a new massive flow of such documents.
We have before us unique documents that provide a panorama of events at the local level. The documents testify to the awareness of the country's leadership about the situation on the ground, about the attitude towards them and their authorities, and also reveal many other "hidden" aspects of Soviet life, "hidden" - that is, not existing in official discourse. The corpus of these documents shows us not only WHAT the leaders of the country saw, but also HOW they saw it.

How do authoritarian regimes remain in power? Focusing on the case of Belarus where he lived for more than five years, the author highlights several mechanisms of assent to tyranny, beyond the regime’s ability to control and repress, which should not be underestimated. The book immerses the reader in the depths of the Belarusian countryside, at the heart of this authoritarian regime. The analysis describes sometimes epic characters, their family history, their sufferings and their joys, their secrets and their hopes. It sheds light on the reasons why part of the population supports Lukashenko, and takes a fresh look at the functioning of the last dictatorship in Europe.

Depuis l’élargissement de 2004, la Biélorussie est frontalière de l’Union européenne (UE). Pourtant, contrairement à l’Ukraine et à la Moldavie, l’État biélorusse ne s’est pas donné pour objectif d’adhérer à l’UE. La Biélorussie a préféré les projets d’intégration portés par Moscou. Dans le même temps, le pouvoir biélorusse insiste de manière constante sur son refus d’un modèle qui serait imposé de l’extérieur par les institutions occidentales. Cette relation particulière au processus de construction européenne est le plus souvent réduite à la seule question du régime politique « néo-soviétique » dirigé par Alexandre Loukachenko depuis 1994. Pourtant, au-delà du régime en place, il s’agit de s’interroger sur les représentations de la société biélorusse au sujet de l’Europe et de ses institutions. Celles-ci sont fortement conditionnées par l’évolution d’une identité biélorusse marquée par un fort degré de russification. Or, si le référent national semble de mieux en mieux intégré par les Biélorusses, l’idée d’une « identité européenne » en tant que référent supra-national est loin de faire l’unanimité tant elle semble entrer en concurrence avec l’idée d’un espace civilisationnel russo-centré.

Executive Summary
• Belarus' geopolitical position as Russia's close ally on the borders of the EU means that the West has a vested interest in ensuring a democratic outcome for the crisis that has gripped the country for over six months.
• While economic sanctions are a highly effective mechanism of putting pressure on the Lukashenka regime, they need to be complemented by efforts to support civil society based on a nuanced understanding of prevalent social and political attitudes.
• Belarus has a complex relationship with its Soviet past, which underpins many of the current attitudes, and failure to take this into account when devising engagement strategies risks alienating broader sections of society.

Polish Eastern Policy. Poland’s Eastern Neighbourhood and  Nation Policy, 1989-2009

The volume focuses on the eastern policy of Poland (polska polityka wschodnia), concerning the most outstanding events and processes of the years 1989-2009. This is the first study written in Hungarian that goes into details about the Eastern policy of Warsaw in the past two decades, in the broadest sense. The work can be divided into two main parts. The first one concentrates on the general features of Polish eastern policy, especially foreign affairs, including the interstate relations between Poland and Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine.
The second part of the volume is concerned with some significant Polish communities living in Eastern Europe; namely in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The decades of the Soviet regime had a deep impact on the Polish minorities of the area (emergence of paternalistic mentality, adoption of the Russian language, decline of religiosity). It was already after the fall of the Soviet Union that the citizens of the kin-state became aware of the changes that had taken place in the Polish minority people’s thinking and attitude.

In the report the authors elaborates on possibilities and barriers for local democracy and municipal partnerships. The report gives insights into the local contexts, the capabilities of local governments, and fiscal and political decentralisation. The information and views expressed in these briefs are based on the current understanding of the situation before October 2018.

W temacie wiodącym  numeru i w pedeefie artykuły ówczesnych doktorantów (A.M. Dyner, B. Kapinos, M. Mozol') i magistrantki (K. Psujek) Piotra Załęskiego.

- Marek Ilnicki: Nowa strategia prezydenta Putina
- Katarzyna Psujek: Odbudowa znaczenia Rosji na arenie międzynarodowej w dyskursie Władimira Putina i Dmitrija Miedwiediewa
- Aleksandra Daniluk: Stosunki Republiki Białoruś z Federacją Rosyjską w świetle rosyjskich koncepcji integracyjnych
- Anna Maria Dyner: Polityka historyczna w Republice Białoruś
- Myhajlo Mozol: Instytucjonalna pułapka prezydentury patronażowej: przypadek Wiktora Janukowycza
- Beata Kapinos: „Ratowanie Ukrainy przed upadkiem” – program modernizacji kraju w dyskursie prezydenta Wiktora Janukowycza

One should not expect the 23 September election to comply with democratic standards. The current legislation in Belarus does not guarantee a free and fair process. The institutional setting prevents a transparent vote count and the election of opposition candidates.
Yet, in sending a full-fledged observation mission to Belarus, the OSCE again appears to be giving official Minsk the benefit of the doubt. Breaking the vicious circle of external regime legitimation would require consistency and restraint in giving this periodic electoral farce any credence whatsoever.
Imitating procedural democracy brings regime consolidation for Lukashenka: enticing the opposition forces – and their Western supporters for that matter – into the electoral trap is a pre-emptive scheme to disqualify them. Decapitated, divided, distrusted, the opposition is incapable of carrying out regime change.
The regime's repressive build-up also dissuades Belarusians from mobilising to contest the predictable fraud – for now. They are nonetheless expressing increasing demands for independent election monitoring.
In view of the 2015 presidential elections, the EU should invest more in the capacity-building and training of civil society actors, notably domestic election observers. Turning voters into reliable rule of law watchdogs could raise awareness in, and demand for democracy in Belarus.

The Russians and the Ukrainians, and indeed the Belarusians too, share an origin myth
which reaches back to the legendary Rurik’s founding of the kingdom of the Kyivan Rus However, rather than reaching fruition in the early 20th century, as was the case in much of Central Europe, the origin story was subsumed into the Soviet experiment, and only remerged after 1991. It is still very much a work in progress.
Here we will look at how the founding myth of the Rus has been used in the Ukrainian
nation building project, which will unavoidably lead to comparisons with Russia and, to a
lesser extent, other neighbouring countries such as Poland, Belarus and Lithuania. From the Normanist debate of the mid-18th century to the rise of nationalism in the 19th century and the use of the Rus in the the Soviet Union, we turn to the present with its all its historical complexity and political ramifications regarding the relationship between Ukraine and Russia.

Masowe protesty po sierpniowych wyborach prezydenckich w Białorusi unaoczniły wszystkie słabości oficjalnej machiny propagandowej i polityki tożsamościowej Łukaszenki. Prezentowana monografia ukazuje rolę kontrkultury w procesie budowania białoruskiej tożsamości narodowej i charakteryzuje narzędzia kulturowego protestu (transparenty, muzyka, sztuka uliczna, cyfrowe formy oporu), dzięki którym obnażony został deficyt prawdy w relacjach władza–społeczeństwo.

Kryzys 2020 roku podważył istotę propagandy oficjalnej, której dominującym motywem był „baćka Łukaszenka” jako gwarant stabilności i pokoju społecznego Białorusi. Wizerunek ten został zepchnięty na plan dalszy przez obraz społeczeństwa zbuntowanego przeciwko pozorom wartości, jakie utrwala zbudowany przez Łukaszenkę system władzy.

Publikacja na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa 3.0 PL (CC BY 3.0 PL) (pełna treść wzorca dostępna pod adresem: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/pl/legalcode).

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The Way to Freedom: Belarusian Cultural Guerrilla Movement in Public Space and on the Internet

Mass protests in Belarus after the presidential election in 2020 showed all weaknesses of the official propaganda. The monograph characterises the tools of the cultural protest (banners, music, street art, digital forms of resistance), which exposed a deficit of truth in the relations between the government and society. They undermine and ridicule the actions undertaken by the presidential centre as well as the long-term strategy of the official propaganda. Regardless of the political outcome, the 2020 crisis will have long-lasting political, social and cultural consequences. It is an important factor in building the contemporary Belarusian identity.

Keywords: Belarus, cultural protest, 2020 elections, Alexander Lukashenko, counterculture.

The nature of the Belarusian protests is indeed different from those that has taken place in other post-Soviet states. The country has neither extreme poverty, nor aggravated social inequality, nor radical anti-Russian nationalism. The driving force of the protests, instead, derived from the fact that in this modern, developed and technologically advanced society people do not want to be governed by overt autocratic means and to have their voices ignored and their opinion suppressed.

For failure of complying with democratic standards, since 1997 Belarus has been (self-) isolated from European integration dynamics. Save for a short-lived 'thaw' with the West in 2008-2010, when Alexander Lukashenka’s regime was seeking to compensate for its degraded relations with Moscow, Belarus has been the target of EU sanctions. Yet the country remains apparently impermeable to democratisation and Europeanisation alike. A 'reluctant partner' in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus is also the cornerstone of Russia’s Eurasian Union project. In late 2011 Russia’s renewed subsidising of Belarus virtually saved the country from economic collapse. In energising its own integration offer along the Eurasian vector, Moscow offers official Minsk a cooperation prospect void of democratic conditionality which is more attractive than the EU’s could ever be. Do Lukashenka’s geopolitical preferences reflect the aspiration of the Belarusian people however? Building on the results of independent sociological surveys, this study tries to assess the worldviews, social needs and dividing lines among Belarusian society ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. It critically reviews the EU’s 'dual track' policy and instruments and calls for adopting a new strategy to draw the country closer to the EU while circumventing its authoritarian leadership. Exploring the potential of 'third track' diplomacy – towards a real, pragmatic partnership with Belarus as a country – this study advocates a more inclusive approach of neighbourhood relations, allowing for mutually beneficial cooperation for the sake of modernising and hopefully democratising Belarus.

Книга представляет собой анализ женского активизма в современной Беларуси —
как с точки зрения самих активисток, так и тех, кто изучает их деятельность, включая
ее в свои политические планы и социальные стратегии. Авторы активно используют
современные методологии для того, чтобы выявить и понять существующие
ограничения и возможности женского активизма, в первую очередь, различные
подходы к генеалогии знания, которое производится и воспроизводится активистками, в
том числе и о проблемах женщин. Последовательный анализ политики, академической
деятельности и опыта активисток нацелен на поддержку критического осмысления
текущих проблем женского движения в Беларуси и формирование гендерной повестки.
В книге использованы работы беларусской художницы Марины Напрушкиной,
живущей в Берлине.

У айчыннай гістарыяграфіі гэта праблематыка толькі пачынае набываць сваё даследчыцкае поле з выкарыстаннем новых падыходаў і метадаў. Аўтар раскрывае ролю гістарычнай адукацыі і асветы ў палітыцы памяці беларусаў у міжваеннай Польшчы, аналізуе камемарацыйныя практыкі, звязаныя з усталяваннем помнікаў вядомым беларускім дзеячам на могілках і правядзеннем мемарыяльных мерапрыемстваў, вызначае «літаратурную» накіраванасць гістарычнай палітыкі, дзе на першым месцы згадваліся прадстаўнікі беларускай культуры, а не вядомыя палітычныя дзеячы.

In August 2020, the presidential election took place in Belarus, followed by unprecedented mass protests due to apparent election fraud. Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the country's long-term authoritarian leader, faced the biggest electoral challenge since his first election in 1994. This article analyzes his official rhetoric during the campaign and after the election focusing on the image of the society. For this purpose, discourse-historical approach is applied to understand his political vision of the developments in Belarus and to explore changes in his rhetoric caused by the unprecedented challenge to his power. The research demonstrates that Lukashenka acts as a classical authoritarian ruler with respective discursive strategies. The text shows that he adopted the imaginary role of Belarus's strict father, who has assumed full responsibility for its fate and offensively reacts to every challenger of this role. It also reveals that Lukashenka sees his personal contract with the Belarusian society as a stable and durable instrument that does not require changes and per se implies his personal engagement as a party to it. Finally, the analysis of Lukashenka's rhetoric in 2020 suggests that a voluntary transition of power in Belarus remains rather wishful thinking.

The New Polish Cyrillic in Independent Belarus (pp 79-112). 2019. Colloquia Humanistica. Vol 8. https://ispan.waw.pl/journals/index.php/ch/article/view/ch.2019.006/4989

After the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the religious life of the Roman Catholic community revived in independent Belarus. The country’s Catholics are concentrated in western Belarus, which prior to World War II was part of Poland. In 1991 in Hrodna (Horadnia, Grodno) Region, the Diocese of Hrodna was established. Slightly over half of the region’s population are Catholics and many identify as ethnic Poles. Following the ban on the official use of Polish in postwar Soviet Belarus, the aforementioned region’s population gained an education in Belarusian and Russian, as channeled through the Cyrillic alphabet. Hence, following the 1991 independence of Belarus, the population’s knowledge of the Latin alphabet was none, or minimal. For the sake of providing the faithful with Polish-language religious material that would be of some practical use, the diocesan authorities decided to publish some Polish-language prayer books, but printed in the Russian-style Cyrillic. This currently widespread use of Cyrillic-based Polish-language publications in Belarus remains unknown outside the country, either in Poland or elsewhere in Europe.

Аляксандр Ланеўскі, Гісторыя палітычнай неэфектыўнасці: польскі погляд на беларускую апазіцыю, "Беларускі Гістарычны Агляд" 2016: Т. 23, Сш. 1-2 (44-45), с. 288-310.
Рэцэнзійны артыкул на кнігу:
Arkadiusz Czwołek, Opozycja polityczna na Białorusi (1989-2010), Studio VP, Gdańsk 2013, ss. 896.