NATO-Russian Relations

The Latvian Foreign and Security Policy Yearbook 2021 aims to examine and evaluate various
spheres of Latvia’s foreign and security policy. It looks at what has been achieved in 2020 and
draws up development scenarios for 2021, informing the public and offering recommendations
to Latvian policymakers. In 2020, Latvia’s foreign and security environment experienced significant and unpredictable challenges. The global pandemic has profoundly affected both people’s daily lives and international relations in general. The development of global geopolitics and the background of the pandemic will bring a number of new challenges and opportunities to Latvia in 2021 as well.

This paper presents a realist reflection on the crisis in Ukraine from the perspective of the Western powers, in particular, that of the United States. Its theoretical argumentation is built on the basis of thoughts of contemporary realist minded scholars and geopoliticians, but, concomitantly, criticizes the contradictory nuances in their approaches. The paper analyses the consequences of the Ukraine crisis as an accomplishment from the Western point of view and diverges from other realist scholars who consider it as a mistake of the West. It argues that the United States has successfully completed its geopolitical mission concerning Ukraine by breaking it away from Moscow's sphere of influence, therefore, now it can seek to de-escalate tensions with Russia over Ukraine and redirect its focus on other threats, such as the rise of China.

The current development of a cyber defence policy by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is usually seen as exemplifying the alliance’s changing scope of intervention; as well as its broadened perception of security. From an institutional-liberalist perspective, it is said to illustrate the transformation of NATO from a defensive alliance into a security management institution. However, others have pointed out that NATO cyber defence policy has been developed with regard to seminal events, such as the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008, and mirrors the persisting cold war logic in NATO current policy.

This dissertation aims to investigate if NATO’s cyber agenda exemplifies the alliance’s transformation into a security management institution; or rather if it displays the continuity of NATO’s self-perception as a defensive alliance. In order to address these questions properly, this dissertation is based on an interpretative approach, using discourse analysis as a method, and a theoretical framework drawing on constructivist accounts, as well as on various liberal institutionalist concepts.

The results of this analysis displayed mixed elements. However, it ultimately seems that NATO cyber defence policy exemplifies the continuous prevalence of NATO’s self-perception as an alliance, designed to defend its members against an external threat. Indeed, the analysis highlights that developments in NATO cyber defence policy are generally conceived as new facets of NATO’s original role – demanding adjusting NATO’s strategy and operational capacities. Yet, NATO cyber defence policy does not seem to represent a fundamental shift in NATO’s perception of its own purpose.

This analysis also highlights the need for further research including additional variables, such as the differentiation between different types of cyber security threats that NATO faces.

The objective of this post-graduate thesis work is to analyses “The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” (CFE) which has been accepted as the most
extensive and successful conventional disarmament treaty of the world disarmament
history and its effects to Turkey in a historical perspective. In our work we spotlighted the process between the Treaty was signed in 1990 and 2010s we are present in. We also gave place to the conceptions of disarmament and controlling arms and their historical development process.

Chapter I, was separated to express various conceptions about the subject in historical examples.

In Chapter II, we dealt with the disastrous race of armament started with cold war era and discussions of controlling arms and disarmaments that the balance of terror alerted. While disarmament and the activities of controlling arms were taken in hand just in terms of conventional dimension because of the extent of our topic; the difficult processes of discussion lasting on troublesome ways to CFE were examined thoroughly because of underlying the Treaty.

Chapter III was separated into eight additional protocols, all of which are accepted as an inherent piece of the Treaty text and other treaties and formations completing the regime of CFE.

In the last chapter of our work, Chapter IV we discussed the results of CFE in terms of NATO and VP, compulsory changes were subjected to in accordance with changing political and military conjuncture and the effects on Turkey in terms of all political, military and economical dimensions with all these breaking points were examined deeply.

Key Words: The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Disarmament, Arms Control, NATO, VP, Turkey.

In an age where nothing seems clear-cut it is wonderful to have a hero and an even clearer villain. Putin is the new Hitler, an obsessive maniac with no respect for human life. The Ukrainians, by contrast, remind us of our parents and grandparents and their pluck during World War II, when Britain stood alone. But, of course, nothing is ever quite so simple. So, at this stage in the war, what is the balance of the good, the bad and the ugly?

This paper argues that tactial nuclear weapons on European soil within the NATO framework have no longer any operational value. Moreover, in light of Obama's prague speech, in which he argues to strive for a nuclear weapons free world, a good first step would be to abolish this type of nuclear weapons.

The international analysis carried out in the first two decades after the fall of communism brings us new information regarding the evolution of the influence of NATO on European security and politics. This article aims to analyze the role of NATO in ensuring European security seen through the research of the most significant German think tanks. It is important to underline the fact that the concept of "security" is not unanimously understood by the international environment. After the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, various structures engaged in the study of international relations set themselves the goal of identifying the signs of a newly emerging system and offering their assessments to the actions of the main actors trying to participate in its formation. The USA set the course for the construction of a unipolar international system, which would be guided by the USA. This approach is most often observed in the studies of American experts on global security problems. (Michta, 2014:36-54

Poland's security strategy represents a considerable hurdle to increased defence integration and cooperation in Europe. Recent developments on the international scene, however, should encourage Poland to revisit and further differentiate its strategic outlook, moving to counterbalance Washington's growing unpredictability through closer defence ties with its EU partners. A shift towards a more constructive approach to EU defence cooperation and integration would represent a win-win solution for both the EU and Poland

The appearance on Russian TV stations Channel One and NTV of the plans for a nuclear torpedo/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has prompted much interest among observers.  Among other aspects, its probably salted warhead attracted much attention, the addition of Cobalt-59 ensuring long-lasting radiation designed to render a wide area uninhabitable for years. The July 1948 Baker test in Bikini Atoll illustrated the effects of a shallow underwater explosion. Missile defence experts have noted how, in line with Russian commentary, the system seems to be designed to bypass Western progress in this field. There’s another significant aspect of the possible construction of this weapon: its impact on the international law of the sea.

From this perspective, there are at least three issues that need to be discussed: whether a submarine carrying nuclear torpedoes may carry out innocent passage through another country’s territorial waters, the 1971 treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, and whether a coastal state may restrict the presence of submarines carrying nuclear torpedoes in its EEZ. This paper examines the three.

The E40 notably may lead to the revitalization of a centuries-old transcontinental transportation/trade corridor, connecting two important European seas and more deeply integrating Ukraine (and Belarus) into the EU’s infrastructural and economic frameworks. Yet, given outstanding financial, geopolitical and ecological obstacles to its completion, the concept of the E40 still requires deeper strategic analysis and higher levels of agreement between all the parties involved.

While the new security environment has driven the EU to take a bigger role in security and defence, it has also forced the EU-NATO relations to evolve from a desirable strategic partnership to a more ‘essential’ one, since both their security is interconnected and neither organisation has the full range of tools available to address the new security challenges on its own. Thanks to the new framework initiated by the Joint Declaration in 2016, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been gradually improving in several designated areas. But it is obvious that, within the defined framework, there are many obstacles to overcome before opportunities could be more fully exploited. While the new challenges emanated from the East and South of Europe can be seen as an opportunity for a wider cooperation, the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism in the world, even including the member nations, poses a big challenge against the cooperation. Further concrete steps are to be taken for a wider and substantial cooperation between two Brussels-based organisations. We argue that a joint response must be formulated in the form of a common strategy, implemented in an integrated way by using a more comprehensive toolbox.

Since Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014, the West has become increasingly concerned about Putin's assertive rhetoric and posturing. In this article, the author argues that NATO's unease is largely misplaced; far from being a force to be reckoned with, the Russian Federation is a hollow force.

Finland and Sweden are following their own interests in Europe. The United States (US) must follow her own interests and reject their addition to NATO. A realistic threat assessment would recognize Russia's depleted force structure and demonstrable inability to threaten Europe as a hegemon in any meaningful way in the foreseeable future. Europe, on the other hand, can balance Russia on its own, if it so wishes, as evident from recent trends. US policy should encourage Europeans to shoulder the majority of the security burden in Europe and look to address emerging strategic rivalries elsewhere, especially in the Indo-Pacic. At a time of in ation and economic downturn, domestic turmoil, a southern border crisis, and the rise of an adversarial China, additional security commitments in a theatre of low strategic priority, is imprudent and irresponsible.

While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the literature, the role of mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape small state preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors-political paternalism, economic status, and religiosity-to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes toward Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics. Russia's resurgence, including its ongoing intervention in Ukraine and its previous actions in Georgia and Moldova, sent a clear signal to all former Soviet Union member states that there will be deadly consequences, in addition to energy and economic sanctions, for turning away from Russia and pursuing closer ties with the West. The tepid US response to these crises has also made it obvious that the United States is unwilling to use military force against Russia to defend its interests in non-NATO countries, particularly those on Russia's periphery. Some have even called into question NATO's resolve to respond militarily in the event of a Russian invasion into NATO countries, chiefly the Baltics, which has recently engaged in a series of war games in anticipation of a potential Russian invasion.

This analysis does not represent neither Western, nor Ukrainian or Russian official views concerning the Kerch Straight incident and its legal background. It is an expert analysis that concentrates on realities. It is not the aim of the analysis to come up with “politically correct” views.

Russia-NATO relations have been volatile since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The phases of succession between cooperation and confrontation progressed in almost cyclical fashion. The periods of engagement culminating with declarations of Russian presidents Yeltsin and Putin about Moscow’s intentions to join NATO have contrasted with periods of distrust after the Alliance’s military operation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia or the Russian invasion of Georgia. However, the tension between the two actors never reached as low a level as that which followed the annexation of Crimea. This has been especially evident in Russian official discourse.

Apparently – at least for the moment – Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has changed his tactics. Instead of invading Ukraine, he has now de-facto annexed the Ukrainian regions Donetsk and Lugansk. What will be his next step and what should the West do?

It looked like that Putin was going to pursue the traditional approach of replying to an alleged attack by Ukrainian forces by conducting a full-fletched military invasion, with the larger part of his conventional forces currently deployed at the Russian-Ukrainian and Belarussian-Ukrainian borders. This is what Putin did in 2008, when Russia’s army invaded Georgia, after alleged artillery bombardments by Georgian forces on Russian troops. However, once more, the shrewd fox Putin surprised the West: instead of a military attack, Putin recognized the ‘independence’ of the separatist Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, which have been in conflict with Kiev since 2014, after Russia annexed the Ukrainian region Crimea.

Putin’s recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk follows another pattern of his long-term objective of restoring the Soviet-Russian empire: undermining independent former Soviet republics, by annexing parts of their territory, to an extent that such a state is just a hull, incapable of existing as an independent country. Why a pattern? He did exactly the same with the other former Soviet republic that aspires to join NATO and EU: Georgia. After the August 2008 war of Russia against Georgia, Moscow also recognized the independence of the Georgian separatist regions, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.

Niniejsza praca powstała w celu przedstawienia ewolucji Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego po zimnej wojnie. Na potrzeby pracy autor odniósł się również do wydarzeń poprzedzających ten okres, aby wskazać podstawowe zasady działania NATO oraz dobrze zobrazować jego transformację. W pracy przedstawiono zmiany zachodzące w międzynarodowym środowisku bezpieczeństwa po rozpadzie Związku Radzieckiego. Wydarzenie to spowodowało pojawienie się nowych wyzwań dla Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, który względem nich dostosowywał swoją misję oraz struktury.  W pracy przedstawiono wyżej wymienione zmiany pod kątem ważnych wydarzeń dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego oraz przyjmowanych przez Sojusz koncepcji strategicznych. Autor analizuje wpływ na funkcjonowanie NATO takich wydarzeń jak: rozpad Związku Radzieckiego, wojny w byłej Jugosławii, atak terrorystyczny z 11 września 2001 roku oraz konfliktu na Ukrainie. W pracy przedstawiono genezę Sojusz oraz główne zasady, na których się opiera. Wskazano motywy utrzymania Sojuszu po zimnej wojnie oraz zmiany strukturalne NATO. Zdefiniowano terroryzm jako zagrożenie asymetryczne oraz przedstawiono NATO-wską koncepcję polityki jego zwalczania. W pracy znajdą się również różne przykłady operacji reagowania kryzysowego oraz przedstawione zostanie ich praktyczne zastosowanie. Poruszone zostaną kwestie relacji NATO z Rosją do 2014 roku oraz działalności NATO po wybuchu konfliktu na Ukrainie.

The conflict in Ukraine has altered the geopolitical configuration in Eurasia. The very beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s internal affairs became the starting point of major geopolitical shifts in the region and in the world. Ukraine and later Syria became “points of no
return” – of Russia’s policy course transformation into a policy of essentially different quality, possibly with regard to the Central Asian region, too. The conflict began to de-escalate only about six months ago; however, the consequences of the Ukraine conflict still continue to
unfold in time and space.
Those consequences have affected all the Central Asian countries, but, especially, Kazakhstan, Russia’s geographical neighbor, with a strong division of public opinion, which was fraught with numerous dangers.
The principal consequences of the Ukraine conflict for Central Asia and Kazakhstan can be classified and described as follows...

A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően a NATO keleti bővítése szinte végig teljes mértékben az USA és nyugati szövetségesei elképzelései szerint alakult. Az identitás-válságban szenvedő, útját kereső, súlyos gazdasági gondokkal küzdő, gyenge Oroszországot a nyugat részéről meg lehetett győzni arról, hogy a német újraegyesítést követően a NATO keleti bővítése nem fog folytatódni. A továbbiakban a NATO keleti bővítése nem ütközött különösebb ellenállásba vagy akadályba, Moszkva tehetetlenül tudomásul vett mindent. Ez egészen az ukrajnai és grúziai háborús konfliktusig folytatódott, amikor Oroszország először tanúsított érdemi és történelmi következményekkel járó ellenállást, elhalasztva Ukrajna és Grúzia felvételét a NATO-ba.
A NATO keleti bővítése elleni orosz ellenállás radikalizálódásának és új minőségi szintre lépésének mérföldköve a 2021 decemberében az USA számára átadott, majd rövidesen nyilvánosságra hozott orosz biztonság- és védelempolitikai kezdeményezés. Ez radikálisan új helyzetet teremt (!). Minden jel arra mutat, hogy Oroszország alaposan átgondolta az egészet és nem blöfföl.  Moszkva a továbbiakban nem tűri el a NATO további keleti bővítését és nyugati együttműködés hiányában saját katonai-technikai (katonai infrastruktúra telepítése) és katonai eszközeivel (katonai beavatkozás) fogja garantálni érdekei érvényesítését. Az orosz álláspont lényege, hogy a nyugat „vagy arrébb megy” a katonai fenyegetéssel, vagy „arrébb lesz téve.”
Szinte teljesen kizárt, hogy az USA és a NATO elfogadja az orosz kezdeményezésben foglalt, leglényegesebb pontokat,    mivel ehhez a nyugat részéről a korábbi elvek és a gyakorlat teljes felülvizsgálatára,  illetve korábbi „alapelvek” jelentős részének feladására lenne szükség.  Marad tehát az orosz érdekérvényesítés katonai dimenziójának megtapasztalása, mint „végső érv”.  Mindez nem jelent NATO-orosz háborút, ugyanakkor a Szövetség keleti bővítésének végét valószínűleg igen, emellett az eddigiekben nem látott mértékű gazdasági adok-kapok játszmát is valószínűleg igen. Emellett várható a nyugat és kelet harcának további éleződése, aminek többek között az orosz-kínai együttműködés minden eddiginél sokkal szorosabbra zárása valószínűleg következménye lesz.  Ez a küzdelem egy negatív végösszegű játszma, ami a nyugat relatív hanyatlását és a kelet további felemelkedését fogja gyorsítani.

At the moment, there are good reasons to give consideration not only to the Alliance’s open-door policy but the proposed roadmap for Ukraine’s future membership (sort of Ukraine’s Compatibility plan with NATO) as NATO develops its Strategic Concept for 2030. Such a roadmap would confirm the destination point set within the Bucharest Summit as to Ukraine and Georgia’s future membership in the Alliance and allow the sides to determine Ukraine’s best route towards this point through the implementation of a certain array of reforms.

The end of the “Cold War”, and thus the collapse of the Soviet Union caused, against predictions, further tensions, conflicts and disintegration. The most powerful countries, such as the USA, Russia, China, India, as well as international organizations (NATO, EU) started to create their own, new international order. The key to the future of Ukraine and its possible accession to NATO will be the actions to be undertaken by the Servant of the People, which has the majority in the Ukrainian Parliament, headed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. Nowadays, Ukraine’s territory is a stem of discord and the main reason for the destabilization of security in Central and Eastern Europe.

This paper serves as an analysis of the Russian Federation's (RF) strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) as they relate to the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy and the relationship between the RF and the United States. This paper uses the SWOT analysis to justify recommended changes to US-RF national security strategy and foreign policy, toward stabilizing US-RF relations and reassuring American allies. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the U.S. must continue to perceive the RF as a long-term challenger to U.S. interests and the sovereignty of its allies, and must therefore enact both hard and soft power policies over the long term that reassure American allies, and solidify American hegemony in Europe. Furthermore, this paper frames the recommended U.S. responses in the Christian Worldview, illustrating the applicability of Scripture to the US-RF national security and foreign policy posture.

* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today.

If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine.

This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition.

The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all.

This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly,  re-establishing  the  field operations in  Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe  and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, but especially with the decision to expand NATO in 2002, the Black Sea became an intersection of Euro-Atlantic geopolitical and geo-economic borders. At the same time, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO (2004) and to the EU (2007) brought the two organizations into a region that has been under the influence of the Russian Federation. The aims of this article are to determinate the way that these geostrategic movements have influenced the importance of the Black Sea, not only for NATO and the EU, but also for Russia. The objectives are to identify the main reasons for witch this region is so important, to describe and present the military strengthening from the Black Sea Region, and to establish the role and significance of Crimea for Russia. From the perspective of this research, geopolitics is used to analyze the foreign policy of Russia towards the Black Sea, by seeking to understand, explain and anticipate the international political behavior of the states from the wider Black Sea region as well as of the global actors. The main conclusion of this article is that the Black Sea plays a very important role for the Russian Federation and the placement of the Black Sea region in the focus of the strategic concerns is a requirement of the current global interest, but also an essential condition for the good evolution of relations in this region, as well as for the regional and global stability and security.

As you know, since a few days, Russian troops are in Ukraine, in a military operation. As a reaction, the West has imposed very, very harsh sanctions on Russia, which are going to have incredible effects, not only on Russia, but also on the whole world. President Putin ordered the military to put the Russian nuclear deterrence forces on high alert. Any further escalation of this situation has the danger of things going completely out of control, and in the worst case, it will lead to a nuclear exchange, and World War III. If that happens, the chances are that nobody will survive; it could be the extinction of the human species.

To understand how we got to this point, one has to look at the recent history of at least the last 30 years. We have been sleepwalking from a point, which was incredibly hopeful, into a worsening of the situation—step by step, step by step—and most people were completely indifferent to what was happening.
Sections: A Fatal Unipolar Fantasy
The 2014 Coup in Ukraine
Russia’s Proposed Security Guarantees Ignored
Russia Remembers Hitler and Napoleon
Germany On a War Footing
A New Peace of Westphalia
Development for All Is the Path to Peace

My friends, we are losing a war you weren’t told existed. If the audience is not yet aware of the takeover and the exact nature of the players involved, then this document will 1) get the audience up to speed with homework of what to read/study, 2) prepare a formulaic list of things to do for the individual and 3) for the western society (churches, institutions, etc.), which 4) while unable to stop the flow of money towards evil at the moment will in the future provide for a new foundation of the west on all levels from spiritual to material dimensions, and everything in between. Finally, martial recommendations will be made, along with access to an example template document, for replication in your local to regional jurisdictions while it is still legal to think independently and act against the wishes of the BORG/consensus leftist ideologies who want freedom to persecute those who want freedom just to be left alone. This was the main reason for the American Revolution and what constitutes Americanism (to be a patriot in America or around the world is to often be staunchly against nationalism) abroad.

KEYWORDS: Liberty - Freedom - Digital War - Asymmetric Attack - COVID - civil war - humanistic

Il termine guerra ibrida è balzato agli onori delle cronache del 2014 ed oramai viene ampiamente usato anche al di fuori dell'ambito degli esperti in materia di sicurezza, ma cosa si intenda realmente con questo termine in realtà c'è piuttosto confusione. Nella stampa generalista il termine guerra ibrida viene usato come sinonimo di cyber warfare  e pure in ambito accademico la discussione è stata, qualche tempo addietro, accesa sull'uso o meno del termine ibridaocome verrà brevemente accennato più avanti. Si pone quindi un primo problema di definire quindi cosa sia la guerra ibrida. Innanzittuto si può dire che non è una forma di guerra totalmente 'nuova', ma ne è una definizione dottrinaria, pure applicata sul terreno, come mai era stata messa nero su bianco da un attore statale nell'ambito di conflitti verso altri attori statali pur con alcune sostanziali novità concettuali. Nell'immaginario collettivo due stati si confrontano solitamente su un campo di battaglia con le unità ben identificabili. Al più possono esserci guerre di prossimità tra due attori statali che in realtà combattono per conto 'terzi'. Questa è quella che nel grande pubblico viene vista come guerra convenzionale, per quanto la realtà sia poi ovviamente molto più sfumata. Una guerra definitiva non convenzionale (o assimetrica o di quarta generazione, anche in questo caso le definizioni si sprecano e sono ricche di sfumature) solitamente vede coinvolti un attore statale contro attori irregolari o addirittura una guerra tra soli attori irregolari. Una guerra lontana dalle battaglie campali, ma fatta di scontri veloci, sabotaggi e via dicendo. La guerra ibrida vorrebbe, come si intuisce dal termine ibrido, porsi nel mezzo di questi antipodi (in realtà più immaginari che pratici). Il termine in tempi recenti si diffonde giornalisticamente in occidente fino all'ambito NATO a partire da 2014 inoltrato; ancora durante l'annessione della Crimea, su Foreign Policy, si usava 'guerra non lineare' (altro contendente al termine ibrido per definire questa tipologia di scontro) per indicare quanto stava accadendo, per giunta rifacendosi ad un articolo di Vladislav Surkov, consigliere di Putin, pubblicato il 12 marzo 2014 in coincidenza proprio con l'annessione della Crimea. Il termine guerra ibrida (o non lineare) viene usato oggigiorno per indicare una precisa tipologia di operazioni russe che si basano su una chiara dottrina che poi verrà illustrata, ma il termine è stato coniato in tempi meno recenti dal Maggiore statunitense William J. Nemeth in un suo testo intitolato Future War and Chechnya: A case of Hybrid Warfare del 2002. Scritto nel quale si analizzava la condizione ibrida della società cecena divisa tra elementi pre-moderni ed uno stato contemporaneo, una società ibrida che fece sorgere un modo di condurre la guerra originale con elementi regolari ed irregolari mixati in maniera molto efficace. Senza entrare nei dettagli dello 1 Ad esempio si prenda questo articolo del NYT dove il caso che riguardò la Clinton in campagna elettorale viene identificato-erroneamente-con la hybrid warfare confondendo uno dei possibili strumenti della cyber warfare che possono essere usati all'interno della guerra ibrida con la guerra ibrida stessa.

The main conclusions of this paper is that unscrupulous and malicious use of lawfare by State and non-state actors must not discourage law-abiding international actors from continuing to act in compliance with international law. Actors using lawfare affirmatively will give the political and military leadership the necessary room to fine-tune the planning and conduction of military operations using all instruments of power and reflecting on anticipated lawfare by the opponent. Affirmative use of lawfare as counteraction of Hadesian lawfare has extreme limitations in terms of time, space and applicable procedures. Law-abiding actors will be confronted with short-lead times for political decision-making and military planning based on incomplete intelligence and open-source information, an incommensurate broadness of the battlespace – tangible and virtual, and the ‘dictates’ of compliance with the rule of law, in order to follow democratic procedures and be subject to court review and the scrutiny of the public opinion.

Arctic security is a main security challenge – a global one, not only a regional one – not only for the Arctic countries, but for the whole international community, first of all the European. With Russia and China expanding their role in the area, and the difficulty of finding an undisputed governance on maritime routes and economic exploitation of resources, there is the risk of militarization of the Arctic. After briefly summarizing current and future challenges in the Arctic, this paper analyzes the limits due to a deficit of suitable instruments to maintain security in the region, especially in relation to the role of international intergovernmental organizations, and suggests some remedies to overcome these deficiencies.