Soviet, post-Soviet, Russian politics

L’intento di questo lavoro è presentare un quadro che sia il più completo possibile nell’analizzare il percorso dell’Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche dalla sua nascita, nel 1922, fino al suo crollo, nel 1991 e, successivamente, la delicata fase di transizione russa dal comunismo all’economia di mercato, cercando di mettere in luce i problemi incontrati dal Paese nell’instaurare la democrazia. L'ultima parte analizza la figura della Banca Europea per la Ricostruzione e lo Sviluppo ed il suo ruolo specifico nella delicata fase di transizione economica della Russia.

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

Wayne Vucinic Book Prize 2007, "for the most important contribution to Russian, Eurasian, and East European studies in any discipline of the humanities or social sciences." 

Endorsement by Slavoj Zizek:

"Alexei Yurchak's Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More immediately seduced me by its very title with a profound philosophical implication that eternity is a historical category--things can be eternal for some time. The same spirit of paradox runs through the entire book--it renders in wonderful details the gradual disintegration of the Soviet system from within its ideological and cultural space, making visible all the hypocrisy and misery of this process. I consider Yurchak's book by far the best work about the late epoch of the Soviet Union--it is not just history, but a pleasure to read, a true work of art." (Slavoj Zizek, author of In Defense of Lost Causes)

Abstract:

Soviet socialism was based on paradoxes that were revealed by the peculiar experience of its collapse. To the people who lived in that system the collapse seemed both completely unexpected and completely unsurprising. At the moment of collapse it suddenly became obvious that Soviet life had always seemed simultaneously eternal and stagnating, vigorous and ailing, bleak and full of promise. Although these characteristics may appear mutually exclusive, in fact they were mutually constitutive. This book explores the paradoxes of Soviet life during the period of "late socialism" (1960s-1980s) through the eyes of the last Soviet generation.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Hat die derzeitige politische Ordnung in Russland mittel- und langfristig Bestand? Die fundamentale Herausforderung der Fortexistenz des heutigen kleptokratischen Regimes Russlands in den kommenden Jahren wird das Zusammenfallen zweier systemunterwandernder Tendenzen – ökonomischer Stagnation und politischer Transition – sein. Deren kombinierter Effekt wird selbst kluge Kremlführung nicht ohne weiteres neutralisieren können. Es wird daher früher oder später wieder zu einem System- und nicht nur Führungswechsel in Russland kommen, worauf der Westen sich bereits heute einstellen sollte.

Relying primarily on field research in the Siberian city of Omsk, this essay analyses a variety of ways in which state patriotic terminology is used by individuals and groups through the study of organisations and activities that deploy the patriotic label, such as schools, museums, youth clubs, and summer camps. Analysis based on fieldworksuggeststhatalthoughpatriotismincludesabasicconsensusaboutthehomeland,acluetothesuccess oftheconceptisitscapacitytobeappropriated,distorted,orembeddedindiverseunderstandingsandpractices. Easily ‘captured’ by different actors according to their needs and goals, patriotism also appears to be deeply rooted in the personal and the private. Everyday patriotism is thus far from being reduced to its top-down or official dimension. While patriotism is a tool that officials efficiently use to promote their political goals, it is also a symbolic resource that Russian society uses in its attempts to reformulate a new collective identity.

Представленные в книге очерки посвящены выяснению истории постижения человеческого разнообразия СССР, в ходе которого оно анализировалось, формулировались идеи, формировались на их основе представления и политические символы, разделявшиеся исследователями, а затем политиками, публицистами, посредством которых СССР репрезентировался его гражданам и внешнему миру.

The problem of historical periodization of Russian integration activity has been considered. The content of its main stages has been concretized on the basis of the analysis of historical experience. Approaches of specialists have been offered. Russia had the characteristics of empire. Territorial dimensions of the empire were incomparably greater than any of the European countries. Russian foreign policy was characterized by integration imperatives that contribute to the pursuit of the accession of lands within the Eurasian space. Periods of integration (attachment of land to the imperial center) alternated with disintegration (loss of previously acquired lands). The cycles of integration and disintegration in various ratios interacted with the modernization of society of the empire. Accession of lands is done through a cultural impact and bet on the local elite. For their subsequent merger with the imperial center used methods of military, political, ideological, demographic or socio-economic impact. The integration was carried out under the conditions of semi-peripheral position of the empire in the world capitalist system, and within the autarkic union. Ups and downs of the Russian imperial power are not subject to the chronological rhythm and have different lengths of time. Stages of amplification and integration are lasted: 125 years (1480-1605); 199 years (1613-1812); 103 years (1815-1918); 21 (1920-1941); 46 years (1945-1991). Duration of stages attenuation, disintegration and restore of imperial space, excluding the Mongolian (1237-1480: 243 years) and post-Soviet (from 1991 to the present: 24 years) periods, characterized by the relative transience: 8 years (1605-1613); 3 years (1812-1815); 2 years (1918-1920); 4 years (1941-1945).

Key words: integration; disintegration; Russia; Eurasian space; periodization.

В статье рассматривается проблема периодизации российской интеграционной активности на евразийском пространстве. На базе анализа исторического опыта конкретизировано содержание её основных этапов. Приведены подходы специалистов. Показано, что периоды взлётов и падений имперского могущества России не подчиняются хронологической ритмичности, имея различную протяжённость во времени. Выделяются пять стадий интеграционной активности и шесть – пассивности и дезинтеграции.

Ключевые слова и фразы: интеграция; дезинтеграция; Россия; евразийское пространство; периодизация.

The vast majority of historians and anthropologists unequivocally believe that Russia is a part of European civilisation due to a variety of common cultural features. Dispute arises mainly when Russia’s European identity is considered in terms of philosophy and politics. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, it looked like the public controversy over Russia’s identity had purportedly ended with the new Russian government’s decision to conduct democratic reforms and pursue membership in major European and international organisations. Therefore, the question is why didn’t this discourse subside under Yeltsin and Putin’s rule? Why does Russian society return to it over and over again? Why has Russia changed its strategic priorities in the 2000s, displaying little interest in European integration and gradually sliding into a confrontation with the West? Finally, what outcomes can we expect from the public discussions about Russia’s identity?

As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its “hybrid war” in the Donbas, the present-day nonproliferation regime, with its exceptional treatment of the permanent Security Council members, could in the future, paradoxically, encourage rather than stem the construction or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

This article begins by chronicling and evaluating the reaction of the government of Kazakhstan to Sacha Baron Cohen’s film Borat—Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan. It then compares and contrasts the official government reaction with the expressed attitudes of local members of Kazakhstan’s young English-speaking elites. This study is based on the results of a survey of almost five hundred young university students conducted in March 2007 at the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP), the most prestigious university in the country. The sample gives a snapshot of those most likely to have been aware of Borat – the young, internet-savvy, educated urban elite – and inter alia provides insights into how respondents in Kazakhstan thought the movie impacted their country and would influence how they were treated abroad. The survey results suggest that while responses to Borat were heterogeneous, most students accepted that the choice of Kazakhstan as a target for satire was coincidental rather than conspiratorial. Despite official efforts to ban the movie, a majority of the respondents had seen the film and believed that the ban was a mistake. Also, while recognising that Borat would raise Kazakhstan’s profile in the world, respondents doubted it would increase knowledge, and some feared a change in their treatment when travelling abroad.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 remains a deeply puzzling event. The action was uncharacteristic of Moscow's Third World policy and extremely self-destructive. Moreover, archival sources reveal that, just nine months earlier, the Politburo was strongly opposed to such an undertaking. Based on archival documents, this article examines what could have caused this sudden, reckless shift in policy, and attention is drawn to a hitherto overlooked factor. Guided by the “resource curse” literature, the possibility that the Soviet leadership may have been radically emboldened in their contemporary external outlook by the extraordinary surge in energy wealth that occurred during 1979 is analyzed.

Cтоит ли классифицировать природу «системы Путина», ввиду ее недавней радикализации, как современное проявление фашизма, как это недавно сделали некоторые — в том числе и русские — обозреватели? У этих явно антипутинских комментаторов — напр., А. Мотыль, В. Иноземцев, М. Снеговая и др. — прослеживается своего рода утилитарное отношение и избирательный подход к набору свойств исторического фашизма для как можно более эффектного разоблачения бесспорно террористического, агрессивного и репрессивного характера сегодняшнего российского режима. Типичной ценой применения термина «фашистский» к путинскому режиму в результате этого «сбора вишни» является, однако, чрезмерно широкая дефиниция общего понятия «фашизм». Такого рода инклюзивные определения сути фашизма, как правило, приводят к имплицитному утверждению о существовании десятков независимых «фашистских» режимов в истории человечества — а не только в Германии Гитлера, Италии Муссолини, России Путина. Еще одним последствием такой преднамеренной инфляции этого ключевого исторического понятия является открытие вопроса о том, как же тогда обозначить комбинацию тех характеристик итальянской ПНФ, немецкой НСДАП, румынской «Железной гвардии», венгерской Партии скрещенных стрел, испанской Фаланги и др., которую в сравнительном обществоведении иногда называют «фашистским минимумом» или «ядром».

Bushuev A.S. Razvitie politicheskogo soznaniya molodezhi Respubliki Tatarstan v 1985-2004 godakh: istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt. [Development of the Political consciousness of youth of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1985-2004: historical and sociological aspect] Kazan': Institut istorii AN RT, 2009. 204 s.

Монография посвящена актуальной проблеме отечественной социальной истории – развитию молодежного политического сознания в условиях модернизации. В книге представлено одно из первых исследований, где предпринята попытка рассмотреть широкий комплекс проблем, связанных с процессами формирования и трансформации политического сознания молодежи Республики Татарстан в переломный период истории нашей страны с 1985 до 2004 гг. В центре внимания автора оказались такие важные вопросы как государственная политика и изменения политического сознания молодежи в период Перестройки, эволюция политического сознания молодежи в период кризиса коммунистической идеологии и распада государства, и развитие политического сознания молодежи Татарстана в 90-е гг. XX столетия и на современном этапе. Книга адресована широкому кругу читателей – историкам, социологам, политологам, аспирантам и студентам гуманитарных специальностей и всем профессионально занимающимся общественной работой с молодежью, всем интересующимся политикой и историей социальных процессов.

Political consciousness of youth during collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of new Russian statehood is a challenging issue for domestic historiography. Nowadays the given problematics is rendered great importance and is being developed both in various institutes of Russian Academy of Sciences and in Russian universities. Today’s generation of young people witnessed radical large-scale changes: disintegration of superpower, formation of new states within its former territory, reformation of economy and political system, affirmation of national sovereignty and attempts to build civil society. Each young person experiences individual changes in altering conditions and gets over his or her individual way of coming-of-age, simultaneously with fundamental transformations experienced by the country. The development of political consciousness of youth and its structure is a perfect reflection of recent social changes, as the youngest and the most mobile members of society easily get involved in the process of internalization of the existing political and legal norms. At the same time they turn out to be pioneers in the a new-formed society. This is definitely the case with young citizens of a multinational subject of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Tatarstan. The book represents the results of one of the first research projects attempting at consideration of a wide complex of problems related to processes of formation and transformation of political consciousness of youth in the Republic of Tatarstan in one the most difficult and dynamic periods of contemporary history of Russia, encompassing changes in all spheres of social reality within the period from the beginning of Perestroika to the end of the first V.V. Putin’s presidential term. The author focuses on such important issues, as the state youth policy and evolution of political consciousness of youth, ways of its expression, political identification and activity of youth.
The research is based on a wide range of both published and archived sources. Investigation went on “while the trail was still hot”, thus many documents were not available from the state archives. Therefore, it was decided to use material skept at current departmental archives, as well as the results of a number of socio-logical research projects, including projects accomplished personally by the author. The book consists of two chapters. The first chapter characterizes social-economic and political development of the region in the era of Perestroika and crisis of official ideology which had gradually accumulated by the end of the 1980s. It also determines motivation and historical preconditions of changes occurring in political consciousness of youth of the republic, political commitments and activity rate of its young citizens. Second chapter considers youth policy of modern Tatarstan and its influence on the development of the general structure of life of young people, current basic trends of development of political consciousness of youth, including changes in political identification and behavior viewed as real manifestations of political consciousness. The development of political consciousness of Tatarstan youth in 1985–2004 has been essentially influenced by many controversial factors, including negative ones. Long-term unstable economic and political developments in the country, low standard of living of population, collapse of ideals and moral-ethical standards have negatively affected the process of political socialization of youth, prevented strengthening in its consciousness of values and attitudes which would be conductive to the growth of political activity. Stabilization of social-economic and political situation in the second half of the 1990s gave rise to the general tendency of growth of interest of Tatarstan youth to social-political issues. However, this nominal growth of interest to politics badly matches real behavior of youth, as basically young people remain passive and somewhat superficial. During the given period the value (axiological) component of political conscious-ness of youth experienced radical transformation. Although youth has rejected socialist values straight away and suddenly, the process of strengthening of new, democratic values went on very slowly. On the whole, consciousness of youth of modern Tatarstan has accommodated democratic political values and norms, where-as democracy itself and civil freedoms are nowadays the most supported form of social development. However, certain values (for example, multiparty system value) are still weak enough, and this mirrors current situation with social-political development. Apart from that, there are some positive tendencies, such as strengthening in youth consciousness of commitment and love to Fatherland.
Compared to the beginning of 1990s, the level of political requirements of youth has grown up. Since recently, it is increasing through the expansion of political participation of youth in various forms of political activity (youth associations, elections to representative bodies of state power, etc). Although on the whole such participation is yet far from being large-scale, as young people make poor use of available legal means to exert pressure on the authorities, this can be still considered to be a positive tendency. Main conclusions presented in the book are based on long-term research work. Hopefully, the given monograph will answer many of your questions about peculiarities of political consciousness and behavior of Tatarstan youth. The book is addressed to the wide audience – historians, sociologists, political scientists, postgraduates and students majoring in humanities, as well as to all those who are professionally engaged in public work with youth, and all who are interested in politics and history of social processes.

В современной Украине из Степана Бандеры и его организации делают героев, хотя на самом деле они были международными террористами, пишет Иван Качановский, пост-докторский сотрудник факультета политологии Торонтского университета, в своей колонке для журнала Корреспондент. Когда историю забывают – это плохо, но еще хуже – когда ее перекручивают. Яркий тому пример – то, во что в современной Украине превращают Организацию украинских националистов (ОУН) и ее лидера Степана Бандеру.
Работая в архиве президента США Франклина Рузвельта [глава государства в 1933-1945 годы] над книгой о массовом советском терроре в Украине в 1930-х годах, я натолкнулся на собранные американскими спецслужбами материалы об украинских террористах. Я и представить себе не мог, что теперь они станут героями популярной телепрограммы о Великих украинцах. А один из них и вовсе — фаворитом в гонке за звание величайшего из украинцев.

Документы об этих людях были собраны Генри Филдом,

Я натолкнулся на собранные американскими спецслужбами материалы об украинских террористах руководителем специальной разведслужбы при президенте Рузвельте, и Секретной службой США,  охраняющей американских президентов. Они описывают покушение на президента США, которое готовило руководство ОУН и немецкие спецслужбы в годы Второй мировой войны. Насколько мне известно, эти материалы нигде не публиковались, и их исследование еще впереди.

Исполнителем теракта должен был стать Григорий Мацейко, известный тем, что в 1934 году, по приказу Степана Бандеры, убил министра внутренних дел Польши Бронислава Перацкого. После этого убийца бежал в Аргентину. А оттуда, по американским данным, полученным в 1941-1942 годах, он планировал выехать в США. Цель "визита" – устранить Рузвельта по приказу представителей ОУН и нацистской Германии, которые обещали заплатить за это миллион марок.

В случае успеха резонанс от убийства был бы значительным не только в пределах Польши, как это произошло с атакой на польского министра (ее сейчас зачастую представляют как один из аргументов в пользу величия Бандеры), а имел бы мировое значение. Более того: он мог бы повлиять на ход Второй мировой войны.

Показательно, как рассекреченные документы американских спецслужб характеризуют ОУН, а также Бандеру, Мацейко, и других деятелей организации. Исходя из материалов этого дела, объемом в несколько десятков страниц, ОУН определялась американцами как "украинская террористическая организация", которая сотрудничает с нацистской Германией против США. И это не просто заявления – документы содержат агентурные и дипломатические донесения об этом сотрудничестве с конкретными именами и примерами.

Первая информация о подготовке покушения на Рузвельта датируется весной 1941 года. Мацейко должен был въехать в США с паспортом на чужое имя при содействии агентов гестапо и немецких дипломатов в Латинской Америке. В сообщении от 24 марта 1941-го указывается, что эта группа "украинских террористов" организована немецким дипломатом Кристианом Зинсером. Именно Зинсер был ведущим агентом гестапо в Аргентине и других странах Латинской Америки. Его выслали из Гондураса и Гватемалы, где он занимался антиамериканской деятельностью под дипломатическим прикрытием, в апреле 1941 года.

В документах упоминается и освобождение немцами осужденного за убийство министра Перацкого Николая Лебедя — в 1941-м он стал заместителем Бандеры в ОУН. Причем именно он восстановил связи с руководством этой организации. Показана и ведущая роль Бандеры в выборе Мацейко для устранения польского министра — глава ОУН характеризовал его как "умелого террориста".

В начале 1942 года, после того, как поступила новая агентурная информация о подготовке теракта против Рузвельта, американские спецслужбы создали спецгруппу. Она за несколько месяцев собрала детальную информацию на этих и других оуновских террористов и их сторонников в Южной и Северной Америке. Агенты открыто следили за украинскими иммигрантами, связанными с Мацейко и ОУН, чтобы дать понять, что американскому правительству известно о подготовке покушения.

Оуновский теракт против президента Рузвельта так и не был совершен, а след Мацейко спецслужбы потеряли.

Впрочем, на этом история взаимоотношений США и ОУН не заканчивается. 

Но это не помешало ЦРУ и другим правительственным организациям во время холодной войны сотрудничать с бывшими немецкими нацистами.

При этом закрывали глаза на то, что многие из них были причастны к нацистскому геноциду. К примеру, американские и английские спецслужбы использовали Бандеру и его организацию для забрасывания нелегальных групп в Украину на самолетах.

Но спецслужбы США не забывали об оуновской попытке теракта против президента Рузвельта. Даже в 1964 году руководитель Секретной службы США интересовался документами по этому делу, переданными Генри Филдом.

Архивы американских президентов и спецслужб должны содержать еще много интересных материалов, связанных со Степаном Бандерой, лидером террористической ультранационалистической организации и главным претендентом на телевизионное звание "великого украинца".

Эта колонка опубликована в №18 журнала Корреспондент от 17 мая 2008 года.

In 1946, in the Southern Urals, construction of the USSR’s first plutonium plant fell to the GULAG-NKVD. The chief officers in charge of the program—Lavrentii Beria, Sergei Kruglov, and Ivan Tkachenko—had been pivotal figures in the deportation and political and ethnic cleansing of territories re-taken from Axis forces during WWII.  These men were charged with building a nuclear weapons complex to defend the Soviet Union from the American nuclear monopoly. In part thanks to the criminalization and deportation of ethnic minorities, Gulag territories grew crowded with foreign nationals and ethnic minorities in the postwar years. The NKVD generals were appalled to find that masses of forced laborers employed at the plutonium construction site were members of enemy nations. Beria issued orders to cleanse the ranks of foreign enemies, but construction managers could not spare a single healthy body as they raced to complete their deadlines. To solve this problem they created two zones: an interior, affluent zone for plutonium workers made up of almost exclusively of Russians; and anterior zones of prisoners, soldiers, ex-cons and local farmers, many of whom were non-Russian. The selective quality of Soviet ‘nuclearity’ meant that many people who were exposed to the plant’s secret plutonium disasters were ethnic minorities, people whose exposures went unrecorded or under-recorded because of their invisibility and low social value.

Voilà plus de treize ans qu'Auchan, fleuron de la grande distribution alimentaire française, est implantée en Russie. En 2002, lors de l'ouverture de son premier hypermarché dans la banlieue de Moscou, tous les spécialistes étaient d'accord : la Russie, avec sa classe moyenne dépensière et sa croissance annuelle à deux chiffres, représentait le 'nouvel Eldorado' pour les enseignes étrangères. En effet, le pays semble avoir particulièrement réussi à Auchan, qui y emploie aujourd'hui plus de 37000 personnes dans 78 hypermarchés, 122 supermarchés Atac et 34 centres commerciaux. Toutefois, le climat politique actuel, avec notamment la crise ukrainienne et l'embargo russe des produits alimentaires occidentaux, a sérieusement changé la donne pour le groupe nordiste, qui commence à regarder la Russie d'un autre oeil.  Dans notre intervention, nous tenterons d'expliquer les raisons du succès d'Auchan en Russie, avant de nous interroger sur ses perspectives d'avenir dans le pays.

What the world is now witnessing in Ukraine is the cumulative effect of history and memory in the lives of the people of the region—and this book helps readers to understand those subjects. Centered in Kharkiv, a Russian-speaking city in eastern Ukraine, this is an oral history of a group of military colonels, their families, and their contemporaries, covering their lives from the 1960s through the post-Soviet transition. During this period, these military families went from comfortable economic circumstances, professional prestige, and political influence to destitution and disgrace in the 1990s. Based on the 3,000+ pages of Westrate’s interview transcripts and supplemented with materials gleaned from unprecedented access to personal, family, and institutional archives, this book investigates how families endured shifting social, cultural, and political realities. By analyzing the lives of individuals in context, Westrate provides insights from the grassroots level. He reveals how ideological, professional, gender, religious, ethnic, and national imperatives—as developed and transmitted by elites—were internalized, transformed, or rejected by the rank and file. In the process, he shows what those experiences have to offer the study of Soviet, post-Soviet, and transnational history. This study bridges the new boundaries created by the collapse of the USSR and examines the foundations of conflict in twenty-first century Ukraine.

Wenn ein Unterzeichnerland des Vertrages selbst vor einem der fünf Garanten des Sperrabkommens nicht sicher sein kann: Welchen Sinn hat dann das Verbot der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen? Im Austausch gegen einen Abbau von Nuklearwaffen erteilen drei atomwaffenbesitzende UNO-Sicherheitsratsmitglieder dem abrüstenden Land kollektive, ausdrückliche und schriftlich fixierte Sicherheitszusagen. Eines dieser Großmächte erklärt jedoch 20 Jahre später diese Vereinbarung für nichtig: Welches Land ohne eigene Atomwaffen oder enges Bündnis mit einer Nuklearmacht kann sich nun der Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen noch sicher sein? Wenn selbst eine mit Ausnahmerechten ausgestattete Vetomacht im UNO-Sicherheitsrat sich auf Kosten eines Nachbarstaates territorial ausdehnen kann, dann wird das internationale Atomwaffensperrregime zum Selbstbedienungsladen der offiziellen Nuklearmächte.

The diffusion of digital media does not always have democratic consequences. This mixed-methods study examines how the government of Azerbaijan dissuaded Internet users from political activism. We examine how digital media were used for networked authoritarianism, a form of Internet control common in former Soviet states where manipulation over digitally mediated social networks is used more than outright censorship. Through a content analysis of 3 years of Azerbaijani media, a 2-year structural equation model of the relationship between Internet use and attitudes toward protest, and interviews with Azerbaijani online activists, we find that the government has successfully dissuaded frequent Internet users from supporting protest and average Internet users from using social media for political purposes.

This article offers a comprehensive explanation of why Chechen and other North Caucasian jihadists join the Syrian civil war. It also details the ongoing split in the ranks of North Caucasian jihadists; their complex relationship with the leadership of the Caucasus Emirate; and the security implications of the jihadists' prospective return to their homeland.