Polish Eastern Policy

This paper aims to shed light on the historiographical and archival component of an important topic — the efforts to build an independent Ukrainian state in the period 1917–1921. It also scrutinizes Polish Eastern Policy of that period to provide background for further research. The issues touched upon in this brief review indicate the need for further research in this thematic realm. The historiography given in this article captures the views of Polish political elites at the turn of the twentieth century. It could be argued that these elites were strongly focused on the resurrection of an independent Polish state. One of the strongest ositions was formulated by the National Democrats, the so-called Endeks, led by the well-known political figure Roman Dmowski, who in his Thoughts of a Modern Pole (1903), or in Germany, Russia, and the Polish Problem (1908), as well as in his Polish Politics and the Rebirth of the State (1925) and other works stressed the idea of incorporating Ukrainian lands into the Polish state, and called Ukrainians an “ahistorical,” “non-state” nation, i. e. a nation with no right to have a state of their own. The Endeks believed that only those lands along its eastern border should be incorporated. These were lands that Poland could “digest” and gradually Polonize completely, thus becoming a monoethnic state.
He considered Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Podillia to be such territories. Other Ukrainian lands according to the Endeks should belong to Russia and act as a counterweight to German hegemony. Simultaneously the idea of antemurale, of Poland being a bulwark of Christianity confronting the East, was seen as part of the great mission to protect Western civilization from the Bolshevik threat. Thus, in this part of the Polish political elite’s vision there was no place for an independent Ukraine.

For over ten years Polish-Belarusian political relations have been characterized
by a lack of opportunities for real collaboration, caused by the non-democratic nature
of the Belarusian political system. The international isolation of its authoritarian
regime also influences bilateral relations. In the period from 1996–2008 Poland
adopted a principle of critical dialogue in its policy towards Belarus. This implied
official criticism of the infringement of human rights and breaking of democratic
rules while refraining from a total abandonment of dialogue with the Belarusian authorities,
although the level and intensity of this dialogue was significantly diminished.
It was assumed that the complete isolation of the Belarusian authorities was
not in Polish interests and preferential treatment would help to ensure the fundamental
rights of the Polish minority in Belarus. This policy turned out to be ineffective,
though, in relation to a state that does not acknowledge the basic principles and laws
of international relations. To a large extent, the specific character of the Belarusian
political system has been, and will remain, the greatest obstacle in the further development
of Polish-Belarusian relations, and will significantly restrict the possibility
of building good relations in the future.

The subject of studies is Poland’s policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
in the years 1989–2010. It encompasses analysis of the bilateral diplomatic relations from
the point of view of political science. It is not an attempt at a comprehensive presentation
of the problem but only an interpretation of the aspect connected with strictly political
relations, which are the most dynamic element of the eastern policy of Poland. The other
components, phenomena and events connected with Polish eastern policy were presented
as a background or to supplement the cause-and-effect process.
The formation of the first conceptions of Polish eastern policy and the place in it of
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was burdened with the necessity to take into consideration
the still existing USSR. It was only after its fall that making foreign policy without this
“extra” burden was possible. Against all appearances starting diplomatic relations with
eastern neighbours was not easy and, at the beginning, hopes were accompanied by
fears connected with the persistent domination of the historical issues. Their exposing in
the first half of the 1990s in case of Poland’s political relations with Russia as well as with
Ukraine and Belarus, became a source of the first conflicts between Poland and these
three countries. Hope and endeavours to make friendly political relations strongly corresponded
with the fears and threats which were perceived in the bilateral relations. Polish
authorities faced a difficult task of building foreign policy and defining goals and methods
of their realisation in relations with eastern neighbours. The purpose of this book is
to present as objectively and credibly as possible the long process of formation and evolution
of Polish-Russian, Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Belarusian relations.
Political facts and events, which have significantly influenced Poland’s policy towards
eastern neighbours, were taken into account. Poland’s political situation, the advancing
evolution of goals of Polish foreign policy, coalition governments and their
programmes of co-operation with eastern partners, international and many other factors
which have an important impact on Poland’s eastern policy were submitted to a thorough
analysis from the point of view of their positive and negative impact on bilateral
political relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Another goal of this publication is to show to its readers the current state of bilaterial
relations of Poland with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and to answer the question
whether during the last two decades Polish authorities have done everything that was
possible to exist today in a friendly international environment to the East of its borders.
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The aim of this work is also to take into consideration the question of how Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus perceive Polish eastern policy and its influence on the state of Poland’s
bilateral relations with these countries.
This book consists of five chapters. Chapter One deals with the question of defining
foreign policy and the process of making foundations of Poland's eastern policy in the
new geopolitical situation. In his analysis, the author aims to explain the concept and
essence of foreign policy and, its varying conditions, the process of setting goals in foreign
policy and the question of methods and means applied in foreign policy. An important
task of the book was to try to define the concept of raison d’état, which is too often
overused in foreign policies. The subject of analysis were the evolutional process of formulating
goals of eastern policy and the influence of the question of security of the state
and priorities of foreign policy. The “two-way policy” towards Russia, Ukraine and
Belarus, the crisis of eastern policy in the years 1993–1995 and the question of integration
of Poland with the European Union and its impact on the goals set for foreign eastern
policy were also presented.
The subject of Chapter Two is the analysis of Poland’s policy towards the Russian
Federation. An important issue was to answer the question: Why in Poland’s Russian
policy the factor of threat dominated excessively and why the Russian partner was
treated as an opponent in the region? The process of evolutional formation of geopolitical
divergencies, lack of opportunities for a compromise as far as the issue of European
security is concerned and the policy of crises in the Polish-Russian relations. An importatnt
question was to show the role and significance of the Kaliningrad Region as a factor
which has a negative influence on the Polish-Russian relations. In order to verify the
initial hypotheses it was important to give an answer as to the causes of the defensive
character of Poland’s policy towards Russia.
In Chapter Three the author analysed Poland’s policy towards Ukraine, trying to answer
the question of what was the Polish-Ukrainian “strategic partnership”? Whether it
was really the result of special ties and interests uniting the two countries, or only
a media and purely declarative part of Poland's policy towards the Ukrainian partner?
Why did Ukraine so strongly strive to form a political and military alliance with Poland
in the first half of the 90s of the 20th century and why it met refusal on the part of Poland?
An important factor which helps to better understand the state and character of
Polish-Ukrainian political relations was an analysis of the historical policy in mutual
relations and its influence on the perception of bilateral relations.
Poland’s policy towards Belarus is disccused in Chapter Four. An element which
should be analysed was underestimation by the Polish party in its policy towards the
Belorusian party of their fears connected with Polonisation and activities of the Catholic
Church. Initially, issues which were of slight importance to Poland, later became the
main reason of serious divergencies in bilateral relations. Also of importance is the question
of the awareness of the Polish party of the change in the geopolitical future of Belarus
because of Poland’s accession to the NATO. Political changes in Belarus in the years
1994–1996 were analysed in this work as well as their influence on the deterioration of
mutual relations. It was also important to answer the question about the reasons of ineffectiveness
of the policy of critical dialogue towards Belarus and causes of the conflict concerning
Polish minority in 2005.
Chapter Five contains an analysis of the current development of Poland’s policy towards
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and presents short- and long-term perspectives of
further development of Polish eastern policy. Attention was paid to the perspectives of Polish policy towards each of the eastern neighbours in case of realisation of different
variants of opportunities and threats. It was important how external and internal factors
of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus generate challenges, threats and opportunities for Poland's
eastern policy.
The author took up this subject, encouraged by his wish to draw attention to the important
role of Polish eastern policy during the past two decades in the realisation of the
main goals of foreign policy and the security of the state. Initially, left out of consideration
and underestimated, eastern policy began to be treated as an important and indispensable
element of the foreign policy of the state only after the events of “the Orange
Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004. Another factor, which motivated the author to take up
this subject, is a still relatively small number of studies on the subject. Attention should
be drawn to the fact that the output of works which directly deal with Polish eastern
policy and bilateral relations of Poland with Russia, Ukraine and particularly with Belarus
is still rather small. In the available literature, works devoted to historical aspects
dominate, while decisively there is a shortage of monographs written from the point of
view of political science. Although there are many scientific articles in collections of
articles and studies, scientific journals and conference proceedings, they still do not offer
a full diagnosis of the state of mutual relations of Poland with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

Przedmiotem edycji są dwa monarchistyczne projekty: niemiecki (memoriał płk. sztabu generalnego Maxa Bauera ogłoszony na Zjeździe monarchistów w Budapeszcie 20 czerwca 1920) i rosyjski (Memoriał nr 1 gen. Wasilija Biskupskiego ogłoszony na zjeździe monarchistów
w Budapeszcie 8 lipca 1920). Autorka opracowania ukazuje złożony kontekst funkcjonowania swego rodzaju międzynarodówki monarchistycznej po zakończeniu pierwszej wojny światowej.
Stawia hipotezę, iż poza przygotowywaniem planów walki z bolszewikami, efektem aktywności monarchistów niemieckich i rosyjskich w tym czasie miała być destrukcja konkurencyjnego programu wschodniego Józefa Piłsudskiego. Problemy mogące wynikać z polskiej polityki wschodniej znikły jednak dzięki polskim decyzjom podporządkowania ZCZW władzom w Warszawie, co skutkowało utratą zainteresowania Niemców dla ruchu monarchistycznego, traktowanego jako doraźne narzędzie walki politycznej.

Co jakiś czas powracają głosy wzywające do rewizji polskiej polityki wschodniej i uznające, że błędem było oparcie jej na tzw. doktrynie Giedroycia-Mieroszewskiego. Podobne myślenie bazuje na głębokim niezrozumieniu istoty tej doktryny. Zasady, na jakich oparty był program paryskiej „Kultury”, który następnie legł u podstaw polityki suwerennej Polski wobec Europy Wschodniej, nie były bowiem jedną z wielu możliwych opcji do wyboru. Były i pozostają opcją, wobec której nie ma alternatywy.

W 2020 roku minęło 20 lat od śmierci Jerzego Giedroycia i 100 lat od urodzin Bohdana Osadchuka, odpowiednio redaktora paryskiej «Kultury» i jej stałego autora. Na łamach czasopisma emigracyjnego powstał program polityczny, którego elementy stały się podstawą polityki wschodniej Polski po upadku komunizmu. Istotnie B. Osadczuk wniósł znaczący wkład w ukraińską część programu «Kultura», który zgodnie z wolą przestał ukazywać się wraz ze śmiercią redaktora J. Giedroycia. Celem artykułu jest analiza relacji między niepodległą Ukrainą a Polską w kontekście idei programowych pisma emigracyjnego, (nie)aktualności modyfikacji wizji J. Giedroycia i B. Osadczuka na dzień dzisiejszy. Słowa kluczowe: pojednanie polsko-ukraińskie, bezpieczeństwo regionalne, Międzymorze, mniejszość narodowa, granica, mit i stereotyp.