Fields of Fire: Researching and Modeling Peleliu’s WWII Invasion Beaches Toni L. Carrell, Madeline J. Roth, Jennifer F. McKinnon 2020 Historic photographs clockwise from upper left: NARA RG-127; U.S. Navy Seal Museum; Hatch Collection, National Museum of the Pacific War Fields of Fire: Researching and Modeling Peleliu’s WWII Invasion Beaches Grant Agreement No. GA-2287-17-015 Final Report Toni L. Carrell, Madeline J. Roth, Jennifer F. McKinnon 2020 This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior. Obtain copies from Department of the Interior, National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program 1849 C Street, NW, Room 7228 Washington, DC 20240 Portion of a 1944 Japanese Defensive Plan showing fields of fire. Beleliu Museum Executive Summary The focus of this project is the World War II (WWII) Battle of Peleliu that began on September 12, 1944 in the Palau Islands in the Caroline Island archipelago. The scope of the project is limited to the Peleliu invasion beaches, designated as White 1, White 2, Orange 1, Orange 2, and Orange 3, to approximately 30 meters (100 ft.) inland. Seaward, it includes the lagoon, the reef, and the immediate area just beyond the reef. This project is the first effort to study the Peleliu WWII invasion beaches and the offshore battlespace. It is a Phase I historical and archival research effort and follows guidelines for identification activities as defined by the Secretary of Interior Standards for Archeology and Historic Preservation. The methodology focused on the results from prior archaeological investigations, archival background research, primary and secondary accounts of the battle, historic maps, photographs, a battlefield visit, and reconnaissance survey. KOCOA battlefield analysis is used to understand the activities that influenced the invasion and the decisions and limitations imposed by the natural terrain and built environment upon the amphibious landing and the invasion beaches. The impacts of post-war scrap salvage have been so great as to dramatically influence the survivability of the underwater cultural heritage (UCH) of the submerged battlefield. As a result, only a limited number of UCH sites were located. Based upon prior archaeological investigations, historical accounts, invasion and post-invasion land modifications to the project area, the KOCOA analysis, and the results of a site visit and reconnaissance survey, this report assesses the cultural heritage sites that remain. iii Table of Contents Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................iv List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. vii List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... xi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 14 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 14 Methodology, Limitations ..................................................................................................... 14 Legislation and Jurisdiction.................................................................................................... 15 Chapter 2: Previous Research, Archival Resources, Repositories ................................................ 16 Previous Research ..................................................................................................................... 16 Archival Resources and Repositories Consulted ....................................................................... 18 Chapter 3: Historical Background 1911-1945 ............................................................................... 21 The Palau Islands 1911-1941..................................................................................................... 21 The Palau Islands in WWII, 1941-1945...................................................................................... 24 Pre-Assault Air Operations and Reconnaissance................................................................... 26 Operation STALEMATE II ....................................................................................................... 27 Amphibious Strategy and Planning ....................................................................................... 28 UDT Operations ..................................................................................................................................... 30 Japanese Defences on Peleliu................................................................................................ 32 Pre-Assault Bombardment .................................................................................................... 36 The Assault............................................................................................................................. 37 White Beaches 1 and 2 ........................................................................................................................ 42 Orange Beaches 1 and 2 ..................................................................................................................... 45 Orange Beach 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 48 D-Day Plus .............................................................................................................................. 50 iv The Aftermath of the Battle ...................................................................................................... 52 Chapter 4: Peleliu Invasion Beaches and KOCOA Analysis ........................................................... 53 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 53 Pre-invasion Beach Reconnaissance ......................................................................................... 56 D-Day Landing and Initial Assault .............................................................................................. 58 White Beaches ....................................................................................................................... 59 Orange Beaches ..................................................................................................................... 65 Summary of KOCOA Features and Battlefield Boundaries ....................................................... 69 Battlefield, Core, and PotNR Boundaries .............................................................................. 69 Chapter 5: Landscape Modification and Salvage .......................................................................... 72 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 72 Orange Beaches......................................................................................................................... 72 Pontoon Causeway and Harbor ............................................................................................. 73 Airfield Complex .................................................................................................................... 76 Base Development................................................................................................................. 78 Orange Beach Cemetery ........................................................................................................ 80 Orange Beach Shoreline and Marina Dumpsites .................................................................. 82 White Beaches........................................................................................................................... 83 Post War Salvage ....................................................................................................................... 84 Chapter 6: Potential Losses and Invasion Beach Investigation .................................................... 87 Potential Losses in the Project Area.......................................................................................... 87 Peleliu Invasion Beach Investigation ......................................................................................... 88 Terrestrial Inshore Survey ..................................................................................................... 89 Previously Recorded Japanese Defensive Positions................................................................ 91 Previously Unrecorded Japanese Defensive Positions ........................................................... 91 Sites Inshore of the Invasion Beaches........................................................................................... 96 Lagoon Survey...................................................................................................................... 101 Reef Towed Swimmer Survey .............................................................................................. 106 Chapter 7: Modeling ................................................................................................................... 111 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 111 v Site Location Analysis .............................................................................................................. 115 White Beaches 1 and 2 ........................................................................................................ 115 Orange Beaches 1, 2, and 3 ................................................................................................. 117 Chapter 8: Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 122 References Cited ......................................................................................................................... 124 Appendix 1: Sites Investigated and Documented ....................................................................... 132 Appendix 2: Modern Finds ......................................................................................................... 136 vi List of Figures Figure 1. Sites identified during the 1981 survey by Denfeld. Denfeld 1988:5, Figure 21. .......... 16 Figure 2. Location of Palau in the Western Caroline Island. USMC map n.d. .............................. 21 Figure 3. Japanese Mandated Islands in 1921. United States Military Academy, 1941............... 22 Figure 4. Palau Islands. Hough 1950:5, Map 2.............................................................................. 23 Figure 5. The extent of Japanese military control in the Pacific. The two-pronged battle plan to the Japanese home islands went through Palau to the Philippines. Major battles indicated in red. U.S. forces offensive drive strategy indicated in blue. NPS, War in the Pacific National Park, n.d. ................................................................................................................................................ 25 Figure 6. The first wave of LVT(A)s move toward the invasion beaches, passing through the inshore bombardment line of LCI gunboats, September 15 1944. Cruisers and battleships are bombarding from the distance. The landing area is hidden by dust and smoke. Photographed from a USS Honolulu (CL-48) plane. NARA RG-80-G-283533. ...................................................... 29 Figure 7. UDT teams documented an array of obstacles offshore of the Orange beaches, similar to the double row of wooden posts at Scarlet 1 and 2 on the opposite side of the island from the invasion beaches. Navy Seal Museum, 2002.0034.19. .......................................................... 30 Figure 8. UDT Team 6 map of obstacles and blast ramps for the amphibious landing at Orange 3. Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. .......................................................................................... 31 Figure 9. Andy Anderson, GM1/c, of UDT 7, with a J-13 mine at Peleliu. This type of ‘horned’ mine was particularly dangerous because it was so unstable. Navy Seal Museum, 2002.0034.12. ....................................................................................................................................................... 32 Figure 10. Japanese defensive plan. Garand and Strobridge 1971:74 Map 3 by E.L. Wilson; reproduced in Hough 1950:38, Map 5.......................................................................................... 34 Figure 11. U.S. Scheme of Maneuver for Peleliu Operation. Hough 1950:20, Map 4.................. 39 Figure 12. Aerial view of White Beaches 1 and 2 on D-Day, September 15, 1944. White 1 and 2 were assigned to the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marines. Company K, 3/1 is on the extreme north flank. The “Point” is on the northern promontory. NARA RG-127, USN Photo 283745. ... 40 Figure 13. The LVTs move toward the invasion beaches, September 15, 1944. NARA RG-80-G283533. ......................................................................................................................................... 42 Figure 14. Assault on Peleliu showing assigned beaches for each Marine Regiment. USMC Historical Center, 1950, Map by R. Johnstone.............................................................................. 43 Figure 15. Marine riflemen take temporary shelter behind an LVT. The name of the LVT [The Bloody Trail] was more than prophetic. DOD Photo, USN 95253. ............................................... 45 Figure 16. D-Day Showing disposition of troops. Hough 1950:56, Map 6 by E.L. Wilson. ........... 46 Figure 17. Marines landing on Orange Beach 1. Burning amtracs in the distance. NARA RG-127. ....................................................................................................................................................... 47 vii Figure 18. Japanese anti-tank ditch on Orange 3 providing cover for 7th Marines Command Post on D-Day. DOD Photo, USMC 94939............................................................................................. 49 Figure 19. Operational Assault objectives September 15 to October 15, 1944. U.S. Army of Military History, Battle of Peleliu, Source: http://www.army.mil/cmh/brochures/westpac/p27(map).jpg, 2005......................................... 51 Figure 20. U.S. Invasion Objectives at Peleliu. Top inset: Location of Landing Beaches in Palauan Archipelago. Bottom inset: Location of Landing Beaches on Peleliu Island. Image by Roth/Ships of Discovery................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 21. Reconnaissance Map of the White Beaches created by UDT 7. Burke 1944. NARA RG38. ................................................................................................................................................. 58 Figure 22. Smoke from the naval and aerial bombardment rises from Peleliu the morning of September 15, 1944. Photograph taken from USS Clemson. Bureau of Aeronautics Materials, 247290. ......................................................................................................................................... 60 Figure 23. Japanese beach obstacles and fields of fire from coastal defenses on the White beaches. Although most of the range markers were removed by UDT 7, they remain in this image to aid reader with artillery visualization. Artillery caliber sizes and associated ranges were calculated from 2018 site investigation and previous investigation of coastal defenses (Denfeld 1988; Price et al. 2012; Price and Knecht 2015). Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. .................... 61 Figure 24. Burning amphibious vehicles off White beaches 1 and 2 on September 15, 1944. The White/Orange coral promontory is visible with smoke rising behind in center of image. Note range markers and posts off the beach. Bureau of Aeronautics Materials, 46697. .................... 63 Figure 25. The White/Orange promontory, seen on the right, caused minimal delay in troop movement on White 2. By the time Davis reached the area, the majority of men were already nearing the airfield. Frederick R. Findtner Collection, USMC Archives, 2-10. .............................. 64 Figure 26. Lt. (jg) “Butch” Robbins, UDT 7, with a Japanese J-13 “horned” mine at Peleliu, 1944. National Navy UDT Seal Museum 2001.0105.14. ......................................................................... 65 Figure 27. Japanese beach obstacles and fields of fire from coastal defenses on the Orange beaches. Artillery caliber sizes and associated ranges were calculated from 2018 site investigation and previous investigation of coastal defenses (Denfeld 1988; Price et al. 2012; Price and Knecht 2015). Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. .......................................................... 66 Figure 28. KOCOA terrain features on the Peleliu Landing Beaches. Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. ...................................................................................................................................... 70 Figure 29. Suggested Battlefield, Core, and Potential National Register Boundary following 2018 fieldwork. Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. ................................................................................ 71 Figure 30. Within hours of landing on the beaches, the Seabees began clearing damaged equipment and materiel. Norm Hatch Photo Collection, National Museum of the Pacific War, Image Peleliu 031, 1944. ............................................................................................................... 73 viii Figure 31. Seabees and engineers, working under fire, had this causeway operative by D+ 6 to bridge the reef at the Orange beaches. Angaur Island at the top edge. Hough 1950:22. ........... 74 Figure 32. UTD 6 blasted a 15 ft wide channel through a shallow rock and gravel area in preparation for a pontoon causeway (right). Logdson 1944. NARA RG-38.................................. 75 Figure 33. The construction of the harbor completely reconfigured the former area of the causeway and a small unnamed islet. The UDT map overlays the current configuration of the area. Graphic, Roth/Ships of Discovery. ....................................................................................... 75 Figure 34. Orange beach harbor construction, May 15, 1945. Orange beaches to the right. U.S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 1947:331................................................. 76 Figure 35. Japanese airfield on Peleliu on September 16, 1944, taken by a TBM-1C off USS San Jacinto (CVL30). View to south. Orange beach in the upper right. NARA RG-80-G, Box 960...... 77 Figure 36. Airfield complex March 1945 showing the amount of development immediately inshore of the Orange beaches. Military housing and other development extended along the shore at the Orange beaches and inshore of White Beaches (upper left). NARA RG-127........... 77 Figure 37. View to the north along the Orange beaches showing extensive shoreline modifications. By July 1945, the development extended to less than 10 m (33 ft.) of the shore, destroying the Japanese defensive positions. NARA RG-127. ...................................................... 78 Figure 38. Detail from 1946 map of Peleliu titled “Ngarmoked NW-D, Palau Islands.” Note southern harbor and tent areas on the White and Orange beaches. U.S. Army Map Service, 1946. ............................................................................................................................................. 80 Figure 39. A September 1944 aerial view of Orange Beach shows a portion of the extensive Japanese tank traps and complexity of foxholes. Beginning of cemetery circled. NARA RG-127 (after Knecht et al., Figure 4.5, pg. 52). ........................................................................................ 81 Figure 40. Orange Beach cemetery with chapel in background. In 1946-47, all of the remains of service personnel were removed and transferred to Manila, Hawaii, or the mainland. NARA RG127 (after Knecht et al. 2012:62). ................................................................................................. 82 Figure 41. View toward “The Point” at the north end of White Beach 1 showing the quantity of heavy equipment and supplies being offloaded. Note the presence of a row of obstacles in the lagoon. NARA RG-127. .................................................................................................................. 84 Figure 42. Landing craft, Orange Beach, Peleliu, March 1951. UHM Library Digital Image Collections, Margo Duggan, accessed February 11, 2020, https://digital.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/items/show/7808. ...................................................... 85 Figure 43. Landing craft, Peleliu, March 1951. UHM Library Digital Image Collections, Margo Duggan, accessed February 11, 2020, https://digital.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/items/show/7727. ...................................................... 86 Figure 44. Survey areas. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. ............................................................... 89 Figure 45. Section of an August 1944 Japanese defensive plan. The red arrows are the Japanese presumed US avenues of approach for the invasion. The blue arrows represent the fields of fire ix of the gun emplacements across the invasion beaches and reef. The blue half-circles on the beaches represent general defensive positions. Peleliu State Museum...................................... 90 Figure 46. UDT 6 reconnaissance map Orange beaches 1 and 2. Note the rows of wood posts to the left and right of the cleared channels. Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. .................... 111 Figure 47. UDT 6 reconnaissance map Orange 1. Note the row of mines (center) posts (left and right) and 50 Kg aircraft bombs (far right). Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. ................... 112 Figure 48. Japanese defensive positions map with invasion beach overlay shows the intensity of the enfilading fire directed at the beaches. Approximate locations: White beach black lines, Orange beach orange lines. Map section extracted from 1944 Japanese map, courtesy Peleliu Museum. Illustration Carrell/Ships of Discovery. ....................................................................... 113 Figure 49. UDT 7 reconnaissance map of White Beaches 1 & 2. NARA. Note the presence of range markers in approximately 3 ft. of water (indicated by X), and barbed wire closer in to shore (indicated by x-x-x). Immediately inshore is a line of rifle pits. Burke 1944. NARA RG-38. ..................................................................................................................................................... 114 Figure 50. Sites identified at White Beaches 1 and 2, and the northern portion of Orange 1. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. ............................................................................................................. 116 Figure 51. Sites identified at Orange beaches 1, 2, and 3 (top to bottom). Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. .................................................................................................................................... 118 Figure 52. Landing beach obstacles, blast channels, and cleared paths offshore of the Orange beaches. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. ..................................................................................... 120 x List of Tables Table 1. Estimated Japanese Weapons on Peleliu and Ngedebus ............................................... 36 Table 2. Ships Involved in the Naval and Aerial Bombardment ................................................... 37 Table 3. Overview of KOCOA Attributes (after NPS 2016:5 and Babits et al. 2011) .................... 53 Table 4. Terrain Features and KOCOA Attributes Associated with Peleliu Amphibious Invasion 54 Table 5. Previously Recorded Japanese Defensive Positions ....................................................... 91 Table 6. Previously Unrecorded Japanese Defensive Positions ................................................... 92 Table 7. WWII Sites Inshore of the Invasion Beaches................................................................... 96 Table 8. WWII Lagoon Sites ........................................................................................................ 102 Table 9. WWII Reef Sites ............................................................................................................. 106 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AA ABPP AT BB CA cal CBD CL CP CV CVE D+ DD DMS DOD DOI DON DUKW ft. HPO Anti-Aircraft American Battlefield Protection Program Anti-tank Battleship Heavy Cruiser caliber Construction Battalion Detachment Light Cruiser Command Post Aircraft Carrier Escort Carrier Assault Day + 1, 2, 3 etc. Destroyer Destroyer minesweeper Department of Defense Department of the Interior Department of the Navy Amphibious truck feet Historic Preservation Officer xi IJA IJN km LCI LCI(G) LCUs LCT LCM LCVP LSD LST Lt. Col. Lt. Gen. LVTs LVT(A)s KOCOA m mm NARA NHCC NOAA NPS OPC RCT RG SCRU SCUBA TF UCH UDT U.S. USN UXO WWII YMS Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy kilometers Landing Craft, Infantry Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboat Landing Craft, Utility Landing Craft, Tank Landing Craft, Mechanized Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel Landing Ship, Dock Landing Ship, Tank Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant General Landing Vehicle, Tracked Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Armored Key terrain, Observation, Cover and concealment, Avenue of approach and withdrawal meters millimeter National Archives and Records Administration Naval History and Heritage Command National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Park Service Objective 1, 2, etc. Submarine Chaser Regimental Combat Team Record Group Submerged Cultural Resources Unit Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus Task Force Underwater Cultural Heritage Underwater Demolition Team United States of America United States Navy Unexploded Ordnance World War II Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper xii Acknowledgements This project would not have occurred without the help of a number of individuals and groups. The Palau Historic Preservation Office was instrumental in making this project happen, clearing the way for a site visit and assisting with the field reconnaissance. Special thanks go to Sunny Ngirmang, HPO, and Calvin T. Emesiochel, Deputy HPO. Both were extremely helpful and gracious with their time and support. The agencies and organizations that supported this project on island include the Office of the President Republic of Palau, the Office of the Governor State of Peleliu, the Belau National Museum, the Office of the Palau Automated Land and Resource Information Systems (PALARIS), the Palau National Aviation Administration, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Thanks go to Shawn Arnold, John Burns, Jeff Enright, Mark Keusenkothen, Jason Nunn, Kailey Pasco, and Jason Raupp, their field skills, hard work, and sense of humor made the project memorable in the best possible way. A special thank you goes to Madeline Roth and Jennifer McKinnon who contributed their considerable research, writing, and investigative expertise. The project and this report benefited greatly as a result. A thank you is also extended to the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) for providing the funding for this project. We would particularly like to thank Kristen McMasters, Philip Bailey, and Emily Kambic for their support and guidance. A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Ocean Exploration and Research Grant (NA17OAR0110214) augmented the ABPP funds, allowing a longer site visit and remote sensing survey. Toni L. Carrell, Santa Fe Ships of Discovery xiii Chapter 1: Introduction Introduction The focus of this project is the World War II (WWII) Battle of Peleliu that began on September 12, 1944 in Palau Islands in the Caroline Island archipelago. Peleliu is located at the southern end of the Palau Island chain and was a strategic objective for both the Japanese and U.S. militaries. This project is the first effort to study the Peleliu WWII invasion beaches and the offshore battlespace. It is a Phase I historical and archival research effort and follows guidelines for identification activities as defined by the Secretary of Interior Standards for Archeology and Historic Preservation. It analyzes information on the U.S. battle plan and execution, the amphibious assault, the reported locations and extent of known losses, the positions and influence of Japanese defensive batteries and gun emplacements, post-war cleanup, and salvage operations. The battlefield is examined using KOCOA analysis to understand the activities that influenced the invasion and the decisions and limitations imposed by the natural terrain and built environment. Based upon prior archaeological investigations, the historical record, a site visit and reconnaissance survey of the invasion beaches and shoreline, post-invasion land modification and salvage, and the KOCOA analysis, this report assesses the potential range of sites and the underwater cultural heritage sites that remain. This project was funded by a grant from the Department of the Interior (DOI), National Park Service (NPS), ABPP under agreement GA-2287-17-015. A NOAA Ocean Exploration Grant, under agreement (NA17OAR0110214), augmented these funds and permitted a longer site visit and survey. The result of the NOAA remote sensing survey is reported by Carrell et.al. 2020. Methodology, Limitations The methodology focused on archival background research, primary and secondary accounts of the battle, maps, and photographs, prior archaeological research, a battlefield visit, and reconnaissance survey. It does not include site testing or in depth site investigation. The scope of the project is limited to the Peleliu invasion beaches designated as White 1, White 2, Orange 1, Orange 2, and Orange 3, to approximately 30 m (100 ft.) inland. Seaward, it includes the lagoon, the reef, and the immediate area just beyond the reef. 14 Legislation and Jurisdiction Historic shipwrecks in the Republic of Palau are protected through laws passed by the Republic and the U.S. Federal government. The following is a list of legislation relevant to UCH and military heritage: • • • • • The Abandoned Shipwreck Act 1987 protects historic shipwrecks “embedded in State’s submerged lands.” The Sunken Military Craft Act 2005 confirms right, title and interest of the U.S. to any sunken military craft anywhere in the world as well as the same rights and protection to non-U.S. military craft sunk in U.S. controlled bottomland. The National Historic Preservation Act 1966 under Section 106 and 110 provides protection for shipwrecks and other submerged sites concerning permit and mitigation processes and requires inventory and assessment of such sites as standard procedure. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act 1979 prohibits damage to archeological sites that are 100 years or older and provides archeological and permit guidelines. Palau Historical and Preservation Act of 1995 protects all cultural heritage stating, “The national government reserved to itself the exclusive right and privilege of ownership and control over historical sites and tangible cultural property located on lands or waters owned or controlled by the national government. Each state reserves to itself the exclusive right and privilege of ownership and control over historical sites and tangible cultural property located on lands or waters owned or controlled by the state…. The Division may issue permits …for the purpose of historical and cultural preservation. SS 134. The Historic Preservation Office has the overall administrative responsibility for cultural heritage in the Palau Islands. This obligation extends off shore to all UCH, whether or not they have been identified or are yet to be investigated. 15 Chapter 2: Previous Research, Archival Resources, Repositories Previous Research Archeological research on Peleliu has been remarkably limited given the importance and tremendous loss of life during the battle. D. Colt Denfeld’s survey in 1981 was the first, funded through the NPS as part of the on-going Micronesian Archeological Survey. The results of his investigations, Peleliu Revisited: An Historical and Archaeological Survey of World War II Sites on Peleliu Island (1988) identified 46 loci, most with several discrete features, totaling 142 sites. Of particular interest to this project are the sites identified near the White and Orange invasion beaches (Figure 1). Figure 1. Sites identified during the 1981 survey by Denfeld. Denfeld 1988:5, Figure 21. 16 The entire island of Peleliu was nominated to the National Register of Historic Places in 1984 (National Park Service 1984) and was considered for national landmark status in 1991 and again in 2003 (National Park Service 2003). From 1981 to 1989, archeologists from the NPS Submerged Cultural Resources Unit (SCRU) visited a number of islands in the Pacific to support requests for assistance with submerged sites. Each project generated its own small trip report, but it was not until 1990 that Dr. Toni Carrell brought together the disparate information under one cover. The resulting Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment of Micronesia (1991), not intended to be comprehensive nor definitive, was designed “within a resources management framework . . . [to] generat[e] information useful in submerged cultural resources site interpretation, protection, and conservation; . . . [to] contribut[e] to the historical understanding of the region; and . . . [to] answer questions of general archeological and historical interest” (Carrell 1991:1). Included in the report was a discussion of sites in the Palau Islands. From April 11 to June 17, 1988, the SCRU team visited and documented a number of shipwreck sites within Ngemelachel (Malakal) Harbor, Ngeruktabel (Urukthapel) Anchorage, the channel to Kobisang Harbor, and Chelbacheb (the Rock Islands). In addition to shipwrecks, the team examined aircraft, landing craft, and a sunken village. During a brief visit to the island of Ngargersiul to the north of Peleliu, wreckage of at least two Japanese G4M “Betty” bombers were documented (Carrell 1991:537). The team also conducted a limited four-lane magnetometer survey in Peleliu along the reef edge offshore from the invasion beaches. The first lane was close to the reef in 30 ft. of water, the second was in 50 ft. of water, the third and fourth runs were at 50 and 100 yards off the reef in deeper water. No sites were located during this admittedly uncontrolled very brief survey. Importantly, information from boat captain Pablo Siangeldep and Faunny Blunt revealed that in addition to the considerable post-invasion salvage and cleanup effort of the U.S. military, a “Chinese” company worked on contract to remove wreckage from the reef and beaches and the wreckage was dumped into the extremely deep waters in the channel between Peleliu and Angaur (Carrell 1991:542). A long needed revisiting, reexamination, and expansion on Denfeld’s 1981 survey was completed in 2010. Funded under an NPS ABPP Grant, Rick Knecht, Neil Price, and Gavin Lindsay lead a team on an intensive nine-day survey of a portion of the Peleliu terrestrial battlefield. Their report WWII Battlefield Survey of Peleliu Island, Peleliu State, Republic of Palau (2012) includes updates to and cross-references of 72 of Denfeld’s sites and 200 additional sites, not previously recorded. In total, they documented 285 sites related to the battle. Their 17 updated information, including the invasion beaches, is particularly valuable for this study. A second archaeological survey of Peleliu in 2014, built upon and expanded the 2010 fieldwork. Peleliu Archaeological Survey 2014: WWII Battlefield Survey of Peleliu Islands, Peleliu State, Republic of Palau by Lindsay, Knecht, Price, Raffield, and Ashlock (2015) recorded an additional 113 new sites. These two publications are a major contribution to the study of the Peleliu battlefield. In the post-war years numerous histories, accounts, monographs, and official military accounts of the battle were published. The most comprehensive are: The History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Volume IV, Western Pacific Operations by Garand and Strobridge (1971); History of US Naval Operations in WWII: Volumes VIII and XIII by Samuel Eliot Morison (1962); and United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific: The Approach to the Philippines by Robert Ross Smith (1996). Numerous others provide a wealth of additional material: McMillan 1949, Hough 1950, Craven and Gate 1953, Smith 1953, and Fane and Moore 1956. Other syntheses include Gailey 1983, Ross 1991, Hallas 1994, Gilliland 1994, Moran and Rottman 2002, Wright 2002 and 2005, Rottman 2003 and 2004, and Murray 2006. Histories and memoirs include Leckie 1957, Sledge 1981, Hunt 1958, Gayle 1996, and Croziat 1999. Recent unit histories include Blair and DeCioccio 2011, Camp 2008, and Woodard 1994. Price et. al. (2013) offer a thoughtful discussion of multi-cultural perspectives in conflict archeology. Archival Resources and Repositories Consulted Declassified WWII documents, including unit histories, field reports, operations reports, and maps produced while the battle was in progress, along with extensive archival photographic records, are available to the public at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). These documents and photographs are becoming available for download through their online site. For images taken before 1982, it is necessary to contact the Still Pictures Branch. Of particular use for the study of Marine Corps actions during WWII, is the Record Group 127.9 Records of Marine Units, 1914-1949. This record group includes the following textual records: Records of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, including general correspondence, 1942-1946; and "geographical" operation file ("Area File"), 1940-1946. Geographical and subject files of the 2nd Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, 1933-1942. General correspondence, 1st-6th Marine Divisions, 1941-1946. Organization records of ground combat units, 1941-1946. Correspondence and reports of Headquarters, 2nd Marine Division, 1942-1949. Correspondence of the 1st, 3d, and 18 10th Marine Defense Battalions, 1943-1944. Issuances, 1914, and correspondence, 1917- 1919, of the 5th Marine Regiment. Administrative records of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1942-1947. Aircraft action reports of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1944-47. Records of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, consisting of correspondence and reports, 1941-1945; and administrative file, issuances, and miscellaneous personnel reports, 1946. Selected general correspondence files, 1933-1934, and logbooks, 1931-1934, of Marine Aircraft Squadrons VS-14M and VS-15M. The Naval History and Heritage Command (.NHCC) has an extensive website. Of particular use to researchers is their extensive digital collection of ship histories and images. The National Museum of the Pacific War (http://www.pacificwarmuseum.org/) has a range of exhibits and interpretive programs. Of the most use is their digital archive collections from the Nimitz Education and Research Center archival collection. The collection includes WWII veterans’ oral histories, the Chester W. Nimitz Personal Letters Collection (1893-1911), and the Norm Hatch WWII Photographic Collection. Hatch joined the Marine Corps in 1939 and served as a combat photographer. This collection includes official Marine Corps photographs taken by Hatch while on duty from Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Peleliu, the Marshall Islands, Guam, Tinian, Saipan, New Britain, and Nagasaki. The U.S. Navy Seal Museum’s main objective is the promotion of public education through interpretive history (https://www.navysealmuseum.org/). Of particular use for researchers is the Navy Seal Museum Online Collections Database that includes photographs, textual documents, and images of objects (https://navysealmuseum.pastperfectonline.com/). The U.S. Navy Seabee Museum’s mission is to select, collect, preserve and display historic material relating to the history of the Naval Construction Force, better known as the Seabees, and the U.S. Navy Civil Engineer Corps (https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee.html). Of the most use are unit histories, an online reading room, and a digital collection of historic photos. Photos of the Peleliu operation are limited. Of more use is a finding aid for Seabee records, available by request. The Marine Corps History Division, Archives Branch (mcu_archives@usmcu.edu) holds extensive online materials that include personal papers, command chronologies, Marine Corps University materials, select official and unofficial Marine Corps unit materials, and oral histories. Among the personal papers collections are those of General Roy S. Geiger and General Holland M. Smith, both pivotal commanders in the Pacific theater. The campaign collection on Peleliu includes an official document finding aid, photographs, and monographs 19 by General Gordon D. Gayle (1996) and Major Frank O. Hough (1950). Of particular use for this project was the Peleliu Collection finding aid (COLL/3687). Marine Corps University research papers include an online finding aid. Extensive finding aids are available as well as selected digitized publications. The Historic Naval Ships Association ( https://www.hnsa.org/) is comprised of an international membership of naval ship museums. Of the most use are their submarine war reports digital collection of over 1,500 patrol reports (https://www.hnsa.org/manuals-documents/submarinewar-reports/). Appendices provide tabulations of information across multiple war patrols. In addition, there is an Excel formatted spreadsheet with the Special Operations Research Group Summary of U.S. Submarine Attacks in WWII. Perhaps the most useful resource among the online databases is Fold3, a subscription resource of more than 1 million digitized records on WWII. It includes photographs, reports, casualty lists, diaries, and similar. Other online sources of information consulted include the numerous digitized WWII publications at HyperWar, a Hypertext History of the Second World War (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/). Of use was the Pacific Theater of Operations. The site includes a number of Japanese Monographs (http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/) addressing political strategy, pre-war planning, and regional operations. The Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library had limited but useful information in their World War II Operational Documents collection. 20 Chapter 3: Historical Background 1911-1945 The Palau Islands 1911-1941 The end of World War I had important ramifications for the Caroline Islands, including the Palaus. Located in the Western Caroline Islands (Figure 2), Palau effectively became a Japanese Imperial possession in October 1914 when a Japanese occupation force arrived at Koror Island. They quickly established administrative control over the island chain and began limited military development with a harbor facility at Malakal, an airfield at Peleliu, and a seaplane base at Arkabesan. After October 14, all ships “... entering or leaving the islands ... were under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Minister of the Navy.... Nothing could be done without the permission of the Japanese military forces” (Purcell 1967:89-90). The islands were firmly under military control throughout World War I. However, Japanese administration did not officially began in the Caroline Islands until 1921 when the League of Nations approved the defacto occupation of Palau as one of their mandated territories. By 1921, the face of the Palaus had changed dramatically. With Japan’s power firmly established, coupled with its expansionist visions, the islands were essentially possessions, effectively sealed off, and fully integrated into the Japanese Empire. Figure 2. Location of Palau in the Western Caroline Island. USMC map n.d. 21 During the inter-war years, Japan developed the mandated islands under their control (Figure 3) as advanced naval facilities, fighter and bomber long-range patrol bases, and as submarine bases. Increasingly militaristic and expansionist, Japan sought to strengthen its presence in the Pacific. Figure 3. Japanese Mandated Islands in 1921. United States Military Academy, 1941. Despite extensive efforts from 1931-1941 to establish interlocking air bases and to provide suitable naval harbors and intermediate repair facilities, these areas never fully developed into first-class facilities until 1943 (Boyer 1991:259). The Palau islands are an example of the limitations of the Japanese military build-up prior to WWII. The administrative headquarters for the all of the Japanese mandated islands was Koror, in the Palaus (Figure 4). The largest island in the chain, Babelthaup, was an ideal base for ground troops, but had only a small airstrip. By 1941, however, Koror had seaplane docks and AA defenses while nearby Arakabesan Island had a seaplane base and a submarine base. The greatest value of the Palaus lay in the large anchorages at Malakal Harbor in the west and 22 Kossol Passage to the north. The anchorage at Malakal served as a strategic staging area for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) units. With the large and well-developed airfield in Peleliu, both naval and aircraft units could access and support the Japanese held Netherlands Indies and New Guinea (Hough 1950:9). Figure 4. Palau Islands. Hough 1950:5, Map 2. 23 The Palau Islands in WWII, 1941-1945 Across the Pacific, word spread that war was coming, however, only Japan knew when and where it would start. Shortly after the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, Japanese forces initiated air attacks over Guam, which they had been openly monitoring since November. Poorly defended by the U.S., Guam fell on December 10 within six hours of the Japanese military invasion. With this prize under its belt, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy mounted very successful aggressive operations across the Pacific in the early years of the war. By August 1942, the Japanese forces extended their areas of control as far as Attu Island in the Aleutians to the north, Guadalcanal to the south, and Tarawa to the west (Figure 5). Palau served as the jumping-off point for a small carrier task force that assaulted the southern Philippines at Davao. Assault troops for the Mindanao invasion also staged through Palau, and the area remained a critical link in the Japanese supply routes from Saipan in the north to New Guinea in the south and east toward Truk. Air bases on Peleliu and Babelthaup were enlarged and developed to protect the islands and for aircraft on route to the Southern and Central Pacific battlegrounds. The islands also served as an amphibious training ground for various military units. Despite this buildup, the Japanese military had not really given much thought to heavily fortifying the Palau base. They appeared to be more interested in offensive operations to ensure capture and consolidation of the oil-rich southern areas than in strong defensive fortification of their existing major Central Pacific bases. In September 1943, following a string of defeats, the Japanese military began serious efforts to improve the fortifications of their inner defensive perimeter, particularly in Palau and the Marianas (Boyer 1991:259). By early 1944, the Palau islands were host to 14,500 IJA and 3,000 IJN personnel on Babelthaup. A garrison of approximately 6,900 IJA and 4,000 IJN personnel were stationed on Peleliu, and a perimeter garrison of 1,400 men were on Angaur to the south and another garrison on Ngesebus, to the north of Peleliu. Nearly 10,000 Korean and Okinawan conscripted laborers formed a support construction battalion (Knecht et.al. 2012:7; Hough 1950:17-18). The buildup of Babelthaup, in particular, had long-term consequences for the planned U.S. invasion. 24 Figure 5. The extent of Japanese military control in the Pacific. The two-pronged battle plan to the Japanese home islands went through Palau to the Philippines. Major battles indicated in red. U.S. forces offensive drive strategy indicated in blue. NPS, War in the Pacific National Park, n.d. After the U.S. entered WWII in 1941, military planners quickly developed an island-hopping strategy for a westward push across the Pacific to the Japanese home islands. The two-pronged offensive drive involved the Army, led by General Douglas MacArthur, advancing from New Guinea to the Philippines and the Navy, led by Admiral Chester Nimitz, pushing through the Gilbert and Marshall Islands across the Central Pacific to take the Marianas, then to move quickly westward across the Pacific (Figure 5). 25 This broad strategy proved successful for the U.S., and the Japanese government realized, “A strangling noose was tightening around the inner perimeter guarding the path to their homeland” (Lodge 1954). By February 1944, successful operations in the Solomon Islands and in the Bismarck Archipelago in the south and the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in the central Pacific paved the way for the next phase and the westward advance to the Marianas and Caroline Islands (Moran and Rottman 2003:14). Pre-Assault Air Operations and Reconnaissance By March 1944, plans were well underway for the invasion of Hollandia, New Guinea. The fast carrier strikes by Task Force (TF) 58 on Truk on February 17-18, forced the IJN Combined Fleet to retreat to Palau. Intelligence reports suggested that Koror, Malakal Harbor, and Kossol Roads were the most important Japanese naval bases east of Manila. On Peleliu, the Japanese airfield was within easy flying distance of Hollandia and the airfield on Babelthaup was being enlarged. The presence of the IJN fleet in Palau and the extensive use of the Peleliu airfield in support of Japanese troops in New Guinea was considered a potential threat to the Hollandia offensive (Morrison 1953:28). On March 30-31, TF 58 conducted 11 group air strikes throughout the island chain against shipping, aircraft, and installations to reduce operational capacity (Montgomery 1944:1). Over the two days 839 sorties were flown, 186 tons of bombs dropped, 12 torpedoes launched, and 29 mines laid by U.S. Grumman F6F Hellcats and TBM Avengers, a first for carrier based bombers (Morison 1953:32). Final counts include 53 Japanese planes destroyed in and around Koror and an additional 52 damaged or destroyed at the Peleliu airfield (Montgomery 1944:6, 10). Importantly, the operation was the first systematic aerial surveillance of the island chain and Peleliu (Garand and Strobridge 1971:77). Although IJN warships escaped prior to the March 30 assault, U.S. aircraft sank 22 vessels, including four older Wakatake class destroyers, fuel tankers, and cargo ships, in the Palau harbor while damaging a further 36 single and twin engine aircraft (Montgomery 1944:7,11, 17). Finally, pilots reported ground installations across the archipelago as damaged or destroyed. On Peleliu, the airfield bore the brunt of the bombings with damage to fuel tanks, airplane hangars, warehouses, and the tarmac (Montgomery 1944:11). In the wake of the March attack, the Japanese military began rebuilding the Peleliu airstrip and redoubled their efforts to enlarge and expand the island’s underground defenses. In a further effort to reinforce the island’s garrison, the 6,500-man battle-hardened Second Infantry Regiment was dispatched. They brought with them 24 75mm artillery pieces, 13-15 light tanks, approximately 100 .50-cal machine guns, 15 81mm heavy mortars, and about 30 dual-purpose 26 AA guns. These complimented existing 141mm mortars, naval AA guns, and rocket launchers (Gayle 1996:24-25). Because the Palaus were under Japanese military control and public access was strictly controlled beginning in 1914, intelligence data was limited and charts and maps were completely inadequate. In June 1944, and again in August, submarine photographic reconnaissance of the beaches was attempted. On August 11, USS Burrfish (SS312) was able to deploy a five-person team to gather critical information on water depths, locations of potholes, sand bars, the configuration of the fringing reef, and seabed (USS Burrfish Report of Third War Patrol, 11 July to 27 August 1944). The carrier raids on March 30-31, 1944 provided aerial imagery of the island, supplemented by dedicated photographic flights in July and August. According to Denfeld, the photographic coverage was excellent and clearly showed the various geographical features of the island. Disastrously, the jagged pinnacles and crevice-filled limestone ridges hidden by dense foliage were interpreted by analysists as gentle hills (Denfeld 1988:6). Operation STALEMATE II Planning for the Palau invasion went through several iterations beginning on June 2, 1944. MacArthur's forces were preparing for the Philippines operation and planners decided that the Western Caroline Islands were critical to secure the right flank of the Philippine invasion. Although badly damaged by repeated airstrikes in March, Peleliu’s air base was considered a threat to an amphibious landing on Mindanao. Palau was viewed as the last major obstacle to the Philippines and Peleliu was the key. Pre-assault air operations began on June 9, 1944 with a strike on Peleliu’s airfield by land-based Army Air Forces. Subsequent strikes were mounted from fast carrier groups (Morison 1953 [2002 ed.]:174). Between July 25-28, 1944, TF 58.2 and 58.3 attacked the three airfields in Palau, destroying 47 planes, and searched the surrounding sea for ships (Morison 1953 [2002 ed.] 367). By August 1, 1944, the planning and logistical guidelines for Operation Stalemate II were set. Babelthaup was dropped from the list of targets because of the presence of a large garrison of well-trained Japanese navy and army troops (Denfeld 1988:41). Plans coalesced around Peleliu for the main attack, Angaur, and Ulithi. Under the plan, the three islands would become U.S. air and sea bases to neutralize Japanese military bases and operations in the Caroline Islands. Peleliu’s strategic location was ideal for flights to and from the Philippines in support of the larger war effort (Denfeld 1988:6). 27 The operation involved the 1st Marine Division and the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division, with their attached units, totaling more than 43,500 officers and men. They faced battle-seasoned and well-trained soldiers, primarily from the Japanese Army's 14th Division, originally part of the Kwantung Army in China. This four-to-one advantage was illusory, however, because the fighting involved about even numbers on both sides, a situation “...that should have made even the most optimistic planners shudder” (Gailey 1983:23). Long-range reconnaissance and carrier-based attacks continued in August 1944 with the Fifth Air Force’s B-24 Liberators beginning a concentrated operation to knock out defenses throughout the archipelago. A series of flights from August 8 to September 14 dropped 91 tons of fragmentation, demolition, and incendiary bombs over the islands, and beginning on August 25 the heavy bombers started making daylight bombing runs encountering heavy AA fire. Over 394 sorties, the Liberators dropped 793 tons of explosives and destroyed over 500 buildings in Koror Town. Reconnaissance on September 5 showed only 12 Japanese fighter planes, 12 floatplanes, and 3 observation aircraft still based in the islands (Garand and Strobridge 1971:101). The cumulative result was that nearly all Japanese aircraft were destroyed, what few ships remained were sunk, the harbors were sown with mines, and the garrisons on Babelthaup and Koror were isolated and trapped (Knecht et. al. 2012:7). However, to achieve success against well-fortified islands required an unprecedented level of coordination between the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Army. It also required a completely new way of thinking, new equipment designed specifically for the task (amphibious craft), and specially trained teams of men. The new strategy was predicated on getting the maximum number of men safely on shore as quickly as possible. In the case of Peleliu, it was to get 4,500 Marines ashore in the first 19 minutes of the assault. Paving the way for the remaining 24,000 to land within 90 minutes. Amphibious Strategy and Planning The complex technique devised for putting men ashore on an enemy held coast fringed by a reef and lagoon, involved hard lessons learned. From Tarawa, the amphibious landing force stalled getting across the reef because of unknown obstacles. From Guam and Makin, forcing men to wade from the reef edge across an exposed lagoon raked with enfilading fire, cost many lives. Those mistakes were not to be repeated at Peleliu. The new plan involved five imaginary parallel lines offshore where various elements of the task force would stage with their ships and troops before the assault. Farthest out at 18,000 yards were the big ships and transports. Alongside the battleships were the LSTs (landing ship, tank) 28 carrying the troops in LVTs (landing vehicle tracked) in their cavernous holds. At 6,000 yards from shore, the LSTs opened their bow doors and the small LVTs (sometimes called amtracs) embarked. The fourth line was 4,000 yards from shore, still 30 minutes travel time to the beach. This was the rendezvous line for all of the assault waves to form groups opposite their designated beaches. The final line before the reef was at 2,000 yards and 15 minutes from shore, where the LVTs returned after carrying the assault waves to the beach and where the next groups of men and supplies transferred from small boats. When the troop carrying amphibious fleet reached the last line at 1,000 yards, they were on their own to cross the reef and get to shore (Figure 6). Figure 6. The first wave of LVT(A)s move toward the invasion beaches, passing through the inshore bombardment line of LCI gunboats, September 15 1944. Cruisers and battleships are bombarding from the distance. The landing area is hidden by dust and smoke. Photographed from a USS Honolulu (CL-48) plane. NARA RG-80-G-283533. Stewarding the small fleet at each line were submarine chasers, patrol craft, and Higgins boats (LCVP) hoisting signaling flags, forming up the waves, coordinating the ship-to-shore movement, and in constant radio contact (Hough 1950:22). Preceding the first waves of personnel, were armored LVT(A)s (landing vehicle tracked, armored, sometimes called amphibious tanks) armed with machine guns and howitzers, to neutralize beach defenses and support the landings. LCI(G) (landing craft, infantry, gunboats) armed with rockets stood 29 offshore at the 1,000-yard line and raked defensive positions and provide covering fire for the LVT(A)s. Overhead, naval gunfire pummeled the island and aircraft bombed and strafed. The landing was a complex maneuver requiring precise timing and coordination (Denfield 1988:12). UDT Operations As careful as the plan was, unless the amphibious craft could get over the reef, avoid the mines, navigate the concrete anti-boat obstacles, the coral heads, boulders, and land on shore, it was doomed to failure. The Navy underwater demolition teams (UDTs) were formed in 1942 in response to this fundamental problem. However, it was not until the near failure of the landing at Tarawa that their importance was recognized. From that point forward, UDT reconnaissance was integral to all planning. In the run up to the Peleliu operation, UDT 10 scouted the invasion beaches in USS Burrfish. The information gathered in August 1944, revealed an array of concrete tetrahedrons, a double row of wooden posts 75 yards from shore, barbed wire, and horned mines. Importantly they discovered that in some areas the reef was awash with barely 2 ft. of water at low tide (Figure 7). Figure 7. UDT teams documented an array of obstacles offshore of the Orange beaches, similar to the double row of wooden posts at Scarlet 1 and 2 on the opposite side of the island from the invasion beaches. Navy Seal Museum, 2002.0034.19. 30 On September 12, under the cover of the unrelenting naval and carrier fire, UDTs 6 and 7 landed for the third time on the offshore reefs off the Orange Beaches while periodic sniper and machine gun fire from shore targeted the unarmed swimmers. Their role was to create avenues of approach for the assault teams by blasting wide ramps for the LSTs and pathways for the DUKWs (amphibious trucks) to enter the shallow lagoon (Burke 1944:3, Hutson 1944:2). They previously mapped the depth of the lagoon, charted obstacles, and placed buoys and markers (Garand and Strobridge 1971:103). On this final mission, the UDTs crawled ashore to finish the job of demolishing rock cribs, posts, barbed wire, concrete cubes, and set buoys off the reef to mark the newly blasted passageways (Figure 8, Figure 9). Figure 8. UDT Team 6 map of obstacles and blast ramps for the amphibious landing at Orange 3. Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. 31 Figure 9. Andy Anderson, GM1/c, of UDT 7, with a J-13 mine at Peleliu. This type of ‘horned’ mine was particularly dangerous because it was so unstable. Navy Seal Museum, 2002.0034.12. Japanese Defences on Peleliu After a string of losses and the fall of Saipan, the Japanese military developed a new strategy for island defense. The tactics used in the battles at the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands was to meet and destroy the enemy at the beach and, if necessary, push them back into the sea using counterattacks. The new defensive plan retained that core element, but added the strategy of organizing defenses in depth (Denfield 1988:9). Lt. Gen. Sadae Inoue, the commander of the Japanese 14th Division and the Palau Sector Group, and his chief of staff, Colonel Tokechi Tada agreed there would be no useless banzai charges or attempts to throw the enemy back into the sea at the beach in the Palaus. Instead, defenses needed to thwart U.S. naval and air bombardment with deep caves and allow defenders to fall back on previously developed positions. On Peleliu alone, over 500 natural and manmade caves were developed (Boyer 1991:262). The new doctrine dictated by the Imperial Government Headquarters outlined the defense strategy: 32 We will maintain a firm hold on the high ground and prevent the enemy from establishing or using an airbase. We will commence … guerrilla warfare and … will carefully guard the breaks in the high ground (CINCPAC Item No. 11, 902, A Battle Plan for the Defense of Peleliu Island, September 1, 1944). On Peleliu, Navy Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commander of the 2nd Regiment and Commander of the Peleliu Sector Unit, had artillery, mortar, signal, and light tank units under his command. Bolstering that combat strength were the 346th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry. The Navy added the 144th and 126th AA units, the 45th Guard Force Detachment, and construction units and airbase personnel. In all, Nakagawa had approximately 6,500 combat troops, service troops, and noncombatants, bringing the garrison up to 10,500. Some 25,000 troops on the other Palau Islands, many specially trained in amphibious operations, were reinforcements (Garand and Strobridge 1971:68-69). Army Major General Kenjiro Murai, a fortifications expert, took command of the garrison on Peleliu. Because of the rivalry between the Japanese Navy and Army, Mauri oversaw the construction and location of defensive fortifications and caves. The model for the in depth strategy was Biak. The Japanese commander there prolonged the fighting by digging in and forcing the U.S. troops to rout out each defensive position in a long, bloody operation. This lesson, applied to Peleliu, focused on a main line of defense inland, holding back reserve troops to mount counterattacks, and numerous layered defensive positions. In deploying the reserve troops Inoue directed that “there will be no rapid exhaustion of battle strength” and soldiers were to “advance at a crawl, using terrain, natural objects, and shell holes” (Garand and Strobridge 1971:72). The resulting defense system was organized, integrated, and flexible with four zones: northwest, southwest, southeast, and east (Figure 10). Colonel Nakagawa’s and General Murai’s coastal defenses centered on the southwest coast, the only realistically usable landing beaches on Palau. Preparation of the beach defenses followed previously developed strategies. The natural offshore fringing reef was augmented by the strategic positioning of tetrahedron-shaped tank obstacles, barbed wire, aerial bombs adapted to serve as mines, over 300 single- and double-horned anti-invasion mines, extending 30 m (100 yards) or so inland and long anti-tank trenches running parallel to the beach (Garand and Strobridge 1971:72-73). 33 Figure 10. Japanese defensive plan. Garand and Strobridge 1971:74 Map 3 by E.L. Wilson; reproduced in Hough 1950:38, Map 5. 34 The efficacy of the offshore mining was well demonstrated by the losses of USS Perry (DD-340 re-designated DMS-17) on September 13, 1944, USS Woodstock (PC-1180) on September 19 both off Angaur. The loss of LCI(G)-459 also on September 19 off Peleliu, and USS YMS -19 sunk off Angaur September 24, 1944 (NHHC USS Perry-340; NHHC USS Woodstock; NARA Report of USS LCI(G)-458 of September 18-19, 1944, accessed in Fold3). Peleliu’s southwestern promontory and a small island, a few hundred yards offshore, had antiboat guns and machine guns to furnish enfilading fire on the southern beachheads. Everywhere, the dominating terrain was used for the placement of artillery, previously zeroedin on the beaches, to wreak havoc among the assaulting troops. The defensive positions took full advantage of modified and natural cover and concealment to dominate all invasion approaches (Garand and Strobridge 1971:73-74). According to Denfeld, the Peleliu landing beaches had a defensive strategy and trench network of a density only surpassed by those on Iwo Jima (Denfeld 1988:44). On the flat terrain inland from the beaches, the defense consisted of direct fire against advancing troops from well-camouflaged pillboxes, trenches, and other defensive positions, with artillery and mortar fire from the dominating ridges to the north of the airfield. Pillboxes dug into these ridges and a casemate for a 75mm mountain gun commanded the entire southern portion of the island. At least one steel-reinforced concrete blockhouse had as many as 16 mutually supporting automatic weapons (Garand and Strobridge 1971:73). Tactical reasons determined the location of the Army’s caves in the ridges and mountains. The placement of fortifications, weapons, and soldiers provided a mutually interlocking system of concrete pillboxes, entrenchments, gun emplacements, and riflemen’s positions all dominating the strategic areas. Near every important artillery or mortar emplacement were underground positions with automatic weapons for protective fire. Communication trenches or tunnels connected these mutually supporting locations. Observation posts on top of the ridge in natural limestone cavities or crevices provided a strategic overview while being well hidden. The approaches to vital installations were covered from all angles by fire from caves halfway up the surrounding ridges. At most strategic points and in the final defensive area numerous smaller underground positions were placed to provide interlocking support fire from small arms (Garand and Strobridge 1971:75-76). The U.S. estimate of Japanese weapons on Peleliu and Ngedebus in August 1944 was woefully inadequate. It did not account for the weapons brought to the island by Colonel Nakagawa’s 2nd Infantry Regiment, which included 24 75mm artillery pieces, 15 light tanks, approximately 35 100 .50-cal heavy machine guns, 15 81mm heavy mortars, and about 30 dual-purpose AA and coastal defense guns. These complimented existing 141mm mortars, naval AA guns, and rocket launchers (Table 1). Nor did it account for two 200mm anti-boat guns, one on Bloody Nose Ridge the other on Ngedebus (Denfeld 1988:46). When combined with the formidable and extensive cave system, the Japanese defensive position on Peleliu was both strategic and well executed. Table 1. Estimated Japanese Weapons on Peleliu and Ngedebus Weapon Type Rifles 7mm Grenade Discharger Light Machine Gun 6.5x50mm Heavy Machine Gun .50 cal 13mm AT (anti-tank) 20mm AT 37mm AT 70mm Howitzer 81mm Mortar 75mm Field Artillery (FA) 105mm Howitzer Tanks Flame Throwers 20-40mm AA 105-127mm Dual Purpose (DP) 3” – 5” DC 20-40mm Anti-Boat Guns Pillboxes Blockhouses Number 5,066 171 200 58 7 3 9 7 55 12 4 12 2 99 4 5 2 17 12 1st Marine Division Operation Plan 1-44, August 1944:15. Pre-Assault Bombardment The three-day pre-invasion carrier and naval bombardment of Peleliu began on September 6, 1944. Despite previous shelling by both aircraft and warships, naval pilots encountered heavy AA activity. “Much time and many bombs were expended before return fire was sufficiently reduced to let us get down low for close observation and detection of small but important enemy positions, bivouac areas, etc.” (Report of R.L. Kibble, Commander of Air Group Thirteen, September 6-16, 1944, dated November 25, 1944, quoted in Garand and Strobridge 1971:102). The pre-assault element of the Palau operation began at 0530 on September 12, 1944, when the first echelon of the Escort Carrier Group, under the command of Rear Admiral George H. Forte, and two groups comprising the Peleliu Fire Support Group, under the commands of Rear 36 Admiral W.L. Ainsworth and Vice Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, started firing on Peleliu and Angaur. The pattern was two hours of naval gunfire then two hours of carrier-based aircraft attack (Table 2). This alternating pattern continued without pause for 72 hours. Oldendorf was so pleased with the bombardment that on September 14, 1944 he reported that there were no more targets, a comment he would later regret. During the bombardment, the warships used 519 rounds of 16-inch shells, 1,845 rounds of 14-inch shells, 1,427 rounds of 8-inch shells, 1,020 rounds of 6-inch shells, and 12,937 rounds of 5-inch shells, a total of 2,255 tons of ammunition. While the shelling transformed the interior of Peleliu from heavy jungle cover to a denuded harsh environment, the carefully prepared Japanese defenses were largely unscathed. Troops and artillery sheltered in the prepared caves, some of which had iron blast doors, and the defenders suffered few casualties (Garand and Strobridge 1971:103-104). Table 2. Ships Involved in the Naval and Aerial Bombardment Type Battleship (BB) Heavy Cruiser (CA) Light Cruiser (CL) Destroyer (DD) Escort Carrier (CVE) Light Aircraft Carrier (CVL) Aircraft Carrier (CV) Number of Ships 5 4 4 14 10 4 4 Group Fire Support Fire Support Fire Support Fire Support Carrier Carrier Carrier Based on Garand and Strobridge 1971:103. During this part of the operation, the Kossol Passage Detachment began minesweeping operations along the approaches to the designated transport and fire support areas. They also cleared the Kossol Passage, the roadstead where the support ships carrying supplies, stores, and ammunition waited (Garand and Strobridge 1971:103). The Assault At 0530 on September 15, the fire support group under the command of Admiral Oldendorf, opened fire in preparation for the first assault waves. On board the amphibious command ships, USS Mount Olympus and Mount McKinley, the Navy and Marine commanders observed the complicated landing operation, while the staff of the 1st Marine Division operated from the assault transport USS DuPage (Garand and Strobridge 1971:107). The scheme of maneuver called for landing three regimental combat teams (RCTs) in formation across a 2,200-yard-wide beachhead, followed by a drive straight across the island to seize the airfield, divide the Japanese forces, and cut the island in half (Figure 11). This meant that each participant in the operation was dependent on the others to reach their positions according to a tight schedule. 37 The ships involved in the delivery of the troops and equipment to their designated stations included the large ocean going LSDs (landing ship, dock) with a dry dock to transport and launch landing craft and a range of amphibious vehicles. These included LCTs (landing craft, tank), LCMs (landing craft, mechanized), LVTs, LTV(A)s, DUKWs, and LCIs (landing craft, infantry). At the designated time and station, the LSDs flooded their drydock compartment and opened their doors to discharge their amphibious cargoes. LSTs carried LVTs, LCTs, Sherman tanks, and cargo (Hough 1950:20; Rottman 2004). During the Peleliu operation, the LCTs ran to the reef edge to release their modified Sherman tanks, which could approach the beach under their own power, guided by specially assigned LVTs (Hough 1950:20). The LVTs quickly evolved into assault troop and fire support vehicles. Beginning at 0750, 50 carrier-based planes bombed enemy gun positions and installations on the beaches. At 0800 direct supporting fire from the battleships began with high explosives to knock out beach defenses and white phosphorous smoke shells targeted farther inland to screen the approach by blacking-out observation from the high ground north of the airfield (Hough 1950:36). Almost immediately, 18 LCI(G)s equipped with 4.5-inch rocket launchers moved forward approaching within 1,000 yards of the shore and began releasing salvos of 22 rockets each. The naval gunfire moved forward and toward the flanks according to schedule as the LCIs moved into position, while the carrier-borne planes came in to strafe and dive-bomb directly to their front (Hough 1950: 25, 36). Under this cover the first wave of LVT(A)s of the provisional 3rd Armored Amphibian Battalion crossed the line of departure at 0800 and quickly moved toward White and Orange Beaches (Figure 12). The LVT(A)s hit the beach at 0832 using their 37mm and 75mm cannon against the beach defenses. A minute later, the first troop wave arrived in the LVTs. Succeeding waves landed at one-minute intervals against a steadily increasing volume of Japanese artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. The scene was described: Our amtrac [LVT] was among the first assault waves, yet the beach was already a litter of burning, blackened amphibian tractors, of dead and wounded, a mortal garden of exploding mortar shells. Holes had been scooped in the white sand or had been blasted out by the shells, the beach was pocked with holes--all filled with green-clad helmeted Marines (Leckie 1957:286). 38 Figure 11. U.S. Scheme of Maneuver for Peleliu Operation. Hough 1950:20, Map 4. 39 Figure 12. Aerial view of White Beaches 1 and 2 on D-Day, September 15, 1944. White 1 and 2 were assigned to the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marines. Company K, 3/1 is on the extreme north flank. The “Point” is on the northern promontory. NARA RG-127, USN Photo 283745. As the leading waves entered the zone between the transfer line and the reef edge, the Japanese military’s shore-based shelling started. It was not explicitly aimed, but was a protective smoke screen that moved shoreward with the approach of the vehicles. The prevailing winds pushed the smoke out to sea effectively obscuring the beach and its approaches. When visibility was possible, watchers still aboard the ships offshore were appalled 40 to see burning LVTs and DUKWs littered across the length and breadth of the reef (Hough 1950:36). The extent of the destruction, confirmed by an air observer, reported 38 vehicles burning simultaneously. Unofficial estimates by assault unit commanders brought the total knocked out, at least temporarily, in excess of 60. Partly accounting for the apparent discrepancy might be “the extreme reluctance, short of complete demolition or submersion in over 10 fathoms, of any crew chief to regard his vehicle as destroyed” (Hough 1950:37). As the destruction of LVTs mounted, troops were delayed at the transfer control line. The destruction was comparatively light in the center (Orange 1) where only artillery and mortar fire was present. However, high velocity weapons placed on Peleliu’s southwestern promontory and from a small, unnamed island offshore a few hundred yards south of Orange 3 raked the LVTs landing on the southern flanks (Orange 2 and 3). To the north, beyond the boundary of White 1 on a point of high ground that projected about 25 yards to seaward, enfilading fire against the LVTs was equally dangerous (Hough 1950:37-38). When the third assault wave of troops in the LVTs passed the LCI(G)s, they moved to the flanks of the landing beaches, ready to deliver “on call” fire. Four other LCI(G)s, mounting 4.2-inch mortars, took up position on the left (north) flank just off the reef to keep up a continuous fire on the rugged terrain overlooking White Beach 1 (Garand and Strobridge 1971:108). In the face of the heavy losses in LVTs, subsequent waves continued to move shoreward (Figure 13). Landing simultaneously with the fourth wave of marines were the M-4 Sherman tanks. Because of their waterproofing, they successfully negotiated the reef and continued toward land in six parallel columns led by LVTs. The defensive fire was so intense that over half of the 30 tanks were hit during the 10-minute trip to cross the reef. In the 1st Marine’s zone (White Beaches 1 and 2) only one of the assigned tanks avoided being hit during the trip to shore; ultimately three were completely knocked out of action (Garand and Strobridge 1971:109-110). 41 Figure 13. The LVTs move toward the invasion beaches, September 15, 1944. NARA RG-80-G-283533. As the LVT(A)s moved inland, the intensity of the Japanese military attack steadily increased from artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. The beaches and the shore inland for about 30 m (100 yards) were strewn with numerous land mines, many of them the naval ‘horned’ type found by the UDTs. Unexpectedly, many were set on safe and others simply failed to detonate. However, the carefully positioned Japanese high velocity weapons set up a devastating enfilading fire on the approaches as well as on the beach flanks (Garand and Strobridge 1971:108-109). White Beaches 1 and 2 Despite extensive pre-invasion shelling, the defenses on Peleliu saw minimal damage. This was particularly clear on White Beaches 1 and 2, the target of the 1st Marine Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The assault waves landed just before 0945, 3rd Battalion on the left (White 1), and 2nd on the right (White 2) (Figure 14). The 1st Battalion came in behind them at 0945 as the reserve, prepared to participate in the left turn to the north by attacking through the center of the regiment and seizing the high ground to the north of O-2. Companies K and I of the 3rd Battalion on White 1 were particularly hard hit. As the northernmost assault unit, Company K was the pivot when the regiment turned north. The immediate 42 objective was ‘The Point,’ a jagged coral outcropping jutting into the sea and rising some 30 ft. above the water, from which Japanese gunners were placing a dangerous enfilading fire upon the division’s flank (Garand and Strobridge 1971:110-112). Figure 14. Assault on Peleliu showing assigned beaches for each Marine Regiment. USMC Historical Center, 1950, Map by R. Johnstone. Upon landing, Company K, led by Captain George P. Hunt, found themselves about 100 yards to the south of their assigned area. The Company immediately attacked inland and began its turning movement northward with two platoons in assault. The 3rd Platoon, closest to the shore, fought to within 50 yards of The Point before the attack stalled. The 2nd Platoon pushed 43 ahead 75 yards before stumbling into a tank trap and becoming pinned down by heavy fire coming from the northern end of a long coral ridge that loomed up some 30-40 ft. to the right. The precipitous face of this obstacle, shown on none of the photographs or maps supplied to the 1st Marines, was honeycombed with caves and dug-in positions. By this time, the heavy fighting against stiff resistance reduced the effective strength of each of the assault platoons from 40 soldiers to approximately a squad (13 soldiers), and contact between the two units was lost (Garand and Strobridge 1971:112). Ignoring the gap between assault units, Captain Hunt sent the reserve platoon forward to press the attack against The Point. Five reinforced-concrete pillboxes, one with a 47mm cannon, and heavy machine guns, protected this critical piece of high ground. Six to 12 soldiers occupied each pillbox, while other Japanese infantrymen, with light machine guns, were in nearby dug-in positions and coral depressions to provide protective fire (Garand and Strobridge 1971:112). All of these strategically located defenses were still intact at the time of the 1st Marine assault, despite assurances to the Regimental Commander Colonel Lewis Puller that this strategic area enfilading their flank would be properly blanketed with fire during the preliminary bombardment. In fact, “The entire point and its defenses were untouched by naval gunfire . . . the entire length of Beach White One was only moderately damaged by our preparatory firings and bombings” (Col Richard P. Ross, Jr., 7Nov49. 3/1 Rec of Events, dated September 14, 1944, quoted in Garand and Strobridge 1971:112). Because the cannon and heavy machine guns were oriented toward the landing beach area, the Marines assaulted from the rear (east). By 1015, each pillbox and finally the reinforced casemate housing the 47mm cannon was destroyed. One-hundred ten Japanese soldiers were killed and the 1st and 3rd Platoons were reduced to only 32 survivors (Garand and Strobridge 1971:113). At one stage during that first night, Hunt was holding The Point with only 18 men and using a captured Japanese machine gun for defense (Hough 1950:41). The 1st Marine Regiment’s 2nd Battalion landed on White 2 and fared slightly better. They were forced to advance around a high coral ridge separating White 2 from Orange 1. The ridge was carefully prepared with strategically positioned pillboxes and dug in defensive trenches forcing the Marines to take shelter behind a LVT, while other Marines fired at enemy targets (Figure 15). 44 Figure 15. Marine riflemen take temporary shelter behind an LVT. The name of the LVT [The Bloody Trail] was more than prophetic. DOD Photo, USN 95253. Orange Beaches 1 and 2 The 5th Marine Regiments landing on Orange 1 and Orange 2 faced marginally less defensive fire and had comparatively fewer losses that came mainly from artillery and mortar fire when crossing the reef. Two battalions, the 1st on Orange 1 and the 3rd on Orange 2 met only scattered resistance on the beaches. The terrain facing the 1st Battalion offered cover and some concealment, coconut groves providing cover with little obstruction, room to maneuver, and no natural obstacles. The 1st drove through without undue difficulty to the O-1 phase line and tied in with the 1st Marine Regiment’s 2nd Battalion on their left (Figure 16) (Hough 1950:41). The 5th Marine’s 3rd Battalion on Orange 2 was not as fortunate. As the battalion crossed the reef, the LVT carrying most of their field telephone equipment and personnel was destroyed. Within a few moments of hitting the beach, the executive officer was killed, complicating an already difficult command and control problem (Hough 1950:42). Despite these losses, Company I landed on the left (north), Company K on the right, and Company L landed immediately behind. Company I quickly made contact with the 1st Battalion and working together reached O-1 simultaneously, at about 0930 (Figure 16) (Hough 1950:42). 45 Figure 16. D-Day Showing disposition of troops. Hough 1950:56, Map 6 by E.L. Wilson. 46 Company K ran into trouble at once because of the difficulties faced by the assault elements of the 7th Marines attempting to land on Orange 3 (Figure 17). As a result, the 7th landed in the southern zone of Orange 2 rather than on Orange 3. This caused confusion on the beach and delayed Company K’s advance the while the 7th tried make their way to their designated sector. Company K’s line of advance was through dense scrub jungle that provided concealment from the heavy shelling that was holding up other elements facing the open airfield to the east. At 1030, the eastward push resumed, but contact was broken with Company I to the north, which was dangerously extended (Hough 1950:43). Figure 17. Marines landing on Orange Beach 1. Burning amtracs in the distance. NARA RG-127. Advance elements of the 5th Marine Regiment 2nd Battalion that started landing at 0935, came in to the south of the 1st Battalion, and reached the O-1 line by 1130. This relieved the stretched Company I and allowed them to join Company K. The 2nd Battalion’s drive to the east captured the southern edge of the airfield, and Company L reached the eastern shore, cutting the island into two parts (Hough 1950:43). About 1700 a Japanese mortar barrage hit the command post for the 3rd Battalion wounding the commanding officer and completely disrupting operational control. With Companies K, L, and I scattered across the southern end of the airfield and on the eastern shore, it was not until 47 2230 that the companies managed to reposition along the O-1 line and make radio contact with the command post (Hough 195045). Orange Beach 3 On the southern end of the division assault, the 7th Marine Regiment landed their 1st and 3rd Battalions on Orange 3, holding the 2nd in reserve. The scheme of maneuver (Figure 11) called for the 3rd to drive across to the east shore with the 5th Marines to split the island defense. The 1st, landing immediately after 3rd, turned south toward the Japanese troops to isolate them in a pocket, and were backed up by the 3rd (Garand and Strobridge 1971:119). Exposed on the extreme right flank, the 7th was subjected to heavy antiboat, mortar and machine gun fire from Japanese weapons located on the southwest promontory and a small unnamed islet, as well as artillery and mortar fire along the entire length of Orange 3 (Figure 16). As the 3rd Battalion reached the reef, they found it so “cluttered with both natural and mademade obstacles that the amtracs had to pick their way shoreward in a column rather than in a normal wave formation” (Lt. Col. John J. Gormley 27 February 1950 in Peleliu Comment File in Garand and Strobridge 1971:119). This slowed the approach and made the LVTs easy targets for the machine guns and antiboat guns on the southern promontory. The enfilading fire forced many of the LVTs to bear to the north landing at Orange 2 (Hough 1950:46). The combination of mined beaches, barbed wire, and resistance from a system of mutually supporting trenches and reinforced pillboxes, made reaching the designated landing zone more difficult. The only good news was the discovery by one of the support aircraft, just prior to the landing of the first wave, of a large Japanese anti-tank trench a short distance inland on the beach (Figure 18). The commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion described it: Once officers were able to orient themselves it [the antitank ditch] proved an excellent artery for moving troops into the proper position for deployment and advance inland since it crossed the entire width of our zone of action approximately parallel to the beach. With respect to the battalion CP, I am convinced that it enabled us to join the two principal echelons of CP personnel and commence functioning as a complete unit at least an hour earlier than would otherwise have been possible. I landed with my half of the CP personnel, opposite the southwest turning circle of the airfield near the right flank of the CT-5 zone of action. Major Streit landed with the other half of the CP personnel equally as far from our intended position in the opposite direction to the southward. After announcing our early locations to each other, it was simply a question of jumping 48 in the ditch, meeting in the middle, and jumping out again to displace farther inland (Lt. Col. E. H. Hurst, statement 23 Nov 49, quoted in Hough 1950:47). Figure 18. Japanese anti-tank ditch on Orange 3 providing cover for 7th Marines Command Post on DDay. DOD Photo, USMC 94939. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines came in behind 3rd as planned, landing on Orange 3 at 1030. Although some of the early confusion on the beaches was resolved, the 1st faced many of the same problems as 3rd and a portion of its personnel landed on Orange 2. Resistance was “light, except for heavy mortar fire” until about 1200 (Hough 1950:48). As the battalion turned south, enemy fire increased and the terrain became increasingly difficult. A dense swamp that did not appear on the operational map blocked a large portion of the right half of the battalion’s zone of action. Japanese military pillboxes and bunkers skirted the single trail in Company C’s area on its west fringe (Hough 1950:49). Company A, groping around the swamp to the east, eventually extended itself some 250 yards into the 3rd Battalion’s zone. Company B tied-in the flanks of Companies C and A. Only at 1520 49 could Colonel Gormley announce the seizure of the intermediate phase line designated O-A (Hough 1950:49). By the end of D-Day, all of the most critical objectives were achieved (Figure 16). During the night, local counterattacks, hampered by illumination from naval star shells and harassing fire by the 11th Marines, were repulsed with minimal losses. D-Day Plus Although much of Colonel Nakagawa’s defense system was destroyed in the first two days, heavy fighting occurred on every part of Peleliu as the Marines advanced (Figure 19). The discovery of an extensive network of caves on D+1 set the stage for the remainder of fighting. For the marines on the frontlines, the battle became an inch-by-inch struggle through the Umurbrogel Highlands, part of which was the aptly named Bloody Nose Ridge. By the last week of September, “...nine tenths of the island had been captured and an estimated 11,000 Japanese troops had been killed” (Garand and Strobridge 1971:285). Yet, despite all this, the strongest defensive pockets remained on the ridge. Fighting was so intense and casualties so high for the 7th and 5th Marine Regiments that commanders scrambled to get replacements and relied mostly Army troops, who were previously involved in other operations or held in reserve (Boyer 1911:264). Peleliu was ‘secured’ on September 27, 1944 and only a pocket some 300 by 450 yards was still held by about 1,500 Japanese defenders, including Colonel Nakagawa and General Murai (Figure 19). Getting to this pocket cost the 1st Marine Division about 7,800 casualties, including 1,794 killed (Garand and Strobridge 1971:285). Of the 16,459 First Marine Division personnel involved with action on the ground, 7% (1,124) were killed in combat and 31% (5,141) were wounded (Rupertus 1944:55). On October 20, the remaining First Marine Division was withdrawn to the landing beaches, replaced by the Army 81st Infantry Division (Mueller 1945:9). On November 24, 1944, Army units broke the final pocket of resistance, Colonel Nakagawa and General Murai committed suicide, and the remaining 120 Japanese defenders did the same or died in battle. By November 27, Umurbrogel was finally cleared, two and one half months after the initial assault. Army units of the 81st Division suffered over 3,278 casualties and 542 killed in the final assaults while killing some 1,500 of the remaining Japanese defenders. The Japanese military lost an estimated 10,695 men on the island and 3,000 Okinawan and Korean conscript laborers (Price and Knecht 2012:11). Only 302 defenders survived. Of these, 50 only 19 were Japanese combatants; the others were all construction workers of various ethnicities (Smith 1953:576-578). Control of ground defense under non-assault forces did not occur until January 1945. Figure 19. Operational Assault objectives September 15 to October 15, 1944. U.S. Army of Military History, Battle of Peleliu, Source: http://www.army.mil/cmh/brochures/westpac/p27(map).jpg, 2005. 51 The Aftermath of the Battle Air facilities on Peleliu and Angaur were used as a staging point for invasion of the Philippines (Hough 1950:179). The U.S. Navy commissioned the Peleliu Naval Base in 1945 and it remained in operation through 1947. During this period, Japanese soldiers continued to emerge from entrenched positions—a group of 19 surrendered in February 1945 while a further 34 emerged from a cave in 1947, the last formal surrender of World War II (Price and Knecht 2012:12). The capture of Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi closed the campaign in the Central Pacific. U.S. forces had control of the sea, air, major land bases, and naval replenishment sites despite the Japanese military having possession of islands such as Wotje, Truk, and Babelthaup. These bases did not surrender until the end of the war. Beginning with the first invasion in November 1943, it had taken only about a year to recapture the Central Pacific from the Japanese Empire. The Palau Islands paved the road for more decisive battles at Leyte, the Philippines, and indirectly Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Together, the great sacrifices of these and other battles of the Pacific War gave U.S. military planners a clear indication of what to expect from an invasion of the Japanese mainland. Plans for that invasion were in the making when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in the surrender of the Japanese Empire and the conclusion of WWII (Rogers 1995). After the close of the war, the remaining Japanese-occupied islands of the Central Pacific quickly surrendered to U.S. naval forces and all Japanese soldiers were repatriated. Most of the islands returned to their peacetime existence, but not all of them. Kwajalein remained an active military base, initially for the postwar atomic tests and later as a missile test area, and Guam continued in the role of a forward naval base. While there is disagreement by historians and military strategists whether Peleliu and Angaur were worth the huge number of causalities and lives lost, there is no disagreement that those who fought there were extraordinary and their memories should be honored. 52 Chapter 4: Peleliu Invasion Beaches and KOCOA Analysis Introduction KOCOA military terrain analysis originated with the U.S. armed forces as a means of analyzing battlespace geography prior to an engagement (Army 1994:1-1). KOCOA, also written as OCOKA or OAKOC, involves the systematic analysis of site terrain through different tactical lenses. Significant terrain features within the battlespace are classified as one or more of the following: Key Terrain, Observation, Cover/Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal (Table 3). This classification assists with battle preparation and guides military strategy. Today, the NPS ABPP uses KOCOA as one of several terrain analyses for interpreting and understanding historic battlefield sites (NPS 2016). While initially developed for terrestrial landscape analysis, KOCOA has been successfully applied to maritime and aerial engagements (Army 1994; Babits et al. 2011; Sabick and Dennis 2011; Frye and Resnick 2013; McKinnon and Carrell 2015). It was selected for this research due to its flexibility and use on past ABPP projects. Table 3. Overview of KOCOA Attributes (after NPS 2016:5 and Babits et al. 2011) KOCOA Attribute Key Terrain and Decisive Terrain Observation and Fields of Fire Cover and Concealment Obstacles Avenues of Approach and Withdrawal Definition Features that dominate their surroundings by a quality that enhances attack or defeat. Decisive terrain includes areas that must be controlled to succeed in the mission. Features that provide ability to see friendly and enemy forces. Fields of fire are areas that weapons can cover/fire upon. Features that provide protection from enemy fire, observation, and surveillance. Natural or man-made features that prevent, impede, or divert movement. Unobstructed routes that lead to/away from objectives and key terrain. 53 Examples Navigable routes, choke points, significant infrastructure, landing areas, high ground. High ground, entrenched positions, radar operations, coastal defenses. Vessels, buildings, ravines, ditches, overgrowth. Reefs, entrenchments, earthworks, defenses, swamps, mines. Roads, navigable channels, valleys, paths. Prior to fieldwork, researchers compiled a list of significant terrain features identified in primary and secondary sources that influenced the amphibious invasion (Table 4). These features were visited and documented when possible in 2018. The only terrain features discussed here are those involved with the initial amphibious landings. These are located between the offshore drying reef and the area approximately 300 m inshore of the landing beaches. The following provides an abbreviated historical narrative of the amphibious invasion supplemented by eyewitness accounts to illustrate elements of the KOCOA analysis and battlefield implications. KOCOA terrain features within the study area are emphasized with bold text and are summarized in Table 4. Table 4. Terrain Features and KOCOA Attributes Associated with Peleliu Amphibious Invasion Feature Beachhead Drying Reef Lagoon Defenses, White Beach Lagoon Defenses, Orange Beach Attribute Description Located 300-700m inshore of the landing beaches, the beachhead was the first goal of the amphibious invasion (O-1). The beachhead stretched along the Key Terrain western coast and included the southern half of the airfield, the landing beaches, and the island's southern tip. During the pre-invasion bombardment, both UDT teams used the reef (and cover provided by the Observation water) as an observation point for investigating Japanese military shoreline defenses. The offshore area of the beaches, a stretch of 600 Avenue of yards, remained exposed at low tide. Crossing this Approach/Withdrawal stretch of reef was the only avenue of approach to the beaches. The reef's shallow depth acted as a bottleneck for resources moving inshore. At low tide, only wheeled and tracked vehicles could cross, while at Obstacle high tide, some smaller amphibious craft such as LCVPs could also cross in certain areas, although only for very limited periods. Prior to the invasion, Japanese troops placed barbed wire, range markers, and posts in the Obstacle shallows of the reef to slow an amphibious invasion. UDT 6 encountered mines, bombs, and wooden posts strewn along the Orange drying reef. These Obstacle obstacles were found on the beachfront periodically throughout the invasion. Many coral heads were also present on the drying reef. Avenue of The mines and bombs severely impeded Approach/Withdrawal movement ashore as they slowed and/or re-routed 54 Feature Attribute Key Terrain The Point Observation Cover/Concealment Pillboxes on The Point Obstacle Obstacle Tank Traps Cover/Concealment Amphibious Vehicles Obstacle White 2 Ridgeline Cover/Concealment Key Terrain Orange/White Promontory Obstacle Orange Beach Obstacle Description amphibious vehicles. Coral heads worked to funnel invasion forces into narrow avenues of approach. Forming the northern end of the first terrain objective (O-1), The Point was high priority for marines coming ashore. Control of The Point was key to forming and maintaining a beachhead. The Point was used by the Japanese troops for observation over the White Beaches. Under U.S. control, it became a means of watching the landing progress. Pre-invasion bombardment caused little damage to these structures. Construction materials were chosen carefully to provide concealment for the occupants. Sturdy construction and strong defenses made pillboxes on The Point a deadly obstacle. Marines were forced to clear the pillboxes by hand to gain cover from Japanese defensive fire. On White 1, Japanese defenders were successfully able to pin down marines caught in the tank traps. The White 2 and Orange 3 tank traps were used by U.S. forces for cover from Japanese artillery on the Orange/White promontory and southern peninsula, respectively. As mortar fire increased, so did the number of damaged LVTs and DUKWs. The heaviest losses on White 1 and Orange 3 became obstacles for other vehicles trying to land. The Japanese troops used island stratigraphy as a means of cover. High ground such as the White 2 ridgeline became ideal locations for artillery and small arms positions. The marines who landed on White 2 were charged with taking the Orange/White Promontory. Those who landed closest to the promontory succeeded and moved the forward line towards the airport. The artillery facing the White beaches significantly slowed the movement of those in the tank traps. Fortunately, marines who landed on White 2 surpassed the area and moved towards the airfield. Lack of cover (in addition to wide Japanese artillery fields of fire) made crossing the Orange beaches a deadly endeavor. 55 Feature Attribute Orange Brush Cover/Concealment Artillery on the Southern Peninsula Obstacle Description Bordering the Orange beaches was a thin strip of brush, which became the sole source of cover for marines on the beach. Japanese artillery on the southern peninsula destroyed marines on Orange 3 and delayed movement towards the beach, which caused further confusion on shore. Pre-invasion Beach Reconnaissance Establishing the White and Orange beachfront, stretching 2,200 yards in length, was the first objective (O-1) of the amphibious invasion (Figure 20). Chosen for their favorable inshore terrain and distance from areas of higher ground, the beaches were, correctly, suspected to be well defended, necessitating careful planning. The 600-yard stretch of drying reef off the beaches, which remained partially exposed at low tide, was of concern because it was too shallow for LSTs and LCVPs (sometimes called Higgins boats) to maneuver successfully (Rupertus 1944:5). As preparations continued, it was obvious that more information on beach hydrography and potential obstacles was needed. Three days before the invasion, twelve swimmers from UDT 6 and UDT 7 deployed to investigate the submerged reef scape and landing beach terrain (Rupertus 1944:17). The first reports from UDT 7 investigating the White beaches were promising. The reef depth was favorable to amphibious vehicle crossings and few hazardous obstacles were encountered (Figure 21). Posts and barbed wire were driven into the seabed off the White beaches to slow amphibious craft; however, the swimmers determined they posed no threat to vehicles (Burke 1944:3). Several pillboxes were visible along the beach, however the swimmers reported they “had been demolished by naval gunfire” during previous strafing runs (Burke 1944:1). Range markers were also discovered on the shallow reef. Because these were built to increase efficiency of shore-based Japanese guns, UDT 7 returned the evening of September 14 to blast the reef and remove the markers (Burke 1944:3). UDT 6 encountered significantly more obstacles than their counterparts did farther north. The Orange beachfront was lined with wooden posts, and submerged mines, bombs, and boulders were discovered on the drying reef. Following the initial swim survey, UDT 6 transformed into a forward observation post; the swimmers relayed the positions of shore defenses to the officers on the destroyers positioned offshore, who targeted and shelled Japanese military coastal fortifications (Hutson 1944:2; Rupertus 1944:2). Despite the cover fire provided by the 56 destroyers, members of UDT 6 spent September 12-14 clearing the beachfront under continuous Japanese sniper and machine gun fire (Hutson 1944:2). Figure 20. U.S. Invasion Objectives at Peleliu. Top inset: Location of Landing Beaches in Palauan Archipelago. Bottom inset: Location of Landing Beaches on Peleliu Island. Image by Roth/Ships of Discovery. The hydrographic and coastal defense data collected by the UDTs proved critical to final landing preparations. The shallow depths encountered along Peleliu’s western reefs forced LSTs, LCTs, and LCMs to deploy LVTs, amphibious tanks, and DUKWs beyond the reef’s edge (Rupertus 1944:5; Gayle 1996:16). As non-amphibious craft were also required on shore, they would drive across the reef’s shallowest parts while following a lead LVT that scouted a suitable path forward (Gayle 1996:16). 57 Figure 21. Reconnaissance Map of the White Beaches created by UDT 7. Burke 1944. NARA RG-38. D-Day Landing and Initial Assault As September 15, 1944 dawned gray and overcast, fire support ships set to work delivering one final salvo before the assault (Figure 22) (Fort 1944:2). During the night, transport vessels carrying the 1st Marine Division arrived off the coast; those on board woke to the deafening sound of U.S. rockets and aircraft strafing runs (Davis 1988:3). Private Leroy Bronemann, a soldier aboard one of the LSTs, recalls an eerie silence shrouded the island— “it seemed incredible that anyone could be alive after the Navy’s blistering assault” (Bronemann 1982:38). Stationed 16,000 yards from shore, naval transports began loading their cargo into smaller Higgins boats at 0600 hours (Lea 1988:35). Receiving a signal shortly after 0700, the boats 58 approached the transport lines of waiting LSTs and amphibious vehicles. Each craft bore a pennant marking the assault wave and group. Located 4,000 yards off the reef, the seemingly random mass of vessels slowly organized as the 1st Marine Division piled into amtracs and DUKWs (Hunt 1946:39; Lea 1988:35). The assault tactics for each wave of amphibious craft were, in the words of Bronemann, “a simple formation maneuver” (1982:40). The 1st, 5th, and 7th Marine Regiments, all of the 1st Marine Division, were to make a target landfall on their respective beaches with each new wave of the assault. The 1st Marine Regiment was to land on White 1 and 2, the 5th on Orange 1 and 2, and the 7th on Orange 3 (Sledge 2007:62). As the first wave departed the transport lines, the din of the rockets and guns was eclipsed by the grind and rumble of the amphibious engines (Hunt 1946:40). While the preliminary bombardment provided some cover for transport operations, it could do nothing to protect the LVTs as they approached the reef flat. Fearful of hitting friendly forces, the barrage moved 5001000 yards inland beyond the beachfront (Fort 1944:23). Upon final approach, the amphibious vehicles were met with a deadly mix of mortar and artillery fire (Baker 1944:3; Bronemann 1982: 41; Sledge 2007:59). Eugene Sledge (2007:59) recalls: Shells crashed all around. Fragments tore and whirred, slapping on the sand and splashing into the water a few yards behind us. The Japanese were recovered from the shock of our pre-landing bombardment. Their machine gun and rifle fire got thicker, snapping viciously overhead in increasing volume. As the first wave of armored LVTs touched the sand at 0832, scheduled for high tide, those on board threw themselves down onto the beach. The battle had begun. White Beaches As soon as they crossed the reef, marines began moving towards their key terrain targets. For the 1st Marine Regiment, this meant securing the two massive coral promontories that flanked the White beaches. At the northern end of White 1 stood The Point, a 30-ft. high jagged coral outcropping honeycombed with infantry positions (Hunt 1946:58). The entire rock face was reinforced by heavy artillery in pillboxes—one 20mm cannon and one 47mm anti-tank gun stood atop the cliff in pillboxes while another gun, a Model 94 75-mm, was located at the perpendicular drop to the beach (Figure 23) (Hunt 1946:58). 59 Figure 22. Smoke from the naval and aerial bombardment rises from Peleliu the morning of September 15, 1944. Photograph taken from USS Clemson. Bureau of Aeronautics Materials, 247290. 60 Figure 23. Japanese beach obstacles and fields of fire from coastal defenses on the White beaches. Although most of the range markers were removed by UDT 7, they remain in this image to aid reader with artillery visualization. Artillery caliber sizes and associated ranges were calculated from 2018 site investigation and previous investigation of coastal defenses (Denfeld 1988; Price et al. 2012; Price and Knecht 2015). Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. 61 Leading the charge against The Point was Company K, part of the 3rd Marine Battalion, 1st Regiment. Immediately met with an onslaught of artillery and small arms fire, Captain George Hunt later wrote that The Point “surpassed by far anything we had conceived of when we studied the aerial photographs” (1946:58). The intelligence provided by the UDTs and aircraft grossly underrepresented the island’s terrain and Japanese fortifications. For example, the rubble topped pillboxes which UDT 7 believed destroyed were Japanese troop concealment points, “unscarred by the terrific bombardment” (Hunt 1946:68). To gain control of The Point, marines from Hunt’s Company climbed the rocky embrasures and cleared the structures by hand (Hunt 1946:63-64). Despite the short duration of the fighting, The Point was under U.S. control by mid-morning, Japanese defenders and the 1st Marine Regiment alike paid a steep price in casualties (Hunt 1946:69). As those on The Point awaited reinforcements, a picture of the White beach defenses (Figure 24) began forming: Extending from the Point inland and then running parallel to the beach was a coral ridge about twenty-five feet high. From this as well as from the Point the Japanese raked the beach and the flat area of the coconut grove with murderous machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire. On our left, by the use of two platoons, that momentum carried us over the Point. On the right, the momentum died when the second platoon was caught in the tank trap, which was covered by that ridge about fifty yards in front of them (Hunt 1946:81). While the tank traps were observed by UDT 7, Hunt’s comments indicate they were heavily underestimated by those on White 1. The trenches measured anywhere from 5 to 15 yards across, were close to 10 ft. deep, and ran parallel to each of the beaches for several hundred yards (Hunt 1946:75). One of the men caught in the trap later told Hunt (1946:82): Just after we landed on the beach, the fellas began getting’ shot by machine guns from that ridge. Then after a lot of runnin’ with bullets and shrapnel flyin’ all over, I found myself in this deep tank trap, and already could see that everybody was split up and separated.… Any time anybody tried to climb out and keep attackin’, they was shot. It was not until the arrival of amphibious tanks during the later invasion waves that provided enough cover for the marines in the White 1 trap to retreat (Hunt 1946:86). Other obstacles, too, slowed reinforcement of The Point. Arriving on the front as part of the 5th assault wave, Bronemann (1982:41) recalled: 62 Burning DUKWs and burning amtracs told us that all the mortar shells weren’t missing. Marines were lying behind a small coral shelf, making it impossible to drive our DUKWs on land. Whistling bullets bore down on us as we hit the water like rats leaving a burning ship. By now the front line extended twenty feet from the beach into the water! Of the 50 DUKWs in Bronemann’s transportation division, half were knocked out from mortar and artillery fire (Figure 24) (Bronemann 1982:47). While the abandoned vessels became chokepoints for transport across the reef, men and provisions eventually made it onto the White beachfront. Figure 24. Burning amphibious vehicles off White beaches 1 and 2 on September 15, 1944. The White/Orange coral promontory is visible with smoke rising behind in center of image. Note range markers and posts off the beach. Bureau of Aeronautics Materials, 46697. At the southern end of the White beaches, marines were making significant inroads towards the day’s objective. On White 2, members of the 2nd Battalion 1st Marine Regiment used the 63 tank traps to their advantage. Rifleman Russell Davis (1988:21) would later write that the trench was “the best cover on the beach.” The tank trap bottom was out of range of the deadly artillery fire coming from the bunker on the White/Orange promontory. Ordered to link up with the 5th Marine Regiment, Davis used the cover provided by the trenches as he traversed the beachfront (Davis 1988:23). By the time he arrived at the bunker, “the assault men had it in its last stages. Riflemen worked all around it and some of them were in close to the wall, stuffing hand grenades through the fire ports” (Figure 25) (Davis 1988:24). Shortly after, the White/Orange promontory was taken and the 1st Marine Regiment met with the 5th on the western edge of the airfield, thus completing O-1. Figure 25. The White/Orange promontory, seen on the right, caused minimal delay in troop movement on White 2. By the time Davis reached the area, the majority of men were already nearing the airfield. Frederick R. Findtner Collection, USMC Archives, 2-10. 64 Orange Beaches Close to double the length of the White beaches, over 1500 yards in total, both the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments assaulted the Orange beachfront (Sledge 2007:65). The initial plan for landing was straightforward; once on the beach, the 1st Battalion 5th Marine Regiment was to swing north to join the 1st Marine Regiment and push east towards the airfield. The 3rd Battalion 5th Marine Regiment would land on Orange 2 and work towards the airfield, only a mere 300 yards inshore. Finally, the 7th Marine Regiment, landing on Orange 3, would move southeast and secure the southern peninsula (Sledge 2007:62). Simple in design, execution of the landing proved far more challenging than anticipated. Unknown to the landing parties, Japanese swimmers had returned to Orange 3 the evening of September 14 to plant submerged mines and bombs on the reef (Figure 26, Figure 27). Boulders and coral heads, too, remained exposed in the surf. As amphibious vehicles carrying the 7th Regiment churned towards shore, individual craft moved into the waiting minefield. By a sheer stroke of luck, the Japanese defenders had failed to prime the devices (Baker 1944:6). Figure 26. Lt. (jg) “Butch” Robbins, UDT 7, with a Japanese J-13 “horned” mine at Peleliu, 1944. National Navy UDT Seal Museum 2001.0105.14. 65 Figure 27. Japanese beach obstacles and fields of fire from coastal defenses on the Orange beaches. Artillery caliber sizes and associated ranges were calculated from 2018 site investigation and previous investigation of coastal defenses (Denfeld 1988; Price et al. 2012; Price and Knecht 2015). Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. 66 Still, discovery of the trap slowed the vehicles long enough for Japanese 75mm guns on the southern peninsula to begin firing (Fort 1944:2; Lea 1988:40). LIFE magazine correspondent Tom Lea (1988:35) later remarked that after watching a forward LVT stopped dead by a Japanese shell, there was no way for their transport to land on the far right of Orange 3. When they reached the beach, the 7th Marines encountered more land mines and crude booby traps, that again slowed movement as the men were forced to move carefully (Lea 1988: 42-43). On Orange beaches 1 and 2, the first waves of amphibious craft landed just as U.S. naval gunfire shifted inshore. Nevertheless, within the first ten minutes on the beachfront, eleven LVTs were dead in the water (Fort 1944:23). The open expanses of sand and lack of cover made any visible structure a target of Japanese fire (Lea 1988; Sledge 2007:59). An eyewitness to the destruction, mortar man Eugene Sledge (2007:59) writes: I reached the edge of the beach and flattened on the deck. The world was a nightmare of flashes, violent explosions, and snapping bullets. Most of what I saw blurred. My mind was benumbed by the shock of it. I glanced across the beach and saw a DUKW roll up on the sand at a point near where we had just landed. The instant the DUKW stopped, it was engulfed in thick, dirty black smoke as a shell scored a direct hit on it. … I didn’t see any men get out… Despite the fiery onslaught directed towards the amphibious vehicles, rifleman Jim McEnery states “the First Marines were on our left, and the Seventh Marines were on our right, and it looked like both of them were catching hell. But those of us in the center of the beachhead with the Fifth Marines weren’t as bad off” (McEnery and Sloan 2012:208). While the dead DUKWs and LVTs again became an obstacle for landing, the wider expanse of beach at Orange 1 and 2 prevented severe congestion and allowed many of the vehicles to make it to shore. Once on the sand, the largest obstacle to movement across the Orange beaches was the lack of cover—nowhere along the beachhead was there any structure “over knee high” (Sledge 2007:61). McEnery (2012:211-212) remembers the difficulties in moving towards the airfield: Once K/3/5 got past the beach, the ground was solid coral that was next to impossible to even dent with a trenching tool, and the only natural cover between the beach and the field was some scrubby brush and a few low outcroppings of coral. Some of the men were able to find enough rocks to pile up and crawl behind, but many others were basically out in the open with nothing to protect them. 67 Echoing the same sentiment, Johnston (1998:74) states: As I stood there on that beach, it didn’t seem to me that our attack had worked out quite as planned. Nowhere could I see that anyone had gotten across the beach and through that little strip of brush that was between the beach and the airfield. Mortars and artillery rounds landed up and down the length of the beach. Automatic small arms fire came at us from the high ground on our flank. We advanced through the fire across the beach as rapidly as possible. When we reached the cover of the brush strip we stopped. Everywhere people were trying to figure out where everybody was (both our elements and theirs) and what the hell was going on. While many of the marines took cover in the brush that formed a shallow defilade, Sledge (2007:61) recalls only a temporary feeling of relief, as “the Japanese probably would pour mortar fire into it to prevent it being used for shelter.” Pushing forward towards the other regiments, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment soon encountered the 1st Regiment and was able to hold O-1 on the outskirts of the airfield (Moran and Rottman 2002:49). The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment moved south to link up with elements of the 7th Marine Regiment. On Orange 3, the 7th Marine Regiment was finally able to gain some ground. U.S. dive-bombers targeted the southern peninsula, which silenced the Japanese 75mm guns (Lea 1988:41). As the marines moved forward, they stumbled into the Japanese tank traps, finding cover and using the deep ditches for the command post (Lea 1988:42). While the 7th Regiment began clearing the area, a critical flaw in the front was discovered. In an effort to join the 5th and 7th regiments, twice the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment outpaced their counterparts, resulting in gaps along the far-right flank. Fortunately, the 7th Marines were able to close the gap by the end of the day, creating an awkward but complete frontline. By 1800 on the evening of September 15, the 1st Marine Division had secured a beachhead measuring over 3,000 yards in length and stretching close to 500 yards in depth. Meanwhile K Company of 3rd Battalion 5th Marine Regiment was stationed almost 1500 yards inshore (Rupertus 1944:37). Tom Lea (1988:48) notes that as marines dug into the hard coral, “the Jap mortars were far from silent, and direct hits on this kind of concentration really played hell. Yet regardless of fire, the marines were pouring everything they could get on the beach before nightfall and the expected counterattack.” The beachhead survived three separate banzai charges from Japanese soldiers before dawn. 68 As the battle moved farther inshore on D+1, September 16, 1944, the beach became an active interface between maritime and terrestrial parties. UDTs returned to the reef to remove the mines and bombs that were discovered in unprecedented numbers (Fort 1944:218). By D+ 2 the activities moved inshore and the beaches became staging areas to support the inland advance. Summary of KOCOA Features and Battlefield Boundaries The Peleliu landing beach invasion required coordinated efforts between U.S. Navy, Army, and Marine forces. Key terrain for the initial assault included the beaches, the primary terrain objective (O-1) for September 15, and coral promontories expected to hold Japanese defenders (Figure 28). While pre-invasion observation provided detailed information on reef hydrology, it failed to account for the Japanese island defenses including the extensive fields of fire covering the reef tract (Figure 28). The U.S. amphibious vehicles that traversed the shallow lagoon soon encountered artillery and mortar fire, becoming themselves obstacles for later waves of the invasion (Figure 28). Despite the efficacy of Japanese defenses (including mines, tank traps, and concealed gun emplacements), several obstacles became a means of cover for marines on the beaches (Figure 28). Nevertheless, the effort to secure the beachhead was extensive and both Japanese and U.S. personnel endured heavy losses by the end of D-Day. Battlefield, Core, and PotNR Boundaries The entire island of Peleliu was nominated to the National Register of Historic Places in 1984 (National Park Service 1984) and was considered for national landmark status in 1991 and again in 2003 (National Park Service 2003). 69 Figure 28. KOCOA terrain features on the Peleliu Landing Beaches. Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. 70 Should the National Register boundary ever be considered for modification, the entirety of the Orange and White landing beaches, including the lagoon and reef crest, should be included as part of the larger battlefield boundary due to the significance of the reef to pre-battle planning and the initial assault (Figure 29). The project study area, if it were to stand on its own, can be characterized as representing the core battlefield boundary (i.e. areas of heaviest fighting), which are the landing beaches (including 20 ft. into the lagoon) and the immediate areas 300 yards inshore. A potential national register boundary includes the core area except for Orange 3, because it was extensively modified post-battle (Figure 29). Figure 29. Suggested Battlefield, Core, and Potential National Register Boundary following 2018 fieldwork. Map by Roth/Ships of Discovery. 71 Chapter 5: Landscape Modification and Salvage Introduction Any attempt at modeling the potential range of surviving archeological sites associated with the invasion beaches must take into consideration the extent of post-invasion landscape disturbance, navy base construction, and post-war scrap salvage collection. Peleliu has not seen extensive tourism build up along the invasion beaches, the usual causes leading to the loss of sites. However, the extent of land modification has been dramatic. The same post-invasion and post-war salvage impacts that are seen along the beach and immediately inshore also affected the lagoon and offshore reef areas. The WWII Peleliu battlefield is generally acknowledged to be one of the best-preserved terrestrial battlefields in the Pacific; however, the same cannot be said of the invasion beaches and immediate near shore area to about 100 m inland. These areas have undergone extensive land modification. The shoreline and inshore area of both beaches were substantially disturbed during the invasion, post-invasion cleanup, expansion of the airfield, creation of a small boat harbor, and construction of Navy facilities. Orange Beaches The most extensive changes occurred in the area of the Oranges beaches where the focus of activity was the airfield complex and development of the base. In the hours immediately following the Marine landings, the Seabees brought in heavy equipment to clear the beaches of debris, disabled LVTs, and upended DUKWs before setting to work on rebuilding the airfield (Figure 30). Anything that was repairable was quickly put into service; anything that was damaged beyond repair was bulldozed to the side creating jumbled dumpsites. Denfeld reports that one of the areas used as a dumpsite for materiel from the airfield is at the edge of the south breakwater (Site 3, Orange Beach, Feature 6 Denfeld 1988:62; AB219 Knecht et. al. 2012: 57). It consists of both U.S. and Japanese aircraft, and a variety of U.S. military equipment. Seabee CBD 1054 created a second dumpsite, recorded by Denfeld as Site 5 (Denfeld 1988:63). It consists of parts of powered pontoon barges and engines with other miscellaneous items and are in a “scrap pile near the Orange Beach harbor” (Denfeld 1988:63). 72 Figure 30. Within hours of landing on the beaches, the Seabees began clearing damaged equipment and materiel. Norm Hatch Photo Collection, National Museum of the Pacific War, Image Peleliu 031, 1944. Pontoon Causeway and Harbor On D-Day +3, the Seabees started construction of a pontoon causeway from the reef to the shore at the south end of the Orange beaches (Figure 31). The causeway was laid across a naturally shallow, rocky area at the south end of Orange 3 where the UDTs had cleared a path in anticipation of the causeway (Figure 32) (Rupertus 1944:136). 73 Figure 31. Seabees and engineers, working under fire, had this causeway operative by D+ 6 to bridge the reef at the Orange beaches. Angaur Island at the top edge. Hough 1950:22. The permanent harbor construction started in January 1945. The harbor changed the configuration of this area completely removing any traces of the causeway, dredging a channel adjacent to a small islet, deepening the area shoreward behind the islet to create the harbor (Figure 33). The basin was dredged to accommodate three LCTs and included three finger piers with several more along the beach (Denfeld 1988:47) (Figure 34). This completely changed the margins of the islet where a Japanese gun emplacement was sited. 74 Figure 32. UTD 6 blasted a 15 ft wide channel through a shallow rock and gravel area in preparation for a pontoon causeway (right). Logdson 1944. NARA RG-38. Figure 33. The construction of the harbor completely reconfigured the former area of the causeway and a small unnamed islet. The UDT map overlays the current configuration of the area. Graphic, Roth/Ships of Discovery. 75 Figure 34. Orange beach harbor construction, May 15, 1945. Orange beaches to the right. U.S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 1947:331. Airfield Complex The capture of the airfield and restoring it to operational use as quickly as possible was a high priority and tasked to the 33rd U.S. Naval Construction Battalion under the command of Lt. Commander P. Corradi. When U.S. forces took the island there were two landing strips in the form of a cross, each arm of the cross was about 4,000 ft. long and 300 ft. wide (Figure 35). A few days after the capture of the airstrip, reconstruction of the runways, extension of the bomber strip and construction of several taxiways began in earnest. The fighter strip was first temporarily repaired and used while the bomber strip was being rebuilt and additional taxiways constructed. Corradi (1945:27) went on to describe the work: Taxiway "C" was completed in about three days, after which most of the battalion concentrated the bomber strip. Sniper fire along the north end of the strip and near the coral pit made the work hazardous at the start, but the job of laying coral, leveling it off, and grading and rolling continued without interruption. The full extent of the airfield complex and its development is shown in Figure 36. By March 1945 the complex extended along the Orange beaches to within 30 m of the shoreline. 76 Figure 35. Japanese airfield on Peleliu on September 16, 1944, taken by a TBM-1C off USS San Jacinto (CVL30). View to south. Orange beach in the upper right. NARA RG-80-G, Box 960. Figure 36. Airfield complex March 1945 showing the amount of development immediately inshore of the Orange beaches. Military housing and other development extended along the shore at the Orange beaches and inshore of White Beaches (upper left). NARA RG-127. 77 Base Development The 33rd Seabees battalion came ashore on D+1 and immediately set up a work and staging area at the south end of the existing airfield. Bulldozers dug trenches 3 ft. deep, 12 ft. wide, and 80 ft. long with tents pitched over the trenches. By D+6 a galley, shower and other facilities were in place (Corradi 1945:24). In addition to clearing and repairing the airstrip, they began intensive development of the newly established forward airbase (Denfeld 1988:46-47). The Naval base occupied the northern areas of the Orange beaches on the ledge above the shoreline and between the beach and the airstrip (Figure 26). The U.S. military cemetery was in the center inshore from Orange 2 and the southern area was the shop and administrative area for the base and harbor. Figure 37. View to the north along the Orange beaches showing extensive shoreline modifications. By July 1945, the development extended to less than 10 m (33 ft.) of the shore, destroying the Japanese defensive positions. NARA RG-127. While part of the 33rd battalion worked on the airfield, another part under the supervision of Lieutenant A. L. Betz, constructed a base hospital on the island. Tents were first set up for temporary use while Quonset huts for wards, laboratories, operating and consultation rooms, and mess halls were under construction (Corradi 1945:27). 78 At the same time that work on the major projects was underway, several carpenter and labor crews improved the developing base. The camp, complete with new mess hall, showers, toilets, and movie, was useable by the middle of October, when the temporary camp was abandoned and everyone moved (Corradi 1945:27). By December, the emergency work was completed and the camp was complete. In January 1945, construction shifted to semi-permanent structures with steel warehouses, Quonset huts, road, and dock facilities (Corradi 1945:29). Knecht et. al. (2012) describe the extent of the base development: The impressive scale of the 1945 construction is evident in the Department of the Navy’s summary of its activity on Peleliu (1947:330-331). By January 1945, the Seabees had completed a tank farm, consisting of one 10,000-barrel tank, twenty 1,000-barrel tanks, and three 1,000-barrel tanks for diesel oil and aviation fuel. Hospitals constructed by the Seabees were the 17th Army Evacuation Hospital and Navy Base Hospital 20, which had a 440-bed capacity. An additional naval hospital had six H-type Quonset-hut units, of 100 beds each, and a 320-bed annex to Base Hospital 20 was completed in March 1945. Naval dispensaries, with a total capacity of 161 beds, were also constructed. By the end of January 1945, a Japanese concrete-block pier had been rebuilt and the approach channel was dredged to a 10-foot low-water depth and an LCT landing beach prepared. A Marine railway and shops for small-boat repair were built along with a supply depot with 8 Quonset-type warehouses with concrete floors. For the aviation supply depot, the Seabees constructed another five Quonset style buildings. At the airfield, four 20 x 50 foot steel magazines were constructed. The spare parts depot consisted of four Quonset buildings, with concrete floors and unloading platforms, and several Quonset huts for offices. More than 16 miles of primary roads were built to serve these activities on Peleliu. Portable components of these installations were taken down when the base was demobilized and abandoned in 1946. 79 Figure 38. Detail from 1946 map of Peleliu titled “Ngarmoked NW-D, Palau Islands.” Note southern harbor and tent areas on the White and Orange beaches. U.S. Army Map Service, 1946. Orange Beach Cemetery In addition to the base development, the cemetery at Orange Beach had a major impact along the shoreline and immediate inshore areas. The proximity of the cemetery to the invasion beach is well illustrated in Figure 39. A freshly cut road cuts across the Japanese defensive tank trap heading to the airfield complex. The location of the cemetery, only 50 yards inland from Orange 2, is circled. According to the Unit history of the First Marines Peleliu Campaign (1944:3): 80 As a large number of men were killed on the beaches, a cemetery had to be established near the beach. On D plus one, a site was selected about fifty yards inland from Beach Orange Two. This was the only place in the area that had been secured up to that time that was not occupied by tactical units, which could be cleared. The urgent need of all heavy engineering equipment for tactical purposes made clearing and the digging of graves very difficult. The Graves Registration Section collected bodies and transported them by hand, on stretchers, as no other transportation was available. Later, when two DUKW’s that could not be water-borne became available, they were utilized… Enemy dead were buried at convenient locations as soon as conditions permitted. Working parties were obtained from service units for this work. On 20 October 1944 there were 10,695 enemy dead buried… there were 1,058 persons from all branches of the Service buried at the U.S. Armed Forces Cemetery Peleliu Number one. (Quoted in Knecht et al 2012:53). Figure 39. A September 1944 aerial view of Orange Beach shows a portion of the extensive Japanese tank traps and complexity of foxholes. Beginning of cemetery circled. NARA RG-127 (after Knecht et al., Figure 4.5, pg. 52). 81 The full extent of the cemetery, with chapel and memorial monuments, completely removed the Japanese defensive positions in the area (Figure 40). Figure 40. Orange Beach cemetery with chapel in background. In 1946-47, all of the remains of service personnel were removed and transferred to Manila, Hawaii, or the mainland. NARA RG-127 (after Knecht et al. 2012:62). Orange Beach Shoreline and Marina Dumpsites The Japanese tank traps (Figure 39) and rifle pits, which feature prominently in historic accounts, are readily identifiable in the landscape. Not only were these defensive features bulldozed during construction and modified for other use, but also were reused becoming “middens” for WWII materials. Inshore of the landing zones at the Orange beaches, a wide array of material culture including rolls of barbed wire, U.S. canteens, and military vehicles are still visible in these former tank traps and secondary defensive positions. The location of these materials on site suggests they were bulldozed into the tank traps as the airfield and surrounding areas were cleared for base repair and use. While these actions did not occur during the initial hours of the invasion, they represent historic U.S. military use and immediate post-battle occupation and disturbance. 82 Denfeld reports that one of the areas used as a dumpsite for materiel from the airfield is at the edge of the south breakwater (Site 3, Orange Beach, Feature 6 Denfeld 1988:62; AB219 Knecht et al 2012: 57). It consists of both U.S. and Japanese aircraft, and a variety of U.S. equipment. Seabee CBD 1054 created a second dumpsite, recorded by Denfeld as Site 5 (Denfeld 1988:63). It consists of parts of powered pontoon barges and engines with other miscellaneous items and are in a “scrap pile near the Orange Beach harbor” (Denfeld 1988:63). WWII cultural materials are still visible in the construction of the marina; part of the fill for land reclamation includes the pontoon barges from the 1944 Orange beach LST ramp. Moreover, post-battle cleanup is exhibited nearby; the extensive remains of a U.S. aircraft graveyard are present on the southern side of the marina. Likely deposited at the harbor after the war for shipment; the aircraft were abandoned. White Beaches The northern end of White Beach 1 was a formidable obstacle during the invasion (Figure 41). The White beaches are situated between 2 rock outcroppings that extend seaward approximately 120 m at the northern end and approximately 50 m at the southern end. These two promontories, along with a ridgeline, effectively isolated these beaches from the immediate post-invasion cleanup and land modifications. The area inshore at the north end of the White beaches was developed only after Peleliu was secure. Development was not completed until early 1945, and was only used by the Commander of the Western Carolines Sub Area, and his associated support staff (Denfeld 1988:53). Foundations for Quonset huts for barracks, officers’ quarters, mess and club, access roads, and other support buildings, including a tennis court were constructed. This did not completely obliterate the Japanese defensive positions located here, but Denfeld reports that the area was landscaped and many items including a Japanese 75mm gun and aircraft propeller were added as decoration (Denfeld 1988:57-59). A short distance from these buildings Denfeld recorded a dump containing radio parts, hoses, and fuel pumps, among other things (Denfeld 1988:59). 83 Figure 41. View toward “The Point” at the north end of White Beach 1 showing the quantity of heavy equipment and supplies being offloaded. Note the presence of a row of obstacles in the lagoon. NARA RG-127. Post War Salvage In the 1950s, the islands of the Pacific battles were opening up as tourist attractions. One such ‘tourist’ was Margaret (Margo) Duggan. From 1943 through 1945, Duggan served in the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II. In late 1949, she began work as a civilian employee of the U.S. Trust Territories Administration. Between 1949 and 1954, she worked on or visited islands throughout Micronesia also spending time at the Trust Territory headquarters in Hawai'i. Her photographs document an important transition period in the early post-war period. Importantly, her images of Peleliu show the condition of equipment and watercraft, still easily recognizable and abandoned in the lagoon and along the shore (Figure 42, Figure 43). Abandonment of equipment was a long-practiced policy post-war; the cost to return it to the U.S. was considered prohibitive and not in the best economic interest of manufacturers (Arthur 1945). As a result, abandoned WWII equipment littered the islands of the Pacific. It was a “resource” waiting to be exploited. 84 Figure 42. Landing craft, Orange Beach, Peleliu, March 1951. UHM Library Digital Image Collections, Margo Duggan, accessed February 11, 2020, https://digital.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/items/show/7808. In the 1950s, scrap dealers collected metal from several post-invasion dumpsites (Denfeld 1988:62, Knecht et al 2012:57). Scrap collecting was not limited to the dumpsites and included the shoreline, lagoon, and reefs (Calvin Emesiochel, 2018, personal communication). Post-war, aluminum and iron scrap drives were common throughout the Pacific and middens of dismantled machinery and partially salvaged WWII equipment are found throughout the Marianas, Marshall, and Caroline Islands (Spennemann 1998). In an effort to allow Japan to pay off war claims to the Trust Territory, the government and its nationals were given permission to salvage and dispose of their ships sunk in the territorial waters of Palau and throughout Micronesia. In Palau, the Fujita Salvage Company moved in and started operations in the 1960s. According to Bailey, 27 wrecks were partially or completely salvaged (Bailey 1991:ix). Another non-Japanese salvage operator and at least one local salvage operator with Japanese affiliations was also engaged in salvage at the same time. Salvage was so lucrative it became a major export market (Bailey 1991:ix). 85 Figure 43. Landing craft, Peleliu, March 1951. UHM Library Digital Image Collections, Margo Duggan, accessed February 11, 2020, https://digital.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/items/show/7727. The impact of this intense period of scrap salvage from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s, combined with complete dismantling and removal of ships and other support craft and equipment, was that: . . . local and foreign entrepreneurs . . . pillaged these sites in search of scrap iron and especially non-ferrous metals. For some islands, scrap metal was a major source of revenue. In the Marshall Islands . . . it was the second largest export commodity in the late 1960s . . . . These scrap metal drives continued the destruction of the historical resources at an unprecedented rate . . . . In retrospect, the scrap metal collectors, as well as the well-intentioned clean-ups and the removal of unexploded World War II ammunition during the same period caused more structural damage to the World War II heritage than the entire war impact (Spenemann 1998). The result, in almost all areas of the Pacific, was the loss of ‘future’ underwater cultural heritage sites that today provide much needed tourism income to local economies. Those sites that remain are invariably subjected to intense visitation. 86 Chapter 6: Potential Losses and Invasion Beach Investigation Potential Losses in the Project Area The planning and invasion of Peleliu involved hundreds of ships, amphibious vehicles, aircraft, offensive and terrestrial support vehicles, and logistical support equipment. Ships involved in the pre-invasion naval and aerial bombardment included 5 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers (Garand and Strobridge 1971:103). Ten escort carriers, 4 light aircraft carriers, and 4 aircraft carriers augmented the battleships and cruisers, none of which were lost during the battle (Garand and Strobridge 1971:103-104). LSTs, LSDs, and DMS, stationed 18,000 yards from shore with the main battlegroup and well beyond the range of defensive gun batteries, provided Battlegroup support. The LSDs and LSTs only moved shoreward during the lead up to the invasion to discharge their cargoes 6,000 yards from shore; none of these were lost during the battle. Front line assault craft that were vulnerable to loss included: LTCs, LCMs, LVT-2 and LVT-4s, LVT(A)s, LCVPs, LCI(G)s, LCIs, LSTs. Because the personnel carrying LVTs were used repeatedly to shuttle troops to the shore and return carrying wounded, they were particularly vulnerable to loss from defensive fire. One gunboat, LCI(G)-459 was lost after hitting a mine on September 19, 1944, while maneuvering into position off of Peleliu’s west coast to continue fire support. Throughout the invasion, carrier-based aircraft strafed the landing beaches, near shore defensive positions, inland anti-aircraft batteries, and mountain gun positions. The types of aircraft, and variants, used during the battle included: FM-2 Wildcat, F6F Hellcat, F4U and FG-1 Corsair, SB2C Helldiver, TBM-1C and TBF Avenger, and SBD scout bomber. AA fire resulted in the loss of numerous aircraft. Varieties of offensive and support vehicles and equipment were deployed on the heels of the initial landing. These included DUKWs, unmodified Sherman tanks, amphibious trailers, tractors, and pontoon barges with crawler cranes. On shore, the Seabees used crawler tractors, amphibious trailers, A-frames, trucks, and jeeps to clear the beaches of damaged equipment and move supplies forward. Under constant fire, the loss of every category of vehicle including numerous DUKWs, tanks, and trucks is well documented by Gayle (1996) and others (Rupertus 1944; Garand and Strobridge 1971). Several accounts documented seeing burning amtracs (LVTs) and DUKWs littered across the length and breadth of the reef and along shore (Hough 1950:36). The extent of the destruction, confirmed by an air observer, reported 38 vehicles 87 burning simultaneously (both LVTs and DUKWs). Unofficial estimates by assault unit commanders brought the total knocked out, at least temporarily, in excess of 60 (Hough 1950:37). Each of the front line and support craft losses represent potential UCH site types in the project area. The Seabees also cleared the wreckage of Japanese equipment from the nearshore area and airfield complex. Corradi (1945:25) reported: Close to 140 planes, not one without a few bullet or shrapnel holes, were counted on the island. Almost all of the heavy bombers were found destroyed by either U.S. fire or Jap demolition crews . . . . It was evident from the number and types of planes as well as the great amount of equipment and supplies that the airfield had been a major one. Antiaircraft guns of every caliber surrounded the field while radar units and large searchlights were spotted at strategic locations. Bomb dumps, torpedo maintenance shops, plane hangars, ammunition magazines, spare parts warehouses and fuel tanks, all the necessary facilities for a major air base were found. Anything useful was repurposed, everything else was bulldozed into the former tank traps and mixed with other damaged items at numerous dumpsites. These materiel remains also represent potential cultural heritage sites, although their integrity and intermixing present numerous challenges. Peleliu Invasion Beach Investigation In April 2018, the Ships of Discovery archaeology team visited Peleliu to undertake a survey of the fringing reef, the shallow lagoon, and defensive positions immediately inshore of the invasion beaches (Figure 44). The team revisited or located 100 sites that represent both WWII specific remains and modern debris. Appendix 1 is a comprehensive list of sites investigated and documented during the 2018 project; Appendix 2 lists non-historic finds. 88 Figure 44. Survey areas. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. Terrestrial Inshore Survey The inshore survey was conducted from April 3-6, 2018, during which a three-person survey team, spaced 5-6 meters apart, examined the shoreline from the mean low water line to approximately 30 m (100 ft.) inland. The survey area was roughly rectangular from the south end at the existing harbor to the northernmost end of White 1 beach, a distance of approximately 2.25 km (1.4 miles). Survey tracks and site locations were recorded using a Garmin GPSMAP 64st. The purpose of the inshore survey was to relocate Japanese defensive positions that were strategically located to direct enfilading fire from the shore out to the reef line (Figure 45). Working with information recorded by Denfeld (1980) and Price and Knecht (2012), the team re-examined previously recorded sites and documented several previously unrecorded sites. 89 Fields of fire were recorded at each defensive position that had clear access to the shore to support an invasion beach specific KOCOA analysis. The terrestrial survey inshore of the invasion beaches identified 60 artifact scatters, miscellaneous debris, pieces of equipment, or Japanese defensive positions. The team revisited 16 archeological sites previously recorded by Denfeld (1980) and/or by Knecht, Price, and Lindsay (2012) and identified 9 previously unrecorded sites. Figure 45. Section of an August 1944 Japanese defensive plan. The red arrows are the Japanese presumed US avenues of approach for the invasion. The blue arrows represent the fields of fire of the gun emplacements across the invasion beaches and reef. The blue half-circles on the beaches represent general defensive positions. Peleliu State Museum. 90 Previously Recorded Japanese Defensive Positions In 1980, Denfeld documented 13 defensive positions along the shoreline. In 2010, Knecht, Price, and Lindsay revisited the majority of the Denfeld shoreline sites and documented an additional three, adding considerable details on each in their 2012 report. Table 5 summarizes the previously recorded sites visited during this survey. Table 5. Previously Recorded Japanese Defensive Positions Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Description N/A Site 7 AB221 Japanese defensive cave N/A Site 7 AB220 Japanese defensive cave Ships048 Site 1 Feature 10 N/A Ships050 Site 1 Feature 7 AB279 Japanese defensive site Japanese Defensive Position, Fuel drum embankment Ships054 Site 1 Feature 11 AB50 Japanese defensive structure on “the Point” Ships055 N/A AB60 Ships056 Site 1 Feature 20 AB550 Japanese defensive structure Japanese defensive structure coral ridges and rifle pits Ships057 Site 1 Feature 12 N/A Japanese Gun and Defensive Structure Ships058 Site 1 Feature 12 N/A Japanese Reinforced Defensive Cave Ships059 Site 1 Feature 12 N/A Japanese Gun Housing Ships062 Site 1 Feature 1 AB52.1 Japanese Defensive Cave, Structure, and Gun Ships063 AB54 Japanese Defensive Cave Ships064 N/A Site 1 Feature 2 N/A Japanese Observation Platform Ships065 N/A AB53 Ships066 Site 1 Feature 3 N/A Japanese Defensive Cave, collapsed Japanese Defensive Position, Concrete Slab and Boulders Ships070 Site 3 Feature 1 N/A Japanese Defensive Structure Previously Unrecorded Japanese Defensive Positions Nine previously unrecorded Japanese defensive positions, summarized in Table 6, were located during the shoreline survey. Ships073, collapsed box-like structures at Orange Beach 3, with octagonal “windows”, show evidence of being bulldozed from their original position. The type of construction observed at these structures is similar to that at Ships083, a concrete and rebar reinforced low defensive position. These materials are markedly different in color and texture from those observed and associated with concrete foundations for the naval base, suggesting that these may have been defensive in nature. 91 Table 6. Previously Unrecorded Japanese Defensive Positions Site Number Ships047 Denfeld Site ID Ships061 N/A N/A Price/Knecht Description Site ID N/A Japanese Defensive Position, Fuel Drum Embankment. Fuel drums were used to create the corner of a built up Japanese defensive position. The rim of a second fuel drum sitting upright is visible at the top edge of the fuel drum in the foreground Roth/Ships of Discovery Science Team. N/A Japanese Defensive Position, Embankment with “pipe” fixture; poss. gun mount. Roth/Ships of Discovery 92 Site Number Ships068 Denfeld Site ID Ships069 N/A N/A Price/Knecht Description Site ID N/A Japanese Gun. A recently exposed Japanese gun eroding out of a defensive position (assoc. with Ships069). Roth/Ships of Discovery N/A “Pipe” Fixture on Concrete Mount (assoc. with Ships068). Roth/Ships of Discovery 93 Site Number Ships073 Denfeld Site ID Ships083 N/A N/A Price/Knecht Description Site ID N/A Concrete box-like structures w/octagonal ‘windows’, collapsed. Roth/Ships of Discovery N/A Japanese Low Defensive Position constructed of rebar and concrete. Roth/Ships of Discovery 94 Site Number Ships085 Denfeld Site ID Ships086 N/A N/A Price/Knecht Description Site ID N/A Japanese Defensive Trenches associated with a dumpsite. Roth/Ships of Discovery. N/A Japanese Defensive Position With Gun Mount. Roth/Ships of Discovery 95 Site Number Ships095 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Description Site ID N/A Japanese Defensive Position (collapsed) built into rock. Roth/Ships of Discovery Sites Inshore of the Invasion Beaches Both modern and historic remains were recorded during the terrestrial survey. The historic sites include: isolated finds and large multi-component equipment dumps, pontoon dock sections, collapsed defensive caves, secondary low defensive positions with poured concrete, defensive trenches, concrete “box-like” structures on the shore with unidentified purpose, and concrete foundations for buildings associated with the Naval base construction. Table 7 summarizes the WWII terrestrial sites immediately inshore of the invasion beaches. Table 7. WWII Sites Inshore of the Invasion Beaches Site Number Ships041 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A Description and Designation Tug boat 96 Site Number Ships042 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A Ships043 Ships044 N/A N/A N/A Site 3 Feature 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A Site 7 Site 7 N/A N/A N/A Ships045 N/A Ships046 N/A N/A N/A Ships047 AB219 N/A AB230 N/A AB218 AB221 AB220 N/A Description and Designation Site consists of two axles that may be associated with a rail car or refrigerated truck Tractor Engine; U.S. mfg. tire marked Goodrich Debris Scatter (Dumping Area w/flatbed trailer, rail ties, U.S. Navy ceramic plate suggests dump created by U.S. personnel Aircraft Dump Pontoon from Seabee Dock C-46 Aircraft Engine Cowling Pontoon from Seabee Dock LARC Amphibious Vehicle Defensive cave used by Japanese troops Defensive cave used by Japanese troops Fuel Barrel Embankment 97 Site Number Ships048 N/A Ships049 Ships050 Ships051 Denfeld Site ID Site 1 Feature 10 N/A N/A Site 1 Feature 7 Site 1 Feature 6 Price/Knecht Site ID N/A AB58 N/A Japanese Defensive Structure Tower Foundation Amphibious Vehicle Treads AB279 Japanese Defensive position, Fuel Drum Embankment AB280 Beached Amphibious Vehicle 3 Axles with Tires. Denfeld (1992) tentatively identified the axles as belonging to a DUKW. Roth/Ships of Discovery Tractor with blade, beached Ships052 Ships053 Ships054 Site 1 Feature 5 N/A Site 1 Feature 11 N/A N/A AB50 N/A Site 1 Feature 20 N/A N/A Site 1 Feature 12 Site 1 Feature 12 Site 1 Feature 12 N/A AB60 Japanese Defensive Structure on "the Point" Japanese Defensive Structure on the road to White Beaches AB55 AB148 AB268 Japanese Defensive position, Coral Ridges and Rifle Pits Aircraft Dump with Merlin Engines and Japanese Tanks A6M "Zero" Aircraft N/A Japanese Gun and Defensive Structure N/A Japanese Reinforced Defensive Cave N/A N/A N/A Site 1 Feature 1 N/A Site 1 Feature 2 N/A Site 1 Feature 3 N/A N/A N/A Site 3 Feature 1 N/A Japanese Gun Housing Sprocket, Amphibious Vehicle Japanese Defensive position, Embankment with “pipe” fixture, poss. gun mount AB52.1 AB54 Japanese Defensive Cave, Structure, and Gun Japanese Defensive Cave N/A AB53 Japanese Defensive position, Observation Platform Japanese Defensive Cave, collapsed N/A N/A N/A N/A Japanese Defensive position, Concrete Slab and Boulders Engine Block, poss. amphibious vehicle Japanese Gun, assoc. with Ships 069 “Pipe” Fixture on Concrete Mount, assoc. with Ships068 N/A Japanese Defensive Structure Ships055 Ships056 N/A N/A Ships057 Ships058 Ships059 Ships060 Ships061 Ships062 Ships063 Ships064 Ships065 Ships066 Ships067 Ships068 Ships069 Ships070 Description and Designation 98 Site Number Ships071 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A Ships073 Ships075 Ships078 Ships079 Ships080 Ships081 Ships082 Ships083 Ships085 Ships086 Ships087 Ships090 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Description and Designation Octagonal Platform w/trapezoidal monument; unknown purpose. Roth/Ships of Discovery Concrete Box-like structures w/octagonal ‘windows’, collapsed. Tractor Vehicle Debris Vehicle Debris Disarticulated Concrete Structure Iron Debris Engine Block, poss. amphibious vehicle Japanese Low Defensive Position Japanese Defensive Trenches and U.S. Dump Japanese Defensive Position With Gun Mount Tank Base (large), poss. from water or fuel tank Concrete trapezoidal foundation, unknown purpose 99 Site Number Ships092 Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Ships094 N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships095 Ships096 Ships097 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Description and Designation Concrete Building Foundation; clustered with others assoc. with Navy base construction Engine Blocks w/nearby machinery and debris, marked with “ENGIN” Japanese Defensive Structure Concrete Foundation assoc. with Navy base construction Concrete Foundation assoc. with Navy base construction 100 Site Number Ships098 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A Ships099 Ships100 N/A N/A N/A N/A Description and Designation Concrete Slab with Boilers, assoc. with Navy base construction Concrete Foundation assoc. with Navy base construction Concrete Foundation assoc. with Navy base construction Lagoon Survey The walking survey, undertaken on April 10 and 11, 2018, consisted of a 5-person team spaced approximately 5-6 m apart. The lagoon is less than 3 ft. deep and the visibility is excellent, making visual identification possible. An unusual storm in October 2017 eroded areas of the landing beaches, exposing some remains previously buried but now visible for documentation. The survey area was roughly rectangular from the south end at the existing harbor at Orange Beach 3 to the northernmost end of White 1 beach, a distance of approximately 2.25 km (1.4 miles) and from the mean low water line out to the fringing reef, approximately 300 m (800 ft.). Survey tracks and site locations were recorded using a Garmin GPSMAP 64st GPS. Sites identified included: disarticulated Sherman tank tracks, DUKW (amphibious truck) wheels and axels, LCM3 (Landing Craft, Mechanized model 3), bulldozer blade for tank or LVT conversion, possible LVT roller and tread, unidentified engine components, the remains of a U.S.aircraft, and miscellaneous unidentifiable pipe and cable. Of the 22 sites, only 12 are definitely associated with WWII activities. Table 8 summarizes the WWII lagoon sites. 101 Table 8. WWII Lagoon Sites Site Number Ships010 Ships011 Denfeld Site ID N/A N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A N/A Description and Designation Ships012 N/A N/A Plane wing with landing gear. Remains of an F4U Corsair. Raupp/Ships of Discovery Ships012 N/A N/A Plane section (curved). Associated with Ships012. McKinnon/Ships of Discovery LVT Roller Landing gear strut associated with Ships012. Arnold/Ships of Discovery 102 Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Description and Designation Ships012 N/A N/A Plane fragment (shot up Ships013 N/A N/A Radial Engine (1.25 x 1.2m). Associated with Ships012. Arnold/Ships of Discovery Ships014 Ships015 N/A N/A N/A N/A Wheel, DUKW Wheel, DUKW. Arnold/Ships of Discovery 103 Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Description and Designation Ships016 Ships018 N/A N/A N/A N/A LVT Tread Sherman tank tread possibly Model M4A2. Roth/Ships of Discovery 104 Site Number Ships019 Denfeld Site ID N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A Description and Designation Ships036 N/A N/A LCM-3. Raupp/Ships of Discovery Ships042 Ships052 N/A Site 1, Fea 5 N/A N/A Two Axles with vehicle debris. DUKW, Axel and wheel assemblies. Carrell/Ships of Discovery Bulldozer bucket. Roth/Ships of Discovery 105 Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Description and Designation Reef Towed Swimmer Survey Because the reef is shallow with limited boat and remote sensing equipment access, the survey included a towed swimmer examination of the reef margins and seaward reef flat. The towed swimmer survey consisted of four of overlapping lines spaced approximately 20 m (66 ft.) apart covering approximately 9-1/2 line miles. Water visibility was in excess of 60 ft., making visual inspection possible. Because the survey occurred during high tide, the two-person teams were able to get very close to the reef resulting in the location of 12 sites. A Garmin GPSMAP 64st was use to record survey tracks and site locations. Both historic and modern debris sites were recorded during this survey; Table 9 summarizes the WWII reef sites. Table 9. WWII Reef Sites Site Number Ships020 Ships021 Denfel d Site ID N/A N/A Price/Knech t Site ID N/A N/A Description and Designation Historic (HIST) or Modern (MOD) UXO Navy Stockless Anchor. Carrell/Ships of Discovery 106 Ships023 N/A N/A Pontoon Barge Fragments. Pascoe/UHH/Ships of Discovery Ships024 N/A N/A Aircraft Propeller Blade. This blade may be associated with aircraft remains found in the lagoon (Ships012). Raupp/Ships of Discovery Ships025 N/A N/A Stud Link Anchor Chain 107 Ships027 N/A N/A Tractor with blade. This tractor may have been lost in the initial hours during beach cleanup. McKinnon/Ships of Discovery Navy Stockless Anchor Isolated find. Raupp/Ships of Discovery Ships028 N/A N/A 108 Ships030 N/A N/A Debris Scatter and Stockless Navy Anchor. Possibly associated with the loss of a crane barge. Raupp/Ships of Discovery Disarticulated LVT Raupp/Ships of Discovery Ships032 Ships035 N/A N/A N/A N/A Stud Link Anchor Chain 109 Ships038 N/A N/A LVT associated with Ships 039 and 040. LVT at offshore dumpsite. Pascoe/Ships of Discovery Ships039 N/A N/A LVT associated with Ships038 and 040. Collapsed LVT at offshore dumpsite. Burns/Ships of Discovery Ships040 N/A N/A LVT associated with Ships038 and 039 dumpsite 110 Chapter 7: Modeling Introduction The historical analysis of the assault, research undertaken to identify landscape modification and post-war salvage, KOCOA analysis, and the invasion beach site visit, provides a framework for understanding and modeling the loss locations and the remains documented in 2018. The defensive structures in the lagoon and the drying reef offshore of the Orange beaches were the first obstacles to the invasion. Although the UDT teams addressed many of them, not all could be removed, and the Japanese troops reinstalled some prior to the invasion (Figure 46, Figure 47). These obstacles hampered ingress and maneuverability close to the shore. Figure 46. UDT 6 reconnaissance map Orange beaches 1 and 2. Note the rows of wood posts to the left and right of the cleared channels. Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. 111 Figure 47. UDT 6 reconnaissance map Orange 1. Note the row of mines (center) posts (left and right) and 50 Kg aircraft bombs (far right). Logsdon 1944. NARA RG-38, Box 788. At the reef, blasting channels to access the lagoon at the Orange beaches meant the incoming amphibious craft were channeled into limited avenues of approach and were forced to brave pre-set fields of fire with range markers aiding the effectiveness of the shore batteries. The proximity of the Orange beaches to the airfield, a critical strategic objective for both sides, meant that the Japanese concentrated more of their defenses here and the enfilading fire was more intense (Figure 48). The combined effect of enfilading fire and more constrained avenues of approach off the Orange beaches, particularly off Orange 3, was reflected in the numerous losses of DUKWs and tanks reported in the first hours (Hough 1950:37). Because the lagoon is shallower here, the blast channels provided the best avenue for the LVTs to lead the modified Sherman tanks ashore. However, the restricted avenue of approach increased losses, damage, and delays for those critical pieces of equipment. 112 Figure 48. Japanese defensive positions map with invasion beach overlay shows the intensity of the enfilading fire directed at the beaches. Approximate locations: White beach black lines, Orange beach orange lines. Map section extracted from 1944 Japanese map, courtesy Peleliu Museum. Illustration Carrell/Ships of Discovery. The White beaches Japanese defenses were only marginally less concentrated than the Orange beaches. Directly inshore were several Japanese installations and a radio tower (Figure 48). Hampering a direct line of assault from the White beaches to these locations are a steep cliff and a ragged ridgeline. Taking advantage of these natural obstacles, the defensive positions and 113 associated enfilading fire was less concentrated (Figure 48). The White beach assault was advantaged only insofar as the amphibious craft were not as limited in their access to the beaches because the reef is deeper here, nor were there as many obstacles (Figure 49). This meant that the assault craft had more room to maneuver to avoid incoming raking fire. This ability to move quickly from the final line of assembly to the shore put the men and equipment in less peril in the last dash to the beachhead. Figure 49. UDT 7 reconnaissance map of White Beaches 1 & 2. NARA. Note the presence of range markers in approximately 3 ft. of water (indicated by X), and barbed wire closer in to shore (indicated by x-x-x). Immediately inshore is a line of rifle pits. Burke 1944. NARA RG-38. 114 Site Location Analysis White Beaches 1 and 2 Figure 50 illustrates sites identified on the reef, in the lagoon, and along the shore at White beaches 1 and 2, and the northern portion of Orange 1. Keeping in mind that the top of the reef is relatively deeper in this area, the presence of only one site on the reef is somewhat surprising. Ships028 is an isolated Navy stockless anchor; there is no other associated debris identified. Absent a major salvage operation using scuba or surface supplied divers, which only happened in the northern anchorage at Koror, it would seem logical that remains in even slightly deeper water would be untouched. Two sites were identified in the lagoon; Sherman tank treads (Ships018) and the bucket to a bulldozer or LVT bulldozer conversion kit (Ships019). At the shore, tracked vehicle treads, probably from a Sherman tank (Ships049), DUKW axels and tires (Ships052), remains of a tractor with blade (Ships053), and miscellaneous remains of LVTs (Ships051 and Ships060) are present. All of these are scattered remains with no intact pieces of equipment. Because of extensive post-war salvage, the dearth of equipment remains in the lagoon is not surprising. The depth at the White beaches is on average only slightly deeper than that off the Orange beaches, making any sites there and along the shore readily accessible to salvage. The shoreline at the White beaches is considerably more rugged and steeper than the Orange beaches. This area was not subjected to the same degree of post-invasion nearshore development as the Orange beaches. As a result, several Japanese defensive positions are well preserved. The best preserved are north of the White beaches, and at the White/Orange beach promontory. However, the area was not untouched; foundations associated with the facilities for the Commander of the Western Caroline Sub Area are present in the vicinity of the White/Orange promontory. It is not possible to state with certainty that fewer obstructions, only marginally less enfilading fire, and slightly deeper water had an impact on losses on the reef and lagoon. Certainly, the numerous surviving defensive positions and historical accounts suggests that the White beaches were very strongly defended. This would imply that the relative numbers of losses were close or equal to those at the Orange beaches, with the concomitant potential for remains. So few surviving sites supports extensive post-war salvage. 115 Figure 50. Sites identified at White Beaches 1 and 2, and the northern portion of Orange 1. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. 116 Orange Beaches 1, 2, and 3 Orange 1 (Figure 50 bottom, Figure 51 top) has no identified reef or lagoon sites. However, there are well-preserved and readily identifiable defensive positions and numerous foundations associated with the development of the naval base in the vicinity of and to the south of the White/Orange promontory (Ships 062, 063, 064, 065, 066, 067, 068, 069, 070, 090, 092, 094, 095, 096, 097, 098, 099, and 100). Figure 51 illustrates sites identified on the reef, in the lagoon, and the shore at Orange 2 (middle), and Orange 3 (bottom). One site was identified on the reef at Orange 2. Ships027 is the nearly intact remains of a tractor with blade, identified as a Caterpillar Model D-4 Type 2E. It sits in small hole, in approximately 8 ft. of water that is deeper than the surrounding area. The hole could be the result of defensive fire from Japanese guns. The tractor’s undamaged condition suggests it was not abandoned, but lost during deployment. A wheel from a DUKW (Ships014) is in the lagoon at Orange 2 and on shore is another DUKW wheel assembly (Ships015). In both cases, there is no other associated debris. The locations of these sites and the numerous losses of DUKWs during the initial hours of the assault suggests these are associated with that event. The lack of other associated debris may reflect the effects of post-war salvage and the discard of less valuable elements. Also on shore is the tread from an LVT (Ships016). Orange 2 has very few remaining shore sites. Ships083 is a low defensive position consisting of poured concrete and rebar, likely used as a rifle pit. Ships084, 085, 086 are defensive trenches associated with a large, extensive dumpsite. The trenches provided a ready-made dumping ground during the post-invasion cleanup. Ships087 is the base of a large iron tank that is most likely associated with naval base construction and associated buildings. The lack of surviving defensive positions is a marked difference from the White beaches, and Orange 1, reflecting the extent of shoreline modifications. Orange 3 has the most numerous reef sites (Figure 51). Ships032 is the disarticulated remains of an LVT. Ships035 and 025 are long sections of stud-link anchor chain with no associated debris. Ships 030 is a debris scatter, tentatively identified as pontoons with a Navy stockless anchor that may be associated with the loss of a crane barge before the completion of the pontoon causeway during the invasion. An LVT dumpsite, consisting of three heavily salvaged craft (Ships038, 039, and 040) is present in approximately 90 ft. of water. The location is at the edge of a steep drop-off into deep water. 117 The practice of disposing of unrepairable equipment in deep water, after removing everything useful, was common during the Pacific campaign and later during the post-war demobilization period (Arthur 1945). Figure 51. Sites identified at Orange beaches 1, 2, and 3 (top to bottom). Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. 118 Ships024 is a single aircraft propeller blade that is associated with a landing gear strut (Ships011), a section of aircraft wing and fuselage (Ships012), and an aircraft radial engine (Ships013) in the lagoon. The aircraft is identified as an F4U Corsair. A single section of LVT roller (Ships010) is also in the lagoon and is not associated with any other debris. Both the aircraft and the LVT are probably the remains left after salvage. The heavily degraded remains of an LCM (Ships036) is adjacent to the harbor breakwater at the south end of Orange 3. Identified as an LCM-3, it consists of the lower hull, cargo space plating, and portions of bulkheads. Margo Duggin photographed several abandoned LCMs in 1951 (Figure 42 and Figure 43) and this could be the remains of one of those. The disarticulated and scattered remains of a tracked vehicle (Ships075), tentatively identified as a tractor, is at the breakwater at the southern end of Orange 3. The condition of the tractor suggests it was damaged beyond repair shortly after the invasion when the Seabees were under constant attack rather than a perfectly functional piece of equipment simply being abandoned. The number of surviving shoreline defensive positions at Orange 3 is markedly different when compared to the White beaches, Orange 1 (refer to Figure 50), and Orange 2. No definitively identifiable defensive positions were identified at Orange 3. Rather the sites represented are miscellaneous vehicle debris dumps, engine blocks, concrete blocks, unidentifiable collapsed concrete box-like structures that may or may not have been defensive in nature, and miscellaneous debris associated with general equipment dumpsites (Ships073, 078, 079, 080, 081, and 082). Immediately south of Orange 3, in the harbor are the remains of pontoons repurposed for harbor construction (Ships045, and 046), and three large equipment dumps (Ships042, 043, and 044). Outside the reef at the mouth of the harbor are the remains of pontoons (Ships023), which may have been lost during a storm shortly after the pontoon causeway was constructed. Ships021 is a Navy stockless anchor with no associated debris. An examination of the invasion beaches with the blast channels overlaid (Figure 52) and a comparison of reef and lagoon site locations identified in the 2018 investigation is revealing. The location of the nearly intact crawler tractor (Ships027) and the DUKW wheels (Ships014) corresponds to the location of the path cleared for LVT access between Orange 2 and 3. 119 Figure 52. Landing beach obstacles, blast channels, and cleared paths offshore of the Orange beaches. Map Roth/Ships of Discovery. 120 The single piece of unexploded ordnance (Ships020), the disarticulated LVT (Ships032), the stud link anchor chains (Ships035 and 025) all correlate to the passages for LVT and DUKWs at the northern edge of the Orange 3 beach. No other sites identified during the 2018 survey are located in the cleared lanes for equipment landing and deployment. Similar to the White beaches, the Japanese placed extensive obstacles in the lagoon, prepared boat barriers, rifle pits, and strategically positioned their coastal batteries for maximum effect. As a result, the Orange beaches experienced some of the worst fighting and comparatively greater equipment losses during the assault. This would imply a high potential for remains. That there are so few supports extensive post-war salvage. 121 Chapter 8: Conclusion Peleliu is considered one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war but it has not received the same level of examination as the more widely publicized campaigns on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. It was the first time the Marines came up against the fully developed and implemented in-depth Japanese defensive strategy using carefully concealed and heavily fortified caves. As a result, the battle lasted 66 days, cost thousands of lives on both sides, and coined the phrase, the thousand yard stare (Lea 1945:65). Peleliu was a battle of attrition and one that, in some post war analyses, may not have been necessary. At the time, however, it was seen as a part of a larger offensive plan in the drive to the Philippines and ultimately Japan. To achieve success against well-fortified islands required an unprecedented level of coordination between the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Army. It also required a completely new way of thinking, new equipment designed specifically for the task, and specially trained teams of men. This more fully developed amphibious strategy was predicated on getting the maximum number of men safely on shore as quickly as possible. Essentially, moving nearly 30,000 Marines and all of their equipment on shore within 90 minutes. The landing was a complex maneuver requiring precise timing and coordination (Denfield 1988:12). As careful as the plan was, unless the amphibious craft could get over the reef, avoid the mines, navigate the concrete anti-boat obstacles, the coral heads, boulders, and land on shore, it was doomed to failure. It was not until the near failure of the landing at Tarawa that the importance of Navy UDTs was recognized and fully integrated into invasion planning. In the run up to the Peleliu operation, UDTs scouted the invasion beaches revealing that the reef was awash with barely 2 ft. of water at low tide. The only option was for the UDTs to blast wide channels through the drying reef to allow the amphibious craft to reach the invasion beaches. The amphibious strategy played out on the reef, in the lagoon, and on the shore. This was the first research effort to focus on the maritime battlefield and to examine it through the lens of maritime historical archeology and KOCOA analysis. It was also the first effort to systematically survey the three areas for underwater cultural heritage remains. The effects of post-war salvage are so great as to overwhelm the numerical losses suffered and the potential for the survival of more than limited, disarticulated, and fragmentary remains in the lagoon and offshore reefs. The results of the survey clearly reflects these consequences. Despite this impact, examples of a variety of assault-related vehicles and equipment types are still present including landing craft (LVT and LCM), Sherman tanks, amphibious trucks (DUKWs), 122 aircraft (F4U Corsair), pontoons and anchors associated with the Seabee causeway, isolated Navy stockless anchors, and equipment deployed for beach cleanup (tractors). The extensive dumpsites on shore include the remains of both Japanese and U.S. aircraft, LVTs, tanks, tractors, trucks, rail cars, generators, barbed wire, miscellaneous equipment, and trash associated with the U.S. Navy base. The post assault cleanup of the shoreline was both necessary and thorough, with repairable equipment put back into use and that which was not, pushed into the dumpsites. Widespread land modification during the construction of the U.S. base has obliterated many Japanese defensive positions; however, foundations associated with the base are present. Post war demobilization of the base completed the dismantling, removal, and dumping of discarded and other abandoned equipment. Scrap salvage further scrambled and degraded the integrity of individual artifacts and sites. The survival of Japanese defensive positions along the shore provided important new information on the effectiveness of the fields of fire and their effects on the invasion. The results of this project, when combined with the previous research of Denfeld, Price, Knecht, Lindsay, and others, will hopefully provide a more complete picture of the battle for Peleliu and honor all who lost their lives. The information on surviving UCH and information on newly identified sites will contribute to the Peleliu site inventory and provide baseline information for management of their important WWII resources. Most importantly, understanding and preserving these sites will serve to recognize and honor all who lost their lives. 123 References Cited 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) 1944 Operation Plan Number 1-44, Palau Operation, Caroline Islands. By Command of Major General Rupertus: by J.T. Selden, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff. Arthur, J.M. 1945 Procedure for Dumping of Materials at Sea, Serial: 19304, 5 November 1945; Headquarters, Island Command, Guam; Folder S36-4 Garbage and Trash, Box 8, Department of the Navy, Record Group 181; National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Region. Babits, Lawrence, Christopher T. Espenshade, and Sarah Lowry 2011 Battlefield Analysis: Six Maritime Battles in Maryland Revolutionary War and War of 1812. Final Report. 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United States Department of Interior, Washington, DC. 2016 Battlefield Survey Manual American Battlefield Protection Program. Revised. National Park Service, Washington, DC. 128 Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) n.d. Online database of ships of the U.S. Navy, https://www.history.navy.mil/ . USS Perry (DM-17): https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/search.html?q=DMS-17 ; USS Woodstock (PC 1180): https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/shiphistories/danfs/w/woodstock.html Phelan, W.C. 1945 Japanese Military Caves on Peleliu “Know Your Enemy.” U.S. Navy, Peleliu, Palau, Caroline Islands, July 23. Price, Neil, and Rick Knecht 2012 Peleliu 1944: The Archaeology of a South Pacific D-Day. Journal of Conflict Archaeology 7:5–48. Price, Neil, Rick Knecht, Steve Ballinger, Steve Cypra, Calvin Emesiochel, Tangie Hesus, Errolflynn Kloulechad, Gavin Lindsay, David McQuillen, and Sunny Ochob Ngirmang 2013 After the Typhoon: Multicultural Archaeologies of World War II on Peleliu, Palau, Micronesia. Journal of Conflict Archaeology 8:193–248. Purcell, David C. Jr. 1967 Japanese Expansion in the South Pacific, 1890-1935. Unpublished dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Richardson, Robert C. Lt. General, Commanding 1946 Participation in the Western Carolinas and Central Philippines Operations. United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, September – November 1944. Seven Part Series. U.S. Army, Washington, DC. Ross, B.D. 1991 Peleliu – Tragic Triumph. The Untold Story of the Pacific War’s Forgotten Battle. Random House, New York. Rottman, Gordon L. 2003 Japanese Pacific Island Defenses 1941-45.Osprey, Oxford. 2004 US World War II Amphibious Tactics; Army and Marine Core, Pacific Theater. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK. 129 Rupertus, William H. 1944 Special Action Report: Palau Operation, First Marine Division (REIN). Action Report. U.S. Marine Corps, Palau, Caroline Islands, October 20. Sabick, Christopher R., and Joanne M. Dennis 2011 Submerged Battlefield Manual. Lake Champlain Maritime Museum. Sledge, E.B. 1981 With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa. Presidio Press, New York. Smith, Robert R. 1953 The War in the Pacific. Part 3: Approach to the Philippines. In United States Army in World War II. Vol. 2. Department of the Army, Washington, DC Spennemann, Dirk H.R. 1998 Essays on the Marshallese Past. 2d edition. Albury. http://marshall.csu.edu.au/Marshalls/html/essays/es-ww2-1.html >>. U.S. Department of the Army (Army) 1994 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Field Manual. U.S. Army, Washington, DC. 1948 The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II. Infantry Journal Press, Washington, DC. U.S. Department of the Navy 1947 Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946. Two volumes. Bureau of Yards and Docks. U.S. Government Printing Office. USS Burrfish (SS-312) 1944 Operational Reports 2 February 1944 to 13 May 1945. Report of Third War Patrol, 4 June to 27 August 1944. NARA Microfilm Reel #AR-187-77. Serial SS312/A16-3. Division of Naval History. Woodard, Larry L. 1994 Before the First Wave: The 3rd Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Peleliu and Okinawa. Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, Kansas. 130 Wright, D 2002 To the Far Side of Hell: The Battle for Peleliu, 1944. Crowood Press, Marlborough. 2005 Pacific Victory: Tarawa to Okinawa 1943-1945. Sutton Press, Stroud. 131 Appendix 1: Sites Investigated and Documented Site Number Ships001 Ships002 Ships003 Ships004 Ships005 Ships006 Ships007 Ships008 Ships009 Ships010 Ships011 Ships012 Ships013 Ships014 Ships015 Ships016 Ships017 Ships018 Ships019 Denfeld Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Description Pipe Pipe Pipe Pipe Pipe Pipe Steel Casing Pipe Metal Plate LVT Roller Aircraft Landing Gear Strut Aircraft Wing and Landing Gear Aircraft Radial Engine Wheel, DUKW Wheel, DUKW LVT Tread Steel Cable Tank Tread, possibly Sherman Bulldozer Bucket Ships020 N/A N/A UXO Ships021 N/A N/A Navy Stockless Anchor Ships022 N/A N/A Anchor, modern Ships023 N/A N/A Pontoon Barge Fragments Ships024 N/A N/A Aircraft Propeller Blade Ships025 N/A N/A Stud Link Anchor Chain Ships026 N/A N/A Metal Scatter w/3” cable Ships027 N/A N/A Tractor with blade Ships028 N/A N/A Navy Stockless Anchor Ships029 N/A N/A Danforth Anchor 132 General Location Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Drying Reef Orange Beaches Orange Beaches White Drying Reef White Beaches White Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of White Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Ships030 N/A N/A Description Debris Scatter (poss. pontoon) and Stockless Navy Anchor Ships031 N/A N/A Concrete Mooring Block Ships032 N/A N/A LVT, disarticulated Ships033 N/A N/A Iron Rod/Beam Ships034 N/A N/A Steel Cable Ships035 N/A N/A Stud Link Anchor Chain Ships036 N/A N/A LCM Ships037 N/A N/A Anchor, modern Ships038 N/A N/A LVT Ships039 N/A N/A LVT Ships040 Ships041 N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships042 Ships043 Ships044 N/A N/A N/A Site 3 Feature 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A Site 7 Site 7 N/A N/A N/A LVT Tug Boat Two Axles with vehicle debris (Dump Area) Tractor Engine Debris Scatter (Dumping Area) N/A Site 1 Feature 10 N/A N/A N/A Site 1 Feature 7 N/A N/A Ships045 N/A Ships046 N/A N/A N/A Ships047 Ships048 N/A Ships049 Ships050 AB219 N/A AB230 N/A AB218 AB221 AB220 N/A AB58 AB279 General Location Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore of Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Orange Beach Drying Reef Offshore Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Offshore Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Aircraft Dump, 100m long Pontoon from Seabee Dock C-46 Aircraft Engine Cowling Pontoon from Seabee Dock LARC Amphibious Vehicle Japanese Defensive cave Japanese Defensive cave Japanese Defensive position, Fuel Barrel Embankment Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches North of White Beaches Japanese Defensive Structure Tower Foundation Tracked Vehicle Treads, prob. Sherman tank Japanese Defensive position, Fuel Drum Embankment White Beaches White Beaches 133 White Beaches White Beaches Site Number Ships051 Ships052 Ships053 Ships054 Ships055 Denfeld Site ID Site 1 Feature 6 Site 1 Feature 5 N/A Site 1 Feature 11 Price/Knecht Site ID LVT, partially buried White Beaches N/A N/A 3 Axles with Tires, DUKW Tractor with blade, beached Japanese Defensive Structure on "the Point" Japanese Defensive Structure on the road to White Beaches Japanese Defensive position, Coral Ridges and Rifle Pits Aircraft Dump with Merlin Engines and Japanese Tanks A6M "Zero" Aircraft Japanese Gun and Defensive Structure Japanese Reinforced Defensive Cave Japanese Defensive position, Gun Housing Amphibious Vehicle Sprocket Japanese Defensive position, Embankment Japanese Defensive Cave, Structure, and Gun Japanese Defensive Cave Japanese Defensive position, Observation Platform Japanese Defensive Cave, collapsed White Beaches White Beaches Concrete Slab and Boulders Engine Block Japanese Gun, assoc. with Ships069 “Pipe” Fixture on Concrete Mount, assoc. with Ships068 Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Japanese Defensive Structure Octagonal Platform w/trapezoidal monument Memorial Pedestal Concrete Box-like structure, collapsed Iron Debris approx. 4 sq. m Tractor, disarticulated, degraded Orange Beaches AB50 AB60 N/A N/A Site 1 Feature 12 Site 1 Feature 12 Site 1 Feature 12 N/A AB148 AB268 N/A Site 1 Feature 1 N/A Site 1 Feature 2 N/A AB53 Ships066 Ships067 N/A Site 1 Feature 3 N/A Ships068 N/A N/A Ships069 N/A Ships070 N/A Site 3 Feature 1 Ships071 Ships072 N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships073 Ships074 Ships075 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships057 Ships058 Ships059 Ships060 Ships061 Ships062 Ships063 Ships064 Ships065 General Location AB280 N/A Site 1 Feature 20 Ships056 Description AB55 N/A N/A N/A N/A AB52.1 AB54 N/A N/A N/A N/A 134 White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches White Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Site Number Ships076 Ships077 Ships078 Ships079 Denfeld Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships080 N/A N/A Ships081 Ships082 N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships083 Ships084 N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships085 N/A N/A Ships086 Ships087 Ships088 Ships089 Ships090 Ships091 Ships092 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships093 Ships094 Ships095 Ships096 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships097 Ships098 Ships099 Ships100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Description Tug, poss. Japanese Iron Buoy Vehicle Debris Vehicle Debris Disarticulated Concrete Structure Iron Debris; poss. dock or pontoon Engine Block Japanese Low Defensive Position, poured concrete Tower Foundations, set of 4 Japanese Defensive Trenches and American Dump Japanese Defensive Position With Gun Mount Tank Base, iron Single Aluminum Fragment Cement Marker, poss. memorial Concrete Foundation Iron frame, highly degraded Concrete Foundation Metal Scrap and Debris scatter, approx. 15m long Engine Block w/debris Japanese Defensive Structure Concrete Foundation w/trapezoidal monument, set of 5 Concrete Foundation Concrete Slab with Boilers Concrete Foundation Concrete Foundation 135 General Location Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Orange Beaches Appendix 2: Modern Finds Site Number Ships001 Ships002 Ships003 Ships004 Ships005 Ships006 Ships007 Ships008 Ships009 Ships017 Ships022 Ships026 Ships029 Ships031 Ships033 Ships034 Ships037 Ships041 Denfeld Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Price/Knecht Site ID N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ships071 N/A N/A Ships072 N/A N/A Ships074 Ships076 N/A N/A N/A N/A Description Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Unidentified metal scatter; may be part of a steel casing. Remnants of pipe, approx. 20cm diameter Metal Plate Steel cable Anchor, modern. Unidentified metal scatter w/3" cable Danforth anchor, modern Concrete Mooring Block Iron Rod/Beam Steel Cable Channel Anchor, modern Tug, modern Octagonal platform w/trapezoidal monument Memorial pedestal found in the Camp Beck Dock area. The plaque is no longer present. Iron Debris that covers approx. 4 square meters. An iron hatch is also present. Japanese Tug Boat, modern 136 Site Number Denfeld Site ID Price/Knecht Site ID Description Ships077 N/A N/A Large iron buoy, modern Ships084 N/A N/A Ships088 N/A N/A Ships089 N/A N/A Ships091 N/A N/A Ships093 N/A N/A Site consists of four concrete tower foundations measuring approximately .5x.47m (high 0.23m). Broken L-beams are set into the center of each foundation. The Foundations are spaced approximately 3m apart. Single aluminum fragment possibly associated with an aircraft. Red paint is present. Small cement marker, approx. 30cm in height. The top is marked with an 'x'. The marker is visually similar to other memorial Japanese markers throughout the Pacific. The site consists of an iron frame; the iron is highly degraded and original form is indeterminable. Site consists of metal bars and scrap spread across 15m of beach. No identifiable equipment makers’ mark. 137