White-Collar Crimes Beyond the Nation-State

White-Collar Crimes Beyond the Nation-State Nicholas Lord, , School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester Yongyu Zeng, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester and Aleksandra Jordanoska, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.575 Published online: 27 October 2020 Summary Historically, white-collar crime scholarship, including and since the seminal work of Sutherland, has tended to concentrate empirical, conceptual, and theoretical focus on manifestations of associated crimes and deviance, their dynamics and generative conditions, within individual nation-states. While white-collar crime scholarship itself has expanded across the globe, this predilection for analyses of local and/or national-level cases and the nature, extent, and scope of these white-collar crimes has largely remained. Notwithstanding, it is not entirely uncommon for white-collar crime scholars to make reference to the international, multinational, transnational, or global aspects of the crimes they study, even if these are predominantly national in nature, but the corresponding features and components of these “beyond-national” dynamics have not been comprehensively unpacked or conceptualized. Similarly, conceptualizing and interrogating the dynamics of white-collar crimes that go beyond national boundaries as part of their organization and nature, while recognized as significant, is often not a core analytical concern. Understanding the varying characteristics and features, as well as the differing configurations, interrelations, and organizational dynamics of those white-collar crimes that in some way transcend jurisdictional boundaries, is significant for whitecollar crime theory and research. Examining these issues in further detail and thinking through the implications of the beyond-national aspects of white-collar crimes is a useful framework for interrogating white-collar crimes and understanding the necessary and conditional relationships of the white-collar crime commission process that overlay onto common patterns of routine business activities. There are notable examples from the academic literature but also from real cases of white-collar crime that demonstrate how white-collar and corporate offenders have organized their criminal activities across jurisdictional boundaries, how they have externalized the risks associated with their crimes, how they have exported their crimes to take place in other jurisdictions, and/or how they have utilized cross-jurisdictional structures and systems, including digital spaces and infrastructures, to facilitate their criminal activities and associated concealment, conversion, and control of illicit finances. Such analyses have often been accompanied by reference to purported processes of globalization as a generator of new and increased opportunities for white-collar crimes (though little is known about why some opportunities are realized but not others). Globalization, despite itself being a contested concept, has emerged as a significant factor for analyses of white-collar and corporate crimes that extend beyond individual nation-states as greater interconnectedness, increased mobilities, and increased Page 1 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October interdependencies are seen. These purported processes of globalization have been identified as possessing varying intensity and speed that have influenced opportunities for, and the organization of, white-collar crimes. That said, globalization per se does not inevitably generate more white-collar crimes organized beyond the nation-state if they can be productive without having to do so. In these terms, globalization of white-collar crimes is not automatic, but is one explanatory factor that contributes to how some white-collar crimes have beyond-state aspects, usually alongside the expansion of routine business activities. Nevertheless, there is a need to explore the spatial (including digital) contexts of white-collar crimes that have beyond-national scope with a view to questioning how useful it is, or can be, to understand how different white-collar crimes pertain to, are associated with, or are restricted to particular “territories” at the domestic (i.e., nation-state), international, transnational, multinational, supranational, and global levels and how this has implications for research, policy, and practice. Keywords: white-collar crime, corporate crime, financial crime, globalization, international crime, transnational crime, global crime, international criminology Introduction Part of the lesson here [from long-firm frauds in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s] is that globalization of crime is not automatic but is part of the conditional relationship between crime, controls and opportunities that reflects the general patterns of business activities (Levi, 2008, p. xxxiv). When Edwin Sutherland introduced the concept of white-collar crime, his primary concern was with shifting analytical and societal focus toward those, “approximately” defined, persons of high social status and respectability implicated in law violations in the course of their occupations within the United States (Sutherland, 1949, p. 9). His empirical focus was on the violations of the 70 largest U.S. corporations at that time and their elite executives but while the behaviors he analyzed, such as bribery and corruption, unfair trading practices, and other deceptive activities, may have had an international dimension and may have concerned Sutherland (we cannot say), his empirical focus and writing concentrated on the manifestations of white-collar crimes, their dynamics, and the conditions that were generative of these in the United States alone. Seminal works since Sutherland retained this U.S. focus (see for instance Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Weisburd, Wheeler, Waring, & Bode, 1991) and while white-collar crime scholarship has expanded across the globe, with rich empirical and theoretical insights from Europe in particular, there remains a predilection for local and/or national level analyses of the nature, extent, and scope of associated behaviors (Lord, van Wingerde, & Levi, forthcoming). Notwithstanding, it is not entirely uncommon for white-collar crime scholars to make reference to the international, multinational, transnational, or global aspects of the crimes they study, even if these are predominantly national in nature, but the corresponding features and components of these “beyond-national” dynamics have not been comprehensively unpacked or conceptualized. Page 2 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Similarly, conceptualizing and interrogating the dynamics of white-collar crimes that go beyond national boundaries as part of their organization and nature, while recognized as significant, are often not a core analytical concern. Understanding the varying characteristics and features, as well as the differing configurations, interrelations, and organizational dynamics of those white-collar crimes that in some way transcend jurisdictional boundaries, is significant for white-collar crime theory and research. Examining these issues in further detail and thinking through the implications of the beyond-national aspects of white-collar crimes is a useful framework for interrogating white-collar crimes and understanding, as Levi (2008) notes in the prior quote, the conditional relationships of the white-collar crime commission process that overlay onto common patterns of routine business activities. These relationships shape the organization, distribution, and concentration of white-collar offending across jurisdictional boundaries. With this in mind, this article explores white-collar crimes that have beyond national scope with a view to questioning how useful it is, or can be, to understand how different white-collar crimes pertain to, are associated with, or are restricted to particular “territories” at the domestic (i.e., nation-state), international, transnational, multinational, supranational, and global levels. The article does not analyze the conditions or processes that have created opportunities for white-collar offending beyond the nation-state, such as varying aspects of globalization, though it does touch upon these given their importance to explanatory accounts of related offending. Nor does it analyze white-collar offenders and their motivations, whether they be corporate, business, state/political, or other organizational and elite actors. Similarly, the article does not analyze the (changing) patterns of business activities associated with globalization and the ways in which white-collar crime dynamics reflect these, though these are significant in the cases presented. Relatedly, the article does not analyze other aspects of these white-collar crimes, such as the international, cross-jurisdictional legal and extra-legal enforcement and regulatory responses to them, though of course control responses are a key factor in shaping the organization of white-collar crimes. While the concept of white-collar crime is used in this article, also included are other associated phenomena such as “corporate crime,” “organizational crime,” and “occupational crime.” (For robust interrogations of the concept of white-collar crime, readers should see Levi & Lord, 2017; Nelken, 2012). The article is structured as follows. First, it briefly considers how the expansion of whitecollar crimes to the frequent transcending of national boundaries has emerged alongside purported processes of globalization, and the implications of this for such offending. Second, the article foregrounds key concepts relating to the potential and actual geographical scope of white-collar crimes—domestic, international, multinational, transnational, global, supranational, and non-territorial/digital—and unpacks the characteristics and referents of each level of inquiry, utilizing key case examples to demonstrate notable features for 1 consideration when analyzing white-collar crimes that go beyond the nation-state. Third, the article raises some key analytical themes in relation to temporality (i.e., change over time), interdependency (i.e., interrelations), and gestalt (i.e., configurations and “scripts”) that scholars ought to consider when analyzing the beyond nation-state aspects of white-collar crimes. Fourth, three short case studies of white-collar crimes with beyond national scope are provided to demonstrate these key issues: corporate foreign bribery, insider dealing/trading, and market manipulation. The key intention of this article is to encourage white-collar crime scholars to engage with, and foreground, the necessary and contingent aspects of white-collar Page 3 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October crimes that determine how and why they are organized beyond the individual nation-state, exploring the conditional relationships between white-collar crimes, business activities, and purported processes of globalization. Globalization and White-Collar Crimes As has been noted elsewhere, “if white-collar crime was originally a largely local phenomenon, then a state or national phenomenon, it is increasingly a global phenomenon, with some of its most significant forms transcending national boundaries” (Friedrichs, 2007, p. 163). There are many examples from the academic literature and also from real cases of white-collar crime that demonstrate how white-collar and corporate offenders have organized their criminal activities across jurisdictional boundaries, how they have externalized the risks associated with their crimes, how they have exported their crimes to take place in other jurisdictions, and/or how they have utilized cross-jurisdictional structures and systems to facilitate their criminal activities. These are clear indicators of the inter/trans/multinational nature of white-collar crimes that have utilized some opportunities generated through processes associated with globalization, usually alongside developing patterns of business behaviors in a more interconnected and interdependent world. Globalization, despite being a contested concept, has emerged as a significant factor for analyses of white-collar and corporate crimes that extend beyond individual nation-states, and these phenomena have been extensively discussed in the academic literature (see Dicken, 2015; Friedrichs, 2007; Passas, 1999, 2000; Passas & Goodwin, 2004; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2015). As summarized by van Wingerde and Lord (2019) in relation to the elusiveness of white-collar crimes at the global level, the following key processes have been fundamental to shaping such offending beyond the national level. First, greater interconnectedness in the form of the mobility of ideas, information, capital, people, goods, and services globally. This has created more accessibility of information and knowledge, enabled greater consumption of products and services from other cultures, and connected those from different societies, but alongside this there have been increased opportunities for moving illicit activities across borders, exporting/importing risky products and the creation of greater access to would-be-offenders and victims. For instance, there is scope, for the purposes of illicit activities, to exploit structural/legal/political/economic/cultural differences and inequalities, so-called “criminogenic asymmetries” (Passas, 1999). In these terms, as white-collar and corporate elites sometimes opt to make the most of these asymmetries, it has been argued that globalization facilitates “crimes without lawbreaking” or “legal corporate crimes” (Passas, 2005; Passas & Goodwin, 2004). The significance of spatial differences and similarities between sovereign states is fundamental to how white-collar crimes are organized internationally. Second, these increased mobilities refer not only to tangible, physical things, but also to digital markets, products, and services. Technological innovations generate new means of organizing criminal activities in other jurisdictions without actually being there, allowing variation in terms of the remoteness or spatial connections between offenders, victims, and offending contexts. This also facilitates how offenders can neutralize criminal activities, harms, and victims, while removing evidential connections between what they know or do, and this has implications for investigation, prosecution, and conviction. In addition, the “hyperrealities” (Friedrichs, 2007) created through modern technologies permit business or economic activities within digital or cyber markets, where algorithms and machines can take Page 4 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October on and dominate decision-making capacities to undermine markets that have global accessibility. Third, key interdependencies between people, markets, and industries have accompanied globalization (Grabosky, 2009, p. 133). This results in activities in one jurisdiction having major impacts in other jurisdictions, reflecting the increased complexity of modern business, as was seen with the Global Financial Crisis in 2007–2008. For instance, numerous actors, entities, professions, markets, and contracts can be reliant on one another in any given business arrangement. This might increase flexibility for business operations but can also obscure ethics, responsibility, and accountability, as decision-making becomes obscured, fragmented, and diffuse, creating distance between those accountable and the actual crimes or harms. In this globalized world, academic research that retains a focus on local, national case studies while valuable and rich can also be limited in its analytical focus by not fully recognizing the importance of the beyond-state dynamics of how these behaviors are organized. This might reflect the organization of criminality across borders (e.g., exploiting legal loopholes for tax avoidance/evasion), or the creation of contrived financial arrangements for the movement of illicit finances (e.g., creating U.K. companies with bank accounts in Latvia to conceal the proceeds of fraud and corruption in the Ukraine), among other issues, with even the most local of cases often being interconnected with or embedded within digital systems, such as the financial system, that have global existence. A further complicating factor is that white-collar “crimes” can occur within grey areas when legal definitions differ across countries, meaning enforcement responses cannot always be effective. This allows corporations to engage in regulatory arbitrage by shifting operations to more lax regulatory systems. Tax avoidance is one such example where the behaviors may be seen as unethical but strictly legal. When analyzing the nature and organization of white-collar crimes, it might be said that the previously mentioned processes of globalization have seemingly generated opportunities for white-collar and corporate elites to organize their criminal activities in varying ways across jurisdictional boundaries. However, we know little about why some opportunities are realized but not others. That said, globalization does not necessarily lead to white-collar crimes being organized beyond an individual nation-state, as such crimes might be sufficiently accomplished domestically with no need to transcend boundaries. In these terms, globalization of white-collar crimes is not automatic but is one explanatory factor that contributes to how some white-collar crimes have beyond-state aspects, usually alongside the developments in business operations (Levi, 2008). In any case, such opportunities might be in the form of externalizing the adverse consequences of their activities in other countries or exporting their crimes to jurisdictions within which the coordination takes place in their home country, as well as creating neutralizations of harms and offending for those involved. The key argument here is that when focusing on the nation-state as a central unit of analysis, these processes are connected to the organization of white-collar crimes across different geographical and sovereign regions, but how they are organized can vary depending on what is needed for the activities under different circumstances and conditions in order to accomplish them successfully. Carrying out research on such white-collar crimes beyond the nation-state, or that have international or comparative scope, is difficult intellectually, as seeking to embed oneself in more than one culture to fully understand the relevance of different dynamics is beset with pragmatic and conceptual obstacles (see Nelken, 2010). This article provides an organizing framework for pursuing these intellectual challenges. Page 5 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October The Geographical Scope of White-Collar Crimes State sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law and international relations 2 used to refer to the notion that individual states have governing power over their territories. Correspondingly, as with most social issues, much white-collar crime scholarship has traditionally focused on crimes that occur within such sovereign states, although recent scholarship has moved to analyze those cases that take place in more than one sovereign state. Accepting the significance of white-collar crimes that occur beyond the level of the nation-state implies a need to better conceptualize the different ways that these crimes may be organized internationally, transnationally, multinationally, globally, supranationally, or digitally (see Table 1). Do these different concepts have different meanings, or are they synonyms of the same phenomena? Is attempting to clarify these vocabularies a semantic endeavor or does it have implications for research, policy, and regulatory/enforcement strategies and operations? Do these concepts reflect varying organizational dynamics of white-collar crimes? This section examines in further detail the varying scope of inquiry of beyond-national analyses of white-collar crimes and considers the implications of doing so. Transcending national boundaries is a key feature of many white-collar and corporate crimes, particularly when including the laundering of illicit finances within the scope of analysis. Table 1 outlines some key analytical questions that inform the geographical context of such white-collar crimes and the likely characteristics and referents that relate to each. This is not a comprehensive typology of white-collar crime offending geographies but an indicative set of questions that address some key aspects of white-collar crimes and the levels at which they are organized that researchers ought to consider when analyzing related cases. For instance, why might any given case of corporate fraud make use of other jurisdictions? Are the criminal activities coordinated from one jurisdiction or collaborative across many? Why do some jurisdictions offer value to those organizing white-collar crimes? Is it significant that there is a movement of resource across borders? Such questions are important for how we explain what the necessary and conditional aspects of white-collar offending are. For example, while foreign corrupt practices, at the level of necessity, might inherently involve at least two jurisdictions, this alone is not sufficient for the crimes to take place, as other conditions, such as levels and nature of enforcement, availability of suitable business targets or resources, and so on, contribute. Furthermore, while the table separates out different geographical levels, the categories may in reality overlap in different white-collar crimes. The particularities of each individual case will determine the most relevant level of inquiry, though it is likely that most white-collar crimes involve digital and/or Internet-connected systems. The table provides a framework for interrogating and questioning varying beyond nation-state configurations of white-collar offending. Delineating the geographical connections of places, people, and ideas, and considering the corresponding concentration and distribution of white-collar crimes within and across jurisdictions, is important for explanatory accounts and for regulation and control. Page 6 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Table 1. Key Issues Relating to the Geographical Scope of White-Collar Crimes Scope of Inquiry Likely Characteristics/Referents Key Analytical Questions Domestic Domestic white-collar crimes are inherently connected to a single nation-state and are organized within individual sovereign boundaries. (Any beyond-state aspects, such as flows of money, are contingent and not necessary to the organization of the activities). - Is the white-collar International International white-collar crimes predominantly pertain to a single nationstate, as the behaviors are coordinated within one jurisdiction, but they draw on resources in other jurisdictions, implying interaction between those nation-states. (In international white-collar crimes, it is necessary to involve resources from another nation-state that is not accessible in the home state, but the choice of other states is contingent on the organizational requirements). crime entirely internally generated within one nation-state? - Can the white-collar crime be sufficiently organized by utilizing resource in only one jurisdiction? - Is the white-collar crime internally generated within one nation-state but has a necessary reliance on resources from other nation-states? - Is coordination of the crime undertaken entirely by actors in one jurisdiction? - Why is another jurisdiction necessary for the organization of the white-collar crime? Multinational Multinational white-collar crimes involve activities in at least two jurisdictions but coordinated from a “home” country. These crimes are organized and adapted in terms of the local contexts and markets, but the crimes in the primary nation-state are less ephemeral. - Is the white-collar crime internally generated within one nation-state but externally perpetrated with coordination of activities in other nation-states a key feature of the activities? - Why are the criminal activities orchestrated to take place in other jurisdictions and which conditions drive this? Page 7 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Scope of Inquiry Likely Characteristics/Referents Key Analytical Questions Transnational Transnational white-collar crimes are more complexly organized, in that crimes occur in at least two jurisdictions with coordinated decision-making located in each jurisdiction involved. (These crimes also involve a significant cross-border component and by definition no sole coordination by actors in any given nationstate). - Is some aspect of collusion and collaboration across nation-states necessary or evident in the white-collar crime? - Do actors with core decision-making responsibilities exist in at least two jurisdictions? - Is there a flow of product, finances, or other matériel across borders? - Why does the crime require decisionmaking responsibilities in different nation-states? Global Global white-collar crimes are those that involve activities in multiple regions and continents but with a more decentralized coordination of activities in each region and country, whereby the principles of operation in each location relate to a centralized, core rationale. - Are the white-collar crimes decentralized in terms of the criminal activities but organized in line with centralized principles that shape their organization across diverse regions? - Do the means and methods of crime commission vary across jurisdictions and why might this be the case? Supranational Supranational white-collar crimes incorporate illicit activities undertaken by organizations or actors who are part of bodies or unions that transcend the interests of any individual nation-state and operate above the nation-state. - Do the motivations for committing the whitecollar crimes transcend any individual actor or group of actors, including states themselves, in the pursuit of ideological agendas that exist above nation-states? Page 8 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Scope of Inquiry Likely Characteristics/Referents Key Analytical Questions Non- Non-territorial white-collar crimes refers to those that predominantly exist or are purely dependent on (Internet-connected) cyber and digital systems, rather than “traditional” white-collar crimes executed through opportunities provided by the digital space (i.e., cyber-dependent, rather than cyber-enabled or cyber-assisted). - In which ways have territorial/ digital information and communications technologies generated opportunities for (new types of) white-collar crimes in deterritorialized spaces? - Are there significant connections to physical locations and what are these interconnections between the digital and non-digital? There are no valid data on the extent and scope of white-collar crimes that occur entirely within nation-states, let alone those activities that involve in some way more than one jurisdiction. It is therefore not possible to infer the proportions of white-collar and corporate crimes that may be more international, multinational, or transnational, and so forth, as conceptualized in Table 1. However, insight can be gained into the nature and organization of corresponding crimes based on those known cases and scandals that emerge on a seemingly regular basis. An appreciation of how white-collar and corporate crimes are rarely limited to national boundaries but frequently are multi-jurisdictional within and beyond particular nation-states or regions, and interconnected with varying global systems, should be of interest to white-collar crime scholars. For some analyses, it may be enough to simply state that some white-collar crimes extend in scope beyond the domestic level, enabling scholars to proceed to focus on the phenomenon that interests them, whether motivations, situations, or underlying causes. In these terms, whether such crimes are labeled international, multinational, and so forth makes little difference, as they are all variations of crime beyond the nation-state. However, at a more incisive analytical level, these different concepts can have different meanings, or point to different questions that inform variations in how these crimes are organized. For instance, a notable empirical question to pose is how we can better understand variations in offending within and across different jurisdictions and the factors that drive this, including why it might be necessary to organize white-collar crimes across borders. Alongside this, it is beneficial to investigate the distribution and concentration of different white-collar crime types across jurisdictions to better understand why some white-collar crimes are organized as they are, and whether key similarities or differences exist in the organizational dynamics over time. The concepts in Table 1 provide structure to such analysis. Page 9 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October At the domestic level, it might be stated that white-collar crimes are both internally generated within the nation-state but also self-sufficient in terms of the access to what is needed for the crimes. When white-collar crimes are organized internationally, it is likely they predominantly pertain to criminal activities coordinated within one jurisdiction but rely on another for resources, such as when requiring access to certain goods or materials, or to minimize enforcement risks. For example, in a basic missing trader fraud, or acquisition fraud, within the European Union (EU), a business may purchase goods from a supplier in another EU country but is not required to pay Value Added Tax (VAT), as this is a cross-border transaction within the EU. However, when the goods are sold on to another buyer, or the consumer, the VAT it charges on those sales is not declared to or passed on to the tax authorities. This arrangement can be obscured using falsified documentation and often involves further transactions, sometimes in a “carousel” form, as goods are sold on to another EU jurisdiction, but in any case, there is a necessary reliance on another nation-state in order for the fraud to work. In such cases, the fraud could be organized from one jurisdiction, but there is a 3 necessary reliance on the regional infrastructure to exploit tax requirements. When white-collar crimes are organized multinationally, they involve at least two jurisdictions in that the criminal activities are generated and coordinated in one jurisdiction but perpetrated externally in another jurisdiction with the organization of the crimes tailored for particular contexts and markets. For example, with telemarketing frauds or investment frauds, perpetrators in one country can target potential investors in other countries based on the local demands of those investors in those countries. Similarly, corporate environmental crimes such as waste dumping may be orchestrated by corporate actors in Country A, directing subsidiaries based in Country B to dump waste unlawfully in Country C. In such waste dumping cases, legal frameworks can be exploited in other countries that do not prohibit such behaviors in the same way as the corporate actors of Country A. In such cases, the criminal activities might be orchestrated in these ways to capitalize on the availability of a large population of potential victims or to capitalize on weak regulatory regimes. These contingent conditions shape how and why the white-collar crimes are organized in certain jurisdictions but not others. With transnational white-collar crimes, the organization of the criminal activities is usually more complex, with collusion between actors with decision-making responsibilities spread across at least two jurisdictions. In contrast to international or multinational crimes, transnational white-collar crimes involve a notable cross-border component and by definition no sole-coordination by actors in any given nation-state. For example, major cases of market manipulation such as the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) scandals involved conspiracy of traders and submitters in multiple jurisdictions within the same corporations but also between corporations. In such cases, the implicated actors were able to decide what was needed to rig these market rates at any given time and work together across jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, with information, data, ideas, and finance flowing across borders via digital spaces. In such cases, criminal opportunities are recognized in different jurisdictions and the realization of these is instigated by local actors with relevant expertise and knowledge of their markets, hence the need for coordination and decision-making in different places. There is also the flow of information and ideas across borders to facilitate and make the manipulations possible. Page 10 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October In terms of global white-collar crimes, it might be that white-collar crimes and associated activities are organized in multiple regions and continents with activities organized in a decentralized way according to legal and cultural contexts within each jurisdiction involved but driven by centralized or core principles in relation to the underlying rationale of the crime. For instance, in the case of money laundering, or the flow of illicit finances across jurisdictions, we see contrived financial arrangements generated that utilize different corporate and legal structures in different countries to conceal, convert, and control the illicit finances of individual and corporate elites. By using front companies and shell firms that offer different features in different jurisdictions, the beneficial owner of the companies, and therefore the beneficiary of the finances and assets, can be hidden, remaining virtually anonymous and undetectable to the enforcement authorities as they encounter crossjurisdictional barriers, especially when investigating finances that pass through regimes with high levels of client confidentiality (or secrecy, i.e., “tax havens”). Thus, the core rationale is to conceal the finances and the actors involved, but different mechanisms are utilized in different jurisdictions in a more decentralized way, with local nominees or company formation agents facilitating these activities. The methods are similar but with contextually specific variations. With supranational white-collar crimes, illicit activities are undertaken by those organizations, institutions, or actors that are part of bodies or unions that transcend the interests of any individual nation-state, operating above the level of the nation-state, and often for more ideological motivations. For example, Friedrichs (2007) draws attention to concerns relating to how international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank may be complicit, or at least criminally negligent, in serious crimes against those who live in developing countries. With focus on the World Bank specifically, Friedrichs (2007) suggests that while the organization does not intend to do harm, its mode of operation is criminogenic, with those involved hiding behind a veil of secrecy and being insufficiently accountable. Supranational white-collar crimes are not as explicitly linked geographically to particular locations as the other categories in Table 1 but are connected to institutions that have particular political, legal, or ideological intentions, though these are often connected to certain regions or groups of nation-states. Of course, some white-collar crimes, given technological advancements, may have loose connections to physical locations or territorial regions, as they take place predominantly, if not entirely, within cyber and digital systems. For instance, information and communications technologies generate opportunities for white-collar crimes in de-territorialized spaces but that may not have significant connections to physical locations. To give an example, “flash trading” (Lewis, 2014; see also Györy, 2019) involves high-frequency trading in financial markets that permit traders to utilize entirely automated processes to manipulate global financial markets. Whilst there is clearly some physical connection to the actors involved, the behaviors and activities occur in digital spaces that permeate the entire globe. This conceptualization is not intended to provide an empirically or theoretically comprehensive framework for analysis of white-collar crimes but is intended to stimulate questions about why white-collar crimes are organized in certain ways beyond the nationstate over time and which factors dictate why it might be necessary to do so, including who needs to get involved and why. Attempting to delineate these vocabularies is not just a semantic endeavor but has implications for theory building (e.g., what is the impact on criminological explanations when offending is across different cultures?), policy responses Page 11 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October (e.g., how do different geopolitical contexts shape the legality of behaviors and responses to them?), and enforcement strategies (e.g., what can authorities do in one jurisdiction alone without assistance or coordination in other jurisdictions that facilitated or were the location of the crimes?). In addition, the intention here is to encourage white-collar crime scholars to think through the necessary and contingent aspects of white-collar crimes beyond individual nation-states, consider the conditions that drive the criminal enterprise, and interrogate the relationships between the organization of white-collar crimes and patterns of routine business activities in a globalized world. This can enable insights into whether the organizational dynamics of white-collar offending vary depending on the jurisdictions that are involved and why. The Dynamics of White-Collar Crimes Beyond the Nation-State Alongside interrogating the geographical components of white-collar crimes, there are also key processes and issues that shape the organization of white-collar crimes at these levels. This section discusses some of these analytical dynamics, notably, gestalt (i.e., configurations and “scripts”), interdependency (i.e., interrelations) and temporality (i.e., change over time), and associated implications for research, policy, and regulation. Gestalt White-collar crimes that are organized beyond the national level, in contrast to those that are predominantly domestic in organization, are likely to vary in terms of the “scripts” through which implicated actors must go to undertake and arrange their criminal activities (see Lord & Levi, forthcoming). Similarly, the opportunity structures (see Benson & Simpson, 2018) of white-collar crimes at the beyond-national level are likely to be configured differently in terms of the conditions or elements that must be in place for the crime to take place. In order to analyze variation in “scripts” and opportunity structures at these geographical levels, it is beneficial to think in terms of “how would-be offenders confront problems of gaining finance, gaining access to crime opportunities, and retaining their freedom and crime proceeds” (Levi, 2009, p. 225) to understand the mechanics, processes, and procedures required to organize white-collar crimes that span more than one jurisdiction. For instance, how are criminal networks of collaborators established, arranged, and maintained in such cases, when there is spatial separation between the would-be-offenders? In line with theories of routine activities, convergence in space and time of the elements of crime when more than one jurisdiction is involved becomes more complex. In such cases, the nature of specific situations, targets, and a lack of capable guardians requires further thought. How do patterns of white-collar crimes differ at the beyond-national level compared to domestic white-collar crimes? Do routine activities and corresponding substantial relations of connections differ in different jurisdictions? How can context be incorporated into explanatory accounts whereby there may be cultural diversity? How is the nature of industries affecting the distribution of offending at the domestic vis-à-vis beyond the nation-state level? For example, the financial markets have an inherently global character and digital innovation is deeply embedded in their development, thus they represent a fertile context for transnational and global white-collar crimes. The greater interconnectedness of ideas, information, capital, people, goods, and Page 12 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October services globally influences the gestalt and organizational dynamics of white-collar crimes. These are important and interesting empirical questions, as understanding these conditions and circumstances can inform theory building. Interdependency Interdependency is an inherent part of the modern social world. This is especially the case with white-collar crimes that have a beyond-national element. White-collar offenders and their crimes in one jurisdiction are internally connected to others through actor collaboration, cooperation, and collusion. Modes of interdependency are also found in the use of multijurisdictional financial arrangements or the use of digital systems. In terms of victimization, impacts and harms may ripple throughout the globe, as seen with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. There is convergence/divergence in terms of institutional, organizational, and elite individual patterns of behavior and practices, as ideas, information, and methods transcend borders and actors learn from each other. For instance, great commonalities can be seen in how illicit finances flow from and through culturally and socially diverse countries. And tensions also exist between different nation-states and between nation-states and supranational organizations, such as the EU, as laws, policies, and norms about elite deviance vary (or in many cases converge). Such interdependencies are seemingly accelerating and increasing in intensity, and as mentioned, such reliance on collaborations between people, markets, and industries have accompanied processes of globalization. Temporality How white-collar crimes unfold and develop over time in relation to the extent to which they involve different jurisdictions or regions at different stages of the offending is an important analytical question. Do white-collar crimes with a multinational dimension begin as international crimes? Or are transnational white-collar crimes more ephemeral in nature as actors come together to collaborate fleetingly before focusing on crimes at the domestic level? These are empirical questions that can inform how we understand the beyond-national nature of white-collar crimes. But the notion of time has different conceptualizations, such as more subjective accounts of individual perceptions of how long things take, or as a means to organize social behaviors, and these can be of relevance for studies of white-collar crimes. However, in terms of understanding the organization of white-collar crimes at the beyondnational level, it is beneficial to analyze time in an objective sense in order to observe empirically how events take place over specified periods and why. Additionally, understanding “duration” (start-end), “tendency” (direction of prevailing movements over time), “sequences” (an ordered list of events), “timing” (an examination of the spacing of events in time), and “path dependence” (how past arrangements and historical legacies structure individual and collective behavior) is relevant. Finally, as discussed in relation to globalization, increased mobilities over time in terms of digital markets, products, and services offer new ways of organizing illicit activities. Exploring these variations at a series of points over time can inform theories of white-collar crime offending. Page 13 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Case Studies of White-Collar Crimes Beyond the Nation-State This section presents three case studies of white-collar crimes that have beyond nation-state aspects: corporate foreign bribery, manipulation of global markets, and insider dealing/ trading across jurisdictional boundaries. The case studies consider the characteristics and questions identified in Table 1 and explore which levels of analysis are useful for understanding how and why these crimes are organized in the ways that they are. The key point is that by interrogating such crimes in terms of whether and how they involve other jurisdictions, insights are gained into variations in self-sufficiency, reliance, coordination, collaboration, and centralization, and the form and shape of the crimes dependent on the corresponding spatial features over time. As will be seen, these classifications of white-collar crime can involve the overlap of different levels of analysis, whether international, multinational, global, and so on, and the associated features and characteristics in Table 1. The more specific the level of analysis and abstraction, the more clearly a case may be categorized. Case Study 1: Corporate Foreign Bribery A core feature of modern business is expansion into overseas markets and understanding how business operates in those new markets is often vital. Local expertise is often required to facilitate the obtaining of contracts or to meet demands by local decision makers about how they expect business to be conducted, as these expectations may differ from the company’s home country. In these terms, when cultural, social, economic, and/or legal asymmetries exist, businesses entering these markets may rationalize the offering or giving of inducements to obtain advantages over competitors, particularly when their products may be inferior or longstanding business relations exist already within these new markets. Such inducements for preferential treatment and commercial advantage (receiving contracts, licenses, etc.) constitute bribery and corruption in line with international conventions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997 and the UN Convention Against Corruption of 2003. The United States and the United Kingdom are signatories of these conventions, but to ensure that business runs smoothly, companies may instigate or acquiesce to bribery as they contend with a desire or need to expand in their pursuit of profit. But they also must operate in line with normative expectations of international and world society, as well as domestic laws such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 or the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010. In those cases where preferential treatment in business is explicitly sought by offering or giving incentives, it is clear bribery has occurred. Such corporate bribery therefore involves the bribing of foreign (public) officials by corporations operating in international business in order to win or maintain a business advantage (Lord, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). Businesses that expand from domestic operations into new overseas markets inherently enter into international commercial activities and relations. Where these businesses are implicated in bribery in these new markets, a clear international geographical dimension of this whitecollar crime emerges. The key analytical question to pose is which conditions shape how and why the bribery is organized. For instance, in terms of the gestalt or “scripts” of the bribery, when seeking to enter new markets, many companies would enlist local agents, Page 14 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October intermediaries, and third-party actors to work on their behalf, usually in a consultancy or liaison capacity, as they have access to key decision makers in the country or locality as well as knowledge of how business should be conducted. Alternatively, companies would form subsidiaries in the target jurisdictions to utilize local resources including personnel. In both cases, local actors can gain access to key public officials with procurement responsibilities and/or incentivize these officials to favor certain businesses. Interdependencies between offending actors are necessary to how the bribery is organized, as actors in one jurisdiction are reliant on those in others. In these cases, bribery may take the form of cash or electronic payments, extravagant hospitality, or other perceived material benefits such as gifts or the provision of sex workers. By configuring business in this way, some spatial separation can be generated between the underlying corporate offender and those directly involved in the bribery, and this can be useful for creating plausible deniability and minimizing the impacts of law enforcement interventions. For instance, it is common for parent companies to present themselves as unwittingly involved in the bribery carried out by others on their behalf for attractive commissions. Notably, in the United States, vicarious liability makes it more straightforward to establish criminal liability, but the U.K. model of corporate criminal liability is less able to do so. At its most basic level, such corporate bribery may involve only two jurisdictions. However, multinational companies frequently engage in similar corrupt practices in more than one other jurisdiction, utilizing similar methods to induce foreign public officials to provide preferential treatment but with some level of coordination from actors in the home country. The case of Rolls-Royce in the United Kingdom is a clear example of the widespread, pervasive, and multinational nature of potential bribery schemes. In 2017, Rolls-Royce entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in relation to 12 counts of conspiracy to corrupt, false accounting, and failure to prevent bribery. Rolls-Royce’s civil aerospace and defense aerospace businesses and its former energy business made use of a network of agents to bribe and induce public officials in at least seven countries to win lucrative contracts over a period of three decades. This network of bribery generated profit of over £258 million and led to a financial settlement of £497.25 million (this represented a disgorgement of the profit gained plus a financial penalty of £239 million plus £13 million in prosecution costs) with the SFO. The conditions that drove this bribery over time were the desire to capitalize and generate profit in markets perceived to be lucrative for Rolls-Royce and to maintain longstanding economic relations. For example, inducements were used, as there were concerns that competitors were going to win contracts ahead of Rolls-Royce in Thailand, to conceal unlawful activities in relation to the use of intermediaries in India, to ensure that competitors submitted uncompetitive bids in Indonesia, and to receive confidential competitor information in Nigeria, among other similar drivers. In addition, if the focus is on the money component of such corporate bribery, that is, how the finances to pay bribes are generated and organized, and how the proceeds of the bribery are concealed (see Lord & Levi, 2017), then there is often reliance on the creation of contrived financial arrangements utilizing the financial system in multiple jurisdictions. In these cases, substantive offending may not take place in all involved jurisdictions, but the flow of finances through these jurisdictions is fundamental to the gestalt of the bribery enterprise, representing a key interdependency. Fabricated paper trails between shell companies and bank accounts across jurisdictions enable companies to conceal the criminal purpose or nature of the finances. Forming companies or opening bank accounts in jurisdictions with Page 15 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October reputations for high confidentiality are attractive for those looking to conceal their bribery. For example, in the case of BAE Systems, a company that was sanctioned in the United States and the United Kingdom, court documents indicated that the company made a series of substantial payments to shell companies and third-party intermediaries to conceal the use of “marketing advisors” and the provision of “support services” and the flow of funds to these for use in bribery (see Lord, van Wingerde, & Campbell, 2018): BAES contracted with and paid certain advisors through various offshore shell companies beneficially owned by BAES. BAES also encouraged certain advisors to establish their own offshore shell companies to receive payments from BAES while disguising the origins and recipients of these payments. (Department of Justice [DoJ], 2010, para. 8) These arrangements and illicit transactions essentially mirror otherwise lawful or legitimate business practices and relations, as bribery, like many white-collar crimes, is “parasitical” on lawful business (Benson & Simpson, 2018). This makes detection rare, obfuscates evidential trails for enforcement authorities, and enables white-collar criminals to remain elusive within the globalized economy (van Wingerde & Lord, 2019). In these terms, the flow of illicit finances through particular jurisdictions represents an attempt to circumvent enforcement intervention. Where domestic companies and bank accounts are used, the risks of detection are significantly increased, and this is a key driver of why corporate bribery may be organized in these ways. Case Study 2: Manipulation of Global Markets Financial markets are by their very nature global: large financial institutions such as banks are important multinational corporate actors with a high degree of interconnectedness across jurisdictions; financial products and services are highly mobile across national boundaries; and digital innovation that crucially underpins financial innovation strengthens further these global movements. The recent benchmarks manipulation scandal shows how these industry characteristics make financial markets an opportune setting also for beyond-national whitecollar crimes. The manipulation involved deceptive practices in the guise of false statements, artificial transactions, and collusive collaboration to influence the proper setting of the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate), EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), and, to a lesser extent, other important reference rates used widely in the global financial markets. The deviance included various business units of nine multinational banks and two London-based inter-broker dealers (see further Jordanoska & Lord, 2019), so this case study lends itself well for unpacking and analyzing the beyond-national elements of complex corporate crime. The LIBOR rates were calculated daily on the basis of submissions from a panel of selected banks on the London money markets on the average interest rate at which they would lend to each other. The perceptions of the average borrowing rates can be fixed with regard to a set of 10 different currencies (notably, the U.S. dollar, sterling, yen, Swiss franc). Similarly, the EURIBOR rates were calculated daily from submissions by a set of eurozone panel banks on the average interest rate at which they would lend to each other on the euro money market. The two sets of rates were calculated in a similar process of discarding the highest and lowest submissions and averaging out the rest, but any significantly higher or lower submissions Page 16 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October would also bring the overall average higher or lower. To prevent mirroring of other banks’ submissions, the participating banks were not allowed to see the other banks’ inputs during the submissions process. The manipulative activities focused on artificially moving the averaged-out LIBOR and EURIBOR upward or downward through improper submissions. These activities were motivated by the fact that the movements of LIBOR and EURIBOR represent the basis for the value of a range of derivatives contracts—achieving a desired LIBOR and EURIBOR meant lucrative profits for the banks’ derivatives traders who managed large portfolios with such contracts. Complex beyond-national interdependencies form the basis of the benchmarks manipulation: the market where the manipulated object was set, the markets where the financial products tied to the manipulated object were traded, and the collaboration between actors situated across multiple and multinational geographical locations. LIBOR was set more “locally” in the London intra-bank money market, but, at the time of the manipulative activities, EURIBOR was determined using submissions from a panel of over 40, mostly European, banks. As a place on the reference setting panel was reserved for the most active institutions with the highest volume of business in the European Monetary Union, this created concentrated markets with a preferential access to determining the rates by a relatively small group of financial participants in different eurozone countries. These mechanics enabled manipulative activities by institutions dispersed across various jurisdictions: Barclays and RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) in the United Kingdom, Deutsche Bank in Germany, Rabobank in the Netherlands, and Société Générale in France. The market for the derivatives linked to the movements of the benchmarks’ interest rates enabled the convergence of organizational and elite individual practices of trading and profitability in such contracts in a truly global way. For example, the market for derivatives linked to EURIBOR is one of the largest and most active in the world (DoJ, 2015, p. 21). The organization of the manipulation depended on a social network of individual and corporate actors with beyond-national geographical positioning. The offending involved corporate offices located primarily in London, Tokyo, and New York, but also in Singapore, Connecticut, and the cities of the headquarters of some of the involved global banks: Frankfurt, Utrecht, Paris, and Zurich (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019). Within the bank corporate actors, two sets of individuals were crucial for the manipulative activities: the banks’ submitters, that is, the persons who calculated and submitted the interest rates on behalf of the bank; and the derivatives traders, that is, the persons who managed the portfolio of derivatives contracts on behalf of the bank. The ways in which an interdependency developed between these actors, dispersed across beyond-national geographical positions, can be explained by market and corporate structuring factors, but also by the social dynamics of identifying suitable collaborators (recruitment). The location of the submitters was determined mainly by the location of the manipulated object and the process of the submissions, so they were predominately based in London or in the corresponding eurozone bank headquarters. The derivatives traders, in turn, were located in some of the largest financial markets in the world where investment banks have a significant presence. The derivatives traders within one bank had truly multinational locations, based in the bank’s investment arms and subsidiaries across multiple countries. In some cases, the location of the traders involved also largely corresponded to the types of derivatives contracts they traded, for example, the manipulation of the yen LIBOR by RBS involved 21 traders predominately based in London and Tokyo, and to a lesser extent in New York and Singapore (Financial Page 17 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Services Authority [FSA], 2013). The global nature of the derivatives market, however, enabled the traders to manage derivatives contracts portfolios from any financial markets’ hub in the world. Finally, the continuous existence of a social network that operated on the basis of favoritism and exchange of favors (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019) rather than being an ephemeral or a spontaneous endeavor was central. The choosing of co-offenders in different jurisdictions therefore may depend not only on the benefits provided by that or any other particular jurisdiction but on the dynamics of establishing of a social network that could have been located anywhere. In this case study, however, the market factors require that the network could only have operated in financial hubs. The gestalt of the colluding activities, either at the national level, for example where the submitters and traders were both housed in London, or at the beyond-national level, followed these scenes (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019): calculated positioning and identification of cocollaborators, recruitment, (ephemeral) manipulation, and recompense and solicitation. At the heart of the manipulation scheme were the sub-scenes of conveying requests for submissions favorable to the traders’ portfolio and of acting upon these requests. The scripts of international or multinational offending involved collusion by “in-house” individuals spread across different organizational units of the same global bank. For example, the manipulation of the LIBOR and EURIBOR rates by Barclays, at various times, involved the conveying of requests by traders located in London, Tokyo, New York, and Singapore to the bank’s submitters based in London (FSA, 2012b). Further multinational offending scripts concerned the complex collective collusion with multiple requests and submissions by traders and submitters at several panel banks, acting in a coordinated manner to manipulate LIBOR (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019). This involved communication and concentrated actions between individual actors across multiple jurisdictions. For example, in 2008, a senior Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) trader based in Tokyo made an agreement with a Deutsche Bank trader based in London to influence their respective banks’ yen LIBOR submissions to benefit their respective trading books (DoJ, 2015). The scripts of multinational offending might have been facilitated by the nature of the organizational structuring of some of the banks with divisions organized according to financial activities rather than jurisdictions. Specifically, single global finance units had employees in multiple legal entities associated with the bank and in multiple locations around the world: for example, the derivatives traders at Deutsche Bank in London, Frankfurt, and New York were employed in its single Global Finance and Foreign Exchange (GFFX) business unit. The belonging to a single unit across countries might have fostered a similar culture of tweaking LIBOR to benefit the derivatives portfolio as well as corporate environments where guardianship was lax. The opportunities for beyond-national collusion were facilitated also by the fact that communication was relatively easy via online technology channels, as the conveying of requests occurred through social platforms (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019). Finally, guardianship (or lack thereof) factors could have also played a role. First, and this is true for other complex crimes, regardless of the jurisdiction, the banks’ organizational systems played a paradoxical role of both “capable guardians” and “facilitators of misconduct” (Jordanoska & Lord, 2019). Further, despite its global nature, finance remains to be regulated predominately by domestic regulators (for the United Kingdom specifically, see Jordanoska, 2017, 2018, 2019) so the organization of global white-collar crimes in finance might fall under the radar of Page 18 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October enforcement agencies. More specific to the benchmarks manipulation, however, is the fact that, at the time of offending, the setting of the benchmarks was largely self-regulated, and thoroughly depended on the honest and objective submissions by the panel banks. The fact that the involved submitters and traders within one bank were often located in different countries does not lend itself well to establishing the temporality of the manipulations as national (or domestic) first and then as progressing toward beyond-national. In addition, colluding activities of different levels of complexity (e.g., within one bank vs. concentrated collusion by multiple banks) coexisted in time. Limited evidence, however, shows that, the more complicated collusion may have commenced later in time; for example, in the case of Deutsche Bank, the U.S. Department of Justice established that the internal manipulations of yen LIBOR occurred from at least 2006, whereas the interbank coordination of yen LIBOR submission started from at least 2008 (DoJ, 2015). Case Study 3: Insider Dealing/Trading Across Jurisdictional Boundaries Insider dealing has been established as an opportunistic individual trust violation that reflects organizational elements (Reichman, 1993). It is often considered within the organizational context of the financial deal-making network (Hansen, 2014), but little consideration has been given to the geographical context of the offending. The geographical context, however, has implications when aiming to understand more complex forms of insider dealing where offenders strategically conceal the criminal nature of their activities beyond the national level. For instance, as Barnes (2011) notes, insider dealing not only takes the form of individual and opportunistic malfeasance, it also takes the form of a collaborative “ring” and/or “scheme” where co-offenders work together within or between jurisdictions to conspire to prey on confidential information for financial benefits. Additionally, recent cases of insider dealing, such as Operation Tabernula in the United Kingdom, reveal that offshore companies were present where insider dealers exploit anonymity and privacy provided in third-party jurisdictions (Financial Conduct Authority [FCA], 2019). Furthermore, also significant are technological developments in the trading platforms of financial products that enable investors to remotely invest in foreign stock markets, and the implications of such developments in the concept of a physical location in the organization of insider dealing. The aspect of gestalt—“scripts” through which insider dealers go—has important analytical value in understanding insider dealing dynamics at the various beyond-national levels. To illustrate this, Zeng’s crime script analysis (unpublished) of insider dealing based on 42 cases with criminal or civil sanctions in the United Kingdom provides insights on how insider dealing can transcend national boundaries. Based on her empirical analysis, Zeng identified four core (sequential) “scenes” or stages of insider dealing: (a) accessing inside information, (b) transferring information, (c) illicit trading, and (d) criminal proceeds. The variations among these four stages across insider dealing cases reflect different modes of interdependency for co-offenders and resources located in different jurisdictions, shaping insider dealing organization at the various beyond-national levels. International insider dealing implies that criminal activities are mainly coordinated in one jurisdiction but rely on another in accessing necessary resources, with such criminality contingent upon the context in the “home” country. That is, conditions such as whether Page 19 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October confidential information is accessible, the capacity of illicit trading (whether there are sufficient finance and trading accounts), and the requirement for risk reduction (i.e., circumventing regulatory or other detection) all shape the organization of the insider dealing beyond the nation-state. In her analysis, Zeng identified that the international dimension is salient in the separation of physical and national locations between the first stage, accessing insider information, and the third scene, the illicit trading, with a key feature of scene two being the transfer of information from one to another country. For instance, the following case in the United Kingdom illustrates these international aspects. This case involved a three-year insider dealing scheme that started in 2006, during which a San Francisco–based banker at Deloitte, Arnold McClellan, allegedly passed confidential information about forthcoming acquisitions on seven occasions to his wife, Annabel. While information was generated in America through occupational access by Arnold McClellan, the confidential information was then transferred internationally to the United Kingdom from Annabel to her sister and brother-in-law, the Sanders couple based in London (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] v. Arnold McClellan, 2010). Illicit insider dealing was carried out in the United Kingdom by the Sanders couple, who promised to return financial benefits to the McClellans given that they provided the confidential information. The information was further circulated in the United Kingdom from James Sanders to his colleague James Swallow at the company Blue Index Limited, which was a London-based brokerage firm specializing in contract for difference (CFD). James Swallow, on one hand, conducted illicit insider dealing and, on the other hand, used such information to persuade Blue Index’s clients to purchase CFD in order to boost the firm’s performance (FSA, 2012a). In this case, the geographical separation between co-offenders facilitated illicit trading in London by bridging the necessary access to confidential information regarding the American NASDAQ- and NYSE-listed shares and also by reducing enforcement risk through distancing criminal activities from the source country of information. In another case, a prolonged eight-year insider dealing scheme was carried out by three coconspirators including Christian Littlewood, a senior investment banker and director at various London-based investment banks; his wife, Angie Littlewood; and her friend Helmy Omar Sa’aid, who was living in Singapore. Christian Littlewood legitimately had access to confidential information during his employment and passed it to Angie to invest in the related shares. The insider dealing scheme turned international when Angie Littlewood received a letter from the Financial Services Authority (FSA, now Financial Conduct Authority) inquiring about her trading under her Singaporean maiden name; hence, she stopped trading personally but passed such information from the United Kingdom to Singapore to her friend Sa’aid. Thereby, Sa’aid became the sole-trader for the trio and conducted illicit trading from Singapore (FSA, 2011), reflecting how law enforcement activities pushed insider dealing beyond the national level. On the other hand, it further suggests evolution of the insider dealing organization in a temporal dimension. The scheme started off as a domestic scheme and was later transformed to an international one in order to adjust to the need for enforcement risk reduction. There are also cases of insider dealing that have clearer multinational aspects, whereby one core country generated the illicit scheme but distributed and coordinated various criminal activities in other jurisdictions. Depending on certain local contexts, such as whether potential co-offenders in other jurisdictions are interested in joining the scheme or whether there are Page 20 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October legal loopholes that can be exploited in the legal framework, the criminal activities in the noncore country might be short-lived. The multinational elements might also occur across all four scenes within the gestalt, indicating different modes of interdependency for various resources such as confidential information and finance and risk reductions. For example, in one case concluded in 2016, the following elements could be seen: the information was generated in country A in scene one but then passed to co-offenders interested in such illegal schemes in country B in scene two; the finances from offshore bank accounts were used to invest through hedge funds registered in foreign countries in scene three, and criminal proceeds were then funneled through offshore bank accounts and companies in scene four to exploit a high level of account secrecy—this case involved three key actors: Hind, Dodgson, and Baldwin (FCA, 2016). Hind was a former accountant at PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Arcadia; Dodgson, an investment banker at various investment banks based in London; and Baldwin, who was a former business partner of Hind, held offshore companies in Zurich, Panama, and Marylebone. They were part of the insider dealing ring that involved three other members who were acquitted due to the lack of evidence. The ring was started by Hind. He recruited the London-based bankers from whom he obtained confidential information, and then recruited a pair of traders who resided overseas to prey on such information. One of the traders was allegedly invested in the scheme with money from foreign bank accounts using both onshore and offshore stockbrokers in various locations including Spain, Dubai, and America. Hind then recruited Baldwin for two out of the five years of the scheme to launder the criminal proceeds. Baldwin channeled the illicit profits through offshore accounts and companies in Zurich and Panama and issued false invoices, and then distributed the money to other ring members. In this case, Hind initiated the scheme in London but spread the main criminal activities across different jurisdictions to conceal illicit activities and finances for and from insider dealing. This further suggests the importance of understanding the temporal dimension of insider dealing organization at the multinational level. With Baldwin joining for the later period of the scheme, the insider dealing ring stretched its activities that were originally confined to a set of countries to include even more offshore jurisdictions, signifying the intensification of the multinational aspect in the money component. Finally, there are also cases that have a more explicit digital/non-territorial dimension. For instance, insider dealing implies a context of the increasing fuzziness of national boundaries facilitated by the digitalization of international share trading platforms. Access to foreign share markets in the home country is now provided and enabled in different countries and by various digital platforms. Opportunities for insider dealing of shares listed in a foreign stock market are hence present without the need to be physically in the target country. For instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspected traders physically located in Switzerland were illegally trading the NASDAQ-listed Heinz shares ahead of public announcement of its acquisition via a Zurich brokerage account (SEC v. One or More Unknown Traders, 2013). Elsewhere, the Hong Kong Court recently convicted Eric Lee, his two sisters, and Betty Young, who all lived in Hong Kong, in committing insider dealing in the shares of the Taiwan-listed Hsinchu Bank via a Hong Kong securities account (Securities and Futures Commission [SFC], 2018). In both instances, the illicit share trading transcended national boundaries whereby offenders were physically in one jurisdiction but committed crime in foreign share markets via digital trading platforms. Page 21 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Review of Literature Historically, white-collar crime scholarship, including and since the seminal work of Edwin Sutherland, has tended to concentrate empirical, conceptual, and theoretical focus on manifestations of associated crimes and deviance, their dynamics and generative conditions, within individual nation-states. While white-collar crime scholarship itself has expanded across the globe, this predilection for analyses of local and/or national level cases and the nature, extent, and scope of these white-collar crimes has largely remained (see Lord et al., forthcoming). Notwithstanding, it is not entirely uncommon for white-collar crime scholars to make reference to the international, multinational, transnational, or global aspects of the crimes they study, even if these are predominantly national in nature, but the corresponding features and components of these “beyond-national” dynamics have not been comprehensively unpacked or conceptualized. While globalization may offer increased and different opportunities for white-collar crimes, this does not mean that crimes will inevitably occur, as an opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for offending. For instance, to some extent, as Zagaris (2015, p. 2) notes in relation to the environment that gives rise to international economic crimes (of a white-collar nature), “contemporary transnational criminals take advantage of globalization, trade liberalization, and emerging technologies to commit a diverse range of crimes and to move money, goods, services and people instantaneously for purposes of pure economic gain, political violence, or both.” However, the globalization of crime may not automatically occur alongside the globalization of business, as white-collar crimes are shaped by the “conditional relationship between crime, controls and opportunities that reflects the general patterns of business activities” (Levi, 2008, p. xxxiv). In other words, why organize white-collar crimes across national boundaries when it may not be necessary to do so in order to be successful and profitable? An array of other factors and conditions influence motivations to offend. However, it can clearly be argued that white-collar crimes are no longer solely local and/or even domestic or national phenomena but increasingly involve an international or global dimension, as can be seen in significant cases that transcend national boundaries (Friedrichs, 2007). There are many examples that illustrate the ways in which white-collar and corporate offenders organize their criminal activities across jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., Lord & Levi, 2017), how they globally externalize the risks associated with their crimes (e.g., Rothe & Friedrichs, 2015), how they export their crimes to take place in other jurisdictions (e.g., van Wingerde, 2015), and how they utilize cross-jurisdictional structures and systems to facilitate their criminal activities (e.g., Lord et al., 2018). The inter/trans/multinational nature of these white-collar crimes that have utilized some opportunities generated through processes associated with globalization is clear. This, in turn, reinforces why the concept of globalization is a significant consideration in the criminological literature in relation to white-collar crimes (see Dicken, 2015; Friedrichs, 2007; Passas, 1999, 2000; Passas & Goodwin, 2004; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2015). The benefits for white-collar criminals in organizing their activities beyond the national level are even clearer when the concealment, conversion, and control of corresponding illicit finances are incorporated into the scope of analysis, as the otherwise lawful financial system can be misused to concoct financial arrangements for obscuring the identities of the beneficial owners of assets and monies (see Lord et al., 2018; Lord, Campbell, & van Wingerde, 2019). Page 22 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Even the most seemingly local manifestations of white-collar crimes can incorporate other jurisdictions by virtue of digital and cyber systems. In these terms, globalization, despite itself being a contested concept, has emerged as a significant factor for analyses of white-collar and corporate crimes that extend beyond individual nation-states. More specifically, van Wingerde and Lord (2019) summarize three key developments in terms of the relationship between white-collar crime and globalization: (a) greater interconnectedness in the form of the mobility of ideas, information, capital, people, goods, and services globally; (b) increased mobilities referring not only to tangible, physical things, but also to digital markets, products, and services that offer new ways of organizing illicit activities, and (c) key interdependencies between people, markets, and industries that have accompanied globalization. These processes of varying intensity and speed have influenced opportunities for, and the organization of, white-collar crimes, and this is significant when analyzing white-collar crimes that are configured or have impacts beyond individual nation-states. As mentioned, researching white-collar crimes that have an international or comparative scope is intellectually and practically difficult. Undertaking such endeavors as lone researchers is beset with obstacles, but this opens up opportunities for research collaboration across jurisdictions. Methodologies that incorporate time-series analyses (see Braithwaite, 2016), deliberative accounts of informed expertise across varied cultures (see Lord et al., forthcoming), or multi-site embedded case studies (see Maesschalck, forthcoming) offer great potential for comparative research and gaining insight into variation across jurisdictions and the construct validity of similarities and differences. Additionally, greater accessibility to “big data” at the domestic and global level, such as in relation to financial transactions, company ownership, trade relations, and so on, offers a route to mapping key aspects of white-collar crime organization beyond individual nation-states. Understanding the varying characteristics and features, as well as the differing configurations, interrelations, and organizational dynamics of those white-collar crimes that in some way transcend jurisdictional boundaries, including their distribution and concentration across space, is significant for white-collar crime theory and research. References Barnes, P. (2011). Insider dealing and market abuse: The UK’s record on enforcement. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 39(3), 174–189. Benson, M., & Simpson, S. (2018). White-collar crime: An opportunity perspective. London, UK: Routledge. Braithwaite, J. (2016). In search of Donald Campbell. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(2), 417– 437. Clinard, M. B., & Quinney, R. (1973). Criminal behavior systems: A typology (rev. ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Clinard, M. B., & Yeager, P. C. (1980). Corporate crime. New York, NY: Free Press. Department of Justice. (2010). 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Regulatory enforcement against organizational insiders: Interactions in the pursuit of individual accountability <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12280>. Regulation and Governance. Jordanoska, A., & Lord, N. (2019). Scripting the mechanics of the benchmark manipulation corporate scandals: The “guardian” paradox. European Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 9–30. Levi, M. (2008). The phantom capitalists: The organization and control of long-firm fraud (rev. ed.). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Levi, M. (2009). Financial crimes. In M. Tonry (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of crime and public policy (pp. 223–246). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Levi, M., & Lord, N. (2017). White-collar and corporate crimes. In A. Liebling, S. Maruna, & L. McAra (Eds.), Oxford handbook of criminology (6th ed., pp. 722–743). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lewis, M. (2014). Flash boys—A Wall Street revolt. New York, NY: Norton. Lord, N. (2014a). 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Lord, N., van Wingerde, K., & Campbell, C. (2018). Organising the monies of corporate financial crimes via organisational structures: Ostensible legitimacy, effective anonymity, and third-party facilitation. Administrative Sciences, 8(2), 17. Lord, N., van Wingerde, L., & Levi., M. (forthcoming). Corruption, culture and comparative analyses across Europe: Developing new research traditions. In N. Lord, E. Inzelt, W. Huisman, & R. Faria (Eds.), What is “European” about white-collar and corporate crime in Europe? A collection of essays. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Maesschalck, J. (forthcoming). Mapping and assessing approaches to the prevention of corporate and occupational crime: the EU as natural experiment. In N. Lord, E. Inzelt, W. Huisman, & R. Faria (Eds.), What is “European” about white-collar and corporate crime in Europe? A collection of essays. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Nelken, D. (2010). 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New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Zagaris, B. (2015). International white collar crime: Cases and materials (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Zeng, Y. (Unpublished). “Scripting” insider dealing: The abuse of inside information (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Manchester. Page 26 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October Notes 1. Our unit of analysis is the nation-state in this article. Werecognize that analytically, using the nation-state as a distinguishing feature is beset with issues, but sovereignty and territorial demarcation remains a core feature of modern societies, in particular in relation to legal frameworks and definitions of crime. 2. Considering boundary changes over time in relation to white-collar crime opportunities and implications might also be valuable, particularly in regions where there has been notable transition in recent decades, as differentials can emerge or disappear. 3. An alternative conceptualization, based not on geographical location but on legal systems, might instead view Missing Trader Intra Community (MTIC) frauds as transgressions against a supranational legal regime, so they could potentially be also labeled “supranational” crime. Related Articles Professional Criminals and White-Collar Crime in Popular Culture Legal and Political Reponses to White-Collar Crime Statistical Analysis of White-Collar Crime White-Collar Delinquency Public Knowledge About White-Collar Crime Corporate Crime and the State Economic Crises, Common Crime, and Penality Individual, Educational, and Other Social Influences On Greed: Implications for the Study of White-Collar Crime Finance Crime Women and White-Collar Crime Theoretical Perspectives on White-Collar Crime Page 27 of 27 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/criminology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see and ). Privacy Policy <https://global.oup.com/privacy> Legal Notice Subscriber: University of Manchester; date: 30 October